AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY Introduction To Law Comprehensive Notes 2015u8 !"## Fly Higher Brother Fly! Aquila Legis Fraternity Bar Topnotchers William Veto, 19494th place, 1951Solon Garcia, 1969A4th place, 1972 Jose Reyes, 19504th place, 1953Vicente Solis, 1970B1st place, 1973 Antonio Quintos, 19517th place, 1954Augusto Panlilio, 1972A4th place, 1975 Rufino Luna, 19517th place, 1955RoldanDalman, 1972A6th place, 1975 Gabriel Singson, 19522nd place, 1952Ruben Cleofe, 1973A8th place, 1977 MeynardoTiro, 19529th place, 1952Nicolas Gomez, Jr., 1973A10th place,1977 Ernesto Maceda, Jr., 195310th place, 1956VirgilioGesmundo, 1973A1st place, 1977 Amado Santiago, 19549th place, 1958Vicente Ruaro, 1974A4th place, 1974 Antonio Navarette, 19552nd place, 1957Gregorio Batiller, Jr., 1975A1st place, 1979 Sergio Apostol, 19557th place, 1958Marius Corpus, 1975A4th place, 1979 Jose Brillantes, 19566th place, 1960GiorgidiAggabao, 197610th place,1980 RedentorSalonga, 19564th place, 1960Noel Sanchez, 19767th place, 1980 Adolfo Angala, 19607th place, 1964Reynaldo Salutan, 19765th place, 1980 Arthur Cabilete, 1963B7th place, 1966Jose Jesus Laurel, 1977A6th place, 1981 Ramon Aviado, Jr., 1963A9th place, 1966Efren de Leon, 1978A7th place, 1982 BasilioAlo, 1963B3rd place, 1967Thaddeus Venturanza, 19855th place, 1989 LuisitoBaluyot, 1963A5th place, 1967Ding Concepcion, 1987B9th place, 1990 TeodoroVillarmia, Jr., 1964B3rd place, 1966Nelson Victorino, 1989B4th place, 1992 Franklin Ebdalin, 1965A10th place, 1967Francis Ampil, 19943rd place, 1999 Raul Cabrera, 1965A7th place, 1968Grain Baysa-Pee, 1995A10th place,1999 Arthur Soller, 1965A4th place, 1969Darren L. Salipsip, 1998B10th place,2010 Liberador Villegas, 1968A3rd place, 1971Eric David Tan, 2005B5th place, 2009 Prospero Nograles, 1968A2nd place, 1971Yves-Randolph Gonzalez, 2005A6th place, 2009 JanuarioSoller, Jr., 1968B1st place, 1972Cesareo Antonio S. Singzon, Jr., 2006A 1st place, 2010

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY Table of Contents Day 1 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4 Day 2 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 Do I Have Rights? Republic v Sandiganbayan ............................................................................................................................................................. 15 Could Morality Be Legislated? Imbong v Ochoa ................................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Do You Care for Me? Oposa v Factoran .............................................................................................................................................................................. 24 Resident Marine Mammals v Reyes ......................................................................................................................................... 27 Phillenials All Disini v Secretary of Justice ....................................................................................................................................................... 30 Peace Be With You Cruz v DENR ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 32 Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel ........................................................................................................... 35 Of Pork and Beans Belgica v Executive Secretary Ochoa ..................................................................................................................................... 42 Araullo v Aquino ................................................................................................................................................................................. 47 Day 3 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 50

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY4 Day 1 DWORKINS INTERPRETATIVE THEORY Rules and principles: the idea of Fit According to Dworkin, legal interpretation requires moral judgments. Laws are more than the rules explicitly authorized.Theyarenotmerecollectionofnorms,but rather an expression of the philosophy of government. Thelawconsistsoftheexplicitlyadoptedrules PLUS the best Moral Principle that lie behind those rules. Theprinciplesserveaslegitimatebasesforlegal decisionsandhelpguideintheinterpretationoflegal cases. Dworkin also stated that there must be a degree of FITbetweenaproposedprincipleandtherules.There aretwoaspectsoffit.First,theremustbealogical consistencybetweentherules,althoughtotal consistencyisnotrequired.Second,theremustbean underlying principle to justify a rationale for the rules. Example: Fitting the Fourth Amendment privacy TheFourthAmendmentprotectstherightofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizureby thegovernment.Itwouldbereasonabletoassumethat therightofthegovernmenttodowhateveritcanto punishcriminalactivitiesisnotafit.Aprinciplethat would properly fit to the law is the principle of privacy. A rationaletotherulewouldprotectthepeoplefromthe government. Olmstead and beyond Knowingtheunderlyingprinciplewouldhelpin the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The right to privacy should be interpreted to include new technology. In the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, the court ruled that the wiretap used against the accused without awarrantdidnotviolatetheFourthAmendment.The courtdeclaredthattheamendmentonlyrefersto searches and seizures involving physical intrusion. They failedtoconsiderthefactthatthemakersofthelaw might not have predicted the arrival of new technologies (such as wiretapping) which could also violate the Fourth Amendment. Using Dworkins method would provide a different approachtoacaselikeOlmstead.Sincethemoral principleisthatofprivacy,itwouldbeclearthatit would not be limited to the physical aspect of the right to privacy.Privacyhastwoaspects,thephysicalandthe informational.Wiretappingwouldfallunderthe informationalaspect.Assuch,theFourthAmendment protectingtherighttoprivacymustnotbelimitedto physical unreasonable searches and seizure, but include unauthorized gathering of information.