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Aspects of Fiji Indian History, 1879-1939: A Society in Transition: IIAuthor(s): Ahmed AliSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 43 (Oct. 22, 1977), pp. 1821+1823-1830Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4366042 .

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A s p e c t s o f F i j i I n d i a n History , 1879-1939A Society in Transition-II

Ahmed AliFollowing an agreement betweent the colonial oo;ernments in Inidia and Fiji, Indiais wunerenden-

tured to work in the sugar plantations anid mills Whlichwere started in Fiji by the Australia-based Colo-niail Sugar Refining Company from 1879 onwards. This migration of Indian labour to Fiji wenit on uninter-rupted till the end of 1919 when, follotwina nationalist pressure in India, it was stopped from the begin-ning of 1920.The Indians in Fiji had to live and wvork n extremely harsh conditions, yet by far the mnajorityof these labourers made Fiji their home, even when they had ani option of being repatriaited to India atthe cost of the government at the end of their conitracts.This article presents a historic(il accouniitof the migration of Indian labourers to Fiji, the condi-tions of their life and wvork, nd the impact the new environment had on the traditional attitude towardscaste, religion, languiage, etc. It traces the gradual tranLsformationof traditiotnail Indian society andthe growing diversification of the occupatfions. The major part of the paper deals with the struggleslaun-ched by the Indians for economic atnd political rights, including the riglht to (Idult franchise, andthe attempts of the colonial gov;ernment to conitain these demands.The article is published in two parts. The first part appeared last week. This, the second part, de-scribes the prolonged struggles of the Indian labouirers with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, ardthle gradual politicisation of the struggle. The last section traces the actual political struggles that cull-minated in the constitutional settlement of 1937, which still fell far short of Indian aspirations.

SUGARNDusTmYISPU-T , 1921FOUR days short of a y-ear after .heSuva strike had ended, Indian labour-ers working for the CSR Company andother European planters in Ba stoppedwork on February 11, 1921. Soon allIndian labourers working for Eiiropeans(including the Government) did like-wise and the strike spread immediatelywest to Penang and then by FebruarY19 to Lautoka and down the coast asfar as the cane district of Nadroga.Indian cane growers belonging to theemployer class found themselves equallyaffected. Though the stoppage wassudden it was not unexpected.Relations between Indian sugarcanelabourers and their European masters,especially the powerful CSR Companyof Australia, had never been happy.The Indians viewed their employerswith suspicion and distrust and sawthemselves as martyrs whose blood,sweat and toil had ensured profits forthose who worked them.68 After theabolition of the indenture system, thelabourers, now free to sell their labourto whoever they wished, had expecteda new outlook from the employers.This was not forthcoming, old attitu-des prevailed, and the complaints ofthe workers were given the customarynegative treatment.Indian dissatisfaction in the caneareas was common knowledge well be-fore the strike.69 Reports from Dis-

trict Commissioners, Resident Inspec-tors of Immigrants as well as individualsin conversations with officials all indi-catedl a deteriorating situation in 1920and an imminent strike. Despitewidespread discontent the CSR Com-p)any announced in September that in1921 it . would no longer pay thebonus of ?1 per acre of cane plauted;this affected the grower's profits. Forthe labourers this proved beneficialit forced Indian cane growers to makecomnmon cause with their countrymenseeking better wages. Besides theCSR Company management, both inFiji and Australia, turned a deaf earto advice and suggestions, both fromgovernment officials as well as labourleaders. They were unwilling to nego-tiate with anyone but their workerswho in Fiji were generallv illiterateand needed outside assistance. TheCompany ignored a set of demandsand the deadline (February 1, 1921) setto meet them.70 On February 11labourers at Ba stopped work andothers followed suit, staying out forsix months and mnaking t the longeststrike. in Fiji's history.

Led by a recent arrival from India,a Sadhu Basisth Muini, the strikerscalled a large meeting at Bulolu, about7 miles on the Ba-Tavua Road, onFebruary 13, (a Sunday) to discusstheir position. On February 16 anothermeeting drew up their 14-point log of

claims. By the time these were pre-sented to the CSR Company a monthlater (on March 18) they had grownto 16 demands. They covered a widefield:(1) The employer is to provide eachlabourer with a good house withits own separate bathroom,dining room and latrine, andfurnished with bedding, mos-quito net, mattress. a table, twochairs and a large looking glass.(2) Each labourer is to be givernrent-free 5 acres of land to growfood crops.(3) Employers are to allow eachlabourer to own and have freegrazing for cows, 2 bullocks an.la hack.(4) Wages of at least 12s perdiem.(5) The work-day is to be of 6hotirs.(6) A five-dav week.(7) Repeal of that section of theMasters and Servants Ordinancewhich required a month's noticefrom the labourer if he wishedto leave his job.(8) The employer is to obtain thbabrogation of the Ordinancewhich led to Manilal's removal..(9) "The release of those innocentstrikers who are rotting in Suvagaol".(10) The employers are to ensurepunishment of those 'larrikins'who deceived the Suva strikers,aided employers, and "robbe(ithe Indians and committedshameful deed on the persons of'many an Indian woman".(11) The labourers are to be giveuifree medicine, and during illnessall doctors' visits are to be atthe employer's expense.

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY October 22, 1977(12) Compensation and pension byemlployerto be provided in caseof an accident which incapaci-tated a worker by loss of a limb.(13) Payment of half wages duringillness whether hospitalised ornot.(14) Hindi schools to be provided forthe labourers' children with

teachers paid by the employer.(15) The employers are to bring downithe prices of foodstuffs, clothingand other goods to the 1914level.(16) The Company and the employersshould not discriminate betweenIndians and Europeans travellingon railways, and there should beno, restriction on Indians wish-ing to transport their goods bytrain in any direction.Had all the demands been acceded to,Fiji would have become a labourer'sparadise. The Company and theplanters branded the strike as politi-cal, adding. that it was aimed atfomenting sedition.7" This was anover-simplification, but useful for itsprotagonists to deny that the labourershad any cause for dissatisfaction. Itwas still a dogma of faith amongEuropeans that the Indian was now-here better treated than in Fiji; afterall, the McNeill-Chimanlal Report hadeven pronounced the indenture systemas possessing more benefits than draw-backs.72 The Europeans argued fur-ther that Indians wanted equality withwhites; to this the Company wasespecially vehement in its opposition.The Company view was strengthenedby the request of the labourers in thedeputation of March 18 for chairs tosit on the verandah and discuss termswith CSR officials. The Governmentsaw its intervention necessary andoffeted a Commission to investigate thestrikers' claims. It appointed the ChiefJustice of Tonga as Chairman andPillay, a South Indian merchant as thesecond member. Its third choice fellon Harricks, a planter, who, however,refused to serve, unless the strikersfirst went back to work. He was re-placed by a Ba shop-keeper, H H Ragg.Neither was popular with Indians andthe latter, not even with the Company.73The Company objected to the Com-mission sitting until the labourers hadresumed work, and accused the Go-vernment of weakness. The Indiansrefused to give evidence and not eventhe deportation of Basisth Muni fromFiji made them budge. By April 1,the Government had withdrawn theCommission; its efforts had been invain. But one wonders whether theCommnissionwould have achieved any-

