[G.R. No. 86889.December 4, 1990.]LUZ FARMS,petitioner,vs.THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM,respondent.Enrique M. Belofor petitioner.D E C I S I O
NPARAS,Jp:This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for
restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction
against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and
Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.
6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further
from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of
the petitioner.As gathered from the records, the factual background
of this case, is as follows:On June 10, 1988, the President of the
Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).On
January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo,
p. 80).On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).Luz Farms,
petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock
and poultry business and together with others in the same business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657
promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).Hence, this petition praying that
aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction
or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from
enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms
and other livestock and poultry raisers.This Court in its
Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz
Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its
Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).Later,
however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989
resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of
an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).The petitioner filed its
Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).On December
22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition
as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).Luz Farms questions the
following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to
apply to it:(a)Section 3(b)which includes the "raising of livestock
(and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."(b)Section 11which defines
"commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."(c)Section
13which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing
plan.(d)Section 16(d) and 17which vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.(e)Section 32which spells out the
production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby
three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such
lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the
fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in
such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive:
Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in
excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper
application, determine a lower ceiling.In the event that the
individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of
the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and
other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal
year . . ."The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality
of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith.The constitutional provision under consideration reads as
follows:ARTICLE XIIIxxx xxx xxxAGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES
REFORMSection 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State
shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.xxx xxx
xxx"Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of
R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness
of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that
Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of
the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131).
Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree
farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and
represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment
of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many
owners of residential lands all over the country who use available
space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising
purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing
corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers
(Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities
attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is
incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in
productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about
80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy
five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms
(Rollo, p. 11).On the other hand, the public respondent argued that
livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture"
and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A.
6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary,
Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:"Agriculture the
art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting
crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of
livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.It includes farming,
horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .Livestock
domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for
profit.Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of
domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).The petition is
impressed with merit.The question raised is one of constitutional
construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon &
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
[1970]).Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of
Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The
words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co.
vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).It is generally
held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the
debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the
intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its
proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the
Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was
meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the
subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the
understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).The transcripts of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the Government.The Committee adopted the
definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land
(Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of
the Committee is to limit the application of the word
"agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word
"ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such
lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties
because all of them fall under the general classification of the
word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are
limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do
not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record,
CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).In the interpellation,
then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed
several questions, among others, quoted as follows:xxx xxx xxx"Line
19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of
farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold
tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it
speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own
directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by
Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries
and poultry projects.I was wondering whether I am wrong in my
appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry
project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these
farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually,
directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the
piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM,
August 2, 1986, p. 618).xxx xxx xxxThe questions were answered and
explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as
follows:xxx xxx xxx"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo
hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na
hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama
rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin
dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p.
621).It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition
of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
(Rollo, p. 21).Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that
the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing
"corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to
execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon
to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten
percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore
violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).It has been established
that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico,
G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA
343).However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when
confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to
declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to
probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and
political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence
its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for
all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will
not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of
these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as
expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742;
Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v.
Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).Thus, where the legislature or the
executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the
essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X,
Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of
the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many
instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b),
11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is
hereby MADE permanent.SO ORDERED.Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, MedialdeaandRegalado, JJ.,concur.Feliciano, J.,is on
leave.Separate OpinionsSARMIENTO,J., concurring:I agree that the
petition be granted.It is my opinion however that the main issue on
the validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing
Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include the raising of
livestock, poultry, and swine in their coverage can not be
simplistically reduced to a question of constitutional
construction.It is a well-settled rule that construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. A close
reading however of the constitutional text in point, specifically,
Sec. 4, Art. XIII, particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof,"
provides a basis for the clear and possible coverage of livestock,
poultry, and swine raising within the ambit of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. This accords with the principle that every
presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute and the court in considering the validity of a statute
should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to
bring it within the fundamental law.1The presumption against
unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight when a
ruling to the contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and
noble purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless farmers
and farmworkers in the promotion of social justice, by the
expedient conversion of agricultural lands into livestock, poultry,
and swine raising by scheming landowners, thus, rendering the
comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.The
instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of
whether or not the assailed provisions violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1) which teaches
simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.2There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that
substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to
cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively
used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real
differences, to wit:xxx xxx xxxNo land is tilled and no crop is
harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants
nor landlords, only employers and employees.Livestock and poultry
do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."Land is
not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is
inconsequential that all the commercial hog and poultry farms
combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2%
for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land supposedly
covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of
land.In every respect livestock and poultry production is an
industrial activity. Its use of an inconsequential portion of land
is a mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking,
business or otherwise.The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry
production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere more evident
when one considers that at least 95% of total investment in these
farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial in
nature.These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities
complete with drainage, waterers, blowers, misters and in some
cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive
warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4)
anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated
water tanks, pumphouses and accessory facilities; (6) modern
equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory
facilities complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a
myriad other such technologically advanced appurtances.How then can
livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost
totally occupied by these structures?The fallacy of equating the
status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of
agricultural tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to
output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry farms is no more than
4% of total operating cost. The 98% balance represents inputs not
obtained from the land nor provided by the farmworkers inputs such
as feeds and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power cost, cost
of money and several others.Moreover, livestock and poultry
farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy
law. They are entitled to social security benefits where
tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than crop
shares. And as in any other industry, they receive additional
benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and other incentives such as
free housing privileges, light and water.Equating livestock and
poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also
fallacious in the sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a
market for, rather than a source of agricultural output. At least
60% of the entire domestic supply of corn is absorbed by livestock
and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-bran),
coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish
meal).3xxx xxx xxxIn view of the foregoing, it is clear that both
kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence, can not be
treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for
the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage
of the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification
and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.FootnotesSARMIENTO, J.,
concurring: 1.In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
70 L. ed., p. 1059. 2.Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155. 3.Rollo,
29-30.============================================================================================================THIRD
DIVISIONFROILAN DE GUZMAN,G.R. No. 156965ANGEL MARCELO andNICASIO
MAGBITANG,Present:Petitioners,QUISUMBING, J.,Chairperson,- versus
-CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andVELASCO, JR.,JJ.THE COURT OF
APPEALS,OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,and the MUNICIPALITY
OFPromulgated:BALIUAG, BULACAN,Respondents.October 12, 2006x
-------------------------------------------------------------xD E C
I S I O NTINGA,J.:On appeal via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the
Decision[1]and Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55710. The Decision affirmed the Resolution dated4 October
1999of the Office of the President dismissing petitioners appeal
from the Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform declaring that
the disputed property cannot be placed under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program or the Operation Land Transfer.The
following factual antecedents are matters of record.Petitioners
Froilan De Guzman, Angel Marcelo and Nicasio Magbitang were among
the tenants of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Pagala,
Baliuag, Bulacan. The land, measuring six (6) hectares, was
formerly owned by the Vergel De Dios family. Sometime in 1979,
respondent Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan (municipality) sought
the expropriation of the land before the now defunct Court of
Agrarian Relations. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, the municipality and petitioners entered into a
compromise agreement, whereby petitioners irrevocably withdrew
their opposition to the expropriation of the land in consideration
of the payment of a disturbance compensation ofP25,000.00 per
hectare orP2.50 per square meter. Petitioners also waived all
claims and demands against the municipality. The Court of Agrarian
Relations approved said compromise agreement in its decisions
dated16 April 1979and9 August 1979.[3]From the records, it can be
gathered that the municipality eventually acquired ownership of the
land through expropriation but allowed petitioners to continue
cultivating their lots pending the construction of the Baliuag
Wholesale Complex Market. For this arrangement, petitioners
remitted rentals to the municipal treasurer. Despite the lapse of
several years, construction of the market did not push through.
This prompted petitioners, who had continually occupied and
cultivated the land, to file in 1996 a petition with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Baliuag, praying that the land be
placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) in accordance with
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[4]Following the filing of their
petition for CARP coverage before the MARO, petitioners filed a
complaint on13 May 1997with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) against the municipality. In their
complaint docketed as DARAB Case No.03-02-505497, petitioners
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to secure their peaceful possession over the
land. The Provincial Adjudicator rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners on17 July 1997. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the
plaintiffs a [sic] bona-fide farmer[-]beneficiaries of agrarian
reform[.] [A]ccordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1.
Directing the the [sic] respondent, Municipality of Baliuag,
Bulacan[,] represented by Honorable Mayor Edilberto Tengco and all
other persons acting in their behalf to permanently cease and
desist from dumping garbage in the premises in question;2.