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITYS However,itisinsufficienttofamiliarizeourselves with the Moral Principle alone. For example: The concept ofprivacyisacomplexsubjectinwhichpeoplehave differingviews.Peopleagreeingonthesubjectof wiretappingmaydifferonothermattersofprivacysuch as contraceptives. The role of morality Dworkins solution is to look into morality. For him, thelawconsistsoftherulesexplicitlyadoptedbythe politicalcommunityplusthebestmoralprinciple.This understandingwouldenableustofindlegalanswersto cases, which the explicit rules cannot answer. But moral judgmentsarenotoriouslycontroversial.Dworkinsays thateachpersonmustdecideforhimself.Followinghis methodwouldgivethejudgeagood-faithdecision.This iswhatgivesjudicialdecisionsauthority.Additionally, DworkinsaidthatthereisIntegrityinthelaw.Integrity is acquired by the rules explicitly adopted by the political communityplusthebestmoralprincipleraiseslawin the moral domain. The challenge of skepticism Dworkinsappealtomoralitymay,insteadof givingarightanswer,ensurethatthereisnonesince there is no right answer to moral questions. In response, he claimed that the existence of disagreements does not mean there is no right answer. Externalskepticismisthetheorythatwelivein anempiricalworldandthatmoralquestionscannotbe answeredbecausenothinginthisempiricalworldcan makethemtrueorfalse.Dworkinrespondedbysaying that this is a false premise since there are things that do not need such proofs. For example, to say that torturing babies is wrong does not need proof to say such is true. Unfortunately,Dworkindidnotprovideamethodto establishthecorrectmoralreasoning.(Aflawfrom Dworkins reasoning is that there is an assumption of a right answer.)Internal skepticism is the theory that the legal system isfundamentallyunjust.Thepoliciesandlawsare reflectiveonlyofthoseinpower.ThisrefutesDworkins idea that the law has integrity and is raised from power politics.Moreover,itsaysthatthelawsarefilledwith inconsistencies that it is im-possible to reflect a coherent underlying philosophy. Assessing Dworkin Dworkins interpretation of natural law serves as a bridgebetweenAquinasandFuller.UnlikeAquinas,he doesnotsayunjustlawsareinvalidlaws.Andunlike Fuller,hedoesnotsaythatlegalitygivesmoral obligation to follow.Dworkin emphasizes that there is a moral aspect to legal interpretationanditisbasedonitsIntegrity.Thereare flaws to his assessment. He gives judges the authority to basedecisionsontheirmoralityratherthanfollow establishednorms.Inaddition,heneverexplainedwhy law must necessarily have a moral dimension. LEGAL POSITIVISM: OVERVIEW Legalpositivismrejectstheideafromnaturallaw that laws are necessarily just. (Austin and Hart)

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY6 AUSTINS THEORY OF LAWLaw as command Austin,lawsareruleslaiddownbysuperiorsto guide the actions of their subordinates. Rules are species ofcommand.Somecommandsrequireorprohibit certainactions.Andsincelawsarecommands,they imposeanobligationtowhomitisaddressed.In consequence of this, they are liable to sanctions in case their obligation is breached. Somerulesarenotlaiddownbutareofgeneral opinion. For example, giving help to those in need is not a positive law. He calls these, positive morality. Positive laws are established by the sovereign of an independentpoliticalsociety.Thesovereignisthe supreme ruler- the source of power and not of justice or other moral concept. The sovereign does not even have to claim to be just. As such, there is no connection between legalandmoralobligation.Theconceptoflawispurely power.AccordingtoAustin,tosaythatunjustlawsareinvalid lawswouldleadtoanarchy.Thiswillshowthatthe judicialsystemisinconclusive.Buthedoesnotclaim thatthereisnoconnectionbetweenpositivelawand morality.Positivemoral-ityisagoodsourceofpositive law,butitisnotdependentonit.Moreover,Austin recognizesthatallhumansareundermoralobligation imposed by God. ThedefendantsattheNurembergtrialused Austiniantheorywhentheyassertedinnocence.Austin however rejects the idea of international law, as there is no global sovereign. Assessing Austin Austinsinterpretationthatthenaturallaw theorists refusal to implement unjust laws would lead to confusionmaybeduetothedifferentcircumstances duringhistime.Itwasunlikethemedievaltimeswhen therewasasinglevaluesystem,whichwaswhen Aquinas theory was made. HART: LAW AS PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RULESTypesoflegalRules:HartscritiqueofAustinscommand theory Certaintypesofrulescannotbeadequately understood as commands that prohibit or require. Some legal rules instead empower individuals to do things that would have otherwise been impossible for them to do. PowerConferringRuleslegalrulesthatempower individuals-Privatepersons:e.g.rulesofcontract.Individuals could agree with one another to do certain things, but those agreements would not be legally binding contracts with-out the rules of contract law.-Public officials: e.g. judges are conferred the power tointerpretandapplylaws;legislatorsthepower tomakeandalterit;andexecutiveofficialsthe power to enforce it.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY7 PowerConferringRulescannotbeproperly consideredasCommands.Whilethetwoaresimilarin thesensethatboththeirgoalsistoaltertheworldin somewayratherthanjustdescribetheworldasitis, theirmethodofachievingthisgoaldiffers.Acommand seekstorealizeitsgoalbycompellingorpreventingan actfromanindividual.PowerConferringRules, meanwhile,onlyallowanindividualtodothingsheor she would have otherwise been unable to do. There is no compulsion to speak of.However,Austinfailedtodrawarelevantdistinction be-tweenthecommandsofthesovereignandthe declarations of a sovereign. Power conferring rules must alsoissuefromthesovereign,i.e.,theserulesare declarations of the sovereign. Legal Obligation: Government and Gunman AccordingtoHart,Austinsconceptionoflegal obligation is seriously defective. -Austin: for a person to have a legal obligation to do (ornotdo)anact,hemuststandundersome generalcommandofthesovereignandrisks havingsomesanctioninflictedonhimshouldhe fail to comply.