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Freedom of Expression in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova

Freedom of Expression in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. 2016 Retrospective

2016 Retrospective

PROMO–LEX Association127 Stefan cel Mare str., Chisinau, Moldova Tel./fax: (+373 22) 450024E-mail: [email protected]

All rights reserved. The content of the Report may be used and reproduced for not-for-profit purposes and without the preliminary consent of Promo-LEX Association, provided that the source of information is indicated.

The content of the Report reflects the opinion and positions of the authors. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) does not bear any responsibility for the content of the Report.

The Report was developed under “Promoting human rights in Transnistria” Project, which was implemented by Promo-LEX Association with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

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PROMO–LEX Association127 Stefan cel Mare str., Chisinau, Moldova Tel./fax: (+373 22) 450024E-mail: [email protected]

National Endowment for Democracy1025 F Street NW. SUITE 800, Washington DC 20004, USAtel: (+1 202) 3789700E-mail: [email protected]

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Abbreviations.Terminology ...............................................................................................................................................4

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................................5

1. National and international principles on freedom of expression .............................................................6

2. Regulation on freedom of expression in the Transnistrian region ...........................................................11

3. Freedom of expression during the electoral campaign ..................................................................................13

Appendix .......................................................................................................................................................................................20

CONTENTS

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UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

CPPCG Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Committee

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

CINGOs Conference of International Non-governmental Organizations at the Council of Europe

KGB Institution specializing in security

PP Private television station - Первый Приднестровский

TSV Private television station - Телевидение свободного выбора (ТСВ)

JCC Joint Control Commission

RMN Self-proclaimed Moldovan Nistrean Republic

This Report covers aspects of the status of freedom of expression in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. The terms used do not imply any political position, in particular regarding the legal recognition of the institutions of the region or of the laws adopted by the de facto administration. In context, we will use the names of local organs and actors in italics, in order to differentiate them from constitutional organs and actors. The phrase de facto administration indicates the administration that exercises control over the territory to the east of the Republic of Moldova and that is not under the jurisdiction of the constitutional authorities.

TERMINOLOGY

ABBREVIATIONS


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Freedom of expression is a precondition for the creation of a democratic society. Every person has the right to free speech. As a member of a society, regardless of the structure of that society, human beings have the right to express their opinions publically. In this context, there arises an obligation for states to not intervene with fundamental liberties, to create opportunities for their expression, to encourage them and to protect them. These obligations, within the context of human rights, also apply to de facto administrations that exercise control over territory.

In this analysis we will refer to the status of freedom of expression in the Transnistrian region in 2016. In addition, we will describe the methods used to exert pressure on speech during the campaign for the elections of 11 December 20161. In order to demonstrate the systemic problems in that area, our findings have been formulated using relevant international standards. In addition, it is necessary to emphasize that national law does not apply in Transnistrian territory, and that international norms are only declarative. Although the de facto administration has unilaterally decided to respect four international conventions (ICCPR, ECHR, ICESCR and CPPCG), this does not entail any more than a minimal guarantee. The findings of this report allow us to conclude that the right to free expression remains one of the rights most frequently violated in the region.

Here, we would like to mention international structures’ interest not only in the political resolution of the Transnistrian dispute, but also in the human rights situation. For example, according to Freedom House, the Transnistrian region was classified as not free in 20162. The Conference of International Non-Governmental Organizations at the Council of Europe adopted the Recommendation on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in the Transnistrian Region on 24 June 2016, emphasizing that that sector should enjoy freedom of expression3.

In October 2016, in its 118th examination session on the State report about the implementation of the ICCPR by the Republic of Moldova, the UNHRC reiterated the need to reevaluate policies and to take all possible measures to effectively ensure human rights in the Transnistrian region, which was the subject of the recommendations formulated by UN Expert Thomas Hammarberg4.

International concern convinced the constitutional authorities to search for solutions and to continue to inform international organs about the status of respect for human rights. For the time being, the political dialogue does not include issues related to the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region, although those issues are being addressed more and more often by civil society and sometimes by the Bureau for Reintegration5. We hope that our observations will represent a reference point for those engaged in the process of resolving the Transnistrian dispute and will encourage an inclusive dialogue on ensuring freedom of expression. On the other hand, this report suggests that international opinion should establish clear principles

1 The local presidential elections of 11 December 2016.2 Freedom House Report, Freedom in the World, 2016, the situation in Transnistria; viewed 14 January 2017/ https://freedomhouse.org/

report/freedom-world/2016/transnistria.3 Recommendation CONF/PLE (2016)REC1 adopted by the Conference of INGOs on 24 June 2016, viewed on 14 January 2017/ https://

rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent.4 The interactive debates on 18 October 2016 at the UN Committee for Human Rights, session 118 on the implementation of the ICCPR,

viewed on 18 October 2016 / http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/human-rights-treaty-bodies/human-rights-committee/watch/consideration-of-moldova-3309th-meeting-118th-session-of-human-rights-committee/5175602357001.

5 Press release “The Reintegration Office condemns the indimidation and restriction of the activities of human rights promoters in the Transnistrian region”, viewed on 10 January 2017, at 13:00. http://gov.md/ro/content/biroul-pentru-reintegrare-condamna-actiunile-de-intimidare-si-de-restrictionare-activitatii.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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for guaranteeing the right to expression in conflict zones. We are of the opinion that, barring a unified international approach to this topic, the efforts of civil society have a minimal chance of contributing to respect for the right to expression.

Qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis were used in preparing this report, which is based on official and unofficial open sources. The data used were collected by direct observation, interviews with journalists and local activists and the study of repressive phenomena and of individual cases in which the freedom of expression was violated. In addition, the laws of the region and initiatives to modify or change them were also analyzed.

