Algeria vs. Fanon

8/13/2019 Algeria vs. Fanon

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University of UtahWestern Political Science Association

Algeria vs. Fanon: The Theory of Revolutionary Decolonization, and the Algerian ExperienceAuthor(s): Paul A. BeckettSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), pp. 5-27Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/446648 .Accessed: 27/11/2013 14:56

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ALGERIA vs. FANON: THE THEORY OFREVOLUTIONARY DECOLONIZATION, AND THE

ALGERIAN EXPERIENCEPAUL A. BECKETT

AhmaduBelloUniversity, aria, Nigeria

HE GROWING literature n Frantz Fanon' reflects is continued ignifi-cance as a theorist of revolution n general and revolution n colonial con-texts n particular. The tendency t present to see decolonization as a more

useful process concept than modernization, political development, integra-tion, etc.,2 suggests that continued interest n Fanon is not misplaced. In termsof decolonization Algeria stands alone among the previously olonized African coun-tries that are presently ndependent, n that in the Algerian case alone was formalindependence the product of prolonged and general revolutionary war against thecolonial power. Fanon's chronicle of the Algerian war, in turn, must certainly beconsidered the boldest and one of the most important theoretical disquisitions onaspects of decolonization to have emerged from Africa.3

While frequently resented n the language of universals Fanon's most impor-tant work was rooted in the circumstances of the Algerian war. It seems surpris-ing, therefore, hat his theory of revolutionary decolonization and its consequenceshas not heretofore een systematically tudied in juxtaposition with the facts of theAlgerian case (both before and after ndependence). Such a juxtaposition is the

1Three book-length treatments have appeared recently: Renate Zahar, L'Oeuvre de FrantzFanon (Paris: Maspero, 1970; originally published in German as Kolonialismus undEntfremdung); David Caute, Fanon (London: Fontana, 1970); and Peter Geismar,Fanon (New York: Dial Press, 1971). Zahar's book is the most useeful; it and Caute'sbook provide bibliographic guides on Fanon. The most systematic ttempt to relateelements of Fanon's thought to problems and concepts of comparative politics s MartinStaniland, Frantz Fanon and the African Political Class, African Affairs, 68, 270(January 1969), 4-25. An attempt to evaluate the present-day ignificance f Fanon forpost-colonial Africa is P. A. Beckett, Frantz and Sub-Sahara Africa: Notes on theContemporary ignificance of His Thought, Africa Today, 19, 2 (1972), 59-72.

2 The attacks on the use of modernization are well-reflected n S. F. Huntington's own re-evaluation, The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics, Com-parative Politics, 3 (1971), 283-322. The most theoretically mbitious attack on cus-tomary uses of the modernization concept (and related ones) is that by C. S. Whitaker,A Dysrhythmic rocess of Political Change, World Politics, 19 (January 1967), 190-

217. See also, Theoretical Context and Setting n his The Politics of Tradition (Prince-ton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 3-34. See also R. Sklar's Political Scienceand National Integration: A Radical Approach, Journal of Modern African Studies,5 (1967), 1-11; and J. S. Saul and G. Arrighi, Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa, Socialist Register (London), 1969. For what is (in my opinion) themost interesting se of the decolonization theme see Roger Genoud's Nationalism andEconomic Development in Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1969).

3 The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1966). Unless otherwise noted, pagenumbers n the text and footnotes efer to this book in this edition. It is perhaps morethan coincidental that the most interesting heoretical work in a radical vein which is

currently merging from Africa is likewise rooted in one of the rare cases of prolongedanticolonial insurrection. refer o Amilcar Cabral; see Revolution in Guinea; an Afri-can People's Struggle (London: Stage One, 1969). Particularly n the question of spon-taneity nd with respect to social class analysis, Cabral's work s in sharp and interestingcontrast to Fanon's. No systematic omparison of their theoretical work seems to existat present.

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6 THE WESTERN POLITICALQUARTERLY

purpose f this ssay. The aim is not somuch to see what Fanon can tell us aboutAlgeria, s to see what Algeria an tell usaboutFanon (i.e.,the trengths nd weak-nesses f his

theory). Bythus

xploringhe natural

Algerian)context f Fanon's

text, we can hope to move beyond he uncritical ummary nd elucidation fFanon's thought hichhas been characteristic f much of the writing n him o far.

Underneath he omewhat umbled ppearancepresented y The Wretched fthe Earth, with ts bewildering hifts f tone and perspective, ies a single hemewhich gives coherence o the whole. This theme concerns he long-term onse-quences of contrasting aths to formal ndependence. Leaving aside other cat-tered eferences, anon gives ttention o twoprincipal nd sharply pposed modes:that of revolutionary ecolonization represented y Algeria), and that of bour-geois nationalism represented y most other French-speaking erritories). hemain distinguishing actor s not despite hefrequent se of classterms) heir asisin social class rigorously efined, ut rather he degree of violence nd the extent(in both quantitative nd qualitative erms) f popular participation. he interestof Fanon's distinction rises from his argument hat the mode by which inde-pendence sachievedwillhavecrucial onsequences or ost-independenceecoloni-zation. In what s perhapshis best known assageon the subjectFanon says:Violencealone, violence ommitted y the people,violence rganized nd educatedby itsleaders,makes t possible or hemasses ounderstand ocial truths nd gives hekey o them.Without hat truggle, ithout hatknowledge f the practice f action, here's othing ut afancy-dress aradeand the blareof the trumpets. here'snothing ave a minimum f readap-tation, fewreforms t the top, flagwaving: and downthere t the bottom n undividedmass, till iving n the middle ges, ndlessly arking ime.4

Underneath herhetoric f this passage s both warning nd hypothesis. hesignificance f the warning, s one surveys he African tates fter he first ecadeof independence, s all too obvious. Frequently ne encounters, long with dis-appointment ith the results f independence or lack of them), regret n thepart of nationals f African ountries hat ndependence ame, n Azikiwe's hrase,on a platter f gold. While the history f the sub-Saharan ountries annot be

reversed, he nterest f Fanon'shypothesis eems onfirmed.Stated more precisely, anon is asserting hat mass participation n violent

decolonization - revolutionary decolonization - lays the basis for true revolu-tionary decolonizationfter ndependence.We wish oexplore hishypothesis yan examination f the very ase that gaverise o t. To do so,we must sk nitiallytwo questions:

(1) Did the Algerianwar for ndependence viewednow from he distanceof a decade and more fit Fanon's picture f people'santicolonial evolutionarywar?

(2) Has the post-independencevolution f the Algerian ystem ollowedineswhich could be considered oth positive nd revolutionary n terms f a Fanonistvalueposition? A third uestionmust hen be dealt with, his nvolving herelationbetween ur answers othe first uestion nd those o the econd.

4P. 117.



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ALGERIA vs.FANON 7

To anticipate, will rgue hat 1) the Algerianwar n tsgeneral haracteris-ticsdid fit anon's portrait f nticolonial ar; but 2) Algeria's ost-independence

evolution as not beenrevolutionary n Fanonist erms. Of most nterest s the hirdquestion, orhere the argument obe made is that the most ignificant ost-inde-pendence ailures re related recisely o the Fanonian character f the strugglefor ndependence.

The inquirywill proceed n three major sections.First, t will be necessary oexplore n more detail Fanon's theory f violence nd revolutionary ecolonization.Second,the history f the Algerianwar for ndependence ill be briefly eviewed.Third, review f the revolutionary ction of the post-independence eriodmustbeundertaken. final ection will uggest onclusions.

