Allen_2001

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Educational Mismatches versus Skill Mismatches: Effects on Wages, Job Satisfaction, and On-the-Job SearchAuthor(s): Jim Allen and Rolf van der VeldenSource: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 53, No. 3, Special Issue on Skills Measurement andEconomic Analysis (Jul., 2001), pp. 434-452

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8/10/2019 Allen_2001


?

Oxford

niversity

ress 001

All

rights

eserved

Oxford

conomic

apers

3

(2001),

434-452 434

Educational ismatchesersuskill

mismatches:ffectsn

wages,

ob

satisfaction,

nd

on-the-job

earch

By

JimAllen* nd

Rolf

van der

Veldent

*

Research entre or ducation nd theLabourMarket, niversityfMaastricht,

Postbus

16,

6200

MD

Maastricht,

he

Netherlands;

e-mail:

[email protected].

t

Research entre

or ducation nd theLabourMarket,

niversity

f

Maastricht

Education-job

mismatchesre

reported

o have serious ffectsn

wages

nd other

labour market utcomes. uch results

re

often

ited in

support

f

assignment

theory,

ut can also be

explained y

nstitutionalnd human

apital

models. o test

the

ssignment

xplanation,

e examine herelation etween ducationalmismatches

and skillmismatches.n inewith arlieresearch,ducationalmismatchesffect ages

strongly.ontrary

o the

ssumptions

f

assignment

heory,

his ffects

not

explained

by

skill

mismatches.

onversely,

kill

mismatches

re

much

better

redictors

f

ob

satisfactionnd

on-the-job

earch han

re educationalmismatches.

1.

Introduction

Education-job

mismatchesre

reported

o have serious ffectsn a

number f

labourmarketutcomes. vereducations known o affectabour urnover

Topel,

1986; Hersch,

1991),

occupational

hoice

(Viscusi,

1979),

and

job

satisfaction

(Tsang

and

Levin,

985).

A

major

ine of research asbeen

developed

egarding

the effect f

education-job

mismatchesn

wages.

Empirical

esults

uggest

hat

both ndividual uman

capital

nd

ob

characteristicsre related o

wages.

ndi-

viduals

working

n

jobs

for

which lower evel of

education han their wn is

required

overeducation)

re often ound o earn

ess than ndividuals ith he

same level of education

working

n

jobs

forwhich heir wn

level s

required

(adequate

education),

ut more than ndividuals

orking

n an

equivalent

ob

with the level of education

actuallyrequired

Duncan

and

Hoffman,

981;

Hartog

nd

Oosterbeek,

988; Sicherman, 991;

Hersch,

991;

Cohn and

Khan,

1995;

Van

Smoorenburg

nd Van der

Velden,

000).

Conversely,

ndividuals ork-

ing

n

obs

forwhich

higher

evel s

required

undereducation)

ften arnmore

than

ndividuals ith he ame

evel

of

education

working

n

obs

for

which heir

own evel s

required,

ut essthan ndividuals ith he

evel f

education

ctually

required

n

such

obs.

The

wage

effectsf overeducation

re

usually tronger

han

thewageeffectsfundereducation.






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


JIM

ALLEN AND ROLF VAN DER VELDEN 435

Such results re often ited n

support

f so-called

assignment'

odels f the

labourmarket

Sattinger,

993),

whereby

he

returns

o additionalnvestmentsn

human

capitaldepend

n

part

on the

matchbetween

he worker nd the

ob.

The basic idea is

that,

lthough igher

ducation aises

productivity

n

general,

the actual evelof

productivity

ealised

s

also

determined

y

the match etween

educationalevel nd

ob

level.

Working

n a

job

below

one's own evel

mposes

limitation

o the

utilisation

f skills. he lower

evelofthe

ob

in effect

mposes

a

ceiling

n theworker's

roductivity,esulting

n lower

wages.

Conversely,

ork-

ing

n a

job

aboveone's own evel

n

effect

aises his

productivity

eiling',

llowing

workers

o be more

productive

han

they

would be

when

working

t

their wn

level.However,n this ase, heworker's wn abilities rethemainfactorimiting

productivity.

ecauseworkers

mployed

n a

job

at their wn level are

already

performing

t a levelclose to

their wn

personal roductivityeiling,

he

wage

benefits

f

working

boveone'sown evel re

generally

odest. his accounts

or

theobserved

symmetry

n

the

wage

effects

f over- nd undereducation.

According

o

assignmentheory,

he allocation s

optimal

when workers re

allocated

top-down

according

o

their

skills,

whereby

he

most

competent

worker s

assigned

o the most

complex ob

and the east

competent

orker s

assignedothe implestob.' The ncidence feducationalmismatchesan thus e

explained y

differences

n theshares f

complex obs

and skilledworkers. ow-

ever,

s

Hartog

2000)

has

pointed

out,

over- nd undereducationan also be

explained

n

other

ways.According

o search

nd

matching heory, emporary

mismatches

ay

occur as a result f

imperfect

nformation.he fact hatover-

education s

typically

igher

n the

phase

of thetransitionrom chool o work s

often aken s evidence or his

nterpretation.

owever,

thers ave

rgued,

rom

the

point

fview fhuman

apital

heory,

hat he

high

ncidence

f

overeducation

among

chool-leaverseflectsheseworkers'ackofwork

xperience

Groot

nd

Maassenvan den

Brink,

996).

Thishuman

apital rgument

an be stated

n a

more

general ay,

o

provide

n

alternative

xplanation

or he

effects

ormally

ttributedo

assignmentheory.

Although

he intuitive

ppeal

of

assignment heory

s

considerable,

he

wage

equations

sed

are

not

directly

erived rom

ssignmentheory

Hartog,

000).

The observed

age

differencesor

obs

below nd aboveone's

own

evel

mightust

as easily eflectndividual ifferencesn humancapitalwithin ducationevels,

which re

roughly

orted

ccording

o

ob

level.

Those

working

below heir wn

level' re n

that ase

ess

productive

n

average

han hose

working

at their wn

level',

not

because he

ob imposes

imitationsn their

roductivity,

ut

because

they

have ess human

capital

n

average

o

begin

with.

imilarly,

hose

working

'In

addition o theeffectsf a mismatch etween

equired

nd actual evel f

education,

many

tudies

also take nto ccount he ffectsf

working

n a

job

forwhich

field

f

education ifferentrom ne's

own field s required.






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


436 EDUCATIONAL

VS SKILL

MISMATCHES

'abovetheir

wn evel'have

ccording

o this iewmorehuman

apital

n

average

than hose

working

t their wn

evel.