-Hart:basedonAustinsconception,itis impossibletocorrectlydistinguishagovernment from a gunman.oBeingobligedtodosomethingisnotthe same as being obligated to do it.oGovernments are different from gunmen, i.e., governmentscancreateobligationsby enactinglawswhilegunmenthroughtheir commands(threatsandorders)cannot createanyobligationmoral,legal,orany other kind. oHartrejectsnaturallawapproachto distinguishgovernmentsfromgunmen basedonaconnectionoflawandmorality, which is absent from the gunmans orders. oTheideaofanobligationmustbeexplained in terms of the idea of rule Aruleexistswhenpeoplegenerally(1)actinacertain way and (2) regards deviations from that way of acting as something to be criticized -condition(1)isexternalinvolvingout-ward behavior-condition(2)isinternalinvolvingtheattitude people take Hartsconception:apersonhasanobligationwhena certain kind of rule applies to him/her. -Theremustbeagreatdealofsocialpressureto con-form to the rule-Therulemusthelpmaintainanaspectofsociety that is important and valuable.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY8 -It must sometimes require a person to act contrary to his/her individual self-interest. -All societies have rules that impose obligations but notallhaverulesthatimposelegalobligation because not all societies have legal systems. -Inordertohavealegalsystem,asocietymust have certain special kinds of rules over and above the rules that impose obligations Primary and Secondary Rules Primary Rules: Rules imposing obligations SecondaryRules:Hartsreferstothefollowingthree special kinds of rules as secondary rules. -First,asocietywithalegalsystemmusthavea rulethatsinglesouttherulesthatactuallydo impose obligations in that society.oRuleofRecognitionpeopleinasociety recognize the rules under which they will be officiallyheldaccountable.Thishelps diminishuncertaintyoverwhatthe obligations of people in the society are.oRulessingledoutbytheruleofrecognition are the legally valid rules of that society.-Second, a society must have rules that specify how the legally valid rules can be changed.-Third,asocietymusthaverulesthatempower specificindividualstoenforceandapplythat societys legally valid rules. Hart:Legalsystemasystemthatbringstogetherboth primary and secondary rules In a functioning legal system:-People must generally comply with the legally valid primary rules; they do not need to have an internal perspective;theyonlyneedtocomplywiththose rules and may do so only from fear of punishment; primaryrulesareperceivedmerelyascommands andwillnotregardviolationsassomethingtobe criticized.-Publicofficialsmustacceptthesecondaryrules andtheprimaryrulesidentifiedbytheruleof recognition;theymustadoptaninternal perspective;departuresaresomethingtobe criticized. Question:IsInternationalLaw(IL)alegalsystembased on the Hart conception? -Itisunclearwhethertherewasanyruleof recognition specifying primary rules that obligated nations-ILclearlylackssecondaryrulesauthorizing particularagenciestoenforcethosebinding primary rules

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY9 -Hart:existenceofalegalsystemisamatterof degree, not an all-or nothing affair. Assessing Hart-Harts conception of obligation is no different from Austins.-Harts extreme case scenario (where people comply withthelegallyvalidprimaryrulessolelyoutof fear)doesnotseemessentiallydifferentfromthe gunman situation.-Hartsconceptioncanbemaintainedifhe concedesthenaturalapproachbygivingupthe positivist separation of positive law and morality. -Hartsconceptioncanbesustainedishewereto distinguishagovernmentundertheruleoflaw fromanarbitrarygovernment.Agovernmentof lawsisunlikeagunmaninthatitsexerciseof powerisregulatedbysecondaryrules. Governmentwhetherarbitraryorregulatedby rules has sovereign power, while the gunman lacks it; it is not a matter of how it is exercised justly or unjustlybutratheritismatterofwhetherthe agentoragencyhasthesovereignpowertorule society.-The point of positivism is that law does not need to meet any moral test in order to possess validity or authority. -Hart:moralityaside,thereisnopointof distinguishingbetweenarbitraryAustinian sovereignsandgovernmentsthatoperatethrough a system of secondary and primary rules. It would havebeenbetterforHarttohavedescribedthe differencebetweenarbitraryandrule-governed politicalsystemswithoutinsistingthatonlythe latter can impose legal obligations. LAWASTHEUNIONOFPRIMARYANDSECONDARY RULES A Fresh StartThelastthreechaptersdemonstratethefailureof thesimplemodeloflaw,asthesovereignscoercive orders,todemonstratesomeofthesalientfeaturesofa legal system. Hence, the need for a fresh start. Main reasons why the over-simple theory failed: -Therearelawsthatcommonlyalsoapplytothose who enact it and not merely to the subordinates.-There are varieties of laws-Therearelegalruleswhichdifferfromorderin their mode of origin-The analysis of law in terms of the sovereign failed toaccountforthecontinuityoflegislative authority Other conceptions that failed -TacitOrderhavenoapplicationtothecomplex actualities of a modern legal system.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY1u -PowerConferringRulesadevisetoreconcilethe self-binding character of legislation with the theory thatastatuteisanordergiventoothers legislators have an official capacity and a separate personality.