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t
AIR
POWER
AND
THE
GROUND
WR
I N
VIETNAM
IDEAS
AND
ACTIONS
by
DONALD
.
MROZEK
Seni or
Resear ch Fel l ow
Ai rpower Resear ch
I n s t i t u t e
Ai r Uni versi t y Press
Maxwel l Ai r
Force
Base, Aabama
36112- 5532
J anuary 1988
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Li brary
of Congr ess
Cat al ogi ng- i n- Publ i cat i on
Dat a
Mr ozek Donal d J
Ai r
Power
and
t he
Gr ound
War
i n
Vi et nam
I ncl udes bi bl i ographi es and i ndex
Vi et namese o n f l i c t
1961- 1975- Aer i al
Oper ati ons
Amer i can I
T i t l e
DS 8 M79 1988 959. 704 348 87- 31931
I SBN
1- 58566- 015- 9
Fust P r i n t i n g J anuar y 1988
Second
P r i n t i n g December 2
Thi rd P r i n t i n g Sept ember
2002
D scl ai mer
Thi s
study represents
thevi ews
of
the
author
and
does
not
necessar i l y
ref l ect
the
o f f i c i a l
opi n-
i on of the Ai r
Uni ver si t y
Center f or Aerospace
Doct r i ne
Research
and
Educati on AUCADRE
or theDepartment of the
Ai r
Force
Thi s p ubl i cat i on has
been
revi ewedby
secur i t y
andpol i c y
revi ew
aut hor i t i es
and
i s
cl eared
f or
publ i c
rel ease
For
s a l e by
t he Superi nt endent
of
Doc ument s
US
Gover nment
P r i n t i n g
Of f i ce
Washi ngt on
D C
20402
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q
Im
cqol z
a i orz
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Chapter
Cont ent s
DSCLAIMER
Page
FOREWORD x
ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR
x
ACKNOWEDGMENTS x
I NTRODUCTION
xv
P RT
ONE
EVERYBODY S
WR
NOBODY S
WR
AIR
POWR
THEORIES AIR
FORCE
THNKING
AND
THE
CONFLICTIN
VI ETNAM
THEPASTWSPROLOGUE
3
The
Thrust of US
Ai r
Power Theor i es
5
The
Ascendancy
of t he
Of f ensi ve
7
Li mted
Wr as
aChal l enge
t o
Doct r i ne
3
Vi etnamandt he Burden of t he
Past 7
Notes
24
INTERSERV CE
DFFERENCES OMM NDND
CONTROL
ANDTHECONDUCTOF
WR
NSOUTHEAST
ASIA
27
I nt erservi ce
Di f f erences i n t he
Post Wrl d
Wr
Context
9
TheSearch
f or Si mpl i ci t y
i n
t he Compl exi ty of
Sout heas t Asi a
Pressures f or Change
8
Doct r i ne and
Compl exi ty
44
Notes
46
WRMAKNG
ANDWROLITICS CIVI LIAN
OFFICIALS
AND
THE
USES
OF
MLITARY
POWR
49
Pol i t i cal
Acti on
as
aCount erguerr i l l a
Wr
50
Competi ng
Vi si ons of t he Vi etnamWr
52
Sel f Def eati ng
Aspect s
of t he
US
Commtment
t o
Count er i nsur gency
57
Wr as Pol i t i cs
6
The
Cont i nuat i on of
Wr as
Pol i t i cs
64
Notes
65
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Chapter
P RTTWO
TWO
THREE
M NY
VIETNAMS
P RTTHREE
REFLECTIONSND
CONCLUSIONS
Page
4
RETHNKING
GROUNDWRF RE
73
Mobi l i t y
versus
Autonomy 74
Fi r epower
and
Fi r ebases 77
Suppl y
Suppor t and Secur i t y
83
Secr et
Bombi ng
and Hi dden War f ar e
86
Hal f - Tol d Tal es
9
Not es 94
5
PRO LEMS
I N
THE
PERFORM NCEOF
TRADTIONAL
ROLES
99
Per si st ence
and
Pr i de
I nte l l i gence and Reconnai ssance 106
Search Rescue
and Evacuat i on
114
Suppor t i ng
GroundCombat
Forces
118
Not es
120
6
THELIMTS
OFINNOVATION
123
Fi xed- Wng Gunshi ps
Squar e Pegs Var i ed Hol es
and
t he
Penkni f e
of
I nnovat i on 125
War and
t he Envi r onment
132
Tact i cal I nnovat i on
and t he
B 52 139
Ground Al t er nat i ves
f o r
Cl ear i ng and
I nt e r di c t i on
145
Sel f - Sustai ni ng
Change
148
Not es 148
7 AIR
POWR NDTHEM IV LENCEOFVETN M
155
War
as
an
Event and
as
a
Process
161
Li m tedWar and Li m ted Commtment 166
Compl exi t y
and
Si mpl i c i t y
171
ManagngWar
and
WgngD pl omacy
175
Between
Ri gi di t y
and
Vac i l l at i on
180
The
I l l u s i o n
of Neut r al i t y
185
Not es
187
I NDEX 193
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LI ST
I LLUSTRATI ONS
Tabl e
1 Rat i o of Enemy t o
A l l i e d Casual t i es
80
2 I mpressi oni st i c
Repr esent at i on of
Decr easi ng Doubt / Di f f i cul t y of
Gunshi p
Fi r e- Suppor t Rol e
and
I ncreas i ng
Doubt /
D f f i c u l t y of
Guns hi p
I nt erdi c t i on Rol e
133
3
Repr esentat i on
of
Area
of
Uncer t ai nt y
on
I nt er di c t or y
versus
Support Rol e
of
Def ol i at i on
137
M s si ons
Sor t i es and
Res ul t s of
Shi ni ng
Brass P r a i r i e
F i r e
and
hu
Dung
111
2 M s si ons Sor t i es and
Resul t s
of Dani el
Boone
Sal em House
and
Thot
ot
113
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Foreword
Dr
Donal d
Mr ozek s
research
sheds consi der abl e
l i g h t
on
howt he
use of
a i r
power
evol ved
i n
t he
Vi et nam
War Much more
t han
si mpl y r e t e l l i n g
event s
rozek anal yzes howh i s t o r y p o l i t i c s t echnol ogy
and t he compl exi t y of t he war
dr ove
t he
appl i cat i on
of
a i r
power
i n
a
l ong
and
di vi si ve st ruggl e
Mozek
del ves
i nto
a
weal t h
of
or i gi nal document at i on and hi s
schol arshi p
i mpeccabl e
Hi s
anal ysi s
t hor ough and bal anced Hi s concl usi ons a r e
wel l
r easoned
but
wi l l t roubl e t hose who
have
never seri ousl y consi dered how t he
appl i cat i on
of a i r power i s i nf l uencedby
f a c t o r s
f a r
beyond t he
b a t t l e f i e l d
Whether
or not t he reader
agrees
w t h
Mr ozek
t he qual i t y of
hi s
research
and anal ysi s
makes
hi s
concl usi ons i mpossi bl e t o
i gnore
O NC FRYER R
Br i gadi er General
US F
Commander
Cent er
f o r
Aerospace Doct r i ne
Research and Educat i on
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OUT
THE
UTHOR
Dr
DonaldJ Mozek
Donal d J Mozek
i s
Prof essor of Hi st or y a t
Kansas S t a t e
Uni ver si t y, wher e
he
has t aught si nce
1972
He
ear ned
bot h
hi s M and PhD degr ees
a t
Rut ger s
Uni ver si t y, and hi s d i s s e r t a t i o n study
on
def ense
pol i cy
dur i ng
t he presi dency of
Harry Truman yi el ded a r t i c l e s i n
publ i cat i ons
such as M l i t ar y
Af f ai r s
and The
Busi ness
Hi st or y Revi ew Later
research i n
war t i me
and post war def ense i s s ue s
r esul t ed
i n
a r t i c l e s
i n
such
j ournal s as
t he
Annal s
of
I owa
and
Mi ssour i
Hi st or i cal
Revi ew
I n 1980, hi s a r t i c l e TheCr oat an
I nci dent
The
US
Navy and t he Pr obl em
of Raci al D scr i mnat i on a f t e r
World
War I I appear ed i n
M l i t ar y
Af f ai r s Al so i n
1980,
he
co- edi t ed The Mar t i n
Marauder
and t he Fr ankl i n
Al l ens
:
War t i me Love
S t o r y w t h Robi n Hghamand J eanne Loui se A l l en Newel l
Wth
hi s
col l eague
Robi n
H gham
he has al so
co- edi t ed
Gui de
t o
t he Sour ces of US
M l i t ar y
Hi st or y, i ncl udi ng t he 1981 and
1986
suppl ement ar y
vol umes
Dr
Mozek
has al so
engaged
i n research, publ i shed,
and t aught Amer i can
cul t ure Some of hi s
publ i cat i ons
have f used t he
ar eas of
ml i ta r y and c ul t ur a l
h i s t o r y
I n
1980, hi s essay TheCul t
and
Ri t ual
of
Toughness
i n
Col d
War
Ameri ca appear ed i n Ray Browne ed Ri t ual s and
Cer emoni es
i n Popul ar
Cul t ur e
I n
1984,
The
I nt erpl ay of
Metaphor and
Practi ce
i n t he
US
Def ense
Depar t ment s
Use
of
Spor t
was
publ i shed i n
t he J ournal
of
Amer i can
Cul t ur e,
and
i n 1985, Spor t and t he
Amer i can
M l i t ar y
D ver s i on
and
Duty
appear ed i n t he
cent enni al
i s s ue
of t he
Resear ch
Quar t er l y
f or
Exer ci se andSpor t
Oneof hi s more
recent
sol e- author ed ml i tary hi story
publ i cat i ons e n t i t l e d
The
L im t s
of
I nnovat i on
Aspects of
Ai r
Power
i n
Vi etnam
appear ed i n t he
J anuar y- Febr uar y
1985
i ssue
of
Ai r
Uni ver s i t y
Revi ew
I n
1986,
Ai r
Uni ver s i t y
Revi ew
a l s o publ i shed hi s
essay I n Sear ch
of t he Uni cor n, a di scussi on of t he
br oad
devel opment
of
ml i ta r y re form
movements
si nce
t he
Federal i st
er a
Havi ng
compl et ed
recent
st udi es f ocused
on t he era
of t he
Vi et nam
War
Dr Mozekpl ans
a
book- l engt h essay onUS
def ense
pol i cy a f t e r Worl dWar I I
