ISBN 978 154082 6 !-: .f~~·.",.,;.l··:,<.~_.: ·~···.'
isBN' o 19 575457 3
Stadt- u. Univ.--Bibl. .. Frankfurt 1 Main ---.. -------J
Printed by Oluseyi Press Limited lbadan.
Published by OxJoNi:rJ,;tversity Press Nigeria
Oxford il!Juiie, id do Gl&,·ip/M.B.i so95;-ibadrm, Nigeria
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION . vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ix
1. ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN CONTROL AND ANGLOSPANISH CONNECTION 1
2.
3.
HISTORY OF LABOUR RECRUITING
THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE PREDOMINANCE OF NIGERIAN LABOUR IN FERNANDO PO
V
23
36
INTRODUCTION
The publication of this monograph marks the inauguration of the Monograph Series of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. It is a welcome addition to the multiplicity of publications emanating from the Institute: the Seminar Series, the Lecture Series, the Bulletin on Foreign Affairs Series, the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs and the Annual Survey of Nigerian Affairs.
This particular monograph also symbolises the co-operative working relationship between the Institute and Nigerian scholars in Nigerian universities. Even though the Institute does not have as much money as it would like to have to cover the research activities of its own resident staff, it is still prepared to make allocations to scholars outside the Institute because it firmly believes that it should not be a closed shop but should be a forum for the dissemination of ideas by the community of Nigerian intellectuals in both the public and private services.
ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN CONTROL AND ANG LO-SPANISH CONNECTION
The name "Nigeria" is of course a creation of the British just as the country is a creation of British imperialism. The British connection with what became Nigeria goes back to the era of the slave trade, when Africa's contribution to the rise of western capitalism was in the provision of cheap labour required in the nursery land of the sugar cane and cotton plantations of the ne'(V world. When the trade in 'black cargoes' became unattractivt;~ to the British, present day Nigeria because of its agricUltural potentialities rec~ived the attention of British entrepreneurs who were interested in developing and fostering what was then called "legitimat~ _ traqe". The period of "free trade imperialism" coinciding with · the period of British industrial and commercial ascendancy came to an end at the twilight of British industrial supremac}l' and at ·the advent on the industrial scene of new nations, particularly Germany and the -United States. "Free trade imperialism" in the Bights of Benin and Biafra was translated· between the 1880s and 1900s into territorial annexation of what became Nigeria. .
'The Spanish connection with Equatorial Guinea is perhaps much more romantic than the bread and butter relationship of Britain to Nigeria. Spanish colonies in the Gulf of Guinea consisted of the Islands of Annobon, Femando Po, (known to its African inhabitants as Hedepette) Corisco, Elobey Grande and Elobey Gluco and an enclave in the Cameroons situated round the Rio Muni basin. The aggregate area is 128,060 square miles and the native population was estimated in 1943 to be 163,000 of which some 33,000 were on the Island of Femando Po. Spanish residents numbered 2,800. 1
By all yardsticks Fernando Po was the most important part of Equatorial Guinea, and the Spaniards hardly paid any regard to other areas.
The first whiteman to visit Fernando Po was Fernan Po, one of the earliest Portuguese navigators who came to the island during the reign of King Alonzo V and certainly between 1469 and 1474 and gave the island the name of "Formosa". On his return journey he died opposite the island, and his companions as a gesture of goodwill and through a sense of loss decided to immortalise his name by giving the island hi~ name. 2 Portugal, in consequence of the "discovery", claimed the island as her own. The Portuguese did try to plant colonies on the island, and one persistent but unsuccessful colonizer was Don Ramirez de Esquival who during the 16th century undertook to settle Portuguese colons on the
· island, but the irregularity of supplies arriving on the island from Europe and the hostility of the native population, the Bubi saw to the failure of the Portuguese attempt at coloniza-
' tion. Many of the settlers died of hunger, others were believed to have been killed by the Bubi, while stragglers escaped into the interior and "went native" in order to survive. Femando Po was ceded to_Spain by the 13th, 14th and 15th Articles of the Treaty of Pardo concluded between Spain and Portugal on 1 March 1778.3 As in the subsequent history of EuroAfrican relations, this Treaty was concluded using African territories as diplomatic counters on a European diplomatic chess board, for some territorial concessions along their frontiers. Portugal ceded Fernando Po to Spain with a view to promoting their "mutual trade in slaves" and also "in order that the subjects of the crown of Spain may establish themselves in the said Island and from thence pursue their commerce and the slave trade in the ports and on the coasts of the continent and rivers opposite to the Island, but without prejudice to the trade which the Portuguese may carry on in the said ports and on the said coasts".4 When the Island of Ferhando Po was ceded to Spain, trading rights over what became Nigeria, the Cameroons and French Congo were
2
among the concessions of the treaty.5 The Spanish expedition which set out to take Femando Po left Monte Video in April 1778, only one month after the definitive treaty had been signed and consequently before there could have been any exchange of the ratifications. However, formal transfer of the island took place on the island on 24 October 1778, when Don Luis Caetano de Castro formally handed over the island to the Spanish representative Conde de· Argelexox (Argeligos).6 The expedition sent to take possession of Femando Po and Annobon consisted of two frigates with a crew of 547. They had with them 170 marines including a staff of 11, and it was commanded by the Con de de Argelexox. They reached Femando Po on the 24 October 1778 only to find that the Portuguese settlement no longer existed. The Conde, however, attempted to form one for Spain, but half of his men fell victim to the climate before six months had elapsed and he returned home with the · remainder to tell his tale and complain that his country had been deceived by Portugal in her attempt to palm off upon Spain a territpry to which she herself had no claim. 7 With this experience Spain took no interest in Femando Po or any part of Equatorial Guinea until the nineteenth century. This must have been a welcomed development for the Bubi population of the island who were at least spared for almost a century the horrors of plantation economy and its attendant human wastage. The Bubi, who arrived on the island from the adjacent continent some time during the fourteenth century, are Bantu speaking and therefore must be related to other Bantu speaking peoples of adjacent coasts of present day Central Africa. When the Europeans first visited Femando Po the Bubi numbered just a few thousand rural folk who lived on the .lower slopes and valleys of Pico de Sante Isabel, the highest peak (about 9,000 ft. above sea level) on this mountainous and volcanic island. Their life style was simple; they gathered the fruits of -wild palm and occasionally exchanged yams and other staples with passing ships. The · Mrican population of bot}l Femando Po and Annobon was
1
3
' (
complete!~, :unaware of any Spanish claim of suzerainty over their terri~ories; in fact, Spain herself took so little interest in these possessions that when the Island of Annobon was finally visited by representatives of Spain in 1836, the expedition found the Africans to be under the impression that they were still the subjects of Portugal. s The Spanish territory of Rio Muni on the mainland received even less attention. It was not until1901 that the Spaniards attempted occupying the territory effectively.9
BRITISH INTEREST IN FERNANDO PO
The attention of the British governm~nt appeared to have been drawn to this island in the summer of 1825, when some British merchants sent a petition to the Colonial Office as"king the government to allow them to settle on the island.10 One of the motives urged upon the government for obtaining this permission invariably was that a British settlement there would afford a check to the slave trade. The British merchants also claimed that the island offered more security to them and that they could explore adjacent coasts particularly the Niger Delta from the island.ll Just around the same time the merchants were pleading with the government for permission to establish a trading settlement on Fernando Po, the British government received remonstrances from the Portuguese and Spanish governments complaining about the unhealthiness of Sierra Leone, the seat of the Court of Mixed Commission which had been set up after the abolition of the slave trade to punish those engaged in illegal traffic in fellow human beings. Britain then took up this matter by proposing that the Court of Mixed Commission should be removed to Fernando Po, which on account of its situation near the resort of the slave traders and on account of its reported salubrity, was a more desirable spot, for the purpose. The British government decided in the Cabinet meeting of 11 July 1825 to sound the opinions of other members of the
4
Court of Mixed Commission, particularly the important ones such as Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands. The Dutch government did not object, the Portuguese Foreign Minister Porto San to answered that "setting aside all questions of, property and sovereignty, His most faith full majesty had no objectionthat the mixed commission should be transferred to that Island . . . . " 12 The British envoy in Madrid was then instructed to make the proposal to Spain in the sense of the proposition already made to Portugal, and that he should add the fact of the consent of the latter power. The Spanish foreign member, the Duke del Infantado, answered that "His Catholic Majesty only waited for further information as to the possibility of effecting the object, before he acceded to the proposal".13 Asked what other information was wanted by Spain, the minister said "whenever I would notify to him that the Commissioners could be lodged on the Island, His Catholic Majesty would name a commissioner to reside there".l4 The British volunteered to provide neces~ary accommodation and even infrastructure to facilitate the movement and work of the Court of Mixed Commission, realising that by its position Femando Po commanded nearly all the abominable traffic in slaves. The British were therefore eager to stop the trade at its source by locating the Court of Mixed Commission on the island. Femando Po was nearer the Bight of Biafra, where the slaves were mostly captured, than was Sierra Leone 1,500 miles away. The British were decided on pressurising the Spaniards to agree to moving the Mixed Commission to Fernando Po. They were this, eager because the task of stopping slavers on the high seas was becoming not only hazardous to British sailors but to the slaves themselves since they were quickly dumped into the sea on the approach of a British cruiser. With British diplomatic pressure, , the Spaniards agreed to the sue of Fernando Po as the seat of the Court of Mixed Commission. But hardly had they granted this concession when they began to raise issues oflegal technicalities. Firstly, they claimed, and rightly so, that by Article 12 of the Treaty concluded on the
5
23 September 1817 setting up the Court of Mixed Commission, it was stipulated that "the Mixed Commission should reside in two points, one of which should absolutely be in the English and the other in the Spanish Dominions". 15
What the Spaniards were saying was that since the other seat of the Court of Mixed Commission was in Cuba which was a Spanish domain, it Would not be right to locate the second seat in Eernando Po. The Spanish told the British government that unless a prior negotiation and transfer of Fernando Po to 'Britain were undertaken British occupation of Fernando Po wpuld not only breach international law but also the article setting up the Mixed Commissions.16 The Spaniards, in order to solve the legal issue of the transfer of the Court of Mixed Commission to Fernando Po offered the sale of the island to Britain; the Spanish foreign minister informed his British counterpart that " ... if England, from any political or commercial object, should fmd it convenient to acquire the property or sovereignty of the Islands of Fernando Po and / An:nobon in the Gulf of Guinea, the Spanish government will make no difficulty in ceding them to Great Britain on such just and reasonable conditions as may be stipulated ... " 17
The British for several reasons were not prepared to add an inch of territorY to their empire, since the conventional political wisdom of the day was against imperialism. Many British politicians believed that trade would naturally find its outlets and markets without the necessity of creating a mercantilist empire where British trade woul;fbe protected against foreign competition. The British ()»t of sheer confidence in their commercial and naval supremacy felt they did not need. this kind of empire, although while prepared to keep what they had in the Indian sub-continent and Canada and Australia they were nevertheless firm believers in Adam Smith's theory of anti-Imperialism and free trade. Secondly, right from 1822 people with vested interests in Sierra Leone had always argued against acquisition of Fernando'Po on the grounds that it would compete with Sierra Leone. They were only prepared to support British presence on the island
6
through stationing of men-of war on the North-western bay of the island.lB ·
The British were also not prepared to dis~uss the question of sale of the Island .of Fernando Po and the.British emphatically declared that " ... H.M's government cannot agree to enter into any negotiation for the purchase of the Ishtrid-the consent of the Crown of Spain to the establishment there of the. slave trade commission, must either be gi~en gratuitously or altogether withheld . . . "19_ When Spain realised that the British were not interested in buying Fernando Po, the sale of which was to be .used by. Spain to defray the claims of her subjects after the abolition of the slave trade, 20 she neither gave her verbal consent or dissent to the idea of removing the Court of Mixed Commission to Fernando _Po. But the Spanish government spokesman, the Duke del lnfantado, had on 12.Apri11826 said that whenever the Spanish government was notified that the Mixed Commission could be comfortably lodged on the Island " ... His Catholic Majesty would name a Commissioner to proceed to Fernando Po".21
It was precisely upon these grounds as well as the accession of the other powers, particularly Portugal and the Netherlands, that the colonial office informed the Lords of the Admiralty of government's decision that the Admiralty should ·send "an officer of experience and discretion" to Fernando .. Po " ... in a vessel of war to prepare a suitable residence in that Island for the reception of the several members of the Mixed Commissi-on Court· and of the slaves who should be brought there for adjudication, as well as barracks for the accommodation of such troops as might be necessary. to protect the establishment from the incursion of the Natives : .. " 22 The Admiralty chose Captain Owen for this pioneering job. He sailed from Plymouth on 29 July 1827 and was empowered to found a settlement on Fernando Po.23 Captain Owen was to call in Sierra Leone on his way. to Fernando Po. The Governor of Sierra Leone was instructed to provide a black company of the Royal African Corps together with an adequate number of artificers and to give
7
assistance with building materials. In view of the considerable burden the expenditure on Fernando Po caused to the Sierra Leone treasury, the Governor of the colony demanded that Fernando Po should be put under his remote control, a demand to which the home government acceded. To prevent Captain Owen from carving out a little colony for himself, he was specifically told not to enter into any treaty or political engagement with the Africans on the island.