Directing the respondent to maintain petitioners in peaceful
possession over the disputed property.SO ORDERED.[5]On6 January
1997, the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) issued an order granting the petition and declaring the land
as covered by OLT.[6]The municipality moved for its reconsideration
in vain. Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
the municipality elevated the matter to the DAR Secretary who, in
his Order dated8 August 1997, reversed the Order of6 January 1997of
the Regional Director.[7]Petitioners, aggrieved this time, filed an
appeal with the Office of the President. On1 July 1999, Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, by authority of the President,
dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the order of the DAR
Secretary.[8]Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, which prayed for the reversal of the
Order of 1 July 1999 issued by the Office of the President on the
grounds that the land remained agricultural and that the Office of
the President erred in relying upon the certification issued by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) classifying the land
as commercial. They also argued that under the provisions of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20, series of 1992, the conversion
of the land for non-agricultural purposes was disallowed.On30
January, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision,
dismissing petitioners appeal. Upholding the non-agricultural
classification of the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
land could no longer be subject of the comprehensive agrarian
reform law (CARL). The Court of Appeals also denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution datedJanuary
20, 2003.Hence, the instant petition, imputing the following errors
to the Court of Appeals:I.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED BY
OPERATION LAND TRANSFER PURSUANT TO P.D. NO. 27 DUE TO THE FAILURE
OF THE LANDOWNER TO CARRY OUT ITS CONVERSION FROM AGRICULTURAL LAND
FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT UPHOLD (sic) THE RECLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT
LANDHOLDING.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE PROVISIONS OF THE O.P.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 20 SERIES OF 1992 WHICH CLEARLY PROVIDES
THE NON NEGOTIABILITY OF IRRIGATED PRIME AGRICULTURAL LANDS TO
NON-AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES.[9]Essentially, the main issue to be
resolved is whether the subject land can be reclassified to
agricultural after the purpose of its conversion to a
non-agricultural land had not materialized.Petitioners contend that
despite the conversion of the land for a commercial purpose, they
have remained tenants of the land devoting it for agricultural
production. Though the earlier tenancy relationship had been
terminated upon the payment of disturbance compensation pursuant to
the 1979 compromise agreement, petitioners posit that a tenancy
relationship was created anew between them and the municipality
when the latter allowed petitioners to cultivate the land after the
expropriation proceeding.The petition has no merit.Under Section
3(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), an agricultural land
refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined therein
andnot classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands
which are arable and suitable agricultural lands anddo not include
commercial, industrial and residentiallands.[10]InNatalia Realty,
Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform,[11]it was held that lands
not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARLincluding lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
the DAR. This rule has been reiterated in a number of subsequent
cases. Despite claims that the areas have been devoted for
agricultural production, the Court has upheld the non-agricultural
classification made by the NHA over housing and resettlements
projects,[12]zoning ordinances passed by local government units
classifying residential areas,[13]and certifications over watershed
areas issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).[14]The DAR itself has recognized the prospective
application of R.A. No. 6657, insofar as it provides under Section
3(c) thereof that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the
effectivity of the CARL are not covered by the CARL. Thus, DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1990 provides:Agricultural
land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
R.A. [No.] 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, andnot classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June
1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.(Emphasis
supplied.}That the subject land had been reclassified from
agricultural to non-agricultural is not disputed. The records
reveal that as early as 1980, the municipality had passed a zoning
ordinance which identified the subject land as the site of the
wholesale market complex. As per certification issued by the HLURB,
the land is within the zoning plan approved by the National
Coordinating Council for Town Planning, Housing and
Zoning.Petitioners also theorize that they earned a vested right
over the land when a tenancy relationship was established anew
between them and the municipality subsequent to the latters
acquisition of the land. In support of this theory, petitioners
cite minutes of meetings and resolutions passed by the
municipalitysSanggunian, purportedly indicating the municipalitys
recognition of their status as tenants of the subject
landholding.Petitioners theory does not persuade the Court.A
segment of the minutes of the meeting of the
municipalitysSangguniandated27 May 1988, which petitioners cite to
bolster their theory, is quoted below:Tumindig din at namahayag ang
ating Punong Bayan Kgg. Reynaldo S. del Rosario at sinabing sa
kasulukuyan ay hindi pa naman kailanganngPamahalaangBayan
angnasabinglupangunitkungitoaykakailangannaaykinakailangangumalissiladitongmahinusay,walangpasubaliatmaluwagsakanilangkalooban,
kungkayatiminungkahiniyanagumawangisangnakasulatnakasunduannaangnakasaadaykusang-loobsilangaalissanasabinglupapagdatingngpanahonnaitoaykailanganinnangPamahalaangBayan.[15]The
aforequoted minutes clearly show that petitioners use and
possession of the land was by mere tolerance of the municipality
and subject to the condition that petitioners would voluntarily