-The elements on which the theory was constructed order,obedience,habits,andthreats,andtheir combinations do not produce the idea of rule. Rules:Primaryandsecondarytheunionofthetwo elucidates the concepts that constitute the framework of legal thought. The Idea of Obligation CrucialStep:Buildinganewaccountoflawintermsof the interplay of primary and secondary rules-Gunmansituation:AordersBtohandoverhis moneyandthreatenstoshoothimifhedoesnot comply. If B obeyed:-B was obliged to do it. statement of beliefs and motiveswithwhichtheactionisdone;a psychological one; normally carries the implication that he actually did it. -Bhadanobligationtodoit.wasobligednot sufficienttowarrantthisstatement;beliefsand motivesarenotnecessary;remainstrueand independent of the question of fact. ObjectionstoEmpiricalapproachtoobligation:Chance orlikelihoodthatapersonhavingtheobligationtodo something will suffer punishment or evil at the hands of others in the event of disobedience.(1)Fundamentalobjection:whererulesexist, deviationsfromthemarenotmerelygrounds for a prediction. (2)Simpler reason: statement that a person had an obligation meant that he was likely to suffer in theeventofdisobediencemayaswellbetrue andunlessingeneral,sanctionswerelikelyto beexactedfromoffenders,therewouldbeno pointinmakingparticularstatementsabouta persons obligation. Obligation is not be found in the gunman situation -Existence of social rulesa.Thoughunstated,makingcertaintypesofbehavior standardisthenormalbackgroundorpropercontext (normativevocabulary:ought,must,should; obligation and duty)b.Applyingageneralruletoaparticularpersonby calling attention to the fact that his case falls under it. Differentiatingsocialrulesfrommerehabitsis indispensableforunderstandingthenotionof obligations or duty, but it is not sufficient by itself.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY11 Thestatementthatsomeonehasorisunderobligation impliestheexistenceofarule.Butitisnotalwaysthe casethatrulesexistwhenthestandardofbehavior requiredbythemisconceivedofintermsofobligation. HeoughttohaveandHehadanobligationtoarenot alwaysinterchangeableexpression.Note:rulesof etiquette or correct speech. Rulesareconceivedandspokenofasimposing obligationwhenthegeneraldemandforconformityis insistentandthesocialpressurebroughttobearupon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great. Primarycharacteristic:whatisimportantisthatthe seriousnessofsocialpressurebehindtherulesisthe primaryfactordeterminingwhethertheyarethoughtof as giving rise to obligations. Two other characteristics: First: The rules are believed to be necessary to the maintenance of social order or some highly prized feature of it. (Sacrifice) Second: The conduct required by these rules may, while benefitingothers,conflictwithwhatthepersonwho owes the duty may wish to do. (Renunciation) Henceobligationsanddutiesarethoughtofas characteristically involving sacrifice and renunciation. Bond = Obligation,!"Debt = Duty Performance!"exact the penalty The Elements of Law Simplesocialstructure-Societywithoutalegislature, courts or officials "customs Primary rules of obligation = Customs Conditions:a. Rules must contain some form of restrictions (e.g. free use of violence, theft, etc.)b.Thosewhoaccepttherulesmustbemorethanthe those who reject the rules Defects:a. Uncertainty defect in the simple social structureb. Static Character slow process of change and growthc. Inefficiency diffuse social pressure Remedy:supplementingprimaryruleswithsecondary rulesa. Uncertainty rule of recognitionb. Static Character rules of changec. Inefficiency rules of adjudication INTERNATIONAL LAWSources of Doubt Theideaoftheunionofprimaryandsecondary rulesisasufficientconditionfortheapplicationofthe expression legal system.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY12 Is International Law really law?Thisquestionarisesfromtheideathat internationallawnotonlylacksthesecondaryrulesof changeandadjudicationwhichprovideforlegislature andcourts,butalsoaunifyingruleofrecognition specifyingsourcesoflawandprovidinggeneralcriteria for the identification of its rules. Municipallawistakenastheclearstandard example of what law is. Two Principal Sources of Doubts a)The first has its roots deep in the conception of law asfundamentallyamatterofordersbackedby threats and contrasts the character of the rules of international law with those of municipal law.b)Thesecondformofdoubtspringsfromthe obscurebeliefthatstatesarefundamentally incapableofbeingthesubjectsoflegalobligation, andcontraststhecharacterofthesubjectsof international law with those of municipal law.Obligations and SanctionsWhatismeantbysayingofawholesystemoflaw that it is binding? The statement that a particular rule of a system is binding on a particular person is one familiar to lawyers and tolerably clear in meaning. We may paraphrase it by theassertionthattheruleinquestionisavalidrule, and under it the person in question has some obligation or duty. Conflictoflawsorinpublicinternationallaw happenswhenwemaybedoubtfulincertain circumstanceswhetheronelegalsystemoranother applies to a particular person. Two Forms of argument a.)Toarguethatinternationallawisnotbindingbe-causeofitslackoforganizedsanctionsistacitlyto accept the analysis of obligation contained in the theory thatlawisessentiallyamatterofordersbackedby threats.b.)Theskepticmaypointoutthatthereareina municipal system, as we have ourselves stressed, certain provisions which are justifiably called necessary; among these are primary rules of obligation, prohibiting the free use of violence, and rules of providing for the official use of force as a sanction for these and other rules.Justbecausethesimpletruismswhichholdgoodfor individualsdonotholdgoodforstates,andthefactual background to international law is so different from that of municipal law, there is neither a similar necessity for sanctionsnorasimilarprospectoftheirsafeand efficacioususe.Thisissobecauseaggressionbetween states is very unlike that between individuals. The use of violencebetweenstatesmustbepublic,andthough thereisnointernationalpoliceforce,therecanbevery littlecertaintythatitwillremainamatterbetween