Communication of the British presence on Fernando Po was made to the Spanish government through the British envoy at Madrid. M. Salmon, the new foreign minister of Spain, surprised the British ambassador by his hostile attitude to the Fernando Po expedition. He claimed that Britain had sent out an expedition of troops as a preliminary step for acquiring jurisdiction and property over the Island. He then said Spain could not consent to this step over a Spanish possession, and then added that Spain was willing and ready to cede the island " ... on just and reasonable terms".24 The British reaction was the same as it was earlier, that is they were not interested in buying the island. The Spanish government was told that if it continued to object to British presence in Fernando Po Captain Owen would be recalled and the Court of Mixed Commission would have to remain in Sierra Leone which Spain and Portugal had criticised as an unhealthy place. The Spanish government answered that supposing Spain did accede to the proposal of removiilg the Court of Mixed Commission to Fernando Po, she would still expect explanation as to the meaning of the title of "Governor" said to have been conferred on Captaih' Owen (the superintendent of the establishment) and as· to the reported plan of " ... military occupation and colonisation and local authority".2s The Spanish ministet, M. Salinon, added that these explanations would be . unnecessary if England acquired " ... the property and sovereignty of the Island in the manner proposed by the Spanish government
"26
While this diplomatic bargaining continued for a whole
8
year, construction of houses continued on Femando Po and by July 1828 buildings for the accommodation of the Court of Mixed Commission were ready. At this point the British before proceeding further again asked the Spanish ambassador in London, Conde de Ofalia, in September 1828 whether the Spanish government were to be considered as agreeing to the temporary settlement of Fernando Po. He replied that he was " ... only authorised to propose to the government of Great Britain the cession by Spain of the property and sovereigrity of Fernando Po and Annabon on reasonable terms, and not to treat separately and solely for the removal of the Mixed Commission" _27 He said that he would write to Madrid on -the subject once more. Conde de Ofalia shortly afterwards announced that his government was disposed to concede the permission requested for the removal of the Court of Mixed Commission from Sierra Leone to Fernando Po but demanded that the British should put forward " ... an authentic document formally and explicitly acknowledging the incontrovertible rights of sovereignty and those of prpperty and p·ossession vested in Spain over the said Island of Fernando Po and which were acquired under an onerous title by article 13 of the Treaty of March 1778".28 The British Foreign Office instructed the British envoy in Madrid -to tell the Spanish government that " ... H.M.G. have no hesitation in meeting the wishes of the Spanish government, by engaging in the most ample and unequivocal manner, that no danger will ever result to the rights of Spain, whatever they may be, to the sovereignty of Femando Po from the establishment now forming in that Island for the simple object of ~xecuting the existing treaties for the suppression of the slave trade." The Spaniards were told that Captain Owen had been directed to limit his operation to the establishment of a residence for the Mixed Commission and was and would be invested with no authority which could interfere with the rights of the sovereign of the Island whoever he may be. 30 He was directed to add a declaration that "Great Britain had no private object in view in the proposed measures nor any end to answer by it
9
.· .···:
in which Spain, as a party to the slave trade abolition treaties. ought not to participate . . . "31 In spite of all· these assurances M. Salmon, the Spanish foreign minister, said that. " ... the assurances given by the British government were irisufficient and that the ack.nowledgement of the rights of sovereignty of Spain was desirable".32 M. Salmon instructed the Spanish ambassador in London, M. de Zea, to continue negotiation and to receive the formal declaration required. What it seems the Spanish government wanted was the sale of their possession in Guinea to the British. Since 'they had not incurred any expenditure on developing the islands, and since its acquisition was through diplomacy and not 'discovery' they did not seem to appreciate the worth of the island and wanted in the bargain to make some profit by selling the island to a relatively prosperous Britain which was expected fo relish the acquisition of the island if not because of anything else, at least because of her naval necessity. After much debate the Colonial Office advised that Spain should be made to cede Fernando Po to Britain temporarily, but Lord Ab~rdeen, the Foreign ·Secretary, thought it best to limit the
.. Brjti$h deinand to a request "that Spain sho1;1ld grant permission for the establishment of the Commission in that Island as ·a Spanish possession. " 33 The British government then wrote M. de Zea, the Spanish ambassador in London, on the 28 October 1830 plainly and p·ositively recognising on the part of Britain the sovereignty of Spain over Fernando Po. The note made it clear that " ... no danger, wrong or impediment will ever result to the sovereign rights, power and authority of His Catholic Majesty over Fernando Po from the establishment now forming in that Island . . . "34 Lord Aberdeen added that the superintendent had been directed to limit his operations to that object alone and to provide for the future disposal of such of the captured Afric~ns as may be liberated by the adjucation of the Courts. He made it clear that Captain Owen was granted no powers beyond what were necessary to maintain order within the establishment and to preserve those employed under him from the attacks of the
10
natives and that he was ", .. invested with no authority nor was it intended to supply him with any, which can in any way interfere with the rights of His Catholic Majesty". 35
With this clear undertaking to preserve the rights of Spain in Fernando Po, the Spanish government gave its consent _and asked that this be incorporated into a treaty. When this agreement was reached in 1831·, Britain inserted two vital clauses in the agreement: · (a) That the emancipated negroes may be. located on the
Island of Fernando Po without detriment to their rights as British subjects.
(b) That Britain be granted the power of removing such slaves as may be employed in Fernando Po to some British possession when the Commission shall cease to reside at Fernando Po and the Island shall revert to Spain.
The insertion of these clauses caused a breakdown in negotiation and the Spanish promise that as soon as Britain guaranteed the sovereign rights of Spain, she would promulgate a royal Cedula relative to the grant of the p.ermission, was not fulfilled. What seemed to have angered the Spanish government was the impression created by the two clauses inserted in 1831, that Spain was not likely to respect or uphold the right of liberated Africans on Fernando Po.
It was at this juncture that the Colonial Office advised the Foreign Office to propose to Spain that Fernando Po be exchanged for Crab Island or (Becque Island) in the British Virgin Islands in the West Indies. What the British were offering was at that ·time being claimed by Spain, so it was not surprising that they got no reply to the new offer of territorial exchange. In any case Spain at that time was thinking of converting Fernando Po into a "convict settlement" on the pattern of Botany Bay in Australia. In view of this the Colonial Office wrote to the Foreign Office in August 1832 that "Lord Goderich considering the altered circumstance under which it is hoped that the slave trade will be carried on
11
.J
· for the future and the difficulties which have been interposed to the settlement of this question, has come to the resolution that the most prudent course will be to withdraw the establishment from Fernando Po and that it will be proper for the F.O. to acquaint His Majesty's minister at Madrid, that this resolution having been adopted, the negotiation respecting the exchange of Fernando Po for Becque (Crab) Island cannot any longer be caft:ied on". 36 By October 1832 the Commissioners of the Court of Mixed Commission were. duly apprised of the issue of this transaction, so that it would be clear to them that they need · not prepare to move to Fernando Po. · · ·
While these series of negotiations were proceeding many liberated Africans had already been landed at the Is~and of Fernando Po from captured slave vessels. Their number rose from 505 in 1828 to 818 by 1835.37 The result of'this was that a British stamp was being given to the island since many of these Africans who were liberated by the British navy claimed British protection and later British citizenship. Their presence on. the island even after the British had officially withdraw:n.in 1834 was to shape the course of future development of Feriiari~6 Po.38
PERIOD OF UNOFFICIAL BRITISH CONTROL ... . . .
When the British government. severed its links wit4 Fernando Po officially, several. ·lib~rated Af:nc.al}s were s;hipped to Freetown, Cape Coast ~~nd pat;ticularly Bathurst39 with its better and cooler climate, ·and the naval stores were · transferred to the Island or" Ascension; 40. but severalliberat~d. Mricans remained on the island and many more continued to be landed there after 1834. The break up of the British settlement also did not mean complete abandonment of the island, for the Royal Navy continued to pay occasional visits to the island.41 By 1836 the political vacuum in Fernando Po had been filled by a company of English merchants.42 This
12
group included Messrs Dillon, Tennant and Company in which the famous John Beecroft was a partner; it also included Lynslager in whose employment was John Holt who later bought over the Lynslager business from his African wife after the former had died in 1867. The British continued to be concerned about the fate of the liberated Africans still remaining on the island and even sent a one-man mission to enquire into their affairs in 1838. The mission however found out that the liberated Africans in Fernando Po lived better than those in Sierra Leone and were not prepared to leave the island. Since there was this sizeable population of liberated Africans in Fernando Po numbering over a thousand,43 there was the need for some kind of law and order and leadership. This role was ably performed between 1834 and 1849 by two interesting English adventurers on the Coast, namely James worked officially for the British as Superintendent ofWorks and had acted for Lt. Col. Nicolls as Superintendent in 1831. Lynslager on the other hand was a successful businessman. These two men virtually ruled the island businessman. These two men virtually· ruled · the island together between 1834 and 1849 without any legal authority. Even when Spain asserted her·.sovereignty over the island in 1843, when Don Juan Jose de·Lerene symbolically replanted the Sp.anish flag, they had to accept the fait accompli of the power and influence of this duo, so that they appointed John Be.ecroft as Governor and James Lynslager as Chief Magistrate of fhe. ·island that. numbered about 35,000 Africans in 1843.45
. The assertion of Spanish sovereignty over the. island did not affect British dominance o( the island. Ftom the island too, British influence was to spread to the coast of Nigeria on which the settlement had depended for food following the incessant shortages of victuals from Sierra Leone. In fact it was the knowledge of the Delta and its immediate hinterland gathered by John Beecroft while in Fernando Po that made the task of intervention in the politics of what was to become Southern Nigeria almost inevitable. When as a result of his
13
activities in Fernando Po, Lord Palmerston appointed John Beecroft as her Britannic Majesty's consul to the Bights of Beni:ri and Biafra, Beecroft quickly implemented palmerstonian forward policy in Nigeria. The palm oil trade in this area then was worth over a million pounds sterling and the Royal Navy was used to protect British merchants and to open up the coast of Nigeria to British goods. It wa~ in this connection, that Lagos was occupied in 1851 by Beecroft and King Pepple of Bonny deposed in 1854, although these actions were later rationalised as moves aimed at suppression of the slave trade. Even by 1839 the British, it was apparent, were already regretting46 not ·having bought Fernando Po since Spain. had been offering it for sale to her since 1829.
. The Bri~ish seemed to have sounded a note of interest in buying the isiand in 1841 for £60,000, but the project had to be abando.ned owing to. popular indignation in Spain and the opposi~ion of, the Cortes. 47 But as pointed out previously, the. British .continu~d to dominate. the island. The only challenge to their authority was the abor,tive insurrection of liberated Africans in 1857 which .was sparked off by the irrational behaviour of James Lynslager, the acting governor,
. who threatened to shoot a Sierra Leonian carpenter. . .
