Alliances and Asymmetry_ an Alternative to the Capability Aggregattion Model of Alliances_ JAMES...

8/12/2019 Alliances and Asymmetry_ an Alternative to the Capability Aggregattion Model of Alliances_ JAMES MORROw_1991

1/31

Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of AlliancesAuthor(s): James D. MorrowSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 904-933Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499

Accessed: 07/09/2009 13:04

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mpsa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Midwest Political Science Associationis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

American Journal of Political Science.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mpsahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mpsahttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/31

AlliancesandAsymmetry: n Alternative o theCapabilityAggregationModelofAlliances*James D. Morrow,HooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity

This paperproposesan alternativeogic of alliancesto thecapabilityaggregationmodelwhereboth allies receive securityfrom an alliance. In this alternativeogic, one partner eceivesautonomybenefits, and the other, securitybenefits from the alliance. The formertype of alliances are calledsymmetric and the latter asymmetric.The paperdevelops both logics from a model of alliancechoices in the face of trade-offsbetweenautonomyandsecurityandprovidesa precisedefinitionofthose two concepts. It thenderives a series of criticaltests thatshow the trade-offmodel is superiorto thecapabilityaggregationmodel. First, asymmetricalliances will be easierto formandlast longerthan symmetric alliances. Second, regardlessof the type of alliance, the greaterthe change in itsmembers' ndividualcapabilities,themorelikely it will be broken.Third,second-rankmajorpowerswill be more likely to form asymmetricalliances as theircapabilitiesincrease. All the hypothesesaresupportedby a statisticalexaminationof militaryalliancesformedbetween 1815 and 1965. Theimplicationsof the argument or severaltopics in international elations heoryaredrawnout.

Alliances are a critical tool in international olitics, butwe understand ittleabout them.As Ward 1982, 26) describesourknowledge, littleworkhasprobedthe black boxes of decision makingwithineithernationsor alliances. . . . Norhas there been very much work which has sought to examine, understand,orpredictwhich alliance groupingswere likely to form. Much of the literatureemphasizesalliance formationanddissolutionat the systemiclevel (e.g., Li andThompson 1978; McGowanandRood 1975;Midlarsky 1981, 1983). However,this body of workgives us few clues aboutwhy individualnations form specificalliances. Historical studies (e.g., Liska 1962; Rothstein 1968) discuss somecases in depthbut providelittle insight into what generaltendencieshold. Thesurveysof workon alliances(Buenode MesquitaandSinger 1973;Holsti, Hop-mann, and Sullivan 1973;Ward1982) leave the impression hat much workhasbeen done with few results.The dominant view sees alliances as tools for aggregating capabilitiesagainsta threat;nations formalliancesto increasetheirsecurityby massingtheircapabilitiesagainsta common enemy. The need for the allianceends when thethreatpasses. This view will be called the capabilityaggregationmodel of alli-ances. Although its origins lie in balanceof power theory (Morgenthau1973;

* An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the 1987 annualmeetingof the MidwestPolitical Science Association in Chicago. I would like to express my gratitude o Michael Altfeld,BruceBuenode Mesquita,CharlesGlaser,PaulHuth,JackLevy,MichaelMcGinnis,RobertPowell,RandolphSiverson, and BarryWeingast; heir commentsimprovedboth the presentationand sub-stanceof this paper.AmericanJournal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, November1991, Pp. 904-33(D1991by the Universityof TexasPress, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713


3/31

ALLIANCESAND ASYMMETRY 905

Waltz 1979), capability aggregation s the centraltheme of most work on alli-ances. This view emphasizes how alliances advance the common interestsoftheir members. Because the common interestis generally assumed to be thedeterrenceor defeat of a mutualthreat,alliances are seen as tools of capabilityaggregation n the face of an expansionistpower.This papercontends thatthe typical view of alliances as tools of capabilityaggregationandthreatdeterrencealone is incomplete,butit can be subsumed na more generalmodel. Nations, particularlygreat powers, can use alliances tofurther heir pursuitof changes in the foreignpolicy statusquo. Weakerpartiescan offer concessions, such as militarybases or the coordinationof foreignanddomestic policies, that can increasea strongerally's freedomof action whileincreasingtheir protection romexternalthreats.Alliances can advance diverse,but compatible, interests.'In this view a nationwill judge the attractivenessofan allianceby comparing he benefitsof the ally's abilityto advance its intereststo the costs of advancing he ally's interests.Whenthe formerexceeds the latterfor both nations, they will wantto forman alliance. The capabilityaggregationmodel is the special case of this broaderview where the allies possess a mutualinterest n repellinga common threat.To understandhe logic of alliances,we need a theory thatexplains nationalchoices to form and to break them. Altfeld (1984) presentsa rational choicetheoryof militaryalliances thatemphasizesthe trade-offbetween increased se-curity and decreased autonomy.Morrow(1987) broadens Altfeld's concept ofautonomyto createthe possibilityof autonomygains from alliances. This paperextends the Altfeld model by linking it to a spatial representation f issues andinterests (Morrow 1986; also see Morgan 1984). This extensionprovides cleardefinitionsof autonomyandsecurityfrominterestsand shows how alliances canadvanceeitherautonomyor security.The autonomy-securityrade-offmodelex-plainsboth symmetric(whereboth allies receive security or autonomybenefits)andasymmetric whereone ally gainssecurityandthe other autonomy)alliancesand the conditionsunderwhich each type occurs.This more generalmodel subsumes the capability aggregationmodel andshows the differencesbetween the two types of alliances. It leads to novel hy-potheses about alliance patternsand durations hat cannot be derived from thecapabilityaggregationmodel. The critical test of themodel is whetherasymmet-ric alliancesare morecommon and last longerthansymmetricalliances.Becausethe two sides in asymmetricalliancesderive their benefits from different inter-ests, they strike a morestablebargainof intereststhan those in symmetricalli-ances. As each side's capabilitiesand interestschange over time, asymmetricalliances are more likely than symmetricalliances to continue to provide net

'For example, the WarsawPactprovidesthe Soviet Union with controlover the internalandforeign policies of its allies and internaland externalsecurityfor the EasternEuropeannations.


