The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 11 | Number 1 | Article ID 4299 | Mar 16, 2015

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“All Japan” versus “All Okinawa” - Abe Shinzo’s Military-Firstism 「オール・ジャパン」対「オール沖縄」　安倍晋三の軍事最優先主義

Gavan McCormack

A grand, and massively unequal, struggle overthe future of Japan is underway. At sea, aminiscule flotilla of canoes and kayaksconfronts a solid wall of National Coastguardships and on land a few hundred protestersface off 24 hours a day against riot policeoutside Camp Schwab Marine Corps base,trying in vain to halt the delivery of materialsfor the construction of a new Marine Corpsbase on Oura Bay.

As Okinawa struggles to assert and give shapeto its new form of "All Okinawa" politics, itsstruggle is waged against the backdrop ofnation-wide indifference, reinforced by thesilence of the press, amounting to a nationalconsensus of support for the discrimination andviolent repression meted out by the begovernment, a contemporary soryokusen (All-Out War) in which Abe's "All Japan" brings tobear the "irresistible force" of state power uponthe "immovable object" of "All Okinawa"resistance.

Should the state now proceed to crush, divide,and remove that resistance, the crystallizationof an unprecedented prefectural consensus, thehumiliation would likely outrank all those ofprevious history – whether assimilation bypunishment in 1879, reversion withoutreversion in 1972, or return of Futenma,repeatedly promised but repeatedly denied andpostponed, since 1996 – since never has therebeen a consensus across Okinawan society inthe past. By the end of 2015, Okinawanconstitutional and democratic forces will eitherhave forced unprecedented change of directionupon the national government or they will have

suffered devastating defeat.

The Japan Problem and the OkinawaProblem

The Okinawa crisis is rooted in the East Asiandisposal wrought at high diplomatic level bythe agreements of 1951, 1972, 1996, and 2006(Guam). First, the San Francisco Treatysevered it from Japan as the war state tocomplement mainland Japan's peace state, thenits "reversion" to Japan was manipulated so asto maintain the priority of war and militarymatters over all else. Then, in 1996 Futenma"reversion" was likewise a sham, turning out tobe dependent upon the prior construction andhandover of a much superior, multi-functionalfacility. The grim reality for Okinawa is that,sixty-four years after the San Francisco Treaty,US forces still occupy 20 per cent of the land ofOkinawa Island and concentrate three-quartersof all US military presence in the country, whilebase authorities retain a sovereign authoritylittle diminished from the time when the islandwas under direct US military rule.

The base "system" ratified under the SanFrancisco Treaty in 1951 restored sovereigntyto Japan at the price of splitting Okinawa fromit under total US military control, reserving theright to maintain bases elsewhere throughoutthe country wherever and for however long itfelt necessary, and retaining fundamentallevers of control over national governmentpolicy.1 That system has of course evolved, butwithout change to its fundamentals. Japan'squalified sovereignty of 1952 steadily deepenedinto the "client state" relationship of the early

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21st century,2 despite feeble attempts to reduceor even reverse the path of dependency,notably under the Hosokawa and Hatoyamagovernments (1993-1994 and 2009-2010). Thetwo governments of Abe Shinzo, from 2006 to2007 and again from 2012, have pursued thereverse process – accelerating and deepeningclientelism,3 masked by nationalist cover, orwhat Nakano Koichi refers to as "AirNationalism." 4

Through 2014, Okinawan civil society deliveredpowerful messages to the government in Tokyo,to the nation, and to the government of theUnited States on three major fronts. In January,citizens of Nago City returned to office itsmayor, Inamine Susumu, who was anuncompromising opponent of any baseconstruction within the city (and in September,Inamine supporters retained control of the CityAssembly); in November, the Okinawanelectorate decisively rejected the Governor,Nakaima Hirokazu, who had reneged on hispledge to oppose base construction and issuedthe permit the government needed tocommence reclamation of Oura Bay, electing inhis stead (by the unprecedented majority ofover 100,000 votes (380,820 to 261,076), acandidate (Onaga Takeshi) committed to doing"everything in my power" to stop constructionat Henoko, close Futenma Air Base, and havethe Marine Corps' controversial Osprey MV 22aircraft withdrawn from the prefecture(therefore stopping the construction of "OspreyPads" for them in the Yambaru forest, also inNorthern Okinawa); and in December all fourOkinawan local constituencies elected anti-baseconstruction candidates to the lower house inthe National Diet.5

The November election of Onaga as Governorwas the key event, a resounding "No" to thenational government's Okinawan agenda. Ifjustice and democracy meant anything, theOkinawan people reasoned, then surely nowthe Japanese state would concede that theirwill had been clear beyond a shadow of doubt

and therefore abandon the project to imposeupon them one more massive militaryinstallation.

Governor Onaga on Assumption of Office,10 December 2014 (Photo: Okinawataimusu)

For Abe, construction of the Henoko base is acore national policy, fundamental to therelationship between Japan and the UnitedStates, whereas Okinawa late in 2014 chose aGovernor committed to "employ all resources atmy disposal" to stop the project. Likewise, notonly is the Abe government determined tosupport the deployment of Osprey MV 22aircraft to Okinawa, but it considers equippingthe Self-Defense Forces with them, whereasOnaga has pledged to have them withdrawn

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from Okinawa (which also means, implicitly,stopping the construction of "Osprey pads" inthe northern Okinawa forests designed toaccommodate them). The Abe government isalso committed to the deployment of JapaneseSelf-Defense Forces into the frontier islands,including Yonaguni, despite evidence of adivided island opinion (as witness the February2015 referendum, discussed below).37 Evenbefore Onaga's election, Chief CabinetSecretary Suga insisted that Okinawan opinionwas irrelevant,6 After it, he simply repeated that the die was cast, the proceduresprescribed by law had been met and thegovernment would proceed "shukushuku to"(solemnly) with construction.7

Abe Shinzo, re-elected in December 2014,stands a reasonable chance of remaining inoffice until 2018, and therefore has time and,apparently, the resolve, to proceed to remakethe Japanese state, liquidating the post-warregime and replacing it with his conception of a"new" and "beautiful" Japan. Within that Japan,the key raison d'etre for Okinawa has to be as ajoint US-Japan bastion projecting force whererequired for the regional and global hegemonicproject. But to push ahead successfully withthat agenda, he must first defeat the Okinawanchallenge. Elsewhere, few dare to challenge oroppose this radical program, in the Dietopposition is in disarray, resistance fragmentedand minimal, but in Okinawa opposition isserious and enjoys wide support. It is also,since 2014, marked by a new strategy, that of"All Okinawa" (discussed below).