Institutionalheories fferyet anotherpossible explanation or the same

observed

wage

effects.

heypoint

out that

mployers

ften orced o base

wages

on

easily

bservable

haracteristics

f

employees

r

obs,

rather han n individual

performance

Thurow,

975).

From

uch a

perspective,

heobserved

age

differ-

ences ouldbe accounted

or

y

hefact hat oth

heformal ducation

f

employ-

ees and the

required

ducation

or he

ob

are

frequently

ncorporated

n

wage

scales s determined

n

collective

argaining

greements.

he differences

ay

not

reflectndividual ifferences

n

productivity,

ut

rather

hevalue

assigned

o

edu-

cation nd ob categoriesn suchagreements.

Wage

analyses

ased on

attained nd

required

ducation

annot n

themselves

provide

definitive

nswer othe

uestion

f

which

xplanation

s correct.

he aim

of this

rticle s to

shed somefurther

ight

n

this

discussion,

y examining

he

relation

etween

he

ducation-job

atch n one

handand theutilisation

f

ndi-

vidual

kills

n theother. he basic dea

s

that he

bove-mentionedheories

iffer

in the

waythey ostulate

relation etween

he formal'

ducation-job

ismatch

(hereafter

alled educational

mismatches)

nd

the actual mismatch

etween

acquired ndrequiredkills hereafteralled killmismatches).

In

assignmentheory,

ducational

mismatches

mply

killmismatches.

killmis-

matches

rebelievedo account

or heobserved

age

effectsf over- nd under-

education. f the

assignment

xplanation

s

valid,

we shouldtherefore

ind hat

individuals

orking

elow

their wn evel re

underutilising

heir

nowledge

nd

skills o

a

significantegree,

hile ndividuals

orking

bove

their

wn

evel

ack

someofthe

knowledge

nd

skills hat re

required

n order o

performptimally

n

their

ob.

We

would

lso

expect

he

ffects

f

education-job

atch

n

wage nalyses

to be accounted or o a

large

xtent

y

mismatchesn the

utilisation

f

knowledge

and skills. he same

applies

o effects

n

other

utcomes ike

ob

satisfactionnd

intention

o

quit.

This

paperputs

he

ssignmentheory

o the est.

f

educational

mismatcheso

not

mply

kill

mismatches,

nd skill

mismatches

o not account or heeffects

f

educationalmismatches n

wages

and other

outcomes,

ssignmentheory

s

seriouslyhallenged.

n the

paper

we address he

following

uestions:

(i) to what extentdo skillmismatchesorrespondo mismatches etween

available

nd

required

ducationn

obs?

(ii)

to what xtent an

wage

ffectsf ducationalmismatcheseaccountedor

y

skillmismatches?

(iii)

to

what

xtent

nd in what

ways

do skillmismatches

nd educationalmis-

matchesnfluence

ob

satisfaction?

(iv)

to

what

extent nd

in what

ways

do skill mismatches nd educational

mismatchesnfluence

mployees'

ecisions o

actively

eekother

mploy-

ment?






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


JIM

ALLEN AND ROLF VAN DER VELDEN 437

2. Data

The data

usedfor he

nalyses

ere ollected or he

projectHigher

ducation nd

GraduateEmploymentn Europe',an internationalomparative tudyof the

labour market ituation

f

graduates

rom

ertiary

ducation n 11

European

countries

nd

Japan.2

n theNetherlandswomain

ypes

f

graduates

rom

ertiary

education

re

distinguished:

hosewho

graduate

rom

niversity,

nd thosewho

graduate

rom

college

for

higher

ocational

ducation. wo

graduate

ohorts

were

pproached

t the

end of 1998.The first ohort

onsisted f a

representative

sample

of those

graduating

rom

ertiary

ducation

n the academic

year

1990-

1991. The second cohort

comprised representativeample

of those who

graduatedn the academicyear1994-95. For this article he Dutch data from

the former

ohort re

used,

whichmeans

thatour

subjects

re individuals ho

graduated

rom

ertiary

ducation ome seven

years

rior

o the

survey.

round

6000

graduates

were

approached,

f which2723

responded

with

a

completed

questionnaire.

he

analyses

re restrictedo the 2460 individualswho at the

time of

the

survey

were

n

paid employment

or at least

12

hours

per

week.

From these 2460 individuals 01

graduated

rom

university

nd 1559 from

higher

ocational ducation n the academic

year

1991.

For

furthernformation

we refer o Allen nd Van derVelden forthcoming).

3.

Educationalmismatch nd skillmismatch

Variousmeasures ave n the

past

been

proposed

o indicate he

match etween

education nd

job.

In this rticlewe use an

employee elf-rating

f the evelof

educationmost

ppropriate

or

he urrent

ob,

with

esponse ategories:

niversity

pluspostgraduatetudy1); universitynly 2); higher ocational ducation lus

postgraduate

tudy

3);

higher

ocational ducation

nly

4);

secondary

ocational

education r

equivalent

5);

or ower

6).

By omparing

his o the

highest

ttained

level f education f

the

workers,3

e

can determine

hether,

nd to

what

xtent,

respondents

re

working

boveor

below heir wn evel. orthe

Netherlands,

an

derVelden nd Van

Smoorenburg

1997)

have hown hat

workers'

elf-ratings

re

farmorevalid

than

commonly

sed

alternative,

amely

he

expert-rating

f

ob

titles. rom he

point

fview f

matchingheory,appropriate

evel' s

preferable

o

the ften-usedlternativef requiredevel'. he attermeasuremay artlymeasure

formal election

equirements,

hereas he

formers more

ikely

o refero

actual

job

content.

2

This projectwas

partiallyunded

y the European ommission

nder heTargeted

ocio-Economic

Research

TSER)

program

TSER

EGS-SOE2-CT97-2023),

ith dditional

unding

y

theDutch

Min-

istry

f

Education. he

project

s

coordinated

y

Prof.U.

Teichler

rom

he

University

f

Kassel.

3Many

f

hose ho

raduated

rom

university

r

higher

ocationalducationnstituten

1990/1991

subsequentlyarned higher egreewithinertiaryducation.






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


438

EDUCATIONAL VS SKILL

MISMATCHES

Next we asked the

respondents

o indicatewhichfield

f education s most

appropriate

or heir

ob,

with

esponse

ategories:only

my

wnfield f

ducation'

(1);

'my

own or a related ield'

2);

'a

completely

ifferentield f education'

3);

'for his

ob

no

specific

ield s

required'

4);

and for his

ob

no

specific

ield

yet)

exists'

5).

We

collapsed

hese ive

ategories

nto wo

by distinguishingategories

(1)

and

(2)

from

3), (4),

and

(5).