The report consists of three chapters that describe international and national standards for freedom of expression and analyze the de facto legal and institutional framework, including the status of freedom of expression in the region. In the last chapter we reflect on freedom of expression during the electoral campaign of December 2016.

Promo-LEX is grateful to its local partners for their support in completing this Report.

1. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON ENSURING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION1.1. National provisions and guarantees related to freedom of expression

The Republic of Moldova is part of a series of international treaties that regulate government involvement in order to ensure and protect fundamental rights and liberties throughout the entire territory of the signatory countries. We would like to mention that the Republic of Moldova has a favorable legal framework for exercising freedom of expression.

Freedom of opinion, expression, and artistic creation are provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova6. Article 32 guarantees freedom of opinion, affirming that “each citizen is guaranteed freedom of thought and of opinion, in addition to the freedom to publicly express themselves using words, images or any other possible means.” Article 33 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of artistic creation, which cannot be subjected to censorship. There also is a series of legislative acts that regulates the activity of the mass media7. According to these laws, the freedom to express ideas and opinions, the right to freely communicate information through mass media institutions, and the right to complete and true information are guaranteed by law. Pluralism of opinion and authors’ rights are guaranteed by the state, and media institutions cannot be subjected to censorship.

Law 64 from 23/04/2010 on freedom of expression explicitly regulates freedom of expression8. It guarantees the right to freedom of expression in searching for, receiving, and communicating facts and ideas. Freedom of expression protects both the contents and the form of the information expressed, including information that offends, shocks, and annoys. The law provides strict conditions for restricting freedom of expression. Limits are only allowed in order to protect a legitimate interest, and they must be proportional to the situation that prompted them and must respect a just equilibrium between the interests being protected and freedom of expression, as

6 Articles 32, 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, 1994/ http://lex.justice.md/document_rom.php?id=44B9F30E:7AC17731, viewed on 20/01/2017.

7 Legea nr. 243 din 26/10/1994 on the press (1995) http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=311633, viewed on 20/01/2017.

8 Law nr.64 from 23/04/2010 on freedom of expression. MO nr.117-118, in force from 09/10/2010 http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=335145&lang=1, viewed on 20/01/2017.

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well as the right of the public to be informed. The provisions mentioned above institute civil supervision of public authorities, which represents a democratic mechanism for ensuring the transparency and responsible execution of the public authorities’ duties. In this way, the legislation creates a favorable environment so that everyone can freely reveal information about the activities of public institutions, including by means of the media. In addition, criminal legislation establishes penalties for intentionally impeding the activities of the mass media, for the intimidation of critics, and for censorship9. It is, however, important to understand that, even though the press plays an important role in a democratic society, it should not overstep certain limits, especially those related to the protection of the reputations and rights of others, national security, and legal authorities10.

Another interesting topic for our analysis is the way in which Law 64 protects professional honor, dignity, and reputation. Article 7 of this law establishes that every person has the right to defend his or her professional honor, dignity, and reputation when it is attacked by the dissemination of false statements about facts or value judgments without sufficient factual basis. The person thus attacked by the dissemination of the allegations can be restored to rights if the information is false, defamatory, and allows for the identification of the person being attacked. In these types of situations, a person can request the correction or withdrawal of the information, as well as moral and material damages as determined by the court, in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.

Law 64 maintains that a person is slandered when verbal, written or non-verbal communication is is intentional and does not correspond to the norms of generally acceptable behavior in a democratic society, and allows for the identification of the person being slandered. In cases of slander, the person slandered can request an apology, or moral or material damages. In addition, the Contraventional Code of the Republic of Moldova establishes misdemeanor penalties for slander in public and in the mass media11.

1.2. International regulations on the freedom of expression

The UDHR states that every person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This right includes the right to hold opinions without interference, and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas by any means and regardless of state borders12.

These provisions are recognized in Article 19 of the ICCPR13. According the Covenant, every person has the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of borders, either orally or in print, in the form of art, or in any other means of choice. The treaty does not permit interference with freedom of opinion, although there are some restrictions on it, as provided for by law: respect for the rights or reputation of others, or the protection of national security, public order, public health, or public morals.

In addition, Article 10 of the ECHR specifies that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right consists of freedom of opinion and the freedom to receive or communicate information

9 Article 180/1-180/2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova (2002) http://lex.justice.md/md/331268/, viewed on 20/01/2017.

10 See the cases Colombani and others v. France/ Thoma v. Luxemburg.11 Article 69 of the Contraventional Code of the Republic of Moldova (2008) http://lex.justice.md/md/330333/, viewed on 20/01/2017. 12 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights/ http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/rum.pdf,

viewed on 20/01/2017. 13 Article 19 of the PIDCP/ http://www.irdo.ro/file.php?fisiere_id=80&inline, viewed on 20/01/2017.

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or ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. The Convention acknowledges the right of states to require the licensing of media companies.

The Court pays much attention to public expressions made in good faith, both in mass media and during rallies, especially about issues related to public personalities, to the administration of public judicial proceedings and any other issue of public interest.

The ECtHR also pays much attention to public debates, especially political ones, as a form of expression. The European Court is of the opinion that freedom of expression during political debates should not be unjustifiably limited.14 However, the Court notes that exercising freedom of opinion calls for obligations and responsibilities, that interference and sanctions are only permissible through law, and that only if the interference constitutes a necessary measure for national security, territorial integrity or public safety, the defense of order and the prevention of crime, the protection of health and morality, the protection of the reputation or rights of others, the protection of confidential information from being divulged or guaranteeing the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

States can limit freedom of expression in the conditions described above, but, in order to prevent abuse, they must demonstrate that these measures are necessary. If states cannot justify their actions, the ECtHR could find that Article 10 was violated. In this case, member states do not just have the negative obligation to not intervene, but they are required, as part of their positive obligations, to take all possible measures to ensure the effective existence of pluralism of the media, opinions, and ideas. In fact, the European Convention clearly explains that freedom of expression is not absolute. It ends when there are violations of the freedom of others; in these cases, it permits forms of civil, disciplinary, administrative, and even criminal sanctions as repercussions.