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Acknowedgments
Onl y
those who
have had g r e a t
hel p
can
f u l l y appr eci at e howi mpor t ant
t
i s i n
devel opi ng
a
d i f f i c u l t ar gument on
a
cont ent i ous i ssue Per haps onl y
those
persons
wi l l sense t he dept h
of
my
gr a t i t ude t o
Col Kennet h
J Al nw ck
f or mer
d i r e c t o r of
t he
Ai r power
Resear ch
n s t i t u t e
f o r
hi s
ear l y
and
cont i nui ng
i nt e r e s t
i n
t h i s
pr o j ec t
and
t o
Col Donal dD
St evens t hen
d i r e c t o r
of
t he Ai r power Resear ch n s t i t u t e and
commnder
of t he
Ai r Uni ver s i t y Cent er f o r Aer ospace
Doct r i ne
Resear ch and
Educat i on AUCADRE)
have benefi t ed
f r o m
t he t hought f ul suggest i ons and
i ns i ght s
of
Lt Col
Donal dR
Baucomand Col
Denni s
M
Dr ew
who
have gui ded
research i n
t he Ai r power Resear ch n s t i t u t e Thei r
f r i endshi p val ue as
mch
as
t h ei r
advi ce
n t he revi s i on
and
s t a b i l i z a t i o n of
t h i s
st udy f ew persons l abored as
hard-and
had as mch t o l abor
over-asM
Thoms
Lobenst ei n
and
M
Preston
Br yant
of t he
Ai r Uni ver s i t y Pr ess
i n
U DRE
Thei r
d i l i gent
e f f o r t s
cl ose
at t ent i o n t o
wor di ng and a b i l i t y t o cat ch t he t h r u s t of
my
i nt ended ar gument s have mde
t h i s
workmch b e t t e r t han woul dot her w se have
been
t he case
The
s k i l l e d
and
hi ghl y
r esponsi ve s t a f f
of t he Ai r
Uni ver s i t y Li brary mdemny of
t he t a s ks
associ at ed
w t h
devel opi ng t he ar gument s i n
t h i s
work
mch easi er
than s
usual l y
t he
case
i n
any
l ong
pr oj ect
n add i t i on
owe a gr eat debt t o AUCADRE s hi ghl y
pr of essi onal and
capabl e
Document Pr ocessi ng
Center to al l
who
wor ked
on
t h i s
pr oj ect
but especi al l y t o
J o
Ann
Per due and Mar ci a
W l l i ams successi ve
d i r e c t o r s
i n
document
pr ocessi ng
Al so
Dor ot hy
McCl uski e
oversaw
s k i l l f u l l y
t he
t r ansf ormat i on of
t h i s
work
f r o m
a
manuscr i pt
i n t o a
book
The
at mospher e of
s er i ous i nqui ry
and
t he genui ne d e s i r e t o
avoi d mer el y
conveni ent
answer s t o naggi ng quest i ons
mdemy
two year s as a
Vi s i t i ng Resear ch
Fel l ow at AUCADRE s Ai r power Resear ch n s t i t u t e
a per sonal
and pr of essi onal
pl easur e
of a
mos t
hi gh or der The l a s t t hi ng a c i v i l i a n wor ki ng on t empor ar y
ass i gnment
i n a
m l i t a r y
agency
w shes
t o
be
s a cour t h i s t o r i a n
So
t
was
especi al l y
r eassur i ng t o
f i nd
t h a t
t h i s
was t he
l a s t
t hi ng
U DRE
want ed
us
t o be
eyond
t h a t
mus t
not e
my
pr of ound
respect
f o r t he di verse t a l e n t s
sawi n t he Ai r
Force
per sonnel
w t h
whom
wor ked
both
m l i t a r y
and
c i v i l i a n
and
f or t he
modest y
w t h
whi ch
they
carry
t h ei r
a b i l i t y
I nf or mal conver sat i ons w t h a number
of per sons
hel ped met o gai n someadded
f e e l
f o r t he Ai r
Force
as
a
ser vi ce
Wthout
s l i g h t i n g t he i nf or mal i n s t r u c t i o n
r ecei ved f r o m
al l
of
my
m l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n
col l eagues
i n research
amspeci al l y
g r a t e f u l t o
Lt
Col Davi d J
ean and Lt Col
W l l i am
Mack
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
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The
per sonal
aspects
of
l i v i n g and wor ki ng
i n
Montgomery pr oved t o
be an
unexpect edl y
r i c h
benef i t
of
my t aki ng
a t empor ar y ass i gnment a t Maxwel l
Ai r
Force
Base
s ha l l
al ways remember
t he f r i e n d l i n e s s
and
cour t esy of t he
peopl e
met
dur i ng
these past
two years
Speci al
f ondness
i s reserved
f o r
t he
Montgomery
Tr ack and
Runni ng
Cl ub,
however , and
f o r t he
wel com ng
and
engagi ng
peopl e
met on t he
r un
t was a l s o a pl easur e t o share
my
t i me i n t he Sout h w t h my f aml y,
especi al l y
my parents, somet i mes
i n
person
but more f r equent l y i n
l e t t e r s
Words
can
onl y suggest
what t h e i r cont i nui ng
suppor t means
Thi s work i s dedi cat ed t o t he memory of J oseph J
Mal one,
a f i n e h i s t o r i a n and
genui ne
exper t i n M ddl e
Eastern a f f a i r s
whosepassi ng mademe
r e a l i z e
howmuch
he meant and cont i nues t o mean to
me
usedt o
k i d
t h a t
J oe
Mal one was
t he
man
who
a s chai r man
of
t he Depar t ment of Hi s t or y
a t
Kansas
S t a t e
Uni ver si t y
i n
1972, had t he
good
t a s t e t o h i r e
me
. Actual l y,
t hough,
he was a manwho took
t he
r i s k
of
doi ng
so
Hi s
suppor t
of
my
pr of essi onal
e f f o r t s
di d much
t o
sust ai n
my
b e l i e f
t h a t somet hi ng
mght comeof i t
a l l i n t he
end came
t o
val ue J oe
Mal one
a l l
t he
more i n
t he
cont ext of
my
cl oser s t udi es
of
t he f r u s t r a t i o n s and
pai n
of t he
Amer i can
exper i ence i n
Vi et nam Onl y
t hen di d
appr eci at e J oe s
ser vi ce
t o
our
country i n Worl d
War
and hi s sense of how l i f e out si de t he
ml i t a r y
or t he
gover nment mght al so be
a
r e a l
ser vi ce t o
t he nat i on s
decency a s
wel l
a s t o i t s
s e c u r i t y and pr osper i t y For
t h a t
amgr atef ul t o hi m and f o r t h a t coul d not
f o r g e t hi meven i f t r i e d
7
ON L MROZEK
Vi s i t i ng Resear ch
Fel l ow
Ai r power
Resear ch n s t i t u t e
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
16/213
I nt r oduct i on
Ul t i mat el y
t h i s study
s
about
a smal l er
Vi et nam
War than
t h a t whi ch
s
commonl y recal l ed
t
f ocuses
on expect at i ons
concerni ng t h e i mpact
of a i r
power
on t he gr ound war
and
on someof
i t s
a c t u a l e f f e c t s but
t avoi ds
maj or
t r eat ment of
some
of
t h e
mos t
dr amat i c
a i r
acti ons
of
t h e
war
such
a s
t he
bombi ng
of
Hanoi
To
many
who
f ought t h e
war
and
bel i eve
t ought
t o
have been
conduct ed on a s t
l a r g e r scal e
o r w t h f ewer r e s t r a i n t s
t h i s
study may seem
al most perverse
emphasi zi ng a s
t
does t h e
u t i l i t y of a i r power i n
conduct i ng
t h e c o n f l i c t a s a
gr ound
war
and
w t hout
t o t a l
expl oi tat i on of
our most awe i nspi r i ng t echnol ogy
J u s t i f i c a t i o n s
f o r
such
a
study may
take
many f or ms
he si mpl est
s
t h a t
a i r
power
cont r i but ed
much
t o
l ower l e v el
c o n f l i c t Al l ow ng f o r
t he
great i mpor t ance
of s t r a t e g i c deterrence t he Uni t ed States w l l s t l l
face chal l enges t o
i t s
own and t s
a l l i e s
i n t e r e s t s
a t f a r
l ower
l e v e l s
of
c o n f l i c t
I n t h e cont ext of these l i k e l y
pr obl ems t h e
Vi et nam
exper i ence as sumes consi derabl e i n t er e s t
Al t hough
t h e chapters i n
t h i s
study a r e i nt ended
t o
f o r m
a coherent and
uni f i ed
ar gument
each al so o f f e r s
d i s c r e t e
mes sages
The chapters a r e not
meant t o
be
d e f i n i t i v e
hey
do
not
exhaust
avai l abl e
document ar y
materi al and
they often
r e l y
heavi l y
on
publ i shed account s or
do
they pr ovi de a
compl et e
chr onol ogi cal
pi ctur e
of t h e uses of a i r power
even
w t h respect t o t h e gr ound war or
i s
coverage
of
areas i n whi ch a i r power was
empl oyed South Vi et nam Laos
Cambodi a and
North
Vi etnamevenl y d i s t r i b u t e d nor
necessar i l y
pr opor t i onat e t o
t h e
e f f o r t
expended
i n
each
pl ace dur i ng
t h e
war
Lastl y
some
may
f i n d
one
o r
anot her
f o r m
of a i r power e i t h er s l i g h t l y or i n s u f f i c i e n t l y
treated
uch c r i t i c i s ms
a r e bes i de t he po i n t f o r t h e obj ecti ves
of t h i s
study a r e t o expl or e a
comparat i vel y
negl ected
theme the i mpact
of
a i r
power ont he ground and t o encourage
further