vacate the land when the need would arise. In the same minutes,
theSanggunianresolved to authorize then Mayor Reynaldo S. del
Rosario to enter into an agreement in writing with petitioners
concerning the latterstemporarycultivation of the land ashired
labor.As discussed earlier, the land had ceased to be classified as
agricultural when the municipality extended petitioners occupation
of the land. After the municipality acquired ownership over the
land through expropriation and passed the ordinance converting said
land into a commercial area, any transaction entered into by the
municipality involving the land was governed by the applicable
civil law in relation to laws on local government. At this point,
agrarian laws no longer governed the relationship between
petitioners and the municipality. While it was not established
whether the relationship between petitioners and the municipality
was that of a lessor and lessee or that of an employer and laborer,
as the supposed written agreement was not offered in evidence, the
fact remains that the subject land had already been identified as
commercial in the zoning ordinance.Certainly, petitioners
occupation of the land, made possible as it was by the tolerance of
the municipality, was subject to its peremptory right to terminate.
As absolute owner of the land, the municipality is entitled to
devote the land for purposes it deems appropriate.It is noteworthy
that even prior to its expropriation and reclassification, the land
was never placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Although it appears that petitioners had been tilling the land as
tenants of the Vergel De Dios family, the municipalitys
predecessor-in-interest, the records do not show that petitioners
had applied for coverage of the land under the agrarian reform
program. Before a claimant becomes a qualified beneficiary of
agrarian reform, the administrative process for coverage under the
CARP must be initiated. The mere fact of cultivating an
agricultural land does notipso jurevest ownership right in favor of
the tiller. Since petitioners had not applied for CARP coverage
prior to the reclassification of the land to commercial, their
occupation by mere tolerance cannot ripen into absolute
ownership.Petitioners further argue that the municipalitys failure
to realize the commercial project operates to reinstate the
original status of the land as agricultural. In support of this
theory, petitioners cite Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, or the
Agriculture Land Reform Code,unaware that the provision had been
amended by R.A. 6389, entitled, An Act Amending Republic Act
Numbered Thirty Eight Hundred and Forty Four, As Amended, Otherwise
Known As the Agricultural Land Reform Code and For Other
Purposes.Before its amendment, Section 36 (1), R.A. No. 3844
provided:SEC.36.Possession of Landholding;
Exceptions.Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that
is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:(1)The
agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory,
hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes:Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five
and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to
an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him:Provided, further, That
should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three
years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one
year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed
that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss
incurred by him because of said dispossessions.With the enactment
of the amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner to
implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a
non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted.
Section 36 (1), R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now
reads:SEC.36.Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding
any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an
agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession
of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory
if after due hearing it is shown that:(1) The landholding is
declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes:Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of gross harvests on his
landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;x x x
x[16]The amendment is the Legislatures recognition that the optimal
use of some lands may not necessarily be for agriculture. Thus,
discretion is vested on the appropriate government agencies to
determine the suitability of a land for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes. With the passage of the CARL, the
conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses was
retained and the imposition on the landowner to implement within a
time frame the proposed non-agricultural use of the land was done
away with.Moreover, inPasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[17]the Court declared categorically that the
failure of the landowner therein to complete the housing project
did not have the effect of reverting the property to its
classification as agricultural land, although the order of
conversion issued by the then Minister of Agrarian Reform obliged
the landowner to commence the physical development of the housing
project within one year from receipt of the order of
conversion.[18]In said case, a vast tract of land claimed to be
cultivated by its tenants formed part of the subdivision plan of a
housing project approved by the National Planning Commission and
Municipal Council of Carmona and subsequently declared by the
Provincial Board of Cavite as composite of the industrial areas of
Carmona, Dasmarias, Silang and Trece Martirez. Because the
reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of
Carmona to non-agricultural land took place before the effectivity
of the CARL, the Court held that Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 cannot
be applied retroactively.[19]More importantly, the Court inPasong
Bayabasrecognized the power of local government units to adopt
zoning ordinances, citing Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,[20]to
wit:Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government
Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation
with the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance
prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.