THE THEORY OFREVOLUTIONARYECOLONIZATION

The Theory f ViolenceWithout violence, Fanon argues in the passage cited above, there's noth-

ing... . Elsewhere, treatment n positive erms sprovided, hich epresents neof Fanon's most mportant ontributions o revolutionary nd to political heory.Historically, violence has been seen, even by revolutionary hinkers, primarily ninstrumental erms. Fanon's treatment f violence n the context f colonization

and decolonization, on the other hand, is remarkable both forts

emotional impactand for ts multidimensional haracter. First, violence is the essence of the colonialsituation. stablished yviolence, olonial ystems emain ependent n a peculiarlynakedfashion n violence:In the capitalist ountries multitude f moral eachers, ounsellors nd bewilderers epa-rate the exploited from those in power. In the colonial countries, n the contrary, he police-man and the soldier, by their mmediate presence and their frequent nd direct action main-tain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts nd napalm not to budge.It is obvious here that the agents of government peak the language of pure force. The inter-mediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them upand puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is

the bringer f violence nto the home and into the mind of the native.6

5 Thus Hannah Arendt argues that violence and (political) power are opposites; that violenceis speechless, encenon-theoretical; nd that ts discussionmust be left to the tech-nicians. See Reflections on Violence, Journal of International Affairs, 3 (1969),1-35; On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 9 especially. Chalmers John-son puts the traditional view of violence within revolutionary hought when he writesthat true revolution is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the system o changewhen all else has failed... . See Revolutionary Change (New York: Little, Brown,1966, p. 12. Harry Bienen puts it that What Mao, Debray, and Lenin are getting t isthat under conditions of a specifiable kind, well-organized violence is the shortest dis-tance between two points... ; see Violence and Social Change (University of Chicago

Press, 1968), p.46. Marx and

Engels,while

identifyingorce

ncludingviolence as the

midwife of every society pregnant with a new one endorsed it only in terms of eitherinevitability r necessity; f these came in doubt (the U.S., Britain, Holland), then theacceptance of force was automatically brought back into question. On the other hand,precedents for Fanon's considerably more positive view of violence can be seen in certainof the anarchists (Malatesta and Kropotkin n particular), and, of course, n Sorel,

6 P. 31.



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8 THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLY

The violence of the colonial regime s balanced7 by the autodestructive violenceof the native and native society. Thus the eventual development of anti-colonial

counter-violencedoes not

amountto a

newfactor

n thecolonial

situation,but to the redirection f violence:

We have seen that this ame violence, hough eptverymuchon the surface ll through hecolonialperiod, yet turns n the void. We have also seen that t is canalisedby the emo-tional outlets f dance and possession y spirits; we have seenhow t is exhausted n fratri-cidal combats between native groups nd individuals].Nowthe problem s to lay hold ofthis violencewhich s changing irection. Whenformerly t was appeasedbymyths nd exer-cised ts talents n finding resh ays f committing ass uicide, ownew onditions ill makepossible completely ew ineof ction.8The violence f the colonial egime nd the counter-violencef the native alanceeachotherand respond o eachother n an extraordinary eciprocal omogeneity.'

It can besuggestedhat n Fanon's icture f the olonial ituation, elationsofviolencere as much he ssence s economic elations re for Marx. Already,therefore, anon's reatment f violence oesbeyond he imple otion f condi-tionallynstrumentalesort oviolence. he essence f colonialismeing iolence,its ontradictions found ncounter-violence.utFanon dds nother imension;in hisview he olonized anfinds isfreedom ot nly hrough iolencethe ra-ditional onception), ut lso n it. It is in violence hat he native ecomesman; thus he C&saireassage uoted yFanonends: I struck nd the bloodspurted; hat s the nly aptism hat remember oday. 10n Fanon's wnwords:At the evel f

ndividuals,iolencesa

cleansingorce. t frees henative rom

his inferiority omplex and from his despair inaction; it makes him fearless nd re-stores his self respect. 1

The colonized man finds his freedom n and through violence.?2 Such a trans-formation s, it is implied, not only of qualitative character, but permanent. Atthe social level an analogous transformation ccurs, as the nation is formed (orrediscovered, s is sometimes mplied) :

... it so happens hat for the colonised eoplethis violence, ecause t constitutes heir nlywork, nvests heir haracters ith positive nd creative ualities. The practice f violencebinds hem ogether s a whole, ince ach individual orms violent ink n the great hain,a

partof the

great rganismf violencewhichhas

surgedpwards n reaction o the ettler's

violence n the beginning. he groups ecognizeach other nd the future ation s alreadyindivisible.

It is violence, finally and this point is crucial for the present exercise thatguarantees a positive (democratic, popular, and participatory) content to the newnationhood. Thus a new and genuine culture emerges to underpin and maintainthe collective identity, .g., a fighting iterature, revolutionary iterature, nd a

Fanon brings ut the dea of balance between he violence f the colonial regime nd theresponsive ounter-violence f the native- the two interacting n an extraordinaryreciprocal omogeneity at a number f points; eepp. 30, 31, 33, 40, 48, 69.

8 P. 46.9P. 69.0Aim6C6saire, Les armesmiraculeuses, oc.cit., . 69.f P. 74.' P. 67.

P. 73. Emphasis dded.



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ALGERIA vs. FANON 9

national iterature. 14 Native institutions uch as the professional tory-tellerfind ew functions n the process f the truggle pp. 193-94),while raditional ul-

tural rtifacts, uchas female eclusion, hich re out of tune with he newpartici-patory ulture-to-be, re swept way or redefined. Most important, rom he nar-rowly olitical tandpoint, s the argument hat the spontaneous, oluntaristic ndunbureaucratic rganization f the strugglewill be projected nto the post-inde-pendence eriod:When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation they will allow no one toset themselves up as liberators. They show themselves o be jealous of the results of theiraction and take good care not to place their future, heir destiny or the fate of their countryin the hands of a living god. Yesterday they were completely rresponsible; oday they mean tounderstand everything nd make all decisions. Illuminated by violence, the consciousness ofthe

peoplerebels

against any pacification.From now on the

demagogues,the opportunists nd

the magicians have a difficult ask. The action which has thrown them into a hand-to-handstruggle onfers upon the masses a voracious taste for the concrete. The attempt t mystifica-tion becomes n the ong run, practically mpossible.

What is important n the arguments o far summarized an be seen n termsof the functional nalysis f violence. Within his evel of discourse, e can in turndistinguish wo evels.First, hetraditional iewof violence n nstrumental erms spresent. Here violence n the form f armed rebellion sseen s instrumental o theoverthrow f the colonialregime nd the achievement f ndependence. he pres-ence of this iew of violence n Fanon's treatment equires ocomment; he nstru-

mental view is necessarily nd inevitably resent n every ody of revolutionarytheory.

The second aspect of the functionality f violence, n the other hand, sees tas carrying in terms f its effects) solution n itself. Thus at the level of theindividual, articipation n violence may permit r provide he conditions or areorganization f personality lements hich mounts o the elimination f the per-sonality f native, with ts sense of inferiority nd objectless iolence. At thesocial evel that to which Fanon givesmost ttention the results re summedup in the emergence f the nation. This means, more specifically, hree hings.

(1) There is accomplished edirection f violenceby the members f the nationcollectively oward ts proper ocialobject; with his omes n end to divisions ndto collective utodestruction. 2) The nation organizes tself orgoal achieve-ment. The nation, n other words, ecomes political nit apableof action withinwhich participation s universal, nd collective urpose manates irectly rom hepeople. (3) An integrated nd national ulture makes the nation cultural nitas well, s a variety f cultural ources, re, so to speak, ired ogether n the cruci-ble of anticolonial evolution.

These dimensions, aken ogether, ouldseemto represent he outline f the

positive ideto the quotedassertion hichbegan this ssay: that without iolencethere's othing.... Thus, with iolence here re the positive esults isted bove.

14 . 179.15 . 74.



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The Description f the Revolutionary arEffortThe empirical eferent orFanon's violence s revolutionary ar against he

colonialpower. We must ttempt o draw from anon a picture escription fthe main patterns f the truggle or ndependence. his description an be framedin terms f three problemswhich are alwaysrelevant o the characterization finstances f popular revolution: he nception f the revolution; heorganizationand leadership f the revolution; nd the political development f the revolutionin terms f deology nd post-takeover rogram.

1. The inception f the revolution. wo not completely isparate ersions fthe source of the revolutionary utbreak re apparent n The Wretched f theEarth. In the first, illegalists igure.They are radicals forced ut of the urban

bourgeoisnationalist olitical parties by the nationalist eadership, nd pursuedinto herural hinterland ythe olonialist olice.16There they ome n contactwiththe peasantry, lready hinking n terms f violence. In this version, he llegal-istsperhaps perform necessary oleas catalyst nd to someextent s educators,giving othe peasants'natural understanding f the colonial ituation theoreticalgrounding besides providing echnical xpertise n organization nd means ofwarfare). The peasants nce aroused, herevolution sseento filter nto he urbansectors f the colonialsociety y way of the lumpen-proletariat that portionof the urban ector which etains ts ultural nd social connections ith hepeasan-try nd whichhasnot been ssimilated othe olonialistmachine.

The secondversion which s perhapsmore felt by the reader han preciselyexpressed y Fanon- simply liminates he factor f llegalist ntellectual ction,leavingus with the peasantry tself. This class is described s spontaneouslyrevolutionary. hroughout most of the long essay Concerning Violence t ispossible osee the peasantry s rising pontaneously ithout enefit f catalysts romoutside tself nd its relationship othe olonial ystem.