4/31

906 James D. Morrow

benefits to their members. Further,the model shows why alliances are morelikely to break when the allies' capabilitieschange (Berkowitz 1983) and whyincreases in capabilities by second-rankmajor powers further he formationofasymmetricalliances.Existingresearchprovidessome resultssupporting hese hypotheses.Mid-larsky (1988, 158-68) finds thatallianceswith greatdifferences in capabilitieslast longer thanthose with smalldifferences. Altfeld (1984) found thatsymmet-ric alliances among major powers were formed to-gain security for all parties.Along a similarline, Lalman and Newman(1991) found that 88% of all Euro-pean nations formingalliances since 1815 increasedtheir security as a conse-quence of the alliance. At the same time, a substantialnumberof nations, 31,(12% of all the national decisions to form alliances in the period 1816-1965)lost securitywhen they formedan alliance. Theirresults suggest thatboth secu-rity andnonsecuritymotivationsexist for alliances.The paperbegins with the capabilityaggregationmodel andthen discussesthe concepts of autonomyand security.A model of alliance decisions focusingon the autonomy-securityrade-off is presented.The differencesbetween sym-metricandasymmetricalliances aredrawn,and the implicationsof those differ-ences for the formationand durationof alliances derived. Those implicationsaretested on the set of internationalmilitaryalliances formed between 1815 and1965. The paper concludes with a discussion of the wide-ranging mplicationsof the resultsfor a numberof topics in international elations.

The Capability Aggregation Model of AlliancesAlliances andalignmentsoccur when two or morenationsagree to coordi-nate theiractions. We distinguish ormalalliancesfrom alignmentsby the greaterlengthof commitmentpresent n an alliance; alignmentsreflectsimilarity n in-terest withoutthe formal mutualcommitmentpresent in an alliance (Dingman

1979; Ward1982). Alignmentsoccur when nations concert theiractions to pur-sue common interests at the present without the implicationof coordinationoftheiractions in the future.2Alliances entail a pledge of futurecoordinationbe-tween the allies. Because those pledges arenot binding,alliancesdo not mergethe allies' capabilitiesby forgingan everlastingcoordinationof action. Instead,alliances signal to other nationsthat the allies share certaininterests and so arelikely to coordinate heiractionsin the future.Prospective allies must share both harmonious and divergent interests.Without the latter,an alliancewould be unnecessarybecauseeach party wouldcome to the other'saidsimplyin order o pursue ts own (identical) nterests. Forinstance, the United States and Israel have never signed a military alliance be-cause there has neverbeen a question that the United Stateswould provide mili-2Alignmentscorrespond o the coalitions in Morrow(1986). Coalitions thererequirecoordi-nation on an agreedcoalitional positionand lastonly for the durationof the crisis.


5/31

ALLIANCES AND ASYMMETRY 907

taryassistance to Israel n a crisis. Theirmilitary nterestshave been sufficientlysimilar that an alliance has beenunnecessary.Thecapabilityaggregationmodelof alliancesassumesthat allies value eachotherforthe militaryassistance hey canprovideone another.Althoughthisviewis not statedpurely in any one source, it is quitecommon in the literature e.g.,Kaplan 1957;Morgenthau1973; Walt1987; Waltz1979). The presentationheresynthesizes the common elements of these differentanalyses. In this view alli-ances serve as a substitute or internalsources of powerby increasing he likeli-hood that the allies will send their military forces to defend one another. Theincreasedcredibility of military nterventionadvancesthe allies' mutual nterestin the deterrenceof a common threat,and the massingof their military forcesincreases theirability to defeat such a threatshouldit materialize.The greateranation's relative capabilities, the more attractive t will be as an ally (given asharedperceptionof the threat). (Note: the term capabilities always refers torelative ratherthan absolute capabilitiesin this paper.) All else equal, majorpowers arethe most attractivealliancepartnersn this view.In the capabilityaggregationmodel, alliances last as long as theyareusefulagainst the threatthey counter. Alliances will be terminatedwhen the threatpasses. They could be short-livedor long-liveddependinguponthe natureof thethreat. But nationsshould also break alliances when their allies can no longerprovide the necessarycapabilitiesor when those additionalcapabilitiesare nolongerneeded. Increasesor decreases n eitherally'srelativecapabilities ncreasetheprobabilityhatit no longerneedsits ally's capabilitiesorthat it can no longerprovide its ally with the necessarycapabilities,andso shouldincreasethe proba-bility of an alliancebreakingup (all else equal).As a nation's elativecapabilitiesincrease, its ability to deteror defeatthe threaton its own increases,lowering itsvaluationof an alliance. As a nation'srelative capabilitiesdecrease, its value asan ally declines, encouragingits ally to terminate he alliance. In eithercase,one of the two allies will value the alliance less. Havingdetailedthe capabilityaggregationmodel and its implicationsfor alliance durations,we turn to thealternative, he autonomy-securityrade-offmodel.

Possible Benefits of Alliances: Autonomy and SecurityI startwith the assumption hatnationspursuevalues-some realized,someunrealized n the currentstateof affairs-in theirforeign policies andthat inter-national issues are the manifestationof disagreementson those values acrossnations.These values run the gamutfrom the ideologicalthrough he pragmatic

to the material.Specific international ssues arepolicies of one or more nations+hnt nar thm f %il f rnff 3

3Mansbachand Vasquez(1981) present a general theoryof international elationsbased onissues (although theirconcept of stake corresponds o my notion of issue). Morrow(1986) presentsa formal model that analyzes international onflictfor set of issues where the positionsof the actors