The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to
residential lands to non-agricultural lands reclassified is not
subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner
applies only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for
the conversion of lands previously placed under agrarian reform law
after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to
agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to
the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.[21]Thus, the zoning ordinance
passed by the municipality sometime in 1980 reclassifying the
subject land as commercial and future site of a market complex
operated to take away the agricultural status of the subject
property. Subsequent events cited by petitioners such as their
continuous tillage of the land and the non-commencement of the
construction of the market complex did not strip the land of its
classification as commercial.Petitioners reliance on the provisions
of A.O. No. 20, series of 1992, issued by then President Fidel
Ramos is misplaced. A.O. No. 20, which sets forth the guidelines to
be observed by local government units and government agencies on
agricultural land use conversion, cannot be applied to the subject
land for the reason that the land had already been classified as
commercial long before its issuance. Indeed, A.O. No. 20 cannot be
applied retroactively.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari isDENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55710 areAFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.SO ORDERED.DANTE O. TINGAAssociate JusticeWE
CONCUR:ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice
[1]Rollo,pp. 28-39. Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and
concurred in byJJ. Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Chairman, Tenth
Division, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.[2]Id.at
41-49.[3]Id.at29-30.[4]Id.at30.[5]Id.at 48.[6]CArollo, pp.
32-33.[7]Id.at 42-47.[8]Id.at 17-21.[9]Rollo, p. 9.[10]Natalia
Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 103302, 12
August1993, 225 SCRA 278, 283.[11]G.R. No. 103302,12 August1993,
225 SCRA 278.[12]National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde, 376
Phil. 147 (1999).[13]Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 142359, 25 May2004, 429 SCRA 109;Junio v.
Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 173.[14]Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 457
(2001.[15]CArollo, p. 48.[16]R.A. No. 3844, Section 36 (1), as
amended by R.A. No. 6389.[17]Supra note 13.[18]Supra
noteat136.[19]Supra note 13 at 135.[20]Power to adopt zoning and
planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and
Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their
respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the
City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and
municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning
Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning.[21]Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note
13 at 134-35.
============================================================================================================EN
BANCG.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE
A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO
T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M.
MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM,respondent.G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989ARSENIO AL. ACUNA,
NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO
GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental,petitioners,vs.JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL,respondents.G.R. No. 79744
July 14, 1989INOCENTES PABICO,petitioner,vs.HON. PHILIP E. JUICO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO
TAAY,respondents.G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989NICOLAS S. MANAAY and
AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR.,petitioners,vs.HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; ROLE. Although holding
neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested
with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the
executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law.
This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of
judicial supremacy.
2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS; CONSTRUED. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint,
born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the
other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and
the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend
of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that
before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies
were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO DECLARE AN ACT OR LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; CONSTITUTIONS. The Constitution itself lays down
stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on
the issue during their session en banc.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY; REQUISITES. The Court will
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case
or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PROPER PARTY; CASE AT BAR. With
particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in
the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO DECLARE AN ACT OR
LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL; TRIBUNAL WITH WIDE DISCRETION TO WAIVE
REQUIREMENT. Even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court
to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.
7. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. . . . When the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.
8. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENT; EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER DURING MARTIAL LAW, SUSTAINED. The promulgation of P.D. No.
27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial
law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find
no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue.
9. ID.; 1987 CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENT; LEGISLATIVE POWER,
AUTHORIZED. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above. The said measures were issued by
President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power
from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt
the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987,
and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were
both issued on July 22, 1987.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEASURES PROMULGATED REMAINS VALID EVEN AFTER
LOST OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; RATIONALE. Neither is it correct to say
that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her
legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in
force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared
invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become
inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature
that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquinos loss of
legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
11. ID.; STATUTES; PROCLAMATION REMAINS VALID EVEN AFTER LOST OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; RATIONALE. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation
measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for
that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release
of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is
agrarian reform.
12. ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION NO. 131 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229;
ABSENCE OF RETENTION LIMIT PROVIDED FOR IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for
retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide that
in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to two (2) qualification which is now in Section
6 of the law.
