46
4. * x . SANDIA REPORT SAND951361 UC-610 Unlimited Release Printed June 1995 Aging Assessment for Active Fire Protection Systems Steven B. Ross, Steven P. Nowlen, Tina Tanaka
4. *
x .
SANDIA REPORT SAND951361 UC-610 Unlimited Release Printed June 1995
Aging Assessment for Active Fire Protection Systems
Steven B. Ross, Steven P. Nowlen, Tina Tanaka
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Govern- ment nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, prod- uct, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe pri- vately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Govern- ment, any agency thereof or any of their contractors.
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a
Distribution Category UC-6 10
SAND95- 136 1 Unlimited Release Printed June 1995
AGING ASSESSMENT FOR ACTIVE
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Steven B. Ross Science & Engineering Associates, Inc.
Steven P. Nowlen and Tina Tanaka Component & Structures Safety & Reliability Department
Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185
Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office Nuclear Regulatory Research Division of Engineering
FIN No. A1833
Abstract
This study assessed the impact of aging on the performance and reliability of active fire protection systems including both fixed fire suppression and fixed fire detection systems. The experience base shows that most nuclear power plants have an aggressive maintenance and testing program and are finding degraded fire protection system components before a failure occurs. Also, fi-om the data reviewed it is clear that the risk impact of fire protection system aging is low. However, it is assumed that a more aggressive maintenance and testing program involving preventive diagnostics may reduce the risk impact even hrther.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge Jack Haugh of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for his cooperation and review regarding NSAC 179L. We would also like to acknowledge the review and guidance of Christina Antonescu of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Research.
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section: Page:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 1
1 . INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3 2 . NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA ..................................................................................................... 4
2.1 LERs Related to Failure to Perform or Maintain a Fire Watch ............................................... 4 2.2 Events Related to Inadequacy of Fire Barriers ........................................................................ 5 2.3 Smoke Detector-Related Events ............................................................................................. 5 2.4 FPS Electric and Diesel Pumps .............................................................................................. 6 2.5 Fire Barrier or Fire Seal Failure ............................................................................................. 7 2.6 Fire Doors ............................................................................................................................. 7 2.7 FPS Piping and Nozzles ........................................................................................................ 8 2.8 Miscellaneous FPS Aging Failures ........................................................................................ -8 2.9 FPS Aging-Related Events Obtained from Sandia Fire Event Database and
EPRI Fire Event Database ..................................................................................................... 8 2.10 Summary .............................................................................................................................. 9
3 . RELIABILITY OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ....................................................................... 11 3.1 Nuclear Power Plant FPS Reliability ..................................................................................... 1 1 3.2 EPRI FPS Reliability Estimates ............................................................................................. 12 3.3 NFPA FPS Reliability ........................................................................................................... 15 3.4 DOE Experience .................................................................................................................... 16 3.5 Australia - New Zealand FPS Experience ............................................................................... 19 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE PROTECTION GUIDELINES ............................................... 20 4.1 NRC Requirements ................................................................................................................ 20 4.2 National Fire Protection Association Guidance ....................................................................... 20
5 . INSIGHTS ..................................................................................................................................... 25 5.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 26
6 . REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 28
4 .
APPENDIX A . AGE RELATED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURES ................................... 29
FIGURES
1 FPA-Reported Sprinkler Failures (1 970- 1874) ............................................................................... 15
TABLES
1
2 3 4 5
FPS Age-Related Failures ............................................................................................................... 5
Automatic Suppression System Failure Rates (On Demand) ............................................................ 12 NFPA-Reported Sprinkler Failures (%) ........................................................................................... 36
FPS Minimum Inspection, Testing, And Maintenance ...................................................................... 23 National Fire Protection Association Standards ............................................................................... 22
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.
This study assessed the impact of aging on the performance and reliability of active fire protection
systems (FPSs), including both fmed fire suppression and fixed fire detection systems. From the
review of the data, it is clear that most FPS failures are discovered during testing and maintenance
activities and not when the FPS is required to actuate. Most of the aging-related failures came
from FPS pumps, smoke detectors, and fire doors. The FPS pumps failed for a number of
different reasons, including battery and shaft seal failure. The smoke detector failures were a
result of both aging and increased sensitivity from an accumulation of dust and dirt. The fire
doors that failed were mostly in a high-traffic area.
The reliability of FPSs was also examined for both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
Historically, water-based systems at nuclear power plants are generally assumed to have a 96%
reliability as in, for example, the NUREG-1 150 and NUREGKR-4840 studies. This compares
with Department of Energy (DOE) experience of 98.3%. None of these studies attempted to
identify the contribution of aging to the probability of failure. The experience documented by
DOE should closely mirror that of nuclear power plants, given the similarity of requirements for
testing and maintaining FPSs. However, the experience base for nuclear power plants is not as
comprehensive or as well studied as the DOE experience. In addition, an Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) report (NSAC- 179L) presents fire suppression system reliability values
which are utilized in EPRI’s fire methodology plant screening guide, FIVE (Fire-Induced
Vulnerability Evaluation), and which are very similar to the NUREGKR-4840 values. Given that
the non-nuclear industry’s testing and maintenance programs are generally less comprehensive
than those of the nuclear power industry, one could assume that the reliability for the nuclear
industry should be at least comparable ( 95% reported by National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) and 99.1 % reported by an Australian-New Zealand study [Automatic Fire Sprinkler
Performance in Australia and New Zealand, H.W. Maryatt]), if not better. Clearly, this
assumption is dependent on the attention and importance given to testing and maintenance at
individual nuclear power plants. The lack of FPS failure data and a comprehensive study of FPS
reliability at nuclear power plants makes it difficult to make a direct comparison with the non-
nuclear industry.
The discovery or occurrence of most of the significant FPS failures during testing and
maintenance activities and not on demand demonstrates the existence of an aggressive testing and
maintenance program at most nuclear power plants. However, it is assumed that a more
aggressive testing and maintenance program involving preventive diagnostics might flag age-
related FPS problems before they are found either during testing and maintenance or on demand.
In closing, although there has not been a quantitative estimate of the risk due to age-related FPS
failures, it is clear from the data on both FPS failure and reliability that the risk impact is low.
Further, current fire risk assessment practices generally include sufficient margin in system
reliability estimates to take into account the age-related failures which have been observed.
Adding predictive diagnostics to the maintenance program could reduce this already low risk even
further.
2
1. INTRODUCTION
This study involved assessing the impact of aging on the performance and reliability of active fire
protection systems (FPSs), including both fixed fire suppression and fixed fire detection systems.
As part of this study, both nuclear and non-nuclear industry data were investigated. Valuable
insights were obtained from a Department of Energy (DOE) study (Ref 1). To obtain industry
insights, organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), The Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC), and other
fire safety/protection organizations and professionals were contacted. The results of these efforts
were limited by the scarcity of research on FPS aging. However, insights from these contacts are
discussed in Section 5.0.