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY1S aggressorandvictim,asamurderortheft,inthe absence of a police force, might. Evensomuchmaybesecured,itshowsthatnosimple deductioncanbemadefromthenecessityoforganized sanctions to municipal law, in its setting of physical and psychologicalfacts.Thus,withoutsanctions, international law, in its very different setting, imposes no obligations,isnotbinding,andsonotworththetileof law. Obligation and the Sovereignty of states Oneofthemostpersistentsourcesofperplexityabout theobligatorycharacterofinternationallawhasbeen the difficulty felt in accepting or explaining the fact that a state which is sovereign may also be bound by, or has an obligation under, international law. A State refers to: a.) A population inhabiting a territory which lives under a form of ordered government provided by a legal system withitscharacteristicstructureoflegislature,courts, and primary rules;b.)Athegovernmentthatenjoysavaguelydefined degree of independence Dependenceofoneterritorialunittoanotherisnotthe only way in which a States independence may be limited. In-dependencemayalsobelimitedbyaninternational authoritywhichaffectsunitsthatareindependentof each other.Theuncriticaluseoftheideaofsovereigntyhasspread similarconfusioninthetheoryofbothmunicipaland international law. Belief in the necessary existence of the legally unlimited sovereign prejudges the questions:a)Formunicipallaw-whatistheextentofthe supremelegislativeauthorityrecognizedinthis system? b)ForInternationallawwhatisthemaximum areas of autonomy which the rules allow to states? Theory of auto-limitation Individuals, naturally free and independent, were bound bymunicipallaw,bytreatingtheobligationtoobeythe lawasonearisingfromacontractbybeingboundto each other and in some cases with their rulers.Threefoldargumentofauto-limitationagainstthe voluntarist theories of international law: 1. The theories fail to completely explain how it is known thatstatescanonlybeboundbyself-imposed obligations,orwhythisviewoftheirsovereigntyshould be accepted in advance of any examination of the actual character of international law.2.Thereissomethingincoherentintheargument designedtoshowthatstates,becauseoftheir sovereignty,canonlybesubjecttoorboundbyrules which they have imposed upon themselves.3.Theclaimthatstatescanonlybeboundbyself-imposedobligationsshouldbedistinguishedfromthe

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY14 claimthattheycouldbeboundinotherwaysun-dera different system. International Law and Morality Theinsistencethatrulesgoverningtherelationsbe-tween states are only moral rules is inspired by the old dogmatismthatanyformofsocialstructurethatisnot reducible to order backed by threats can only be a form of morality. Reasonsforresistingtheclassificationofitsrulesas morality. -Statesoftenreproacheachotherforimmoral conductorpraisethemselvesorothersforliving up to the standard of international morality.-Claims under international law are not couched in moralterms,butinmunicipallaw,itmaybe joined with a moral appeal. Law,however,whileitalsocontainsmoralimportance, can and does contain just moral rules, and the arbitrary distinctions,formalities,andhighlyspecificdetails whichwouldbemostdifficulttounderstandaspartof morality,areconsequentlynaturalandeasily comprehensible features of law.EvenifparticularrulesofMunicipalLawconflictwith morality, the system as a whole must rest on a generally diffusedconvictionthatthereisamoralobligationto obeyitsrules,thoughthismaybeoverriddeninspecial exceptional cases. Analogies of form and content Onesalientdifferencebetweenmunicipaland internationallawisthattheformerusuallydoesnot recognize the validity of agreements extorted by violence. Kelsen and many modern theorists insist that, like municipallaw,internationallawpossessesandindeed mustpossessabasicnorm,orwhatwehavetermeda ruleofrecognition,byreferencetowhichthevalidityof the other rules of the system is assessed, and in virtue of which the rules constitute a single system. The opposite viewisthatthisanalogyofstructureisfalse: internationallawsimplyconsistsofasetofseparate primaryrulesofobligationwhicharenotunitedinthis manner. Thevalidityoftherulescannotbedemonstrated byreferencetoanymorebasicrule.Therulesofthe simplestructureare,likethebasicruleofthemore advancedsystems,bindingiftheyareacceptedand function as such. It is worth noting that-The analogy is one of the content not of form-Inanalogyofcontent,noothersocialrulesareso closetomunicipallawasthoseofinternational law.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY1S Day 2 Do I Have Rights? REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 104768, July 21, 2003 Facts: Pres.CorazonAquinoissuedExecutiveOrderNo.1 creatingthePresidentialCommissiononGood Government(PCGG,petitioner).EONo.1primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,hisimmediatefamily, relatives,subordinatesandcloseassociates.ThePCGG thencreatedtheAFPAnti-GraftBoard(AFPBoard) taskedtoinvestigatereportsofunexplainedwealthand corruptpracticesbyAFPpersonnel(activeorretired). ThePCGGinvestigatedvariousreportsofalleged unexplainedwealthofMajorGeneralJosephusQ. Ramas (Ramas, respondent). AraidingteamwenttothehouseofElizabethDimaano (Dimaano,co-respondent),mistressofRamas,armed withasearchwarrantcaptionedIllegalPossessionof Firearms and Ammunition. The team then confiscated militaryequipment/itemsandcommunications equipment,inaddition,theteamwasalsoableto confiscatemoneyintheamountofP2,870,000.00 and$50,000.Swornstatementintherecorddisclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income. TheSolicitorGeneralthenfiledanAmendedComplaint allegingthatRamasacquiredfunds,assetsand propertiesmanifestlyoutofproportiontohissalaryas anarmyofficerandhisotherincomefromlegitimately acquired property, taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as officeroftheAFPandasasubordinateandclose associateofthedeposedPresidentFerdinandMarcos. This is in violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY16 PracticesAct)andRA1379(TheActforthe ForfeitureofUnlawfullyAcquiredProperty).The AmendedComplaintprayedfortheforfeitureofRamas properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State. Duringthecontinuationofthetrial,thePCGG manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.TheSandiganbayannotedthatpetitionerhad alreadydelayedthecaseforoverayearmainlybecause of its many postponements. The Sandiganbayan ordered PCGGtoprepareforpresentationofitsadditional evidence, but they still failed to do so. Ramas and Dimaano then filed their motions to dismiss basedonRepublicv.Migrino(CruzJr.vs. Sandiganbayan was also a cited case similar to this one). The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers byreasonofmerepositionheldwithoutashowingthat they are subordinates of former President Marcos. TheSandiganbayandismissedthecaseinfavorof RamasandDimaano,andalsoruledthattherewasan illegalsearchandseizureoftheitemsconfiscated, makingtheminadmissibleinevidence.Duetothis dismissal,theRepublicofthePhilippinesfiledthis petition. Issues: 1.WhetherornotthePCGGhasthejurisdictiontoinvestigate the respondents? - No, they did not have the jurisdiction 2.Whetherornotthecasewasproperlydismissedbythe Sandiganbayan?- Yes 3.Whetherornottherevolutionarygovernmentwasboundby theBillofRightsofthe1973Constitutionduringthe interregnum,(aftertheactualandeffectivetake-overofpower byPresidentCoryAquino)?-No,therevolutionarygovernment was not bound by the 1973 Constitution 4.Whetherornotprotectionaccordedtoindividualsunderthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") andtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights("Declaration") remainedineffectduringtheinterregnum?-Yes,the

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY17 revolutionarygovernmentonlyrepudiatedthe1973 Constitution, not the Covenant or the Declaration 5.)WhetherornotthesearchandseizureofDimaanos propertieswaslegal?-Partly,Yes.Itisonlylegalastothe property indicated in the search warrant, those seized items not in the warrant should be returned to Dimaano. Held: 1.)ThePCGG,throughtheAFPBoard,canonly investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices ofAFPpersonnelwhofallundereitherofthetwo categoriesmentionedinSection2ofEONo.1.These are:(1)AFPpersonnelwhohaveaccumulatedill-gotten wealthduringtheadministrationofformerPresident Marcosbybeingthelattersimmediatefamily,relative, subordinateorcloseassociate,takingundue advantageoftheirpublicofficeorusingtheirpowers, influencexxx;or(2)AFPpersonnelinvolvedinother casesofgraftandcorruptionprovidedthePresident assigns their cases to the PCGG. TheRepublicdoesnotclaimthatRamascasewas assignedtothePCGG.Therefore,Ramascaseshould fallunderthefirstcategoryofAFPpersonnelbeforethe PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. The main argumentforclaimingthatRamaswasaMarcos subordinateisbecauseofhispositionasthe CommandingGeneralofthePhilippineArmy.The SupremeCourtholdsthatRamaswasnota subordinateofformerPresidentMarcosinthesense contemplatedunderEONo.1anditsamendments.Merepositionheldbyamilitaryofficerdoesnot automaticallymakehimasubordinateabsenta showingthatheenjoyedcloseassociationwithformer President Marcos. Moreover,theresolutionoftheAFPBoardandeventhe AmendedComplaintdonotshowthattheproperties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of President Marcos. Given the fact that Ramas case does not fall within any of the 2 classes that the PCGG can investigate, then the PCGG does not have jurisdiction over this case.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY18 2.) The PCGG has only itself to blame for non-completion ofthepresentationofitsevidence.First,thiscasehas beenpendingforfouryearsbeforetheSandiganbayan dismissedit.PCGGhadalmosttwoyearstoprepareits evidence.However,despitethissufficienttime,the PCGGstilldelayedthepresentationoftherestofits evidencebyfilingnumerousmotionsforpostponements and extensions. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more thansufficienttimetofinishthepresentationofits evidence.TheSandiganbayanoverlookedpetitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong the disposition of the case even more. 3.)TheraiddoneonDimaanoshousewasdone5days aftertheEDSAPeoplePower.PCGGarguesthata revolutionarygovernmentwasoperativeatthattimeby virtueofProclamationNo.1announcingthatPresident AquinoandVicePresidentLaurelweretakingpowerin thenameandbythewilloftheFilipinopeople,in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. PCGG asserts that the revolutionarygovernmenteffectivelywithheldthe operationofthe1973Constitutionwhichguaranteed RamasandDimaanosexclusionaryright(thatevidence illegallyseizedcannotbeusedagainstasuspectina criminal prosecution). During the interregnum (a period of time when there is a vacancy or there is no formal government), the directives andordersoftherevolutionarygovernmentwasthe supremelawbecausenoconstitutionlimitedtheextent andscopeofsuchdirectivesandorders.Withthe abrogationofthe1973Constitutionbytherevolution, therewasnomunicipallawhigherthanthedirectives andordersoftherevolutionarygovernment.Thus, duringtheinterregnum,apersoncouldnotinvokeany exclusionaryrightunderaBillofRightsbecausethere was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnumuntiltheratificationofthe1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. 4.)TheBillofRightsunderthe1973Constitutionwas notoperativeduringtheinterregnum.However,the courtrulesthattheprotectionaccordedtoindividuals under2InternationalAgreementstowhichthe