These two views are, in fact, not widely eparated, nd can be largely nte-grated through eference o Fanon's psychology f colonization, he relation fwhich to the description f revolution eems not to have been fully ppreciated.

Here we see that the psychoanalytic aterials rovide hebasisof a psychologicalmodel of revolutionary esponse o colonialism.The native s a psychologicallyrepressed eing, oheavily ffected y the colonial ituation s to be nearly rtificialas a human being. The society f natives eflects his: muscular ension s itsgeneral characteristic; ension s imperfectly esolved hrough ance, myth, ndcollective utodestruction s the violence ent up within he ociety f natives

is released pon itself. The psychology f the colonized ociety s not a stableone;the situation s unbearable nd at somepoint will find ts climax, onversion ndsolution n a collective nd unified ising gainst the colonialsystem. Thus, thispsychologicalmodel of revolution eads toward n explosion mage, nd confirms

that Fanon's revolution s emphatically popular and basically pontaneous ne.The presence f illegalist lements mong the peasantry nly makes he situationmore mminently xplosive p. 102); the illegalist ntellectuals o not create the

1 Seepp. 53and 102especially.



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ALGERIA vs.FANON 11

psychological nd cultural onditions or revolution. t might be suggested hatthese llegalists lay approximately he same role as propaganda, party ctivities,

etc.,n the

Marxist heoryf

revolution: heymay have crucial mpact,ut

onlywhen he underlying onditions or evolution re already resent.2. Organization nd leadership. t is considerablymore difficult o classify

Fanon'sarguments ith eference othe question f eadership nd organization fthe revolutionary truggle. The difficulty risesprincipally rom he contrast e-tween he occasional pecific eferences o the role of eadership nd organization,and the more general mood suggesting hat the spontaneous nd leaderless ualityof the revolution's nception emains ts characteristic hroughout hecourse f thearmed truggle.

Thus, on the one hand, there s the repeated message hat the people knowand understand ll, and are the truth p. 39). The perfect olidarity f the people,once the rebellion egins, s seenas based on psychology, ulture, nd shared bjec-tive nterest ather han on organization. anon opposes hedevelopment f func-tionally pecific, ureaucratic rganization; hushe condemns he tendency f theintellectual ointroduce the dea of specialdisciplines, f specialized unctions,

of departments ithin he terrible tone rusher, he fierce mixingmachinewhicha popular revolution s. 17 Elsewhere p. 87), the fetish f organisation hich scharacteristic f bourgeois)nationalist arty eaders s condemned.

On the other hand, there are (mainly within he essay Spontaneity: ts

Strength nd Weakness ) a number f references othe need to organize herebel-lion and politically ducate the masses hat participate n t.1sAt one point, n fact,Fanon reaches positionwhich s Maoist,drawing distinction etween hespon-taneous easant ebellion nd the onscious, irected evolution.The leaders f the rebellion ome to seethat venvery arge-scale easant isings eed to becontrollednd directed nto ertain hannels. hese eaders re ed to renounce hemove-ment n so far as it can be termed peasant revolt, nd to transform t into a revolutionarywar. They discover hat the success f the struggle resupposes lear objectives, definitemethodologynd above ll the needfor he mass f the people orealise hat heir norganizedefforts an onlybe a temporary ynamic. You can hold out for hree ays maybe venforthree months on the strength f the admixture f sheer esentment ontained n the mass

of the people; but you won't win a nationalwar, you'll never verthrow he terrible nemymachine, nd you won't change human beings f you forget o raise the standard f con-sciousnessf the rank-and-file. either tubborn ourage orfine logans re enough.

Only two not-very-satisfactoryonclusions an be drawn from anon's com-ments on the question f leadership nd organization. irst, ne must concludethat Fanon himself evermanaged oclarify isthought n the point. Collation fthe widely eparated eferenceseaves us with n unreconciled ension etween heideal of peasant revolution hich s both spontaneous nd completewithin tself,and the sense of the need for organization, irection nd control. But second,regardless f the weight hat one attaches oreferences n the atter ategory, t is

I P. 40.18 See pp. 47, 105-8, 110, 145, 148 especially.SP. 108. Note that a few pages later, the theme of peasant sufficiency e-enters; p. 114:

... the peasants, who are all the time adding to their knowledge n the light of exper-ience, will come to show themselves apable of directing he people's struggle.



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safe to saythat Fanon givesrelatively ittle ttention o organization y comparisonwith other major theorists f revolution. Almost verywhere, here eems o be an

implicit ssumption hat the necessary rganization ill be forthcoming, s if byitself. t is similarly rue hatFanon sat least s aware of the dangers f too muchorganization resulting n the fragmentation f the people both vertically ndhorizontally, nd in the danger f creating n authoritarian leader ) as he s of thedangers f too little rganization. inally, we may note that Fanon saysremark-ably ittle bout the form hat organizationmust take. Strikingly, he ong essayConcerning Violence does not refer o the revolutionary arty t all party

organization igures nly n connectionwith the pre-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) fforts f the nationalist ourgeois eaders.

3. Program nd ideology. On this point one encounters he same anomaly.On the one hand, at several points he need for coherence p. 47) ideology ndprogram p. 162) and a definite ethodology p. 108) is affirmed. n the otherhand, these references o not add up to much within he book as a whole. Moreimportant, here s very ittle ndication f the content f program nd ideology.Like the Soummam lateforme, obe discussed resently, anon is stronger n thenegative in showing the ways that post-independence evelopment an bevitiated nd perverted. On the positive ide, one finds nly scattered nd frag-mentary lements f a post-independence rogram: Fanon advocates new systemsof management esigned o take dvantage f that revolutionary apitalwhich s

the people (p. 122); he affirms hat the economyhouldbe

placedat the service

of the nation p. 124) he saysthat the middleman's ector must be nationalized(p. 144) he endorses emocratic ooperatives hichwillbe decentralized byget-ting hemassof the people nterested n the ordering f public ffairs p. 145) hecondemns evelopment f tourism ndustries p. 125); he says hepoorest egionsshouldbe favored p. 149) and he opts for socialism p. 78). But these nd afew other pecifics hich could be mentionedwould seem to represent elativelyunimportant ragments hrown ut from coherent heory hich s left mplicit nthe powerful low f The Wretched f the Earth. It is inescapable hat Fanon'spreoccupation aswith heviolent haseof decolonization; isexamination f the

problems f post-independence evolution ad only begun to progress eyond hestageof critique.

THE ALGERIANWAR

Can Fanon's vision f Third World revolution e brought ogether ith lessvividfactual description f the Algerianwar for ndependence?We maymake theattempt n two ections, xamining irst he nception f the war and then he ourseit took.

TheInception

f theAlgerian

War for ndependenceTwo questionsmust be askedhere: (1) what upport s there or Fanon's pic-

ture of the mmense sychologicalmpact on the native by the colonial ystem?and (2) what support s there orFanon's picture f a largely pontaneous easantrising?



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ALGERIA vs.FANON 13

With respect othe first uestion, nly partial nswer an be suggested. hatthe French olonial ystem n Algeriahad an unusually eavy mpact by referenceto

other olonial ystemsn Africa, specially) annot be doubted. The size of theEuropean settler opulation nearly ne million) and above all the fact that thesettler opulation was to an important xtent dispersed n farming ccupationssuggests tself personal mpact on a large proportion f the Muslim population.Muslimshad been effectively ispossessedf nearly ll land which ould be profit-ablyfarmed or ash crops. By 1954,when heanticolonialwar began,nearly alfof Muslimmalesof working ge were unemployed; nnual per capita ncomeforMuslimswas lessthan a tenth f that for Algerians f European stock. About 70percent f Muslimswere ural, et heMuslim gricultural ector roduced minis-cule portion f Algeria's ash crops. Stillmore mportant heeconomic osition fthe most numerous roup of Algerian Muslims eems, n closeanalysis, o haveactually worsened uring he twentieth entury. Thus Favrod has shown, or n-stance, hat the amount of grain disposed f by each individual, n the average,was nearly hree imes higher n 1870 than n 1950, nd that heepaveraged woper person n 1911and one per 1.8persons n 1954.20The longduration nd deeppenetration f colonialpolitical ule s likewise o be noted. Finally, herewas thedestructive nd stifling ffect f the French ystem n the cultural ealm.21

These and other spects f the colonial ystem n Algeriawhichmight e citeddo not in themselves onfirm anon's psychoanalytic icture f the native andcolonized

ociety; ndeed,ne of the

majorcontributions f Fanon'swork s to

pointout that virtually owork n the psychologicalmpact f colonial ystems asbeendone. It isunquestionable, owever, hatwhat s known f the material nd politicalconditions f colonizedAlgeriadoes contribute o the credibility f Fanon's owndescription f ndividual ehumanization nd cultural islocation.