First, international law unanimously states that limits on freedom of expression must be provided for by law. This means that states must adopt specific, accessible, and reliable laws. A person should know what the applicable law is in concrete situations and what sanctions and limits on expression exist, so as to be able to regulate their behavior. In addition, states should have clear and extensive jurisprudence in the area in order to reinforce the guarantee of freedom of expression. Second, interference should have a legitimate goal and should be necessary and justified in a democratic society. The Convention intends that only the state can decide on the necessary character of limiting measures and their proportionality, on the basis of its internal laws. The ECtHR reserves the right to supervise the way in which these guarantees are respected in conformance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention.

UN mechanisms are intended to supervise and consolidate the efforts of States to implement on the national level the provisions of the conventions signed. These mechanisms evaluate and issue recommendations by country, providing expertise, without becoming involved in national politics or systems for the resolution of any given problem. Obviously they cannot ignore abuses and interference with fundamental rights and liberties committed by signatory States. If this is the case, the UN mechanisms carry political responsibility. In the case of the ECHR, the Court is not intended to replace national courts or to verify whether national courts’ decisions conform to the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention. Rather, the Court examines cases under the triple test: if the interference allowed by the state is proportional to the legitimate aim being persued and if the arguments invoked by national courts are pertinent and sufficient.

14 The Feldek v Slovakia case (2001).

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1.3. Applying mechanisms for ensuring human rights in the Transnistrian region

International rules oblige States to ensure respect for guaranteed rights in the whole of their national territory. One challenge remains mechanisms for ensuring fundamental rights and liberties in zones outside the control of constitutional authorities, so-called “conflict zones” with de facto regimes. Because of the specific features of these conflicts, mechanisms for ensuring human rights are practically nonexistent.

For 25 years the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova has remained isolated, as it is governed by a regime that does not respect democratic principles or human rights. We note that the de facto administration impedes the application of national legislation and international law, including by opposing or rejecting proposals to collaborate in that domain. One example is the Recommendations of UN Expert Thomas Hammarberg15 on respecting human rights in the Transnistrian region, which were not implemented by the de facto administration. We note that the expert conducted three monitoring missions on human rights in the Transnistrian region in 2012, coordinated by the UN Office in the Republic of Moldova. The goal of the visits to the Transnistrian region was to identify problems and issues that must be resolved. He offered suggestions to the de facto administration and international agencies on the contributions that they could make to promoting human rights in the region. We must note that he did not analyze the area of freedom of expression and did not make specific recommendations on this subject. Although the recommendations were released in 2013, the de facto administration has still not implemented them, arguing that their implementation is not obligatory16.

For more than 25 years the de facto administration of the region has discouraged every effort by international organizations and civil society to monitor or to effectively contribute to the defense of human rights in the area. Because of the political and geopolitical circumstances, an effective method of convincing the administration to respect a minimum set of rules and standards guaranteeing fundamental human rights has still not been found. Considering that the actions of the de facto administration also continue to produce legal consequences, we believe that the discussion of these problems, with the goal of urgently finding solutions, cannot be further postponed.

The one format that could be considered a mechanism for guaranteeing human rights is the existing framework for political negotiations, through which the de facto administration could be held accountable for infringements of rights. International actors, including the government of the Republic of Moldova, consider this negotiation format the only mechanism through which a compromise solution can be found17. However, in the opinion of the Promo-LEX Association, when we talk about human rights we should not have to negotiate. Who has the right to negotiate about fundamental human rights and what are the limits on such negotiations? Obviously, this type of approach goes against the spirit of international rights, according to which all human beings, including those in frozen conflict zones, are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Therefore, no one is empowered to negotiate about the degree of respect or non-respect for fundamental rights and liberties. Negotiations must include discussion on the identification of effective instruments for promoting and defending fundamental rights and liberties.

15 The Report of the Senior UN Expert on human rights in the Transnistrian region, Th. Hammarberg (2013) www.un.md/publicdocget/46/, viewed on 20/01/2017.

16 Report on Respect for human rights in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. 2015 Retrospective. https://promolex.md/30-raport-respectarea-drepturilor-omului-in-regiunea-transnistreana-a-r-moldova-retrospectiva-2015/, viewed on 20/01/2017.

17 Press Release, Reintegration Office, http://gov.md/ro/content/participarea-viceprim-ministrului-gheorghe-balan-la-conferinta-internationala-cu-tematica, viewed on 20/01/2017.

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The de facto administration, however, dismisses any dialog about the human rights situation, considering it a political or politicized subject. At the same time, efforts by civil society (regional and international) to monitor the human rights situation are discouraged18. Other factors, including the lack of a compromise between Chișinău and Tiraspol, the lack of political resolve for the resolution of the conflict, the disinterest of society in settling the dispute, pronounced geopolitical aspects, unilateral demonstrations by actors in the negotiations, the lack of a strategy for solutions, aims, goals, etc. discourage actions that would promote and ensure human rights in the Transnistrian region19. Therefore, ensuring fundamental rights and freedoms through political dialogue remains a serious problem.

The activity of the JCC only extends to the security zone (north, center, and south) and does not cover the whole Transnistrian region (from a geographical point of view). It depends on the supposed supervision of agreements for the withdrawal of armed forces and other units, military technology and armaments, continuous monitoring of the situation in the security zone, and contributions to the peaceful resolution of the conflict20. The JCC monitors and decides whether or not to become involved (in conflict situations) during meetings that take place in the security zone. Its decisions in concrete situations are made on the basis of compromise. In reality, the JCC has not succeeded in making decisions during several incidents that have taken place in the Security Zone, and the subject of human rights has never even been broached in this format21.