Abe moves Japan's defence and securitysystems closer to full integration with those ofthe US, commits to construct major newfacilities for the latter in Okinawa, Guam andthe Marianas, and for the Japanese self-DefenseForces on the Southwestern islands of Amami,Miyako, Ishigaki and Yonaguni, and heproceeds towards setting up Japanese versionsof the CIA and the Marine Corps (an"amphibious rapid deployment brigade"). While

much of his history and identity agenda(Yasukuni, Comfort Women, war memory)alarms Washington, his security agenda plainlyp l e a s e s i t . H e m a y b e s e e n a s t h epersonification of the contradictions of thepost-war and post-San Francisco treaty system.

Henoko, Takae, Yonaguni

Three sites, Henoko, Takae, and Yonaguni, arecovered briefly in this paper. With Onaga'selection in November and Abe's re-election inDecember 2014, each of them now enters aprobably decisive stage. Through their prism,something of the essential qualities of theJapanese state itself – democracy, law,constitution – may be seen

In accordance with the Abe design and despitethe opposition, construction works began atHenoko on the much-contested base project inJuly 2014. They were several times suspendedduring the year due to the of fierce andcontinuing Okinawan protest, typhoon weather,and the exigencies of elections, before beingresumed shortly after the New Year holiday of2015. Meanwhile, however, budgetaryallocations were unchallenged, tenderscontinued to be let, landfill sought andal located, and Abe to assure the USgovernment that the works would proceedaccording to his plan. Okinawan sentiment isirrelevant.

As for the six "Osprey pads" to be constructedin the Yambaru forest at Takae for the MarineCorps, the government late in 2014, havingfailed to exclude local protest by securingvarious restraining "SLAPP"-type court orders,8

planned to transfer control over the No 70prefectural road to the US military, leaving it todrive away protesters when works resumed.9 InFebruary 2015 it then handed over to theMarine Corps in advance the two Osprey padsthat had been completed. Two days laterprotesters' roadside tents at the sitedisappeared overnight, presumably at thehands of the Okinawa Defense Bureau (directly

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or indirectly, although the ODB denied it). TheHigashi Village Assembly then adoptedunanimously (and for the first time) aresolution declaring that the construction hadbeen against the wishes of the local communityand banning US helicopters from using them.Two days later however, on 25 February 2015,the Marine Corps' Osprey appeared at the siteand began training flights.10

The message from the Abe government wasthat Osprey-pad construction would continue atTakae, and that therefore the priority to the USmilitary over the forest dwellers, whetherhuman, animal, or avian, would continue. Arecent spate of unexplained deaths of the rareand endangered Noguchigera woodpecker(found only in this forest) was attributed bysome to the penetration of Osprey noise intothe deepest recesses of the forest.11 While theAbe government continued to talk of "reducing"the base burden, residents of Takae and itsNorthern Okinawan vicinity faced the prospectof the newly introduced and ear-crushinglynoisy Osprey flying roughly twice as often asthe CH-46 it was to replace.12 It was especiallygalling for them, eight years into an unyieldingstruggle to protect their living environment,with zero resources and virtually ignored bythe national media, to be singled out for abuseby the Marine commander of Camp Gonsalveswho referred to them contemptuously as being"paid by the Communist Party.13

As for Yonaguni, and the South-Westernfrontier islands in general, from the time of theDemocratic Party governments of 2009-2012the commitment to establish a militarypresence there has been part of a sharedsecurity consensus. By the time a plebiscitewas conducted on Yonaguni in February 2015on the government's plan to construct a Self-Defense Force base there the government hadalready acquired a site and was proceedingwith all possible to construct facilities, planningto have the Self Defense Forces to move inearly in 2016. Because Yonaguni thus actually

seemed to be choosing a base future (albeitJapanese rather than American), its case mayseem at odds with Henoko and Takae but, asshown below, the structural parallel is clear: inall three cases national policy exigency over-rode any consideration of local opposition.

Henoko: Abe's "Shock and Awe"

The undisputed objective of all Japanesegovernments since 1996, save Hatoyama's, hasbeen the same: to retain the Marines onOkinawa by building a new base for them onOura Bay. Originally (1996) referred to as aheliport, it grew and grew, into today's projectto reclaim 160 hectares of sea fronting HenokoBay to the east and Oura Bay to the west,imposing on it a mass of concrete towering 10metres above the sea and featuring two 1,800metre runways and a deep-sea 272 meter-longdock. This so-called Futenma ReplacementFacility (FRF), a land-sea-air base with its owndeep-water port, is a design to serve throughthe 21st century as potentially the largestconcentration of land, sea, and air militarypower in East Asia, from which Japanese andUS forces would combine to confront andcontain China.

Henoko, the hamlet chosen for this project,happens to be one of the most bio-diverse andspectacularly beautiful marine and coastalzones in all Japan, one that its Ministry of theEnvironment wants to promote as a UNESCOWorld Heritage Site. It hosts a cornucopia oflife forms from blue-and many other species of-coral (with the countless microorganisms towhich they are host) through crustaceans, seacucumbers and seaweeds and hundreds ofspecies of shrimp, snail, fish, tortoise, snakeand mammal. Many are rare or endangered,and strictly protected, none more so than thecritically endangered dugong.

However, service to the American MarineCorps clearly trumps protection of bio-diversityor rare and endangered species for the Abegovernment. On the very day, 19 November

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2014, that the National Diet adopted a speciallaw to address the problem of Chinese fishingboat depredations of the coral in the seasaround the Ogasawara Islands, the samegovernment itself began to destroy the coral ofOkinawa's Oura Bay.

From 1996 to 2013, popular resistance forcesin Okinawa successfully blocked the FutenmaReplacement Facility (FRF) agenda. For thelast three years of that period, the Hatoyamapromise of "at least not within Okinawa" (saiteidemo kengai) helped precipitate the shift bylocal governing authorities, bringing about anOkinawan consensus, shared by the Governor,Prefectural and City Assemblies, prefecturalchapters of the major national political parties(Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito),the two main newspapers and majority opinionin general (according to repeated surveys):Oura Bay must be saved. In the lead up to theNovember 2014 election, opposition to anysuch FRF was running at 74 per cent in lateApril rising to over 80 per cent in late August,the highest ever recorded.14

The Abe government (as also previousgovernments) case for Henoko constructionalways stressed that a Marine Corps presencewas vital to Japan's defense and that ifFutenma was to be returned there was noalternative but to shift it to Henoko. Bothpropositions were dubious and few specialistsagreed with them. From 1996, both sidesagreed that Futenma had to be returned. Had itbeen located on US soil, it would long ago havebeen shut down as posing too great a threat topeople of the surrounding town. GovernorNakaima made its return a core promise of hiscampaign for re-election in 2014, declaring thatPrime Minister Abe had promised him Futenma"reversion within 5 years." The same promisewas reiterated later by his successor, GovernorOnaga. Yet the formal bilateral (US-Japan)agreement on the issue in April 2013 stipulatedreversion by "at earliest, 2022."15 When Abea n d o t h e r m i n i s t e r s i n A p r i l 2 0 1 4

communicated to the US side the Okinawan"request" that this be altered to 2019,16 MarineCorps commander John Wissler explicitly ruledit out. Withdrawal from Futenma was not onthe cards until troops could be transferred tothe newly built facility at Henoko.17 Ginowanwould have to live with the noise and danger ofa major base in its midst for at least eight, notfive years, and almost certainly much longer.