u t i l i z a t i o n
of
l essons
drawn
f r o m
t he
Vi et nam
experi ence
Part one
exam nes
t h e way i n whi ch i deas about a i r power affected t h e t hi nki ng of
many Ai r
Force personnel about howt o
f i g h t
both
bef or e
and
dur i ng
t h e
Vi et nam
War some
r el evant
c o n f l i c t s w t h i n
t he
Ai r Force t h e re l at i onshi p bet ween
i n t e r s er v i c e
di f f er ences
and
t he
ar r angement s made f o r
command and c o n t r o l and
t h e
t endency
among
bot h
c i v i l i a n s
and
t h e
m l i t a r y
t o
f a i l
t o di f f e r e n t i a t e
bet ween
war a s combat and war as p o l i t i c s
The three chapters do more than
pr ovi de
h i s t o r i c a l
backgr ound They
argue
t h a t t h e Ai r
Force was
nei t her neut ral nor
passi ve
w t h respect
t o t he c o n f l i c t i n Sout heast Asi a These chapters al so argue t h a t Ai r
Force i deas
pr oduced
onl y one s et of st r ongl y
advocat ed
opt i ons f o r
managi ng
t h e
war
he centers
of
c i v i l i a n
aut hor i t y t hemsel ves
became
i mpor t ant
a c t o r s
i n
t h e
war i n
Sout heast Asi a f a r
beyond
mere r eacti on
Pr obl ems
do
not e x i s t i n a
vacuum
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
17/213
nor
ar e t h e i r di mensi ons under st andabl e
i n
i s o l a t i o n
hey take
on
meani ng
when
they pass
through
t he
l ens of a behol der and t he character of t he w r
i n Sout heast
Asi a
coul d
never
be
establ i shed t o t he gener al agr eement
of al l
par t i es on
t he
a l l i e d
si de
because they
wer e usi ng d i f f er e n t l en s es Further
t h i s
f r u s t r a t i n g
di ver gence i n
t he
per cept i on
of
t h e c on f l i c t
sever el y
compl i cat ed
t he
devel opment
of
a
uni ver sal l y
s a t i s f a c t o r y command and
control
system These
and other
f a c t o r s
show how
pr obl ems
or i gi nat i ng
l ar gel y
i n
t he Uni t ed
States
added
t o
t he
t r oubl i ng compl exi t y
of
an
appar ent l y
Sout heast
Asi an
pr obl em
he
succeedi ng
three chapt er s deal more d i r e c t l y w t h t he conduct of t he war i n
Sout heast Asi a al t hough they ar e f ar
f r ombei ng convent i onal
oper at i onal h i s t o r i e s
Whi l e
t h i s
st udy
does
not
c l a im
t ha t ai r
power i n an y
si mpl e
sense r evol ut i oni zed
gr ound
war f are
nor
t ha t t
di spl aced t r a d i t i o n a l
pri nci pl es
of
w r
w t h some
new
s et
of pr i n c i p l es
t
does
c l a imt h a t ai r power i nc l i nedmany ml i t a r y
l eader s and some
c i v i l i a n s
t o
a l t e r
t h e i r
under st andi ngs
of
what
t he
pr i nci pl es
meant
i n t he
cont ext of
cont empor ar y
oper at i ons
Chapt er s
4
and
6
deal w t h
these
al t er e d
under st andi ngs
t h e i r achi evement s and l i m t s and some of
t h e i r
i mpl i cat i ons
Tr adi t i onal t erms
such as i n t e r d i c t i o n f i r epower
mobi l i t y
and
sur pr i se
make
t h e i r
appear ance
i n t hese chapt er s
but
t he
pr i nci pal
focus t o
f o l l ow
t he ext ent t o
whi ch
t hey r ecei ved a
novel t wi s t i n t he
cont ext
of t he
Vi et nam
and Sout heast Asi an
exper i ences
he
concl udi ng
chapt er pr ovi des an oppor t uni t y f o r
synt hesi s
f o r s t a t i n g
concl usi ons
both
gener al
and
s p e c i f i c
i n
nature
and
f o r
enumerat i ng
r ecommendat i ons
based on
t he l essons of f er ed by
t he
Vi et nam
c o n f l i c t n
assessment of
what
var i ous par t i es have concl uded about t he
Vi et nam
arbecomes
per t i n en t
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PARTONE
EVERYBODY'S
WAR
NOBODY'SWAR
Many
readi l y
accept as a t r ui sm t h a t US commtment t o t h e war i n Vi etnam
l acked
u n i t y , c l a r i t y ,
and
coher ence .
But
f ew ever
s t a t e ,
much
l e s s accept , t h e
cor ol l ar y- t hat t he commtment
of
t h e var i ous p a r t i e s t o t he war was s im la r l y
moot ed
.
Fi xed
poi nt s of
r ef erence
wer e
l acki ng
;
and, w t hout c r i t e r i a f o r
perf ormance t h a t m ght
be
i mposed across t h e boar d
on
c i v i l i a n
and ml i t ar y
agenci es t o det erm ne
m ssi on
accompl i shment ,
t h e
war f e l l
bet ween t h e
cracks.
Wth everybody drawn
i n t o
t he
a c t ,
i t was a war bel ongi ng t o no
one i n
par t i cul ar - per haps
not even Presi dent Lyndon
J ohnson, whose name
was most
of t en af f i xed
t o
t he c o n f l i c t . Fragment at i on of aut hor i t y was paral l el ed by
f r agment at i on
of
responsi bi l i t y
and, equal l y i mport ant , by
f r agment at i on
of t h e
sense
of
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
.
The
a t t i t u d e
al l eged
t o
have gover ned
much
of
US
behavi or
i n t h e l a t e r s t a g e s
of
t h e war- that t h e c on f l i c t not
be
l o s t on
our watch but , by
i mpl i cat i on,
on someone
el se' s- was
t he
f i n a l ,
b i t t e r ,
and
s t e r i l e
i ncarnat i on
of
t h i s
erosi on of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , whi ch i n turn was
born
of t h e i n a b i l i t y
t o
i mpose
a
coherent v i s i o n
of
t he war as a whol e .
The
US
e f f o r t i n Vi et nam was not
an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,
c u l t u r a l l y , or t echni cal l y
n e u t r a l
response t o ext ernal
pr obl ems
creat ed by an ext ernal enemy Nor
was i t
unaf f ect ed by i t s own
i n t e r n a l
dynamcs- theAmeri canwayof war
whi ch
i ncl uded
a
s p e c i f i c
s et
of
pref erences
f o r d i f f e r e n t
groups
about
how
best
t o
use
ai r
power
.
Thus, what Amer i cans t hought about ai r power
as
t hey approached t he pr obl ems of
Sout heast
Asi a
became a d i s t i n c t pl ayer i n t he c o n f l i c t , af f ect i ng t h e war . Perhaps i t
woul d be
be t t e r t o say pl ayer s i n t he p l u r a l ,
si nce t h e r e
wer e di sagreement s .
Consci ousness of t hese
i deas and t he s e l f - l i m t i n g and s el f - r e s t r a i n i ng qua l i t i e s
t hey
i mpose
i s t he
key
f or t he f u t u r e .
Ot herw se,
we
bi nd our sel ves
t o unt hi nki ng
m suse
of
our
resources,
and
we
r i s k
m si nt erpret i ng
t he s i t u at i o n whi l e
we
unconsci ousl y
prot ect
our l ess- exam ned
predi l ect i ons
.
The m l i t a r y ser vi ces often seemed f a r
more i nt erested i n
j ockeyi ng
w t h one
anot her
t han
t h e s i t u a t i on may
have
demanded, and t h i s r i v a l r y
had several seri ous
e f f e c t s
: ( 1) e f f o r t s t o resol ve c o n f l i c t s over command
and cont rol
and strategy went
on
f ar t oo
l ong,
perhaps t oo l ong t o come t o g r i p s w t h t he r e a l pr obl em ( 2) a
deci si on
once
agreed upon coul d not e a s i l y
be
overt ur ned,
si nce
i t r epresent ed e i t h e r
a
d e l i c a t e
p o l i t i c a l
compromse
or t oo
much
i nvest ed
e f f o r t and sunk cost ; and ( 3)
what ever
t h e r e a l i t y
behi nd
t he servi ce' s mot i vat i ons, t h e ml i t ar y seemed so s e l f -
servi ng
as t o
under m ne t he aut hor i t y t hey coul d have must ered w t h
t h e execut i ve
branch, i n
t h e
momentswhen
i t was open t o advi ce, or
w t h
t h e
Congr ess .
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
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I n t e r s e r v i c e and i n t r a s e r v i c e
r i v a l r i e s , especi al l y
at
l ower
l e v e l s ,
cannot be
expect ed
t o
vani sh magi cal l y
i n
war t i me
. Thei r
resol ut i on
must
r ecei ve
hi gh
p r i o r i t y i n
peacet i me i f US
forces
a r e t o be capabl e of
handl i ng
t h e
mul t i f acet ed
aspect s of
a
l ow i nt ensi t y
c o n f l i c t
;
and as
such
c o n f l i c t s escal at e t o m d- l evel or
above, t h e damage resul t i ng f romi n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y becomes
even
more ser i ous .