The rebelli()US state of affairs was the result of lack of support from Spain since ho Spanish man-of-wiu visited the island from 1846 to 1857 and no civil or military functiona~ ries were in Fernando Po to assist Lynslager.~8 The liberated Mricans had been angered specifically by Lord Shelburne, the Secretary of State for the colonies, who declared in 1856 that " ... the liberation by British Authorities of slaves taken out of ships captured by British Cruisers will not entitle such slaves to be considered as British subjects. Fermindo Po never was part of the possessions of the . British Crown and the residence of such slaves in Fernando Po after their liberation cannot give them any other character or status than that of being during such residence subjects of the authority of the Crown of Spain."50 It was in fact to resolve this anomalous
14
situation of an absentee sovereign that the blacks wanted to set up a government of their own to protect themselves from the irrational tendencies of Lynslager, the businessman-turned -governor. The news of this threatened rebellion compelled the Spaniards fmally to send a Governor to Fernando Po in 1858. He was Commander Don Carlos Chacon51 and he took over from James Lynslager as Governor of Fernando Po, Annobon and Corisco, Lynslager having been acting governor for eleven years and Chief Magistrate and Governor for· four years. The period of British political ascendancy and cultural domination seemed to be coming to an end. As if to signify the dawn of a new dispensation Don Carlos Chacon immediately issued a proclamation saying that "the religion of this colony is that of the Roman Catholic Church, as the only one of the Kingdom of Spain with the exclusion of any other and no other religious profession is tolerated or allowed ... and any other religious denominations would have to confine their worship within their OWI}~private houses or families". 52
This proclamation was however nbt enforceable until the Spaniards could garrison the island with Spanish troops. The leader of the Baptist Mission, one Rev. Nicoll, a Sierra Leonian, immediately said that his fellow settlers would not
· abide by the law and would expect the long hand of the British navy to protect them against Spanish tyranny. The bluff seemed to have succeeded temporarily for three Sierra l..eonians, Peter Nicolls, (not the Rev. Nicoll .mentioned above), Richard Brwe and Samuel Johnson were subsequently appointed as Justices of the Peace, although later on in the year the Baptists were asked to leave the island by Madrid. Even though the Baptists did not leave as ordered, the British did not raise a finger in their defence, since Britain during this time was preoccupied with the Niger expedition. The British by 186553 were beginning to be hurt by Spanish policies, especially by high taxes, so that they began to mpve out to Ambas Bay and particularly to Victoria in what became the Cameroons. But of course not all of them were moving out, some remained and prospered. First they traded. in palm
15
oil which they bought from the native Bubi and sold to European merchants in Oarence <?Ji: Santa Isabel. Later when cocoa was introduced to the isl~d •. the black settlers m~ved into the cocoa trade. The crq~twas mtroduced from Brazil to Sao Tome in 1822 and in·\lS54 to Fernando Po. It was from Fernando Po thaJ. cocoa came to the Gold Coast, Nigeria and other West Mrican States. The Sierra Leonian settlers established cocoa plantations and invested their profits from the palm oil trade in their various cocoa plantations to the extent that by the 1880s one of the Sierra Leonians, William Alien Vivour, was Fernando Po's largest land owner.54 By this time the Spaniards had become aware of the econorqic potentialities of Fernando Po, and were creating problems for non-Spanish subjects especially in land ownership. Nevertheless, culturally, English speaking people were still the dominant element in Fernando Po's life. The primitive Methodist-Missionary Society had missions and schools where only English was the medium of expression up till 1885. They were forced to use Spanish and English in 1887 or close down.ss In short, English culture was so dominant up to the 1890s'*at a Catholic missionary complained that ·~the Island of Bernando Po above all, has been captured by the English blacks of Si~rra Leone . . . and thus, the major part of the Island is in the hands of these English Blacks and they have herded the Bubis, the natives of the Island into the interior of the Island, the wqrst part of all, where the means of subsis-tence are hardly found and those foreign English blacks have, for the most part, the better coastal soil. "56 ' ·The economy of the island at this time was still solidly in
the hands of not only black settlers who claimed British citizenship but the carrying trade of the island was also
· monopolised by the British. For example in the last quarter ·of the 19th century the English firms of John Holt and Company, Blythe, Hamilton, Struthers and Harrington monopolised t~e paim oil and kernels trade of Fernando Po.57 In view of -this British predominant position in Fernando Po, their activities began to attract the attention of other powers
16
in Europe. The Germans were said to be interested in buying the island from Spain. The British ambassador in Berlin, reported that the influential Gennan journal the Kolonialsrit: schrift stated in June 1907 that Spain had conceded to Germany the right of pre-emption over the Island of Fernando Po. He also claimed that a "Fernando Po committee" had been formed in Germany which would induce the Imperial government to purchase the Island outright. This group believed that Fernando Po was not that valuable but that they were out to prevent "a second Zanzibar" on the West Coast of Africa.SB The Belgians at another time were also alleged to be interested in Fernando Po. People with Congolese interest and background wanted to secure from the "weak and poverty stricken"59 Spanish government the lease of all the unoccupied land in Fernando Po and the Spanish possession of Rio Muni. The scheme involved the creation of two large chartered companies for exploitation and administration of these areas. TJ:le rights of Spain would still exist nominally, but to all intents and purposes Fernando Po, Corisco Bay and Rio Muni would become Belgian. One thing that was clear was that Spain wanted to sell Fernando Po arid ,was listening to anybody prepared to offer a high price.60
British Imperialists did not remain inactive during this time: Sir Ralph Moor, Commissioner and Consul-General in charge of the Niger Coast Protectorate, commented that" ... should. there at any time be a question of Spain parting with the Island, I should strenously urge Her Majesty's government to take steps to obtain possession of it as it would fonn a most valuable sanatorium for Nigeria". As a Briton with the traditional love of ports that could be useful to the royal navy, he
· added that " ... its position would .be almost invaluable as a coaling station particularly having regard to the fact that it can be easily defended and has a good harbour into which the largest ships of Her Majesty's navy can go for coaling purposes". 61 "It is a great pity that we have__~t got, Fernando Po," minuted an official of the Colonial Office, "Bu ti-do---not
17
suppose that there is any chance of being able to acquire it and all that we can do is to see that Germany doesn't get it behind our backs."62 Private capitalists like John Holt also pleaded with the British government to annex Fernando Po. He claimed that Fernando Po had a fine climate and would be good as a sanatorium. John Holt was insistent on keeping the horrible Belgians out. He wrote" ... we ought not to let the_ place go to the Belgians or anybody else if we can help it. It was ours until we chose to give it up to Spain after having spent a lot of money on it. Holt claimed that Fernando Po would be an ideal place for the headquarters of the government of Nigeria. Just sixty miles from the mouth of the old Calabar river, he felt it was a desirable adjunct to Nigeria especially since the Island was more conducive to work and for-~ecuperation from insect borne diseases prevalent around the Niger Delta.63 The British were so concerned about the
- future of Fernando Po that they were even toying with the idea that Germany could be offered Rio Muni while the British would keep the island. They however made it quite clear to Spain that " ... it is to the interest of Great Britain that Fernando Po should remain in Spanish possession, as a British occupation would be politically inexpedient and in a military sense undesirable, while if the Island belonged to a strong naval power with which we were at war its capture might become necessary. "64 While all this was going on, one thing that the British themselves realised was that they did not have a stronger claim to Fernando Po than that of the Germans. Even the British Foreign Office commented that Fernando Po was much nearer to the Cameroons than to · Nigeria and doubted " ... whether the German government would be pleased to see a repetition off the Cameroons Colony of the Zanzibar and Pemba grievance off German East Africa."65 The British finally decided against pressing their claims, although they knew Fernando Po in enemy hands would be detrimental to Nigeria's security, but the argument against annexation was, however, overwhelming as can be seen in the stand of the British Colonial Office, when one of its
18
principal officers wrote "The C.D.C. reported that Fernando Po may in fact be regarded &S geographically a dependency of . the Cameroons which belong to Germany and that the occupation of the Island by ·Great Britain would almost inevitably be regarded by Germany as a menace to the Cameroons. This is probably true and I conclude that it is out of the question for us to take any steps to acquire the Island."66 The result of this was that Britain was not going to allow Fernando Po to be annexed by any other power while she herself was not going to annex the territory; the Germans were however keeping their options- open and had designs about Fernando Po which the British did not dare. to ignore especially because of the generally hostile attitude of the Germans to British imperialism which they felt had been at Germany's expense. The security aspect of Fernando Po's question was to assume a wider dimension during the two World Wars when Spain and consequently Fernando Po were manifestly Pro-German. The labour question, which is not unrelated to the security of Fernando Po loomed larger in the history of Fernando Po's relation with other West Mrican countries particularly with Nigeria.
REFERENCES
1 F.O. 371/49640. Foreign Office Research dept. Memo on Spanish Guinea, 1 Feb. 1945.
2 C.O. 82/9. Memo presented to Lord Palmerston by S. Bandinell on Fernando Po. Jan. 30, 1939.
3 C.O. 82/1. The Conde de Ofalia Minister Extraordinary of His Catholic Majesty of Spain to Viscount Dudley, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 10 Sept. 1827.
4 - C.O. 82/9. Memo presented to Lord Palmerston 30 Jan. 1839.
19
5 F.O. 371/49640. Foreign Office Research dept. 1st Feb. 1945.
6 c.o. 82/1.
7 C.O. 82/9. The number of colonists and seamen who went to Fe man do Po was 705; 494 died within six months and only 211 made it back to Spain.
8 F.O. 371/49640. Foreign Office Research dept. Memo of 1st Feb. 1945.
9 See Jide Osuntokun: 'Nigeria~Femando Po Relations from colonial times to the present' in Nigeria and the World ed. by Bolaji Akinyemi (N.I.I.A.) forthcoming.
10 C.O. 82/9. Memo by S. Bandinell of F.O. on Femando Po, Jan. 30, 1839.
11 C.O. 82/4. Lt. Col. Nicholls to Lord Gorderich, 26 March 1831.
12 Quoted in C.O. 82/9. Memo by S. Bandinell30 Jan. 1839.
13 Ibid.'.
14 Mr. I.amb H.B.M. ambassador in Madrid to F.O. quoted in C.O. 82/9.
15 C.O. 82/1 Conde de Ofalia to Earl of Dudley 10 Dec. 1827.
16 Ibid.
17 C.O. 82/1 Conde de Ofalia Minister Extraorditiary of His Catholic Majesty of Spain to Viscount Dudley, His Brittanic Majl)sty's . Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 10 Sept. 1827. ·
18 The Royal Gazette and Sierra Leone Advertiser August 12, 1822.
19 C.O. 82/1 Earl Dudley to Conde de Ofalia, Jan. 10, 1828.
20 C.O. 82/1 George Bosanquet British ambassador in Madrio to Earl Dudley, 17 March, 1828. ·
21 C.O. 82/1 Earl Dudley to Conde de Ofalia, Jan. 10, 1828.
22 C.O: 82/9 Memo presented to Lord Palmerston by S. Bandinell of F.O. on Femando Po. 30 Jan, 1839.
23 c.o. 82/110 Sept., 1827.
24 C.O. 82/9 Memo by Bandinell of F.O. of 30 Jan., 1839.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
20
27 Ibid.
28 C.O. 82/1 F.O. note of27 Dec., 1828.
29 C.O. 82/9 Memo presented to Lord Palmerston 30 Jan., 1839.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 C.O. 82/4. 24 Sept., 1831.
37 The number landed in 1828 was 505, in 1829, 161, in 1833, 152, in 1834, 108, in 1835, 44 making a total of 8f8.
38 F.O. 371/49640. Forei~ Office Research Department's memo of 1st Feb., 1945. ·
39 C.0.82/5. 14/8/1832.
40 Ibid.
41 c.o. 82/7. 3 May, 1834.
42 C.O. 82/9. Lord Glenelg to Lord Palmerston Dec. 20, 1838.
43 C.O. 714/167. Captain Owen to C.O. 28 April1828.
44 C.O. 82/4. Lt. Col. Edward Nicolls to C.O. 24 Jan., 1831.
45 F.O. 2/19 J. Hutchinson H.M's consul to Earl' of Clarendon,
46
47
48
49
50
23 May, 1857. See also F.O. 84/775, Palmerston to Beecroft 12/71849. K.O. Dike: John Beecroft 1790-1854 Her Brittanic Majesty's consul to the Bights of Benin and Biafra 1849-1854" Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria .(J.H.S.N.)Vol.l,No.l p. 7.1956.
C.O. 8l/9. Lord Palmerston to Lord Glenelg 30 Jan:, 1839.
F.O. 371/49640. R.O. Research Dept. 1st Feb., 1945.
F.O. 2/19. J. Hutchinson H.M's Consul to Earl of Qarendon 23 May, 1857.
Ibid.
21
51 F.O. 2/25. Hutchinson to Earl ofMalmesbury 28 May, 1858.
S2 Ibid.
53 F.O. 2/45. Charles livingstone H.B.M. Consul to F.O. 2 June, 1865.
54 I.K. Sundiata: Prelude to Scandal: Uberia and Femando Po ' 1880H930 'Journal of African History XV' 1974, p. 98.
55 c.o. 520/39.
56 Cristobal Femandex: Missiones Y Missioneros en la Guinea espanola. Madrid 1962, p. 109. See Sundiata op. cit p. 98.
57 F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie note encl. in B.R Bourdillon to Rt. Hon. Lord· lloyd of Dolobran, Secretary of state for the colonies. 4 Jan., 1941.
58 C.O. 520/U. British ambassador in Berlin to F.O. 5 July, 1901.
59 West Africa, 2 March 1902.
60 C.O. 520/11. Sir M. Durand British ambassador in Madrid to F.O. 17 ~y. 1901.
61 . C.Q; 44411. R Moor to C.O. 7th April, 1899.
. 62 C.O. 444/1. Antrobus minute of 21 Aug., 1899.
63 See C.O. 520/11. John Holt to F.O. 10 April1901~ also /bid John Holt to F.O. 28 March 1901. C.O. 520/12 John Holt to F.O. 22 March 1901.
· 66 C;O. ·520/12. Charles Strachey's minute of March 27, 1901.