At a joint ministerial meeting in Tokyo on 2October 2014 senior US officials (of Defenseand State) dismissed Nakaima's pledge as a"pipedream."18 In February 2015, John McCain,prominent Republican and head of the USSenate's Military Affairs Sub-committee, addedhis view of such early return as "impossible."The Abe government's insistence that itsHenoko construction project was the only andthe "realistic" option for securing Futenma'sreturn "within five years" was disingenuous. Itwas deliberately misinterpreting the clearposition of the government of the US, knowingthat the US side had explicitly ruled out anyFutenma reversion earlier than 2022.19

McCain's comment pointed to irritation at highlevels in Washington over Tokyo's duplicity.

Prime Minister Abe, having taken the first fullyear of his second term to secure the consenthe needed for reclamation of Oura Bay fromGovernor Nakaima (in December 2013) thenbegan serious preparations and at thebeginning of July 2014 declared just over halfof Oura Bay off limits and initiated preliminarysurvey works.20 By mobilizing an armada ofships under the Coastguard to enforce theworks, his government hoped to display suchshock and awe as to sow Okinawa with despair.His display reminded Okinawans of nothing somuch as the previous armada, the Americanone that launched the catastrophic attack onOkinawa in the summer of 1945. This time theirown government was the attacker.

Four days before departing from office (on 10December 2014) Nakaima delivered his final

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insult to the people who had voted him out ofof f ice. He approved two out of threeapplications by the Okinawa Defense Bureaufor amendments to the Henoko reclamationplan that were designed to change the originaldesign so as to block any possible interventionby Nago City (which resolutely opposesconstruction). He did so from deep within thecorridors of the Prefectural Office, avoidingexplanation or justification.21

"All Okinawa"

Decades of seething Okinawan discontentbrought to the fore late in 2014 an unlikelyfigure to play a key role in its next phase.Onaga Takeshi had built his career as aconservative politician and core figure in theLDP, campaign manager, no less, for NakaimaHirokazu in the 2010 gubernatorial election.His appeal to the Okinawan mass sentiment isbased on his "re-birth" as an avatar of "All-Okinawa" identity politics, transcending thecategories of conservative and progressive,"left" and "right," and proclaiming the priorityof "identity over ideology." It was he who ledthe January 2013 prefectural delegation,Kempakusho, many of its members staunchlyconservative, to Tokyo to demand unconditionalclosure and return of Futenma and withdrawalof the MV-22 Osprey vertical takeoff andlanding (VTOL) Marine Corps aircraft. Thatmission thereby in effect set the keynote ofsubsequent Okinawan identity politics. Whetheror not such an essentially moral politics can beviable in the long term, in the short term thecontradiction between Okinawa and the nationstate of Japan is so overwhelming that it iswidely supported.

The Kempakusho events and their ongoingsequel ser iously spl i t the Okinawanconservative camp. While many, especiallythose with significant construction industryinterests, remained loyal to Nakaima, asignificant group, headed by leading figures inthe hotel, tourism, retail and food industries,

moved instead to support Onaga and the "AllOkinawa," anti-base cause.22 They saw the USbases as "nothing but an obstacle todevelopment." One prominent figure, KanehideGroup's Goya Morimasa said "The governmentis likely to wield money and power in thiselection but it cannot crush voices of thepeople. This is an election that goes to theidentity of Okinawa. Let us adopt theperspective of government of Okinawa by thepeople of Okinawa and for the people ofOkinawa."23

More broadly, the LDP claim to offer Okinawathe best economic prospects because of itsguarantee of pipeline from nation to prefecturehad worn thin because successive conservativeregimes in Okinawa had brought no change tothe statistical facts that the prefecture rankedbottom in the country in terms of per capitaincome, highest in terms of unemployment, andNo 1 or No 2 in terms of absolute poverty,proportion of working poor, and of irregularworkers in the workforce. "All Okinawa"seemed to offer a better prospect.

As Onaga's campaign developed in 2014 his"All Okinawa" message became increasinglyforthright and focused on the pledge "to stopconstruction using every means at mydisposal" 2 4 to prevent Henoko beingconstructed and to rid Okinawa of the Osprey.25

The bases, he declared (echoing businessleaders such as Goya), were the "biggestobstacles to Okinawan development."26

Having begun his campaign with a visit to thefront lines of struggle at Henoko, Onagafollowed his victory just two days later byrepeating that gesture, declaring his solidarityand determination to stop the works. By then,he enjoyed support across the politicalspec t rum, so tha t commun i s t s andconservatives could stand together onOkinawan platforms, something unprecedentednot only in Okinawa but the country as a whole.Okinawa therefore had from December 2014 a

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Governor who enjoyed an extraordinary level ofpopular support to stop the construction worksat Henoko, cancel all outstanding tendersrelated to the project, remove structures builton the bay since July 2014 and restore OuraBay, and stop the construction of the "Osprey"bases throughout the Yambaru forest(especially in the hamlet of Takae).

Once in office, however, Governor Onaga wasoddly hesitant. Instead of quickly revoking orcanceling the permit for reclamation of OuraBay issued by his predecessor, he promised toset up a commission to look into the question.Instead of confrontation, he even suggestedthat cancelation or revocation might not benecessary because he might be able topersuade the Abe government to stopconstruction,27 and on the question of how longthings might take he said, in response to aquestion in the Prefectural Assembly, that itmight not be possible to fulfill his pledgeswithin a single four-year term. 2 8 Thiscircumspect Onaga sounded very different tothe Onaga who just before the prefecturalelection had stood on the Henoko beachdeclaring to a mass protest meeting, beforesome 5,500 people , h is unequivocalcommitment to "zettai ni soshi" (absolutely puta stop to) base construction.29

In late December 2014 and the following mid-January, Onaga made several visits to Tokyo, tosubmit his credentials, establish contact withthe Abe government, and negotiate the annualfiscal grant to the prefecture. However, majorfigures (Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary,Foreign Minister) refused to see him (inmarked contrast with their warm greetings forhis predecessor earlier in the month). ChiefCabinet secretary Suga said bluntly, "I have nointention to meet him during [the remainder of]this year."30 For them, the base issue was"settled" and there was therefore nothing todiscuss. If Onaga wanted to communicatesomething to the government, said a seniorofficial of the ruling LDP, then he could do so

through the prefectural branch of the party,i.e., precisely those forces with whom he was atodds over fundamental policy issues.31 Thehostility was plain. The government seemed tothink that a severe scolding would lead Onagato resume the proper role of Governor, asobedient supplicant.