Successi ve
admni st r at i ons
i n t h e Uni t ed
St at es
f a i l e d
t o make
cl ear or
unqual i f i ed
comm t ment s
t o what t hey
w shed
t o achi eve i n
Sout heast
Asi a .
(The
Ni xon admni str at i on, once i t s et get t i ng out of
Vi et nam as i t s
maxi mum
ml i t ar y
and general
pol i cy
p r i o r i t y ,
was a possi bl e
except i on
. )
Even
t h e Kennedy
admni st rat i on qual i f i ed- per haps even cont radi ct ed- i t s own verbal commtment
t o
count eri nsur gency .
I t
di d
s o,
f o r
exampl e,
by
l eapi ng
t o
emer gency
i n s e r t i o n
of
US
combat - capabl e
t roops
t o
buy
t i me
when
t h e accept ed v i ew was t h a t
count er i nsur gency must
be
handl ed s lowy and
gr adual l y
.
That
v i ew
of
e f f e c t i v e
count er i nsur gency a l s o, i n e f f e c t , cont ai ned t h e r i s k
of
l o s s and even
general
f a i l u r e
; but
t h e
Kennedy adm ni st rat i on coul d not swal l ow i t .
The
J ohnson
admni st rat i on, despi t e t he magni t ude of i t s
e s ca l a t i ons , per cei ved t h a t
i t was
engaged i n a
cont i nui ng
p o l i t i c a l process even more
t han
i n wagi ng a
war
; but t here
i s reason
t o
suspect t h a t t he i n t e r p r e t a t i o n gi ven t o
J ohnson' s
l anguage of ml i t ar y
act i ons
i n
Washi ngt on
was
d i f f e r e n t
f rom
t h a t
gi ven
i n
Hanoi
.
Despi t e
t h e de s i r e t o
keep
opt i ons open, an
adm ni st rat i on
must t ake i n t o account
t h a t t he use
of
ml i t ar y
force
at var i ous l e v e l s and i n var i ous combi nat i ons begi ns t o
i mpose c e r t a i n
l i m t i n g q u a l i t i e s
on
i t s f r eedomof
act i on
.
Once
a ml i t ar y opt i on i s
t o
be
consi dered,
i t
must
be
assessed i n t erms
of
bot h i t s ml i t ar y and p o l i t i c a l
e f f e c t s
.
Fur t her , f or al l t h e t a l k of
r esponsi veness
of
ml i t ar y f o r c e s , c i v i l i a n s
and
m l i t a r y
a l i k e
must remember t h a t
t h e r e
ar e l i m t s t o
bot h
t h e r esponsi veness and t h e
f l e x i b i l i t y
of
any
pi ece of bureaucrat i c
machi ner y :
a
t a c t i c can
be changed
f a s t e r i n
t he
mnd
t han
i n
t h e
f i e l d ,
and
a
strategy
can
be
j o t t e d
down
f a s t e r
on
paper
t han
i t
can
be
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o force s t r u c t u r e and depl oyment . Vi et nam i l l u s t r a t e d ,
among
other t h i n g s , t h a t
i deas
and
execut i on
can
be
p e r s i s t e n t l y out of phase . Onewoul d
h e s i t a t e t o say t h a t v i r t u a l l y any
one
pol i cy
shoul d
have
been
mai nt ai ned r a t h e r
t han
r i s k a mess caused by
changes
i n
pol i cy
. Yet t h i s v i ew i s
usef ul
enough
t o
i n v i t e
consi derat i on .
The Vi et nam Wr does not t e l l
us
whet her
we can ef f ect i vel y f i g h t a
count er i nsurgency, si nce
we
wer e never
f u l l y dedi cat ed
t o i t . Count er i nsur gency i s
therefore not a di scredi t ed or
di spr oven
concept . A
simlar
l o g i c
appl i es
t o
many
t e c hn i c a l
and
operat i onal
aspect s
of
t he
war
.
I n s h o r t ,
t h e
subset s
of
t he
war - i t s
pr a c t i c al mat t er s- - can
be
decoupl ed f rom
some
of
i t s t h eo r e t i c al
ones
. Ef f i ci ency
does
not prove
ef f ect i veness
. Ef f i ci ency means
merel y
t he s k i l l f u l
execut i on
of
a
pr edet erm ned
rout i ne
;
ef f ect i veness
suggest s t h a t t h e
rout i ne
had a
u s e f u l purpose
and t h a t
execut i ng
i t
achi eved t he
pr edet erm ned
goal .
But
i nef f ect i veness
i n
Vi et namdoes
not necessar i l y
i ndi cat e probabl e
i nef f ect i veness
el sewhere
.
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CHAPTER
1
Ai r
Power
Theor i es, Ar
Force
Thi nki ng,
and t he
Conf l i ct i n
Vi etnam
The
Past WasProl ogue
Ever si nce the Fi rst Worl dWar , Ai r
Power
has
hel d pol i t i c a l a l l ur e , seem ng
t o
offer
t he pr om se of al most pai nl ess v i c t o r y . Thepr om se has
not al ways
been f u l f i l l e d ,
but
i t
i s part of t he
nat ure
of ai r power t hat i t s real e f f e c t s
are
often d i f f i c u l t t o separat efrom
t hose cl ai med.
W l l i amShawcr oss
Howt h e
Ai r
Force
and
t h e
ot her servi ces
i nt erpret ed
t h e Vi et nam
Wr
depended
l a r g e l y on what t hey t hought about ml i t ar y power
and
i t s empl oyment i n general .
Al t hough
event s i n
Sout heast
Asi a
had
di s c r e t e f e at u r e s , t hey
l ooked
d i f f e r e n t t o
observers accor di ng t o
t h e i r
vari ous perspect i ves . Di f f erent
poi nt s of
v i ew
generat ed
d i f f e r e n t
vi si ons of
war ,
somet i mes
c a l l i n g
f o r cont rar y sol ut i ons .
And
t h e war
on
t h e
ground and
i n t he ai r
over
Vi etnampl ayed
agai nst
t h e war w thi n t h e
m nds
of
ml i t ar y and c i v i l i a n observers as t o whose
vi si on
was
r i g h t
. Thus
Ai r
Force t hi nki ng and ment al i t y became one among many
aut onomous
v ar i abl e s i n
shapi ng
and
i n t e r p r e t i n g
event s
i n
Vi etnam
As
t he
Uni t ed St at es became more
i nvol ved i n t h e
war
i n
Vi et nam i t
l acked
a
coherent under st andi ng
of ai r power-what i t coul d do, what
equi pment
i t r equi red,
what organi zat i on i t needed,
and
what c o n f l i c t s
i t
was
best sui t ed f o r . Nor was t h e r e
even
a commonsense of what ai r power was . D d t h e
term
appl y si mpl y t o
anyt hi ng
t h a t
f lew or
must
i t be
reserved f o r speci al ai r vehi cl es
or gani zed i n
speci al
ways?
At t he same t i me,
despi t e
t he uncer t ai nt i es concer ni ng ai r power and
how
t o use
i t ,
t h e r e wer e
deep- seat ed hopes
about i t s
po t e nt i a l
. The pr om se of
ai r power
pe r s i s t e d,
no
mat t er
what
d i f f i c u l t i e s
had
appear ed
i n
ai r
operat i ons
i n
t h e
decades
before t he Vi et nam Wr .
But
t h e
e f f o r t t o f u l f i l l
t h e pr om se
was
f r agment ed,
broken
among
t he several ml i tary servi ces
and
even
among
f act i ons w thi n them
The
f r agment at i on
so much a part
of
t he
hi st ory
of
ai r
power
came t o bear
on t h e
war i n
Sout heast
Asi a
. Past
debat es
over
ai r power
f ormed
a compl ex
pr ol ogue
t o
Vi et nam
I deas prom nent i n t h e Ai r Force i n t h e
ear l y
1960s wer e r oot ed i n
decades of
t hi nki ng
by ai r power t h e o r i s t s about concept s
and
doct r i nes t h a t wer e a r t i c u l a t e d
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AIR
POWERANDTHEGROUNDWRNVIETNAM
w t h
speci al
force
a f t e r
1947 . These i deas
car r i ed
f orwar d i n a di r e c t l i ne f romt he
i nt erwar
years
i n t o
t he
Vi et nam
e r a
.
Despi t e
t h e
d i v e r s i t y
of
vi ews
w thi n
t he
Ai r
Force,
t h e r e wer e br oad
areas
of consensus
:
t h e
i mpor t ance
of t he s t r a t e g i c
d e t e r r e n t , t he ef f ect i veness of manned bombi ng, and t h e
need
f o r ai r superi ori t y
.
And,
not w t hst andi ng
di f f erences among t h e several s e r v i c e s ,
there
was i n t e r s e r v i c e
accept ance t h a t t he v e r t i c a l di mensi on i n modern
war f ar e
coul d not
be
evaded
. Yet
t h e
c l o s e r
one
adhered t o o r i g i n a l
i deas
about ai r power or
t o
t h e i r
l i n e a l
descendant s, t h e
cl oser
one
came
t o devel opi ng an absol ut e
model
f o r t he use of ai r
power
i n
warfare-one
t h a t m ght
not onl y r un af oul of
compet i ng
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,
devel oped
i n t h e
other
servi ces
or even
among c i v i l i a n s ,
but
a l s o
force t he
r e a l i t i e s
of t h e war a t hand t o conf or m t o t h e expect at i ons of one' s t heor y . The cl oser one' s
vi ews about
war
i n t h e 1960s
conf ormed
t o
ai r
power t heor i es shaped
i n
t he i nt erwar
ye a r s , t he l e s s m ght t hey respond t o novel pressures
and
demands i mposed
by
event s or c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s . The more one i n s i s t e d upon t h e deci si veness
of
one
f o rm
of
ai r
power ,
t h e great er t h e danger t h a t
other f orms
woul d
l angui sh . I n t h i s
way, t h e o r i e s about
ai r
power
and s p e c i f i c Ai r
Force t hi nki ng
about
i t became
pl ayers
i n
t h e
c o n f l i c t s
of t h e 1950s
and
1960s .