Applying national legal mechanisms in the region is practically impossible because, first of all, national law is not enforceable there, and, secondly, criminal investigations cannot be effectively carried out by constitutional law enforcement agencies in the region. To this is added the influence of political factors, which discourage activity by law enforcement agencies in the region22. Therefore, we are in a situation in which national legislation is not applied in the entire territory of the country.

1.4. The recognition of responsibility for violations of freedom of expression in the Transnistrian region.

ECtHR practice offers details on the assumption of responsibility for the violation of human rights in the Transnistrian region. In the cases Ilașcu and others v. Moldova and Russia23, Catan and others v. Moldova and Russia and Moser v. Moldova and Russia both the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of the Russian Federation were found to have jurisdiction over the Transnistrian region. In the opinion of the Court, jurisdiction over the territory compels the Governments to apply all internal mechanisms (political, diplomatic, economic, legal) in order to ensure respect for the rights of the inhabitants of the Transnistrian region. The cases mentioned were based on violations of Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention. The Court also mentioned that the so-called courts of the Transnistrian region are not in

18 Press Release by the investigative committee “The Investigative Committee for Initiating a Criminal Case against Members of Promo-LEX” (2015), http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/15-04-17/sledstvennyy-komitet-vozbudil-ugolovnoe-delo-protiv-chlenov, viewed on 20/01/2017.

19 Digi24 interview with Alin Gvidiani. A map of the obstacles on the road to reintegrating the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria (2016) http://www.digi24.ro/opinii/interviu-cu-alin-gvidiani-harta-obstacolelor-din-calea-reintegrarii-r-moldova-si-transnistriei-637006, viewed on 20/01/2017.

20 The competence of the JCC, http://gov.md/ro/content/delegatia-republicii-moldova-comisia-unificata-de-control, vizualizat la 20/01/2017.

21 See the case Mițul and Coțofan v. Moldova and Russia (Application nr. 33446/11). https://promolex.md/old/index.php?module=litigation&cat=0&item=1680, viewed on 20/01/2017

22 DW Article, Tiraspol has stopped negotiations because of the criminal cases opened by Chișinău (2014) http://www.dw.com/ro/tiraspolul-a-blocat-negocierile-din-cauza-dosarelor-penale-ini%C8%9Biate-de-chi%C8%99in%C4%83u/a-17904055, viewed on 20/01/2017.

23 The Case Ilașcu and others v. Moldova and Russia (48787/99) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["\"CASE OF ILAŞCU AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA\""],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-61886"]}, viewed on 20/01/2017.

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compliance with the provisions of the ECHR, and that the arrests ordered by those courts are arbitrary. Again, humanitarian law asserts that the de facto administration, as well as the internationally recognized administration, is obligated to ensure respect for international norms on the territory it controls24.

2. REGULATION ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE TRANSNISTRIAN REGIONThis chapter consists of a general analysis of the legal and institutional framework on freedom of expression in the Transnistrian region. Through recent examples, we will discuss the protection, or, better said, lack of protection for this right as well as the inefficacy of local mechanisms for ensuring freedom of expression. Reading local laws should not in any way be interpreted as supporting them, but is meant to emphasize the fact that the de facto administration has theorized on their supposed relation to international standards.

We note that there are no specific laws on freedom of expression in the region other than that formulated in the RMN Constitution. Although freedom of expression is guaranteed, its implementation is not legally or institutionally ensured.

Any form of restriction on freedom of expression in the region cannot possibly be in conformance with the elementary criteria of international, national, or even local legal frameworks. Nevertheless, we emphasize the interest of the de facto administration in maintaining the population of the region under control, including by promoting a single opinion. In these conditions, we report that the inhabitants of the region are limited in their freedom to express alternative opinions and in their freedom to criticize local public institutions.

The single legal reference to freedom of expression is in the local constitution25. Article 27 states that: “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, speech and belief. Every person has the right to seek, receive and impart any information through legal means, with the exception of speech directed against constitutional ordinances or information that is a state secret. The list of state secrets is approved through separate laws. Everyone is guaranteed the right to hold an opinion and beliefs, and to the free expression thereof”. Other guarantees, including the freedom of criticize the administration and its laws are not provided. Instead, the constitution guarantees the right to receive, possess and disseminate complete and true information on the activities of public and civic institutions related to the political and economic situation, international life and environmental conditions to RMN citizens only.

We also observe that the so-called supreme law does not guarantee residents the right to receive and disseminate information on the manner in which human rights are protected and respected. In this sense, the right of residents to request information on the activities of public organs is restricted. Instead, this privilege is exclusively accorded to public institutions, which are intended to ensure that the people are informed. Only the de facto administration can assure that the public is informed about the activities of public institutions, limiting, therefore, civil rights and freedoms.

24 The Report of the Senior UN Expert on human rights in the Transnistrian region, Th. Hammarberg (2013) www.un.md/publicdocget/46/, viewed on 20/01/2017.

25 Local Constitution (1996) http://vspmr.org/legislation/constitution/.

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In practice, all local news related to social, economic, political, geopolitical and other problems has to do with human rights. A quick analysis of the news recently broadcasted by public television stations finds that information on the situation regarding human rights and fundamental liberties is practically absent26.

In fact, the local constitution guarantees the right to receive information of public interest only to citizens of the RMN. We believe that this provision is contradictory, because, according to Article 3 of that law, persons who possess double citizenship and stateless persons have the same rights and freedoms as citizens of the RMN. This statement represents an abuse, because it does not expressly provide for the type of information that cannot be accessed by non-citizens.

Another observation on the text of the Constitution relates to the lack of information on the limits of freedom of expression. Therefore, understanding the reasons for restricting freedom of expression in the region is difficult. There are two types of restrictions expressly provided for in local legislation. They are: opinions that infringe on the constitutional order and information consisting of a state secret.