For his part, however, Onaga seemed strangelyreluctant to press the prefecture's case. He didmeet on both occasions with the minister incharge of Okinawan matters, YamaguchiShunichi, but when he did he seems to havetalked only about the scale of budget grantOkinawa could expect.32 Asked to explain whyhe chose not to even mention Henoko, he madethe strange reply: "It would have been impoliteto mention it during a ten minute conversationas I was taking my leave."33

An unnamed Okinawan LDP member of theDiet may have spoken for general sentimentwithin the party when he (or she) was quotedas saying there was "no need to cooperate withthose who have gone over to the enemy."34 Thepunishment to Okinawa for electing Onagaincluded a 10 per cent cut in the annual budgetfor 2015 (to around 310 billion yen),35 and thealmost certain deletion of the main projectedinfrastructural item - a north-south railway onOkinawa Island.

His treatment was reminiscent of that accordedOta Masahide, governor between 1990 and1998, who also offended Tokyo by his stubbornattempts to re-negotiate the base issue and wastherefore frozen out of all contacts with thenational government from February toDecember 1998, when he was eventuallydefeated at the polls.

Though he might have chosen to wield areformist broom through the prefectural officesso as to create an "All Okinawa" team esprit decorps, instead he seemed intent on retainingthe core of the old regime within the new.Rather than frontal opposition to the national

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government his approach was marked byrestraint and the hope for compromise.

As Deputy Governors he chose two localpoliticians and long-term associates with widebureaucratic experience but no record ofstrong views on base issues or dugong – AgedaMitsuo (aged 66) and Urasaki Isho (aged 71).Then he made an even more start l ingappointment, that of Henzan Hideo (aged 66) toset up and run a Washington office for theprefecture. Henzan's career included 30 yearsemployment as special adviser to the USconsul-general's office in Naha, committed toserving US (rather than Okinawan, or evenJapanese) interests. Whatever his competenceat negotiating in English and his wide circle ofWashington insider contacts, it was far fromclear how from 2015 he would embody "All-Okinawan" anti-base determination.

No appointments carried more weight thanthose to the specialist advisory body (the"Experts Committee") that Onaga set up toexamine and advise him on the legality of theprocess of decision-making by his predecessorto identity possible flaws in the legal processthat would warrant its cancelation. Heannounced the plan to set it up at the outset ofhis administration, but then took two months tosettle its membership while he sought scholarsand public figures who could be seen as"neutral" and "objective." That meant excludingfrom the outset those identified with the anti-base struggle, whether lawyers (because mostOkinawan lawyers have been involved by nowin one or other base-related suit against thegovernment), or environmentalists. In fact anyenvironmentalist still neutral on the threat ofbase development to Okinawa's environment 18years into a bitter contest between the nationstate and the prefecture on precisely this issueshould rather have been disqualified. Then o t i o n o f a " n e u t r a l " O k i n a w a nenvironmentalist was oxymoronic.

Eventually, the process prolonged by the quest

for "balance," a six-man panel was appointed,comprising three environmentalists and threelawyers.36 All were distinguished scholars orjurists, but only one, Sakurai Kunitoshi, had arecord of concern with the issue they would becalled to investigate.37 Sakurai was well knownfor the view that the Henoko assessmentprocess had been deeply flawed from the outsetand that therefore the Nakaima decision tolicense reclamation was improper and illegal.As the prefecture's best-known environmentalassessment specialist and former president ofOkinawa University, he could scarcely beoverlooked for a seat on the Commission butsome suspected darkly that the reason that fullmembership took so long to settle might havebeen because of the desire to find authoritativefigures who would be able to "balance" hisviews.

The Commission began meeting in February2015 and was to keep thereafter to afortnightly schedule, leading to an outcome nosooner than June, so that there was thereforelittle likelihood of any Onaga decision beforeJuly. By that time, and whatever the panelrecommended, it was clear that it would be toolate to save Oura Bay.

Even Governor Nakaima, though he eventuallysigned off on it, declared that constructionwould "cause tremendous problems in terms ofenvironmental conservation" and that "evenwith the conservation measures in the EIA, theconservation of the livelihood of local peopleand of the environment in the area affected isimpossible."38 The question for Governor Onaga,therefore, was not so much one of findingpossible procedural flaws in Nakaima's actionsas of exercising his own gubernatorialauthority, based on the expression of thepopular will clear in his election, to revoke thereclamation license. Under the "Reclamation ofPublicly Owned Water Surfaces Act" (Koyusuimen umetateho, 1921) reclamation may onlybe permitted (under Art icle 4) i f dueconsideration has been paid to conservation,

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whereas this environmental impact assessmentprocess has been widely declared "the worstEIA in the history of Japanese EIA."39

Aside from the establishment of the "experts"panel, Onaga's "All Okinawa" politics involvedformalizing his administration's mass base asthe "All Okinawa Conference to Implement theKenpakusho and Open the Future," planning aprefectural delegation to Washington (expectedto occur around May 2015), and pressing theOkinawan cause to all 46 Japanese prefectures,and (in some as yet unspecified way) the UnitedNations.40 Whatever such initiatives mightaccomplish, however, there seemed littleprospect that they might significantly changethe attitude of the Abe government.

Onaga's hesitant moves on the Henoko (andTakae) fronts contrasted sharply with Abe'sdecisiveness. Watching with pain and disbeliefearly in 2015 as the Abe government proceededto drop huge, coral crushing, concrete blocks,each between 10 and 45 tons, across Oura Bayto mark the outline of the reclamation site, tolet works-related contracts, prepare anddispatch materials, and harass, beat, and arrestprotesters, many who had been among Onaga'senthusiastic supporters just months earlier,were shocked.

Ocean Floor Drilling Rig, Oura Bay, 13March 2015, (Ryukyu shimpo)

On 16 February 2015, three months after hiselection, Onaga at last took action, even if bythe most modest set of measures. He orderedthat no more concrete blocks be lowered intothe sea, that existing ones remain where theywere, that no further changes be made to thesea floor, and that photographs be preparedshowing the location of the blocks that hadbeen lowered and the impact on theirimmediately surrounding environment. He alsoordered a prefectural study to be completedby10 March, to be followed by whatever actionthen seemed appropriate.