With respect o the secondquestion, factual historical iew ikewise endssupport oFanon's view of the beginning f violent evolt. One index, n fact, fthe cultural nd social mpact of the French olonial ystem s the tardy evelop-ment of organized xpression f Algerian nationalism whether bourgeois rotherwise). As late as 1936one of the most prominent ourgeois olitical eaders

found himself nable, after horough earch, o discover n Algeriannation.22Only during World War II did the nationalist lite begin n fact to talk of theAlgerian eople and to articulate vigorousmessage f anticolonialism.2s erhat

Abbas'parties AML and, after 947,UDMA) developed arge claimedmember-

2 See Favrod's analysis, Le F.L.N. et l'Algirie (Paris: Plon, 1962; a revised edition of LaRe'volution lgerienne of 1959), pp. 172-81.

= See Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston, Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 190-91 especially;David C. Gordon, North Africa's French Legacy, 1954-62 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1964).

SFerhat Abbas, L'Entente (Abbas' newspaper), 23 February 1936. Quoted in Lacouture,Cinq hommes et la France (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1961), p. 274.* This may be dated from Ferhat Abbas' Manifesto of the Algerian People, issued on 10February 1943. The Manifesto contains demands for mmediate and effective articipa-tion of Muslims in the government f their people, and compares colonialism to theslavery of antiquity. But it likewise shows the continuing trength f the French culturalmold, and condemns colonization in the Algerian case because it is one imposed on awhite race of prestigious ast.



11/24


shipsbut failed, s Fanon so effectively oints ut, to develop message f revolu-tionary nationalism. Another nationalist radition, ased more clearly on the

Algerian roletariatoth n

Algeriand

France, was thatof Messali

Hadj, whosecredentials s a radical nationalist xtended ll the wayback to the early 1920s.Bythe ate 1940s,however,Messali was considered asseby n emerging ewgenera-tion of nationalists, s Ben Bella,nominally member f Messali'sMTLD, laterexplained: Messali, n fact, wasbecomingmore nd more onstitutional, nd be-lieved that thanks o the elections he situation would evolveand that we wouldeventually e able to make ourselves eard and gradually btain more concessionsfrom he olonial dministration. 4

Two other potential rganizers f radical anticolonial ction (the AlgerianCommunist arty nd the Ulema) likewise ontributed ittle o the actual courseofdevelopment f herevolutionary ffort.The triggering f the revolution, nstead,was accomplished y scarcely morethan handful f young adicals, rganized s a secret roup calledthe Organisa-tion Spiciale) within heMessalistMTLD. These organized the resort o forcewhichbeganon 1 November, 954. The widely cattered ncidents f 1 Novemberresulted n only ixFrench illed nd a dozen wounded. It issignificant hatneitherthe French, isposing f ome70,000 roops n Algeria, or heprincipal bourgeoisnationalist eader, Ferhat Abbas, considered he declaration f rebellion y thissmallgroup of illegalists f much mportance.25 The rebels' ction, n fact, rewthe mmediate

upportf none of the established

arties.Yet the disorder

preadand took hapeand, t soon became pparent, wasable to draw on the rural massesof the fellah n a way that noneof the nationalist artieshad beenable to do. Theestablished olitical eaderswere forced o recognize hat their trategies ad beentranscended yviolence, ust as the Frenchwereforced o recognize hat heywerefighting armore hanoutlawdissidents. he Algerian evolution or ndependencehad begun, nd was not o ceasefor nearly ight ears.

The Character f the War

If, then, hiswar seems n fact to have been triggered ather han organized(and thus to fit Fanon's model), did it retain ts character f Fanonian spon-taneity fter? Put in older terms,27 id this evolution emain ne from elow,or was it subsequently akenover, managed, directed nd turned nto revolutionfrom bove by an elite oligarchy? We will find hat the answer o this uestion

would seem to be both yes and no, with the atter more significant or ourpurposes.

4 In the autobiography repared y Robert Merle,Ben Bella (London: Michael Joseph,1967), p. 77.

25 On 12November 954,Abbasrefused o support he ctivists, eiterating hat violencewillsolvenothing.2 Abbas ate his earlier words, nnouncing is adherence o the revolutionary ffort fromCairo) on 26 April 1956. The bulk of the AlgerianCommunist arty never arge)joined the revolutionary ffort, fter omedelay, n the basisof ndividual dherence.

27Lenin, in the process of a refutation f an article by Plekhanov, gives a general review ofthe problem n his 1905 article, Only from below, or from bove as well as from below?(Republished;Moscow:Progress ublishers, 966).



12/24

ALGERIA vs. FANON 15

The revolutionary ffort as formalized y the establishment f an officialparty with n official eadership. The formation f the FLN (Front de Libiration

Nationale) had been announced n rather iffident erms n November 954. Thefirst meeting o democratically evelopstructures nd program ccurred nearlytwo years ater, n August 1956,when adherents met n secrecy n the valleyofSoumman n Algeria. This meeting rovided orgoverning odies and developeda statement f policies n the form f a Plateforme. he latter, which was to bethe onlyformal rogram roduced during he war years,managed to say remark-ably little bout the long-range oals of the revolution; ts main thrust, n fact,seemed o concern what the revolution as not.28Perhaps hesinglemost mpor-tant element f policy o emergewas the principle f precedence f political vermilitary, nd interior ver exterior. n fact, heoppositewas to prevail,withmilitary aking recedence ver political, xterior ver nterior, nd, finally, ili-tary f the exterior ver the military f the nterior. hus official olitical eader-ship (in the form f the Conseil National de la Revolution Algirienne nd theComitJ e Coordination xecutif, nd, after eptember 958,the GouvernementProvisoire e la RevolutionAlgirienne) soon shifted utside he country nd re-mained very much a leadership f the exterior hroughout he war. Militarystructures ere likewise ifurcated y the increasingly ffective rench barrages.The bulk of the Armde de Liberation Nationale (ALN), under Houari Bou-medienne, as based n Tunisiaand Morocco developingn size to about40,000

men), equipment, iscipline,nd

ideological ommitment,ut reduced n

militaryterms orelatively nsignificant orays cross hebarriers nd back. Meanwhile, heforces f the nterior, hich according ofigures hichhaveno solidbasisbut aregenerally ccepted) numbered etween ive nd ten thousand ctive fighters, ar-ried on the war n increasing solation rom he xterior nd evenfrom ach other.The French resettlement olicy accentuated his solation of the active fighters(whichwas its aim), and toward he end the French were successfuln markedlyreducing heflow f arms nd equipment nto he nterior.

In the meantime, succession f three rovisional overnments GPRA) spokefor the revolution broad (from Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli), and eventually ego-tiated the peace with he de Gaullegovernment. he general cceptance utsideAlgeria of the political eadership's oots n a party the FLN) connecting hemwith the masses n Algeria eems ronic n retrospect. rslan Humbaraci, closeobserver f the war, asserts hat the political eadership ever ackled the prob-lem of the FLN itself. 29 he claimed membership f only one to two hundredthousand had indeed the characteristics f a Front in Ben Bella'sphrase, itwas a little ikea zoologicalgarden. 3 Structures erepoorly rticulated, nd the

' E.g., that the Algerian Revolution was not aimed at throwing Algerians of European origininto the sea ; that the Revolution was neither civil nor religious war; and that the

Revolution was bound in feudal relationship neither o Cairo, nor London, nor Moscow,nor Washington. See Andr6 Mandouze, ed., La Re'volution algerienne par les textes(.Paris: Maspero, 1961), passim, for the text of the Plateforme.' Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution that Failed (London: Pall Mall, 1966), p. 67.

Le Monde, 8-9 September 1963. Boumedienne has given a similar description f the FLN(grouping all elements from eft to right, nd bursting nto pieces with the end of thewar) ; Le Monde, 4 April 1968.



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most basicdecisions bout the character f the party e.g., whether t was massor cadre ) remained o bemadeafter ndependence.