thing if it had sat and had, in the wayof all Commissions, laboriously siftedevidence and pronounced its aflegedlyunbiased judgment. No party was any-way legally bound to accept its pro-nouncement.Throughout the strike the Govern-meint found itself in an awkward posi-tion. There were the usual pressuresfrom Europeans to adopt a 'firm line'with the strikers by deporting theleaders or restricting their movements.7'Where Government stood was bestsummed up by the Colonial Secretary,T E Fell, writing at the end of 1920when strike action was imminent:

It is, in these delicate times, imposi-sible and impolitic for us by publicutterance or official documents toopenly state what line we consideremployers should take. To do sowould be to raise a hornet's nest oflabourers round the majority of whiteemployers. Labourers would claimthat the Government had declared ontheir side and would back them inany extravagant demands. The resultwould be chaotic...75Nonetheless it did muster enougbcourage to let the CSR Companyknow what it really thought of thestrike. It sent to Edward Knox (theCompany's head in Sydney, Australia)the deliberations of the ExecutiveCouncil of March 4, 1921, wherein itstated categorically that (1) while themotives of some or all the strike leadersmight be political or racial, the griev-ances, real or imaginary, of the majo-rity of labourers were economic; (2)had the company been willing to dis-cuss terms with labourers and theirdelegates in 1920, it was possible mostof the strikers would have been lessinclined to pay attention to politicalagitators; (3) by disregarding warningsthe CSR showed a lack of judgmentand, apart from the inconvenience andexpenses to Fiji, the Company's attitudeto labour had been unsympathetic; (4)failing early indication of the Com-pany's willingness to reach a settlement,the Government would be forced tointervene if necessary in the interestsof all sections of the comnmunity.Laterin the Legislative Council, the Governorwarned that they must not be tooquick to brand the strike a politicalagitation.76 The Govemment alsoiginored Knox's demand to rescind theabove minutes of the Executive Coun-cil because, Knox claimed, they wererecorded without knowledge of all thefacts. In Government's eyes there wastnOdoubt that the Company could haveprevented the strike; in official docu-

ients, though not immediately in thepublic eye, the Company was culpable.Some even felt that the Company wasdeliberately permitting this course ofevents to eliminate European plantersand so be able to purchase its canefrom Indian growers at a lower price.in interviews and correspondence, theGovernment tried to counter the Com-pany's arguments but the latter insistedthat the strike was purely political andracial. Company officials felt it wasof no significance that in Navua -thestronghbold of Basisth Muni - theVancouver-Fiji Sugar Company hadbeen able to avert a strike by increasingthe daily wage to 3s and that conse-quently it was embarrassed by surpluslabour. Nor did it matter that neitherSuva nor Nausori bad joined with thecane-farners - in fact in both placesIndian opinion was against any parti-cipation.77 Nothing was done by theCompany to ensure that Labasa, whichstruck much later, would not alignitself with Viti Levu; the CompanyManager blamed it on the Governmentfor not declaring this area out ofbounds for 'agitators' from Viti Levudespite the attempts of officials thereto coax Indians not to down tools.

The strike dragged on. On April 9the same men who had gone as a de-putation to the CSR on March 18,accompanied by W C Thomas, a plan-ter and Richard Piper, a Methodistimissionary, as interpreter, visited theagreement but it had been forced uponGovernor. They admitted that thestrike was a bad means oi reaching anthem. Low wages, a high cost ofliving and the inability to buy enoughfood and clothing were emphasised.Housing accommodation in the lineswas condemned as unsuitable for mar-ried people; there was no privacy, noarrangement for private bathing, con-ditions for women in child-birth weremiserable. They couLldnot save toremit to dependants in India but ifconditions improved they would notpress for repatriation. The Governorrequested that they resume work andthey promised to discuss this whenthey returned home. But at a publicmeeting later most of the strikersvoted against the resumption of work.76

The next move was made by CSRwith its announcement of June 4, 1921,authorised as usual, by Edward Knox'from Sydney. (This need to refereverything to Australia put the Comnpany officials in Fiji at a tactical dis-

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October 22, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYadvantage.) Actually the company'sattorney in Fiji was instructed byKnox to tell the labourers' deputationof March 18 that the matter had to bereferred to Sydney and he could holdout no hope for a wage increase. Hecould have been authorised to makea more definite statement. withoutstating that the matter had to be refer-red to Sydney -it smacked of delay-ing tactics, infuriating and negative invalue. With the Government's permis-sion the Company called meetings tomake simultaneous announcements onJune 6, but unfortunately for it notmany Indians attended. The tune wasthe same; no wage increase; separatehousing for each family had not beenfinalised; steps would be taken toreduce the cost of living by importingand selling cheaply necessary articles;and the 6d per day bonus would infuture be paid weekly.79Unimpressed, the Indians stayed out.Not till the end of the second week inAugust was the strike finally over.The drift back to work, however, be-gan in July. Labasa was the first toreturn to normal conditions, but else-where return to work was slower.80Unlike the previous year the strike hadbeen orderly and peaceful and this didnot escape official comment.8"The aftermath of the conflict wasnot without bitterness. It furtheralienated the Indian and Europeancommunitie3 from each other. Indianswere denounced as poor workers andingrates and, there was a call for theirtotal repatriation. Some wantedChinese labourers to be brought inplace of Indian labour because thesewould return home on the expiry oftheir contract and not wage war forpolitical rights and equality with theAnglo-Saxon.82 The Fiji Times in itsleader, however, did not despair of allIndians:

