AgendaAgenda• The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview

• Focused Rotation “a Vehicle for Change”

• Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No. 99-16

• Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat Training Environment (JRTC)

• The CALL Homepage and MOUT

• Other CALL Products

• Questions

• The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview

• Focused Rotation “a Vehicle for Change”

• Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No. 99-16

• Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat Training Environment (JRTC)

• The CALL Homepage and MOUT

• Other CALL Products

• Questions

CALL OverviewCALL Overview

• Organization and location.

• Mission ~ “Collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and research material to the U.S. Army.”

• History ~ 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.

• Organization and location.

• Mission ~ “Collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and research material to the U.S. Army.”

• History ~ 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.

Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change

Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change

• The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP) identifies negative trends observed at the CTCs and assigns a lead proponent to develop a corrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct 96.

• The proponent develops a solution set and gives it to a unit to use and validate at a focused rotation.

• The proponent then implements a solution across the Army in a way that permanently corrects the problem.

• The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP) identifies negative trends observed at the CTCs and assigns a lead proponent to develop a corrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct 96.

• The proponent develops a solution set and gives it to a unit to use and validate at a focused rotation.

• The proponent then implements a solution across the Army in a way that permanently corrects the problem.

Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16

Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16

•The “idea” November of 1997

•Soliciting support

•CO-OP Infantry School (MOUT Proponent)

•MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop

•Focused Rotation, March 1998

•Newsletter development and consensus

•The “idea” November of 1997

•Soliciting support

•CO-OP Infantry School (MOUT Proponent)

•MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop

•Focused Rotation, March 1998

•Newsletter development and consensus

Urban Focused Pre-RotationAssumptions (as of Nov. 1997)Urban Focused Pre-Rotation

Assumptions (as of Nov. 1997)

1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated.

2. The political realities of urban combat have resulted in the use of terms that tend to place limitations on the conduct of these operations.

3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under the current downsizing agenda, the Army does not have the soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian experience at Grozny and meet its two regional war mission.

1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated.

2. The political realities of urban combat have resulted in the use of terms that tend to place limitations on the conduct of these operations.

3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under the current downsizing agenda, the Army does not have the soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian experience at Grozny and meet its two regional war mission.

Urban Focused Pre-Rotation Assumptions

Urban Focused Pre-Rotation Assumptions

4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for combat in the large metropolitan areas.

5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special weapons needed and lack the quantities of weapons necessary for urban operations. The weapons historically needed to do the job are in many cases either not in the inventory or not available for training in the urban environment.

6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Army must be prepared to address in the urban combat situation. Previous evidence shows that urban combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, from ammunition to bandages.

4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for combat in the large metropolitan areas.

5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special weapons needed and lack the quantities of weapons necessary for urban operations. The weapons historically needed to do the job are in many cases either not in the inventory or not available for training in the urban environment.

6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Army must be prepared to address in the urban combat situation. Previous evidence shows that urban combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, from ammunition to bandages.

Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions

Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions

7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitable for urban combat. In past wars the types of ammunition in the inventory worked for all possibilities.

8. Specialty communications equipment is now only available to special units. This communications equipment is needed now for regular infantry for training and potential combat operations.

9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated into urban combat training.

7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitable for urban combat. In past wars the types of ammunition in the inventory worked for all possibilities.

8. Specialty communications equipment is now only available to special units. This communications equipment is needed now for regular infantry for training and potential combat operations.

9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated into urban combat training.

Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training

Environment

Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training

EnvironmentThe Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

• TA.1 Maneuver

• TA.2 Fire Support

• TA.3 Air Defense

• TA.4 Command and Control

• TA.5 Intelligence

• TA.6 Mobility and Survivability

• TA.7 Combat Service Support

The Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

• TA.1 Maneuver

• TA.2 Fire Support

• TA.3 Air Defense

• TA.4 Command and Control

• TA.5 Intelligence

• TA.6 Mobility and Survivability

• TA.7 Combat Service Support

TA.1 ManeuverTA.1 Maneuver

• There is a lack of focus in the movement to the objective, resulting in significant casualties.

• Units lack focus in the use of combined arms tactics, techniques and procedures for armor, aviation, and close air support for urban combat.

• Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch are more common in the urban environment.

• Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with the exception of Special Operations Units.

• There is a lack of focus in the movement to the objective, resulting in significant casualties.

• Units lack focus in the use of combined arms tactics, techniques and procedures for armor, aviation, and close air support for urban combat.

• Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch are more common in the urban environment.

• Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with the exception of Special Operations Units.

TA.2 Fire SupportTA.2 Fire Support

• Units have problems with allocation of resources and positioning of fire support assets in the urban fight.

• Units do a poor job using restrictive rule of engagement in dealing with collateral damage and associated urban combat effects.

• Units were not effective in the use of counter battery fires.