The initial step in this study involved reviewing nuclear power plant data, starting with a review of
pertinent Licensee Event Reports (LERs) obtained through the Nuclear Operations Analysis
Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In addition, Sandia’s Fire Event Database (Ref 2) and
EPRI’s Fire Event Database (Ref. 3) were reviewed for fire protection system events related to
aging. Section 2 presents the results of this data search and review. Section 3.0 presents a
discussion of FPS reliability for nuclear power plants, DOE, and non-nuclear industry
applications. Section 4.0 presents a discussion of the codes and standards applicable to nuclear
power plants, including NFPA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidance. Section 5.0
summarizes this investigation into FPS aging, provides insights, and suggests improvements to
anticipate potential FPS failures and minimize the risk from aging.
As part of this study, it was desired to obtain and evaluate information on EPRI-sponsored efforts
in FPS aging and reliability. This study reviewed a report (Ref 4) prepared by EPRI to be used in
conjunction with the Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) (Ref 5) methodology for
analyzing the fire vulnerability of nuclear power plants. The EPRI report provides a database on
FPS reliability, including data from nuclear and non-nuclear sources, and a spectrum of FPS ages.
Some of the sources of data include FMRC, EPRI, the U.S. Navy, and others. Reliability is
described by type of FPS @e., Halon, COz, wet pipe, etc.). The EPRI report was obtained and
reviewed, and the results are included in Section 3.2.
3
2. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA
To estimate the frequency of fire protection system failures which could be attributed to aging,
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for the period 01/79 to 12/93 were searched for events involving
the failure of a fire protection/detection system component. This search identified 21 67 LERs to
review for their applicability to FPS age-related failures. These LERs were obtained from the
Nuclear Operations Analysis Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In addition, the Sandia
Fire Event Database and the EPRI Fire Event Database were reviewed for aging-related FPS
failures. Table 1 provides a summary of the types and numbers of age-related fire protection
system failures found in the LER search, the Sandia Fire Event Database, and the EPRI Fire Event
Database. A total of 1 19 events were determined to be aging-related failures or unknown failures
which could be related to age of the system. The specific causes of the failures, along with
frequently occurring nonage-related events, are discussed in hrther detail below. Although the
scope of this task did not include nonage-related FPS problems, the non-aging FPS events were
significant enough in number to require a brief discussion. This can be found in Sections 2.1 and
2.2. Sections 2.3 through 2.9 present discussions of the age-related FPS failures. Appendix A
provides details on the specific events summarized in Table 1.
2.1 LERs Related to Failure to Perform or Maintain a Fire Watch
Based on the significant number of LERs related to the failure to perform or maintain a fire
watch, it was decided to briefly mention this widespread and recurring problem. Upon review of
the 2 167 LERs, it was apparent a that number of the utilities do not understand the fire protection
requirements with respect to the plant technical specifications and the limiting conditions for
operation. As a result, a large percentage of the LERs reviewed were associated with a failure to
perform or establish an appropriate fire watch. These events occurred when an FPS in a given
area was found to be inoperable or intentionally made inoperable for activities such as
maintenance, or when inadequate fire barriers(i.e., doors) or seals were discovered. For most of
these events, the failure to establish a fire watch was not due to an age-related failure of a FPS.
In these events, a continuous or periodic fire watch must be implemented; however, on numerous
occasions the fire watches were not established or the fiequency of the fire watch was inadequate
.
4
.
or not maintained. Most of the LERs could be attributed to a lack of understanding of the
limiting conditions for operation in the event of the degradation of a fire protectioddetection
system.
Table 1. FPS Age-Related Failures
Component Failure Number of Failures
FPS pump (electric or diesel) 37
Fire barriers
Fire detectors
Fire doors
FPS pipinglsprinkler heads
Miscellaneous
7
35
16
14
10
2.2 Events Related to Inadequacy of Fire Barriers
An additional type of FPS failure found in significant numbers in the LERs which for the most
part was not applicable to aging is the failure or inadequacy of fire bamers. Most of these events
were found during routine plant walkdowns or during scheduled fire barrier inspections. The
largest source of reporting was from construction or modification activities during which fire
barriers were improperly sealed during installation or resealed following maintenance activity.
There were a few barrier failure events which were attributed to aging; these are discussed in the
following sections.
2.3 Smoke Detector-Related Events
There were a significant number of age-related events (22) in which smoke detectors went off and
could not be reset because of increased sensitivity, dust/dirt accumulation or high humidity.
However, of the events where there was a malhnction caused by dirt or dust, it is not clear if all
5
of them can be attributed to aging. Some of the events occurred after activity in the area which
increased airborne dust. The events which could be attributed to aging involved the increased
sensitivity of the detector. These events were consistently described as related to aging
phenomenon. The events related to high humidity are difficult to avoid unless the type of detector
is changed or if the event was due to unusual circumstances. The events related to dirt /dust
accumulation are almost unavoidable in high traffic areas. If it is important to avoid spurious
actuations of smoke detectors, an aggressive program (especially in high-traffic areas) to
periodically clean and check the detectors must be implemented on a frequency based on plant
experience with such actuations. Current maintenance activities may not be frequent enough for
high-traffic areas or areas with a potential for high airborne diddust accumulation. This may be
an area where performance-based inspections could reduce the number of failures.
/
There were a few additional events related to the failure of a fire-indicating unit which controlled
the alardtrip fbnctions of the smoke detectors; in these cases the failure could be attributed to
aging of the component. There was one event in which 6 of 10 smoke detectors in one fire zone
failed due to corrosion from an unknown source.
2.4 FPS Electric and Diesel Pumps
In the review of the LERs, it was found that the majority of age-related failures of a FPS came
from failures of the diesel or electric fire pump (37 events). However, only one of these failures
could be classified as failure on demand during the required actuation of a FPS; the rest (36) were
failure on demand during periodic testing or when the running pump was switched to perform
maintenance. There were 7 events in which the starting batteries failed as a result of age or
frequent testing and the diesel fire pump did not start on demand. The remaining 30 events were
due to various age-related failures, including the following:
- Three-phase motor contactor worn
-
- Pressure switch failure - Broken he1 line
- Voltage regulator
Worn shaft seal on pump casing
6
Unfortunately, unless an aggressive preventive maintenance program is implemented, most of
these failures will not be found until the end of life for the failed component. Although plants are
required to have a backup pumping source for the FPS water supply, an additional random failure
in Combination with an age-related failure could result in a total loss of FPS water for at least the
time required to line up an additional source of water. A maintenance program based on
predictive diagnostics of critical FPS pumping components could significantly reduce the
probability of losing both FPS pumping sources. Similar efforts for diesel generators have greatly
improved their reliability.