The industrious Indian is welcome inFiji. He is a good citizen, and avaluable asset, but the idle vagabondand the agitating parasite is as greata curse to Fiji as he is to any otherland, and we want him blotted out.83Others interpreted the strike as anattempted Indian takeover. This viewwas summed in a letter to the FijiTimes by a I P Bayly, later a memberof the Legislative Council."To add to the gall the Companyannounced in February 1922 a reduc-tion in wages because the sugar markethad slumped."' Their resources ex-hausted after the previous year's dis-pute, the labourers were forced to

swallow their anger and continueworking.86

LAND AND RURAL CONDITIONSFroin statistics on Indian occupationsearlier quoted from Census reports ithas been estab-lished that by far themajority were engaged in agriculture.Given the additional factor of Indianpopulation growth it was understand-able that the need for land which wassteady from the beginning should gainimpetus after the abolition of the in-denture system. Following the 1921strike and gathering momentum in the1960s as Indian society began to tryto carve a permanent niche for itselfin Fiji, Indians sought to augmenttheir holdings with guaranteed securityof tenure.87Sir George O'Brien (1897-1901)seems to have been the first Governorto have taken a definite step to keepIndian labourers in Fiji. An IndianSettlement Fund was established withthe surplus from the Return Passages'Fund in order to obtain land for settle-ment and to open up communications.88During his governorship legislationwas passed to enable settlers wantingsmall blocks of land under 5 acres todo so without surveys. This conces-sion was abolished in 1910.89 Thoughgovernment settlements continued toincrease slowly and were continuedeven after the abolition of the inden-ture system, the number of allotmentsleft vacant suggest that they were notas popular as native leases.90It was native land to which Indiansappeared more attracted, but herethere were difficulties. By law nonative land could be alienated in free-hold; this legislation had been enactedin 1880 and except for a brief break(1905-1908) it had continued undistur-bed. But it does not seem at this

stage that the Indians were enthusias-tic about purchasing freehold.91 Whenfrom 1910 all leases had to be survey-ed, the Executive Council decreed thatin cases of leases of not more than 21years, the expenses of issuing a leasemust be borne by the lessees. For aten-acre plot the survey in 1922 cost?6.6.0. and the preliminary expensesamounted to ?10 or ?12 p a-- all aconsidierable drain on the savings ofthe average small settler.92 There weresome officials who favoured restrictionson the acreage Indians might be per-mitted to lease, for sometimes largeareas were taken, sub-let, and then

inefficient or reneging tenants ran intodifficulties and were unable to fulfiltheir commitments to the original les-sor. Further the Executive Councilin 1910 advised that as a rule Indiansshould not be given more than 5 acresof agricultural land or 10 acres ofgrazing land for more than 10 yearsat a time except in special cases.There was some relaxation in 1916when leases for 21 years with exten-sions of 10 years were permitted, andGovernment took over responsibility forleasing native land and assumed powersto extend leases or enforce recompensa-tion for improvements unless the ownercould show that the land he wished toresume was essential for his ownneeds.93 The CSR Company too showedsome concern and offered a long-termloan of ? 100,000 to facilitate Indiansettlement on the land, but after muchdiscussion and correspondence it wasdecided not to take positive action untila regular supply of Indian labourcould be guaranteed; and as this be-came impossible after the end of theindenture system the scheme was neverimplemented.94 To facilitate Indiansthe Government in 1921 abolished thesale of leases by auction.95 Thereaftelthe only significant piece of legislation,until the Native Lands Trust Ordinanceof 1940, was passed in 1932 whenextension of another 9 years could begranted to a lease of 21 years.996Gov-ernment was committed to its policvof the paramountcy of Fijian interestsand therefore every Indian demand badto be weighed within the context ofthis requirement before it could besatisfied.

Increased Indian demand for landwas a consequence of several forces.First, the Indians, especially after thegrant of political franchise and an in-crease in the number of local born, werebeginning to accept Fiji as their perma-nent home where they must prosper orlanguish in poverty. Second, with theincrease in population came a need forresources to satisfy ordinary wants andas most of the Indian population wasagricultural, pressure on land wasgreatest. Third, the introduction ofthe peasant farmer system in the sugarindustry and allied to it the disap-pearance of the European planters, theconcentration of the CSR Company onthe manufacture of sugar rather thanthe growing of cane, the increase innumber of cane contracts available forcultivators -all these increased Indian

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY October 22, 1977desire for land.9" The difficulty insatisfying this desire was not merely aresult of Government policy; it sprangfrom persistent Fijian reluctance topart with the land, even to hand itover temporarily to Government con-trol for leasing, and in the 1930s, fromFijians' growing awareness that theyneeded it for their own economic deve-lopment.93 Furthermore some Fijianowners demanded gifts and otherinducements from intending lessees be-fore they would agree to relinquishtheir land, or permit an extension of alease.99 These difficulties notwithstand-ing Fijians showed considerable trustwhen in 1936 at their Council of Chiefsmeeting they gave their lands to Gov-ernment to demarcate into reserves fortheir sole utilisation and the surplus tobe available for leasing.

Though Indians faced obstacles theland they leased changed handsfrequently judging by the number oftransfers of leases held by them.'00 Thismight indicate that there were manywho found themselves not very suc-cessful at agriculture. But it alsoimplies that some transferred theirlease in order to obtain a larger orbetter piece of land elsewhere.Throughout, however, Indian landholdings increased in acreage. Indianagriculturists showed diversificationas well: not only was there an increasein the number of Indian cane growers,area of cane grown and production;there was also the cultivation of otheicrops like rice, bananas and cottonbesides fruit and vegetable for theirown consumption as well as for sale.'"

Though generally Indians soughtland close to the sugar mills and thecoastal areas and their settlementsgrew in these regions, they did notform nucleated villages of the type intheir homeland. Proximity to the nuillwas essential to reduce transportationcosts and closeness to settled areas,especially of non-agricultural workers,meant a market for their vegetables,home-made ghee (if they had a cow),even Indian sweets. Indians on theirown leases, unlike on the Govern-ment settlements where the villagepattern was adopted, kept their dis-stance from one another; there wassocial contact and some co-operationbut no permanent ties or loyalties,except through marriage. Sometimesconflict resulted, and quarrels, notnecessarily with a violent finale, con-tinued beyond one generation. tSome-times friendships cut across linguistic

or religious barriers and provedequally lasting. The intense individu-alism bred under indenture condi-tions, which also undermined tradi-tional and regional loyalties of thehomeland, also militated against thegrowth of villages. Instead loyalty toone's family, the need to protect one'swomen, (again a consequence of inden-ture conditions) prevailed. In addi-tion there was the need for family co-operation and self-help; the small-holders could not afford hiredlabourers and every member of thefamily was required to work the larndto ensure not profit but sheer sur-vival. The farmer depended on thebounty of the seasons and worldmarkets, and in Fiji, satisfying thedemands of the exacting CSR Com-pany - all beyond his own controlbut all liable to fluctuate.'02 Underthese circumstances, the extendedfamily proved beneficial in the ruralareas. But while this provided help,the extended family also meant greaterpressure on the land with increaseddemands for larger farms and failingthis, under-employment.