13. ID.; ID.; TITLE OF A BILL NEED NOT BE CATALOGUED. The title
of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and
will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to
each other and may be inferred from the title.
14. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ISSUANCES FROM
THE PRESIDENT REQUIRE PUBLICATION FOR EFFECTIVITY. But for all
their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos
still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this
Court held in Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, unless published in the
Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code,
they could not have any force and effect if they were among those
enactments successfully challenged in that case. (LOI 474 was
published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,
1976.)
15. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS; OFFICE.
Mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty
itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other
words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific
action.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY NOT AVAILABLE WHERE THERE IS A
PLAIN, SPEEDY REMEDY; EXCEPTION. While it is true that as a rule
the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the
issue raised is a question of law.
17. POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN; TRADITIONAL
DISTINCTIONS. There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to
and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain.
18. BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; CLASSIFICATION;
DEFINED. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons
or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES.; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
CLASSIFICATION; DEFINED. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it
must apply equally to all the members of the class.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING. Equal protection simply means that
all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both
as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.
21. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; NATURE. Eminent domain is an
inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.
22. ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILED OF. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions
offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come
into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the
interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to
the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare
of the people is the supreme law.
23. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS. Basically, the requirements for a
proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
24. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION; DEFINED. The term "political
question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure. (Taada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil.
1101)
25. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN JUST COMPENSATION; DEFINED. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
26. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "JUST", EXPLAINED. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
takers gain but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
27. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPENSABLE TAKING; CONDITIONS. There is
compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be
for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be
devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
28. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSIT NOT NECESSARY WHERE THE EXPROPRIATOR
IS THE ESTATE. Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is
not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession
of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all
the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount."cralaw virtua1aw library
29. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION THEREOF, ADDRESSED TO THE
COURTS OF JUSTICE. The determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped
by any other branch or official of the government.
30. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM LAW; DETERMINATION MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ONLY PRELIMINARY. The determination of the just
compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive
upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16
(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation. The determination made by the
DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to
review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.
31. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT IN MONEY ONLY NOT APPLICABLE IN
REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION. We do not deal here with the
traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for
a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation before us
affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. Such a program will involve
not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under
the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos
will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion
initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our
present standards. The Court has not found in the records of the
Constitutional Commission any categorial agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program being contemplated. On the other hand, there is nothing in
the records either that militates against the assumptions we are
making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on
the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner
in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the
limitations of the expropriator. Therefore, payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money.
32. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT TITLE SHALL PASS ONLY UPON
FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, NOT APPLICABLE. Title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. The CARP Law, for
its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. Hence, that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected.
33. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
CASE AT BAR. It does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has
already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate
resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet
to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim
that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not
own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues.
CRUZ,J.:In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who
blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae
after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but
Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened
several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son
of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was
touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and
crushed him to death.Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver
of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.The cases before us are not as fanciful as the
foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life
and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining
strength of the precious earth to stay alive."Land for the
Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the
distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is
more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a
battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the
sun.Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the
policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people,"1especially the less privileged. In
1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically
that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits."2Significantly, there was also the
specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform
program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil."3The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides
echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the
common people. These include a call in the following words for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:SEC. 4. The
State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in
line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and
indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July
17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D.
No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This
was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.Subsequently, with its formal organization, the
revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power
from the President and started its own deliberations, including
extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of
farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was
the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.4The above-captioned cases have been consolidated
because they involve common legal questions, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion
and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require
separate treatment, however, and will first be explained
hereunder.G.R. No. 79777Squarely raised in this petition is the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and
his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned
by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under
P.D. No. 27.The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative
power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is
invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small
landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section
25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.In
connection with the determination of just compensation, the
petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of
justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke
the recent cases ofEPZA v. Dulay5andManotok v. National Food
Authority.6Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill
of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of
bonds or other things of value.In considering the rentals as
advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process.
The equal protection clause is also violated because the order
places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the
owners of other properties.The petitioners also maintain that in
declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of
the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial
prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would
not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are
deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that
P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez
v. Zobel,7Gonzales v. Estrella,8and Association of Rice and Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform
Council.9The determination of just compensation by the executive
authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does
not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted.