The Law on State Secrets was adopted in 1994, even though the Constitution of the RMN was adopted in 199727. According to the definition given in this law, a state secret is protected information on the military, foreign policy, and economic sectors, on espionage or counterespionage, or obtained as a consequence of operational investigations, the dissemination of which could put the security of the RMN in danger. In addition, the law forbids the classification of information on social occurances relating to the residents of the region, the ecological situation, hydrology, cultivation and agriculture, the health of the leaders of the RMN, and violations of the law by executive, judicial, and civil service organs. Taking into account the abovementioned provisions, it is certain that the information on fundamental rights and liberties and cases of violations thereof included in this Report cannot be considered state secrets and do not countravene the state order.

In continuation, the law gives RMN citizens and civil servents the right to request access to state secrets. Access can be limited in cases in which the applicant is declared unfit, is under criminal investigation, has relatives who reside outside the region, if information that affects the security of the RMN would be released by granting the application or if incorrect information is provided. We can deduce from this text that the organs from which one can request the declassification of information can, without the consent of the person concerned, access that person’s personal data (for example, by checking a person’s relatives), which could constitute interference in the private life of an applicant. In cases in which a person receives access to classified information, both the applicant and the civil servant bear responsibility for the disclosure for a period of 10 years and more restrictions are imposed on them. This regulation prevents and discourages people from requesting and providing information on the situation in the Transnistrian region, especially information on sensitive subjects.

The honor and dignity of the individual are protected by civil and criminal legislation in the region. A series of other laws on combatting terrorism and extremism, the protection of information, the mass media, religions confessions, non-profit organizatons and peaceful protests contain restrictions on freedom of expression, but do not describe the features, concept, and meaning of expression. In this situation, supervisory organs, as wells as courts, have a wide

26 List of news bulletins on the website Pervîi Pridnestrovschii https://tv.pgtrk.ru/search/site/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0?page=2.

27 Закон о государственной тайне (version from 05/05/2015) http://vspmr.org/legislation/laws/zakonodateljnie-akti-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki-v-sfere-konstitutsionnogo-stroya-osnov-pravoporyadka-a-takje-deyateljnosti-organov-gosudarstvennoy-vlasti-i-upravleniya/zakon-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki-o-gosudarstvennoy-tayne.html.




margin of judgment regarding forms of expression. In addition, practical recommendations on prosecuting cases in which the limits of freedom of expression are overstepped do not exist. Legal practice in this area is also lacking. For example, in 2016 the arbitration tribunal administered six cases on compensatory damages following from slander28.

The only specialized institution in the region with the power to monitor the human rights situation is the Commission for Human Rights. This institution has functioned since 1 January 2006, and has the power to examine complaints and to write opinions and annual reports29. The competence of the Commission is relatively narrow, and its annual reports to the Supreme Soviet are merely informative. Collaboration with the relevent sector is only formal, and the institution does not benefit from recognition and authority among the residents of the region. It is worth mentioning that this institution’s reports do not contain references or recommendations regarding freedom of information, the mass media, and freedom of opinion in the region30.

Although there are more than 3000 non-governmental organizations in the region, they are not allowed to monitor compliance with human rights, except in certain narrow sectors (especially the social and ecological sectors). The non-governmental sector in the region is, therefore, not set up to advocate regarding human rights problems31. There are no alternative reports on the human rights situation in general and freedom of experession in particular.

3. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REGION of December 2016In 2016, there were so-called presidential elections in the Transnistrian region. Six candidates participated in the electoral race, including the former president of the RMN Evghenii Șevciuc and the Chief of the Supreme Soviet of the RMN Vadim Krasnoselski. Many violations of freedom of expression were reported during the electoral campaign. Electoral candidates tried to take control over the region’s media sources and put pressure on journalists. Special attention was paid to speech on social networks and in online press.

Our observations show that the media space during the electoral campaign was especially vulnerable. Certain journalists were not allowed into meetings and public events, and others were investigated. Both the Supreme Soviet and the executive branch initiated drafts of legislation on regulating the activity of the mass media in the region, the criteria for financing mass media and sanctions for criticizing and offending officials. Although those initiatives were not carried out, they negatively impacted the media space. External communication on the activities of public institutions happened through press releases only.

3.1. Freedom of expression in the mass media and on social networks

According to the mass media Register, 94 media sources are registered in the region, including 10 online publishers, 6 news agencies, 52 magazines, 9 newspapers, 3 TV channels, and 10 radio stations32.

28 http://arbitr-pmr.org/. 29 Law on a committee for human rights (2006), viewed on 20/01/2017. 30 See the Committee Reports section / http://www.ombudsmanpmr.org/doclady_upolnomochennogo.htm, viewed on 20/01/2017.31 The 2015 sustainability index for civil society organizations management.md/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Moldova-.pdf, viewed on

20/01/2017. 32 Record of registered mass media (2017) http://minregion.gospmr.org/index.php/gos-reestry/189-reestr-9, vizualizat la 20/01/2017.

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2016 Retrospective

The activity of mass media sources in the region is regulated by the Law on the mass media33. According to this law, searching for, promoting, producing and disseminating information and the funding and the operation of media institutions may not be subject to limitation, with the exception of cases provided for in other law.

Local legislation defines the mass media as audio, periodical and print publishers, television, radio stations, magazines, and newspapers. In additions, sources can be: state (funded by the executive), municipal (funded by local administrations) and online resources. In the Transnistrian region there is no notion of a private press. Nevertheless, certain mass media sources, including TSV and the newspaper “Chelovek i ego prava” are considered by the administration to be de facto commercial.

Local laws stipulate that the mass media cannot be subject to censureship and is required to be registered34. Legislative, executive, and judicial websides, publications with a circulation of less than 1000 copies, radio or TV communications from schools, hospitals, or enterprises, and publications that have less than 10 subscribers cannot be registered as mass media sources. Mass media can only function if it is registered. Registration is also obligatory for online portals. If they are not registered, they cannot function as media institutions.