.%
2.5 Fire Barrier or Fire Seal Failure
While many events associated with failure of fire barrier systems were identified, only a very small
number of these events (7) appear to be age-related. Three of these involved the failure of fire
barriers or door seals due to age-related phenomena. In addition, two of these three events
involved potential deficiencies from construction activities, and the third (door seal failure) had
management deficiencies as a contributing factor. One of the seven events involved a design
deficiency in the control room door seals. In the remaining three events, a fire damper failed to
close. In two of these events the fire damper was stuck because there was debris in the track. No
root cause was found for the damper that failed to close upon actuation of the Halon FPS.
2.6 F'ireDoors
Eighteen LERs involved fire door problems that may have been related to age. Two of the events
involved degraded seals on the control room doors and in the remaining sixteen a fire door failed
because of aging or high use (i.e., worn hinges, latch). The failure of a fire door may be a
violation of a Technical Specifications requirement, depending on the configuration of the fire
zone being protected (FPS present, equipment in the area). Such failures may also provide a path
for the spread of fire or fire products (smoke and heat) beyond a single fire area. This situation
also requires a fire watch until the door is repaired. An aggressive program to track all the fire
doors at a plant site and their inspection would be necessary to prevent such problems. However,
-
7
it is equally important, and potentially more cost effective, to stress to plant personnel the
importance of fire doors and the need for prompt notification of any deficiency.
2.7 FPS Piping and Nozzles r
Fourteen events involved the failure or partial failure of a water-based FPS system because rust
and scale buildup caused a blockage or because the piping wall was corroded. In one event, the
entire FPS water main was lost because two carbon steel tension tie bolts were corroded. One of
the fourteen events involved a pinhole leak in a 3-inch fire protection line caused by corrosion that
pitted the wall. In twelve of the fourteen events, the FPS nozzles were plugged by rust and scale.
A more aggressive maintenance program to flush out the FPS lines might have prevented the
plugging of the nozzles. However, if only the end nozzle in the line is opened as required by
current procedures, debris may be lodged in the nozzles upstream of the opened nozzle. It is
important to note that the plugging of the nozzles did not in any case involve 100% blockage;
therefore partial FPS coverage was available.
2.8 Miscellaneous FPS Aging Failures
The FPS failures that fall into this category cover all age-related failures not discussed in the
previous sections. Nineteen events were categorized as miscellaneous FPS failures. Examples of
the types of failures are:
Solenoid valve failure COZ discharge timer Circuit cardhoard failure Relay coils Failed capacitor
2.9 FPS Aging-Related Events Obtained from Sandia Fire Event Database and EPRI Fire Event Database
This section presents additional age-related failures found in the review of the Sandia Fire Event
Database and EPRI Fire Event Database. Five additional events not found in the LER search
8
which could be interpreted as age-related were identified. A total of 454 events in the Sandia Fire
Event Database and 772 events in the EPRI Fire Event Database were screened. These age-
related failures are included in Appendix A and are summarized as follows:
The first event involved a fire in a cooling tower. The fire was extinguished by plant personnel,
with extensive damage to the tower. The sprinkler system deluge valve was not effective in
extinguishing the fire. The exact failure mode is unknown.
The second event involved the failure of a panel alarm buzzer relay in a fire detection
instrumentation panel, causing a fire. The panel was de-energized and fire detectors in the
switchgear rooms, battery room, diesel generator area, and diesel fuel storage area were rendered
inoperable.
The third event involved the overheating and failure of a fire pump engine and its failure to trip.
The root cause for this event was a broken fan belt.
The fourth event involved the rupture of the Division I diesel generator fuel line, resulting in a fire
near the left bank turbocharger. The fire protection system deluge valve failed to open
automatically as designed. The valve was forced open by a mechanic. The root cause of the
deluge valve failure was not reported.
The fifth event involved the failure of a deluge valve in the diesel generator area, which was
attributed to rough mating surfaces between the valve latch and the clapper.
2.10 Summary
The experience indicates that the most common failures encountered are the failure of the FPS
pumping source (diesel or electric pump). Most of these failures were aging-related and in most
cases a redundant pumping source was available. This type of event is reportable because of the
9
loss of redundancy in FPS pumping capabilities. Although periodic testing and maintenance
usually identify FPS pump failures, only through trending and preventive diagnostics can FPS
pumping-related failures be predicted and effectively eliminated. The second most common
failure encountered was the spurious actuation or failure of smoke detectors to reset because of
either aging and increased sensitivity, or an accumulation of dirt and dust. The third most
common failure was fire door failure caused by aging or high use and traffic. Although this type
of failure requires the spread of smoke or fire to an adjacent fire zone to be significant, it is a
technical specification violation and requires a fire watch until it is corrected. For both the
detector and fire door failures, an aggressive maintenance program tracking these types of failures
and implementing preventive or corrective measures should ensure that there is limited recurrence
or none. The following section uses this experience base and other FPS experience to
characterize FPS reliability for both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
10
3. RELIABILITY OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
This section presents a summary of FPS reliability from four different sources (nuclear power
plant, NFPA non-nuclear, DOE, and Australia-New Zealand experience). Although some of the
reliability data are not directly applicable to nuclear power plant FPS installations, insights can be
gained from the experience of other industries and government agencies. Specifically, the work
most applicable to nuclear power plant experience is the DOE reliability study, which provides
data that are directly comparable to nuclear power plant performance when considering the level
of inspection, testing, and maintenance that both DOE and NRC require. The first study
presented is that for nuclear power plants and is based on data from the United States and abroad.
The NFPA general industry data are presented next, followed by the DOE and Australian-New
Zealand data.
3.1 Nuclear Power Plant FPS Reliability
In reference 6, failure rates (on demand) for three types of fire system (water deluge, COZ and
Halon) are presented which were based on a literature review (Refs. 7 - 10). Table 2 lists the
failure probabilities given a demand for the three system types. Based on this literature search,
best-estimate values for system reliability for water, Halon and COZ were taken to be 96%, 94%,
and 96% respectively.
It is assumed that the FPS failure rates were based upon data in the referenced sources, which
include nuclear power plants of various ages. Inherently this includes data from FPS with a
spectrum of ages and therefore includes to some degree the effect of FPS aging. Without a
detailed look at the data used to estimate these failure rates in conjunction with plant specific
testing and maintenance programs, it would be difficult to assess the contribution of aging to the
failure rates in Table 2.