To the officials, the Indian com-munity epitomised prosperity andsuccess.'03 Whereas it would be in-correct to deny that Indians prosper-ed in Fiji it would be equally false tocharacterise Indian society as opulent.Paupers were few, and their im-poverishment, if not brought about byinfirmity or physical disability, wasfrequently of their own making.There was no lack of opportunity,despite what has been already saidabout land problems. Employment insome form was always available;remuneration might not be what wasdesired or expected, but there wasenough to eke out an existence. Star-vation and famine were non-existent;the climate was healthy; floods andhurricanes were rare and when theyoccurred their effects were localised;pestilence was unknown (barring the1919 influenza epidemic).'04 Underthese favourable conditions a sectionof the Indian community did accum-mulate wealth and property and aclass of nouveau riche emerged. Inthe absence of statistics it is im-possible to say what portion oftheir community fell into this cate-gory; but conversations with in-dividuals who remembered conditionsin their period suggest that about 10per cent of the Indians who had comeas indentured labourers or weredescended from thenmbecame land-

lords, money-lenders or shop-keepers;most of the remainder made a livingand achieved some savings; and therest survived because they were p e-pared to work hard and live withintheir means.Two related problems affected thematerial prospects of the farmers. Onewas indebtedness; the other concern-ed dealings with fellow Indian shop-keepers. There was the practice ofcultivators depositing money withshopkeepers, who offered interest(as much as 10 per cent) but providedno security.105 When the shopkeeperran into difficulty and insolvency, thedepositor had no redress and losteverything. An example was the bank-r-uptcy in 1929 of a Tamil shopkeeperwho had ? 3,000 in his care; MorrisHedstrom and Company took all thatwas owing to them and the rest wastaken by another merchant, a fellowSouth Indian. Later the two SouthIndians went into partnership withanother South, Indian previouslyoperating separately. The three thenestablished a combined business butto protect their own interests one ofthe clauses of agreement read: "Thefirm shall not be liable to pay any.debt of any partner for money heldon deposit or borrowed unless hisaccount with the firm is sufficiently incredit to pay the same'06 Thosewho had deposited their moneywhen these three had separatebusinesses, knew nothing of theamalgamation. Oftentimes shopkeeperswere not as prosperous as they ap-peared and merely survived on ex-tended and indefinite credit, or bycontinually borrowing from differentsources to keep other creditors atbay.'07 Sometimes the farmers them-selves contributed to the precariousfinancial state of their storekeepers bypurchasing goods on credit and pay-ing for them slowly over a long periodof time so that the merchant alwayshad large sums owing to him and thetrickle of repayments provided himand his family with only a livelihoodd,and little or no capital to re-invest inhis business. The crisis was acute andneeded urgent remedy, and despite theplea of the Secretary of Indian Affairsin 1929 none was forthcoming:It is no use objecting that it isnot our business to save fools fromtheir folly, because in this case we-have to deal with a section of thepopulation which is improving inmaterial prosperity out of propor-

tion to its improvement in educa-tion, and modern legislation tendseverywhere to protect persons of1825

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October 22, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYthis class against the unscrupulouswho have every temptation to preyon them.108That there were numerous Indianfarmers in debt was admitted by theGovernment but with the proviso thatthere were "particular cases which[did] not justify the general assump-

tion that all Indian agriculturists[were] in the sanre plight". The officialargument was that though there Weremany causes of indebtedness, whatmost called for sympathy was a situa-tion where a person found himself inthis plight by entering into "an in-equitable contract for the purchase ofhis landholding". And the commonestcause of general indebtedness wasgiven as "undoubtedly the improvid-ence of the average Indian farmer,who, in order to obtain prestige atthe birth of his child or marriage ofhis daughter, will incur a debt whichmay be far beyond his normal meansto repay".1' Admittedly there wassome truth in this assertion but itwas not the whole explanation. Birthsand marriages in every culture areoccasions of joy, celebration and ex-penditure. What needs answering iswhy the amount spent by the Indianfarmer was beyond his means.Agriculture itself was a precariousmeans of livelihood for a small farmerwith a short-term lease and high rents.

Secondly there was dissatisfactionwith the CSR Company, both forwages received by its Indian labourersand the price obtained by contractorsfor their cane. The Company after1926 had a monopoly and, coulddictate terms. Thirdly the farmershad to borrow to make ends meet.Here the money-lender - usually theshopkeeper or the landlord - thriv-ed 110Dissatisfaction with the Company'swages and cane prices was expressedby cane farmers in their meeting

with its General Manager, Sir PhilipGoldfinch in 1937. Indians felt thatthe Company was making substantialprofits while they themselves werereceiving insufficient returns for theirefforts. Frustration in their dealingswith both the Company and themoney-lenders inspired the farmers toform their own associations. Indianplanters' associations, though short-lived, appeared in 1934, but the firstfarmers' union was the Kisan Sangh(1937) which however was hamperedby divisions in the Indian communityand the refusal of the company togrant it recognition for purposes of

negotiation. II Relations between far-mers and the Company continued todeteriorate and reached their nadir- in1943 when a mutually destructivestrike resulted.The rapacity of money-lenders hasknown no end and the farmers to this

day have been plagued by indebted-ness."12 High rates of interest werethe crux of the problem. The DistrictCommissioner of Ba stated in Decem-ber 1927 that money was easily avail-able for 15 per cent interest."" InNadi cultivators had no money topay for surveys stock, implements andeven living expenses. The soluztionlay in a visit to the money-lender whocharged exorbitant interest and some-times took a whole year's crops inrepayment leaving the debtor con-tinually in debt - either the farmerkept renewing his lien or ultimatelyquit the land in despair. Sometimesin obtaining land a cultivator wasfleeced from ?20 to ?60 per acre for'goodwill' alone before he acquiredthe lease. In Nadi shop-keepers en-couraged clients to run into heavydebts by freely supplying-goods athigh prices. On the one hand thecultivator tended to be ignorant,though at the same time desirous ofbecoming a landholder at any priceto improve his social standing. On theother hand, the storekeeper andmoney-lenders were calculating enoughto gain the confidence of others byvarious 'charitable' and 'religious' actsand by posing as social 'leaders'.Those who became money-lenderswere usually shopkeepers, govern-ment clerks, policemen, cultivatorsand landlords. Money-lenders whowere also landlords aind shopkeeperswere thus 'trebly' sure of theirvictims. Daily loans of ?1 or ?2 perweek carried 5s or more as interest.The District Commissioner of Nadireported a case where a landlord-shopkeeper borrowed at 5 per centfrom the CSR Company and re-lentthe money at 20 to 25 per cent inter-est. In 1939, in Macuata in VanuaLevu, there was a report of an ex-treme case where a planter who hadborrowed ?100 and had repaid ?230was still owing the money-lender al-most ?300."14 In Ba, the CSR Com-pany charged 5 per cent interest whileMorris Hedstrom and Company ad-vanced goods on the security ofcrops at 10 per cent-115 Other Euro-pean and Indian money-lenders charg-ed as much as 25 per cent interest on?100 loans. Genexally, however, madc-