The Supreme Soviet, the executive and legal organs can have their own regulations on information broadcasting. In 2016, some of these provisions were the topic of active debates on how these institutions provide and disseminate public information. Why? Most likely, in order to restrict access to information by the target audience. Both the Supreme Soviet and the administration of the former president I. Șevciuc tried to be presented to the electorate in a positive light. The first initiative of this type came from the Supreme Soviet.

For example, in April 2016 the Supreme Soviet made changes to the regulations on access for journalists to its meeting hall. This regulation provides for the re-broadcast of debates by the press service of the Supreme Soviet only35. Access for journalists to the local public station was restricted36.

Although there was much criticism of the changes made, that act was not revised37. In this context, the prosecutor of the region found that the Supreme Soviet had violated the rights of journalists by issuing decrees forbidding media in its meeting hall38. In spite of the prosecutor’s complaint, however, the Supreme Soviet continued to limit access for journalists to the meeting hall. A series of public speeches by the chief of the Supreme Soviet Vadim Krasnoselski on journalists’ lack of impartiality followed on the public station. In his opinion “…the Supreme Soviet is not a show space, but a work space, where public television cameras are unnecessary”.

Finally, certain deputies wrote a draft law on the procedure for reporting on the activities of public organs, which provides for: the re-registering of governmental mass media, the introduction of limits on the monopoly on public mass media exercised by the leaders of the region, and the withdrawal for that reason of the single founder of PP, Radio 1, and Radio Pridnestrovie.

33 Law on mass media in the RMN (2016) http://vspmr.org/legislation/laws/zakonodateljnie-akti-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki-v-sfere-obrazovaniya-kuljturi-sporta-molodejnoy-politiki-sredstv-massovoy-informatsii-a-takje-v-sfere-realizatsii-politicheskih-prav-i-svobod-grajdan/zakon-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki-o-sredstvah-massovoy-informatsii.html.

34 Idem35 Regulation on the presentation of information on the activity of the Supreme Soviet http://www.vspmr.org/news/supreme-council/

novie-pravila.html, viewed on 20/01/2017.36 RIA Novosti PMR Article „Public cameras were not let into the Supreme Soviet meeting”http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-10-06/

kamery-pervogo-pridnestrovskogo-telekanala-ne-pustili-na, viewed on 20/01/2017.37 Video report made by PP „The Supreme Soviet strikes freedom of speech” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHnfDoM1bjo, viewed on

20/01/2017. 38 http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-04-15/prokuror-respubliki-akkreditovannomu-zhurnalistu-nikto-ne-vprave




In addition, the deputies proposed implementing elements of censureship, reducing salaries for public media employees (432 people), and introducing an obligation to broadcast official political events, declarations by deputies and administration leaders, the opening and closing of local council sessions, and appointments to public office in their entirety and within 24 hours39.

The mass media law does not mention the concept of social networks (i.e. online forums) and does not regulate the expression of opinions through the Internet. Rather, the de facto administration maintains that these Internet platforms are illegal, because they are not covered by supervisory and security measures. At least 16 informational websites (dniester.ru, tiras.ru, rodinapmr.ru, forum.pridnestrovie.com, forum.dnestra.com, openpmr.info, nistru.net, etc) have been blocked since 201240. The security structures have played a principle role in supervising and blocking the websites. Under the pretext of preventing the spread of information that encroaches upon the security of the region and the protection of the health, morals, rights, and interests of citizens, the KGB has continued to impede free expression on the Internet, both directly and indirectly.

On 24 May 2016, the head of the KGB, M. Lapițchii, informed the Supreme Soviet about a decision to stop the activity of several informational portals because they were not registered or had allowed crimes to occur, despite the fact that, accoding to laws on the mass media, only courts have the right to order the cessation, halting, or banning of publications, etc. (see Appendix 1).

In 2016, the secret services continued to watch the Internet, intervene in private life and limit the population’s freedom of opinion. The actions of the KGB actually violated the laws of the Transnistrian region, according to which that institution can undertake certain actions only in situations of obvious danger to security, extremism, and terrorism.

The Law on the mass media forbids interference by the public authorities in the distribution of media publications of any kind. The Law also states that only courts can forbid the distribution of periodicals and only in cases in which those periodicals infringe on authors’ rights. Halting circulation is also permissible only by court order. There are no other circumstances provided for by law for disallowing the distribution of publications. In practice, however, abuses continue.

On 3 and 4 October 2016, the local police organized a serious hunt for the newspaper “Человек и его права” (“Chelovek i ego Prava”). The police confiscated the latest edition of the newspaper directly from the mailboxes of residential buildings and the private houses of subscribers, as well as in public places. Residents of Bender and Râbnița were stopped by the police, intimidated, and prevented from reading or distributing the newpaper. According to the police, the publication contains slanderous articles addressed at the leader of the region, Evghenii Șevciuc41. In this case, there was no court order banning the distribution of the newspaper.

A similar case took place on November 12, 2016 in the city of Bender. A representative of the police intimidated a young person who was distributing Edition Nr. 23 of the newspaper «Человек и его права» („Chelovek i ego Prava”) for free42. The confiscated newspaper was not returned, and the abusive intimidation and confiscation of the newspaper from readers continued until the end of the electoral campaign.

39 Law on reporting by the media on the activities of public institutions (2017) http://president.gospmr.org/pravovye-akty/zakony/154-zakon-pmr-10-z-vi-o-poryadke-osveshcheniya-deyatelnosti-organov-gosudarstvennoj-vlasti-v-gosudarstvennykh-respublikanskikh-sredstvakh-massovoj-informatsii-a-takzhe-mestnykh-predstavitelnykh-i-ispolnitelnykh-organov-gosudarstvennoj-vlasti-v-munitsipalnykh-sredstvakh-massovoj-informatsii, viewed on 20/01/2017.

