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    F A L L E N G I A N TCase Study of American International Group, Inc.

    J E N N I F E R D E M A R S

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS(hyperlinks)

    I BACKGROUND

    II CAUSES OF FAILURE

    III RISKS TAKEN

    IV LESSONS LEARNED

    CONCLUSION

    REFERENCES

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    AIG Building, 70 Pine St., Lower Manhattan (1931 Photo)

    B A C K G R O U N DOVERVIEW HISTORY FINANCIAL CONDITION & ANALYSIS

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    O V E R V I E W

    American InternationalGroup, Inc. (AIG) is aworld leader ininsurance and financialservices.

    It is headquartered in NewYork City, and operates inmore than 130 countriesand jurisdictions.

    Its primary activities

    include General Insuranceand Life Insurance &Retirement Services.

    NYC

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    In 2006, AIG had sales of$113 billion and 116,000employees (Saporito, 2009).

    According to the 2008 ForbesGlobal 2000 list, AIG wasonce the 18th-largestpublic company in theworld.

    It was listed on the Dow JonesIndustrial Average from April8, 2004 to September 22,2008.

    AIG's common stock is listedon the New York StockExchange, as well as the stockexchanges in Ireland andTokyo.

    London, England

    O V E R V I E W

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    AIG Building, 70 Pine St., LowerManhattan

    AIG faltered in Americas sub-prime

    mortgage crisis. It had tradedheavily in credit default swapsand could not meet its obligations.The United States governmentcame to its rescue with an $85billion bailout on September 16,2008.

    O V E R V I E W

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    AIG has taken a major step

    toward cleaning up its imageby reorganizing its insuranceunits under AIU Holdings, asof March 2009.

    AIU and its subsidiary brands

    are now distinct from AIG(National News, 2009).

    The holding company, itself, iscurrently undergoingrebranding that includes a

    new name, which is expectedto be revealed in the nearfuture.

    O V E R V I E W

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    H I S T O R Y

    Cornelius V. Starrstarted AIG as American Asiatic Underwriters in 1919 in Shanghai (Madsen 2008).

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    H I S T O R Y

    Starr moved AIG from Shanghai to New York after the Communists came to power in 1949.

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    In 1962, Starr gave management of

    the company's lagging U.S. holdingsto Maurice R. Greenberg, whoshifted its focus onto sellinginsurance through independentbrokers rather than agents.

    In 1968, Starr named Greenberg hissuccessor.

    AIG went public in 1969.

    Maurice R. Greenberg

    H I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    Greenberg wasfired due toaccounting scandal

    in February 2005,and was succeededas CEO by

    Martin J. Sullivan.On June 15, 2008,Sullivan resigned

    and was replaced by

    Robert B.Willumstad,

    Chairman of the AIGBoard of Directors.Willumstad wasforced by the U.S.government to stepdown and wasreplaced by

    Edward M. Liddyon September 17,2008.

    S OS O

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    H I S T O R Y

    SEPTEMBER 2008

    AIGs credit ratings were

    downgraded below "AA"levels, causing thecompany to suffer aliquidity crisis.

    The United StatesFederal Reserve Bank

    created an $85 billioncredit facility to help AIGmeet increased collateralobligations, in exchangefor stock warrants worth79.9% of the companysequity.

    H I S T O R Y

    H I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    LATE SEPTEMBER 2008

    Two weeks after AIG wasbailed out, the companyheld a $443,344.71

    party for its salespeopleat the St. Regis Resort inDana Point, California.

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    H I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    Since September 2008, AIG has been marketing its assets to pay off itsgovernment loans. A decline in the valuation of insurance businesses, and theweakening financial state of potential bidders, has hindered its efforts (Barr

    2009).

    AIG subsidiary, International Lease Finance Corp. (ILFC), Los Angeles, CA

    H I S T O R YH I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    MARCH 2, 2009

    AIG reported a fourth quarter 2008 loss of $61.7 billion.