btedness in all the districts was dueto Indians exploiting Indians. Govern-ment seemed unable to provideremedy, and official thinking wasdivided on such solutions as co-ope-rative banks or legislation to limit thepercentage of crops that could besigned over in liens. The CSR Com-pany after careful investigation gaveloans to its tenants if their need wasgenuine; beyond this nothing assuagedthe cultivators' plight.EDUCAnON

Land was essential for materialprosperity but that was not all thatIndians were seeking. Their experienceof the rigours of girmit and their diffi-culties afterwards determined themto establish themselves on firmerfoundations. Though they retainedtheir culture and religion, withmodifications to suit the new environ-ment, they recognised early that suc-cess depended on their being able toemulate Europeans. Indians felt thatby becoming like Europeans and byacquiring their values, they wouldguarantee that their children would nothave to undergo a second girmit. Themeans to this end was the possessionof Western education.

Very early in their stay in Fiji theyrecognised the value of education.Indian hunger for education was asstrong as their quest for security oftenure of land. To onlookers thisinsatiable desire was evident from thebeginning; it also brought forth someconcern that Indians in Fiji, broughtthere to work as agricultural labourers,were aspiring towards becomingbaboos; others were more favourabletowards this thirst for education.

The first school for Indians wasstarted by Badri Maharaj, later to bethe first nominated Indian member inthe Legislative Council, in 1899 atWairuku. Badri Maharaj had come asan indentured labourer but by hardwork had been able to improve him-self and rise to the status of indepen-dent farmer. He was a self-made manwho discovered early that Indians hadto take their own initiative rather thanrely on others if they wished to betterthe quality of life for their descen-dants. His being barely literate him-self must have made him aware of hisown shortcoming and encouraged himto save the next generation from asimilar fate.

Gov&rnment contribution to Indianeducation was, by its own admission,1826

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY October 22, 1977poor. There was no attempt todisguise this before the EducationCommission of 1909, and in 1912 anOrdinance was passed requiring theemployers of indentured labourers toprovide school buildings. AnotherOrdinance, in 1916, provided forGovernment assistance to schoolswhich fulfilled certain standards; thefollowing year an amendment extendedthis scheme to vernacular schoolswhich gave instruction in a dialect ap-proved by the Board of Education. ByDecember 1919 there was only oneGovernment school for Indians and 17assisted schools of which six gavetheir instructions in the vernacularand taught 189 of the 997 Indianchildren in the various schools in theColony. In 1921 the Government spent? 350 on sending four Indians toIndia for agricultural training.At the end of indenture, besidesfinance, there were other problems.Indians were moving to the hinterlandand encountering difficulties in findingcentres for properly equipped andstaffed schools; in fact the sparsedistribution of population meant thatthere were sometimes not enoughchildren in an area to operate a school.Sectarianism, particularly from thediversity of Indian languages and reli-gion worked against unity in centreslarge enough for one school only. Ashortage of qualified and trained tea-chers was another obstacle; and inlater years the shortage grew worsewhen government was reluctant toobtain teachers from India because itconsidered their behaviour seditious.

Towards the end of 1929 the Gover-nor admitted that in the field ofIndian education, "the progress since1909 has been very meagre". TheDirector of Education added: "Noone can help noticing the eagerness,amounting to a kind of hunger, foreducation among the Indians of Fiji".And with the entry of the first electedIndian members in the LegislativeCouncil in 1929 Government was al-most annually harangued on itsneglect of education for Indians. More-over the existence of racially separateschools for Europeans, better equippedand better financed, was found to benot in consonance with the equalrights of Indians as British subjects.A hindrance to Indian education hadbeeit European attitudes in much thesame manner they had cavilled at thegrant of political rights to this com-munity. Remarks made to the Educa-tion commissions in 1909 and 1926

indicate that there was a fear thatWestern education would spoil FijiIndians and make them similar to thenationalist politicians in India. Thiswas linked with the notion that theIndian ought to remain on the landrather than compete with the Euro-peans. Such prejudice meant that Eu.o-,pean members in the Council and thepress kept close scrutiny on everyitem of Government expenditure onIndian education. For the Indians,Government contribution towardstheir education failed to keep up withdemand. The relative neglect wasillustrated by Census figures whichshowed Indian illiteracy rates to bethe worst in the Colony. Had theChristian missionaries not made a sub-stantial contribution (though aidedimmensely by financial grants fromthe Government) and had Indiansthemselves not been prepared toundergo many sacrifices for the educa-tion of their children the situationwould have been considerably worse.Despite their keenness for educationIndian parents, particularfy in ruralareas, not infrequently forced theirsons to miss classes so that theycould assist in the cultivation orharvesting of crops. Also there was allthrough the thirties and for some timebeyond reluctance to send girls toschool. Fear, ignorance and early mar-riages were responsible for such astate of affairs. However, Govern-ment's willingness to help in the educa-tion of girls, missionary promptingsand the determination of the girlsthemselves contributed to the slowerosion of the barriers of prejudice.Though Indians remained dissatisfiedwith Government policy on education,by the end of the thirties, the Gov-ernment was becoming more aware ofits obligations. Besides contributionsto primary schools and the trainingcollege -in Fiji and admittance to themedical school, Government evenprovided aid to a very small numberstudying abroad. But it seemed thatGovernment was still wary of too mucheducation for Indians, reflected by itsstrong but unsuccessful opposition tothe Marist Brothers when in 1937 theyopened up a multi-racial high schoolof which, it was obvious, the greatestbeneficiaries would be Indians.