40 From a technical point of view, the KGB cites the Internet operator in the relevant case, InterDnestrCom, which is obliged to halt the activity of the websites in the absence of a court order.

41 Promo-LEX Press Release, A newspaper hunt has begun in the Transnistrian region (2016) https://promolex.md/3511-a-inceput-vanatoarea-de-ziare-in-regiunea-transnistreana/.

42 TSV Video Report (2016) The hunt for the newspaper Chelovek i ego pravahttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zk1RIkfPBGs.

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2016 Retrospective

In the case of the newspaper “Chelovek i ego Prava”, interference that was not in conformance with either international standards or local law was allowed to occur. Therefore, local organs are willing to allow abuses of all forms of expression, regardless of internal regulations prohibiting them.

Journalists from the region remain vulnerable to pressure from the Tiraspol administration, as it is possible to use of various types of intimidation against troublemakers, including threatening dismissal, preventing employment in other positions, and opening an administrative or criminal investigation. In 2016, there were no cases of a journalist being convicted. However, there were situations in which journalists were intimidated for their reporting.

In October 2016, five journalists from the private television station “TSV” were summoned by the Tiraspol Directorate of Internal Affairs in relation to a video report on the violation of electoral law by a political group43. At the police station, the journalists stated that they had not been implicated any crime. On the contrary, they stated that through their reporting they had uncovered massive organization of voters by the political group “Party of Communists” during the federal election for the State Duma of the Russian Federation on 18 September 2016. TSV reporters covered and discussed the investigation in televised broadcasts. Later, the police sent cases against five TSV reporters to court, but the court dismissed the administrative proceedings. Neither the reporters nor the police appealed the court’s decision.

On November 14, 2016, the journalist Natalia Scurtul was called to the same Tiraspol Directorate of Internal Affairs for expressing her opinion on the abovementioned broadcast. After interrogating the journalist, representatives of the police told her that they were not going to open an investigation, because she was not employed by the television station TSV and could not be held responsible administratively. Otherwise, there could have been an administrative investigation. Although she was not held responsible administratively, Natalia Scurtul declared that this incident was a sign that freedom of expression is restricted in the region44.

3.2. Attempts to prosecute people for criticism of the administration

In the Transnistrian region, local legislation does not regulate integrity, civic oversight, and mechanisms for supervising the activities of public actors. The de facto administration interprets every criticism addressed at public institutions or functionaries as libel or slander. More often than not, people who criticize the administration are prosecuted. A telling example of this phenomenon is the actions of the former leader of the region, Evghenii Șevciuc, who proposed raising the punishement for libel after information on the misappropriation of funds and corruption appeared in the press.

On June 28, 2016, E. Șevciuc proposed raising the fine for slander from $300 US to $700 US. The draft law was rejected by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet45.

On October 3, 2016, E. Șevciuc sent the Supreme Soviet a draft law on prohibiting the

43 TSV report „Journalists from our station were summoned by the police”,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KcydNziP_Cs , viewed on 21/01/2017.44 TSV Report „Journalist Natalia Scurtul was summoned for discussions” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpL8yncZIjk, viewed on

21/01/2017.45 RIA NovostiPMR Article „Draft on criminal responsibility for libel will be examined in 14 days” http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-06-

28/zakonoproekt-ob-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti-za-klevetu-rassmotryat-v , viewed on 21/01/2017.




dissemination of slanderous and unverified information. According to him, the population is incorrectly informed regarding the activity of the insititutions that lead it, leading to the destabilization of the situation in the Transnistrian reigion. The draft was rejected on the grouds that it would worsen the situation of the mass media46.

On November 2, 2016, the Supreme Soviet examined another initiative by Șevciuc to raise the punishment for libel. According to him, from 2010 to 2014, police organs examined 456 criminal and 3207 administrative cases of libel. The goal of the draft was to take measures to prevent these cases. The deputies rejected this draft law as well47.

3.3.The introduction of criminal punishment for negative opinions on the Peacekeeping MissionIn 2016, a criminal penalty was introduced in the Transnistrian region for expressing and disseminating anti-Russian messages48. This initiative of the de facto administration was supported by the argument that in society there was increasing doubt about the efficacy of the Peacekeeping Mission. On the other hand, these sanctions also had an external justification. On the right bank of the Nistru the view that the peacekeeping mission should be replaced with a civil mission was being expressed with greater force, including in discussions at the UN on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Moldova. In order to stop discussion on this subject in the region, the de facto administration adopted repressive measures.

On June 15, 2016, the Supreme Soviet approved modifications to the local criminal code introducing a new type of infraction, namely “denying the role of the Peacekeeping Mission of the Russian Federation in Transnistria”.

The text of article 278-3 of the Criminal Code provides that:

1. Public actions, including declarations […] that express an clear lack of respect towards the Peacekeeping Mission of the Russian Federation in the RMN or that attempt to distort the positive role of that mission or to somehow diminish the merit of the Russian Federation in the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the RMN will be punished with a fee of 500 to 100 c.v. (up to 20 thousand lei) or by imprisonment for up to 3 years;

2. For such actions undertaken by a person who makes use of his or her official function, or by a group of people on the basis of a preexisting understanding, there shall be a fine of 1000 to 1500 c.v. (up to 30 thousand lei) or imprisonment from 5 to 7 years with the loss of the right to occupy a public function for a term of 3 years.

The modifications forbid any critical discourse addressed at the Peacekeeping Mission, both in public or on social networks. In fact, this criminal law is in contradiction with the constitution of the region, which guarentees freedom of opinion and belief, and prohibits censorship.