What concerned him at this point, however,was not the works per se and the destructionthey might be causing to the environment butwhether some part of them might be ultravires, in other words whether the OkinawanDefense Bureau might have exceeded theauthority granted it by Governor Nakaima inAugust 2014 (a detailed, subsidiary consent forfracture of coral in parts of the designated sitefollowing his overarching grant of consent toreclamation issued in December of thepreceding year). A few days later, in his formalpolicy speech to the prefectural Assembly,Onaga insisted that his goals of stoppingHenoko and having Futenma returned werefoundations of prefectural policy.

Furthermore, as the government and resistanceforces faced each other at Henoko, the Abegovernment adopted increasingly forcefulmeans. On 20 November, 85 year oldShimabukuro Fumiko (a Battle of Okinawasurvivor) was carried off to hospital from theCamp Schwab protest gathering, suffering asuspected concussion.41 On the following dayjournalists from the Okinawan daily Ryukyushimpo were manhandled, abused and forciblyremoved from the site and protesting canoeistsand kayakers were intimidated and driven offor on occasion dumped at sea, as far as fourkilometres from shore, after being held forvarying periods.42 In one much publicized caseon 20 January 2015, a Coastguard officer

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gripped a woman film maker around the neckwith his legs (a "horse riding" assault) intent onwrenching away her camera.43

On 22 February, just before the opening of amass protest meeting at the gate of CampSchwab, local Japanese security agents for theUS Marine Corps arrested three protesters,including the head of the Okinawa PeaceMovement Centre, Yamashiro Hiroji, onsuspicion of breaching the special criminal law(adopted in 1952 at the height of the KoreanWar to prescribe stringent punishment forunauthorized entry or attempted entry into USbases in Japan). Film footage showedYamashiro, when ordering demonstrators to beespecially careful not to cross the boundaryline, being suddenly attacked, flung to theground, handcuffed, and dragged feet-first intothe base by US Marine Corps securitypersonnel. As the Okinawa Times noted, itappeared to be a clear case in which theconstitutional right to freedom of assembly,opinion, and expression had been sacrificed tothe overarching extraterritorial rights enjoyedby the US.44 For Okinawans, it suggested areturn to the lawless dark ages of the 1950swhen US forces confiscated land andconstructed bases at will, and treatedOkinawans with violence and contempt.

When LDP party chief Ishiba Shigeru wrote inhis blog on 29 November 2013 that after allthere was little difference in substancebetween vociferous demonstrators andterrorists, he likely spoke the sentiment of theAbe government as a whole.45

However, three months after Onaga's electionand despite his pledges to the contrary, nothinghad halted or slowed progress on constructionat Henoko or Takae. Osprey flew freely inOkinawan skies, fresh blocks of concretecontinued to be dropped onto the ocean floorand there was no indication that the Americanoccupation of Futenma would be ending anytime soon. The government simply ignored the

Governor's order that works be suspendedpending the outcome of a prefectural study.From the very next day it began depositingfresh concrete blocks on the Bay floor. Early inMarch it sent in riot police to rip away the tent-like protection that had been put in place for aperformance at Camp Schwab Gate by 20sanshin (the Okinawan three-stringedinstrument known in Japan as shamisen),leaving them to perform under the rain. On 12March 2015, it began to bore into the sea floorfrom a gigantic drill ing rig.4 6 The Abegovernment still refused to talk to the Onagaadministration (it would be "meaningless," saidDefense Secretary Nakatani on 13 March), andthe US authorities refused (for "operationalreasons") permission to the Governor to enterthe site to conduct the survey he had promised.

Onaga referred to this as "extremelyregrettable" (taihen ikan), promising to stick tohis pledge to stop the construction.47 However,it remained to be seen if he possessed thegumption to issue an order rescinding thereclamation license granted by his predecessor,order immediate stoppage of Oura Bay works,and launch court proceedings against thenational government for an order to cease itsdepredations, remove the concrete blocks, andrestore the ecology of the Bay. To do so wouldbe to remove the fig leaf of legality beneathwhich the Abe government sheltered. It mightnot stop the Tokyo juggernaut, but it wouldexpose in sharp relief the anti-democraticassault of the national state on the prefecture.

Yonaguni

The "Yonaguni problem" has to be understoodin the same frame as the "Okinawa problem"and the "Henoko problem," all of which arepart of the "Japan problem." Throughout theCold War, the 600 ki lometre chain ofSouthwest (Nansei) Japanese islands stretchingthrough the East China Sea to Taiwanremained peaceful and stable, with nosignificant military presence despite the

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adjacent Cold War frontier and just twopolicemen, a hand-gun apiece, to keep order.Since it ended, Yonaguni and other Okinawanoutlying islands, as much "offshore" fromTaiwan and China in the East China Sea asfrom Japan, have faced a debate over theirfuture. Far from Japan's metropolitan centersYonaguni is at its closest point around 110kilometres from the shore of Taiwan, just 370from the East China coastal city of Foochowand a mere 150 from the uninhabited butfiercely contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Theprefectural capital, Naha, by contrast is 520kilometres and the national capital of Tokyoaround 2,000 kilometres distant.48

Though it is basically an offshore island ofTaiwan, and just slightly farther offshore fromChina itself, there is in Yonaguni minimal senseof any "China threat" and (common throughoutOkinawa) a strong social memory of half amillennium of close and friendly pre-moderncontact with China.

In the midst of a booming region, Yonagunisuffers population attrition and economicdecline because of the lack of direct transportor communications links with either Taiwan orChina. It was populated half a century ago byover 10,000 people but now a mere 1,500.Uniquely in Japan, therefore, it has twice in thepast decade formally debated its collectivefuture, in 2004-5 and in 2014-2015. In 2005, itformulated a "Vision" for a future based onregional (East China Sea) cooperation and opendoor trade, fishing and tourism link withTaiwan, but Tokyo forbade it. Then, following aUS naval intelligence-gathering visit to theisland in 2007, a different, even opposite, ideaof a military centred future began to gatherattention. A petition to urge a base presencewas organized in 2008 by a local "DefenseAssociation" and drew 514 signatures, and theYonaguni mayor, Hokama Shukichi, in June2009 approached the Ministry of Defense andthe Ground Self-Defense Forces to suggest theyset up a base on the island.