POLIIICALTATUSWhen Indians left to work as in-

dentured labourers there was no clhar-ter drawn between India and the re-cipient colonies on the subject of

political status of the migrants. It wasnevertheless "the intention of the Bri-tish Government... that the Indianswho went to the colonies should beallowed to settle permanently andshould be treated as full citizens."116Earlier in 1910, the Sanderson Com-mittee had stated about Fiji:The present administration itselfrecognises the value of the Indiansas permanent settlers, and is will-ing to concede to them the enjoy-ment of equal rights. The wholetenor of the correspondence bet-ween India and the Colony showsthat it was on this condition thatindentured emigration to Fiji hasbeen allowed in the past, and anymeasures directed towards loweringthe political status of the emigrantsor reducing their economic freedomwould in our opinion involve abreach of faith with those affect-ed117

Yet in 1905, when the first electionsfor the Fiji Legislative Council wereheld, Indans - by then numbering22,790, of whom 9,776 were still serv-ing their indenture - did not havethe right to vote.1"' The franchise,based on property and income quali-fications, was confined to Europeans,who totalled 2,440 they had sixrepresentatives in the LegislativeCouncil. The indigenous Fijians whonumbered 92,000 had two representa-tives nominated by the Governor onthe recommendation of the Councilof Chiefs. The refusal to grant fran-chise to the Indians was explainedthus by the Governor:I do not think it necessary to pro-vide representation for the Indian...element, which has shown itselfvery open to corruption at themunicipal elections, and whose in-terests I would safeguard by ap-pointing the Agent-General an offi-cial Member of Council.119The Governor did not elaborate andan examination of official records ofthe time has failed to provide evid-ence of the corruption attributed toIndians. Apparently the Governor hadfallen prey to local Europeanprejudice which shortly after-wards began a campaign to re-move non-European voters fromthe municipal electoral rolls in Suva.In 1910, it was claimed that out of305 coloureds on the Suva municipalroll 95 were Indians, and that over85 per cent of these "coloured peo-ple [could] neither read, write norunderstand English", and that theseknew very little about votinig andwere "certainly easy to influence and...open to corruption."'20 ndians in Suvawere alarmed by European intentionsand a petition was drafted and sent

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October 22, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYon their behalf deprecating suchmoves and demanding "the right toelect two English gentlemen to repre-sent [them] in the [Legislative] Coun-cil."121 While the Indian request boreno fruit, consistent European pressureby 1915 was able to introduce astringent literacy test in English as aprerequisite for municipal franchise.Despite protests from Indians in Fijias well as the Government of Inidia,the colonial regime surrendered toEuropean demands which resulted inthe number of Indian voters on theSuva Municipal rolls being reduced to14 in 1915.122

The Indians too reacted to theseEuropean attitudes. The arrival ofthe lawyer, Manilal in 1912 and hisefforts thereafter to seek redress forIndian grievances led to Indians inFiji becoming vocal on the issue ofpolitical rights. In 1915 a number ofIndians petitioned the Governor tonominate Manilal as their representa-tive in the Legislative Council.'23 TheGovernor responded that Indian inter-ests were adequately catered for buthe was prepared to grant the requestprovided an Indian with the neces-sary qualifications could be foundand the Government of India sup-ported the demand. The Governmentof India was of the view that Indiansin Fiji were "under a political disabi-lity to which they are not subject inany other colonies which recruit In-dian labour".124On the basis of In-dia's recommendation the Governorof Fiji nominated an Indian, BadriMaharaj, in 1916 to representhis community in the Legisia-tive Council. Neither the form ofrepresentation nor the man chosenproved popular with the Indians. In-stead of Badri Maharaj, a former in-dentured labourer turned farmer, anda successful one at that, Indians pre-ferred Manilal, who was not eligi-ble as he was born in Baroda andwas therefore not a British subject.

The matter did not end there. By1916 it was becoming obvious thatFiji would not be able to receive forlong a continuous supply of cheaplabour from India. It was felt in somequarters that one of the points againstFiji was its failure to give Indiansthere suitable political representation.C W Doorly, who had been the Emi-gration Agent in India of the FijiGovernment told the Colonial Officethat "my knowledge of the opinionsheld by --leaders of native public opi-nion in India has forced me to the

definite conclusion that no scheme forthe future emigration of Indians toFiji will be accepted unless it assuiresto all Indians in the Colony full poli-tical rights".1'25As a result Londonsent the following telegram to FijiDoorly holds oninion that unlessIndians have political rights, anyscheme of Indian emigration will beunacceptable. He suggests that In-dian community should elect two ormore representatives to LegislativeCouncil. I am impressed by advicess to effect on Indian oninion offranchise in British Guiana. I wouldagree to two members being electedby Indians if you should so recom-mend. In order to safeguard officialmaiority add another two represen-tatives. Separate Indian electoratewith fairly wide franchise wouldseem desirable. Please considerwhether an offer of this kind couldbe made to Indian Government andreport by telegram.'26The reply from Fiji was favourable.rndian labour was considered indispen-sible for the maintenance of thecolony's economic lifeline, its sugarindustry. On January 9, 1920 the FijiExecutive Council authorised theGovernor to announce publicly thatthe franchise for Indians would comeinto effect at a later date on the basisof two Indian members to be electedby their own race.Though the industrial dispute ofJanuary 20, 1920 and its aftermaaroused considerable anxiety in offi-cial minds, the Governor appointed onAugust 25 a Commission to make re-commendations after public discussion.Its report was tabled in April 1921when Fiji was in the grip of anotherstrike which caused further disenchant-ment of the Government and Euro-pean settlers with the Indians. At thisstage, Fiji's recommendation based onthe Commission's report - two In-dians elected on a communal fran-chise - was forwarded to India forcomment.India opposed communal franchiseand pressed for a common franchiseof one man, one vote. Within Fijithis was resisted. The Governmentfelt this would undermine the princi-ple of paramountcy of Fijian ;nter-ests; while Fijians feared that it wouldlead to Indian domination. Thus thedebate between Fiji, the Colonial Officeand India became a protracted affair.Fiji stood firm on its principles andIndia continued to argue that a com-munal franchise was a denial of equlalstatus for Indians with others in Fiji.Though unwilling to concede on com-mon franchise, Fiji was prepared topass legislation guaranteeing equal