The
di sti nct i veness
of
t he
way
of
war advocat ed byUSexponent s of ai r power
i s
i t s e l f
part
of
a
broader
scheme
.
The
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s
of
ai r
power
t o
Ameri cans-even
i n i t s ext r eme or i de al
forms-stems
l argel y f rom i t s
compat i bi l i t y
w t h deep- seat ed
nat i onal t endenci es
and
preferences as t o t h e conduct of
war
. I n
The
Ameri canWy
of
War ,
f o r
exampl e,
h i s t o r i a n Russel l F . Wei gl ey del i neat ed t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
ways t h e Uni t ed S t a t e s has f ought i t s
war s
. Amer i cans
have
p e r s i s t e n t l y seen
t hemsel ves as out number ed,
whet her
agai nst
more numer ous I ndi ans i n t h e
sevent eent h cent ury, t he so- cal l ed Yel l ow P e r i l of t h e ni net eent h cent ur y, or
t h e
s t e r e ot yp i c a l Chi nese
hordes and
Russi an bear i n t h e t went i et h .
Occasi onal l y,
t h i s
f eel i ng
of
i nsuf f i ci ency
i s
f o r t i f i e d
by
i s o l a t e d
event s
such
as
t he Cust er
massacr e or
perhaps t h e
si ege at Khe Sanh . I n
t h e i r
d e s i r e
t o
o f f s e t t h i s
per cei ved
sense of numer i cal i n f e r i o r i t y , US
l eaders
have devel oped an
i nt ense
rel i ance
on
f i r epower and
t echnol ogy . From i r i n g cannon t o over awe t he I ndi ans i n
col oni al Vi rgi ni a t hr ough t h e compar at i vel y
heavy
use of f i r epower
by Benamn_
Chur ch i n Ki ng P h i l i p ' s
Wr
t o t h e i ncreasi ng carnage of t h e
US
C i v i l War,
these
t endenci es st rengthened .
As
t h e
si ckeni ng
anxi et y
over a t t r i t i o n i n Wrl d
Wr I
was
added t o t h e
stored
memor i es
of
e a r l i e r
wars, bombardment
a i r c r a f t seemed t o
o f f e r
a c l e an , s c i e n t i f i c , and
l i f esavi ng
means
t o a t t ai n
secur i t y obj ect i ves
i n
a manner
t h a t best sui t ed
t h e
nat i on' s pecul i ar st rengt hs
whi l e mn im z i n g
i t s shor t com ngs .
I n p a r t ,
t h e
r i s e of
ai r power
t o i t s
i n t e gr a l
pl ace
i n
US
s t r a t e g y
and doct r i ne
depended
on an
al t ered d i s t i n c t i o n bet ween
combat ant
and noncombat ant
.
Thi s
process began i n t he C i v i l Wr
w t h
W l l i amTecumseh Sherman
and Ul ysses
S .
Grant . Bot h of t hese Uni on general s
accept ed
t h e i dea
of a
peopl e' s
war i n whi ch
t hose
c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t
suppor t ed
an
enemy' s ml i t ar y
capabi l i t y
became
l egi t i mat e
ml i t ar y
t a r g e t s
as a
prot ot ypi cal
home
front
. Thi s i dea l a t e r became p a r t
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
22/213
AIRPOWER
THEORES,
AIR
FORCETHNKNG
of a l a r ge r r eeval uat i on of
J om ni an
and Cl ausew t zi an s t r a t e g i c t hi nki ng t h a t l e d t o
a
broadened
sense of perm ssi bl e
conduct
i n
war
. And
on
t h i s ,
t h e
s t r u c t u r e
of
a
s t r a t e g i c
ai r
of f ensi ve was ul t i mat el y
b u i l t
.
Gen
Freder i ck CWyand,
f ormer chi ef of
s t a f f
of
t h e
Army
and t h e
l a s t
head of
t h e US Mi l i t ary
Assi st ance
Command,
Vi et nam
s t y l e d t he US
way
of war
as
part i cul arl y v i o l e n t , deadl y
and
dreadf ul .
W
bel i eve
i n usi ng
' th ings' -art i l lery ,
bombs, massi ve
f i r epower - i n
order t o conserve our s o l d i e r s ' l i v e s . General
Wyand
al so not ed t h a t t he enem es f aced by t he Uni t ed S t a t e s i n Vi etnamdi d
near l y
t he opposi t e,
compensat i ng
f o r a l ack of ` t h i ngs '
by
expendi ng men
i nst ead
of
machi nes
.
z
Theenemy
wer e
not
onl y
peopl e
and
t h e
mat eri el
t hey
coul d
g a t h e r ,
but
t h e very way i n
whi ch
war and i t s pr osecut i on wer e concei ved . Not onl y was
t h e
Uni t ed St at es
a t
war
i n Vi et nam
but
i t s
whol e
way of t hi nki ng about
c o n f l i c t
was at
war ,
t oo .
Ser i ous
ref l ect i on
on
t h e
Korean Wr m ght have
prepared t h e
Uni t ed St at e s be t t e r f o r t he
ki nd
of Vi et cong
and
Nor t h Vi et namese commtment
t h a t
was
encount ered
i n Vi et nam
and
f a i l u r e
t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h a t
e a r l i e r
exper i ence
suggest ed
t h e persi st ence of t h i s
speci al
US
ment al i t y
about war . Act ual condi t i ons
i n t h e
t h e a t e r
of
c o n f l i c t
compr i se
onl y one
part
of
a much broader phenomenon
The d i s t i n c t i v e way
US
s t r a t e g i s t s v i ewwar i s
especi al l y
evi dent i n t h e manner i n
whi ch
t hey
have
l ooked
at
ai r power
and
i t s r o l e i n
combat
.
The
Thrust of US
Ar
Power Theori es
Sever al p e r s i s t e n t
t hemes have
appear ed amd t h e accumul at i on of i deas
about ai r
power i n
Amer i ca,
and
t hese
event ual l y i nf l uenced
t he use of ai r
f o r c e s i n
Vi et nam These
t hemes
deri ve t h e i r
coher ence
l e s s f rom
how t hey
i nt eract ed
t echni cal l y i n t h e event s of t h e 1960s
and
1970s t han f rom
t h e i r
common o r i g i n i n
t h e t hi nki ng done bet ween Wrl d
Wrs
I
and
I I . F i r s t , ai r power ' s proponent s,
especi al l y
t h e
most
ardent ,
have t y p i c a l l y st ressed t he e s s e n t i a l
novel t y
of
t he ai r
age and t he consequent i r r el evance of h i s t o r i c a l exper i ence . The
new
pri nci pl es and
p r a c t i c e s of ai r power supposedl y super seded o l d ml i t ar y
l essons
and
dogmas,
whi ch had a r i s e n i n ref l ect i on
on
t h e charact er
of surface
war f ar e . Newdoct r i nes
f o r ai r power
r i sked
i gnor i ng t he t e s t of exper i ence,
whi ch
obvi ousl y coul d
be
f ormed
onl y i n
t h e past
.
However
much t he
advocat es
of ai r power
woul d l a t e r
seek
evi dence i n i t s
short
h i s t o r y ,
val i dat i on
f o r t h e i r
cont ent i ons
l a y
i n
t heor y
i t s e l f
.
The
emphasi s
on novel t y was a l s o made
possi bl e by
a
corol l ary
feature
so often
di scussed
t h a t
i t
appear s
t o
be
a
separat e
t heme
.
The
advocat es
of
ai r
power
devel oped an especi al l y st r ong dependence upon t echnol ogi cal
i nnovat i on and
a
pecul i ar at t achment
t o
weapons
and
syst ems proj ect ed f o r t he f ut ur e r at he r t han
t hose of t h e more
convent i onal
present .
Al t hough l and power
and
s e a power
t h e o r i s t s
wer e
al so a t t r a c t e d t o t echnol ogy, ai r
ent husi ast s
showed
a s pe c i a l
commtment because t he
movement
and
ser vi ce t hey
fostered owed t h e i r
very
i d e n t i t i e s t o a
compar at i vel y r ecent t echnol ogi cal br eakt hr ough
. Whi l e
t hey
accept ed t he i mpor t ance of ai r
forces
as
a
const ant
and
an absol ute, t hey
i n s i s t e d
on
a d i l i g e n t and
per manent
search
f o r
i mpr oved
a i r c r a f t
and
weapons
t ypes
t o
f u l f i l l
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
23/213
ARPOWER
AND
THEGROUND
WRNVIETNAM
ai r power ' s pr om se . The wor ds of GenHenr y HAr nol d
shor t l y
a f t e r Worl d
Wr
1 1
exempl i f y
t h i s
t h r u s t
:
The f i r s t
essent i al
of a i r power
necessary
f or peace and securi t y i s t he
preemnence i n
research
.
Wmust
count
on s c i e n t i f i c advances requi r i ng us t o r epl ace
about
one- f i f t h
of
exi st i ng
Ai r
Forces
equi pment each year and
we
must be sure
t h a t
t hese addi t i ons are
t he most advanced i n t he whol eworl d 4
Al t hough
he
want ed
number s,
General
Ar nol d
regarded
i mproved t echnol ogy as
e s s ent i a l . The
r e s u l t
was
a
di m ni shed opi ni on
of
t h e
wort h
of t hose
a i r c r a f t
and
weapons t h a t wer e not of t h e most
recent
and most advanced desi gn .