At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department
of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties
because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention
limit of 7 hectares.Replying, the petitioners insist they are
proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention
limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a
class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below
24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just
compensation by the administrative authorities is a final
ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent,
the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed inChavez,
while what was decided inGonzaleswas the validity of the imposition
of martial law.In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it
is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except
Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared
unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same
infirmities as the earlier measures.A petition for intervention was
filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of
a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on
the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a
compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment
of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted
the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above-
mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No.
6657.G.R. No. 79310The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar
planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an
organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks
to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229.The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although
they agree that the President could exercise legislative power
until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact
emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even
assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was
properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have
to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.They also argue
that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:Agrarian
Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as
the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS
(P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall
be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset
Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth
received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and
such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts
collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered
automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The
money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation
has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this
time.Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary,
Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines
"shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by
the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of
current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but
subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be
paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of
part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or
direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by
the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or
approved by the PARC.The petitioners also argue that in the
issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful
study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem
in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to
them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the
same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate
group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal
protection has been violated.A motion for intervention was filed on
August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters
(NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual
sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another
motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona,
et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were
granted by the Court.NASP alleges that President Aquino had no
authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any
event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the
amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and
21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty
billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the
maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the
stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National
Treasurer as actually available.Two additional arguments are made
by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of
eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.The petitioners also decry the penalty for
non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the
said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's
valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the
landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to
immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation
of the uniformity rule.In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity
for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the
Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP
and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not
indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.On the alleged
violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have
failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of
Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later.
From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be
premature.The public respondent also points out that the
constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money
without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only
money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation
law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian
Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually
the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that
additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.On
April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a
petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano
contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:(1) Only
public lands should be included in the CARP;(2) E.O. No. 229
embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the
title;(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on
July 2, 1987; and(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special
fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.G.R. No. 79744The petitioner alleges that the then
Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his
landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the
private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to
him.On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous
inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer
and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of
Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims
that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing.
On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which
had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private
respondents.The petitioner now argues that:(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.(2)
The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation.(3) The petitioner is denied the right
of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.The
petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229
shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary,
besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory
Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be
promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.The
petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his
property without due process of law and to the retention of his
small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides
denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O.
No. 228 declaring that:Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the
farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.is an unconstitutional taking of a
vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion
of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners
with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.In
his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is
premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the
Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the
validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that
they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:The
incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until the first Congress is convened.On the issue of just
compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated
on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was
deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals
paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner
maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14,
1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless
with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect
sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.G.R. No.
78742The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention
granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend
to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the
statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.According to P.D. No. 316, which was
promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:No tenant-farmer in
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be
ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall
have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.The petitioners claim they cannot eject
their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They
therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent to issue the said rules.In his Comment, the public
respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other
agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family.
And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms,
the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued,
to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on
Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide
Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No.
18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage
of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off
Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding
applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners
are now barred from invoking this right.The public respondent also
stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of
the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules,
assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of
discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ ofmandamus.
This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this
case, to a separate department of the government.In their Reply,
the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not
applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares
of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules
were intended to cover them also, the said measures are
nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as
required by law and the ruling of this Court inTanada v.
Tuvera.10As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional
reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed
the presidential decree.IAlthough holding neither purse nor sword
and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the
government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of
both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the
reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily
exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the
courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions
and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down
the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional.
The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is
to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law
was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the
President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be
breached.In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent
conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring
therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the
issue during their session en banc.11And as established by judge
made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.12With particular regard to the requirement of proper party
as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as
a result of the acts or measures complained of.13And even if,
strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.In the first
Emergency Powers Cases,14ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties
and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have
since then applied this exception in many other cases.15The other
above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present
petitions.In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing
upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the
ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act
invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at
this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God
and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and
discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations
are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment
is as ineffectual as intimidation.For all the awesome power of the
Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make
the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy
language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public
official, betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution.It need only be added, to borrow again the words of
Justice Laurel, that ... when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.16The cases before us categorically raise
constitutional questions that this Court must categorically
resolve. And so we shall.IIWe proceed first to the examination of
the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges
to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these
petitions.The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in
the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been
sustained inGonzales v. Estrellaand we find no reason to modify or
reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O