Alongwith the

fragmentednd

superficial olitical rganization fthe revo-

lution,went the failure odevelop clear statement f the revolution's deologicalcharacter nd its post-independence rogram. The inadequacy f the SoummamPlateforme asbeennoted. Through he ourse f the war there was,as Mandouzehas said,a continual lux n the deological nd programmatic evels a continualdialoguebetween deas thrown ut by the various eaders nd elitegroups, herevo-lutionary ublications of which he most mportant as El Moudjahid), the radio( Voice of fighting lgeria ), with, t the same time, constant alancing ofideology nd practical necessity.3' ne as friendly o the revolution s FrancisJeanson found t necessary o remark n this nearly otal failure o define he

revolutionary equirements f the Algerian eople.32 nterviews f fighters f theinterior y an American ournalist ound striking bsenceof developed deology;enlistedmen tended o feel hat he war wasa job to be done, that t was directedtoward ndependence, nd that independencewas associatedwith freedom ndliberty. With respect o the form f the new society, it would be better han t isnow.

On the heels of the Accords f Evian and the ceasefire, faction mong theAlgerian ationalist eadershastened ofill he deological oid. This group,meet-ing in June, 1962,adopted the Programme e Tripoli, designed oserve s the

ideologicalnstrument f the

ndependent lgeria. Scarcelyn emanation rom

the people,the Programme as reportedly ritten n a few daysby as few s fourleftist ntellectuals.34 he document et forward learly he dea of post-indepen-dence revolution succeeding he battle for ndependencewill be the democraticpopular revolution ); 35 ffirmed socialist erspective nd collectivization f thelarger means of production ; alled for perfect emocracy ; nd so forth. Moresignificant, erhaps, he Programme hows modernist rientation, ffirming heneed to complete he ob of wiping ut the feudal piritwhichhas for o longper-meated the life of the Maghreb, 36nd giveshints of a hard-headed pproachwhichperhaps ontradicts anon's faith n permanent ransformation n the processof revolutionary iolence: It is important obewareof moralism, hereflection fthe idealistic nd infantile ntellect, hich consists f wanting o transform hesociety nd solve tsproblems ith he id ofmoral alues lone. 7

See Mandouze, op. cit., ntroduction.' Francis Jeanson, La Revolution Algerienne Milan: Feltrinelli, 962).' See Herb Greer, A Scattering of Dust (London: Hutchinson, 1962), pp. 94-96, 122, andpassim.' Gerard Chaliand says that the Programme was written by Mostefa Lacheref, Ridha Malek,Mohammed Harbi and Ben Yahia. See L'Algerie, est-elle socialiste? (Paris: Maspero,1964), p. 18. See also Humbaraci, op. cit., p. 67.' Le Programme de Tripoli (Published by the Tendence r6volutionnaire u Parti Communiste

Frangais, 1962), p. 15.38P. 10.P. 17. Simone de Beauvoir reports hat Fanon was satisfied with the decisions taken by the

C.N.R.A. at Tripoli. ... But it should be noted that by this time Fanon was approach-ing the last stage of his illness; Beauvoir notes his obsession with disaster which shethinks was largely explained by consciousnessof impending death. See Force of Circum-stance (Penguin, 1968), pp. 608-9, and passim.



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ALGERIAvs.FANON 17

Although mphasis n the need for deology s one of the principal hemes fthe Programme, hedocument tself carcely stablishes n ideology. t is aptlycalled

Programme,orthis s what t is- a list of the

policyrecommendations

of a small group of socialist ntellectuals, ware that the Algerian evolution n1962had no positive ontent, nd verywilling oprescribe nefor t.

The War and FanonFanon's style, articularly n the first hapter f The Wretched f the Earth,

is apocalyptic nd his description f revolutionary ecolonization s usually re-sented s applicableto situations f colonialism nd decolonization enerally. etthis urvey as shown that there s a general nd significant ongruence etweenFanon's picture f revolutionary ecolonization nd the facts f the Algerianwarfor ndependence,o far s those acts an be known.

First, he revolution n its nception eems o have been triggered ore thanorganized. While t must be considered n oversimplification,anon's general ic-ture of illegalists, nable to work within he framework f the above-groundnationalist arties,who are forced nto contact with rural masses eady orviolentrevolt eems o besupported y heknown acts.

Second, this pontaneous nd popular character revailed hroughout hewar period. The insurrection as not effectively rganized nd controlled romabove. The FLN, created fter herebellion egan,was ess n organization hanshared

onviction.he

military rganizationas

fragmented,ith he onvention-

allyorganized nd equipped portion f t confined othe exterior. nside, hemili-tary ffort as carried by ncreasingly utonomous roupsdrawing upport romrural masses. 8In my pinion, hemain thrust f Fanon's thought sto argue hatprolonged nsurrection gainst colonialregime an take placewith minimum fhierarchical rganization relying nstead on the readiness for revolt of ruralmassesprepared by oppressive olonialism and this n fact eems o be the mostprominent eature f the Algerianwar.

Third, while quantitativemeasures an be no more than suggestive, he warseems o have fulfilled by the extent f ts violence nd disruptive mpact n the

Algerian opulation Fanon's conditions or permanent ultural hangebroughtabout through iolent ather han peaceful ecolonization. he figures re of ques-tionable ccuracy,39 et n any version hey ndicate both duration nd intensity,e.g.,betweenNovember 954 nd the ummer f 1962:- 42,000recorded cts of terrorism re said to have caused 10,704casualties mong Euro-

peancivilians, 3,284 asualties oMuslim ivilians;- 4,300Muslims re said to have been killed n France tself many n internecine ighting

between LN and Messalist dherents);

8 The significance f this support s shown by the magnitude of the French resettlement ffort,designed to deny the active fighters f contact with the civilian peoples.* It is notable that the post-independence regime (in 1967) has revised downward the pre-viously accepted figures n casualties among fighters or ndependence (for a summaryof the new figures, ee Africa Report, June 1967). In part, this presumably reflects hepressure on government revenues represented by pensions and survivors' benefits. SeeHumbaraci, op. cit., pp. 62-3, on the problem of post-independence nflation of thenumber of self-declared maquisards.



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- The ALN is said to have lost ome 141,000men killed,while he French re said to havelost ome12,000 egulars illed.

Perhapsmost uggestive f all is the fact hat ome 1.8millionMuslimswereforcedto leave their homes, ither hrough oluntary light rom he fighting r by theFrench program f resettlement esigned o isolate the nationalist ighters.4' nmore qualitative erms he war was an unusually ruel one,with orture ecom-ing a standard nstrument f warfare as Fanon's own case histories estify). Anexpectation f permanent ultural hange resulting rom his onflagration ouldseemreasonable.A French ociologist hose nterpretation f the war snot other-wise similar o Fanon's presents n this point a conclusionwhich s remarkablyFanonian : There is no doubt that the war, by reason of ts form, ts duration,

and the significance hich t has taken n the conscience f all Algerians, asbrought bout a true ulturalmutation. 42

AFTER INDEPENDENCE

A Survey of Revolutionary Action

1. Introduction: shall take t that n Fanon's terms, hepost-independencerevolutionmust be about the solution f socialproblems backwardness ndnational poverty n particular) hrough hecollective ction of the people. Threemajor aspects f Algeria's socialproblem uggest hemselves s logicaltargets fthe post-independence evolution.Most obvious s the extreme nequality n distri-

bution of wealth which was characteristic f the ancien regime. Second (and re-lated to the first) was the extreme overty f Algeria's ural masses, ngaged nessentially ubsistencegriculture n tiny lots f poor and using rimitive ethods.Third were the masses f unemployed n both herural nd urban ectors.

In Fanon's terms hese re both descriptions f a problem nd also of the (revo-lutionary) meansof ts solution. Wealth could be redistributed. ore important,in the ongrun, heunemployed nd underemployed asses ould be mobilizedn astrenuous, ational evolution f economic evelopment.

2. Policiesof the revolution: n accomplishing evolutionary hange n thedirection f a socialist nd

participatory ociety, lgeria'smost

strikingchieve-

ment has been the creation f an economic ector haracterized y autogestion(self-management). utogestion s interesting n that t purports ogivereality otonly o socialownership f the meansof production, ut also to Fanon's vision ftrue nd direct ontrol y the workers nd people. Autogestion ad its origin n theconfusion f the first ixmonths f ndependence.With he drawing oa closeof hewar, arge numbers f Europeanproperty wners eft r fled Algeria.43 he pre-

4oThese figures re drawn from E. O'Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection (Hamden, Conn.:Archon Books, 1967), pp. 200-201.41 Ibid.42 Pierre Bourdieu, De la Guerre R6volutionnaire la R6volution, in F. Perroux, ed., Prob-lImes de l'Alge'rie ndipendante (Paris: PressesUniversitaires, 963), p. 8.' In 1961 nearly one million Europeans had remained in Algeria. By the end of 1962 this

number had dropped to an estimated 150,000. See O'Ballance, op. cit., pp. 200-201.The exodus took place despite the pleas of the new government which initially stimatedthat some 500,000 would remain. See Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France (New York:Praeger, 1963), p. 167.