Defense of the Southwestern (or Frontier,Sakishima) islands had been stressed by bothLDP and DPJ governments, especially followingthe 2010 incidents at sea between Japan andChina over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands (foradministrative purposes part of the OkinawanYaeyama Island group). But many wereunhappy at the thought of a military centeredfuture. In 2011, 556 people, roughly 46 percent of the electorate (and marginally morethan had signed the initial petition to invite theSDF), signed a petition seeking to cancel theinvitation. When that had no effect, it then, in2012, organized a petition calling for a localplebiscite on the issue. That attracted 544signatures, but it too had no effect because theCity Assembly voted 3:2 to reject it.

In June 2013 the Town Assembly voted (3:2) tolease an island property (South Ranch orMinami Bokujo) to the SDF and two monthslater pro-base mayor Hokama was re-elected, ifby the narrowest of margins (553:506). Opinionremained finely balanced but the pro-basegroup determinedly opposed any directconsultation with the island public. Then,however, as works commenced in the spring ofthe following year to level and contour the sitefor construction, the political balance of theisland again shifted following a Town Assemblyelection in September 2014. An anti-basecandidate topped the poll and in November aresolution to conduct a referendum on the baseissue (in effect the same as had been narrowlyrejected two years earlier) was adopted, 3:2.49

However, even as the political wheels to callthe project into question and ultimately to tryto cancel it and reclaim the site were thusslowly turning, the bulldozers and trucks at thesite were stepping up the tempo of worksdesigned to make them irreversible.

Base proponents tended not to mentionstrategic or military considerations. MayorHokama appealed to the island to support theSDF base proposal as an economic boost to theflagging island's economy. In his re-election

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campaign in 2013 and in his referendumcampaign in 2015, He concentrated onpromises of free school lunches, a wasteincinerator, town water and sewerage systems,a sports ground, and optical fibre internetconnections. He claimed that the arrival of adetachment of well-paid and mostly youngsoldiers would constitute a significanteconomic boost, invigorating the island.50

The anti-base position rested on severalgrounds, fundamentally the aversion formil i tarization and the memory of thecatastrophe of 1945. Any military presence,once established, could only grow, feeding thecross-sea confrontation, gradually changing thecharacter of the island and widening thepainful splits it had already caused in its close-knit community. As Okinawa in 1945constituted the "sacrificial stones" for defenseof mainland Japan, so Yonaguni Islanders (andOkinawans in general) feared that any militarypresence at the heart of the confrontationbetween China and Japan (backed by the US)had the potential to turn them again intosacrificial victims in any future East China Seaclash. Defense, in 2014 as in 1945, wasconcerned with Japan's core, its mainland, notOkinawa and least of all Yonaguni.

Opponents of the base also feared possiblehealth risks, especially in the immediatevicinity of the project camp, and possibleadverse consequences for the island's faunaand flora. Asked about the impact of high-powered electro-magnetic waves that were tobe directed from the prospective base over thetownship, school, and kindergarten of Kubura,24 hours a day, Prime Minister Abe told theUpper House of the Diet in November 2014that there would be no risk, but since hedeclined on grounds of military secrecy toreveal the strength of those waves, noteveryone was convinced.51 Also, the island isknown to be home to 52 threatened orendangered plant and animal species, includingthe Yonaguni Marubane Kuwagata (a

distinctive stag beetle).52 It is also home to theworld's largest moth, Yonaguni-san or Ayumihabiru, and Japan's smallest horse, theYonaguni horse. Nobody could say for certainwhat the impact on these creatures would be.

However, though opponents of the base projecttended to hark back to the 2005 "Vision"agenda of an East Asian or East China Seacommunity, they found it difficult to spell outhow this would be accomplished. One modestinitial proposal was for a ferry service to linkYonaguni Island to Taiwan (a two to two and ahalf hour journey by hydrofoil) as a simple stepthat they believed could radically transform lifeon the island.53

In the event, the 22 February referendumreturned a fairly clear "Yes" result, 632 to 445(in an 85 per cent poll), thus settling thelongstanding question over the project. AGround Self Defense Force (GSDF) of around150 would be based on the island from 2016engaged in surveillance of adjacent sea andsky. Fatigue from years of bitter struggle in thesmall, close-knit island community played alarge role in the outcome.5 4 Many werediscouraged by the silence of OkinawanGovernor Onaga, who they had assumed,following his victory in November 2014, wouldincorporate the island within his general "AllOkinawa" anti-base stance. Without externalsupport, and knowing that Minister of DefenseNakatani Gen had said that construction wasgoing to proceed irrespective of the poll result,it seemed futile for a few hundred islanders toattempt to resist the determined centralgovernment. Still, the 41 per cent No voteshowed that divisions in the communityremained deep.

Whatever the future holds, the choice that wasmade had a Faustian quality: the SDF maybring economic benefits, but, once ensconcedon the island they will be loath ever to leave,and they will bring with them the real, ifindeterminate risk for Yonaguni of being

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assigned a place on a putative Chinese missiletarget list. One island resident wrote, sadly,"When the base gets built I believe that asubstantial number of people will leave, thattourism will decline significantly, that quality oflife will decrease, that far fewer children willreturn after high school, that, as a result thecharacter of the island will change for theworse."55

Furthermore, the military logic of East ChinaSea surveillance from Yonaguni is dubious.Chinese ships passing from the East China Seato the Pacific naturally prefer the route throughinternational waters in the Miyako straitbetween Okinawa Island and Miyako Island(some hundred or so kilometres to thenortheast). Some in the other Japanese SDFservices (Air and Maritime) suspected that thereal reasons on the part of the GSDF fordeployment to Yonaguni were "turf"considerations, to compensate for the loss ofrole in Hokkaido where, through the Cold War,they prepared for a putative land attack bySoviet forces.56 In the post-Cold War, post-Waron Terror era, the South-West was the growtharea for Japan's military. Both Air and Maritimeforces had already assured themselves of amajor role there and Yonaguni was the Groundforce's chance. A similar move into the muchlarger Ishigaki Island, where the newly re-elected conservative mayor is known to besupportive of such stationing and alsowelcoming of Maritime SDF visits, was alsoexpected to follow shortly.

Reluctant or otherwise, however, the 10-yearstruggle to define a post-Cold War role forYonaguni had been resolved. For better or forworse, the island had made the fateful decisionto throw in its lot with the Japanese military(and its Pentagon backers).

Prospect

Canoeist Grabbed by Coastguard, 4 March2015. Photo:Ryukyu shimpo

Following the gubernatorial election ofNovember and the national lower houseelections of December, the Okinawan peopleappeared to an unprecedented degree united,rejuvenated, determined. Just three monthslater, the mood had shifted to doubt and fearthat the process of construction at Henoko (andTakae) had developed a perhaps unstoppablemomentum, the Osprey presence was beingstepped up, and that all Governor Onaga'sprofessions of stopping these things might inthe end prove empty. Conditions at Yonaguniwere probably unique, but the outcome theremight be taken as a signal that Tokyo's willwould in the end prevail.