22
2
HISTORY OF LABOUR RECRUITING
The introduction of cocoa to Fernando Po produced a shift from trade in palm oil to plantation agriculture. In the last quarter of the 19th century when Femando Po was still dominated by English firms, labour became scarce as a result of the gradual economic transformation of .:he island. Labour requirements of both Spanish and alien employers were inadequately met by the unsophisticated Bubi of the island. By the 1880s it became the usual practice for these English firms and their Spanish hosts to encourage "Kru men" from Liberia employed in the various vessels plying the West Mrican route, to accept employment on shore. Considerable numbers of Kru men were employed in this way and th~ terms of employment were generally acceptable to those employed. Spanish mercantile firms also began to require more labour than the island could supply and consequently the Spanish government decided to permit the transport of Kru men on the gun boats "Prosperidad", "Ligera" and "Concordia" that used frequently to visit the island.1 The labourers~ must have been psychologically over-awed through their experience in these gun boats. After reaching Femando Po, they were expected to remain on the island for one year. Food was provided free and wages were in kind. The usual payment was a Dane gun and a supply of powder. These conditions continued till about 1890 when the wide-spread destruction of oil palms, resulting from the production of palm wine, caused the trading community to look for new exports. As pointed out earlier, cocoa began to take pride of place around this time. In actual fact the planting of cocoa on a commercial scale was first encouraged by the Englishman, Lynslager. The trade grew and Spanish and Portuguese
23
colonists began to buy land extensively from the indigenous · Blibi paying for it with gin and brandy. The results were quickly disastrous for the Bubi, who by 1905 were regarded as a degenerate race, well on the way to extinction.
Agricultural development in Femando Po faced. various constraints. There was little or no infrastructure on the island, thus hampering mobility of goods and the small labour force available. The Spanish regime had hardly taken an interest in linking the capital with other centres of settlement. San Carlos, for example, had no road link with Santa Isabel, a distance of thirty miles, with the result that goods had to be sent by sea to and from these important settlements. There was also constant fluctuation in the price of cocoa, and the Mrican planter was open to speculative deals with European entrepreneurs, so that many African planters went bankrupt or sold their property to their European competitors. Apart from this problem, the several Sierra Leon \an settlers and the British community were open to nationalist attack from Spaniards who manipulated the laws of nationality to undermine the prosperity of these alien capitalists.2 But the greatest problem of all the problems facing Femando Po was shortage of labour. Even though only 3.5 per cent of the land area of the island was under cultivation by 1912, the question of labour was crucial to the economic development of the island. Unfortunately for Femando Po, the period the Spanish government wanted to embark upon agricultural exploitation of the island coincided with the period of the intensification of agricultural exploitation by other European powers in West Africa, particularly Germany. 3 The result was under-development in Femando Po, as compared with the neighbouring Portuguese Island of Sao Tome, which exported over sixty million pounds sterling worth of cocoa, compared with six million pounds sterling produced in Femando Po in 1909.4 The reason for this gross disparity was availability of labour to Sao Tome from Angola which served as a human resetvoir to the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, whereas Femando Po did not have such a reservoir on the mainland. Rio Muni
24
i.
( i
wa~ hardly in a position to supply labour to Femando Po since Rio Muni itself was not yet pacified, and the Spanish government was not in effective occupation of the entire area. It became quite clear then to all concerned that if Femando Po was to develop, labour must be sought somewhere in West Africa.
African labour recruiters first made their appearance about 1896. About that time a Lagosian named Reis began importing Yoruba labour from Lagos and Ijebu-Ode.s The Yoruba soon decided that the conditions in Femando Po were unsatisfacto:ry so this source of labour supply dried tip. Some 450 of them had to be repatriated en masse at the expense of the Spanish government when they went on illegal strike. About 1900, a Sierra Leonianby the name of Vivourstarted to bring labour in considerable numbers from Freetown, Monrovia and Accra. The Spaniards enacted in 1906 a labour code and conditions improved for migrant workers. In spite of this the Sierra Leonian government put an end to organised recruiting, apparently because they considered the methods Hsed illegal. It was useless to seek supplies of labour in the neighbouring Cameroons, as the German concessions were then employing nearly 40,000 Mricans and were even recruiting labour from Liberia. Accordingly, the Spaniards sent a labour commission to Liberia. The success of this mission can be gauged by the fact that by 1901 there were already 933 6
Liberian labourers on the island. The Spano-Liberian agreement was conceived in a liberal spirit and modelled on the Portuguese labour agreement whereby many thousands of Angolans and Mozambiqans had been indentured for work in Sao Tome and Principe. Before 1901, and particularly in the 1890s recruitment of labourers from Liberia was done through private individuals. It was in these circumstances that one German, August Humplmayr, was given recruiting rights along with some Liberians. These rights were subsequently abused and were consequently abrogated. African recruiters usually went into the interior where they linked up with chiefs who produced these labourers and were able to smuggle
25
them on to Spanish ships without paying any taxes to the Liberian government. But from 1897 the Liberian government tried to control this new slave trade by demanding that contractors of labour should post a $150 bond for labourers' return and imposed a fine of $100 for a labourer who might die in Fernando Po. The recruiter was also to buy his licence for $250 ~d pay $5 on each labourer. In spite of these laws illegal trafficking continued because it was profitable. In 1903 the Liberian government signed an agreement with the German firm of Wiechers and Helm. The posting of a bond was waived and in return the company promised to repatriate 'time expired' l~bourers back to Liberia. Workers were not to be permitted under any circumstance to remain in Liberia for more than two years. A similar agreement was signed with another German firm Woermann Linie A. G. with the important difference that the Woermann Company could ship their labourers to anywhere outside Fernando Po. In the recruiting exercise the headman seemed to play an important role and he and the Liberian national treasury benefited from this traffic either through payment of commission and taxes
· directly to the headman, the agents and the Liberian government, or through fraudulent means whereby some months' salaries were collected by agents before the labourers left Liberian shores. The German firms themselves made profits ranging from 100 to 150 per cent through the same fraudulent methods.? But another accord was signed by Liberian and Spanish authorities in Fernando Po in 1905 to block the loopholes in the existing agreements. The liberian authorities were under so much international pressure that by 1908 they had tightened things up to such an extent that the Spanish authorities began to find it extremely difficult to recruit labour. When the Spaniards tried to tap the labour resources of Rio Muni, 8 they met with failure, because Spanish planters and traders in Rio Muni had become sufficiently numerous that they were able to impress upon· the authorities that their labour needs were great enough to absorb all the available local labour supply.
26
f !' I
!
I
Since the British embargoed the export of labour from their colonies to Spanish Guinea, the Liberian connection was revived again and after the Liberian Secretary of State, Joseph J. Sharp, had toured Fernando Po in 1913 and apparently reported favourably about the labour conditions, the two governments signed a labour agreement in 1914 permitting Liberian labourers to be recruited for service in Fernando Po. The Liberian economy at this time was in a mess and by 1912 the country's economy had been put to international receivership because of inability of the country not only to service loans, but to pay back the loans themselves. The outbreak of war in 1914 further damaged the economy of mercantile and shipping companies. With the outbreak of war the question of labour shortage assumed security dimensions.
Relations between British Nigeria and Spanish Equatorial Guinea before the war had not been cordial because of Britain's opposition to Spanish labour recruitment in West Africa as a whole and in Nigeria in particular. The Spaniards had been illegally recruiting people from the Eastern part of Nigeria, particularly in the lgbo heartland where labour was abundant. 9 The Spaniards were in the habit of making exaggerated promises of high wages which were never paid and of hiding the fact that the labourers were going to Fernando Po. It is quite clear that since 1827, Fernando Po had been heavily dependent on Old Calabar and had to a certain extent maintained this state of dependency even up to the outbreak of the First World War. In order to put an end to the illegal human traffic between Nigeria and Fernando Po, the British Admiralty was given the power of "search and arrest" over Spanish ships that might be suspected of indulging in the human traffic which the Nigerian authorities saw as a new slave trade.
When war broke out in Europe, it was quite clear that the Nigeria-Fernando Po relation was going to undergo a period of strain. The Germans had always been interested in Fernando Po; they had made economic inroads into the island, and the carrying trade of the island was largely in their
27
hands. The Spanish authorities there were also solidly pro-German. The Germans during the war were also using Fernando Po as transmitting stations to get in touch with their warships scattered in the Southern Atlantic and the British also had ample evidence to suggest that Spaniards were engaged in gun-running for the Germans during the period of hostilities in German Cameroons.lO Even after the conclusion of hostilities in 1916, the Spanish authorities continued to give succour to defeated German troops and their Mrican soldiers who were "interned" in Fernando Po, but who were allegedly training to reoccupy the Cameroons. Constant was the correspondence between Lagos and London and between London, Paris and Madrid over the hostile attitude of the ~uthorities on Fernando Po Island to allied milita:ry operations in. the Cameroons. Although the fears of the allied powers about subversion through Fernando Po came to
. nothing, the fact still remains that Fernando Po in the hands of a hostile power was a thorn in the flesh for the British authorities in Nigeria. Even a "neutral" Femando Po during the First World War caused considerable heart-ache in Nigeria.tt·
With the end of the war and the imposition of a League of Nations mandate on the Cameroons, administered by the . British and the French, the security aspect of Fernando Po's question receded. It seems that the evacuation from the Cameroons of about 16,00012 Cameroonians, about 5,000 to 6,000 of whom were soldiers, in 1916 -helped to alleviate the problem of labour in Fernando Po during the First World War; but with the signing of the Armistice and the end of hostilities the perennial question of labour shortage had to be faced again; this time not in Fernando Po but in the whole of Equatorial Guinea. Labour from 1920 onwards was encouraged into Rio Muni from Gabon and the Cameroons under French mandate. Labour from Liberia into Fernando Po continued until 1928 when it came under severe international pressure and opposition. By 1931 the Liberian government was forced by international pressure to stop sending
28
·· .. :
. . . . - •• .--· I
labourers to Fernando ·Po. By this time also, Liberia was no longer the Cinderell~ that she used to be. As a result of ~e opening up of the count:ry by the Firestone Company of Amenca and the intensive plantation of rubber in 1923, the Liberian exchequer was no longer in the penurious state that one had come to expect.B The exclusion of Liberia as a source of labour from 1928 compelled the Spanish authorities to adopt other methods. Unorganised recruiting from various points on the West African coast still brought in labourers but in insufficient quantity. The island enjoyed a post-war boom during the 1920s and as this neared its climax around 1929 various efforts were made to procure labour at all costs.
In 1929 Madrid tried to beat the problem of shortage of artisans by unsuccessfully arranging· that Rumania should send to Femando Po skilled carpenters, smiths and mechanics.14 In 1931 the Chamber of Agriculture in Fernando Po sent a mission to China to recruit 'coolies' but the mission proved unsuccessful. Children and women were · consequently recruited into the labour force in Fernando Po and the judicial system was used to brand all jobless people as rogues and vagabonds to compel them into plantation work. These measures seemed to have sufficed to induce labourers to go to the pl~ntation until 1933 when the French government complained to the League of Nations of the treatment meted out to Cameroon labourers in Spanish Guinea. This in effect meant that the Spaniards could not continue treating their subjects with the same kind of inhumanity previously prevaling on the island without attracting international attention. A treaty to regulate the enlistment of · Cameroonians was signed between the French and Spanish governments in 1934 and the Spaniards issued a Labour Code on Februa:ry 15, 1935 containing a number of the provisions of the agreement. This decree firstly,· made provision for the supply of food and quinine for labourers an.d secondly, a Spanish consul de Carriere was appointed to Duala to supeiVise and encourage recruiting; but it seems, he had scant success. The French authorities seemed to have
29
•
been equally dissatisfied for they denounced the treaty in Febraury 1936.15
In 1937, the farmers of the island began to look seriously for labour in Calabar and the part of the Cameroons under British Mandate. The threat this posed to the security and peace of Nigeria was such that the government set up a preventive branch in the police to deal specifically with the traffic in human cargo to Fernando Po. Just at the time the measure was beginning to have an impact on the illegal traffic, the Second World War broke out and the preventive service was withdrawn thus resulting in practical monopoly of the traffic in mep. by canoe owners around the Cross River.
The traffic, illegal as it was, was well organised by the recruiters in Nigeria and Spanish authorities and employers in Fernando Po. The canoes generally sailed in convoys. The Spanish government and employers paid recruiters liberally both in sterling and pesetas out of which the "canoe men" and paddlers received their share. They supplemented this revenue by trading in contraband.