status for Indians in Fiji; in fact anordinance was drafted but then pres-sure from India on the subject sub-sided and the bill was not brought be-fore the Legislative Council.Besides, the franchise for Indiansoutside India became an imperial ques-tion. Suffice it to say here that beyondcausing delay nothing of substancewas achieved. Given the nature of theBritish empire with its bias towardsthe interests of the white dominionisand its proclamation of the paramo-untcy of native interests, considera-tion of the grievances of Indians andtheir redress occupied a subordinateplace. After much correspondencebetween Fiji, London and India, In-dians in Fiji went to the polls for thefirst time in 1929 to elect three re-presentatives to the Legislative Coun-cil on a communal franchise, limitedfurther by property and income qua-lifications. If the colonial regime hadanticipated peace from Indians aftertheir enfranchisement it was extremelydisappointed. Once in the Council theybegan by asking numerous and de-tailed questions on a plethora of sub-jects affecting their community. TheGovernment responded with patience.Then on November 5, Vishnu Deo,Indian member for the Southern con-stituency moved :(a) that political rights and statusgranted to Indian settlers onracial lines are not acceptableto them, and(b) that Indians in Fiji should begranted Common Franchisealong with other British sub-jects resident in the Colony.In support Vishnu Deo contended thatcommunal franchise segregated theraces and was a denial of the equa-lity promised by the Government. Hisopponents argued that a commonfranchise would lead in the end tothe domination by Indians who werethe fastest increasing component inthe population. If this were permitted,it was contended, then it would bea breach of the undertaking given tothe Fijian people through the Deedof Cession. The combination of Fijian,European and official votes defeatedthe Indian motion. Vishnu Deo andhis two colleagues, Parmanand Singhand James Rao Ramchandar, resigned.The Indian seats remained vacanttill 1932 when two of them were fill-ed by the election of K B Singh andM Mudaliar; there were no contend-ers for the third which remained va-cant. K B Singh once more introduc-ed thepcontentious motion of commonroll; it was again defeated; and he

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY October 22, 1977resigned and was re-elected in a by-election in 1933.Meanwhile the Government, con-cerned about its relations with theIndian community, sought, apart fromgrantirqg them the franchise, to in-volve them in local affairs. There was,at the time, a general inactivity inlocal government and in the twomunicipalities, Suva and Levuka,which had councils, educational qua-lifications and the racial pattern ofvoting pr-evented the election of anIndian. Despite considerable pressurefrom Indians to amend the municipalordinance to enable better Indian re-presentation in the municipalities thegoverniment held firm. In 1930, ittried to placate Indian opinion byappointing Indians to .the variousProvincial Road Boards, which al-ready had officials and European set-tlers, and whose function was purely*advisory. Two difficulties were ap-parent. First in certain areas, Euro-peans objected; in Lomaiviti they hadno wish to welcome James Rao Ram-chandar, former MLC; in Ba, therewas outright rejection of the idea ofan Indian sitting on the Board. Else-where the response was favourable, asin Lautoka, which was willing to ac-accept S B Patel, a lawyer. Secoind,the search for able men possessing asufficient knowledge of English expos-ed the paucity of such leaders in theIndian community, particularly inthe rural districts. Usually there wasno other alternative in a -province butthe one selected by the Governor. Ifthese appointments were meant toplacate -the Indians politically , theyproved unsuccessful. Besides thejurisdictioin of these boards was limit-ed and did not traverse those sphereswherein Indians sought redress.

To improve communication betweenthe Government and the Indian com-munity, the former also establishedAdvisory Committees; the first ofthese was appointed in 1932 in theRewa district. Originally Governmenthad thoughts of reviving panchayatswhich could settle their differencesquickly and peacefully without reper-cussions on the social and politicallife of the colony; but the conceptwas found impracticable and aband-oned. When selections were beingconsidered to the Advisory Com-mittees which were preferred topanchayats, it decided that instead ofthe headmen of various settlementsrepresentatives of different classesand interests should be chosen.

In Rewa the choice was made afterconsultation between the Secretaryfor Indian Affairs and the DistrictCommissioner. The six men chosenwere: Rambissessar, an Arya Samajirice miller; Gulam Nabi, a Muslimtailor; Thakur, a Christian rice mil-ler; Ramsamujh Maharaj, a Sanatanishopkeeper; Ram Singh, an AryaSamaji planter and Battan Singh, aSikh shopkeeper. All these men werefrom the proprietor class, all owningland as well. They comprised a mino-rity in their community and wereamong those who had prospered sig-nificantly by their abode in Fiji. Theywere expected to explain governmentmeasures to the people and advisethe District Commissioners on Indianmatters. Their capacity was solelyadvisory, no resolutions were passedor votes cast at their meetings andthe minute book was to record gene-ral not individual opinions. What thevarious committees discussed weresomewhat similar, if the proceedingsat Rewa and Nadroga during theperiod 1932 to 1939 are taken as typi-cal. In Nadroga, the discussions cen-tred on hurricanes, food relief, buri-als and cemeteries, water supply toKoronumu cemetery, rents of leases, ie-gistration of Indian births. Similartopics were considered in Rewa aswell as repatriation, immigration, landdisputes, and destitute Indians.The majority of Indians were l otdiverted by such concessions fromwhat they considered the panacea fortheir political ills - common fran-chise. They continued to agitate forit and when they found their tworepresentatives in the LegislativeCouncil insufficiently vocal on theirbehalf they, clamoured for it at meet-ings and gatherings outside. Unabat-ing Indian demands for common rolltriggered a reaction in the other com-munities and certain European lead-ers pressed for a reversion to thenomination system. Fijian leaders, noless frightened about the future oftheir own people in case of the ar-rival of common franchise, becamesimilarly insistent. And they found inSir Murchison Fletcher a Governorfully willing to oblige them. Theseforces were joined by members of theMuslim community who did not thinlkthey had a chance of getting one oftheir own people chosen through theelective- process. Muslims in factsought separate representation fromother Indians. The colonial regimein Fiji was willing to oblige them

but was dissuaded from this courseby the Colonial Office acting on theadvice of the Government of India.There were also a number of rnn-Muslim Indians who did not favourcommon roll.Space does not premit a dis--cussion of the debate that ac-companied efforts to replace elect-ed members with nominated mem-bers. The Governor justified hisintention to the Secretary of State onthe grounds of wanting to preservethe principle of paramountcy of Fijianinterests. While the Secretary of Statedid not dispute this doctrine, he didnot entirely agree with Fletcher and,instead, suggested a compromise. Theofficial majority in Council was retain-ed while the three major races wereto receive equal representation. Forthe Fijians their five members werestill to be selected by the Governorfrom a panel of names chosen andsubmitted by the Council of Chiefs.The Indians and Europeans each hadfive members, three elected on a com-munal franchise and two nominatedby the Governor. One of the Indiannominated members through practicethereafter was a Muslim. The consti-tutional settlement of 1937 was farfrom what the Indians desired butit endured till 1963.