16/24


cipitate eparture leaving partments, ouses, ands, tc., unoccupied createdthe problem of the biens vacants a problem which, argely, was solved by

individualAlgerianswho moved nto vacant apartments nd possessed hemselvesof automobiles thus fulfilling anon's visionof redistributive ustice for he en-vious native). In rural areas, seemingly pontaneously, easants organized oharvest ropson abandoned states. t was this phenomenon, ather han the pro-gram and action of the government, hich created autogestion.44 he govern-ment's riginal olewasoneof egitimation ore han nitiative.

The government ubsequently ook the initiative, owever, xtending ndstructuring heautogestion ystem. he rural ector was rounded ut by national-izing decreesby the fall of 1963. By 1964 the rural autogestion ector omprisedsome32.5percent f cultivated ands,produced he bulk of export rops grapesand citrus) and nearly alf of total ereals.45 he significant act s that he auto-gestion ector very losely pproximated he old European agricultural ector.Thus,the utogestion phere omprised early the otal modern gricultural phere,and that only. 46 Autogestion as left the pre-independence ealm of Muslimpeasant agriculture ntouched. t does not amount, n other words, o a revolu-tionary olution o the problem f Algerian grarian poverty. Thus about sevenmillionAlgerians ive n the agrarian ector utside heautogestion ector. Withinthis group here re nearly ne-halfmillion easantproprietors ho own and farmless than ten hectares f and which s, on the average,much ess fertile han the

previously uropeanands.47

By reference o the other rural sectors, he permanent workers n the self-managedestates somewhat ess than 200,000men) represent n islandof relativewell-being nd economic ecurity. The situation was summed up succinctly yRdvolution fricaine:Disposing f a permanent mployment nd having ost their quality of wage earners, heworkers f the self-managedector f agriculture emain n spite of everything rivileged ycomparison ith he majority f the population, hat s to say, by comparison ith peasantswithout and and without ork.

The Algerian leadership has used the spontaneous origin of autogestion to draw a flatteringcomparison with the autogestion of Yugoslavia, by saying that Yugoslavian autogestionwas promoted by the government, nd not, as in Algeria, by the workers hemselves. SeeD. C. Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria (New York: Oxford University Press,1966), p. 154. Note that one radical economist has criticized precisely the spontaneousand uncoordinated character of autogestion, .e., the feature of uncoordinated substi-tution which had the effect f transferring ncomes previously arned by the colons togroups of Algerians rather than to the state where they could have contributed tofinancing development. See Samir Amin, The Maghreb in the Modern World: Algeria,Tunisia, Morocco (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), p. 139 and passim.

* See official data reproduced in Jean Teillac, Autogestion en Alge'rie (Paris: Centre desHautes Etudes Administratives ur I'Afrique et I'Asie modernes, 1965), p. 18. See alsoThomas L. Blair, The Land To Those Who Work t: Algeria's Experiment n WorkerManagement (New York: Anchor Books, 1969).

* Teillac, op. cit., p. 11.4 Chaliand, op. cit., p. 66.a2 November 1963. Blair, op. cit., calls the result of autogestion capitalisme du groupe, a

new group of exploiters. Amin, op. cit., points out that the various vested intereststhat are now established constitute a major obstacle to rapid economic development,p. 141.



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This, from he standpoint f the preoccupations f this rticle, s the real problemwith rural autogestion. A strikingly Fanonian solution o the problem f the

biensvacants reates new ituation cquiseto be defended y tspossessorsgainstegalitarian ressures. he politicalpotential f the autogestion orkers peratingas a defensive ressure roup has undoubtedly een enhanced by the tendencies fgovernment, arty nd army lites o insert heir prot6g6s ithin hese relativelyattractive ituations. ven though, hroughout heperiod of independence, herehas been a high economic ost to the autogestion ystem,49either egime as feltit possible oeliminate he ystem, oreven those ndividual nterprises hichhaveconsistently ailedto break even. In the meantime, ery ittle has been done tointroduce revolutionary hange into the situation f the approximately evenmillion easants utside he utogestion ector, hat s,outside he cashcrop mod-ern ector nherited rom he ncienrigime.Since the installation f autogestion n the formerly uropean agriculturalsector, heonly ther hanges f great ignificancen the economic ieldhave con-cerned he extension f the state ector. n this, here as been a smooth, rogres-sivecontinuity verlapping hechangeof regime n 1965. Thus, starting rom henationalization f the biens vacants n 1962-63, hegovernment asbrought nderits ownership nd management irtually he whole of the modern arge-scaleeconomy, anging rommanufacturing hrough xport nd import, hrough inanceand insurance, o publishing nd advertising. he culminationwas provided n1971 with henationalization f the French il

producing ompanies. Thus,n the

sense hat s frequently and wrongly) iven o socialism, lgeria's ost-indepen-dence regimes avebeen socialist.Yet one must be careful ot to overestimate heimpact f this stablishment f public ownership n terms f the ocial conditionof the nation s a whole. State ownership nd control as manifest nd tangibleadvantages or the apparatus of the state nd, in particular, or ts eaders. Thebenefits o the nation, n the other hand, are at best much esstangible nd muchless mmediate. f there s an economic ost to nationalization statization ouldbe more accurate), then t is likely recisely obe the rural ector hat bears thatcost. One can be all too certain hat neither ndustrialmanagers or workers ill

be made to bear t. And while nationalization closes hedoor to the developmentof an Algerian ourgeoisie ased on ownership f arge ndustry, t helps nevitablyto strengthen nother eveloping ourgeoisie: hat comprised y the managerial,technical, nd administrative liteswithin he tate ector.

Asidefrom heprogressive nlargement f the tate ector within he conomy,the Algerian regimes ave tried relatively ittle, nd have achieved ess. I haveargued previously hat the ndices f Algeria's conomic nd socialproblems inparticular heclose-to-half f the maleworking orce, oth rural nd urban, whichis un- or under-employed could be viewed as representing potential revolu-

* See Humbaraci, op. cit., pp. 120-24; Teillac, op. cit., pp. 30-33, 55; Gordon, op. cit., pp.155-56; Jean-Frangois Kahn, Le Monde, 12-13 January 1964. Boumedienne's majoraddress of 19 June 1968 included information n the past, present and future of auto-gestion, ncluding the fact that after two years of acclaimed progress 1966-68) less thanhalf of the autogestion farms chieved positive results. See translation, Journal of Mod-ern African tudies, 6, No. 3 (1968), 425-39.



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tionary) olution o social problems. Mobilized o collective ffort owardnationalgoals, n other words, hesemillions f men nd women ouldrepresent heempiri-cal

manifestationf

Fanon's revolutionary apital thats

the people.In

fact,plans for a partial and statist ariety f this form f action have been broached.Involvedwould be the creation f state hantiers, rawingworkers rom he lums(Fanon's lumpen-proletariat) hich would build buildings, esurface oads,com-bat soil erosion, nd so forth.5 We need not follow heseplans n detail; for heplain fact s that while somemonieshave been appropriated nd somechantierscreated, hebasicproblem f unemployment as not been touched, nd the contri-bution s nsignificant rom development tandpoint.

In other reas, the government asprogressivelyrticulated ystems f obliga-tory ervicewhereby he coercive otential f the state s substituted orthe revo-lutionary oluntarism escribed nd advocated by Fanon. Thus in 1966and 1967physicians, harmacists, entists, midwives nd lawyerswere brought nder thecontrol f the civil service, nd obligated oserve he nation for t least a year nlocations nd capacitiesdesignated.51 n March 1968, t was announced that acompulsory ational ervice oryouth was to be instituted, imed at obtaining aneffective nd entire participation y youth n projects f national nterest. none sense, uch mobilization hrough he structures f the state an increasinglycommon feature n the more radical African tates can be regarded s anoperationalization f the abstract rinciple f self-sacrifice or the community

as a whole. But in anotherense,

hisform f mobilization ontradicts anon'sbasicassumptions bout the effect f revolutionary anticolonial) violence, n thatvoluntarism esponsive o moral ppeal alone is acknowledged ot to have been afeature f the post-independenceociety.