A
t h i r d
theme
advanced
by
proponent s
of
ai r
power
i n t h i s
count r y
has
been
t h e
essent i al i t y- perhaps t h e domnance- of
t he
s t r a t e g i c a i r of f ensi ve . The best
defense i n a gener i c sense depended upona
force
t h a t coul d proj ect an
of f ense
i n t h e
concret e sense .
For
exampl e, def endi ng
t h e
Uni t ed St at es
seemed t o
r equi re an
ai r
f o r c e t h a t coul d s t r i k e t h e enemy' s
hear t l and
.
I n
t i me,
t h i s
a t t i t u d e proved
compat i bl e
w t h
t h e
f ormal strategy
of
det er r ence
.
But
because i t
had r o o t s i n a
s t r a t e g i c
vi si on
t h a t
consi der ed doi ng
away
w t h sur f ace engagement s, t h e Ai r
Force and i t s
f orebearers
gave consi derabl y l ower p r i o r i t y t o some mat t ers,
such
as
t h e suppor t
of
ground and sea
f o r c e s , whi ch
wer e v i t a l t o t h e Army and
Navy
At
t h e
very
l e a s t ,
t he
Ai r
Force showed
t h i s
pr i o r i t y i n
ways
whi ch
t h e
other
servi ces
f ound
hard
t o
accept .
Four t h, si nce t h e ai r ar ound t h e
wor l d
had no borders, t h e o r i s t s
regarded
i t
as
an
i n d i v i s i b l e medi um
f o r
ml i t ar y
purposes .
They
t hought
t h a t
ai r power shoul d
l i kewse be uni f i ed i n
one
ml i t ar y ser vi ce . I n
f a c t , t h e argument f o r
an aut onomous
ai r of f ensi ve
was
based i n part on t h e i dea t h a t t h e
at mospher e
on t h e one hand and
t h e l and and sea on t h e other
a r e compl et el y separat e t h e a t e r s of
war f ar e
.
Thi s
v i ew
c l e a r l y
suppor t ed
a separat e ai r s e r v i c e , i ndependent
ai r campai gns, and t he
supr emacy of
ai r
force
personnel
i n
cont rol
of
ai r
a s s e t s
dur i ng
j o i n t
operat i ons
.
L a t e r , as pi r a t i ons
of
t h e
var i ous servi ces mat ched t h e way
each force
l ooked at t h e
medi umi n
whi ch i t
operat ed . For
exampl e, basi c
Ai r Force doct r i ne asser t ed t h a t
t he medi um i n
whi ch
ai r
forces oper at e- space- i s an
i n d i v i s i b l e f i e l d of
a c t i v i t y
;
hence,
i t was
necessar y t o preserve t h e i ndependent
command of
ai r
f o r c e s . Thi s doct r i ne
a l s o
i mpl i ed t h a t , i n any
supposed
par t nershi p
among
t h e
s e r v i c e s , t h e ai r component shoul d
be
dom nant
even
whent h e
t heat er
of
operat i ons
was
no more t han r egi onal . Thus, Ai r Force Manual (AFM 1- 2, Uni t ed St at es Ai r
Force
Basi c
Doct r i ne
( 1955) ,
substant i al l y
cont radi ct ed
Army
doct r i ne
expressed
i n
Fi el d Manual (FM
100- 5,
Operat i ons, whi ch cl ai med preem nence f o r t he
ground
f o r c e s preci sel y
because t hey
operat ed
on l and . The
Navy t ook
a
r h e t o r i c a l
mdd l e
ground t h a t
s a t i s f i e d nei t her
t h e Army nor t h e Ai r Force . I n
US
Naval
Warf ar e
Publ i cat i on 10, t he
Navy emphasi zed t h a t
mobi l i t y,
l argel y
by
s e a , enhanced
US
a b i l i t y
t o
put pressure on
enemy
t e r r i t o r y .
Navy
doct r i ne
l e f t t h e exact r o l e
of ai r
power and
ai r
s t r a t e g y
undef i ned,
descr i bi ng i t
as bei ng
i n
t h e process
of h i s t o r i c
devel opment .
5
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
24/213
AIR
POWER
THEORES, AIR
FORCE
THNKING
A
f i f t h
t heme i s
i n
some r espects
t h e
most
i mpor t ant
. Ai r power ent husi ast s
and
advocat es
t ended
t o
adopt
a
par t i cul ar i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of
what
ai r
power was
;
t h a t
i s ,
what
i t s dom nant
aspect
was, and
i n what mode i t coul d
be
used
most e f f e c t i v e l y .
They f ocused over whel m ng
a t t e n t i o n on t h e s t r a t e g i c
a i r of f ensi ve
.
Ot her
consi der at i ons- even one so
basi c
as ai r super i or i t y- became
l argel y t h e
f unct i onal
servant s
of
t he ai r
of f ensi ve . Thi nki ng
about
ai r power
i n
a
broader sense
was
not i ceabl y l acki ng .
Per haps
t he case f or a i r power ' s future
si gni f i cance
and
f o r t he
necessi t y of an
i ndependent
ai r force hi nged on
i t s
cl ai m
t o
t h e dom nant s t r a t e g i c
ml i t ar y r o l e . Yet , however genui ne t h e i r commtment t o t h i s
vi si on,
i t s authors
nar r owed t h e unspoken def in i t ion of ai r power
whi l e
seeki ng t o gi ve
i t
r e a l i t y .
Var i ous
t h i n k e r s , t h e o r i s t s ,
and
pract i t i oners of ai r power mani f est ed
t hese i deas
i n
t h e i r var i ous wor ks .
The t hemes meshed, bl ended, and i n t e r a c t e d,
formng
a
general
context
r a t h e r
t han an
a n a l y t i c a l l y
preci se l i s t of
p a r t i c u l a r s i n
t h e
m nds
of
ai r
power
advocat es
; but
t hey al t ered
t he
cl i mat e
i n
whi ch f u t u r e
c o n f l i c t s
wer e
underst ood
.
The
Ascendancy of t he Of f ensi ve
Ger i Wl l i am
Bi l l y Mi t chel l , a
prophet and
mar t yr i n t h e cause of i ndependent
ai r
power ,
somet i mes def ended a f undament al t r u t h
w t h
a
di scom ort i ng mul t i t ude
of i n t e l l i g e n t guesses
.
I n
a
sense,
t h e
need t o
def end t h e i n f a n t ai r
force encour aged
t h e most opt imst ic
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of
debat abl e and compl ex i s s u e s
.
I n Wnged
Def ense (1925) ,
f o r
exampl e, Mi t chel l
sought t o
emul at e
t h e sweepi ng
power
of
Al f red
T
Mahan
by post i ng a whol e
def ense syst em
based on
ai r
power . He not
onl y
procl ai med
ai r
power ' s em nence
as
t h e new and dom nant medi um
of
t r ans po r t a t i on , but al so sawusef ul peacet i me r o l e s f o r
ai r
power
t h a t
supposedl y
made
arm es
and
navi es wastef ul
and
obsol et e .
Yet
t here wer e di f f erences i n
approach
bet ween
Mahan
and
Mi t chel l
t h a t
persi sted
i n
debat es
among
t h e i r
successors decades l a t e r .
For one
t h i n g , Mahan' s work was l argel y h i s t o r i c a l whi l e
Mi t chel l ' s
was
l a r g e l y
predi ct i ve
.
Among
t h e c r i t i c a l
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
Mahan' s v i ew
of sea power ,
whi ch was
credi bl e and
val uabl e even
f o r
t hose out si de
t h e
naval
f r a t e r n i t y ,
wer e :
0 I t was
nei t her
bound
t o
hi ghl y
s p e c i f i c
t echnol ogi es nor t hr eat ened
by
changes
i n
t echnol ogy .
0Sea- l anes wer e l i m t e d
and
def i nabl e, despi t e t h e vast ness of t he
oceans,
and
t hus
credi bl y
open
t o
di sput e
among
compet i ng power s
.
Seapower not
onl y
deterred enem es but pr omot ed
further
econom c
gr owt h
.
The s i z e
of
a nat i on' s navy shoul d cor rel at e r e a l i s t i c a l l y t o t h e
growt h
of
t h e
nat i on' s shi ppi ng and t h e i mpor t ance of t h e i n t e r e s t s l i nked t o
i t
; and
navy
spendi ng
shoul d
r e l a t e
t o
a measurabl e st andard, mat chi ng
seagoi ng
force w t h
seaborne
i n t e r e s t s
.
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
25/213
AIR
POWERANDTHEGROUNDWRN
VIETNAM
Un i ke
Mahan, who i nsi st ed t hat
t heor i es
of sea power i n t he
age
of steamgrew
f rom
experi ence
i n t he
age
of sai l , ai r power
t heori sts had r el at i vel y
l i t t l e
experi ence
f rom
whi ch
t o pr oj ect . They
were
therefore compel l ed t o pr edi ct f romt heor i z i ng
and
t o ext r apol at e f romt he
nat ure of avai l abl e technol ogi es . Thus, ai r t heori sts
were
f reed
f rom
the l i m t a t i o n s of ten suggested
by
hi st ori cal
experi ence
. But
because
t hei r i magi nati ons
were unr est r ai ned,
ai r
t heor i sts r an t he
r i s k of
subordi nati ng
st r at egi c thought
t o advances
i n
engi neeri ng
and
technol ogy- a
danger
they
seemed
t o
recogn ze
onl y
re l uct ant l y .
The pr esent was deemed
t o offer
l i t t l e
t hat was appl i cabl e t o t he future, and t he f ai l ures of current technol ogy di d
r el at i vel y
l i t t l e
t o
deter wde-rangi ng opt i msm
about
gr eat and ef f ect i ve weapons
t hat
al ways
seem
ust
around
t he
corner
.