Examination f the data reveals hateducationalmismatchesre a common

phenomenon.

considerable

ercentage

f

higher

ocational ducation

raduates

(14%)

and

university raduates

8%)

were

working

n

jobs

for which

they

considered

(somewhat)

higher

evel of educationwas more

appropriate.4

About third f hehigherocational ducation nduniversityraduatesndicated

that

hey

were

working

n a

job

forwhich

hey

onsidered lower evel

f

ducation

would have been more

appropriate. inally,

roundone

in

five

graduates

were

working

n

jobs

for whichtheir wn or a

related

ieldof

educationwas

not

consideredmost

appropriate.

n

all,

some 50%

of

university raduates

nd

56%

of

higher

ocational ducation

graduates

worked n

jobs

for which

they

considered level

and/or

ield f education ther han their wn to be more

appropriate.

At firstight,tseems atherlarminghat ucha large roportionfthemost

highly

rained

ategory

f

participants

n theDutch abourmarket ave

obs

which

don't match heir ducation.How serious s this?

pecifically:

o

what xtent o

such

mismatchesetween wn and

required

ducation

orrespond

o

mismatches

between he

knowledge

nd skills

ossessed

y subjects

nd the

knowledge

nd

skills

equired

n theirwork?

o

investigate

his,

ubjects

ere sked o ndicate he

extent o which

hey greed

with he

following

tatements:

Statement My currentob offersme sufficientcopeto use my knowledge

and skills.

Statement

I

would

perform

etter

n

my

current

ob

if

possessed

dditional

knowledge

nd skills.

The

responses

on

a five

oint

cale)

to statement indicate he

degree

o

which

available kills re

being

tilisedn

the urrent

ob,

and the

responses

o

statement

theextent o which he

respondentossesses

he kills

equired

n

the

ob.

Under-

utilisation,he kills ounterpartfovereducation,s thus ndicated ytheextent

to which

ne

disagrees

ith tatement

. A

Skill

deficit,

he skills

ounterpart

f

undereducation,

s

indicated

y

the extent o

which

ne

agrees

with

tatement.

The

relation etween

hese

measures

f

skill

mismatchesnd

educationalmis-

matches

re shown n

Table 1.

4These

figures

nclude

hosewho have

completed

ome

form f

postgraduate

tudy

within

igher

vocational education and university espectively.






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


JIM

ALLEN AND ROLF VAN DER

VELDEN 439

Table

1

The

relation

etween

ducationalmismatchesnd skill

nderutilisation

None

Strong

Skills underutilisation

1 2 3

4 5

Education-job

match

University

Higher

evel of education

ppropriate

42 42 13 1 1

Own

level and field

f

education

ppropriate

34

48 11 6 2

Own

level

and different

ield

f education

ppropriate

30

48 14

6

2

Lower evel of education

ppropriate

14 37 20 21

8

Total

university

28 44 15

10

4

Higherocationalducation

Higher

evel

of education

ppropriate

25

51 16

6 2

Own

level and

field f education

ppropriate

30

42 15

10 3

Own level and differentield

f education

ppropriate

18

49 20

6

8


ppropriate

20 38 21

15 6

Total

higher

ocational ducation 25 42 18 11

5

Total

university

HVE

26

43 16

11 4

About

15%

of all

graduates xperience

high

or

very high degree

of

underutilisationf skills s

indicated

y

their

esponse

o statement.

The

pattern

of nswerss

clearly

elated

o educationalmismatches.

he relation

s,however,

ar

from

erfect.

s

might

e

expected,

largemajority

f

tertiary

raduates

orking

in

obs

forwhich heir wn or a

higher

evel nd their wn or a

related ield f

education

was

considered

ppropriateppear

o be

quite

satisfied ith

he

scope

which their

ob provides

for

using

their

knowledge

nd

skills. Somewhat

surprisinglyowever, relativelyargeproportionfgraduates orkingn jobs

below theirown level

and/or

utsidetheirown field lso

report

ittle r no

underutilisation.his

s

particularly

he

ase for

niversity

raduates.

urthermore,

even

graduates

hose

ducationmatches heir

obs

sometimes

eport

atherevere

underutilisation.

ll

n

all,

hese esults

uggest

hatwhile

good

match

n terms f

formal

ducation

mproves

hechances hat ne willbe

given

he

opportunity

o

use one's

knowledge

nd

skills,

t s neither

necessary

or a

sufficientondition

for

kill tilisation.

In effect,tatementtakes he kills f the ubject s given,nd seeks o deter-

mine heextent o which

he

ubject

s in a

position

o utilise hese n the

current

work

etting.

tatement

switcheshe

perspective

round,

akingob

requirements

as

given,

nd

seeking

o establish o what xtent he

subject

s

equipped

o fulfil

these

equirements.

able 2

provides

n overview f skill

deficitss

measured

y

the

responses

o statement.

Somewhat

nexpectedly,

large

roportion

f all

categories

f

graduates

how

rather

igh

evels f kill eficits

ccording

o this

measure. his ould

ndicate hat

statement has a low thresholdalue, n thesensethat ubjects greewith he






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


440 EDUCATIONAL VS SKILL MISMATCHES

Table 2 The relation etween ducationalmismatchesnd skill

eficits

None

Strong

Skillsdeficits 1 2 3 4 5

Education-job

match

University

Higher

evel f

education

ppropriate

13 19 21

26 21

Own evel nd

field

f

education

ppropriate

7 19 23

37 15

Own evel nd differentield feducation

ppropriate

9 6 22 43

20


ppropriate

7 18 22

38 15

Total

university

8 18 22

37 16

Higherocationalducation

Higher

evel of education

ppropriate

5 19 28

34 15

Own

level

and field f

education

ppropriate

5 18 32 32 13

Own

level and differentield f

education

ppropriate

10 14 18 33

26


ppropriate

10 20 28

30 13

Total

higher

ocational

ducation

7 19 29

32 14

Total

university

HVE

7 18 26

34

15

statementvenin the case of relatively inor kill deficits. his measure f

skilldeficits

onlyweakly

elated o

education-job

mismatches.

hose

working

outside

theirown

field

ppear

to be somewhatmoreinclined o

report

kill

deficits han

those

working

ithin heir wn

field.

However,

here

eems o be

littleor no relation

between

ob

level and skill deficits. ne

might xpect

graduates

ho work

bove their wn educationalevelto show

higher

evels f

skilldeficitshan

graduates

orking

t or

(especially)

elow heir wn

evel.This

is not thecase.