    The announcement of the loss had an impact onmorning trading in Europe and Asia, with the FTSE100,DAX and Nikkei all suffering steep losses.

    In the U.S., the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell tobelow 7000 points, a twelve-year low.

    H I S T O R Y

    H I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    On top of these losses, in March 2009,AIG was attacked by the public andmedia for its retention payments of$165 million.

    March 18, 2009, Liddy waits to testify on Capitol Hill.

    H I S T O R Y

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    March 23, 2009, Now-blank marquee on AIG building in New York City.

    As a result of publicanger over these

    employee bonuses, AIGhas rebranded a majorityof its business under AIUHoldings, Inc. (Kaiser &Daly 2009).

    H I S T O R Y

    H I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    Liddy announced on May 21, 2009 that he isresigning, but will stay until a new CEO ishired.

    He receives an annual salary of $1 andequity grants, though he may be "eligiblefor a special bonus for extraordinaryperformance payable in 2010" (Barnes2009).

    H I S T O R Y

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    H I S T O R Y

    To date, the U.S. governments total loan package to AIG has topped $182.5 billion(Hamilton, 2009).

    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

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    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

    Sales 17.53 Bil

    Income -97.25 Bil

    Net Profit Margin -557.83%

    Return on Equity -155.05%

    Debt Equity Ratio 4.09

    Revenue/Share 130.87

    Earnings/Share -720.86

    Book Value/Share 340.12

    Dividend Rate 0.00

    Payout Ratio N/A

    AIGCURRENT FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

    from MSN Money, July 20, 2009.

    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

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    FY (12/09) FY (12/08) FY (12/07)

    1st Quarter 20,458.0 14,031.0 30,645.0

    2nd Quarter N/A 19,933.0 31,150.0

    3rd Quarter N/A 898.0 29,836.0

    4th Quarter N/A -23,758.0 18,433.0

    Total 20,458.0 11,104.0 110,064.0

    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

    AIGREVENUE QUARTERLY RESULTS(in Millions)

    from MSN Money, July 20, 2009.

    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

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    FY (12/09) FY (12/08) FY (12/07)

    1st Quarter -$39.67 -$61.75 $31.62

    2nd Quarter N/A -$41.13 $32.87

    3rd Quarter N/A -$181.04 $23.95

    4th Quarter N/A -$459.02 -$41.51

    Total -$39.67 -$742.94 $46.93

    AIGEARNINGS PER SHARE QUARTERLY RESULTS(in Millions)

    from MSN Money, July 20, 2009.

    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

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    FY (12/09) FY (12/08) FY (12/07)

    1st Quarter 91% -49% ---

    2nd Quarter N/A 33% 4%

    3rd Quarter N/A -340% -27%

    4th Quarter N/A -154% N/A

    AIGQUARTER OVER QUARTER ESP GROWTH RATE

    from MSN Money, July 20, 2009.

    F I N A N C I A L C O N D I T I O N

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    FY (12/09) FY (12/08) FY (12/07)

    1st Quarter 36% N/A N/A

    2nd Quarter N/A N/A N/A

    3rd Quarter N/A N/A N/A

    4th Quarter N/A N/A -1,006%

    AIGYEAR OVER YEAR ESP GROWTH RATE

    from MSN Money, July 20, 2009.

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    The financials for 2008 were not good, as AIG posted a $99billion loss for the year.

    The first quarter of 2009 looks promising, however, withrevenue in the first quarter of 2009 outperforming all of 2008.

    Earnings-per-share is poor, but the first quarter 2009 loss wasconsiderably lower than fourth quarter 2008.

    It is the hope of the markets that AIG has started to reboundfrom the low points of their 2008 crisis.

    F I N A N C I A L A N A L Y S I S

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    C A U S E S O F F A I L U R E

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    Many factors led to the ultimate takeover of American International Group(AIG) by the U.S. Federal Reserve in September 2008.