It can thus be seen that the Spaniards from about 1890 onwards recruited labour from most parts of the West Coast. Thanks to their methods they were made to abandon Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Cameroons under French Mandate as recruiting grounds. By 1939 they turned their attention to South-Eastern Nigeria. Here they had a dozen or so "native" recruiters who were given ample funds with which to operate. The sea journey was short and the rewards were considerable. Moreover, labour conditions on the Island of Fernando Po had so improved that service on the island was not unattrac-
, tive to people who were jobless while in Nigeria. The Spanish . authorities knew that Nigeria was the last obvious source of foreign labour and they were not prepared to fail since failure would mean the loss of 12,000 tons of cocoa and 3,000 tons16 of coffee exported annually from Fernando Po to Spain. These commodities Spain could not get in any other place because she had scarce foreign reserves, most of which was committed to buying military hardware because of
30
the internal political problems in Spain itself. In order not to fail, the Spanish authorities in Femando Po were prepared to liberalise their labour legislation in favour of better treatment for contract labourers.
The only labour codes that tried to regulate the conditions of labourers in Femando Po before the Second World War were the 1906 'Reglamento del Trabajo Indigena, i.e. the Native Labour Code. This code was described as provisional but it remained on the statute books until 1940. The code was not completely illiberal; it provided for a one year contract a minimum wage, and also made provision for keeping half,the wage with the labour officer as savings. Nursing mothers and children under ten were not to be put to he~vy work. There was the provision for free rations and hous~ng. Men were expected to work for ten hours and women e1~t hours daily. Labourers, however, could not _leave _theu employers or even the plantations except w1th wntten permission. This code applied to alien labourers, ~ut occasionally it was stretched to apply to the Bubi population· of the island. In 1908, for example, during one of the recruiting shortages of labour, all Bubis not possessing one hectare of land were compelled to enter temporary contract. The alternative was forty days hard labour. These provisions were so harshly enforced that by 1910 the supposedly docile Bubi of Balache area revoltedP In spite of the existence of the 'Reglamento del Trabajo lndigena of 1906 it seems t?e planters were not obeying the laws, for in 1915 the Spantsh authorities in series of exhortations and commands . to planters made it clear that the planters were not fulfllhng their side of the labour bargain especially the aspect that enjoined them to pay half the wage of each l~bourer to. t~e labour officer as savings. In 1929, the Span1sh authont1es became so angry with some planters who were accused of giving the island an "evil reputation" internationally th~t ~ey began to impose heavy fines for such illegal acts as wh1ppmg. In spite of these attempts and another one ~n 193'! to liberalise the Spanish regime on the island, there still remamed
31
some fundamental problems such as the non-payment of adequate compensation for injured labourers, the fact that estate~ of deceased labourers were forfeited to the Spanish colonial government and finally the lack of choice of who t work for. The si~ation was so heavily weighted in favour 0~ the planters that. 1f a labourer declined to accept the contract place.d before h1m, he could be treated under the existing Spanish laws a~ a rogue and a vagabond, offences punishable by transportatiOn to a plantation for hard work. It is often forgottyn ~hat Spain did not treat her own subjects better tha~ th~ aliens .who came to work as contract labourers in her ~erntones. Th1s was . due to the kind of colonial regime Impos:d on her colomes. The colonial system was of course a reflectiOn of the way of thinking about Africans harboured by those who shaped Spanish colonial policy.
COLONIAL POLICY
Th~ ~oli~y of the .spanis~ government was originally that of assimllatl?n, a pobcy which was similar to that of France and Portugal I~ the1r African territories. This policy's premise was t~?:fol~; 1t was adopted in the beiief that Africans had no CIVilizatiOn or. culture worth keeping, so it was thought necessaty to Wip~ out this inexistent or at best barbaric past and be!?n to wnte a new civilization upon a cultural tabula rasa, as It ~ere: ~~condly, the policy was adopted in the belief that Sp~msh CIVilization was the best. This cultural arrogance w~s typical of the latin countries of Europe in their relation With non-Eu.ropean peoples. In the case of Spain in Fernando Po, ~e Afncans, because of their small number, did not constitut~ any ~onstraint on whatever Spain did, so that changes ~ Spamsh colonial administration were primarily due ~o ~lther changes in colonial personnel or changes in Spanish mternal.politi~ at home. The assimilationist policies ~do~te~ by Sprun entailed the imposition on the colony of mst1tut10ns of metropolitan Spain. By 1915 th s · h th ·ti 1 . , e panis au on es c rumed that they were adopting a new policy of
32
"attraction" or association based on respect for native institutions, but the fact was that in the case of Spanish Guinea the aim of the Spanish government was solely domination for the purpose of exploiting the territory by means of native labour. Thus, for example, in spite of Spain's adherence to the forced labour convention of 1930, forced labour (Prestacion personal) continued until 1938. By 1938 Spain recognised in Femando Po two categories of African subjects. There was a class of "emancipated natives"; these were people who had shown themselves in various ways to possess a fairly high standard of "character and ability". These people were subjected to the same system of justice as Europeans, i.e. they were tried according to Spanish laws. A law further defining the degrees of emancipation was passed on 30 December 1944 and by this law fully emancipated subjects came under metropolitan Spanish law without prejudice to such modifications that might be introduced by colonial legislation.
"Unemancipated natives", i.e. other Africans who were mostly illiterate, came under the protection of a Patronato of natives. This was a council for the protection of "natives" which came into existence in 1928 with the main task of advising the Governor-General on African affairs. A further revision of this system was made in 1938; consequently, administration of "native justice" was based on 'native usage'. Polygamy though countenanced was discouraged by a system of fmes operating after the third espousal. There was a hierarchy of native courts culminating in the Supreme Native Tribunal consisting of groups of Africans nominated by the Governor-General and sitting under the presidency of Spanish officials, although the authorities claimed in 1939 that it was their aim to exclude European officials from "native" court administration.
The territorial administration was based on separate administration for Fernando Po and another one for Rio Muni and the remaining islands. The government took little interest in African education though Catholic missionary
33
societies were allowed to operate in Spanish Guinea; Before the Second World War then, one can conclude that Spain was beginning to take more interest in Spanish Guinea not for altruistic reasons but solely for purposes of exploitation. Statements of the Spanish ''mission" in Africa were being made that it began to seem that the " ... rod of the exploiter has been so swathed in altruistic professions that it has come to look almost like an umbrella. "18 It was, however, clear that since Femando Po was dependent on migratory labour which gave the island a transient nature, the full impact of Spanish administration was never really felt and even up till 1940, "Pidgin English" continued to be the lingtUJ franca of the island. This dependence on migratory labour made Femando Po almost a no-man's island and made her future not only economically19 doubtful but also politically unsafe.20
REFERENCES
F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie, H.B.M. Vice Consul encl. in B.H. Bourdillon to Rt. Hon. Lord lioyd of Dolobran, Secretazy of state for the colonies. 4 Jan., 1941.
2 I.K. Sundiata op, cit. pp. 101-103.
3 . H.R. Rudin: Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914: A case study in Modern Imperialism: Yale Univ. Press 1938, pp. 315-316.
4 I.K. Sundiata, op. cit. p. 100.
5 F.O. 371/26908 C.W. Michie Vice-Consul in Santa Isabei, enclo. In B.H. Bourdillon to C.O. 4 Jan., 1941.
6 I.K. Sundiata. Op.cit. p. 103.
7 I.K. Sundiata. Op. cit. p. 104.
8 Ch. III of Spanish Guinea labour code issued in 1906 article 38 adjured Spanish administrative officers to meet labour needs of Fernando Po by official recruiting.
34
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Jide Osuntokun: Anglo-Spanish Relations in West Africa during the First World War 'JHSN. Vol. VII, No. 2, June 197 4 p. 292.
Jide Osuntokun.lbid. p. 296.
Jide Osuntokun.lbid. P· 301.
Ibid. p. 299.
See J. Osuntokun. 'Nigeria-Femando Po Relation' Coming up in A B Akinyemi Ed. Nigeria and the World. Papers read at N:I.I.A. conference held in Lagos in Feb. 1976. See also M.~· Akpan: liberia and the Universal Negro hnprovement Assocta·
t . The background to the abortion of Garvey scheme for ton. Afi. Hi" tory XIV 1 1973 African colonisation. Journal of ncan zs
p. 121.
F.O. 371/26908. Op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie. Op. cit.
Ibid.
Value of exports from Femando Po.
1929 1930 1931
£128,560 £234,200 £77,600
1933
£56,360
These figures reflect declining labour supply'. partic~lar~~e~: 1931 figure reflects the stoppage oflabour recrmtment m li . S F 0 371/49640. Research Dept. 1st Feb., 1945. ee. . . th C 0 583/248. Reporting the migration of Germans .from e
. . d B "tish Mandate to Femando Po m August Cameroons un er n 1939.
35
3 THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE PREDOMINANCE
OF NIGERIAN LABOUR IN FERNANDO PO
It is generally accepted that when people move voluntarily from one place to another, they must be doing so because the recipient area must have something more than the losing area to offer. This would be true not only with regard to itJ.temal migration, either rural-urban, or urban-urban migration, but also when international boundaries are involved. The migratory phenomenon could be explained in the sense of "push" d " 11" 1'. t "Pu h" · th an pu 1ac ors. s m e sense of unfavourable conditions at home and "pull" in the sense of an assumed ~avourable condition in the receiving areas. Political oppresswn, lack of economic opportunities, shortage of land in particular, could lead to exodus of a people to another more favourable area. There is of course the "ethnic pull"; that is people tentl to migrate to an area where representatives of the parent ethnic group already existed.! These factors applied in the case of labour migration to Femando Po from Nigeria.
Right from 1828 to the eve of the Second World War Nigerian labour had always played an important role in th~ economic well-being of Fernando Po. By 1941, for example there were .1 0,000 Nigerians in Fernando Po.2 This labou; came mainly from Owerri, Calabar, Qgoja, Onitsha and Cameroons provinces in that order of importance. The seven divisions showing the highest recruiting rates were Owerri, Aba, Eket, Afikpo, Bende, Ikot-Ekpene and Uyo. These areas are thickly populated to the extent that it would be difficult to resist the argument that shortage,of land was {)ne of the main factors causing emigration. The second factor was the liberal payment made to recruiters by Spanish
36
authorities and employers for each man brought to Femando Po.3 The third factor driving labourers to Fernando Po was pressure of tax collection in Nigeria. This was borne out by the fact that emigration was usually highest from August to October which was also the period of tax collection. There was also the fact that Nigerian labourers engaged in lucrative contraband trade.
The above should not be interpreted as suggesting that conditions in Fernando Po were so good that Nigerians were streaming to the place in large numbers, for in 193 7 and 193 8 the Spaniards were faced with the perennial problem of scarcity of labour. This was primarily due to ill-treatment of Nigerian nationals there and the inconvertibility of Spanish pesetas as a result of non-recognition of Francisco Franco's regime by Great Britain. Even the presence of Nigerians in Fernando Po was illegal as far as the British authorities were concerned. Recruitment of labour to anywhere was forbidden by the Nigerian Labour Ordinance No. 1 of 1929, and emigration of labourers to Femando Po was specifically forbidden by the same law. 4 Nevertheless, the Nigerian government was quite aware of the fact that 'Nigerian' people had been going to Fernando Po illegally from 1828 onwards. Hence, in 1939 an administrative officer was sent to Femando Po by the government of Nigeria, to investigate labour conditions on the island and to evolve in collaboration with the Spanish authorities 'measures which would ensure the welfare of Nigerian labourers.s Thjs mission laid the foundation for the Anglo.Spanish labour accord signed in 1942, but negotiation of which began in 1940, which was designed to streamline relations between Nigeria and Fernando Po.