6/31

908 JamesD. MorrowNationalpreferences,strategies,and the outcomeof issues are definedbythreeconcepts: (1) ideal points that reflectnationalpreferencesover the issues;(2) positionsthatspecify nationalstrategies o achieve thosepreferences;and(3)the statusquo that is theoutcome determinedby all nations'positions. A nation'sideal point gives its preferred esolutionof the issues. A nation'spositionspeci-fies the issue outcomes that it is trying to realize throughits actions. Becausenationsmaychoose not to pursue heirpreferred utcome on all issues, a nation'sposition can differ from its ideal point. The currentresolutionof internationalissues defines the status quo. The status quo is determinedby combining allnations'positions and theirmilitary,political,andeconomiccapabilities o affect

outcomes. Nations evaluate the statusquo by comparing t to their ideal point;the closer the status quo is to their ideal point (controllingfor the salience ofseparate ssues), the morefavorably hey view the statusquo (Morrow1986).The second assumption s thatwinningcoalitions-a coalitionthatcan de-terminethe status quo regardlessof the actions of other actors-do not exist.Because the outcomes of wars are unpredictable,ncreasinga coalition'scapa-bilities increases the chance it will win and decreases the chance it will lose,increasingthe settlement t can extract short of war(Morrow1985). All nationsinfluencethe statusquo, and so winningcoalitions (except for a coalition pos-sessing all the capabilities n the system)cannotexist.4Nations can alter theirpositionby taking actions that eithersupportor op-pose thestatusquo across a rangeof issues (perhapsust one issue or manyissuesat once). Most actionsadjusta nation'spositionslightly. Alliances often lead tolargeshifts in the allies' positionsbecausethey adopt new actionsand abandonprevious actionsto further he goals of the alliance.What nterestscannationspursue hroughalliances?Exceptforthe rarecasewherethe statusquo is some nation's deal point, all nationswill be dissatisfiedwith the status quo over some issues. If actions either supportor oppose thestatusquo on some issue, every nationwill partition he issues into those it actsto preserveandthose it tries to change.A nation'ssecurityis its abilityto main-tain the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve. A nation'ssecurity varies with the issues it defines as security concerns, its capabilitiesto defend those concerns, the support t expects to garnerfromother nationstodefend its securityinterests,andthe magnitudeof threat hat other nationsposeto those interests.Nations wish to change the statusquo for some issues. These issues giverise to a nation'sautonomy,the degree to which it pursues desired changes infor the issues are explicitly defined. For the presentdiscussion, we shall assume that issues exist,that actorshavedifferences in theirpreferred esolutionof those issues, and that no actoris perfectlysatisfiedwith the statusquo.

4Because I assumewinningcoalitions do not exist, the literature n alliancesbasedon the sizeprinciple(Riker 1962) is irrelevant o thispaper.


7/31


thestatusquo. The conceptof autonomyherecapturesone facet:thatof externalself-assertion,of the generalnotion of autonomyas a state'sability to determineits own policies. A nation'sautonomywill vary with the actions it adopts; themore aggressively it challenges the statusquo, the greater ts autonomy.We canjudge a nation'sautonomyby the differencebetween its ideal point and its posi-tion over the issues in the statusquo that it would like to change. If a nationadoptsits ideal pointas its position, it has madeno compromises n its attemptsto achieve desired changes. Each time it abandonsactions aimed to move thestatusquo closer to its ideal point in order to gain supportfor its securityinter-ests, its positionmoves awayfrom its ideal point. As the differencebetween thetwo grows, its autonomydecreases.5Because winning coalitions do not exist, nations can never be absolutelysecure. If winning coalitions did exist, then their members would possessabsolute security (at least from all nations outside the alliance). Instead, thepositions and capabilitiesof all nationsdetermine he statusquo. Then a nation'ssecuritycan alwaysbe increasedby adding capabilitiesthroughan alliancepro-vided that the shift in its position provoked by the alliance does not lead toadditionalthreatsto the statusquo that overmatch he gain from the additionalcapabilities.The importantobservationhere is that althoughall nationspossesssome degreeof security,thereis no stateof perfect security.All nationsare bothsecure and insecure;a motivation o gain securityis always present.Autonomy and security are judged at an instant n time and give a nation'sability to change and protectthe statusquo at that time. Over time, a nation'sautonomy and security rises and falls with its capabilities and the support itreceives from its allies. When autonomygoals arerealized, those issues changeinto security concerns. Autonomy and security are plastic over time; I definethem to be the instantaneousvalues ratherthan to measure the trade-off overtime.6

'Morrow (1987) providesa more thoroughdiscussionof the conceptsof autonomyandsecurityemployed here. One of the referees suggested dividing the conceptof autonomy n two-aggressiveautonomybeing freedom to remake he statusquo, and defensive autonomy reedomfromentanglingalliances. I reject this distinction because the concept of defensive autonomy is problematic. Analliance entangles one of its members when the alliance leads it to adopt policies it would not haveadoptedotherwise. If the alliancecommits it to protect nterests t wouldnot defendotherwise, thenthe alliance has reduced its security by decreasing its ability to defend its other interests. If thealliance leads it to advance nterestsof its allies that t would not otherwise, then the alliance reducesits autonomy by decreasing its ability to advance ts own desired changesin the status quo. In eithercase the pursuitof defensive autonomy s just thepursuitof either autonomyandsecurityas I definethose terms.

6Some actions to change the status quo appear to be taken in the name of future secu-rity-preventive war, for instance. If we consider autonomy and security as dynamic, ratherthaninstantaneous,concepts, we must define the actors'discount factors. Autonomyand securitywouldthen become discountedstreams over time. We would have to estimate discount factorsin order tocalculate (dynamic) securityandautonomy.I rejectthis approach n favorof an instantaneousdefi-


8/31

9IO James D. MorrowThe Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model of Alliance Behavior