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY19 Philippinesisasignatory,isstillineffectduringthe Interregnum;theInternationalCovenantonCiviland Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration). Therevolutionarygovernment,afterinstallingitselfas the de jure government (the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by other states), assumed responsibilityfortheStatesgoodfaithcompliancewith the Covenant. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatoryStatetorespectandtoensuretoall individualswithinitsterritoryandsubjecttoits jurisdictiontherightsrecognizedinthepresent Covenant.UnderArticle17(1)oftheCovenant,the revolutionarygovernmenthadthedutytoinsurethat [n]ooneshallbesubjectedtoarbitraryorunlawful interferencewithhisprivacy,family,homeor correspondence.TheDeclarationprovidesinitsArticle 17(2)that[n]ooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhis property. Therevolutionarygovernmentdidnotrepudiatethe CovenantortheDeclarationduringtheinterregnumin thesamewayitrepudiatedthe1973Constitution.As thedejuregovernment,therevolutionarygovernment couldnotescaperesponsibilityfortheStatesgoodfaith compliancewithitstreatyobligationsunder international law. The Bill of Rights as found in the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the period of Interregnum. However, duetothePhilippinesbeingsignatorytotheCovenant andtheDeclaration,RamasandDimaanostillpretty muchhadtheirexclusionaryrightsandwasprotected from Illegal Search and Seizures. 5.) During the time of this case, all directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionarygovernment,inadditiontheyshouldnot havealsoviolatedtheCovenantortheDeclaration.The warrant,issuedbyajudgeuponproperapplication, specifiedtheitemstobesearchedandseizedandthe warrantisthusvalidwithrespecttotheitems specificallydescribedinthewarrant.Thebasisforthe protection of the people from unlawful seizure is not the Bill of Rights but the Covenant and the Declaration.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY2u Theraidingteamseizeditemsnotincludedinthe warrant; clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority whenitseizedtheseitems.Theseizureoftheseitems wasthereforevoid,andunlesstheseitemsare contraband per se, they must be returned to the person fromwhomtheraidingteamseizedthem.However,the courtdoesnotdeclarethatsuchpersonisthelawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold theseitemsfromthepossessor.Thecourtthusholds thattheseitemsshouldbereturnedimmediatelyto Dimaano. Could Morality Be Legislated? IMBONG v. OCHOA G.R. No. 204819 Facts: TheResponsibleParenthoodandReproductiveHealth Actof2012,betterknownastheRHLaw,wasenacted onDecember21,2012toaddresstheissuesof populationandbirthcontrol,andcontraceptionandto reignintheissuesfacedbythepoorandthe marginalizedandtoprovideforthepeoplesrightto reproductive health to be achieved through a government sponsoredcontraceptionprogram.TheRHLawalso criminalizescertainactsofrefusaltocarryoutits mandates.Itsconstitutionalitywasimmediately challengedbyatotaloffourteen(14)petitionsandtwo (2) petitions-in-intervention.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY21 Issues: Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the following (10): a)Right to Life - No b)Right to Health Noc)Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech - Yes d)The Family - Yes e)Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom - No f)Due Process - No g)Equal Protection - No h)Involuntary Servitude - No i)Delegation of the Authority of the FDA - No j)Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM - No Held: a)No. The Right to Life of a human being is not violated bytheprescriptionanduseofcontraceptives.The Constitutionsprotectionbeginsatthemomentof conceptionoftheunbornasprovidedforunderArt. II,Sec.12.Sec.12providesfortheprotectionofthe sancity of the family and of the unborn child from the momentofconception.Duetoitsnatureasa scientific and medical issue, the court has deemed it propernottodetermineastowhenlifeactually begins.Thecurrentlawissilentwithregardtothis issueandconsideringthatthereisstillnounborn upontheuseofcontraceptives,theprotection provided for by the Sec.12 of the Constitution cannot set in. b)No.AsprovidedforunderArt.II,Sec.15ofthe Constitution, the state shall protect and promote the righttohealthofthepeopleandinstillhealth consciousnessamongthem.Art.XIIIalsoprovides fortheStatesdutytoprovideforthehealthofthe people. The Court held that the RH Law does not aim torenderanyofthepreviouslawsobsolete. Considering the fact that existing contraceptives and abortifacients require prior approval and prescription, thegovernmentprovidesforproperchecksand balancestoensurethepeoplesRighttoLifeand consequently, the Right to Health.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY22 c)Yes,butonlywithregardtoconscientiousobjectors inpursuitofmedicalpractice.Thecourtupheldthe Constitutionalguaranteeofcompleteseparationof theChurchandtheStateasprovidedforinthe Constitution. Such cannot be compelled by the law to violate their religious beliefs and conviction. One may notbeheldliablefortheirrefusaltoactastheFree Exercise Clause provided for under Sec. 23 and Sec. 29mustnotbeimpaired.Thecourtheldthatthe principleofnon-coercionundertherighttofreely exercise religion must not be violated. d)Yes. The court held that Sec. 23 (a) of the RH Law is violative of Art. XV, Sec. 3 of the Constitution which providesthatthestateshalldefendtherightofthe spousestofoundafamily.TheRHLawcannotbe allowedtoinfringeonthemutualdecision-making accordedtospousesandindependencebythe Constitutionasitisaprivatematterwhichbelongs solelytothem.Thecourtalsoprovidedfortwo exceptions: Access to Information (information about familyplanningservices,reproductivehealth proceduresandmodernfamilyplanningmethods) and Life Threatening Cases (emergency procedures). e)No.Art.II,Sec.12oftheConstitutionprovidesthat thenaturalandprimaryrightanddutyofthe parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the supportofthegovernment.Itisalsotheinherent rightoftheStatetoactasparenspatriaetoaidthe parentsinthemoraldevelopmentoftheyouth.The courtfoundthatthelegalmandateoftheRHLaw supplements,ratherthansupplants,therightsand dutiesoftheparentsinthemoraldevelopmentof their children. f)No.ThecourtheldthattheRHLawdoesnotsuffer fromthedefectofvaguenessasitdoesnotlackin thecomprehensiblestandardsthatmenofcommon intelligencemustnecessarilyguessitsmeaningand differ as to its application. The definition of a private healthserviceprovidershouldnotcauseany confusion.Thetermsusedarebroadenoughto