Various reasons led to the signing of this agreement. The British were too anxious about the threat of the possible use of Fernamio Po against British territories by the Axis powers, since it · was even rumoured that Spanish territories were und.er Nazi influence and that there was a group l~ader (Fuehrer) for- the Qerrtian National Socialist Workers Party in Fernlilldo Po,-. whose name was given as Dr. Joseph Worner. 6
37
'lhc Nigerian Fernando Po labour accord was therefore negotiated in the spirit of Anglo-Spanish rapprochement and in consideration of Great Britain's world wide interests. 7
At. the same time the British were prepared to consider offensive action against Fernando Po if Spain went over to the Axis powers, and the British Admiralty even commented that a naval operation to capture Fernando Po should not be a heavy commitment since the number of troops on the island was not more than 200. As if to prove this point, the British Naval Commander-in-Chief South of the Atlantic, without reference to either the Foreign Office or the Colonial Office, and to the two offices great embarrassment and annoyance, ordered H.M.S. Dragon to proceed on 6 July 1940 to evacuate all British nationals with the exception of the Vice-Consul.8 The Spanish authorities were not given prior information about this and they made the right deduction by strengthening the defences of the island
• by bringing 2,5~0 Moroccan and Spanish troops to beef up · the 200 local nfles. 9 The action of the British did not e~dear them to the Spaniards who were in any case sympathetic to the German cause and discriminated against British nationals in Fernando Po throughout the war. In spite of the war, or perhaps because of it, the British went ahead to negotiate a labour treaty with Spain concerning Fernando Po and Nigeria from 1940 to 1942. The ostensible reason for this agreement was to prevent illegal trafficking in labourers. The British claimed that:
... the object of these negotiations with the Spanish gevernment was to regularise what had become a large scale traffic in labour and to endeavour to eliminate the unscrupulous native 'bl;1ck ?irder' who earned a lucrative livelihood by kidnapping the Ignorant peasants from the Ibo and Ibibio areas .. .10
The question to ask is why the British had to wait until the time of the war to use Nigerian labour to bait Spain out of possible desertion to and militazy cooperation with the axis powers against the allies. One can of course argue that the British recognised that if they did not do anything at that
38
time the problem would get out of hand since the number of · Nigerians on the island was on the incn3ase. 11
In December 1942 a treaty was signed between Nigeria and the Spanish authorities in Fern~ndo P.o to obtain a regular supply of healthy labourers. The agreement stipulated that only labourers over the age of 16 could.be recruited. Records and photographs of each labourer were kept at Calabar and Santa Isabel. The labourer could be recruited to work in agriculture, industzy or forestzy. The duration of the contract was initially one year for· bachelors and. two years for a married man who went with his wife. The contract was renewable for. the same number of years, but in the case of a bachelor, he must first return to Nigeria before taking up another contract. Adequate rations and shelter were to be provided free. An agricultural labourer was to be paid £1 a month and others earned 40 per cent more. Half of this money was to be paid to th~ labou,rer and the remaining half was to be· deposited at the office of the Curador cqlonial of Fernando Po who held' the mon·ey in trust for the labourer until the expiration or t~rmination of the contt;act; money accruing to the labourer was then to be paid by th~ Direccion de Hacienda or treasuzy. The're was even some provision .for protestant and muslim !1;liSsionaries t; work with Nigerians in. Fernando Po. Any illegal immigrants were to be repatriated at Nigeria's expense. The most important clause in all the treaty was clause XXVIII which stated inter alia" ... if the employer fails to fulfil any of his afore-mentione<;l obligations in respect of the repatriation of a worker. and/or his family, the said obligation shall be performed by the government of Fernando Po:"12 . . . Under this agreement Nigerian labourers could be recruited
for ~ork in Fernando Po and Rio Muni and the other Spanish Islands. The ~prking or' the agreement was supervised by a labour officer at Calabar. At the request of the Spanish government the firm of Messrs John Holt and Company was appointed the agent for recruiting labour for t~e Spanish chamber of commerce in Fernando Po. John Holt did not
39
only t:ecr~ljt directly; it also farmed out recruiting to Nigerian sub-r:cruiters.13 The Nigerian government allowed the recnutment of a~y numbers of labourers not exceeding 250 a month. The Spa~Ish authorities aimed at maintaining a labour force of approxlffiately 14,000 men. As the normal duration of a labour contract was eighteen months or two years about 6,000 or 7,000 recruits would be required each ;ear to repla~e men whose contracts had expired. The number of recruits usu~!ly fell below the number required, and in fact only 1,430 men officially embarked from Calabar in 1944. ?n arri:al at Fernando Po, the recruits were usually placed m transit camp and were distributed to their respective ~I?ployers after compliance with medical and police formalIties. The papers from the police and medical authorities with the copy of the contract would then be handed by the
_worker over to the employer for safe keeping. Without these documents the labourer would not be able to leave the island by orthod~x means and the milita:ry control of the. island was such that It. was vi~tually impossible for him to leave by canoe.
A!though immigration was controlled by the 1942 treaty ye_t illeg~ trafficking continued: Four pounds sterling was th~ pnce prud per labourer ~legally smuggled in. The welfare of the ~orker was · · naturally· connected with th ffi 'al d
. . . . . . e 0 lCI a mimstratwn of the colony which for most of th' ti . . Is me was corrupt, venal and ~nefficient. The ' chief scourge of the labourer. was the Afncan Guardia colonial and police forc.e. These pe~ple were the cause of much unnecessazy suffering b~t t:he ~~ony of it all was ·that many of them were Ntgen~s. _Any employer could have any of his labourers place_d m pnson for· as long as he· liked. with or without flogging. . · ·
. The . 1942 ~greement was . an unmitigated failure in all res¥ects. It satisfied_nobody. The Spanish authorities rightly
. clrum~d that they did not get the adequate supply oflabour promised them under the treaty. Members of the Fernando P() Chamber. of Commerce had to visit Calabar in 1944 to
40
discuss what steps could be taken to i111prove the rate of recruitment. The impression the Nigerian government got from their visit was that while employers fully realised their dependence on Nigeria for a more contented labour force, there were unsatisfactory conditions for which the Spanish government rather than the employer was responsible. The Spanish government paid insufficient attention to complaints made by the British labour officer and showed little interest while repatriating labourers. No steps were ever taken to get in touch with relations of men who fell sick or died and in the case of labourers contracted before the treaty, the relations of a deceased labourer could not receive his property unless they claimed it in person. The postal service between Femando Po and Nigeria was infrequent and very expensive so that labourers felt very much cut off from their homes during the period of their contract. It was matters such as the~e, which were largely outside the control of the employers which impeded. recruiting.
These unattractive conditions in Fernando . Po led to scarcity of labour and consequently led to lucrativeness of · the smuggling trade. The long and indented coastline of Nigeria made it physically impossible for the authorities to prevent the clandestine smuggling of labour ac_ross to the island by canoe. This was particularly the case in war-time Nigeria, for although Nigeria had one patrol boat working in the area, this was of course quite inadequate. Even this patrol boat had to be withdrawn in 1944 following an order from the Commissioner of Police that the practice of firing across the bows of canoes to force them to stop was to cease.
These canoes engaged in the illicit traffic operated mostly from the network of creeks in and around the estua:ry of the
· Cross· river. The villages of Oron and lkang were particularly . . notorious for. this operation. About sixty ocean-going canoes
' · ·. ·~ere regcll\lrly .engaged)n 'the. traffic f~om the Nigerian side. \ ".Tii~~e ·canoes were propell:ed 'by 'ab.out tep paddlers and '
usl.uilly' ·carried ·U,p . t9 :thirty passengers and took fifteen to twenty hours for tlu~ Joilfliey from ~~a~~u,- ~o Santa Isabel. .. ,.· ..
41
Apart from labourers the canoes carried palm oil kernel . . . ' ' rubb~r, yams, ·gari, motor-cycle tyres and drugs. The profits
on. all the~e commodities were such as . to justifY the smuggle~s' risk. On the Spanish side the whole traffic was d~alt with in an drganised and official basis. Canoes paid harbour dues at Santa Isabel and cargoes were customed. On arrival in the harbour the "Captains" of these canoes were met by officials of the Junta de Abastos who bought the cargoes and organised the distr;ibu tion of labourers. Smuggle_rs were· paid in Spanish currency and they had therefore to turn most of _their earnings into Spanish goods which they thi:m smuggled back to Nigeria. Brandy and perfumes appeared to be the chief cargoes carried. In· view of this smuggling, the Nigerian government considered dertol,lncing t4e 1942 agreement. Bu~ it \Vas felt-that iei?udiati<?n. ofthe.agreeinent would lead to a wJ.lolesale rever~ion to·smuggling oflabour by canoe whi~h · alth9ugb.. st~l continuing· would greatly increase if offi~ial te~ruitiJ1g·were to-come to an end. Repudiation of the a~e~ni~_rit,_ mo!eqv~t, would not cause any vezy serious inconveniimce.. to the Spaniards who would still be able to obtain labour illegally._ Re:pudiation would on the other hand put an end to any immediate hope of securing the improvement in conditions; howeyer slight that may be, which the British claimed the ·agreement was designed to secure. The British realised that . they could therefore not repudiate the agreement and that effective patrol of the coast would also have to wait until the end of the war; the man in charge ruefully commented " .... i(we can ultimately obtain that control, we shall be able to threaten the whole basis of Fernando Po's economy and we ought then to be able to make them do what we like. "16 . .
More galling \yas the pro-Axis sympathy of the authorities in Fernando Po durin-g the war especially of the· GovernorGeneral, Don MarianoAlonso Alonso. ID-treatment of Nigerian labourers was intimately related to pro-Axis feeling of the
.local administration. 1Jle:Union Jack was not respected and · the ~ritish Consul's .car flying it was stopped " ... even by a
42
native sentry at the entrance to the village of San Carlos." British news was banned from the local newspaper Ebano which on the other hand gave prominent publicity to German and Italian communiques relating tci the war. There was almost complete "social boycott" of the British_Yice-Consulate " ... There are few Spanish people in San~a Isabel who would accept an invitation to a private party at the British consulate
"17 All British nationals wishit:J,g to leave the zone 9f S~n~a Isabel were obliged to <?btain special permits o~ each occasion. This included the Briti~ Vice-Consul of the Island whereas Germans had freedom of movement evezywhen: ~n the island. Other anti-British actions o! the autho~~es included the arrest on 13 Februazy 1943 of th~ Bnt~sh chaplain in his mission house in San Carlos becau~e acc?~dmg to the Spanish authorities ~is mission house was ~n a_mihtary zone!' The Methodist mission had a heavy ta:catwn Impose~ on them in 1943 and back-dated t9 1932. Nigerians ':"~re. also frequently arrested for spying for the British. 'I_he ~ntish ~so suspected that Spanish and German agents were mfll~~ting into Nigeria under the guise that they we~e ~patn~ted labourers. The British even claimed· that the Wife _of ~e German Consul in Santa Isabel was once_ seen to be buymg passages for agents posing as labourers to return to N. ·a 18 The British were quite concerned about the Igen . p Th' security aspects of the pro-Axis stance of Fernando o. . _Is was rightly so, since there was a small number of Naz~ m Fernando p0 including the German Consul who ~ad direct cypher communication with Germany. The offiCials of the administration of Fernando Po were falangists who were unfriendly to Britain. There were resident in the island several hundred Pro-German Africans many of them ex-German Kamerun soldiers in the Spanish Guardia colonial. Some were refugees and settlers from the Cameroons who had emigra!ed there since 191619 and had been joined by others. These people had formed a Pro-German orgai~satio~ called Kamerun Eingebomen Deutsche Gesinnten Verem (Umon of Camero?ns natives friendly to the Germans). The Germans were usmg
43
these people for espionage in Nigeria and German propaganda was actually getting into Nigeria by 1944.20 It is of course to. ?~ expected that the British were not objective in their cnttctsm of pro-German feelings of the local administration. Although relations were far from cordial, they were aggravated by the fact that some of the British Vice-Consul's communications with the Governor-General of Spanish Guinea wer couched in hardly courteous terms.
The British consoled themselves by believingthat the antiBritish policy of the Governor-General of Spanish Guinea was a p.ersonal o?e though certainly aided and abetted in it by his ~luef of Pohce who had spy-mania so badly that he saw a spy m almost every disgruntled Nigerian labourer. At the same tim~ their officials were no doubt sure of the devil they were dealt~g with. ~e British Consul in Duala, for example, aptly descnbed the situation when he wrote that in Fernando Po the British Vice-Consul had to conduct business with " ... a Governor-General who was at one time a house painter like a certain Herr Adolph Hitler, and who has precisely the ~ount of breeding and education one would expect from a Spanish artisan . . . " 21 Some British officials blained the spinelessness . of their home government for the unsatisfactory condition in Fernando Po. They argued that Fernando Po which relied on Nigeria not only for labour but also for food should never have been allowed to pose a security threat to Nigeria. One British official declared:
· · · it is only too apparent that the time has come for the mess which is Fernando Po to be cleared up in our own interest and those of the few decent and rational minded Spanish colonists who remain, and it is obvious too that it is the British government who have got to do the clearing, especially in view of the fact of the strong position which Great Britain enjoys today ... 22
The h?stile attitude to the British, however, began to change followmg the collapse of Mussolini's Italy, a sign which was read as portents of things to come on the island. In fact, by ~a.rch 194.5. the administration on the island was not only gmng publicity to British victories, but also co-operating with
44
Nigeria to stop the exportation of palm oil from the Niger Delta to Fernando Po as well as commodity and labour smuggling to Fernando Po. 23 In spite of the mutual antagonism, the 1942 labour agreement remained in force throughout the period of the war, but neither side really enforced it, with the effect that all the aims for negotiating and signing the agreement remained, as can be seen, unfulfilled on both sides. Nevertheless, this agreement remained in force without any revision until 1950. The reasons for this were quite apparent. Firstly, The tempo of nationalist agitation after the Second World War ros~ in Nigeria. ~is ':as characterised by strikes, such as the one m 1945, orgamsahon of nation•wide nationalist parties and the emergence of a politician like Nnamdi Azikiwe who possessed en~~gh charisma to attract national following. These gave the Bnhsh administration much to think about. Emigration to Fernando Po was seen as a saf~ty valve. Secondly, the austerity which was necessitated by the war had made many of Nigeria's infrastructural needs so acute, the ~ost ~hen taken cumulatively became so burdensome that all efforts of the government were directed to solving these probl~ms .and they had no time for revision of the Fernando Po-Nigena labour agreement untill950. . · .