Alliances canbe considered n termsof theireffectson the allies' autonomyand security. Because autonomyand securitydichotomize a nation'sinterests,the political effects of an alliance are separable nto autonomyand securityef-fects. Holding eitherautonomyor securityconstant, increasesin the other arealways preferred.Faced with an increase in one and a decrease in the other, Iassumestates haveconvex preferencesover autonomyandsecurity.A moderatecombinationof both is generallypreferable o high levels of one and low levelsof the other. Given convex preferencesacrossissues, a nationpreferssmall dif-ferences betweenthe statusquo and its ideal pointon many issues to completesatisfaction on a few issues and vast differences on the remaining ssues (oncewe accountfor the relative salience of different ssues). Autonomyand securityare aggregationsof these issues, and so preferencesbetweenautonomyand se-curity must reflect the convex preferencesacross issues. Of course, the exactevaluationof the trade-offbetweenautonomyandsecurityfor a particularnationdepends on how it separates he issues into autonomyandsecurityinterests,therelativesalience of different ssues, and its levels of securityand autonomy.Atradethatproducesa less even mix may be preferredf it producesa very largeincreasein one for only a small loss in theother.7Alliances lead nations to change their actions, producinga shift in theirpositions. By alteringdemands to change the statusquo on some issues whilesupporting he statusquo on others, these new positionsproducechanges in theallies' autonomyandsecurity.The actualchangesin positionare negotiable anddependupon the agreementbetweenthe allies. A nationcan reduce itsautonomyby changing its position on the issues that it would like to change. Any alliancethatreducesa nation'sautonomywill have to garneradditional ecurityfrom thesupportof the new ally (otherwise, why would a nationformanallianceif it lostboth securityand autonomy?).Many international greements,including somemilitaryalliances, are struckon the groundsof bothpartiessacrificingautonomyfor security. Otheragreements ncrease a nation'sautonomyby providing t withassistancefrom the ally thatallows the firstnation to adopt actions that pursuedesiredchanges. At the same time, its security decreasesboth because its newpositionmay provoke new challenges fromother nationsand becausethe nationwill take actions to defend its ally's security intereststhat it would not defendnition of autonomyand security for reasons of simplicity. Although a dynamic model would bepreferable o the staticmodel, thetreatmentpresentedhere is generally n accordwithexisting theoryandempiricalwork.7The assumptionof convex preferences includes the idea of diminishing marginalreturns.Pushingan already high level of security higher may be less preferred han raisinga low level ofautonomy. Still, the evaluation of a particular radedepends upon the exact trade-off;if a largeamountof security could be obtained or a small loss in autonomy, his trademightbe preferred venwhen securitywas alreadyhigh andautonomy ow.


9/31

ALLIANCES AND ASYMMETRY 91I

without the alliance.8Then a nation'sautonomyandsecurity n militaryalliancesare generallyconstrained o move in oppositedirections.9This constraintoper-ates like a budget line in consumertheoryin economics (except that there is noreason to assumethe constraint s necessarily inear).Becausea roughtrade-offbetweenautonomyand securityexists in the logicof militaryalliances, a model of alliance decisions should focus on that trade-off. Altfeld (1984) adopts the conventionsof consumerchoice theoryto explainhow governments which he treatsas unitary,rationalactors) employ arms andalliances as tools to gain the combinationof autonomy,security,and wealththeydesire. Purchasingarms raises a nation's security at the cost of some wealth;forming alliances can raise a nation'ssecurity at the cost of some autonomy.Differentnationswill acquiredifferentcombinationsof arms and alliancesbasedon their utilityfor each of these three goods.

Formally,this approach eads to a constrainedoptimizationproblemwhichAltfeld (1984) solves to determineequilibriumconditions for a nation'sarma-ment and alliancedecisions. My approach s different; examinethe benefits andcosts of possible alliances to determinethe attractivenessof differenttypes ofalliances. Because the set of available alliance partners s small, nations aregenerallyunableto form theiroptimalalliance profile.Instead, theyuse a weakercriterion,forming that alliance which most increasestheir utility. Individualal-liances cannotbe predictedbecausethere are no existing indicatorsof nationalutilities for othernation'spolicies and the status quo other thanBueno de Mes-quita's (1981) alliancesimilarity ndicator.But thereare patterns n the benefitsof alliances thatsuggest certainregularities hatcan be observedacrossa largenumberof alliances. To explain those regularities,we now turn to the securityandautonomybenefits (andcosts) thatdifferentalliance partners an provide.

Benefits and Costs of AlliancesSecurity benefitsarise primarilyfrom the military capabilitiesof an ally.The strongerthe ally, the greaterthe security providedby an alliance (all else8The threatof entrapment,beingdragged nto a war only to supportan ally, is themainsource

of a loss of security froman alliance(Snyder 1984). Entrapmenthreatens nation's ecuritybecausedefeat in war may lead to issue concessionsbeyondthe loss of the ally's interests.

9Some alliances might producegains in both autonomyand securityfor one of the allies if itvalued the continuedexistence of its ally as one of its security interests. Because such allianceswould be costless for thatnation, it would alwaysbe willing to ally. But thenwe should wonderwhywould its ally grant a'utonomyoncessions to form the alliance;the first nationshould be willing todefend the second even without the alliance.Although autonomyand securitycan be traded hroughalliances, thereis not an inverse rela-tionshipacross nationsbetween the two. Assumethatall nationsstartwith equal autonomy,but somenations startwith moresecurity. Those states with high securitywould tradesome to stateswith lessfor additional autonomy.(Strictly speaking, nationscannot trade autonomyand security, but theywould form alliances thatprovide securityto the weaker partyand autonomy o the stronger.)Then


10/31

912 James D. Morrowequal). The preciseamountof securityan ally providesdependson the locationof the ally, the issues the agreementcovers, and the threatother nationspose tothe statusquo (which can be determined rom theircapabilitiesand positions).In some cases an alliance will increasea nation's ecurity by reducingthe threatits ally poses (cf. Walt 1987 on bandwagoningand Mares 1988 on regionalhegemonies). An alliance can reduce a nation'ssecurity by revealingissue posi-tions thatothernationsobjectto or by committing t to defend an ally it wouldnotdefend in the absence of an alliance(Snyder1984). The latterdanger-oftencalled entrapment -is particularly roblematicwhen the ally is weak andem-broiledin a long-termpolicy disputewithanothernation.Generally,the securityanally providesrises with theally'spowerbutcanbe negativeforweak, exposedallies or if the ally advances a controversialposition.The autonomybenefits (or costs) of an alliancearenegotiable.Foran alli-ance to retain credibility over time, the allies must adjust their actions todemonstrate heir continuedcommitment o the alliance. Consequently,Altfeld(1984) assumes thatalliances must reduce bothallies' autonomy. But the defi-nitionof autonomyhere (i.e., the freedom to pursuedesiredchanges in the sta-tus quo) allows for differentpatternsof alliance benefits. Offensive alliances(cf. Levy 1981 on offensive alliancesin history)increaseboth allies' autonomy.The Axis brought together three nations (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, andImperialJapan)that sharedcommon interestsin changingthe statusquo. Alli-ances formed to change the statusquo requireeithershared or complementarygoals. The Axis pursuedcomplementaryerritorial oals:Germany'sgoals beingin Centraland EasternEurope,Italy's in the Mediterranean, nd Japan's n theFarEast.In otheralliances one partyreceives autonomybenefitsfrom the other.Forexample, the Anglo-Portuguesealliance of 1899 (the Windsortreaty) stoppedarmsshipmentsto the Boers throughDelagoa Bay. Because the cession of armsshipmentsassistedthe Britishin theirgoal of establishingcontrol over the Trans-vaal and OrangeFree State (i.e., a change in the statusquo), Britaingainedautonomyfrom the treaty.The Portuguese n returnreceivedterritorialguaran-tees of theircolonies.The exact natureof autonomybenefitsis negotiable in an alliance. If onepartyis willing to offer concessions like changesin its internalpolicies or mili-tary bases that allow the projectionof militaryforces, the other side can gainautonomy romthe alliance.Controloverone ally'sinternalandexternalpolicies(Schroeder1976)canproduceautonomybenefitsby realizingdesiredchangesinthe status quo and by freeing resources to pursueother goats. Of course, thesameconcessions could be made to enhance bothparties'security.What distin-at any point in time, we shouldexpect to findthatnations with above-average ecurityshouldalsohave above-averageautonomy.Even though alliances provide a trade-off between autonomyandsecurity,we shouldobservea positiverelationshipbetween the two acrossnations.