Thi s i ncl i nat i on
tended t o
make
strategy
a
hostage
of
machi nery, and i t i nvi t ed
r el uct ance
t o adapt doctri ne t o experi ence
Dsmssal
of
t he
past
as i r rel evant t o t he f ut ur e
pervaded
Mi t chel l ' s
Wnged
Def ense. Contrasti ng t he age
of
ai r power wth i t s predecessors, Mtchel l wrote
Hndenburg
l ooked
back
t o
Hanni bal ' s b a t t l e of Cannae, andmade h i s di sposi t i ons
t o
f i ght
t he
Russi ans
at Tannenberg
Napol eonstudi ed
t he
campai gns of Al exander
t he Gr eat
and
Genghi s
Khan, t he Mongol
The navi es
drew
t hei r
i nspi rat i on
fromt he b a t t l e of
Act i um n
t he t i me of t he Romans and t he sea f i ght of Traf al gar
I n
t he
devel opment
of
a i r
power,
one
has
t o
l ook
aheadand
not
backward
and
f i gure
out
what i s goi ng t o happen,
not t oo muchwhat has
happened
That i s whyt he
ol der
servi ces
have been psychol ogi cal l y un f i t t o devel op t h i s newarmt o t he
f u l l e s t
extent
practi cabl e
w t h
t he
methods
and
means at hand
9
The
Ar Force s
chroni c
i mpati ence w th
hi s tory or i gi nat ed i n such
t hi nk i ng
.
Moreover,
Mi t chel l ' s
i deas ant i ci pat ed t he
penchant
f or
r econci l i ng apparent
di scr epanci es i n
str at egi c
thought
and theory
wth opt i m st i c pr edi ct i ons
of
new
i nvent i ons .
Thus,
hardware served not
on y t o
carry
out
theory
but
t o
prot ect i t
.
Whatever l essons
experi ence
seemed t o offer, t heor i es cou dal ways be defendedby
weapons yet t o
be
bui l t .
I n prophesyi ng
av i at i on
devel opments,
B i l l y
Mtchel l adopted a tone of absol ute
cert ai nt y,
i r r i t a t i ng
both
ground and sea forces
whi l e
rousi ng t he sp i r i t s of
hi s
f ol l ower s
. I n
Our
Ar Force
( 1921) ,
he contended That ai r shi ps w l l
be
a potent
f act or i n
a l l
commun cati ons i n a
comparat i vel y
f ewyears, there can
be no
doubt .
The words there can
be no
doubt conveyed
t he
cer t i t ude
of a
vi s i onar y,
even
though t he pr edi ct i on
was never
qui t e
f u l f i l l e d
.
1 0
Mi t chel l ' s r o l e may have been t hat of prophet more than
st rat egi st ,
but
hi s
pronouncements
f avored
a
doct r i nal
sl ant
t hat was
a
si gni f i cant
and
i nf l uent i al
part
of
hi s
l egacy t he worl d of ai r power was t oo
new
t o
pay
much
at t ent i on t o ol der
experi ence
and
theory ; ascendancy i n t he age of ai r power woul d
depend
upon
t echnol ogi cal super i or i t y ; and t he mediumof
ai r
woul d encourage a sweepi ng
gl obal perspect i ve, di ct at i ng par t i cul ar st rat egi c concepts and force structures .
Mi t chel l ' s successors
debated t he most ef f ect i ve
way
t o
empl oy
ai r
power
and t he
most
appr opr i at e ways t o assure
and
foster i t s fu tu re w t hi n t he broad
f ramework
of
Mi t chel l ' s
assumpti ons
.
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AIRPOWERTHEORES, AIR
FORCETHNKNG
Such
i deas
m ght
have been
di sm ssed as mer e f oot not es
i n
t h e h i s t o r y of
Amer i can ml i t ar y t hought
had
t hey not
become
c e n t r a l forces
i n
shapi ng
t h e
at t i t udes
and
i n s t i t u t i o n s
of
our nascent
ai r force . What
Mi t chel l
advocat ed
event ual l y became p a r t of the
core of
Ai r
Ser vi ce
t eachi ng
. I n 1921, Maj W l l i am
C Sher man, a f acul t y member at t he
Ai r Ser vi ce
Fi el d
O f f i c e r s ' School ,
underscored
t h e
need
f o r
i ndependence
f romt h e
doct r i nes
of
t h e
other
servi ces : I n
deri vi ng t he
doct r i ne
t h a t must underl i e al l pri nci pl es
of
empl oyment of
t h e ai r
f o r c e ,
we
must
not be gui ded by condi t i ons
sur r oundi ng t h e
use of gr ound
t roops,
but
must seek
our own doct r i ne . . .
i n t h e
el ement
i n
whi ch
t h e ai r
force
operat es
. Such
t hi nki ng
cl ear l y poi nt ed
t owar d commtment
t o
an i ndependent
ai r
campai gn,
st rengt heni ng t he
i nt erdependence
of t he
a i r
of f ensi ve
and
an
aut onomous force
t o
carry i t out .
But
i t al so
suggest ed
an especi al l y
f i r m
v i ew of
doct r i ne as somet hi ng
deeper,
broader,
and
more
endur i ng
t han t he conduct
of
war .
Ai r power t hi nkers t ended t o
base
general doc t r i na l posi t i ons on s p e c i f i c hardware
and syst ems whi l e el evat i ng t he s c i e n t i f i c
pri nci pl es
behi nd
t h e
hardware
t o t h e
s t a t u s of
l aw
. z
The studi es
of
o f f i c e r s i n
t he
Ai r Corps
Tact i cal School
dur i ng t h e 1920s and
1930s c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d a t endency
t o emphasi ze
t h e
ai r
of f ensi ve and a e r i a l
bombar dment ,
and
t h e
Wr
Depar t ment ' s
i nsi st ence
on
a
subordi nat e
r o l e
f o r
ai r
power i n combat st r engt hened t he deep commtment of t hese of f i c e r s t o t he i dea of
an ai r of f ensi ve .
But
not al l ai r o f f i c e r s wer e
suppor t i ve
of t h e
i ndependent
ai r
force
concept .
Suggest i ve
of opposi ng
vi ews gi vi ng ai r
forces
a l e s s c e n t r a l r o l e was a
1928
paper
on
The Doct r i ne
of Ai r For ce, f orwar ded
by
Ai r Servi ce Lt Col C
C
Cul ver .
He
concl uded t h a t t he
ai r
component
.
. .
al ways
suppor t s
t h e
ground
f o r c e s ,
no
mat t er
how
deci si ve i t s
.
. . operat i ons
may
be, nor
how
i n d i r e c t i t s suppor t . Maj
Gen J ames
E . Fechet , who
had
become
chi ef
of
t h e Ai r Corps i n
1927, obj ect ed
t o
t h e
st at ement
as
def ect i ve,
even
i f
i t
di d
conf or m
t o
Wr
Depar t ment
gui del i nes
.
The obj ect i ve of war i s
t o
overcome t he
enemy s wi l l t o
r e s i s t , and
t he
defeat
of
hi s army,
hi s
f l e e t or
t he
occupat i on
of hi s
t e r r i t o r y
i s merel yameans
t o
t h i s endandnone
of them
s
t he t r u e obj ect i ve I f t he
true
obj ect i vecanbe r eached w t hout t he necessi t y of def eat i ng or
br ushi ng
asi de
t he enemyforce
on t he ground
or
water and t he
proper
means
f urni shed t o
subdue t he
enemy s
w l l and bri ng
t he
war
t o
a cl ose, and t he obj ect of war can be
obtai ned w th l e s s destr uct i on and
l ast i ng
after effects t han has heret ofor e been t he case
At
present t he
Ai r Forceprovi des t he onl y
means
f or such an accompl i shment
.
13
Such
not i ons as brushi ng
asi de
h o s t i l e
arm es
conj ur ed
up
vi si ons
of a
r e l a t i v e l y
easy vi ct ory and poi nt ed
even more shar pl y
t o
t h e
w deni ng
gul f bet ween ai r power
t hi nkers
and
t h e
l eaders
of
gr ound
and
naval
forces
.
The Baker Boar d, i n i t s m d- 1934 r e p o r t , w dened t h e
r i f t
. The r e p o r t
expressed
t h e
est abl i shed
vi ew
of t h e Wr Depar t ment as t o t h e Army' s pl ace i n t h e scheme of
defense .
8/7/2019 Airpower and the Ground War in Vietnam
27/213
AR
POWER
AND
THEGROUNDWARINVIETNAM
The i dea t h a t
avi at i on
can r epl ace anyof t he
ot her
el ement s of our armed forces i s f ound,
on
anal ysi s,
t o
be er r oneous
. Si nce ground forces
al one
are capabl e of occupyi ng
t e r r i t o r y ,
o r ,
w t h
cer t ai nt y,
prevent i ng
occupat i on
of
our
own
t e r r i t o r y ,
t he
Army
w t h
i t s
owna i r forces r emai ns t he ul t i mat e deci si ve factor
i n
war
t o
Ai r
power
advocat es
have
f ocused
on
t h i s r emark
preci sel y because' i t
opposed t h e
f ormat i on
of a separat e
and enl ar ged ai r
force . I t
a l s o
provi des an
i n s t r u c t i v e
cl ue
about t h e concept ual under pi nni ng
of
t h e
Army
Fol l ow ng t h e Baker Boar d' s di scour agi ng opi ni on, ai r power
advocat es
r edoubl ed t h e i r e f f o r t s
.