The revised agreement of 19 50 transferred the concessiOn to recruit labour in Nigeria from the British firm of John Holt and Company limited to the Anglo-Spanish employment agency .. This agreement also contained a clause to repatriate illegally recruited labour to Nigeria. This in fact was a clear
d t "kidn " indication that the Spaniards whose agents use o ap people from the Cross River area of Nigeria and ship them to Fernando Po were quite contented with the available manpower on their island and were trying to avoid any cause for friction with Nigerian authorities.; This 1950 agreement was virtually the same as the imprl">perly enforced 1942 agreement. The 1950 agreement apart. from being more generous in its monetary rewards for ~igerian labourers, also reiterated the fact that working conditions of the labourers
45
must .co~fonn with conventions of the international labour orgamsahon.
. In .spite 'of this agreement, allegations of ill-treatment of Ntgena.n workers c<;mtinued to be·made by returninglabouters. Tius prompted a delegation led by the Central Minister of Labour, Chief S. L. Akintola, to visit the island in 1953 to make ~n on-the-spot investigation: As can be expected the delegatiOn was shown round Fernando Po by the Spanish authoritie& who made sure only the good plantations were seen by the visiting Nigerians. The result of this manoeuvre was that the delegation reported that it found no evidence of ill-treatment. The delegation, however, achieved some measure of success since it was able to advise that salaries of the labourers should be raised and that social and educational services . for the labourers and their children should be improved. This concerned ·provision of. educational and religious ~acilities . ..in English .. Finally, the delegation recommended that a register ofall Nigerian workers in Fernando Po should be properly kept. All these recommendations were incqrporated into a- revised ·agreement in 1954 ... Another delegation led by Chief f. S. Okotieboh went to Fernando Po in 1956 on. the invitation of the island's authorities. The result of this visit. was .a 25 p~r cent pay rise for Nigerian wor~ers and the. payment of capitation fee of five pounds sterling on each labourer to the Nigerian government 24
This money was then shared bet"ween the Federal and East~rn re_gio~al government in lieu of the taxes payable by these Ntgenan workers in Fernando Po. The agreement also made provision for increased recruitment of Nigerian labour for plantation agriculture in Fernando Po. Up to a maximum of 800 could be recruited monthly from Nigeria. It is of course clear that Nigeria was not as wealthy as it is today when oil revenue has made Nigeria a relatively affluent nation at least in Africa, but the acceptance of this capitation fee by the F~de~al and Eastern regional governments in a way made the N~ge~an government an accomplice in the degradation of Ntgenan labourers in Fernando Po since it was big business
46
for the government to keep Nigerian labour in Fernando Po no matter what the situation there was .
The Spanish authorities for reasons better known to themselves again invited the Nigerian government to send yet another delegation in 1957 led by Chief J. M. Johnson. ~e delegation reported widespread ill-treatment of Nigenan labourers excessive hours of work, illegal deduction from wages ~d failure to supply food rations. The delegation visited Rio Muni for the first time. (One thing that puzzles one is why the Nigerian authorities never thought it fit to invite the Fernando Po authorities to Nigeria so that it did not appear as though Nigeria was the beggar-nation.) This visit resulted in the extension of the existing agreement, firstly, to include payment of compensation in cases of perman~~t or partial injury to non-treaty labourers; secondly, to prolubtt long periods of detention without trial in cas~s where labourers were accused of criminal offences; thudly, to abolish the pass system for Nigerian workers.25 The government nevertheless agreed that the number of labourers recruited for Fernando Po could in fact be increased. This was in spite of the fact that some members of the delegation had sharply criticised the inhuman conditions under which some of the labourers worked in some of the plantations on the island. In response the government sent a Nigerian labour officer to the territory mainly to deal with labour problems and to look after the welfare of the Nigerian labourers.
Throughout the 1950s the Nigerian government was always careful to point out the official Spanish good neighbourliness as contrasted with the constant contractual lapses of individual planters some of who were in fact brought to book by the Spanish authorities on the island. Furthermore, the governments of Nigeria and Fernando Po were agreed that the labour contracts were mutually beneficial if not to individuals at least to the two contracting governments. Nigerians who would have been unemployed at home were gainfully employed in Fernando Po and both the Federal .and East regional governments in addition derived pecumazy
47
· benefits from this. On the other hand Fernando Po which had remained staiVed of labour for a 1ong time was able to embark on planned agricultural development. Even when opposition to conditions on Fernando Po was aired it was with the purpose of amelioration and none of the crltics of the labour conditions on the island ever suggested a complete halt to recruitment.
With the approach of independence in Nigeria following on 1
the wake of Ghana's independence in 1957 the labour relations between Nigeria and Fernando Po began to assume new dimensions. The transformation from a colonial state into full sovereignty in Nigeria was bound to affect the relations and what used to be a colonial problem became a diplomatic problem. The signs of the future relationship became evident, when on the eve of independence in Nigeria, the West African Pilot, organ of the "National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons" and a junior partner in the Federal Coalition Government, carried an editorial calling on the Federal Government to open negotiation with Spain for the purpose of annexing Fernando Po which the paper claimed was geographically part of Nigeria.26 With Nigeria becoming a sovereign state in October 1960 under the leadership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa advocates of annexation of Fernando Po must have thought that they had a chance of forcing their will on the Federal Government. The N.C.N.C. which had advocated this course of action controlled the foreign affairs department through its nominee Jaja Wachukwu as foreign minister. But because of the nature of the coalition government the N.C.N.C. never really enjoyed absolute control since the Federal Prime Minister had the ove~~ control of and responsibility for foreign policy decisions. One can see from recent studies on Nigeria's fon~ign policy at this time, that Nigeria followed a low profile pohcy usually referred to as "self-effacement" or "functional approach", in her relations with her neighbours. This policy meant that there w~s consciously no political arm~twisting; rather than do thts, attempts at regional cooperation
48
epitomised by the fonnation of such bodies ~ ~he Chad Basin Commission and the Niger River CommiS.swn, ":ere
d 27 All attempts to instigate aggressive actwn agamst
ma e. · d Fernando p0
by a combined parliamentary actwn an press campaign28 for the annexation of ":hat one of the papers referred to as the "Goa" of Africa failed for severa! reaso~s. Nigeria was not united enough to pursue a dynamic forei~ policy. One recognises the fac~ that fo~eign policy could ~ fact be used to foster the spint of umty at home, but this would have been a realistic policy if Fernando Po was a sovereign and weak African country. The fact wa~ that Fernando Po was still protected by the might of Spam and Spanish authorities at this time were using the bogey of possible Nigerian territorial covetousness of Fernando Po to persuade nationalists there that the sovereignty of Fem~do p
0 would be threatened whenever the islan~ remove~ tts.elf
from the protective security umbrella of Spam. The Ntgenan government was apparently convinced that th~ reports of ill-treatment were exaggerated since it was logtcally argued that if conditions were as bad as they were made o~t to be Nigerians would not be going to Fernando Po e.tther as contract labourers or as illegal labourers smuggled mto the island by the hazardous means of manually pa~dled canoes. Finally, Nigeria was not the only interested Afncan coun~ry that could lay claim to Fernando Po. The Ca~eroons w~tc~ was nearer the island than Nigeria, was not unmterested 1f1t became clear that the island was up for partition, purchase or annexation. The campaign for annexation of ~ernando Po which began in 1961 and reached its crescendo m 1965 had its affects on the government of the day. ~ .1.961 four Nigerians were shot in Rio Muni by the local militia (known as the Juventuds). This forced the Federal Govern~e~t not only to lodge a strong protest but also to ask for pe~Is:non to send a high-ranking delegation led by the Federal ~mtst~r of Labour, Chief J. Modupe Johnson, to visi~ Equatonal Gumea. The delegation investigated the complamts of the work~~ and recommended revision of the 1957 agreement. The VISit
49
resulted in further amelioration of labour conditions on the island. Among other accomplishments of the mission were the permanent abolition of the Pass Law which made it compulsory for all Nigerians to carry passes while- ~~ing about on the island, the prohibition oflong detention without trial for Nigerian offenders and finally an agreement by the Spanish authorities in Fernando Po to payment of compensation in cases of permanent or partial physical disability. The Nigerian government warned its critics after signing this agreement which was again reviewed in 1963, that further criticisms of Fernando Po were in fact counter-productive, in the sense that constant emphasis on the fact that Nigerians outnumbered the indigenous Bubi five to one was alienating the feelings of the indigenous people and bringing them into physical friction with Nigerians. This agreement was due for r~v~sion in 1 ~66 but the crisis in Nigeria and the subsequent ClVll war which broke out in Nigeria in 1967 prevented any further review as stipulated by the 1963 accord.
With the outbreak of the civil war the problem took a dif~erent ,t~rn and assumed geo-political dimensions involving as m the Fust and Second World Wars, the strategic location of Fernando Po in relation to Nigeria. Brigadier Bassey, one of the first Nigerians to be commissioned as an officer in the then British-led army, was appointed Consul to Santa Isabel in November 1966, no doubt with the realisation that should the crisis in Nigeria deteriorate to civil war, Fernando Po's position would be crucial to its outcome. At this time there were about 100,000 people on Fernando Po of whom about 85,000 were Nigerians and two-thirds of them were Igbospeaking.29 This of course meant that there was considerable sympathy with the Eastern Nigerian cause not only within the immigrant community but also within the official circle as well.
With the attainment of independence by Equatorial Guinea in October 1968 followed by the withdrawal of Spanish expe~ise and management, working conditions began to detenorate on the island. Equatorial Gurnea's government
50
tried to wriggle out of this difficult position repudiating the agreement concluded between Spanish Guinea because Francisco Macias Nguemu, the of government in Equatorial Guinea, said that the labour agreement was not in line with his governm~n~'s policl.es. Meanwhile the civil war prevented any renegotiation. Durmg the civil war, when Fernando Po was still a Spanish territory the island was used by the International Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Organisation "Caritas" to ferry food and, as claimed by the Nigerian authorities, arms and war materiel to "Biafra". Even when Equatorial Guinea attained sovereign status international pressure by France and the Catholic , . World was mounted to force Fernando Po to grant concessiOn to these foreign powers and organisations to enjoy extraterritorial jurisdiction on the island with the sole purpose of helping the secessionist forces in Nigeria. The government of Equatorial, Guinea was however able to determine what was in her best interest and in January 1969 the government of Equatorial Guinea asked the Red Cross and "Caritas" to cease their operations on the island.30 This was followed by t?e establishment of a telex link between Nigeria and Equatonal Guinea at the expense of Nigeria. A Federal Commissioner, Al-haj Aminu Kano later visited the island in October 19~9 on behalf of the Federal Military Government and President Francisco Macias Nguema was given a note from the N.igerian head of state General Yakubu Gowon, inviting the former not to recognise 'Biafra and to pay an official visit to Nigeria. The Nigerian envoy in Santa Isabel felt the influence of the Nigerian immigrant population on the island w~s so very important in foreign policy decision at least as It affe.cted Nigeria, that he urged his home government to ask either Anthony Asika the Administrator of the East Central State, or Dr. Nnamdi, Azikiwe, the former head of state of Nigeria who had just deserted the "Biafran" cause to join the Federal cause to visit the island to convince the lgbo people that the Fede~l Government was not embarking on a genocidal
campaign against them.