11/31

ALLIANCESAND ASYMMETRY 9I3

guishes these concessions (which arecommon to alliances)as autonomy or se-curity benefits is the motivationthat underliesthem. Now we turnto those mo-tivations andexamine them througha thoughtexperiment.

Power and Alliance MotivationsImagine a pristine international ystem, one where there are no alliances

andno previoushistory.Eachnationdependsonly on its own capabilitiesfor itssecurity, which increases with its capabilities.Major powers in such a systemwould be moresecure than minorpowers becauseof their greatermilitarycapa-bilities. Of course, particularmajorpowers maybe insecureif theirinterestsaregreatly threatened,and particularminor powersmay be secure if their interestsare not threatened.But all nations would possess high levels of autonomy be-cause none have formed alliances or taken actions that wouldmove their posi-tions away from their ideal points. Before the formation of any alliances, allnations wouldpossess similar evels of autonomybut varying levels of security.Given convex preferencesin autonomyand security (i.e., possessing amoderate level of both is preferable o possessing a greatdeal of one and notmuch of the other), nations preferalliances thatequalize the mix of autonomyand securityto an unalignedstate with an unbalancedcombinationof the two.Minorpowershave low levels of securityandhighlevels of autonomyandso tryto form alliancesthat increase their security at the cost of some autonomy.Theexact alliancestheyform(if any at all) dependon the specific tradesof autonomyfor security offeredandthe relative importanceof security versusautonomyforeach nation (i.e., its utility functionfor autonomyand security).The situation s different ormajorpowers.They possess highlevels of bothautonomyandsecurity.Theyhave no overriding nterest o raise either autonomyor security;some desire to enhance their security,while othersare content withtheirs. As a group, major powers will not be driven to pursueexclusively au-tonomyor securityin their alliances.Consider what types of alliances are attractive n this situation. A majorpowercan offer a potentialally a largeincreasein its security,but it demands ahigh price in autonomyto form an alliance. Minorpowerscannot offer muchsecurityto a prospective ally but may be able to offer concessions that increaseits ally's autonomy. Figure 1 displays the attractivenessof differenttypes ofalliances to minor powers. An alliance with a major power provides a largeincrease in security at the cost of a large cost in autonomy;an alliance withanotherminor power provides a small gain in security at a small cost of au-tonomy. An alliance that increasesautonomydoes so at a cost of security.Thehypotheticalminorpower wants to form any alliance that shifts its autonomy-securitymix above its indifferencecurve through ts originalmix, in Figure 1just the possible alliancewith the majorpower.The attractiveness f a particularalliancedependsuponthechangesin autonomyandsecurity t producesand how


12/31

9I4 JamesD. MorrowFigure 1. The Security and Autonomy Consequences of Alliances for Minor Powers

Autonomy ncreasingAllianlce PositionwithoutAlliance

AutonomyAlliance withAlliance with MajorPower

MinorPower

Security

a nation evaluates those changes. The hypotheticalminor power in Figure 1might wantto ally with some minorpowersand notally withsome majorpowersdependingupon theexactconsequencesof thepotentialalliance.However, givenconvex preferencesand an initial mix unbalancedwith moreautonomythan se-curity,minorpowers desire large gains in security,andonly allianceswithmajorpowerscan deliverthe desiredgains.Figure 2 gives a major power'ssituation.An alliance with another majorpower could raise its security at the cost of some autonomy. Alternatively,itcould form an alliance with a minorpowerthat reduces its securitybut raises itsautonomy throughconcessions madeby the minorpowerto secure the alliance.These concessions could includemilitarybases thatprovidestrategic ocation forthe projectionof poweror agreements hatallow themajorpowerto intervene ntheminorpower'sdomesticpoliticsin the future.Deals betweenmajorand minorpowers are natural n this situation; he minorpowerwill make autonomycon-cessions to the major powerin return or the securitythe major power can pro-vide. This pattern of alliance will be called asymmetric because the partiesreceive differentbenefits from the alliance. Additionally, asymmetries n capa-bilities aregenerallyfoundin asymmetricalliances.


13/31


Figure 2. The Security and Autonomy Consequences of Alliances for Major Powers

Alliance withMinorPower

AutonomyPositionwithoutAlliance Alliance withMajorPower

SecuritySymmetric alliances, where each party gains the same type of benefit, arealso possible. Two majorpowers' interestsmaybe sufficientlyclose for them toform an alliance where they both gain security (if their interestsin preservingthe statusquo match)or autonomy (if their interests n changing the statusquo

complementone another),providedthat the cost in the other is not too high.Minor powers may be able to provide one anotherwith sufficient security toovercome the autonomyloss of an alliance, the Little Ententebeing a classicexampleof anallianceof minorpowersfor security. However,such alliances arerare andlimited. The Little Ententefacedonly the Hungarianhreat o the statusquo because the German,Italian,and Soviet threatsto the statusquo were notsharedby its members,and theirmilitarycapabilitieswere insufficient o defeatany of those threats.Opportunities o formsymmetricallianceswill be rarebe-cause they require great harmonyof interest.Asymmetricalliances should beeasier to form because each side receives differentbenefits, and both sides candeliver their end of the bargain. Assumingthere are an equalnumberof oppor-tunities to formbothtypesof alliances,we shouldexpectto see moreasymmetricthan symmetricalliances and more allies that are unequalin powerthan alliesthat areequal.