They
r ecogni zed t h a t e s c o r t a i r c r a f t m ght
be
needed and
t h a t
cont rol
of
t h e ai r was a c r i t i c a l v ar i abl e , but t hey pi nned t h e i r great est hopes
on
i ndependent
ai r
campai gns
ai med
at
t h e
deep
sources
of
t h e
enemy' s
strength
and
t h u s
on
t he s t r a t e g i c bomber .
Secret ar y
of
Wr
Harry Woodri ng
approved
a
report
by
t h e
Wr
Depar t ment Ai r
Boar d,
agreed t o by
Gen
George Mar shal l
:
The
bas i s
of
Ai r Power
i s
t h e
bombardment pl ane
. Al t hough
t h i s r e p o r t di d no t s e t t l e t h e
br oader concept ual and s t r a t e g i c
i ssue of t he r e l a t i v e wort h
of
a i r , l a nd, and
sea
f o r c e s , i t di d
pr ovi de
aut hor i t y t o devel op a force t h a t ai r t h e o r i s t s
saw
as t h e
very
h e a r t
of
ai r power .
Thi s
emphasi s
di d not
decl i ne
w t h t he comng of Worl d
Wr
I I . The war di d
much
t o
l i b e r a t e
t he
o f f i c e r s
of
t he ai r
s e r v i c e, bu t t he
r e a l i t i e s
di d
no t conf or m t o
t h e
f ondest expect at i ons of
ai r power
ent husi ast s . And
f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h
ol d
Ai r
Corps vi ews as
current US
defense pol i cy was di st urbi ng
.
Cont r oversi es over pr oper
t a c t i c s
and
t a r ge t i ng f o r bombi ng,
especi al l y
i n t h e Eur opean t h e a t e r ,
o f f s e t
t h e
s a t i s f a c t i o n of
achi evi ng
a de facto
s t a t u s
of
equal i t y
as
an aut onomous servi ce .
I n
f a c t , t h e
war
became a
source
of compl ai nt
f o r
var i ous
ai r
power
p u r i s t s
. They
at t acked t h e deci si ons
t o
rebui l d t h e US
Navy
and conduct
l arge- scal e
ground
operat i ons as f undament al l y
wrong
and
wast ef ul . They ar gued
t h a t
t h e
count r y
woul d ge t be t t e r r e s u l t s
by
expendi ng i t s
resources
ona moremodern
force-the
ai r
arm
The
most
a r t i c u l a t e proponent
of
t h i s
v i ew
was Al exander P . de
Seversky
.
An
a i r c r a f t
desi gner and
busi nessman
as
wel l
as
a t h e o r i s t ,
and l a t e r
a
l e c t u r e r at t h e Ai r
Uni versi t y, de Sever sky sawno v i r t u e
i n
di spassi on .
He
bol dl y cl ai med t h a t
ai r
power coul d br i ng vi ct ory i n
t h e
wor l d war
w t hout much hel p f rom l and and s e a
f o r c e s . He sought t o suppl ant t h e
naval i sm
of Mahan,
whose
per suasi veness was
a
b a r r i e r
t o
f u l l - s c a l e commtment
t o
ai r power . Never t hel ess, de Seversky bor r owed
heavi l y
f rom
Mahan' s
t erm nol ogy
. I n h i s book Vi ct or y Thr ough Ai r Power
( 1942) ,
he
referred
e x p l i c i t l y
t o
passages
f rom
Mahan' s
most
f amous
t e x t
and
el aborat ed
on
t h e
not i on of an
envel opi ng
ai r ocean .
He
wr ot e
of
dr eadnought s of t he ski es
t h a t woul d
wage
an i nt erhem spher i c
war
d i r e c t across
oceans, w t h
ai r power
f i gh t i ng not over
t h i s
or
t h a t l o c a l i t y , but by l ongi t ude and l a t i t u d e anywhere i n t h e
uni nt erpret ed
` a i r ocean' .
But
whi l e imta t ing
Mahan' s
r h e t o r i c ,
de Seversky
depar t ed
f rom Mahan' s t heor i es
. Rat her t han
j u s t
l e a r n
f rom t h e experi ence
of
Wor l d Wr I I , he debat ed t he whol e shape of t h e
war
even as i t was bei ng f ought .
De Seversky cal l ed f or
bol d
depar t ur es i n force s t r u c t u r e
and
strategy . He even
10
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AR
POWER
THEORES, AIR
FORCETHNKNG
cl ai med t h a t ml i t ar y avi at i on i n t h e war had shaped new pr i nci pl es
of
war f ar e .
Thi s
newway
of
maki ng
war
had
t o
be
freed
f r omgr ound and
sea
commanders
who
wer e
f a t a l l y
i nf ect ed w th ol der s t r a t e g i c i deas and, hence,
unabl e t o appreci at e t h e
t r u e r o l e of ai r power . Mi nci ng nowor ds, de Sever sky
descr i bed
ai r power as
a
force
t h a t el udes s t a t i c , ort hodox mnds no mat t er howb r i l l i a n t t hey
may
be Ai r
power
speaks
a
str at egi c
l anguage so new [ despi t e h i s own bor r ow ng from
Mahan]
t h a t
t ransl at i on i n t o t he hackneyed i di omof t he
past
i s i mpossi bl e I t c a l l s not
onl y
f or
new
machi nes
and
t echni ques
of warmaki ng
but
f or new men
unencumbered
by rout i ne
t hi nki ng
.
16
The
vi si onary' s i mpat i ence
w t h
evol ut i onary,
gradual change had cl earl y
not
been
t he excl usi ve property
of Bi l l y
Mi t chel l
.
De
Seversky
coul d not conceal h i s di sdai n f o r
m nds
t h a t subj ect ed t h e cl ai ms
of
ai r power
ent husi ast s
t o
t h e t e s t of i t s present t echnol ogy
.
The c r i t i c s ,
he
compl ai ned,
ar e unabl e t o
see
t h e
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of ai r power beyond
t h e hor i zons
of i t s
present
equi pment
and
i t s present
t a c t i c s
.
They do not t ake i n t h e f u l l maj est i c
sweep of t h e
i nevi t abl e
progress of a i r c r a f t ; t hey base
t h e i r
t hi nki ng
on
avi at i on
as
we know
i t
t oday ( emphasi s added) .
Al t hough
de Seversky was
r e f e r r i n g
here
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e
need
f o r
an
i ndependent ai r s e r v i c e ,
h i s
emphasi s on t h e pr i macy
of
t he f u t u r e
was
nonet hel ess t i nged w t h i r ony
.
He
sought
t h e
adopt i on
of a
new
pol i cy based l argel y on a f u t u r e t echnol ogy t o
f i g h t
a
current
war
. De
Seversky
saw
t he
chance
t o ski p i nt ermedi ar y st ages
of
devel opment and reach out bol dl y
beyond t h e
present conf i nes
of
avi at i on
t ypes, and
he
was convi nced
t h a t
t he
nat i on
coul d
do so
dur i ng t h e
current
war ( de Sever sky' s emphasi s)
.
He r eached t h i s
concl usi on p a r t l y
because he saw
t h a t
new
t echnol ogi cal
devel opment s wer e
accumul at i ng rapi dl y .
But
t he i dea of ski ppi ng st ages
a l s o suggest ed a measur e
of
f a i t h
t h a t m ght r un ahead of experi ence .
Wth
exuberant
opt i m sm de
Seversky
pressed
h i s
vi ew
t h a t
a i r c r a f t
w t h
gl obal
c a p a b i l i t i e s wer e at hand . He cl ai med t h a t
rapi d
achi evement s i n r ange
wer e
i n e v i t a b l e , and
he
demanded
t h a t t h e
Uni t ed
S t a t e s throw
i t s e l f
whol ehear t edl y i n to
devel opi ng t h e
best
possi bl e ai r
force
.
Wneed onl y make
t he
assumpt i on of
a vastl y
expanded
avi at i on range-anassumpt i on
f u l l y
j us t i f i ed
by t he s c i e n t i f i c
aeronaut i cal
f acts-and
i nstant l y
t he exposed
posi t i on
of
Ameri ca
becomes
evi dent
Imagine
t he reachof ai r
power
mul t i pl i ed
three t o f i v e
t i mes,
and
t he t a c t i c a l posi t i on of t he Uni t ed States
becomes
preci sel y t he same as t h a t of t he
Br i t i sh
I s l e s
t oday
The
range of m l i t ar y avi at i on i s
bei ng
ext ended so rapi d ly t hat
t he
At l ant i c w l l be
cancel ed
out
as a genui ne
obst acl e
w t hi n two years, t he Paci f i c w thi n t hr ee
years
After
t h a t , i n
f i v e
years
a t
t he out si de,
t he
ul t i mat e
r ound- t he- wor l d
range
of
25, 000
m l e s
becomes
i nevi t abl e
At
t h a t poi nt
anynat i on
wi l l
beabl e
t o
hurl i t s
a e r i a l
mght agai nst any
spot on t he
f ace
of t he
gl obe
w t hout
i nt ermedi ary bases
By
t he same
t oken ever y
count r y
wi l l
be subj ect
t o
assaul t f romany di rect i on
anywhere i n
t he worl d The b ows
wi l l
be
del i ver ed f romt he home bases,
r egar dl ess
of di st ance, w t h al l oceans and
bases
i n
betweent ur ned
i n to
a
noman s l and [ de Sever sky' s emphasi s]
. 18
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AIR
POWER
AND
THE
GROUND
WRNVIETNAM
L i k e
earl i er
a i r t heor i sts, de Seversky was
f ar
l e s s gener ous
i n
hi s est i mat e of
what
t he
ground
and
sea
forces
coul d
gai n
f rom
t echnol ogy
.
He
speci f i cal l y
r ej ect ed
separat e, sea- based avi at i on, part l y
t o
preserve
t he
concept of undi vi ded a i r power
and
part l y
t o st r engt hen t he case f or an
i ndependent
a