Taken

ogether,

he

resultshown n

Tables

1

and

2

appear

o

be

in

conflict ith

one ofthe

key ssumptions

f

assignmentheory, amely

hat

mismatchesetween

education nd

ob

are

accompanied

y

serious

mismatches

etween vailable kills

and

required

kills. he

results ndicate

nly

a

relatively

eak

relation etween

educational

mismatchesnd skillmismatches.6

From the

point

of view

of the matchbetween kills

nd skill

requirements,

skill tilisationnd skill

deficitss indicated

y

the

responses

o

statement

and

statement are notsimplywo sidesofthe same coin. t is possible,ven ikely,

sA

comparison

ith he

graduates'

esponses

ased on a list

of 34

separate

kills

ndicates hat he

thresholds

indeed

omewhatow. Even

thosewho

indicated

ery

ewor no

discrepancies

etween

available nd

required

kill

tems

ften

esponded

ositively

o

statement.

Nonetheless,

herewas a

clear

positive

elation

etween he

number

f item

discrepancies

nd the

response

o

statement

,

suggesting

hat

he

tatementas at least certain

egree

f

validity.

6We also

used

other ndicatorsf

kill

tilisationnd skill

eficit y

sking espondents

o

ndicate or

list f

killswhether

hey

were

equired

n the

ob

and

whether

hey

ossessed

hese kills.

hese

nalyses

showroughlyimilar esults,lthoughheeffectsn labourmarketutcomes re ess trong.






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ALLEN AND ROLF VAN DER VELDEN

441

Table3 Combinations

f skill nderutilisation

nd skill eficits

Skill eficits

none/weak strong total

Skill nderutilisation

None/weak

skillmatch skill

hortage

84.8%

41.8% 43.0%

Strong

skill

urplus wrong

kills

15.2%

9.3%

6.0%

Total 51.0% 49.0%

100.0%

that some

people

will

simultaneously

xperience

hortages

nd

surpluses

f

(different)

kills. o illustrate

his,

Table 3 showsdifferentombinationsf the

two

measures.

Table 3

reveals

hat

he

responses

o the two statementsre

onlyquiteweakly

related:

hose

who

disagree

with

tatement

are

slightly

ess

ikely

o

agree

with

statement thanthosewho do not

disagree

with tatement and vice versa.

A

small

group

6%)

of

graduates

imultaneously

eport

hat heir

ob

does not offer

them ufficientcopeforusing heir nowledgend skills nd that hey ould do

theirwork etterf

they ossessed

dditional

nowledge

nd

skills. his

group

f

graduates

oes

not

so

much

ufferrom

aving

oo

little r too

few kills

or

heir

jobs,

as from

aving

he

wrong

kills.

4. The

model

In eachof theanalyses n the effectsf educationalmismatchesnd skillmis-

matches n

wages, ob

satisfactionnd

on-the-job

earch,

we will

use similar

models.We will

begin

with model

containing

ndicators f

acquired

evel of

education,

ith s control

ariablesabour

market

xperience

efore he start f

current

ob,7

tenure n

current

ob,

and dummies or

elf-employment

nd

tem-

porary mployment.

he

model

pecification

s:

Y

=

ao

+

alX

+

a2EDUC

+

e

(1)

WithY= dependentariable nder onsiderationi.e. log wages, ob satisfaction,

looking

or nother

ob);

X=

a

vector f control

ariables,

nd

EDUC

=

a

set

of

dummies

ndicating

he

acquired

ducationalevel.

The dummies

epresenting

he

educationalevel re as

follows:

niversity

lus

postgraduate

tudy

UE+),

university

ducation

nly

UE), higher

ocational

du-

cation

plus

postgraduate

tudy

HVE+),

and

higher

ocational ducation

nly

(HVE)

as

the

reference

ategory.

7Weusedageatthe tart f thecurrentob as a proxy or rior abourmarketxperience.






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442

EDUCATIONAL VS SKILL MISMATCHES

In

model

(2)

we

add

the

mismatches

ccording

o the

formal

ducational

requirements

or

he

ob

Y - model 1+ a3UNDEREDUC+ a40VEREDUC

+

asOWNFIELD

+

e

(2)

With

UNDEREDUC

=

degree

o

which

ob

level s

higher

han wn

chooling

evel,

OVEREDUC

=

degree

o which

ob

level s lower

hanown

schooling

evel,

nd

OWNFIELD

=

dummy ndicating

f

one's

ownor a

related ield f

education

s

considered

ppropriate

1),

zero

otherwise.

The

variables

VEREDUC and

UNDEREDUC are

measured

n

terms f

the

number fyearsnormallyequired or hesubject's wn evelofeducation nd

for

he evel

of

education onsideredmost

ppropriate

or

he

current

ob.

Each

level

f ducations

assigned

score

depending

oth n

thenominal

ength

nd the

difficulty

f

the

educational rack. he

following

cores

re used:

UE+

(21),

UE

(19),

HVE+

(18),

HVE

(17),

secondary

ducation nd lower

14)

(cf.

Van der

Velden nd Van

Smoorenburg,

997).

n linewith

revious

esearch e

distinguish

between he

effectsf

overeducationnd

undereducation.earsof

overeducation

have

been

calculated

y

subtracting

he ctual evelof

education romhe

appro-

priateevelofeducation, ith llnegativecores etto zero. Foryears f under-

education he

reverse as been

pplied, gain etting

ll

negative

cores

o zero.The

reference

ategory

or oth

variables

s

having

matching

ob.

Because

he

model

specification

ncludes he

respondent's

ctual

evel f

education

nstead f

required

level,

he

ssignment

heory redicts

n

model

2 a

negative

ffect

f

overeducation,

since n

this

pecification

vereducation

mplies

job

at

a

lower evel.

imilarly

he

theory redicts

(somewhat

maller)

ositive

ffectf

undereducation.

In

order o

ascertaino what

xtent

ny

ffectsf

educational

mismatch

re due

to skill nderutilisationnd/or eficits, odels3 and4 incorporate easures or

the

wo

ypes

f

kill

mismatch.n

model we

replace

he erms

epresenting

ver-

and

undereducation

y

he

respondents'

udgements

f

kill tilisation

nd

deficits,

as

measured

y

the

responses

o

statementsand

2. The

scores

n statement

are

recoded

uch

that

high

core

ndicates

igh

underutilisation.

Y

=

model 1

+

a6,UNDERUTILISATION

a7DEFICIT

+

e

(3)

with

UNDERUTILISATION

measure ased on

recoded

esponse

o

statement

andDEFICIT = measure ased on responseo statement.