14/31

9I6 James D. Morrow

As alliancesstartto form in ourhypotheticalpristinesystem, minorpowerswill convert some of theirautonomyto security,andmajorpowerswill convertsome of theirsecurity to autonomy.These trades ead to an internationalystemwhere the powerful tend to possess higherlevels of bothautonomyand securitythanthe weak.The attractionof any individualalliancedepends on the autonomy and se-curity that each partycan provide and the value each party attachesto thosegoals. Some minor powers may be unable to form alliances because they areunableto deliver sufficientautonomybenefits to attracta majorpower. For ex-ample, if militarybases arethe autonomyconcession, not all minorpowerspos-sess the strategic ocation thatmake such bases attractive o a majorpower.Onetype of asymmetricalliance(whichMares 1988 calls regionalhegemonies) pro-vides sufficientautonomybenefits for the majorpower to removeits incentive tothreatents ally, thereby ncreasing heminorpower'ssecurity.Otherminorpow-ers will value theirautonomyhighly,making hoseconcessionsunattractive vento gain large securitybenefits. The classic case here is Hoxha'sAlbania, whichquit asymmetricrelationshipswith both the Soviet Union and the People's Re-public of China n order o preserve he autonomyof its foreignpolicy. The sameconsiderations will change the willingness of majorpowers to enter into alli-ances; the United States between the wars valued its security in the WesternHemisphere andits autonomy n LatinAmerica)highly and so remained sola-tionist(withrespectto Europeanpolitics). The argumentabovedoes not suggestthat all nationswill enterasymmetricalliancesnorthatonly asymmetricallianceswill form, but rather hatasymmetricalliances areunusuallyattractive omparedto symmetricalliances.

Hypotheses n Changes n PowerandAlliancesThe thoughtexperimentabove asserts the attractionof asymmetricalli-

ances, but how do the motivationsto form allianceschange in a system wheresome alliancesalreadyexist andcapabilitieschangeovertime?To consider these changes, continuethe thoughtexperimentto analyzethemotivations to breakalliances. A nation will want to breakan alliance when itprefers(i.e., is on a higherindifferencecurve) the combinationof securityandautonomyit obtainswithout the allianceto thatwith it. Threemotivationsmakethis shift attractive:1) a deterioration f its securityor autonomy n the alliance;(2) an improvementn its securityandautonomyout of thealliance;or (3) a shiftin the nation'sutility function(Berkowitz 1983). Figure 3 shows each of thesemotivationsgraphically.Whatchangescan produceeach of these threemotivations o breakan alli-ance? First, growthin capabilitiesin one alliancepartner:as one ally grows inpower, its abilityto provide for its own securityincreases.At the same time, its


15/31


Figure3. ThreeChangesThat CouldBreakan AllianceOriginal ce Curve

l: ..~~~2\ \ Position ihu Alliance

I sn Pbsrt=n outAutonomy 3. Chane - of Alliance3. m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~UilfityFPunction

1. Deterortiono ofAlian,ce.B..enefits. ,

Securitysecurity in the alliance also increases.As a consequenceof this second increase,it will demand additionalautonomyfrom its ally, either by obtainingnew con-cessions or by removingold obligations. Muchof that renegotiationoccurstac-itly as the parties adjust their actions over time; McGinnis (1986) provides aninsightful analysis of such adjustmentbetween superpowersand their clients.These changes can make breakingthe alliance more attractive o the ally thancan continuing the alliance. Second, decline in a nation's capabilitieshas thesame effect when its ally obtains security from the alliance. The alliance nowprovides less security, and the partnerwith constant capabilitieswill demandadditional autonomyto continuethe alliance. For both of the first two reasons,the bigger the change in capabilities, the bigger the renegotiationrequired.Third, shifts in either ally's utility function(e.g., througha change in govern-ment) can makeexisting alliancesno longerattractive such shifts can also rein-force the attractivenessof existing alliances).For all threechanges, adjustments f securityand autonomyare easierwhen


16/31

9I8 James D. MorrowFigure4. A GraphicDepiction f Utility Surplus

Position withoutAlliance

Autonomy PositionwithAlliance

ity Surplus

Security

bothpartieshave a largeutility surplus or the alliancebecauseeach can grantlargerconcessions of autonomyor securityand still wish to remainin the alli-ance. We can thinkof a nation'sutility surplus for an allianceas the distancebetween its autonomyandsecuritypositionwith the alliance andits indifferencecurvethrough ts autonomyandsecuritywithout the alliance(see Figure 4).Asymmetricalliances are less likely to break in a given periodthan sym-metricalliances and so tend to last longer for two reasons. First, changes in theweakerpower'scapabilitieswill not greatly alterthenatureof the trade.Becauseit provides autonomy to the major power, its contribution o the alliance is un-affectedby changes in its capabilities.Its securityis primarilyprovidedby itsmajor power ally, so its benefits from the alliancewill not change greatlywithchanges in its capabilities.Consequently, hese shifts in capabilitiesareunlikelyto breakthe alliance. In a symmetricalliance, a changein eitherally's capabili-ties forces a reallocationof the benefitsof the alliance, makingthe alliance lesslikely to persist. Second, asymmetricalliances tend to produce a greaterutilitysurplus hansymmetricalliances because both allies movetowarda moreevenmixture of autonomy and security. Once again, these argumentsdo not claim