• Units did a poor job in the use of precision munitions.

• Units have problems with allocation of resources and positioning of fire support assets in the urban fight.

• Units do a poor job using restrictive rule of engagement in dealing with collateral damage and associated urban combat effects.

• Units were not effective in the use of counter battery fires.

• Units did a poor job in the use of precision munitions.

TA.3 Air DefenseTA.3 Air Defense• There is a poor allocation of air defense

artillery assets to support the urban fight overall.

• Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions is not taken into consideration in the operations order planning.

• Focusing the correct air defense asset at the proper place and time in the battle is poor.

• There is a poor allocation of air defense artillery assets to support the urban fight overall.

• Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions is not taken into consideration in the operations order planning.

• Focusing the correct air defense asset at the proper place and time in the battle is poor.

TA.4 Command and ControlTA.4 Command and Control

• Units do not effectively locate their command and control nodes.

• Leaders at all levels have problems with rules of engagement and proportionality.

• Sniper teams are not properly planned for or considered eyes on the objective.

• Wargaming and course of action development for urban combat needs work; this must be more precise.

• Units do not effectively locate their command and control nodes.

• Leaders at all levels have problems with rules of engagement and proportionality.

• Sniper teams are not properly planned for or considered eyes on the objective.

• Wargaming and course of action development for urban combat needs work; this must be more precise.

TA.5 IntelligenceTA.5 Intelligence

• The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is not specific enough for the urban battle.

• The use of psychological operations and civil affairs operations are not planned well enough.

• Identification of decision points and setting conditions for success are not emphasized.

• Little thought is given to intelligence collection or care of civilians on the battlefield.

• The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is not specific enough for the urban battle.

• The use of psychological operations and civil affairs operations are not planned well enough.

• Identification of decision points and setting conditions for success are not emphasized.

• Little thought is given to intelligence collection or care of civilians on the battlefield.

TA.6 Mobility and Survivability

TA.6 Mobility and Survivability

• The operations order does not properly allocate engineer resources for urban fight.

• Units are not effective in suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.

• Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.

• Lack of eyes on the objective prevent obstacle identification.

• The operations order does not properly allocate engineer resources for urban fight.

• Units are not effective in suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.

• Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.

• Lack of eyes on the objective prevent obstacle identification.

TA.7 Combat Service SupportTA.7 Combat Service Support

• Allocation of assets to support the urban fight is poor.

• Re-supply and casualty evacuation are not conducted well.

• Urban specific supply items: ladders, knee and elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks, as well as specialty weapons and ammunition need to be made available.

• Speed, not haste, should be the norm in urban operations.

• Allocation of assets to support the urban fight is poor.

• Re-supply and casualty evacuation are not conducted well.

• Urban specific supply items: ladders, knee and elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks, as well as specialty weapons and ammunition need to be made available.

• Speed, not haste, should be the norm in urban operations.

ConclusionsConclusions

The world in which the Army will fight in the 21st century is even more politically complex and dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons available to hostile elements. The United States must cope with advanced technologies that re-invent themselves in hours, days, and weeks.

The world in which the Army will fight in the 21st century is even more politically complex and dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons available to hostile elements. The United States must cope with advanced technologies that re-invent themselves in hours, days, and weeks.

ConclusionsConclusions

The Army now faces a dangerous world without a defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army is caught between a highly successful (but increasingly outmoded) doctrine and the desire to prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat will be a small piece of any new doctrine.

The Army now faces a dangerous world without a defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army is caught between a highly successful (but increasingly outmoded) doctrine and the desire to prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat will be a small piece of any new doctrine.

ConclusionsConclusions

The Army cannot wait for the next revision of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed. Possibly the best approach is to develop new TTP for future contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought that will lead to the new doctrine.

The Army cannot wait for the next revision of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed. Possibly the best approach is to develop new TTP for future contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought that will lead to the new doctrine.

The CALL Homepage and MOUT

The CALL Homepage and MOUT

• http://call.army.mil

• MOUT “hot button”– Links– Published Articles

CALL/FMSO/Others– DOD Urban Operations Journals– SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum– USMC Related Articles– Briefings

• http://call.army.mil

• MOUT “hot button”– Links– Published Articles

CALL/FMSO/Others– DOD Urban Operations Journals– SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum– USMC Related Articles– Briefings

Other CALL ProductsOther CALL Products

• Newsletters

• Handbooks

• Special Studies

• CTC Bulletins

• Newsletters

• Handbooks

• Special Studies

• CTC Bulletins

• Trends

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• Training Techniques

Connect

Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training

Environment

Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training

EnvironmentDTLOMS

• Doctrine

• Training

• Leader Development

• Organization

• Materiel

• Soldiers

DTLOMS

• Doctrine

• Training

• Leader Development

• Organization

• Materiel

• Soldiers