Models 2

and 3

contain

pecifications

f

the

effectsf the

two

types

f

mis-

matches n

labour

market

utcomes. or

model

3,

assignment

heory

eads

to the

prediction

f

a

negative

ffectf

underutilisation,

nalogous

o

the

negative

ffect

predicted

or

vereducation.

he

theory

lso

predicts

(somewhat

ounterintui-

tive)

positive

ffectfskill

eficits,

hich

re

nterpreted

ere s the

kill

ounter-

part

f

undereducation. skill

eficit

hus ndicates

job

aboveone's own

evel.

A

comparison

f

these

models

will

provide

n indication

f

which ind f

mismatch

has the trongerverall ffectn theoutcome nquestion.






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VELDEN

443

More

nteresting

rom ur

point

ofview

s a model

pecification

n which

oth

educational

mismatches

nd

skillmismatchesre ncluded

ogether.

hiswill

llow

us to determine

henet

ffectf eachkinds fmismatches

fter

ontrolling

or

he

effectf theother. hisspecifications shown n model4

Y

=

model

2

+

a6UNDERUTILISATION

a7DEFICIT

+

e

(4)

5. The

effectsf mismatches

n

wages

Table

4

presents

he

results f the

analysis

n the

natural

og)

of

hourlywages.

Model

1

showsthat

only

12%

of the

wage

differences

an be

explained

y

the

variablesn themodel.This eems

uite

ow,

butbut one should ear n mind he

relative

omogeneity

f the

group

n

terms f basic human

apital spects.

here

are n fact

uite arge

ifferences

etween hedifferentducational

evels

cquired.

Having

followed

niversity

ducationrather han

higher

ocational ducation

yields

a

wage

increase f

23%

(exp(0.211)). Having

followed

niversitylus

Table 4

Results

f

regression-analyses

ith

dependent

ariable

n

(hourlywage)

Model

1

Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Dependent

variable:

In(hourlywage)

B SE B SE B SE B

SE

Human

apital

Level

f

ducation

referenceroup

VE)

University+

0.262*

0.023

0.316

0.023 0.244* 0.023 0.304*

0.023

postgraduate tudy

University

0.211

0.018 0.247* 0.018 0.206*

0.018

0.243* 0.018

HVE+

0.073* 0.018 0.110* 0.017

0.065* 0.018

0.103

0.018

postgraduate tudy

Tenure n currentob 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.011* 0.002 0.010* 0.002

Experience

efore

0.011

0.001 0.011* 0.001

0.011

0.001

0.011

0.001

current

ob

Job

haracteristics

temporaryob

-0.145*

0.022

-0.154*

0.021

-0.137

0.021

-0.148*

0.021

self-employed

-0.033 0.024

-0.043 0.023 -0.046

0.024

-

0.050 0.023

Education-job

atch

overeducation

years)

-0.081

0.005

-0.071

0.006

undereducation

years)

0.036* 0.012

0.035* 0.012

job outside own field -0.036 0.015 0.031 0.015

Skill-job

atch

skill

underutilisation

-0.060* 0.005 -0.032*

0.006

(statement )

skill

deficit

0.000 0.005

-

0.004 0.005

(statement

)

Constant

2.938* 0.043

2.947* 0.042 3.080* 0.047

3.033 0.047

Adjusted

R2

0.12

0.23 0.17

0.24

N

2217

2188 2170

2141

*

significantt 1% level






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444

EDUCATIONAL

VS SKILL

MISMATCHES

postgraduate

tudy

ven eads o a

wage

ncreasef

30%.8

Postgraduatetudy

fter

higher

ocational ducation ncreases

ages

y

about8%. Model 1 shows

ositive

effectsfboth

xperience

ariables enure nd

experience

efore urrent

ob,

and

a

negativeffectorhaving temporaryob. Being elf-employedas no significant

effectn

wages.

In model

2

the ndicators f educationalmismatchesre addedto the

model.

This

mproves

hemodelfit

markedly,esulting

n

an

adjusted

2

of0.23. There s

a

significantositive

ffectf

undereducation,

hich onfirmshe

prediction

hat

holding job

for

which

he

appropriate

ducationalevel s

higher

han he one

followed

y

he

respondent

esultsn

higher ages.

he

predicted egative

ffect

f

overeducations also

observed.

n

line with he

predictions

f

assignment

heory

and the results btainedn earlier esearch,heeffectsfovereducationre con-

siderably reater

han

those

for

undereducation.ach

year

of

undereducation

(working

boveone's

evel)

yields

wage

ncrease f some4%. Each

year

fover-

education

working

elowone's

evel)

eadsto a decrease

n

wages

f8%. There

s

no

significant

ffectf

working

n

a

job

forwhich ne's own or a

related ield f

education s not

required.

t is

interesting

o note that

aking

ducational

mis-

matchesnto ccount

ncreaseshe oefficients

or

wneducation. his

reflectshe

fact hat he

reference

roup,

raduates

f

higher

ocational ducation

ithout

ny

additional

ostgraduate

tudy,

howed he owest

roportion

f ndividuals ork-

ing

below

heir wn evel.

In model3 we use skill

mismatchesnstead f ducationalmismatches

o

explain

wage

differences.

nderutilisation,

he skills

ounterpart'

f

overeducation,

hows

the

xpected egative

ffectn

wages.By

contrast,

skill eficit

ppears

o have

no

effecttallon

wages.

kill

mismatchesccount or

good

deal ess

wage

variance

than

do educational

mismatches:he

adjusted

R2 amounts o

0.17,

compared

o

0.23formodel2.

Model 4 combines otheducationalmismatchesnd skillmismatches.oth

kindsof

mismatches ave

a

significant

ffect

n

wages,

ven

when

controlling

for heother.

However,

bouthalf ftheeffectf

skill

nderutilisation

isappears

when

educational

mismatchesre

taken nto

account.

By

contrast,

nly

small

part

of the

effectsf over-

nd

undereducationre accounted or

by

skillmis-

matches.n

terms f

additional

xplained

ariance,

ducational

mismatcheseem

to be much more

mportant

han kill

mismatches. hereas he

adjusted

R2 in

model4 is

ustbarely

igher

han

hat n

model

,

t s

clearly

much

higher

han n

model3.

The

results

resented

n

Table

4

are nconsistentith

he

explanation

iven y

assignment

heory

o the

wage

effects

f over-

nd undereducation.

his

explana-

tion

holds that uch

effectseflect

iffering

evelsof

productivity

s

the match

between

equired

nd

available

kills s

varied.

n

line with his

expectation,

e

8

Thesewage

differentialsre

greater

han hose

normally

ound or

raduates

ne

year fter

raduation,

indicating

hat

he

ge-earnings

rofile

or

niversityraduates

s

steeper

han or

raduates

rom

igher

vocationalducation.