17/31


that all asymmetricalliances persist longer than all symmetric alliances, onlythat across a large numberof alliances, asymmetry eads to greateraverage du-ration. Also the bigger the change in an individualally's capabilities, the morelikely the alliancewill break (all else equal).HYPOTHESIS1: Asymmetricalliances are less likely to break han symmetricalliances andso will tendto last longerthansymmetricalliances.HYPOTHESIS2: The probability hat an alliance will be broken ncreases thegreater he changes in its individualmember'scapabilitiesover time.Let us return o the questionof the formationof alliances. We should expect

thatasymmetricalliances are easier to formthan symmetricalliances. But doesthis observationnecessarilylead to the conclusionthatasymmetricalliancesareformed more often than symmetric alliances? No. Existing alliances providesome nations with additional security and others with additional autonomy,reducing their desire to form asymmetricalliances. Given thatasymmetricalli-ances last longer than symmetric alliances, a smaller numberof asymmetricalliancesmay satisfy the demand for such alliances. Although asymmetricalli-ances are generally more attractive han symmetricalliances, demands for suchalliancesmaybe satisfiedby fewer of thembecause they persist. Moresymmetricalliancesmay be formed beca-useheydo not last as long; nationswill probablyhave to form a symmetric alliance whenevera situationcalling for one arises.Asymmetricalliancesthen should be more common thansymmetricalliances inthe sense that morenation-years f asymmetricalliances should be observedthannation-yearsof symmetric alliances. However, more symmetric alliances arelikely to be formed.

HYPOTHESIS3: Asymmetricalliances exist morefrequently han symmetricalliances-more nation-yearsof asymmetricalliances should be observedthannation-yearsof symmetricalliances.HYPOTHESIS 4: More symmetric alliances are formed than asymmetricalliances.Finally,we turnto which nations are likely to formalliances. Asymmetricalliances tradesecurityfor increasedautonomy.Formajorpowers, increasesintheir capabilitiesraise their security. When the capabilitiesof a major powerincrease, it should want to trade some of that increasedsecurityfor more au-tonomy by forming an asymmetricalliance. The majorpowers that form new

asymmetricalliances should be predominantlydrawn from those major powerswhose capabilitieshaverecentlyincreased.However,this line of logic should not work for the most powerfulnations.Because of their exceptionally high capabilities, those nations should always


18/31

920 James D. Morrowpossess extra securitythattheywould like to tradefor autonomy.Increases ntheir capabilities should be irrelevant o their interest in forming asymmetricalliances.A second reason supports the hypothesis that increases in capabilities in-crease the likelihood that a major power will form an asymmetricalliance butare irrelevant or exceptionally powerfulnations.Asymmetricalliancesrequirean interestedminorpower. Minorpowers require securityto complete such adeal, but not all major powers can providethatsecurity.One way for a minorpowerto ensure thata prospectiveprotectorwill possess sufficientcapabilities sto ally with a majorpowerwhose capabilitiesareincreasing.

Some major powers, such as Britain in the nineteenthcentury and theUnited States in the twentiethcentury,are so powerfulthatthey can guaranteesecurityto any minorpower. Increases in capabilitiesin the lattercase are notnecessaryto ensuretheirabilityto protecttheir clients.Minorpowerstend to have less choice in the formationof asymmetricalli-ances. If they do not hold a strategicgeographicposition or a centralpoliticalrole, it may be very hard to findany majorpowerthat wishes to protectthem inreturnfor autonomy concessions. Changes in minorpower capabilitiesshouldthenbe less relevant o the formationof asymmetricalliances.HYPOTHESIS: Increases in capabilitiesfor second-rankmajor powers in-creasethe chance thattheyform an asymmetricalliance.HYPOTHESIS: Increasesin capabilitiesfor exceptionally powerful nationsare irrelevant o their formationof asymmetricalliances.Comparethe two models of alliances. The capability aggregation modelprovidesa basis for understandingecurity-increasing ymmetric alliances. Butthe autonomy-securityrade-off model is logically superiorbecause it incorpo-rates thisunderstandingwhile also explainingasymmetricalliances and offensivealliances (i.e., autonomy-increasingymmetric alliances). Further,Hypotheses1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide critical tests for separating he two models. Althoughboth models predictthat alliances are more likely to break as their members'capabilitieschange, thecapabilityaggregationmodelsays little aboutwhy asym-metric alliances would form or when they would be broken. Given that minorpowerscan offer little securityto theirmajorpower allies, the capability aggre-gation model suggests thatasymmetricallianceswould be rareand more likelyto break than symmetricalliances. Now we turnto an examinationof alliance

durationsandpatterns o assess the evidencefor the autonomy-securityrade-offmodel.Testing the Hypotheses

A set of 164 militaryalliances formedbetween 1815 and 1965 is used totest the six hypotheses. The primarysource is the Correlatesof War collection


19/31


of all mutualmilitary alliances (Small and Singer 1969) with the addition ofwartimealliancesgiven by Holsti, Hopmann,and Sullivan(1973). Eachallianceis treated as a whole and is not decomposedinto dyads of allies. Separatealli-ances formed with the intentof buildingone multilateralalliance are treated asone alliance, startingwith the formationof the firstalliance in the set andendingwith the dissolution of the whole alliance. For instance, the Little Entente istreatedas one alliancebeginningin 1920, whenCzechoslovakiaandYugoslaviaconcluded the firstbilateralpact.To test the first hypothesis, the alliances were classified as symmetric orasymmetric.Nations are classified into threegroups: minor, major, and super-powers. The definition of majorpowers is taken from the Correlates of War(Small and Singer 1982, 47-50). All nonmajorpowersare classified as minorpowers. After 1945 the definition of major power is problematicbecause theSoviet Union and the United States are more than equals of the other majorpowers(i.e., UnitedKingdom,France, andthe People'sRepublicof China). Torectify this problem, the Soviet Union and the United States are classified assuperpowers rom 1945 on, creating threetypes of nations for thatperiod. Alli-ances with only one type of power are consideredsymmetric;those includingone superpower rone majorpowerandonly lesserpowersare consideredasym-metric. Alliances with more thanone majorpowerandat least one minorpowerwere classified on a case-by-casebasis dependingon the natureandpurpose ofthe alliance.0