Notes68 R C Sharma, "Fiji. Digdarshan"Mandawar, United -Province, India,1937, p 37.69 A great deal of the material usedin this section is derived fromofficial sources marked 'confiden-tial'; hence specific referencescannot be given for all that isstated.70 The demands were submitted byNkB Mitter of Nadi who hadformed the Fiji Indian LabourFederation in October 1920. Thefollowing scale of per diem wageswas requested: ordinary malelabourer 5s, women 3s, sirdar8/6, engine driver 10s, skilledworkman 8s to 10s.71 CSO, 3953/1921; Fiji Times Feb-ruary 26, 1921.72 Report to the Government of Indiaon the Conditions of Indian Im-migrants in Four British coloniesand Surinam, by James McNeill,ICS and Chinian Lal Cmnd 7744-5.73 CSO, 1781/1921.74 Fiji Times, June 18, 1921.75 Fell to Green (Private), December30, 1920; CO, 83/153.76 Fiji Legislative Council Debates,1921, p 3.77 CSO, 1362/1921, 1534/1921.78 R Piper to Governor, May 20,1921, MMC.79 Fiji Times, June 8, 1921.80 CSO, 3246/1921, 452/1921.

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October 22, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY81 Fiji Legislative Council Debates,1921, p 111.82 Fiji Times, March 7, 15; April 4,5, 21; November 21; (1921) FijiLegislative Council Debates, 1921,pp 125-134.83 Fiji Tinmes uly 1, 1921.84 Fiji Timies March 28, 1921.85 CSO, 885/1922.86 Cessation of work was expected.It was reported, however, that outof the normialslack season comple-ment of 550 labourers at the USHmills 365 were currently employ-ed; of the 4,000 fleldworkers,1,653were at work. This was the resultof a continuing shortage from theevents of the previous year andnot of any new strike. Rodwell toColonial Office 111, April 28, 1922.87 As early as 1885 an official minut-ed: "No coolies should be allowedto squat on land that does not be-long to them." And the Commis-sioner of Lands (April 23, 1885)wrote in the same file that he hadbeen informed that a number ofIndians had squatted on land inNavua and built several housesthere; he too was of the opinionthat they ought not to do this oneither government or native landwithout proper authority (CSO,1144/1885). The Government,aware of their difficulties andneeds, began (in 1887) to establishIndian settlements when it granted37 one-acre leases near- Suva onland specifically -surveyed for thepurpose; by 1888 there were 53such blocks (CP, 29/1888, 17/1889; CSO, 269/1887, 392/1887).88 Gillion, op cit, p 140.89 CP, 31/1912..90 CP, 31/1921, 28/1914, 58/1918,43/1924.91 R G Ward "Land Use and Popula-tion in Fiji: A GeographicalStudy", London, 1965, p 117.92 Raju Report, op cit.93 CP, 13/1959.94 CP, 7/1916, 21/1916; CSO, 820!1920.95 CP, 26/1921.96 C K Meek, "Land Law and Cus-tom in the Colonies", London,1949, p 203ff; R C Sharma: op cit,p 32.97 For these changes see, A G Lown-des, 'The Sugar Industry of Fiji' in"South Pacific Enterprise: The

Colonial Sugar Refining CompanyLimited", Sydney, 1956; J CPotts: 'An Outline of the Success-ful Development of Small FarmSystem in the Fiji Sugar Industry',Transactions of the Fiji Society,Volume 9, 1968, pp 26-38.98 CSO, 4041/1899, 1527/1905,10921/1915, 5071/1916, 5300/1929; also, Proceedings of theCouncil of Chiefs, 1876 onwards.99 CSO, 5098/1915; Pacific AgeJanuary 4, 1923, has an interestingeditorial on the difficulties of thesmall-holder'.100 Reports of the Department ofLands, 1920-1930.101 Stockcale Report (1937).102 For a discussion of Indians' viewson the CSR Company, see A Pra-sad, "Th}eStory of the Fiji Kisan

Sangh" (in Hindi), Bombay, 1962.103 CP, 33/1930; CSO, 717/1930.104 In December 1929 and early 1931Fiji experienced severe hurricanesand floods. There was loss ofproperty and life (fewer than 100lives lost in 1929 and fewer than200 in 1931). Grave as thesedisasters were, these were insigni-ficant compared to the loss of lifein similar circumstances in Indiaof the time.105 CSO, 1098/1926.106 CSO, 4504/1929, 4804/1929. Ap-parently one individual had de-posited as much as ? 744 with thismerchant.107 The District Commissioner, Lau-toka, reported in 1922 that if thebusinesses of 90 per cent of theIndian shopkeepers were woundup they would be insolvent (CSO,1162/1923).108 CSO, 4804/1929.109 CP, 39/1938.110 Thne Acting Secretarv for IndianAffairs, J Judd minuted on Sep-tember 18, 1935: "The Indianfarmer has a penchant for livingunder a burden of debt. This isseized upon by money-lenders andstorekeepers, many of whom arefar from scrupulous in their systemof accounting." Another officialreporting from the cane region forthe half year ending June 30, 1935commented: "A. good deal ofharm is the credit system. TheIndian and Chinese storekeepersare only too happy to give creditand the average Indian does notkeep a close check on the pricesand items he receives, especially

when the account runs to sixmonths or over. The result is awvrit for debt, then judgment, andthen the attaching of his caneproceeds. The Court and Counselcosts soon reduce any cane profitsthat may be made."111 Interview (in 1970) with the latePundit Ayodhya Prasad, founderand subsequently Secretary of theKisan Sangh.112 Rural Credit Surveys,, 1961 and1967 (unpublished) Department ofCo-operatives, Fiji; R M Frazer,'A Fiji-Indian Rural Community',Pacific Viewpoint Monograph No3, Wellington, 1968.113 CSO, 1098/1926. Subequent de-tails in this paragraph relating toother districts are from reports inthe same file.114 CSOF, 18/2 Pt 2.115 CSO, 1098/1926.116 Gillion, op cit, p 27.117 Cmnd 5192, p 87.118 On this subject see Ahmed Ali,'Fiji: the Arrival of CommunalFranchise', Journal of Pacific Stu-dies Volume I, 1975, pp 20-46.119 Governor to Colonial Office, 39;April 24, 1903, FRG, 1905, p 107.120 Fiji Legislative Council Debates1910 p 32.121 CSO, 4608/1910.122 CSO, 10819/1915.123 CSO, 4365/1915, 5884/1915.124 India Office to Colonial Office,March 30, 1916.125 Doorly to Green, Private Novem-ber 11, 1919, Colonial Office 83/149.126 Colonial Office to Rodwell, Nov-ember 21, 1919, Colonial Office,83/149.

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