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JIM


445

do observe

significant

egative

wage

effect f skill

underutilisation.

owever,

contrary

o whatwould

be

expected

n thebasis of

assignmentheory,

kill

mis-

matches ccountfor

only

a small

proportion

f the

wage

effectsf

educational

mismatches.killdeficitppears o haveno effectt all.Thismight e due tothe

lower ffectsf

undereducation

n

general

n

combination

ith he ow

threshold

value of our measure f

deficits.

As

indicated

t

the tart f this

paper,

ducationalmismatchesave

been

found

to affect broad

range

f

abourmarket

utcomes,

ot

ustwages.

Outcomes uch

as

job

satisfactionnd

on-the-job

earch re

important

ot

only

to individual

workers,

ut also from he

point

of view

of

the

workings

f

the abour

market.

In

particular,

e

would

ike

o know o what xtent nd n what

way

dissatisfaction

with hematch etweenchoolingnd/orkills nd the characteristicsf the ob

constitutes motivation

or

ndividualso seek

mployment

etter uited o their

own

capabilities.

n

the

following

wo ections e

analyse

he ffectsf

educational

and skillsmismatchesn

the

dependent

ariables

ob

satisfaction

nd

job

quit

intention.

6. Mismatchesnd ob satisfaction

In

this ectionwe discuss

he

effects

f

mismatchesnd other

ariables n

job

satisfaction.

espondents

ere sked

o rate

heir

ver-all

ob

satisfactionn a scale

from

(very

nsatisfied)

o

5

(very

atisfied).

hisvariable as been

recoded nto

dummy

with

alue

1

ifthe

respondent

arked

nswer

ategory

(satisfied)

r 5

(very

atisfied),

nd

value

0

otherwise. o

facilitate

comparison

f

effects,

he

same

independent

ariables

ave

again

been ncluded s

used for he

wage

esti-

mates.

A

number f ndicators

f

ob quality,

ncludingn(hourly age)

tself,

ave

alsobeen ncluded s control ariables. he otherndicatorsomprisehegradu-

ates'

ratings

f a

number

f

aspects

f their

urrent

ob, namely

he

degree

f

autonomy,

he

variety

f

work

tasks,

he

prestige

ssociatedwith

he

ob,

and

the

opportunity

o

introduceheir

wn deas.Thesecontrol

ariables

re

mport-

ant,

ince

he

quality

f

the

ob

might onceivably

nfluenceoth

ob

satisfaction

and the

responses

o

statementsand

2. Table 5

presents

heresults f

the

ogistic

regression

nalysis.

Model 1 shows

hat

ob

satisfaction

s

strongly

nfluenced

y ob

characteristics.

As one might xpect,wageshavequitea strong ffect n job satisfaction,nd

self-employedespondents

re also more

satisfied.

he

respondents'

ob

quality

ratings,

articularly

or

variety

nd room

for own

ideas,

also show

a

strong

effect.

urprisingly,

e

findno

significant

ffectf

holding

temporary

ob.

Model

2

shows

no

improvement

n

modelfit.

Overeducation-working

n a

job

that

requires

lower evel

f

education han

one's own-has a

negative

ffectn

the

ob occupant's

atisfaction,

ut

the ffects

not

ignificant.

ndereducationas

no

significant

ffectn

ob

satisfaction.he

same

applies

o

working

n

a

job

that

doesnotmatch herespondent'sield feducation.






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446

EDUCATIONAL

VS SKILL

MISMATCHES

Table5 Results

f

ogistic

egression-analyses

ith

ependent

ariable

ob

satisfac-

tion

Dependentariable: Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4

(

v

r

y

s f

d.

. .

. . . . . . . . .

.

.

.

. . . .

. . .

.

. . .

. .

.

. . .

.

.

ith

urrent

ob

B SE

B SE

B

SE B

SE

Human

apital

Level

f

ducation

reference

roup

VE)

University+

0.225

0.224

0.323 0.237

0.292

0.238 0.218

0.253

postgraduate

tudy

University

-0.051 0.170

0.057 0.178

0.060

0.181

0.038

0.190

HVE+

0.199 0.162

0.273

0.170

0.217 0.172

0.202

0.181

postgraduatetudy

Tenuren

current

ob

-0.032

0.016 -0.035

0.016

-0.038

0.017

-0.040

0.017

Experience

efore

-0.007 0.013

-0.008

0.011

-0.002

0.012

-0.003

0.012

current

ob

Job

haracteristics

In

(hourly age)

0.830* 0.208

0.638* 0.220

0.458

0.224

0.499

0.236

temporaryob

0.049 0.195

0.037 0.200

-0.076

0.208

-0.037

0.213

self-employment

0.797* 0.300

0.774 0.303

0.794

0.315 0.787

0.318

autonomy

0.204* 0.062

0.187

0.063

0.197

0.066

0.190*

0.067

variety

0.570*

0.062

0.572* 0.063

0.424*

0.068

0.424*

0.068

prestige 0.196 0.062 0.181 0.063 0.104 0.068 0.112 0.069room or wn deas 0.500* 0.066 0.486* 0.067

0.339*

0.071

0.353*

0.072

Education-job

atch

overeducation

years)

-0.134 0.055

0.020

0.061

undereducation

years)

0.124 0.129

0.029

0.136

job

outside wn

field

-0.190 0.143

0.098 0.152

Skill-job

atch

skill

nderutilisation

-0.760*

0.059

-0.755*

0.062

(statement

)

skill

eficit

-0.129

0.053

-0.141

0.053

(statement)Constant -

0.756

-

0.814

-

0.884

-

0.928

--

7.062*

-

6.381*

-

2.230

- 2.429*

Model

hi-square

405.5*

416.8*

577.5*

571.7

d.f.

12

15

14

17

change

n

chi-square

-

11.3

172.0

166.2

relative

o

model

change

n

d.f.

-

3

2

5

relativeo

model

*

ignificant

t

1%

evel.

In

model

3,

skill

mismatches

re

introducedn the

place

of

educational

mis-

matches.n

contrasto

educational

mismatches,

kill

mismatches

ppear

o

exert

strong

nfluence

n

ob

satisfaction.

he

modelfit s

greatly

mproved.

kill

nder-

utilisation as

a

strong

egative

ffectn

satisfaction.he

effect

f

skill

eficits

s

also

negative,

lthough

ot

ignificant.

kill

mismatches

ccount or

considerable

part

of

the

effectsf

job

quality

ndicators.

otably,

he

effects f

wages

and

prestigere no longer ignificant.






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447

Model

4

incorporates

oth ducational

nd skillmismatches.hismodelfits

he

data esswellthan

model

3,

despite

headditional hree

egrees

f freedom

sed.