While the rest of Japan, and its media, turns ablind eye, Okinawan society is subjected to

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enormous strains. As a Ryukyu shimpo editorialof 18 August 2014 put it:

"As far as we know, the government has neverunleashed such reckless disregard of the will ofthe people, as we have seen at Henoko. … Wewonder if there has ever been a case like this,where the government has trampled on the willof the overwhelming majority of people in aprefecture elsewhere in Japan. This action bythe government evokes memories of thecrackdown against peasants during the Edoperiod. … The Abe government seems to be inthe process of moving from 'dictatorship' to'terror politics'."57

And things have only got worse since then.

In contrast to the hesitation and ambiguities ofhis early months in office, and his studiedindifference to Yonaguni, Onaga had begun andended his campaign for the governorship withthe powerful gesture of visiting the anti-baseactivists on the Henoko front lines anddeclaring solidarity with them. It seemedunthinkable that he would renege on thesolemn pledges he had made then. Asprefectural riot police and national Coastguardforces are deployed to crush protesters whosecause he shares, and as the process of boringinto the bed of Oura bay and transformingmuch of it into a major East Asian militaryconcentration in defiance of the wishes of theOkinawan people proceeds, Onaga faces thechallenge of weaving a credible, democraticpolitics out of his general "All-Okinawa"principle.

The problem with Onaga's reiteration of themantra "identity has precedence over ideology"is that politicians, and indeed humans, possessmultiple identities. Onaga is not only Okinawanbut he is also a lifelong (to 2014) member ofthe Liberal Democratic Party. Since that is anidentity he shares with Prime Minister Abe, Abeand his government now must hope thatOnaga's political identity as a conservativewould reassert itself over his ethnic or cultural

identity as Okinawan.

Should Onaga choose to stand at the helm andlead the prefecture into a principled standagainst the national government, "All-Okinawan" unity would constitute a formidablestrength. The national government may persistin intimidation and manipulation, but there areobvious limits to the extent to which it canresort to direct violence. Okinawa seemedready last November to persist in saying "No"(on large matters of security, environment, andindeed democracy) to the national government.The question is: will its Governor lead theminto battle?

Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack,"'All Japan' versus 'All Okinawa' - Abe Shinzo'sMilitary-Firstism," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.13, Issue 10, No. 4, March 16, 2015.

Notes

1 See, inter alia, Gavan McCormack, "The SanFrancisco Treaty at Sixty-The Okinawa Angle,"in Kimie Hara, ed, The San Francisco Systemand Its Legacies: Transformation and HistoricalReconciliation in the Asia-Pacific, London,Routledge, 2015, pp. 144-161

2 Client State: Japan in the American Embrace,London and New York, Verso, 2007. "Zokkokumondai – Beikoku no hoyo to higashi Ajia de nokoritsu," in Magosaki Ukeru and Kimura Akira,eds, Owaranai "senryo", Kyoto, Horitsubunkasha, 2013, pp. 18-38．

3 "Japan's "Positive Pacifism": Issues ofHistorical Memory in Contemporary ForeignPolicy," Brown Journal of World Affairs (BrownUniversity, Watson Institute for InternationalStudies), Vol. XX, issue 2, spring-summer 2014,pp. 73-92.

4 Nakano Koichi, "Neoribe j idai no eanashonarizumu," Saraba dokusaisha, kensho,boso suru Abe seiken," Shukan kinyobi, rinjizokan, 17 April 2014, pp. 8-10．

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5 All four defeated LDP candidates werereturned to Diet seats under the proportionalrepresentation "bloc" system, as part of theLiberal Democratic Party (LDP) slate for theKyushu-Okinawa region.

6 "Henoko chushi 80% "eikyo nai' Sugakanbochokan kaiken, honshi seron chosa,Ryukyu shimpo, 26 August 2014.

7 "Henoko isetsu 'shukushuku to susumeru'Onaga shi tosen ni kambo chokan," Ryukyushimpo, 17 November 2014.

8 Yamaguchi Masanori, "Media ga hojinaiOkinawa," Shukan kinyobi, 13 July 2013, p. 58.For the background to the Takae struggle,Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu,Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japanand the United States, Lanham, Rowman andLittlefield, 2012, pp. 168-172.

9 "Takae heripaddo, toshiake kogi haijo e, Beiga rosokutai kanri," Okinawa taimusu, 31December 2014.

10 "Osupurei ga shin chakurikudai de hatsukunren, Higashi son Takae," Ryukyu shimpo, 26February 2015.

11 "Higashi son de Noguchigera mado nishototsushi, kotoshi yon-wa me," Okinawataimusu, 29 October 2014.

12 "Chakurikudai senko teikyo, hajisubekitaibei juzoku da," editorial, Ryukyu shimpo, 19February 2015.

13 Ibid. See also Jon Mitchell "The ForeignElement: In appearance on far-right TV, U.S.official calls Okinawa base protests 'hatespeech'," Japan Times, 16 February 2015.

14 Ryukyu shimpo, 5 May and 26 August 2014("Seron chosa: 'Henoko chushi' isetsu kyokohantai hirogaru"). Just 19.8 per cent favouredcontinuation of the works. Even in theconservative bloc, 70.1 per cent of LDP

supporters and 91.7 of New Komeitosupporters said they should be stopped.

15 Boeisho, "Beigun saihen nado zainichi Beigunno churyu ni kansuru shisaku, Boeisho," April2013.

16 "'Gonen inai' hitei chabangeki no zokko wamu imi da," Ryukyu shimpo, ed., April 2 2014.

17 "Marines won't leave Futenma till new basebuilt: Wissler," Japan Times, April 12, 2014. USPacific Commander Admiral (Samuel) Lockleartold a Senate Committee hearing the same.("'Gonen inai teishi hitei' kyoko no tanpo toshonin no tsumi," Okinawa taimusu, April 132014.)

18 "Gonen-nai teishi 'kuso' Henoko o minaosujiki da," editorial, Okinawa taimusu, 17 October2014.

19 Heianna Sumiyo, "Futenma 5 nen teishi'arienai', Makein shi," Okinawa taimusu, 19February 2015.

20 For my 1 July report, sailing around the Bayon the eve of this closure, "Gavan McCormack,kaijo ripoto Henoko," 2 July 2014.

21 "'Chiji, kakekomi shonin' shugiin de kenminno shinpan o," Ryukyu shimpo, editorial, 6December 2014.

22 "Three candidates to run in the gubernatorialelection," Ryukyu Shimpo, 24 July 2014.

23 "Onaga shi e asu shutsuba yosei," Okinawataimusu, 6 August 2014.