A general pattern ecomes lear n the foregoing ages. In a literal ense, nemajor element f Fanon's revolution as been fulfilled. At multiple oints Fanonsimplifies heproblem f the Algerian evolution o a stark modelof redistributionbetween wo social categories. The last shall be first ; he envious native halltake what has belonged o the settler. n this ense, he Algerian evolution asproduced heFanonist olution;Algerians avereplaced hecolons nd the French

personnel; heAlgerian tatehas replaced heFrench olonial ystem. his has nowbecome rue hroughout hepolitical nd the conomic ystems.Yet this observation eadsus immediately o the fallacywhich, ll along,has

lurked within anon's redistributive evolution.The socialcategories ere vastlyunequal n number. Only somecould realize heir dreams f possession. Therest have not. And the rest omprises, n the main, the very roup who were up-posedto be at the center f the revolution. hus the masses f the peasants ave, oall appearances, either articipated n nor benefited rom hepost-independencerevolution. t is important o attempt o understand ow this has happened.

This question eads us to the final category within which we shall survey he

For details f the plan announced 3 January 964, eeLe Monde,24 January 964.51 See Le Monde, 13 April 1966; 8-9 October 1967.* Le Monde, 23 March 1968.* P. 32.



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post-independencexperience:namely, n examination f the tructures f partici-pationwhichhavebeendeveloped ince1962.

3. Structures f the revolution:We havestated lready hat hewartime LNwas more a slogan than an organization. As was acknowledged penly by thecliquethat came to power n 1962,the party emained o be constructed fter hewar.54The first ffort n this direction ook place under the aegisof MohammedKhider, heparty's eceretary eneral, nd one of the historical hiefs f the warof liberation. During the first months f independenceKhider constructed napparatus of cadres composed f carefully hosen lements. At the same time hedeveloped nd expounded theory f party predominance ithin he new state.The FLN was to be a mass party, nveloping he Algerian opulation. Khider'sposition n the role of the party brought him into conflict ith Ben Bella andBoumedienne, oth partial to the dea of an avant-garde arty. n April 1963,a showdown ook place with Khider publiclydefying en Bella. The latter, tbecameclear, had a power base which Khider's hastily rganized adres did notprovide. Khider was forced ut of the party nd into xile,with Ben Bella succeed-ing him as secretary-general. hus was initially emonstrated he extreme iffi-culty f constructing vital and popular party, ith tsmajor and inevitable mpli-cations or he ocus of political ower,within he context f an established egimewhich ests n a different ower ase.

As party head, Ben Bella proceeded o the organization f the party's irst

(and so far, only) Congress. This, held in April 1964,produced n ideologicalinstrument 55 o replace the Programme e Tripoli; accomplished measure freconciliation nd integration f elites; nd most mportant, ttempted oestablishthe angible eality f the FLN itself.

The apparent ccomplishments ere deceptive, owever. Party membershipremainedsmall.56Worse, rom hestandpoint f the party's evolutionary ission,was the nature of the membership. haliand quotes Mostefa Lacheref's harshformula a party f false adres nd true notables ) and adds his own:It is incorrect o affirm hat there s no party n Algeria. There s one, but t is not revolu-tionary. .. The party has not mobilized he masses because t does not represent hem....The F.L.N. is no more han oalition f clansof petit-bourgeoisvenfeudalmentality.After he oupofJune 19, 1965, he nsubstantial ature f the party ecame ppar-ent. A first ttempt, n 1965,at reconstruction f the party eems o have failed.A secondattempt, nder Kaid Ahmed, began at the end of 1967 and continuesup to the present. Despite ubsequent ctivity including requirement hat achexisting member enewhis membership, ariousreorganizations, taggered lec-tions n the 15 districts, nd affirmation hat he nfluence f the party nd its mili-tants hould hang ikea sword f Damocles over the agencies f the government- it seems lear that heparty asfailed oacquire dynamic f tsown. While t

seems uite possible hat Boumedienne asspeaking isfeelings henhe said thatSee Ben Bella's remarks, e Monde, 8-9 September 1963.

Known thereafter s the Charter of Algiers.Estimates t this period range from bout 100,000 to about 150,000.

SChaliand, op. cit., pp. 107-8.



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for he uccess f the revolution, verything epends n the party, 58 he ituationremained hat of the mmediate ost-independence eriod. All along, heattempthas

necessarilyeen to

construct,rom he

top downward,vital and

dynamicparty, without eriously isturbing henetwork f relations nd situations n whichthe regime rested.59By definition herefore, ost factum party construction sfraught with erious ontradictions. y 1968,furthermore, heweight f the firstpost-independence ears erved oreinforce he nitial roblems. A pattern f con-flict entering round expertise erived rom ducation ersus war experience addeveloped. Concentrated n the organs of the state, young degree-holders ereready to assert hat having broken hrough he electrified arricade very nightdoes not assure competence o judge a plan of ndustrialization.6 Thus when,

in 1966, n attempt was made to bring heparty nto government ecision-makingthrough ommittees f coordination, pen hostility asoften pparent the moreparalyzing ecause the possibility f conflict as not foreseen, nd it is supposedthat, priori, verything an always earranged on a basis of fraternal nderstand-ing.' 61 The party asdeveloped n old-guard, club mage,whichmakes t diffi-cult to recruit he younger eneration f educated elite groups who would makethe party etter ble to playmore mportant olitical nd economic oles.62 inally,reform hroughout heparty must necessarily epend on the actions f thoseverymen nd structures hat re the ource f the party's eakness.

The persistent eakness f the party s reflected n its nability odevelop ux-

iliary rganizationshich re at oncevital nd subservient o the

party eadership.Of particular nterest, n viewof Fanon's comments n the proletariat, asbeen therole playedby the trade union central, UGTA.63 UGTA wasfounded uring hewar years, nd as in other ational ontexts, ndependence ecessitated efinition fthe relation etween heunion rganization nd the revolutionary arty. A signedagreement n December 1962 (after considerable parring) eemed to settle hequestion, with the FLN promising o respect he essential utonomy f UGTA.This promised, owever, heparty eaders roceeded opack UGTA's first ationalCongresswith ts own militants, nfluencing he debates and elections nfairly.64The FLN leadersdid not, however, ucceed n ensuring he future ocility f the

union, nd in the years inceUGTA has openlydiffered ith both the party ndthe government n a number f ssues. The dilemmaposedto regime eadershas

* Speech to party adres, 12 December 1967; seeLe Monde, 15 December 1967.* Two recent studies cast light on the complex relations between elite groups; see William

B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1960 (Boston: MITPress, 1969); and David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of Socialist Revolu-tion (Berkeley: University f California Press, 1970).

60See J. Ben Brahem's report of interviews uring the 1965-66 attempt to revitalize the party;Le Monde, 21 June 1966.

1Ibid.' In view of Fanon's strictures nclosing

the door to the nationalistbourgeoisie

t is ironicthat Kaid Ahmed complains precisely of the failure of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie toparticipate in the party, despite plentiful ppeals. See Africa Research Bulletin, 7, No.10 (1970), 1901.

' Union Ge'ndraledes Travailleurs Algeriens.Francois Buy, La Republique Alge'rienne e'mocratique et Populaire (Paris: Librairie Fran-

caise, 1965), p. 73.



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been made the more difficult y the fact that n most asesUGTA's criticism asbeen eveledfrom he regime's eft. Thus, UGTA has not subsided nto defense fthe nterests f a limited lientele f

permanent orkers,ut has

repeatedlymbar-

rassed oth regimes y ponsoring hegrievances f the unemployed nd of the poorpeasantswithin he traditional ector.65 GTA has, at every ublicconfrontation,ended by making ormal beisance o the FLN as symbolic upreme nstitution fthe Algerian revolution, nd has not questioned he basic legitimacy f eitherregime. On the other hand, the party's ackof a popularbase has made the party'sassertions f preeminence ssentially ymbolic.UGTA's role has consistently allenbetween womodelpatterns that f syndical ndependence, n the onehand, ndof auxiliary rganization ithin massmovement, n the other hand. The otherauxiliary ectors students, women) have likewise een disappointing o regimeleaders. The women's rganization the UnionNationaledesFemmesAlgeriennes)has provided ochallenge othe party's upremacy, ut neither as t accomplishedmobilization nd socialchange. The student nion, on the other hand, has dis-playedconsiderable itality, ut has consistently esisted he roles nd status stab-lished or t by the tate eaders, articularly uring heperiod f the Boumedienneregime. Neither epression or seduction, or attempts osubstitute new organi-zation (with the unpromising cronym EMP) have permitted heparty o drawon the energy nd support f more han small proportion f the tudents. or thefuture f the party his ailure s significant n that, n the ate 1960s, ully 5 per-cent of the students f the