1 1
Table 2. Automatic Suppression System Failure Rates (On Demand)
System Failure Rate NUREG/CR-4840 Water deluge 0.049 (Ref. 7)
0.038 (Ref. 10) 0.04 0.0063 (Ref. 8)
Halon
co2
3.2 EPRI FPS Reliability Estimates
0.20 (Ref. 7) 0.059l
0.0536 (Ref. 10) 0.06
0.1 16 (Ref. 7) 0.04 (Ref. 9) 0.002 (Ref. 8)
0.07
This section presents a brief summary of EPRI’s report NSAC-l79L, “Automatic and Manual
Suppression Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Plant Fire Risk Analyses.”2 The intent of the
EPRI report, as stated in the abstract, is twofold: “1) to provide reliability data for Fire Risk
Assessments (FRAs) and for EPRI’s Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) Methodology;
and 2) to provide a better understanding of the reasons for conflicting reliability estimates that
have been used in past FRAs.”
Section 1 of NSAC-179L provides an introduction and summary of automatic and manual
suppression reliability data, including guidance on the selection and use of fire protection system
reliability estimates in FRAs. Although FPS aging is not explicitly discussed, the contribution of
aging is inherent in any set of reliability data. In general, the NSAC-179L and the current SNL
review provide very similar overall system reliability point estimates. This is not overly surprising
in that both studies have identified similar, and often identical, data sources. Another point of
Letter from SAIC Senior Staff Scientist Bill Parkinson to John Lambright, Dated May 3,1988. * For information regarding the availability of NSAC-179L, contact Robert Kassawara @PRI) at (415)855-2775.
12
c
.
similarity between the reviews is that both studies highlight aggressive maintenance and testing
programs as the most effective means of ensuring high reliability in fire protection systems.
To determine the source(s) of FPS reliability data used in FRAs, seventeen FRAs and two of the
most recent FRA methodologies -NUREG/CR-4840 (Procedures for the External Event Core
Damage Frequency Analyses for NUREG-1150) and FIVE (Refs. 5 and 6)- were reviewed in
NSAC 179L. An assessment of the specific FPS reliability data for each FRA analyzed was
included. Based on this review, there appears to be a consensus developing regarding the
reliability of automatic suppression systems. The reliability point estimates developed by Sandia
National Laboratories and published in NUREGKR-4840 are presented in Table 2. Although
different assumptions were used to determine the reliability of fire suppression systems, the
NSAC-179L automatic FPS reliability point estimates, which are used in FIVE, are very similar to
the T\suREG/CR-4840 values. However, as noted in NSAC-I 79L, there are two significant
differences in the reliability data between NUREGKR-4840 and FIVE. In FIVE, the design of
the automatic detection system is explicitly evaluated. This results in an additional event in the
fire event tree that explicitly considers failure ofthe automatic detection system. In NUREG/CR-
4840, detection and suppression are lumped as one event. Second, FIVE divides the water-based
systems into two categories: wet pipe systems and deluge or preaction systems. This is done to
account for the quality of the available data and the more reliable design of the wet-pipe system.
NSAC-179L also contains a discussion of automatic suppression system reliability for COz,
Halon, and water-based systems (wet-pipe, deluge, and preaction systems). As stated in Section 3
ofNSAC-l79L, “This study focused on providing data for systems failing to actuate or operate.”
For each system type, data sources for automatic suppression system reliability, including the
Department of Energy, Australia/New Zealand, high-rise buildings, and Navy experience, were
reviewed and evaluated. Each source was reviewed for its applicability to nuclear power plant fire
PRAs and the overall quality of the source, The search criteria were: “quality of the data (number
of success and failures reported, old vs. current, etc.), types of data (actual fire events vs. test
data), completeness (whole suppression system, including detection , vs. suppression only), and
13
industry practices (nuclear plant experience vs. other industry practice).” Each set of data was
reviewed against these criteria and the overall quality of the data evaluated. The sources judged
to be of highest quality for each suppression system type are identified in NSAC- 179L.
One insight that is reported by NFPA and was found to be reflected in the EPRI Fire Event Data
Base (FEDB) is that in the case of wet-pipe system failures, for both nuclear (with a limited data
set) and non-nuclear data, the dominant cause of failure is human error. Given the volume of data
on wet pipe sprinkler experience compared with other systems, it may be that with more operating
history, human error will also be found to be a dominant failure mode for other suppression
system types.
NSAC- 179L also presents a discussion on the reliability of manual suppression. Included is a
brief review of values used in fire PRAs and the manual suppression reliability values obtained
using the EPRI FEDB (Ref 3). In summary, it is stated that “Because it provides a much larger
and more contemporary database of fire durations and suppression times, the EPRI FEDB can be
used to generate a much more complete and realistic set of manual suppression data.”
Overall, NSAC-179L provides a valuable review of available data on the reliability of automatic
fire protection systems and provide additional confirmation for the reliability estimates in nuclear
power plant fire PRAs using the methodology developed in NUREGKR-4840. However, no
information was provided or was available in NSAC- 179L relating the reliability of fire protection
systems to aging. Although NSAC-179L did not explicitly provide information on FPS aging,
some of the data sources referenced in that report -and previously reviewed for this study- did
discuss aging, and those insights were separately incorporated into this report.
14
3.3 NFPA FPS Reliability
The NFPA has tracked sprinkler system failure in general commercial applications. In this - context, NFPA defines failure as the failure to suppress or control a fire, rather than as a failure to
actuate. Figure 1 and Table 3 present the failure type and the percentage for that failure. rn
Inadequate sprinkler coverage caused 26% of the malfunctions; sprinklers shutoff. caused 30% of
the failures; inadequate water or line obstruction caused 13% of the malfunctions; building
construction caused 13%; inadequate system design 7%, inadequate maintenance 4%, and
unknown causes account for 7% of the malfunctions. From this list, 83% of the failures could
have been prevented with an aggressive test and maintenance program.
OSprinklers Shutoff 0 Partial Protection
Faulty Building Construction Inadequate Water Hazard of Occupancy
El Obstruction I3 inadequate Maintenance Bother 8 Unknown Reasons
26%
Figure 1 NFPA-Reported Sprinkler Failures (1970 - 1974)
15
Table 3. NFPA-Reported Sprinkler Failures (%)
Sprinkler Failures Years Years 1925 - 1969 1970 - 1974
Sprinklers Shut off
Partial protection
Faulty building construction
Inadequate water
Hazard of occupancy
Obstruction
Inadequate maintenance
Other and unknown reasons
35.4
8.1
6.0
9.9
13.5
8.2
8.4
10.5
3.4 DOE Experience
29.8
26.1
13.0
7.1
7.1
5.6
4.0
7.3
In a report published by the Department of Energy (Ref. 1) titled “Automatic Sprinkler System
Performance and Reliability in United States Department of Energy Facilities 1952 - 1980,” it is
stated that since the inception of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1947, the automatic
sprinkler system has been accepted as the principal fire protection in all types of facilities. In
addition, sprinklers are the most common protection system installed in computer rooms, reactor
control rooms, electrical equipment rooms, and areas where the principal hazard is from nuclear
criticality or radioactive contamination. Installations at DOE facilities have been based more on
hazard analyses, comparable industrial experience, and insurance industry data than on actual
DOE facility experience. In 1980 a special effort was undertaken to collect as much information
concerning sprinkler operations at DOE facilities as possible. As a result, 600 sprinkler-related
incidents were compiled and analyzed for this effort.