24 "Arayuru shuho o kushi shite, Henoko ni shinkichi wa tsukurasenai."

25 "Futenma kichi no heisa, tekkyo, kennaiisetsu dannen, Osupurei haibi tekkai o tsuyokumotomeru."

26 "Okinawa keizai hatten no saidai no sogai

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yoin."

2 7 "Shimin kensho kankyo men o jushi,"Okinawa taimusu, 18 December 2014 (seediscussion in "Hayaku mo 'kotai' shita hatsugikai toben, Onaga chiji ni setsumei sekinin o,"in the blog "Watashi no Okinawa/Hiroshimanikki," 20 December 2014.

28 Ryukyu shimpo, 17 December 2014 (quotedin "Hayaku mo," ibid.)

29 "Zen Naha shicho, Onaga Takeshi shi gakataru 'Okinawa chiji sen' shutsuba e nokakugo," Nikkan gendai, 13 October 2014.

30 "'Mendan moshiire fuhatsu' seifu wa Okinawano koe o kike," editorial, Okinawa taimusu, 27December 2014.

31 "Okinawa chiji o reigu, jiminto kanbu'Nakaima ja nai kara'," Asahi Shimbun, 9January 2015.

32 For the meeting on 26 December.

33 Okinawa taimusu, 17 January 2015.

34 "Mendan moshiire," op. cit.

3 5 "Okinawa shinko yosan ichiwari gen,rainendo seifu, 3100 oku en de chosei,"Okinawa taimusu, 8 January 2015.

36 "Henoko umetate shonin, kenshohan waSakurai shi ra 5 nin, toshiake hatsu kaigo,"Ryukyu shimpo, 25 December 2014. The groupwas later expanded to six members.

37 For representative Sakurai texts on theenvironmental implications of the Henokoproject, see the Asia-Pacific Journal index. Thetitle of one, "Japan's Illegal EnvironmentalImpact Assessment of the Henoko Base," (TheAsia Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 9, No 5,February 27, 2012) was characteristic.

38 Yoshikawa, ibid.

39 Shimazu Yasuo, former chair-person of theJapan Society for Impact Assessment, quoted inHideki Yoshikawa, "An appeal from Okinawa tothe US Congress," The Asia-Pacific Journal –Japan Focus, 29 September 2014.

40 "Shimagurumi kaigi, kokuren to Bei ni yoseikettei," Ryukyu shimpo, 20 December 2014.

41 "Henoko 85 sai josei kega, ichiji ishikiushinau," Okinawa taimusu, 21 November2014.

42 "Kenkei ga Henoko shusai bogai, kasha, eigakantoku o haijo," Ryukyu shimpo, 21 November2014.

43 "Henoko shin kichi kensetsu, kaiho, setsumeini mujun, umanori shashin 'josei kawashita',"Ryukyu shimpo, 23 January 2015. For resumeof incidents at the site, Jon Mitchell, "Injuries toOkinawa anti-base protesters 'laughable,' saysU.S. military spokesman," Japan Times, 9February 2015. Yamashiro and his companionwere handed over to the Japanese police inNago and their case referred to the prosecutorsbefore they were eventually released 35 hourslater.

44 "'Keitokuho de futari taiho' shinjigatai futokosoku, naze," editorial, Okinawa taimusu, 24February 2015

45 Quoted in Torigoe Shuntaro, "Boso suru Abeseiken – Heisei no fashizumu no ashioto,"Ryukyu shimpo, 7 December 2013.

46 "Henoko umetate: Beigun, ken no tachiirichosa o kyohi," Okinawa taimusu, 12 March2015.

47 "Onaga chiji 'yurusenai' hasai kyoka,torikeshi shisa," Ryukyu shimpo, 13 March2015.

48 On Yonaguni, see (in Japanese) John W.Dower and Gavan McCormack, Tenkanki noNihon e – pakkusu Americana ka pakkusu Ajia

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ka, Tokyo, NHK Bukkusu, chapter 3; and (inEnglish) Gavan McCormack, "Yonaguni:Dilemmas of a Frontier Island in the East ChinaSea," The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 1October, 2012, and "The End of the Postwar?The Abe Government, Okinawa, and YonaguniIsland", The Asia-Pacific Journal, December 8,2014

49 "Jumin tohyo 17 nichi jorei kaketsu e,"Ryukyu shimpo, 15 November 2014 and"'Tozen' 'naze ima sara'," Ryukyu shimpo, 18November 2014.

50 The evidence of Tsushima Island, roughlyh a l f - w a y b e t w e e n F u k u o k a C i t y i nsouthwestern Japan and Pusan in Korea,suggests otherwise. When that city invited theSDF in 1959, its population was 70,000. Now itis around 35,000.

51 Response by Prime Minister Abe to questionfrom Itokazu Keiko on possible adverse healtheffects of SDF radar on Yonaguni. 25November 2014.

52 "Zetsumetsu kigu made '52 shu seisoku',"Okinawa taimusu, 15 April, 2014.

53 Memo by Tasato Chiyoki, member of theYonaguni town assembly, to then Okinawagubernatorial candidate Onaga Takeshi, 17October 2014 (copy courtesy Mr Tasato).

54 Sado Akihiro, "Jumin tsuzuku tairitsu nihihei," and Yasuda Mamoru, "Kokkyo nosentaku," part 1 "Susumu koji ni hantai hagosan," both in Ryukyu shimpo, 24 February2015.

55 Personal communication from an islandresident.

56 "Yonaguni rikuji kikoshiki, haibi kakudai e nofuseki," Ryukyu shimpo, April 20 2014.

57 "Kussaku sagyo ni chakushu, mohaya 'kyofuseiji' da, banko chushi min-i o toe," Ryukyu

shimpo, 18 August 2014, also posted on theweb in English as "Abe administration signalsfuture reign of terror in Henoko."

Author

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor ofAustralian National University, editor of TheAsia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, author ofmany books and articles, including at this site(see index). His most recent books are:Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japanand the United States (with Satoko OkaNorimatsu), Rowman and Littlefield, 2012,Japanese, Korean and Chinese editions fromHoritsu Bunkasha (Kyoto, 2013), Changbi(Seoul, 2014) and SSAP (Beijing, 2015), andTenkanki no Nihon e – 'pakkusu amerikana' ka'pakkusu ajia' ka (with John W. Dower), NHKBukkusu, 2014 (in Japanese). This article waswritten by invitation for publication in Japanesein the monthly journal, Sekai, in the specialissue (rinji zokan) on Okinawa, March 2015.

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Gavan McCormack and Urashima Etsuko,"Okinawa's "Darkest Year", The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 12, Issue 33, No. 4, July 28, 2014.

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