Interestingly,

n

model

4 the

effect

f skilldeficitss now

just) significant.

hese

results how hat killmismatches

eally

matter o workers. ven fter

ontrolling

for

range

f

ob quality

ndicators,

poor

match etween

vailable nd

required

skills as a

strong egative

ffectn

job

satisfaction.

n the

following

ection,

we

attempt

o determineo what xtent

his

ffect

onstitutesmotivation

n the

part

of workerso seek lternative

mployment.

7. Mismatches ndon-the-jobearch

We

have een

hat,

lthough

kill

mismatches

nly

have

rathermoderate ffects

n

wages, hey

ave

strongmpact

n

ob

satisfaction.

n

mportantuestion

ow s

whether hishas

any

real behavioural

onsequences

or

employees.

re

workers

who

experience poor

match etween heir wn skills nd those

equired

n

their

current

ob

motivated

y

this o

quit

their

ob

in

favour f other

work? n

this

sectionwe examine ffectsf mismatchesn the ikelihood hat

respondents

re

looking

or

lternative

mployment.

e asked he

respondents

hether

hey

ad

activelyought therworknthepastfourweeks. able6 presentsheresults f he

logistic

egression

nalysis.

Model 1 shows hat

on-the-job

earch s

strongly

nfluenced

y

the

variety

f

work asks

nd

theroom o

introduce

wn

deas.Other haracteristicshat howed

an

effect

n

satisfaction,

uch as

wages,

don't

appear

to

constitute sufficient

motivationo

actively

eekotherwork.

Model

2,

in which ducational

mismatches avebeen

ntroduced,

oes not fit

thedata

significantly

etter hanmodel

1. A

poor

match etween ormal

chooling

and that onsideredppropriateo the ob does not ncreaseheprobabilityhat

worker ill eekother

mployment.

Model 3 shows hat kill

mismatches,

n

particular

nderutilisationf

skills,

o

have

real

consequences,

n

terms f

on-the-job

earch ehaviour. he model

fit

s

improvedonsiderably

y

the ntroductionf these wo variables.Workers ho

report

n

underutilisation

f

skills re

significantly

ore

ikely

o look for lter-

native

mployment

han hose

who

report

ittle r nounderutilisation.kill eficits

also have a

positive

ffect,

lthough

his s not

significant.nterestingly,

n con-

trolling orthe effects f skillmismatches, agesnow also show a significant

positive

effect n

on-the-job

earch.

By

contrast,

he effects

f

variety

nd

opportunity

o

introduce wn

deas

are

no

longer ignificant.

As

was the case in the

analyses

f

ob

satisfaction,

odel

4

resemblesmodel3

greatly. aking

ducational

mismatchesntoaccount

ncreases he effect f skill

deficits

o

the

point

f

significance,

ut

negates

he

ignificant

ffect

f

wages.

The

results

stablish hat kill

mismatches

learly

ave

behavioural

onsequences.

n

fact,

f

all the

variables,

nly

kill

mismatches

how

significant

ffectn

on-the-

job search.






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


448

EDUCATIONAL

VS SKILL

MISMATCHES

Table

6 Results

f

ogistic

egression-analyses

ith

ependent

ariable

ooking

or

other

work

Dependentvariable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

looking

for..............

.............

.............

........

....

otherwork

B SE B SE

B SE B

SE

Human

apital

Level

f

ducation

reference

roup

VE)

University+

0.078 0.235 0.067 0.249 0.091 0.240 0.160

0.256

postgraduate

tudy

University

0.167 0.187 0.155 0.195 0.101 0.192 0.148

0.201

HVE+

0.141

0.179 0.106

0.187 0.140 0.184 0.150

0.193

postgraduate

tudy

Tenure n currentob -0.006 0.018 -0.002 0.018 -0.004 0.018 -0.001 0.018

Experience

efore

0.000 0.012 0.001

0.012 -0.003

0.013 -0.002

0.013

current

ob

Job

haracteristics

In

(hourlywage)

-0.169 0.213

-0.117

0.226 0.047

0.221 -0.005

0.233

temporary

ob

0.471 0.189 0.428

0.194

0.556* 0.193

0.478 0.198

self-employment

-0.259 0.281 -0.251

0.282

-0.206 0.283 -0.196

0.285

autonomy

-0.089 0.065 -0.089

0.065

-0.072 0.067

-0.079 0.067

variety

-0.190

0.065

-0.191

0.065

-0.089 0.068 -0.093 0.069

prestige

-0.023 0.066

0.031

0.067 0.069

0.068

0.064 0.069

room forown ideas -0.246* 0.069 -0.237* 0.070 -0.133 0.073 -0.138 0.074

Education-job

atch

overeducation

years)

0.016

0.056

-0.042 0.060

undereducation

years)

-0.213 0.140

-0.137 0.141

job

outside own

field

-0.151 0.148

-0.069 0.152

Skill-job

atch

skillunderutilisation

0.380*

0.059 0.380* 0.061

(statement )

skilldeficit

0.130 0.052

0.138

0.053

(statement )

Constant 0.873 0.754 0.750 0.821 -2.169 0.889 -1.917 0.933

Model

chi-square

62.5 66.5

102.5

103.3

d.f.

12 15

14

17

change

n

chi-square

-

4.0

40.0* 40.8*

relative

omodel

change

n

d.f.

-

3

2 5

relative o model 1

*

significant

t

1%

level.

8.

Conclusion

In

this

paper

we have

explored

he relation etween ducationalmismatches

and skillmismatches. ducationalmismatches

re

indicated

y comparing

he

acquired

evel

and field

f

education

with he eveland field f education

on-

sideredmost

ppropriate

or

he

ob.

Skill

mismatchesre indicated

y

worker's

responses

o the statements

My

current

ob

offers e sufficient

cope

to use

my

knowledgend skills' nd I wouldperformetternmy urrentob if possessed






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


JIM


VELDEN 449

additional

knowledge

nd

skills'. In

assignment heory

the two

concepts

educational nd skillmismatchesreassumed o be

closely

elated:

ducational

mismatches

mply

kill

mismatches hich

n turnhave an effectn

productivity

andwages.

Our

findings

n

this

paper

have

mportantmplications

orresearchnto the

effect

f

education

n

labourmarket utcomes.

hey

stablish

eyond

easonable

doubt he

mportance

f

thedistinctionetween

chooling

nd skills.

he results

provide trong upport

orthe

assumption

hat the matchbetween

ndividual

human

capital

and

the

characteristics

f the

job

matters.

n line

with the

predictions

f

assignment heory

nd with

findings

romearlier

research,

educationalmismatches erefound o have a

strong

ffectn

wages.