16
At DOE facilities, the value of automatic sprinkler systems has been confirmed. The report points
out the following facts:
The loss from fire in a sprinklered building is about one-fifth of the loss in an
unsprinklered building despite that fact that only facilities with potentially low losses do
not have sprinklers.
There has been no loss of life caused by fire in a sprinklered DOE building
The sprinkler system is more than 98% effective in controlling or extinguishing fires.
About one-third of all fires were completely extinguished by a single sprinkler head.
The report also, and maybe more important, discusses the reliability of sprinkler systems.
Specifically, the report states that the last bastion of resistance to sprinkler system installations
involves fears about their reliability in general, and water damage in particular. The following
observations may be the most important to have been drawn from this study:
The chance of a sprinkler head failing is about one in a million per year.
The chance of any damage to, or from, a sprinkler system is about one per year for every
800 systems; and nearly half the incidents were so slight that the damage to, or from, the
system was negligible.
Sprinkler systems are more reliable than non-fire protection water systems (e.g., general
plumbing). Both the frequency of losses and the mean dollar loss from sprinkler incidents
is about 1/2 of that from other water systems.
On the basis of actual experience, the damage resulting fiom a sprinkler system is less than
1% of the fire damage that will result if the system is not present.
Thorough inspection, test, and maintenance procedures can eliminate most causes of
sprinkler failure, in either fire or non-fire situations.
Freezing is the most common cause of all sprinkler system losses, including dry pipe
systems.
17
In 115
The wet pipe system is the most effective and reliable type of system
In addition, the DOE indicates that automatic sprinkler systems provide the most vital
aspect of the department’s fire protection programs: continuity.
fires involving sprinkler systems in DOE facilities since 1952, the sprinklers were
successful in controlling or extinguishing the fire in 113, or 98.3% of the incidents. This
compares favorably with the 95% satisfactory performance reported by NFPA (Ref. 11) and is
close to the 99.1% favorable experience recorded by the Australian Fire Protection Association
(Ref. 12). The DOE report indicates that the agency’s experience is closer to the Australian
experience than that reported by NFPA for U.S. industry in general. The reasons for this
performance parallel those given for the favorable Australia - New Zealand experience. They are
summarized as follows:
The reporting is more complete. The report is made up of all fires reported to DOE since
1952. This includes all fires with a fire loss exceeding $50 ($1000 after 1975).
All systems had waterflow alarms. In addition, the majority send an alarm directly to an
on-site emergency organization.
Inspection and maintenance of fire protection systems is better than the U.S. average. In
addition to the NFPA fire protection standards, some 27 DOE sites have on-site fire and
emergency services and nearly all sites that exceed $25 million in replacement value have
one or more professional fire protection engineers on staff.
Sprinkler valve controls, including electrical supervision, are probably more extensive
and effective at DOE facilities than at average U.S. sprinklered properties.
The average age of DOE sprinklers is probably less than the national average. Only ten
of the fires were known to involve old-style (pre-1954) sprinkler heads.
It is also pointed out that while the number of sprinkler events results in less statistical validity
than other studies, the experience covers a wide range of installation types and occupancy groups
over a considerable number of years. In conclusion, the DOE report states that “the DOE
experience is closer to the true performance of sprinkler systems than that reported for the U.S. as
a whole and that the Australia - New Zealand experience is closest to the true performance record
of automatic sprinkler systems.”
The experience documented by DOE should closely mirror that of nuclear power plants, given the
similarity of requirements for test and maintenance of FPSs between DOE and the NRC. Also,
given that the non-nuclear industry’s testing and maintenance programs are generally less
comprehensive than those of the nuclear power industry, one could assume that the reliability for
the nuclear industry is at least comparable, if not better. Clearly, this assumption is dependent on
the attention and importance given to testing and maintenance at individual nuclear power plants.
The lack of statistically complete FPS failure data and a comprehensive study on FPS reliability at
nuclear power plants makes it difficult to make a direct comparison with the non-nuclear industry.
3.5 Australia - New Zealand FPS Experience
The Australia - New Zealand data indicate the best performance from all of the data sources
considered in this section (DOE, NFPA, nuclear power plant), This is attributed to the weekly
inspection testing frequency required in Australia and New Zealand. NFPA requirements, as in
Section 1-6.1 of NFPA 13A “Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Sprinkler Systems,” states:
“The level of reliability of the protection offered by an automatic sprinkler system is promoted
when there is a qualified inspection service. Qualified inspection service should include:
(a) Four visits per year, at regular intervals.
(b) All services indicated in summary Table 7-3 [Table 5 of this report].
(c) The completion of a report form with copies furnished to the property owner.”
The difference in automatic suppression system reliability between NFPA and Australia - New
Zealand data (95% vs. 99.1 %) can, in part, be attributed to the frequency of rigorous inspection
and testing in Australia and New Zedand.
19
4. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE PROTECTION GUIDELINES
4.1 NRC Requirements
The requirements for fire protection are defined in 10 CFR 50.48, which references Appendix R
to 10 CFR 50 and Branch Technical Position, CMEB, 9.5-1, “Guidelines for Fire Protection for
Nuclear Power Plants.” Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 establishes fire protection features required to
satisfy Criterion 3 (Fire Protection) of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. BTP 9.5.1 provides guidelines
acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing General Design Criterion 3 (Appendix of 10 CFR
50). These guidelines include acceptance criteria listed in a number of documents, including
Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.48, The purpose of the fire protection is to ensure the
capability of shutting down the reactor, maintaining it in a safe shutdown condition, and
minimizing radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire. Throughout BTP 9.5.1,
references to NFPA standards are given as recommended guidance or required compliance. The
following section presents a brief overview of the NFPA standards and specifically maintenance
requirements.