Universityf

Algiersxpected o take

up employmentin the dministration r the nterprises f the tate.Thus the structures f the Algerian post-independence) evolution emain

underdeveloped. n particular, he party theoretically he connecting ink be-tween he peopleand the tate nd the basisof popular ontrol ver he tate hasundergone ittle change and less development ince independence. Character-istically, he only apparent progress n expanding tructures f participation ascomewithin he sphere nder he direct ontrol f the tate. I refer othe devolu-

6 The union has consistently aken stands which are purer in terms f an egalitarian premisethan those of the party or the regime. E.g., in 1964 UGTA opposed the decision todistribute profits back to workers n the self-managed ector, arguing (quite correctly)that these workers were already privileged by comparison with the majority of Algerians,and that the money should be used to benefit he unemployed. See Le Monde, 8, 9-10,11, 12 February 1964; Buy, op. cit., 75-6. In 1966, on the other hand (but again, cor-rectly n terms of revolutionary rinciples) the union successfully ook up the cause ofworkers on a self-managed estate which the regime proposed to turn back to privateenterprise the affaire Bouthiba ). In April and December 1967, UGTA issued wide-ranging critiques of the regime's policies and affirmed hat UGTA is concerned by allthe aspects of the political, economic, social or cultural life of the country. See LeMonde, 9-10 April 1967; 21 December 1967.

See Le Monde, 12 January 1967, for results of a student opinion survey conducted at theUniversity f Algiers. At that time, 80 percent of students surveyed pronounced them-selves dissatisfied with the education they were receiving, and the same proportionthought the army and administration had too much influence n the government. Onthe other hand, relatively few are thought to be irremediably disillusioned, and only ahandful to support the leftist nderground opposition formation, he Parti Avant-gardeSocialiste (PAGS). Students were arrested and the UNEA dissolvedbecause of allegedconnections with the PAGS in January 1971. The most complete examination of therole of students n postwar Algeria is by David B. Ottaway, Algeria, in Donald K.Emmerson, ed., Students and Politics in Developing Nations (New York: Praeger,1968), pp. 3-36.



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tion of powers o the commune dministrative nits numbering 91) which sto provide the basis for electoral epresentation ventually ncluding National

Assembly.07CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning f this ssay, woquestionswereposed:(1) Did the Algerian war for ndependence it Fanon's picture of people's

anticolonial evolutionary ar?(2) Has the post-independence eriod been revolutionary n terms f a

Fanonist alueposition?Put most briefly, heanswer o the first uestion would seemto be yes ; to

the second, no. This second,nswer, bviously, equires

omequalification.

tdoesnot seemto me to be correct o label the Algerian aseflatly s a revolutionthat failed. 68 lgeriahas, n particular, arried hroughwhat might e called anationalizing evolution n the decadesince ndependence. n 1954 Algeriawas

- politically, conomically, ulturally, nd uridically the ne of France's olonialterritories hichwas most losely ound to the metropole. ince 1962both Alger-ian regimes ave moved steadily nd purposefully o reduce her dependence nFrance, ulminating n the nationalization f the oil producing ompanies nd theapparent nd of most f the specialrelationship esigned t Evian. This in viewof the problems nvolved Algeria's natural dependence n France) and in rela-

tion to the achievements f other former olonies n Africa, s truly no smallachievement.Yet the present eview f the volution f the post-independenceystem mpha-

sized hat he uccessesince he end of the war are compartmental. With xceptionbeingmade for utogestion n its nception, hesuccesses re those f the state. Agreater measure f ndependence as been achieved hrough hrewd nd cautiousbut determined manipulation f the state's ttribute f sovereignty o nationalizeforeign mainly rench holdings n the economy. The success f this, n turn,has depended n the ability f the regime omanagewhat t takes, nd thus n thestrength f the managerial, ureaucratic nd technical lites. That what revo-lutionary ccomplishment here has been has been brought bout by the newprivileged ational elite ' of administrators, anagers, nd technocrats ug-gests he weakness f Fanon's classanalysis. Fanon has underestimated he cen-trality f this class because he failed to see - or refused o accept the cen-trality f the tate othe question f post-independencehange.

Outside he compartment f the modem tate, n the other hand, his urveyfound failure. Significantly, hefailures erewould seem to be much more mpor-tant from Fanonist tandpoint han the relative uccesses f the statist ector.Viewedoverall, here re two aspects f failure. First, hemasses f the population

Elections o the 691 People'sCommunal ouncils havebeenheld on a Tanzanian om-petitive asis), twice, n February f 1967 and of 1971. Wilaya regional) electionswereheld in May 1969. The date for NationalAssembly lections as yet to be speci-fied.

, The subtitle f Humbaraci's ook, p.cit., Amin, p. cit., p. 141.



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who ived ives f deprivation nder he colonialregime re economically eprivednow.70 This includes heunemployed n all sectors, nd aboveall Fanon'speasantsof the Muslim

agriculturalector. For these

peoplenationalization f the

modernist ector, oth gricultural nd industrial, an have only hemost bstractvalue,whereas he economic acts f poverty re immediate nd finite.

The second aspect of the failure has been that mass participation withinFanon's nation has simply ot been realized. The masseshave not beenbroughtunto the stageof history perhaps he most mportant art of Fanon's revolu-

tion. The manicheism f the colonialsystem as only been partially nd seg-mentally liminated. The Algerian nation (like the other new nations ofAfrica) s a nation f the mobilized minority entered n the apparatus nd enter-prises f the state. The majority f the peasantshave been eft marking ime.

These failures re of crucial mportance rom he standpoint f the Fanoniststructure f values. One cannotpossibly, ithin his tructure f values,write hesefailures ff s unfortunate ut acceptable rade-offsn the process f a more mpor-tant tatist evolution.

Yet here we are brought o a strange osition, or the survey f the post-independence eriod suggests hat these results which are unacceptable fromFanonistviewpoint re rooted precisely n those haracteristics f the war periodwhich eemedmost oresemble anon'svision f argely pontaneous, easant-basedpopular truggle gainst olonial ule.

Thissurvey

herefore alls intoquestion

omeof Fanon's most basicassump-tions about the long-run ignificance f decolonization-by-violence.t is evidentthat he overestimated he depth and permanence f masssocializationwithin hewar experience nd thus of the permanence f cultural nd socialtransformation.The results, nstead, uggest hat neither ultural hangenor mass nvolvement relikely o be permanent nless teps aboveall, masspolitical rganization aretaken to make it so. This is to confirm ears xpressed y Nguyen Nghe on thebasisof the Vietnamese evolutionaryxperience:[Fanons ed] oneglect fundamentalevolutionaryruth: amelyhat he rmed truggle,whileof capital mportance, s however o more han moment, phase n the revolutionary

movement hich sfirst nd fundamentally olitical.... When hearmed truggle astsfor years nd ends victoriously,s in Algeria r n Vietnam,it modifies rofoundly henational ruths, rings bout transformations f ncomparable ag-nitude, iberates nsuspected nergies. ut the profundity f these ransformations,heir er-manence, s in the measure f the political, deologicalworkwhichhas prepared hearmedstruggle nd which, eacereturned, ontinues his truggle.

Fanon's mistake was to assume the political work and ideologicaldevelopment.From this standpoint, it was precisely the violence of this decolonization whichseems to explain the weaknesses. The easiest way to maintain the wartime Front

so n the occasion f the 17th nniversary f the Algerian evolution's utbreak 1 November1971) in signing he Ordonnance elative o the new agrarian eform rogram, ou-medienne cknowledged hat thosewho had suffered ost or ndependence the poorpeasants) still had not fully enefited rom he advantages f it. See Jeune Afrique,No.57, 11December 971,pp. 13-14.

Nguyen ghe, F. Fanonet esprobl~mes e l'Ind6pendence, a Pensde, o. 107,February1963,pp. 23-30.



24/24


was to avoid trying o specify he future. t was likewise he wartime ituationwhichmademasspolitical rganization oth difficult nd seeminglyrrelevant; ndthat made the

postwar redominancef the

military irtuallynevitable.

Finally,we can see now (and the two tudies f Algerian lites hathave recently ppearedconfirm his 2) that he experience f the war while t willundoubtedly unctionas a unifying ymbolic xperience n the long run has added to rather hansimplified he omplex ivisions f Algerian ociety.

72Quandt, op. cit.; D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit.

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Algeria vs. Fanon

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