51
President Francisco Macias Nguema cleverly waited until August 1970 when the war was over before coming on a state visit to Nigeria. By this time Nigerian labourers whose contracts had expired numbered about 30,000 in Santa Isabel which had been renamed Malabo by the nationalist government. The Equatorial Guinea government had no boats to repatriate them and the Federal Government of Nigeria was compelled by the difficult situation in which the labourers found themselves to make arrangement with the Nigerian National Shipping Line to evacuate the stranded Nigerians. The Nigerian government while paying part of the bill asked the Equatorial Guinea's government to pay its share which was put at Nl52,000,31 but this bill was never settled. While this problem remained, Equatorial Guinea approached the Nigerian government to review the 1963 agreement. Negotiations were therefore commenced and as in 1963 representatives of both governments met in Lagos in January 1971 to discuss the details of a new agreement. This was signed on January 1972. The new agreement raised the age of workers from 18 to 21, eliminated corporal punishment, increased wages and capitation fees, provided for a minimum wage of Nl6 per month in addition to free housing, medical care, fully paid sick leave, increased annual leave and substantial daily food ration. The minimum age at which a labourer could be recruited was raised from 18 to 21 years. The labourers were not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, or detention for more than one month without trial. It was also stated that when a Nigerian was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offence under Equatorial Guinea law not recognised by Nigerian law, the worker involved shall immediately be repatriated to Nigeria at his own expense. 32 The new agreement provided for the setting up of a mixed commission of four, two from each country, to deal with breaches of the labour agreement. The Federal Government also stated that the government of Equatorial Guinea should accept the fact that they were not doing Nigeria a favour by employing a large number of Nigerians as workers in their
52
country and that the government of Equatorial Guinea must accept and it was accepted by them that they would bear full responsibility for any contravention of the agreement reached in Lagos on 29 April 1971. But the existence of these clauses did not eliminate abuses, and the recruitment of labourers was in fact suspended in 1973 because of breaches of the
1971 agreement.33 . The Federal Government sent a ministerial delegatwn to
Equatorial Guinea to carry out an on-the-spot investigation of the problem facing Nigerians recruited for labou~ ~nd ~11 those resident in the country. The report of the mm1stenal delegation was no more than " ... a catalogue of b~tal and inhuman treatment meted out to Nigerians by offict~s and people of Equatorial Guinea ... " 34 The result o~ th1~ war a review of the agreement in 1974, but the sad thmg IS the fact that starting from 194 2 to 19 7 4 agreements between these two countries have not been more than Chiffo~ ~e Papier only to be signed and broken at will by the authontles at Santa Isabel (Malabo). By 1974 when the agreement was reviewed wages of labourers remained unpaid for long periods ~p to six months or more on some occasions, contrary to article XVI of the agreement which stipulated monthly payments, military intervention on purely labour matters was a constant occurrence contrary to Article XXXIX, Oause 2 of the agreement. One such military intervention led to the death of a Nigerian in Aprill974 and when the Nigerian amba~sador demanded to see his corpse he was prevented from domg so. The authorities in Fernando Po seemed to have been ~gere~ by what they regarded as Nigeria's meddlesomeness m their internal affairs and they seemed determined to put an end to this. The Nigerian community was subjected to all kinds of abuses climaxing in the humiliation of the Labour Attache, Mr. 0. Arnbah, and his family on 27 February 197 5.
35
The Labour Attache was ordered at gun point and without previous notice to leave his house. On hearing this the ambassador sent two of his senior members of staff, Mr. Anjorin, the Principal Labour Officer, and Mr. Odumosu,
53
Head of Chancery, to investigate the cause of eviction and arrest of the Labour Attache. The response of the Malabo government was the arrest ofboth men and detention by the police, although they were later released. A Nigerian embassy car was seized on 23 March 1975 and the car was never found in spite of strong protests by the ambassador.
What one can make of these events is that law and order seemed to have broken down in Fernando Po. But in fairness one must point out that the plight of Nigerians as well as that of the Bubi has become worse since independence. It is one of the ironies of history that Africans, both native and expatriate, received relatively more humane treatment at the hands of Spanish authorities than at the hands of fellow Africans. The regime of Francisco Macias Nguema has been characterised by brutality and police terror of which Nigerians have been among the victims. With a deteriorating economy it is clear that even the normal administrative functions of government are becoming difficult to carry out and the law enforcing agencies have become laws unto themselves. It is obvious therefore that Nigerians are no longer safe in Fernando Po. With the planned withdrawal of Nigerians from Fernando Po which ended early in February 197 6 Nigeria decided to cut economic ties with Equatorial Guinea. During the evacuation the government used not only her merchant navy but also gun-boats and air force planes apparently to demonstrate that any overt act of brutality against departing Nigerians would not be tolerated. The combined air and sea operation to evacuate abour 25,000 Nigerians remaining on the island and the amount invovled in resettlement cost the government about three hundred million Naira. 36
The reaction of the Nigerian Press was predictable. One newspaper commentator advocated military action or economic strangulation or both. It went on that all Nigerians in prison must be released along with others for the purpose of evacuation and that all the entitlements of Nigerians must be calculated and paid at once and their movable property released and that the exodus must be supetvised by highly
54
placed Nigerian diplomatic officers sent from Laaoa and if Equatorial Guinea Gendarmes molested those ". . . then the exodus should be supetvised by """'-""' .. teams of Nigerian army ... " The paper also called for public apology by Equatorial Guinea and the payment of adequate compensation to the families of those who had been murdered in Equatorial Guinea. Other editorial opinions said the time for reprisals had at last come, and that " ... no government would allow its citizenry or part thereof to be subjected for too long to a situation which borders on slavery. It is therefore time for drastic reprisals. "38
While most of the Nigerian dailies called for military action against "this Hitler of Equatorial Guinea",39 other newspapers put the whole question of Nigerian migrant labour in wider perspective. They referred to the series of humiliations meted to Nigerians in Ghana, Zaire, Gabon, Cameroon, Dahomey, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, and called on the government to repatriate these people back to Nigeria, as one of the editorials put it, " ... In these countries they constitute l! potential target for possible future abuse . . ."40 The government was quick to point out that the position of Nigerians in each of the countries cited above was different from that of Equatorial Guinea, that there was no cause for alarm, that many of the so-called Nigerians in these countries had acquired foreign citizenship and that should they want or be forced to come home normal consular setvices would be provided; but that in the case of Equatorial Guinea Nigerians were faced with possible physical liquidation which the government was not going to allow.
Many people in Nigeria were dissatisfied with the failure of the military government to deal with Fernando Po militarily. But it seems the government was using the economic weapon to achieve the same end. The government was aware of the fact that with the last plane or ship-load of Nigerians le!lving Fernando Po, begins the process of economic decline and imminent backruptcy. Shortage oflabour is bound to lead to the cocoa, coffee and banana plantations reverting back to
55
bush. This would put Fernando Po back into the stagnant situation of 1900s when all developmental schemes were hampered by lack of labour. The prospects are even worse now for with prosperity at home in Nigeria arising from the oil boom and the massive development and reconstruction schemes at home the incentive to seek employment in Fernando Po or elsewhere is no longer there. In fact rather than be a source of emigration, other West Africans have been coming to Nigeria in large numbers these days; the pull is now from us and the push factor is from other impoverished neighbours including Fernando Po itself. Fernando Po is going to find it difficult to attract labour from other West African countries especially since the brutality against Nigerians was widely published; and also, Nigeria is now strong enough to use her influence to prevent labourers from West African countries from going to work in Fernando Po. The result of this would be decline in Fernando Po and the revenue accruing to her from the plantations would no longer be available to meet the day-to-day requirements of government. This eventuality is bound to lead to political upheaval on the island. There is already growing opposition to the sadistic Francisco Macias Nguema regime and the remnants of the indigenous Bubi population of the island are demanding dissolution of the Union with Rio Muni where the President comes from. The Fang from the Mainland seem to have taken over power and the Fernandinos are not likely to accept this indefinitely. If they did, they would be the first in histozy to accept permanent subjection to an alien elite ruling group. If the Fernandinos succeed in dissolving the Union, then a scramble for Equatorial Guinea might ensue. The Mainland is ethnically related to the Cameroons and Gabon, with which Macias Nguema has been conducting a running propaganda campaign. It would be in the interest of Nigeria to be in touch with these two governments in case this unnatural union called Equatorial Guinea dissolves into its natural and separate geographical entities. In this case Nigeria, knowing fully well that Fernando Po would need her labour,
56
technical know-how and. above all economic aid, should be in a strong position to edge Fernando Po into union with Nigeria. The force of strategy demands no less an action. if Nigeria must play a role in this sub-region commensurate wtth her size, population, economic resources and power. One thing that is certain is that Nigeria cannot for long allow this floating dock of an island, strategically positioned, to fall into the hands of enemies of Africa. The recent transfer of the Voice of America transmitters from Kaduna from where they were expelled by the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo government to Fernando Po raises the question about the potential danger this island poses to Nigeria. There is also evidence of increasing Chinese presence41 on the island, but it is not going to be difficult for Nigeria to deal with either China the Soviet Union or the United States firmly over Ferna~do Po. There might come a time when America's dependence on oil exports from Nigeria might be used as quid pro quo to their withdrawing from Fernando Po. ~e Chinese and the Soviets are quite aware of the potential influence of Nigeria in Africa and they are not going to forfeit their friendship with Nigeria in order to win that of a transient state like Equatorial Guinea. What is clear is that Nigeria has a role to play in the future of Fernando Po, but the question to ask is whether Nigeria has the will, the skill and the men to make sure that the fate of Fernando Po is not decided in Washington, Mosco or Peking, but in Lagos.
1
2
REFERENCES
For full discu~sion of this see Samir Amin: Modem Migration in West Africa o.v.p·. Lon. 1974, pp. 68-69.
F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie Op. cit. out of 10,000 Nigerians Owerri province contributed 50% Calabar 38% Ogoja 10% Cameroons (British) 1% Onitsha 1%
57
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Ibid. The Spanish labour officer pays £1 sterling and 150 Pesetas. In addition the employer contributes another 150 to 450 Pesetas for a labourer safely delivered at Fernando Po (The Pound sterling's official rate was £1 = 45 Pesetas).
Section 14 of Nigerian Labour Ordinance of 1929 No. 1 specifically prohibits labour recruiting into Femando Po from Nigeria.
Nigerian Sessional Paper No. 38 of 1939. See also Budget Address by B. H. Bourdillon 4th March, 1940. (Government Printers Lagos).
C.O. 583/240 W.A.F.F. intelligence report for half year ending 31 Dec., 1938.
F.O. 371/24510. Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. to Sir M. Peterson, British ambassador to Mad'rid 7 Feb., 1940.
F.O. 371/24526. Cypher telegram from Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 July, 1940.
F.O. 371/34771. R Pleven (Cornite National Francais to F.O. 22 Jan., 1943.
C.O. 657/53: Annual Report of the Dept. of Labour for the year 1944.
Total population of the Island in 1942 was 23,000 composed as follows:
European Spanish 1 ,000 Portuguese 500 Germans 25 English 4
1,529
African Nigerian French Cameroonians Bubi (indigenous Africans)
17,000 2,000 2,500
21,500
see F.O. 371/34771. British Consul-General in Duala to F.O. 30 June, 1943.
Anglo-Spanish Labour agreement concerning Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. Dec. 1942. Clause XXVIII.
58
13: , - ' Name ofRecruiter.: ' Area of Recruiting j '.••'''
.,_;.,
30 20
· ; · .. }-~~Rtibert'dji-
·_,·..,.
':;;;·
14_.
15
J6
17
2. Bassey Okon Udo 3:A. I; William ; 4. B. A. Efiom Eyamba 5. Bryson Ufot Etukudo 6. J. S. Uranta 7. G:'i1. Allige_' .-
. . . ' ' . . . . . ' .
8. Jo~'M"E~ Et~ wai~er, '
</' T'. ;o. Ngawu~hu .. 16. Emmanueldno Oji_ 11. J. C. Sosoo :12. Mi.chael .Ailyanwu '
- F.O. 371/34771. British Consul-Gehi:m:il m:Dualato _F.O. 30 June,
.•: 1943. ';-- . ,-
18 Ibid. 19 See Jide Osuntokun. 'Anglo-Spanish relati?ns_ d.u~i~gt~~. First
World War' op Cit: See also Jide Osuntokti~- Nzgena zn the First World War Longman (irtPress) forth~ommg.
20 •·- • F.O. 371/39.601. Governor of Nigeria to -F.Q,17 May; 1944. · ..
21 F.O. 371/34771. British Consul-General in Duala to F;O. 30 Ju~e, 1943. -' '
22 F;O, ..371/3.4772; Resident mi_nister in .Accr_a to F.?. 12' July'
1943.
• 23 - .. F.O: 371/49598. British Vice-Consul'in Fernartdo Po to F.O. 31 March, 194S; ·. · · · .
. ~9
24 Bolaji Akinyemi "Nigeria and Femando Po 1958-1966: The Politics of Irredentism: African Affairs: the Quarterly Journal of the Royal African Society Vol. 69, No. 276, July 1970 p. 238.
25 Federal Ministry of Information News Release No. 180, Feb.6, 1976.
26 West African Pilot, 7 Jan, 1958.
27 Supo Ojedokun: 'The Anglo-Nigerian entente and its demise 1960-1962' Staff Seminar Papers School of African and Asian studies 1970-71, at Lagos University library, see also Mahmud Tukur: Nigeria's External Relations: The U.N. as a forum and policy medium in the conduct of foreign policy Oct. 1960-Dec. 1965. A.B.U. Zaria. Institute of Administration publication.
28 See Daily Telegraph 28 Jan. 1963 and 7 Aug. 1963. West African Pilot 9 Feb. 1962, Sunday Times 18 Feb. 1962 and 25 Feb. 1962 Sunday Post 1 April 1962 and 11 March 1962.