4.2 National Fire Protection Association Guidance
NFPA defines maintenance as “ Repair service, including periodically recurrent inspection and
tests, required to keep the protective signaling system and its component parts in an operative
condition at all times, together with replacement of the system or of its components when, for any
reason, they become undependable or inoperative.” A key piece of this definition is “with
replacement of the system or of its components when, for any reason, they become undependable
or inoperative. ” It can and has happened that a component has tested satisfactorily and a
moment after the successfbl test the component entered a degraded mode in which, if it was
required for sexvice, would fail. Under this testing approach, such a component would either fail
on demand, with potentially risk-significant results, or fail upon its next testing cycle. A fire
protection program that includes an aggressive testing and maintenance program satisfying the
guidelines presented in the NFPA standards found in Table 4 should minimize the occurrence of
20
FPS failures on demand. Table 5 presents the minimum inspection, testing, and maintenance
frequencies for FPS components found in NFPA 13A. Most recently (1993) NFPA published
NFPA 20 (1993), Standard for the Installation of Centrifigal Fire Pumps. This rewritten
standard should improve FPS pump reliability. There are three main objectives of the rewritten c
standard. The first is to ensure that the pump will start under any and all conditions. Also, if the
pump will not start automatically, there are provisions to override protective devices for manual
startup. The second objective is that, after the fire pump start up, the circuits and protective fire
pump components will continue operation of the pump as long as water is needed to put out the
fire, even if the pump runs itself to destruction. The third objective is to ensure that the
installation of the pump is as safe as possible. To that end, fire pump controllers must be listed
(certified) for such service.
-
The above standards provide a framework for a successful fire protection program. However, the
NFPA standards alone are not enough to ensure that in the event of a fire the capability to shut
down the reactor, maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and minimize radioactive releases to
the environment is present. Nuclear power plants must have a comprehensive fire protection
program which begins with FPS design and ends with an aggressive inspection, testing, and
maintenance program.
21
Table 4. National Fire Protection Association Standards
NFPA Standard Title Comments
12 Section 1-11 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
12B Section 1 - 1 1 Halon 12 1 1 Fire Extinguishing Systems
12A Section 1-1 1 Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems
13 Section 1-5
13A
1 5 - C h 6
16 Ch 6
16 Ch 7
20 Ch. 11
72A Ch. 2
72B
72C
72D
72E Ch. 8
Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems Recommended Practice for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Sprinkler Systems Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems Centrifugal Pumps
Standard for Local Protective Signaling Systems Standard on Auxiliary Protective Signaling Systems
Standard for Remote Station Protective Signaling Systems Standard for Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors
Inspection, maintenance, and Instructions Inspection, maintenance, and instructions Inspection, maintenance, and instructions Maintenance
Periodic testing and maintenance
Periodic testing
Maintenance
Acceptance, operation, and maintenance
InsDections. tests. and maintenance
22
Table 5. FPS Minimum Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
FPS Component Activity Frequency NFPA 13A Section
Hushing piping Test 5 years 5-4.2
Fire department connections Inspection
Control valves Inspection
Indicator post valve Valves in roadway boxes Main drain
Open sprinklers Pressure gage Sprinklers Sprinklers-high temperature Sprinklers-residential
Water flow alarms
Preactioddeluge detection systems Preactioddeluge systems Hydrants
Antifreeze solution
Inspection Inspection Maintenance
Test Test Flow test
Test Calibration Test Test Test
Test
Test
Monthly
Weekly - sealed
Monthly - locked Monthly - tamper Yearly
Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Annual 5 years 50 years 5 years 20 years, then 10-year intervals Quarterly
Semiannual1 y
Test Annually
Inspection Monthly Test (open and close) Annually Maintenance Semiannually Test Annually
Cold weather valves
Dry/preaction/deluge systems Air and water pressure Weekly
Open and close Fall - close, spring - open
inspection Enclosure Daily - cold weather
Priming water level Quarterly
2.8 2-7.1.4
2-7.1.4 2-7.1.4 2-7.1.8 2-7.3.1 2-7.4.1
2-6.1 5-11.1 4-4.2 3-3.3 3-3.1 3-3.4
4-5.3,4- 7.1,4-12.3 4-12.3
4-12.1 2-5.1 2-5.3 2-5.2 4-7.3 4-7.2
4-8.2.4
4-8.2.5 4-8.2.1
23
Table 5. FPS Minimum Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (Continued)
FPS Component Activity Frequency NFPA 1314 Section f
Low-point drains
Dry pipe valves Dry pipe valves Quick-opening devices Gravity tank - water level
Gravity tank - heat Gravity tank - condition Pressure tank - water level and pressure Pressure tank - heat enclosures Pressure tank - condition Pump Engine drive Motor drive Steam drive
Test Trip test Full flow trip Test Inspection
Inspection Inspection Inspection
Inspection Inspection Test flow
Test operate Test operate Test operate
Fall Annual - Spring 3 years - Spring Semiannually
Monthly Daily - cold weather Biannual
Monthly
Daily - cold weather 3 years Annually
weekly
weekly
Monthly
4-8.2.6
1-6.1 4-8.4
4-11.1
L
2-2.1
2-2.2 NFPA 22 2-3.1
2-3.7 2-3.2 2-4.2.5
2-4.2.1 2-4.2.1 NFPA21
24
5. INSIGHTS
The intent of this work was to determine whether age-related failures of FPSs in nuclear power
f plants are a significant risk and, if they are, how the risk can be minimized.
J
First, based on the FPS aging-related failures found in the data search, there does not appear to be
an aging problem of FPSs at nuclear power plants. Fire suppression and detection systems have
failed on occasion, but the data suggest that most failures related to aging are encountered first
with an aggressive inspection, testing, and maintenance program. Also, aging effects are more
singularly dependent on the environment in which the fire suppression or detection components
are located, and this fact must be factored into the test, maintenance, and inspection activities.
One approach which would further minimize FPS aging problems is performance-based FPS
inspection, testing, and maintenance. An extensive review of aging-related failures of FPSs has
revealed a few potential problem areas. However, experience shows that a factor contributing to
these problemsueas is the frequency of FPS testing activities. For example, the monthly startup
of the diesel-driven pump stresses and ages the pump since the &esel engine is designed for
continuous, not cyclical operation. This suggests that performance-based FPS inspection, testing,
and maintenance might merit further discussion. This performance-based program could be set up
to test 20% of a given system or systems per year with a 5-year frequency to test all components.
During testing, if failure occurs, one can modify the testing to identify any common mode failures
and check all similar components. This approach would lessen the burden for those plants with an
aggressive maintenance program and identify any problem areas for those plants with similar
components.
Another approach that may point to problems before they occur is predictive diagnostics, which
anticipates future performance and identifies the cause of the decrease in performance. Some
aging-related failures can appear as random failures if predictive diagnostics are not used. For
automatic fire suppression systems, there are typically two types of failures: random and age-
1
25
related. Typical random failures can be minimized by good design and frequent inspections. Age-
related failures can be averted with predictive diagnostics. Components have been known to test
satisfactorily and shortly after the test enter a degraded mode in which if they were required for
service they would fail. Thus, such a component would either fail on demand, with potentially
significant risk or fail on its next testing cycle. Since aging-related FPS failures can be
characterized by decreases in performance that develop slowly, one could use these data to
predict failure before it occurs. Examples of these types of failures include a gradual loss of
battery power caused by chemical action and internal resistance, loss of flow capacity in the water
pipe, and stuck valves because of corrosion and buildups of mineral deposits. Predictive
diagnostics would use performance data to predict a failure before it becomes a problem. Age-
related failures are predictable and preventable if the performance decrement can be measured.