46 RIA NovostiPMR Article „Șevciuc’s Russian draft on the mass media has not enjoyed support” http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-10-25/rossiyskiy-zakon-shevchuka-o-smi-ne-nashel-odobreniya-u-deputatov, viewed on 21/01/2017.

47 SS Press release „Deputies have rejected the draft”, http://vspmr.org/news/supreme-council/deputatskiy-korpus-otklonil.html, viewed on 21/01/2017.

48 http://www.vspmr.org/file.xp?file=41706

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2016 Retrospective

3.4. Intimidation for denouncing acts of corruption

In June-July 2016, Evghenii Șevciuc was accused of corruption and abuse of power by activists and representatives of investigative structures. The mass media reported on these acts of corruption and influence trafficking. Evghenii Șevciuc rejected the accusations, stating that they were absurd and related to the pre-electoral environment49. In addition, he initated a lawsuit against his critics. One of the first victims was the activist Olga Ievleva, by profession a psychologist at a preschool in Dubăsari.

On July 12, 2016, Ievleva was arrested by police in the city of Dubăsari and transported to Tiraspol. There, she was accused of “slandering an official while performing official duties”. According to police employees, certain comments on her social network accounts (which she herself denies) disturbed President Șevciuc, and she therefore risked criminal punishment50. The Ievleva case struck a chord. This case was an attempt not to hold her responsible, but to prevent such actions in the future and to demonstrate to the public that they can be investigated for offending an official. Further details on the Ievleva case are not known.

On June 18, 2016, the president of the Union of Collective Workers, Vladimir Emilianov, was summoned for “discussions” with the security structures because of criticism of Evghenii Șevciuc in the newspaper “Trudovoi Tiraspol”. Mr. Emilianov was given a warning.

On July 16, 2016, Iurie Petrik, an activist from Râbnița, was arrested in the street by representatives of the KGB and transported to a police station. There, the activist was accused of “slandering representatives of the state”, risking criminal sanction. That day, searches were carried out both at his personal residence and at those of his relatives, but nothing was found. Mr. Petrik was interviewed for several hours, after which he was freed under orders not to leave the region. On his social network page, the activist qualified these actions as a form of intimidation. Later, the activist was detained several times, for the same reasons.

For the first time, public declarations have been recorded in the region regarding investigations in corruption and influence trafficking cases.

At a press conference on June 23, 2016, investigator Haricikov Alexandr of the Investigative Committee of Tiraspol denounced schemes to defraud humanitarian aid money from the Russian Federation and “gas accounts” through intermediary companies (Energocapital, the National Shipping Company, the Stabilization Fund and the Humitarian Support Fund). According to him, investigators were forced to close several criminal cases implying criminal activity related to the leader Evgheni Șevciuc51. For this denounciation, the investigator was dismissed from his position on July 8, 2016. The information revealed by the investigator was reported in analyses by independent experts in Chișinău and in international investigations52.

49 RIA NovostiPMR Article „Declaration by Evghenii Șevciuc –The bigger the lie, the more attention it attracts”, http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-05-11/evgeniy-shevchuk-o-krazhe-100-mln-chem-naglee-i-neveroyatnee-budet, viewed on 21/01/2017.

50 TSV Reporting „The lack of freedom online”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIrIOSiUVSc&app=desktop, viewed on 21/01/2017.51 TSV Report „A telephone conversation with Investigator Haricikov was published”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b05YEM63iok,

viewed on 21/01/2017.52 Articol portalul AntiCorupție.md „Experți: R. Moldova a suportat un prejudiciu” http://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/experti-r-moldova-a-suportat-un-prejudiciu-de-un-sfert-de-miliard-de-dolari-in-schema-de-procurare-

a-energiei-electrice, vizualizat la 21/01/2017.




On July 8, 2016, the investigator Olga Kașirova from the same Investigative Committee discovered a case of influence trafficking. She submitted a complaint to the law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation on the incidents she was investigating. Because she published a denunciation, she was suspended from her position53.

On July 14, 2016, an employee of the Tiraspol Tax Service, Svetlana Htema, complained about harassment by the administration of leader E. Șevciuc while carrying out a tax audit on an enterprise in the region. She was not able carry out the audit because relevant information was classified54.

3.5. Limitation of freedom of expression in art

Although art and cultural values are generally accepted in the Transnistrian region, freedom of expression is restricted for art that tackles social stereotypes. Carolina Dutca, an activist from the region, tried to organize an exhibit of photographs on the LGBT Community.

On November 2, 2016, a photo exhibit on the stories of 17 LGBT people should have been presented in Tiraspol. The exhibit was intended to sensitize public opinion on the obstacles and stigma onfronted by people from this group.

Carolina Dutca’s exhibit did not take place because, in the opinion of representatives of the KGB, it would have infringed upon the “morals and security of the RMN”. Two days before the event, Carolina was called into an office at Taras Șevcenco University, where she was studying. There, a representative of the KGB threatened her and demanded that she renounce the planned exhibit. The representative assured her that the problem that she was trying to address actually did not exist in the region and that her initative was pointless. He also tried to convince her to sign a statement of collaboration with the KGB and a confidentiality agreement. If she had signed this statement, Carolina could have been held criminally responsible. After she refused, the representative of the KGB warned her that she was putting herself at risk, and that she could be expelled or her parents fired55.

53 TSV Report „How supervision is carried out within investigative bodies. The declaration of Olga Kașirova”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6o7i6dOHmE, viewed on 21/01/2017.

54 TSV Report „Svetlana Htema- following after Haricikov and Kașirova”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD39zIPqGFk, viewed on 21/01/2017.

55 AproriCenter press release, Tiraspol „A Representative of the KGB: For the time being, a gun is not being held to your head”, http://apriori-center.org/no_silence_kgb/, viewed on 21/01/2017.

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2016 Retrospective

Appendix 1_The response of the KGB to the head of the Supreme Soviet on the need to block public forums

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