Contrary

to theassumptionsf

assignmentheory

owever,ducationalmismatchesre

neither

necessary

or

a

sufficientondition or

killmismatches.

urthermore,

only

small

roportion

f

the

wage

ffectsf

educational

mismatches

s

accounted

for

by

skillmismatches.

nderutilisationf

skills

lso

exerts

negative

ffect

n

wages

distinct

rom

he

effectsf

overeducation,

ut the effectsre

very

mall.

However,

kill

mismatches o have a

strong

ffect

n

job

satisfaction

nd on-

the-job

earch,

fter

ontrolling

or

ob quality,

hereas ducational

mismatches

lack

any

effectn these utcomes.

Whatdo these

indings

ean?One

explanation

ould be that ur

operational-

isation of skill mismatches

s

inadequate.

n

particular

he

indicator or

skill

deficits eems to be

somewhat

acking

n

discriminatory

ower,

nd

its effects

throughout

re weak.

Although

his ndicators not

entirely

acking

n

content

and

prediction alidity,

mproving

hismeasure s

clearly

n

important

im for

future esearch.

ortunately,

he results

ertaining

o overeducation

nd under-

utilisation,

hich re n

terms fboth he

heory

nd

empirical indingsy

far he

most mportant,re in no wayaffectedythis ndicator. he results n these

variables

ardly

hange

t

all when kill

deficits

nd

undereducationre

omitted

from he

nalyses.

There s no reason o

doubt

the

basic

validity

f the ndicator or

killunder-

utilisation.

here s

undoubtedly

ome noise n

this

variable,

s in

every

measure

obtained

hrough

urvey

esearch,

owever,

t seems

mplausible

hat

espondents

who are

working

elow heir wn evel o

the

xtent hat

his

has

a

strong

egative

effect n their

wages

would failto

report

hattheir killswere

not

beingfully

utilised,f hiswas n fact hecase.The owerwages ssociatedwith vereducation

musthave a

differentause.

Human

apital heory rovides

s with

ne

possible xplanation

or he

bserved

wage

effects,

amely

hat

graduates

ith he ame evel f

education

ut

differing

abilities re

sorted n the

market,

ith hemost

ompetent

btainingobs

above

their wn evel' nd the

east

ompetent

btainingobs

below heir

evel'.Accord-

ing

o

this

xplanation,

orkersrerewarded

ccording

o

individual

roductivity,

which s

not

dependent

n

any major

extent n

the

ob.

In other

words,

he

apparentffectsfover- ndundereducationrespurious,maskingnmeasured






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


450 EDUCATIONAL VS SKILL MISMATCHES

ability

ifferences

hat re therealdeterminants

f

productivity

nd thence

wages.

This human

apital xplanation

oes not

provide

n

explanation

or ur

finding

that considerable

roportion

f workers

eport uite

erious

nderutilisationf

skills.This could be accounted orby a watered-downersion f assignment

theory, hereby

heeffectsf educationalmismatchesre

primarily

ue to

differ-

ences

n

unmeasured

bilities,

ut where

here s still distinct ffect f

skill

mismatches.

Screening

heory

ffersn alternative

xplanation

or heobserved ffects.

t

has

in commonwith

he human

apital

xplanation

he

assumption

hat ndividuals

are sorted n the abourmarket.

owever,

n contrast o human

capital

heory,

screeningheory

sserts hat ndividualsre sorted-and

rewarded-primarily

n

thebasis of

easily

bservable

roxies

or

productivity,

ather hanon thebasis of

productivity

tself. ne such

proxy

s

education,

utthere re

many

thers uch

s

work

xperience,

ender

nd social

background.

ecause hese ther ndicatorsre

differentially

istributed ithin

educational

ategories,

nd because different

employers

ssign

different

eights

o each

indicator,

considerable

roportion

of

workers nd

up

in

jobs

whichdon't match heir

ducation. hose who as a

result fthis

orting rocess

nd

up

in a

job

belowtheir wn

evel

will

earn ess

than hoseworkingttheir wn evel, egardlessftheir ctual evelofskill, nd

regardless

f the

degree

o which heir kills

re

being

utilised.n a

highly

nstitu-

tionalised

ystem

f

wage

bargaining

s

in

the

Netherlands,

ules bout he evel f

the

ob

and the

educationalevel f

the

occupant

re

frequentlyncorporated

nto

wage

cales.

Our results

elating

o

job

satisfactionnd in

particular

n-the-job

earch re

important,

ince

they

hed

ight

n

the

mechanisms

hrough

hich

djustments

take

place

in

the market. killmismatches

re

an

important

ause of

ob

dis-

satisfaction,hichprovide n incentive or workers o look forotherwork,

presumably

orkwhich s

better uited o their wn

abilities. his shows

that

adjustments

n

the abourmarket

re

strongly

riven

y

the

relation etween

ob

content nd

individual

bilities,

nd less

by

the material

nd

social rewards

provided

y

work.9

Acknowledgements

This

rticles a

revisedersionf

paper

repared

or

he onferenceSkill

Measurement

and

Economic

Analysis',

27-29

March

2000,

University

f

Kent,

Canterbury.

We

would

like

to thank ex

Borghans,

ia

Potma,

imo

Huijgen,

nd

wo

nonymous

eviewersor heir

commentsn

earlierersionsf he

rticle.

9This

neednot meanthat

uch

rewardsre not

mportant

o

workers,

ut could

simply

mean

hat he

differences etween currentrewards and those available elsewhereare not sufficientlyarge.






8/10/2019 Allen_2001


JIM


451

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conomics

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8/10/2019 Allen_2001


452

EDUCATIONAL VS SKILL MISMATCHES

Appendix

Descriptive

tatisticsf variables sed

Table

Al

Intervalvariables

Variable mean standard eviation

Hourly age guilders)

33.0

10.3

Tenure

years)

3.8 3.6

Age

t start fcurrent

ob (years)

31.1 5.1

Years fovereducation 0.6 1.1

Years fundereducation 0.2 0.5

Skill

nderutilisation5-point

cale)

2.2

1.1

Skill

eficit

5-point

cale)

3.3

1.2

Autonomy

n

ob (5-point

cale)

3.7 0.9

Variety

n

ob

(5-point

cale)

3.9 0.9

Prestige

f

ob (5-point

cale)

3.3

0.9

Room

for

wn deas

n

ob (5-point

cale)

3.9 0.9

TableA2 Dummy ariables

Variable

Percentage

Job

atisfaction

73

Looking

or

ther

work

18

Level

f

ducation:

Universitypostgraduatetudy

12

Universitynly

36

Higher

ocationalducation

postgraduatetudy

37

Higherocationalducationnly 16

Temporary

ob

9

Self-employed

6

Work utside wnfield

20

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