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY2S includetheprovidingofinformationandthe rendering of medical procedures g)No.Thecourtheldthatitdoesnotrequirethe universal application of laws to all persons or things withoutdistinction.Whatitsimplyrequiresis equalityamongequalsasdeterminedaccordingtoa validclassificationwhichispermittedbythe Constitution.Theclassification,however,mustpass thetestofreasonableness:itmustreston substantial distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law, it is not limited to existing conditions only, anditappliesequallytoallmembersofthesame class.TheRHLawdoesnotimposeanyconditions amongcouples.Thelawsimplyseekstoprovide prioritytothepoorintheimplementationof governmentprogramstopromotebasicreproductive health care. h)No.Sec.17oftheRHLawcannotbeconsideredas involuntaryservitudeasitprovidesforprobono services as reproductive health care service providers havethediscretionandtimeofrenderingsuch services.Itwasalsoraisedthattheimpositionis withinthepowersofthegovernment,the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth beingaprivilegeandnotaright.Asthepracticeof medicine is of public interest, it is both a power and duty of the state to control and regulate such. There isalsoalackofanyformofcompulsion,forceor threat that could constitute involuntary servitude. i)No.TheFDAdoesnotonlyhavethepowerbutalso the competency to evaluate, register and cover health servicesandmethods.Itistheonlygovernment entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. The functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. This is considered as a validdelegationofpowertotheFDAtoregulatethe medicineandtheimplementationoftherulesand regulations of the RH Law. j)No.TheARMMisnotaseparateandindependent stateandisthus,underthecompletesupervision andcontrolofthenationalgovernment.The

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY24 autonomyoflocalgovernmentsisnotabsolute.The RHLawdoesnotinfringeSec.17oftheLocal GovernmentCodewhichprovidesforthedeliveryofbasicservicesandfacilities.Ithasnopowerovera program for which funding has been provided by the nationalgovernmentundertheannualgeneral appropriationsact,eveniftheprograminvolvesthe delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.Exceptfortheexpressandimpliedlimitations imposedonitbytheConstitution,Congresscannot berestrictedtoexerciseitsinherentandplenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. Do You Care For Me? OPOSA V FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 Facts: Acomplaint,inthiscase,wasinstitutedbythe petitionersprayingthatjudgmentberenderedordering the defendants Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, in his capacity astheSecretaryofDENR,andhisagents,to(1)Cancel allexistingTimberLicenseAgreements(TLA)inthis countryand(2)Ceaseanddesistfromreceiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY2S The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit 1 (seefootnote)wheretheplaintiffminors,asrepresented bytheirparents,allegethattheyareallcitizensofthe Philippinesentitledtothefullbenefitofthenatural resourcetreasureofthecountry.Asaclasssuit,the complaintwasfiledforthepetitionersthemselvesand othersequallyconcernedaboutthepreservationofthe natural resources and the generations yet unborn. As for their cause of action, the petitioners allege that at thepresentrateofdeforestation,thePhilippineswillbe bereft of forest resources after the end of the decade. The continuedallowancebydefendantofTimberLicense Agreementholderstocutanddeforesttheremaining foreststandswillworkgreatdamageandirreparable injurytotheplaintiffsandalsotheirsuccessors/next generations.

1 A class suit is a suit which is biought befoie a couit by a numbei of paities to iepiesent many peisons so numeious that it is impiacticable to join all paities to piesent a contioveisy that is of common inteiest to all.Theyassertthatthedefendantsrefusaltocancelthe TLAs is contrary to the Constitutional policy of the State (among others) to "protectandadvancetherightofthepeopletoa balancedandhealthfulecologyinaccordwiththe rhythmandharmonyofnature."(Section16,Article II, 1987 Constitution) SecretaryFactoranfiledaMotiontoDismissthe complaint based on two grounds: (1) that the petitioners havenocauseofaction2 (seefootnote)againsthimand, (2)theissueraisedbythepetitionersisapolitical question3(see footnote).

2 Acauseofactionistheactoiomissionofapeisonviolativeoftheiightsof otheis.Inthiscase,uefenuantclaimthatpetitioneishavefaileutostate,in theiipetition,aspecificcauseofactionagainsthimsincepetitioneisaieonly claiming a !"#$% "''%#"()*+, *- %+!).*+/%+("' .)#0(, S PoliticalQuestionsaiethosethataietobeueciueubythepeopleintheii soveieigncapacity,oiiniegaiutowhichfull1),2.%()*+ hasbeenuelegateuto theExecutiveoiLegislativeBianch.0nueitheuoctiineofSepaiationof Poweis,theCouitscannotinteifeiewithpoliciesanuactionsuonebythe ExecutiveanuLegislativebianchesintheiicapacityassuch$+'%,, theyacteu contiaiy to law.

AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY26 ThejudgeinthelowercourtgrantedtheMotionto Dismiss.Thejudgereasonedthatthecomplaintindeed statesnocauseofactionsincetheyfailedtoallegea specificlegalrightthattheyareseekingtoenforceand protect,oraspecificlegalwrongtheyareseekingto preventandredress.Thejudgealsoruledthatthe complaintraisesapoliticalquestion.Hefurtherruled thatthegrantingofthereliefprayedfor(cancelingof TLAs)wouldresultintheimpairmentofcontracts4(see footnote), which is prohibited by the Constitution. Thus,petitionersfiledtheinstantcasebeforethe Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether or not the complainant has a sufficient cause of action against the defendant? - Yes

4 Section1uofAiticleIIIoftheConstitutionstatesthat34* '"5 )/6").)+# (0% *7')#"()*+ *- 2*+(."2(, ,0"'' 7% 6",,%189Any law, which changes the teims of a legalcontiactbetweenpaities(thisincluuescancellation),isalawthat impaiistheobligationofacontiactanuisnullanuvoiu.}uiispiuuenceholus, howevei,thatavaliuexeiciseof:*')2%:*5%.;7