This performance measurement should be built into the FPS component to allow the condition to
be assessed at a glance. Any performance decrement would be noted and diagnostics initiated to
determine the cause.
5.1 Conclusions
The experience base shows that most nuclear power plants have an aggressive maintenance and
testing program and are finding degraded FPS components before a failure occurs. However, the
database also shows that there are going to be age-related failures of FPS components. The
question is whether such failures will pose significant risk. The impact of these failures can vary.
For example, if a smoke detector actuates and cannot be reset because of increased sensitivity
caused by aging, a fire detection signal could be masked by the failed detector. This could result
in, at a minimum, a delay in the response to a fire. Also, the plugging of FPS nozzles by rust and
scale buildup could prevent the automatic extinguishment of a fire and require manual fire-fighting
efforts. However, it is important to note that the plugging of the nozzles did not, in any case,
involve 100% blockage; therefore there was partial FPS coverage.
The discovery or occurrence of most of the significant FPS failures during testing and
maintenance activities and not on demand demonstrates the existence of an aggressive testing and
26
maintenance program at most nuclear power plants. However, it is assumed that a more
aggressive testing and maintenance program involving preventive diagnostics might flag age-
related FPS problems before their occurrence either during testing and maintenance or on
demand. In closing, although there has not been a quantitative estimation of the risk due to age-
related FPS failures, it is clear from the FPS failure and reliability data that the risk impact of FPS
aging is low. In general, current maintenance practices are adequately identifying aging
degradation. Further, the system reliability estimates currently used in fire risk assessments
already account for FPS aging-related failures. Changes to the maintenance program with
predictive diagnostics could reduce this already low risk even further.
27
6. REFERENCES
1 . “Automatic Sprinkler System Performance and Reliability in United States Department of Energy Facilities, 1952 - 1980,” DOEEP-0052, U.S. Department of Energy, Ofice of Assistant Secretary for Environmental Protection, Safety, and Emergency Preparedness, Washington, D.C., June 1982.
2. Wheelis, T., “Users Guide for a Personal Computer Based Nuclear Power Plant Fire Data Base”, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, SAND86-0300, NUREGKR- 4586, August 1986.
3. W. Parkinson et al., Fire Events Database for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, Palo Alto, CA Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), July 1992, NSAC-178L.
4. W. Parkinson et al., Automatic and Manual Suppression Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Plant Fire Risk Analysis, Palo Alto, CA, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 1992, NSAC-179.
5 . Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) Methodoloq Plant Screening Guide, Palo Alto, CA, December 1991 , EPRI TR-100370.
6 . Bohn, M. P., and Lambright, J. A., “Procedures for the External Event Core Damage Frequency Analyses for NUREG-1 150,” Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, SAND88-3 102, NUREG/CR-4840, November 1990.
7. Northeast Utilities, Millstone 3 PRA, Appendix 2-K, 1983.
8. Galluci, R., “A Methodology for Evaluating the Probability for Fire Loss of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Functions, Ph.D’. Dissertation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, May 1980.
9. Taiwan Power Company, Maanshan Fire PRA, Appendix D, 1987
10. Levinson, S., and Yeater, M., “Methodology to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Fire Protection Systems at Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Engineering and Design, 1983.
1 1 . NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 14th edition, The experience covered 117,770 fires in sprinklered buildings.
12. H.W. Marryatt, Automatic Fire Sprinkler Performance in Australia and New Zealand, 1886 - 1968 Australian Fire Protection Association 1971.
28
c
APPENDIX A
AGE-RELATED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURES
29
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
Fire Pumps I I
Plant Humboldt Ba 133180-007 Humboldt Ba 133182-003 Humboldt Ba 133185-002
155182-031 2 1 3188-01 6
Nine Mile Point 22OJ81-014 tluad Cities 1 254182-022
tluad Cities 1 I BWR Salem 1 I PWR I272/80-035 Salem 1 IPWR 1272180-061
Salem 1 /PWR 272181 -088
Salem 1 PWR 272/82-019 Salem 1 PWR 272l82-027
Salem 1 PWR 272182-055
Salem 1 PWR 272183-064
Salem 1 PWR 272l83-067
Salem 1 PWR 272/83-069
Pilgrim 1 BWR 293180-066 Pilgrim 1 BWR 293183-055
Arkansas Nuclear 1 IPWR ]313/82-028
Three Mile Island 2 PWR 320181 -008
Duane Arnold BWR 33 1 184-033 I I
Duane Arnold BWR 331 J85-046 Fitzpatrick BWR 333180-033
Fitzpatrick BWR 333/93-006
Beaver Valley IPWR 1334180-030
Beaver Valle 334180-052
Beaver Valle 334180-059 Beaver Valle 334187-004
North Anna 1 1338185-006
Failure Failure
Fire Pump #2 Throttle linkage Aging
Electric fire DumD contactor worn Aaina 3 phase motor
Diesel fire pump Pump shaft seal Aging
Diesel fire pump failure Aging Diesel fire DumD Wear rinas failure Aaina
Pressure switch
Battery bank A Diesel fire pump failure Aging Diesel fire DumD Bearina Unknown " Fire pumpk2 ' I Failed alternator tunknown
Battery cable Fire DumD #2 cracked and arcina Aaina
Failed voltage Fire pump #2 regulator Aging Fire pump #2 Damaged flywheel Unknown
Failed fuse on #1 Fire pump #1 I battery charger IAging
I Fuel oil pressure I I gauge hose I
Diesel fire pump I ruptured /Aging 1 Control rod shaft I
Electric fire DumD Worn pump shaft
Coolina HX failure Electric fire pump sleeve Aging Diesel fire DumD
Inadequate pump discharge pressure
Fire pumps 76P-1 & & engine 76P-2 overheating Unknown
Diesel fire pump and brittle Aging (?)
Diesel fire pump clogged Aging (?)
Fan belt slipping
Fuel oil filter
Diesel fire pump Starter motor failure Aging Diesel fire pump Degraded batteries Aging
Coolant hose Diesel fire pump I ruptured I Aging
A- 1
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
North Anna 1
Davis Besse 1
~
McGuire 1 IPWR
La Salle 1 BWR
La Salle 1 BWR
La Salle 1 BWR
Starter motor & Excessive
Failure of fuel shutoff solenoid
338/86-010 Diesel fire pump battery bank starting
346/80-070 (Diesel fire pump (valve ’ (Unknown I /Lack of lubrication I I I & failed voltage
367/80-054 1 Diesel fire pumps I regulator 1 Unknown I Burned contacts in 1 the starting High
369/81-194 Fire pump C contactor cycling
373/82-001 Diesel fire pump Broken speed cable Aging
373/82-024 Diesel fire pump line Aging
373/85-046 Fire pump B broke Aging
Broken flexible fuel
Alternator belt
.