    NYC

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    CREDIT DERIVATIVES

    AIGs trouble began when its

    Financial Products (FP) unitstarted selling credit defaultswaps.

    AIG FP developed a portfolio of$2.7 trillion in creditderivatives (Leonard, 2008).

    AIG became liable for muchmore money than it could payout if the portfolios were todefault.

    In 2008, AIG FP piled up $40billion in losses related to itsdealings in complex mortgagebond derivatives (Saporito,2009).

    NY Times, 5/14/09

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    FRIENDS INWASHINGTON

    AIG was able to engagein risky business for so

    long because Washingtonlooked the other way.

    The company befriendedpoliticians with campaigncontributions, escaping

    regulation that mighthave prevented thecurrent crisis (Saporito,2009).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    POOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

    Regulators never imagined the extent of the looming defaults. AIG'suncollateralized insurance business was regulated by Washington's Office of ThriftSupervision, whose task is to watch over savings-and-loan companies, not global

    insurers (Saporito, 2009). Evidently it wasn't watching AIG.

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    POOR REGULATORYOVERSIGHT

    Joseph Cassano built

    up AIG FP on what'sbeen described asregulatory arbitrage.

    As Federal ReserveChairman Ben

    Bernanke explained,"AIG exploited a hugegap in the regulatorysystem. There was nooversightof theFinancial Productsdivision. This was a

    hedge fund, basically,that was attached to alarge and stableinsurance company"(Torres & Son, 2009).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    CASSANOSFRANKENFINANCE

    Cassano built hisbusiness unit upon"Frankenfinance(Browning, 2008). Hehad no background inquantitative finance,and didnt fully

    understand thebusiness he wasrunning (Progressive,2009). Also, hisjudgment was cloudedby his insecurity.

    Cassano resigned asChief Executive of AIGFP in March 2008 afterthe company surprisedinvestors by disclosinglosses at the unit.

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    NO COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS

    With its high credit rating, AIG FP wasn't required tostockpile reserves to cover potential losses (Saporito,2009).

    Cassano said in August 2007 that he couldn't imagine asituation in which AIG would "lose one dollar in any of thesetransactions (Saporito, 2009).

    Once the company lost its top credit rating, AIG FP shouldhave stopped writing swaps and hedged, or reinsured, itsexisting ones (Saporito, 2009). But it didnt.

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    CARELESS RISKMANAGEMENT

    When it was initially writingall that CDS protection, AIGthought it wasn't possible totake any losses because itscontracts were supporting

    such highly rated, highlyprotected slices, according toa former AIG FP employee(Eisinger, 2008).

    AIG FP lost more than $10billion in 2007 and $14.7billion in the first six monthsof 2008 (Fox, 2008).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    GREED

    By 2007, the CDSmarket had grown intoa $70 trillion annualbusiness.

    In selling CDS, AIG

    was receiving hugepayments.

    AIG's FP unit was anendless moneymachine, adding $6billion of riches toAIG's reserves from1988 until 2005(Lenzner, 2008).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    DONT ASK, DONT TELL

    As long as AIG FP was producing a

    profit, senior management didnt askor care how it was being achieved.

    Martin Sullivan (fired from being ChiefExecutive of AIG in June 2008) had

    even eliminated a twice-a-monthmeeting to assess the work of the

    unit. He just wasnt interested(Browning, 2008).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    DANGEROUS EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES

    Howard Sosin founded AIG FP in 1987, andremained there until 1993. When he was firsthired, he was offered a 20 percent stake in the FPunit and 20 percent of its profits (Browning,2008).

    While many hedge fund managers receive thistype of incentive program, this a conflict of

    interest. This causes a manager to throw cautionto the wind in order to make a profit.Understanding that the higher the risk, the higherthe expected return, Sosin was given almost freereign.

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    SYSTEMIC RISK

    Insurance companies can handle catastrophicrisk but not systemic risk.

    AIG underwrote systemic risk.

    "One thing about the insurance model: it relieson diversification as its means to exist," said atop executive at an AIG competitor. "If aninsurance company plays in a field where itunderwrites systemic risk, that's a totallydifferent experience" (Saporito, 2009).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    THREAT OF GLOBAL DISASTER

    The CDS market is far from transparent.Nobody knew for sure what the consequencesof AIG's failure for financial markets would be.The fear was that it could lead to total chaos.

    On March 10, Bernanke remarked, In a crisis,

    the authorities have strong incentives toprevent the failure of a large, highlyinterconnected financial firm, because of therisks such a failure would pose to the financialsystem and the broader economy (FRBSpeech, 2009).

    CAUSES OF FAILURE

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    HUGE BONUS PAYOUTS

    After its bailout, AIGs payout of retention bonuses, not to mention

    luxury trips and other perks, has caused AIG further failure in theform of a public relations fiasco.

    R I S K S T A K E N

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    R I S K S T A K E N

    April 30, 2009, Demonstrators outside AIG Headquarters in NYC.

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    CREDIT RISK

    The level of credit risk that AIG insured by

    selling credit default swaps (CDS) was farbeyond what it could tolerate.

    The company mismanaged CDS sellingbecause it failed to plan for what wouldhappen if the assets protected by theswaps would default on a large scale.

    O P E R A T I O N A L R I S K S

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    O P E R A T I O N A L R I S K S

    Computer Models

    AIG placed too much faithin math that told them theworst would never happen.Credit risks werejustifiedbecause computersimulations showed only a

    tiny chance that the firmwould ever have to pay outanything.

    OPERATIONAL RISKS

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    Employee Quality Control

    One of the AIGs familiar arguments about retention bonuses is that it must keep in place thepeople who helped cause the catastrophe because new talent is nearly impossible to find.

    AIG is still keeping Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis in place, thoughhe may be one of the prime culprits of AIG's collapse (Carney, 2009 & WSJ, 2009).

    OPERATIONAL RISKS

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    Compensation Practices

    Focus on retention bonuses means that executives are

    getting paid not for their results, but rather for theirreputation (Gellner, 2009). This tends to weaken thesolvency of the company, as more money goes tocompensation expenses rather than to reinvestment in moretangible assets.

    Estate of AIG Executive James Hass, Fairfield, CT

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    LIQUIDITY RISK

    On Sept. 15, 2008, AIG lost its AA credit rating.Moody's and S&P downgraded it immediately afterLehman failed. It had already been downgradedfrom AAA in 2005. The ratings downgradetriggers in its CDS contracts forced AIG to post $15billion in collateral. AIG couldn't come up withthat much cash on short notice.

    OPERATIONAL RISKS

    M A R K E T R I S K S

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    MARKET RISKS

    AIG plunged into lucrative new markets withoutthoroughly understanding of market risk. AIG wasunprotected and unprepared when the assetsunderlying its credit default swaps failed in greatnumbers.

    April 3, 2009, March on Wall Street & AIG as part of the Bail Out People, Not Banks Protest.

    M A R K E T R I S K S

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    AIG plunged into lucrative new markets withoutthoroughly understanding MARKET RISK.

    AIG had believed, before its collapse, it would haveto take a very unlikely systemic failure for its CDS

    business to go sour (Fox, 2008).

    AIG was never stopped from growing too big tofail.

    AIG did not realize that all of its CDS contracts werehighly correlated.

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    LEGAL RISKS

    AIGs use government money has invited legal trouble.

    One recent example is that insurance regulators are lookinginto allegations that AIG is under-pricing coverage(Hoffman, 2009).

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    REPUTATIONAL RISKS

    AIGs reputation was in the gutter when itgot bailed out. Since then, the company hasnot done much to salvage its character.Does it even matter?