I.
A-2
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
FPS PipinalHeads f
Plant Plant Type LER # FPS Component Failure Corrosion failure of
rlumboldt Bay 1 BWR 11 33lForm 24 I Fire water system (2 carbon steel bolts 17 spray nozzles of I
San Onofre 1
3an Onofre 1
3an Onofre 1
hydrogen seal oil PWR 206185-016 deluge FPS Plugged by rust
Plugged by rust (open nozzle
Plugged due to
8 of 33 nozzles in PWR 206188-021 containment FPS design)
PWR 206189-??? 20 of 78 nozzles corrosion
259182-064
3rowns Ferry 2
Cook 1
Cook 2
Three Mile Island 2
Sequoyah 1
Fitzpatrick
Due to slit and clams in the inline strainer the FPS water supply did not
FPS water su I meet tech specs _I Pinhole leak due to through wall pitting
Plugged with welding slag, rust &
PWR 31 5181-009 vent bits of paper Plugged with welding slag, rust &
PWR 316/81-008 ESF vent bits of paper
BWR 260/82-029 Fire protection line corrosion attact 8 of 72 spray nozzles for ESF
8 of 72 & 14 of 72 spray nozzles for
18 of 90 Aux Bldg filter cabinet Clogged due to
PWR 320-82-01 6 sprinkler heads debris Degraded due to internal piping corrosion deposits,
FPS sprinkler incrustation, river
Spray nozzles for
50% of sprinkler
PWR 327191 -009 heads sediment
BWR 333/81-052 SGTS Plugged wl rust
Beaver Valley 1 PWR 334180-034
Beaver Valley 1 PWR 334186-005
Beaver Valley 1 PWR 334187-021
A-3
nozzles for suppl. leak collection & release system Plugged wl rust
45 of 90 spray nozzles scale
34 of 90 spray nozzles scale
Clogged wl charcoal &white
Clogged w l charcoal & white
Failure
'onment
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Jnknown
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
A-4
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
I I
Multiplexer Smoke Detector transmitter failure
C02 sys failed to actuate due to pneumatic devices
Heat detectors mech. bound
A-5
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
A-6
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
Fire Barriers 1 Plant Plant Type
Palisades PWR
Three Mile Island 2 PWR
1
LER #
255183-069
320183-021
I FPS Component 1 Failure
I
Failure Mode
Fire Barrier Construction &time Aging (?)
Fire Barrier
Control room door seals
Fire damper
Fire dampers lwiring I Unknown Fire damper IBinded in track IUnknown
Construction &time Aging (?) Degradation & management deficiency Aging (?) Failed to close when tested Unknown Debris on track &
Mcguire 1 1 PWR
Mcguire 1 PWR
Summer 1 PWR Wash. Nuclear 2 BWR
Wolf Creek 1 PWR
A-7
369187-026
369188-022
395183-1 29 397183-008
482/87-009 Control room door seals Design deficiency Design
Age-Related Fire Protection System Failures
Miscellaneous Plant
Palisades Browns Ferry 1 Indian Poir;: 3
L Plant Type
PWR BWR PWR
BWR Pi1 rim 1 P I
LER# I FPSComponent Failure 1 Unknown 255181-021 Fire alarms Relay coils i Unknowi- 259183-052 FPS Failed relay j Unknown 286180-007 Deluge valve Dirty contacts unknown
293/80-035 annunciation Capacitor failure Unknown Fire alarm
IGrand Gulf 1
PWR
PWR
31 5/83-035 Deluge valves signal was initiated) Unknown
369183-1 06 board moisture Unknown Fire alarm circuit Corrosion due to
Time delay circuit I boards (actuation
BWR
Rough mating suriace of latch &
41 6183-1 26 Deluge valve clapper Unknown
Form 648 Halon system Failed control board 1 Unknown Dirty contacts on pilot control
I Scale & corrision on 1 1 Form 474 I C O ~ system I solenoid valve 1 Aging
A-8
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Mail Code 1740.2 Bethesda, MD 20084-5000
Research and Development Center
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American Nuclear Insurers Attn: D. Sherman, Library Exchange Building, Suite 245 270 Farmington Ave. Farmington, CT 06032
Underwriters Laboratories Attn: Pravinray Ghandi 333 Pfingston Rd. Northbrook, IL 60062
Impel1 Corporation Attn: Stanley J. Chingo 300 Tri-State International Suite 300 Lincolnshire, IL 600 1 5
Patton Fire Suppression Systems Attn: Richard Patton 53 16 Roseville Rd. Suite P North Highlands, CA 95660
Factory Mutual Research Corporation Attn: Jeff Newman 1 15 1 Boston-Providence Hwy. Nonvood, MA 02062
American Electric Power Service Corp. Attn: Jack Grier Mechanical Engineering Division 19th Floor PO Box 1663 1 Columbus, OH 43216
DIST- I
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Edison Electric Institute Attn: Jim Evans 1 1 1 19th St., NW Washington, DC 20036-3691
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. Attn: Michael S. Kaminski Fire Protection Of€icer, A-543 333 W. Everett St. Milwaukee, WI 53203
Entergy Operations Attn: Ron Rispoli PO Box 137G Russelville, AR 7280 1
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Centre Scientifique et Technique du Batiment Attn: Xavier Bodart Station de Recherche 84 Avenue Jean-Jaures-Champs-sur-Marne 77428 Marne-La-Vallee Cedex 2 FRANCE
Societe Bertin & Cie Attn: Serge Galant BPNo. 3 78373 Plaisir Cedex FRANCE
Electricite De France Attn: Jean Pierre Berthet Thermal Production Headquarters EDF-DSRE-6, Rue Ampere BPI 14 93203 Saint Denis Cedex 1 FRANCE
HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate Attn: Paul A. Woodhouse St. Peters House; Stanley Precinct Balliol Road; Bootle Merseyside L20 3LZ ENGLAND
Hitachi Plant Eng. & Const. Co. Attn: Dr. Kenji Takumi Imai-Mitsubishi Bld. 5F 3-53-1 1 Minami-Otuska Toshima-Ku Tokyo 170, JAPAN
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NWEC Attn: Dr. Hideo Ogasawara S huwa-Kamiyacho Bld. 3-13,4-Chome Toranomon, Manatoku Tokyo 105, JAPAN
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MS0619 Print Media, 1261 5 MS0736 N. R. Ortiz, 6400 MS0737 M. P. Bohn, 6449 MS0737 S. P. Nowlen, 6449 (25) MS0737 S . B. Ross, 6449 (3) MS0899 Technical Library, 13414 (5) MS9018 Central Technical Files, 8523-2
DOE/OSTI, 7613-2 (2)
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