    More large bonuses are now scheduled to behanded out to executives at AIG.

    It will be a miracle if the company canrecover and ever sell off its assets to repayAmerican taxpayers.

    L E S S O N S L E A R N E D

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    L E S S O N S L E A R N E D

    LESSONS LEARNED

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    Retain the Talent and Reward Properly

    In the era of downsizing and mergers, those employees who pusha company forward are the most valuable.

    LESSONS LEARNED

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    Transparency is Essential

    Without transparency, as in AIG's case, there is miscommunication, scandaland inefficiency, which ultimately impacts the entire chain.

    LESSONS LEARNED

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    Gain Shareholder Trust

    Open up more to the public, offer added value and education,and build trust (Moore, 2009).

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    W H A T I S W O R K I N G

    The AIG bailout has helped stabilize the financialmarkets. Federal money has helped AIG redeem some ofits derivatives contracts, getting them off its books and

    out of the system.

    Its also helping AIG unwind itself. Had AIG beenforced to liquidate those assets, AIG would have gottenpennies on the dollar for valuable assets and many otherbusinesses would suddenly have been devalued, too.

    Its keeping AIGs insurance businesses stable. IfAIG had been forced to liquidate, it would have affected itsinsurance units and millions of policyholders. With a moreorderly process underway, the policyholders are nowcompletely protected (Newman, 2009).

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    W H A T I S N O T W O R K I N G

    Revolting bonuses. Giving bonuses to the people whobrought down AIG is a perversion of justice. Officials at theFederal Reserve and the Treasury Dept. should have put

    terms into the original bailout agreement that prevented this.

    Counterparty payouts. AIG has used much of itsgovernment aid money to refund money to big banks andother counterparties, to cash out some of those credit-default swaps and reduce AIGs liabilities. However,regulators still havent explained why the counterparties gotall their money back.

    Secrecy. We (taxpayers) keep learning the terms of the AIGbailout well after the fact. In general, we should learn thedetails of the bailout as they occur (Newman, 2009).

    CO C S O

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    CONCLUSION

    Between the CDS and securitieslending, AIG still has lots ofwork to do. The governmentsburden of AIG will not go awayanytime soon.

    AIG has "made meaningfulprogress," but the company isstill at the mercy of the

    economy (Saporito, 2009).

    In the businesses it wants tokeep, like commercialinsurance, competitors see anopportunity to grab market

    share. For the assets it wantsto sell, there are few buyers.What remains is still a giant,vulnerable company.

    R E F E R E N C E S

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    R E F E R E N C E S

    Barnes, P. (2009, March 20). Treasury, Fed Reviewed AIG Bonus Info Months Ago.Retrieved June 30, 2009, fromhttp://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/industries/finance/treasury-fed-reviewed-aig-bonus-info-months-ago/

    Barr, A. (2008, May 9).AIG's shares fall 9% on record loss, $12.5 billion capital plan -MarketWatch. Retrieved July 1, 2009, fromhttp://www.marketwatch.com/story/aigs-shares-fall-9-on-record-loss-125-billion-capital-plan

    Browning, L. (2008, September 8).AIGs House of Cards. Retrieved July 9, 2009, from

    http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-5/2008/09/28/AIGs-Derivatives-Run-Amok

    Carney, John (2009, March 27). The Business Insider.AIG's Whole Toxic RiskManagement Team Still Happily Employed. Retrieved July 13, 2009 from,http://www.businessinsider.com/aigs-toxic-risk-management-team-still-happily-employed-2009-3

    Eisinger, J. (2008, September 18). What Went Wrong at A.I.G.?Retrieved July 9, 2009,from http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-5/2008/09/18/What-Went-Wrong-at-AIG

    FRB Speech - Bernanke, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk--March 10, 2009.(2009, March 10). Retrieved July 9, 2009, fromhttp://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm

    R E F E R E N C E S (c o n t.)

    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