'?The mixed alliances were classified as follows: The GermanicConfederation s asymmetricbecause Austria and Prussia used it to control the Germanstates (Kraehe 1963). The QuadrupleAlliance is asymmetricbecause Francerequested he additionof Spain and Portugal o the allianceto give BritainandFrancecontrol overSpainandPortugal Webster1951). The 1840alliance againstMehemet Ali is symmetricbecause all parties were interestedin restraining ndependent Frenchaction (Webster 1951; Schroeder 1976). The CrimeanWaralliance of Britain, France, and Turkey ssymmetricbecause of their common interest in resisting the Russian threatto the status quo in theEastern Mediterranean.The 1861 alliance of France, Great Britain, and Spain against Mexico issymmetric because of their common interest n intervening n Mexico (Albrecht-Carrie1958, 120).The alliance of Romaniawith themembersof the TripleAlliance is treatedas a separateasymmetricalliance from the Triple Alliance because Austria-Hungary sed the alliance to provide additionalsupportagainstRussia in the Balkansand to protectagainstRomanianagitation n Transylvania,andRomania insisted that Germanybe included (Taylor1954, 277). The Mediterranean greementbe-tween Austria-Hungary, taly,andSpainis asymmetricbecausethe allianceacted to constrainSpainfrom dealing with France over Morocco. Bulgaria oining the CentralPowers and Romania oiningthe Allies during WorldWar I are symmetricbecause all parties were pursuingchanges in the statusquo. The Brussels Pact is symmetricbecause its originalpurposewas to encourageU.S. protectionof Western Europe (Kaplan 1984); having succeeded in thatgoal with the formationof NATO, Iconsiderthe alliance terminated n 1949, even thoughit continuesto exist to this day.

All bilateralalliances between WarsawPact membersare consideredseparatefrom the pactitself because they areconsideredto bind the Soviet Union to defend EasternEuropemorestronglythan the pact itself (Meissner 1966).

One of the refereeswondered f some alliances betweenmajorand minorpowersareactually


20/31

922 James D. MorrowTable 1. Mean Durations of Symmetric and

Asymmetric AlliancesType Years NumberAsymmetricalliances 15.69 ? 12.80 78Symmetric alliances 12.21 ? 12.84 86

t = 1.74Significance = .043

Note: The t-statistic s calculatedusing independent stimatesof the variancesand 78 degrees of freedom. The significance probability s based on a one-tailedtestof the hypothesisthat asymmetricalliances endure onger thansym-metric alliances.

The average engthsof asymmetricandsymmetricallianceswerecomparedusing a one-tailed t-teston the hypothesisthatasymmetricalliancesshould lastlonger. Table 1 gives the results;asymmetricalliances last three and a half yearslongeron the averagethansymmetricalliances.This differenceis significantatthe .05 level.The data set contains78 asymmetricand 86 symmetricalliances.Comparedto the probabilityof symmetricand asymmetricalliances if alliance partnerswherechosen randomly, he significanceprobabilityof this differenceis .26 (n= 164, the numberof alliances). IAlthoughthis observation upports he fourth

symmetric. Misclassifying symmetric alliances between minor and major powers as asymmetricmight compromisethe statisticaltests. Such misclassificationscould produceeither error or bias.Error i.e., randommisclassificationsof cases) increasesthe varianceof theestimatorswhich wouldreduce the powerof the tests. Bias (i.e., systematic errors) s a more serious problem. If this biasexists here, it can make the testsonly more, not less, likely to falsify thetheory.If my theory s true,such alliances should be short-livedbecausethey producea smallutility surplus or the majorpower.By misclassifying these symmetricalliances as asymmetric,I would reduce the mean durationofasymmetricalliances and increasethat of symmetricalliancesin the test. Thesechangeswould makeit moredifficult to show thatasymmetricalliances last longerthansymmetricalliances. Thus, if mytheoryis true, anyerroror bias introducedby misclassifying symmetricalliancesbetweenmajorandminor powers as asymmetric makes the tests less powerful; it increases the probabilityof type IIerrors,but reduces the probabilityof type I errors.

The readermay also wonder f theaccumulation f differentnationalcommitmentsacross timeinto one alliance introducesa bias by includingex post information what nationswere in the com-plete alliance)whendetermining he nature i.e., symmetricversusasymmetric)of an alliancefor apredictionof its length. This problemdoes not occur because none of the alliances examined thataddedor lost membersafter initial formationchanges its natureas a consequenceof those changes.The randomprobabilitiesof asymmetricand symmetricalliances are calculatedby assumingthat each ally is drawnrandomly rom the three types (super, major, and minor powers) with proba-bility equal to the proportionof alliance commitmentsmadeby the threetypes and thatall alliancesare bilateral. This calculation controls for both the numberof opportunities o form the different


21/31


hypothesis, it understates he higher formationrate of symmetricalliances be-cause morenationsareincluded n the typicalsymmetricalliancethanthe typicalasymmetricalliance. To test the third and fourth hypotheses, the numberofnations that formed each type of alliance and the numberof nation-years hateach type of alliance existed were calculated.Nations formsymmetric alliancesmore often than asymmetricalliances, with 259 nationalcommitmentsto sym-metric alliancescompared o 224 nationalcommitments o asymmetricalliances.Using the same randomprobabilityas above, this difference s significantat the.052 level (n = 483, the numberof alliance commitments).However, moreasymmetricalliances thansymmetricalliances are in existence, with 4,415 na-tion-yearsof asymmetricalliancescompared o 3,261 nation-yearsof symmetricalliances over the 165-yearperiod covered, supporting he thirdhypothesis.Thisdifference is significant at the .028 level (n = 164, the number of alliances)compared o the same randomprobabilitiesabove.Evidence for the second, fifth, and sixth hypothesesrequires more work.The second hypothesis statesthat the greater he changein the individualallies'capabilitiesover time, the more likely an alliance will break. The durationofeach alliance was separated nto a stringof five-year periods, startingwith itsformationandextendingthrough ts dissolution(or 1980if it is still in existence).Forexample, an alliance formedin 1888 and dissolvedin 1901would be brokeninto three five-year periods, 1888 to 1892, 1893 to 1897, 1898 to 1902. Theslope coefficient of a regressionof eachmember'scompositecapabilitieson time(year 1 to year5 of each period)gives an estimateof the change in its relativecapabilitiesover thatfive-yearperiod. 2 Becausebothincreases and decreasesintypes of alliances and thegreaterpropensityof majorpowersto form alliances. Of the 483 alliancecommitments,superpowersmake 15, majorpowers176, andminorpowers292. Then theprobabili-ties of each type makingan alliance commitmentare .031, .364, and .605, respectively.If a pairofallies are chosen randomly,the probabilityof a symmetricalliancebeing formedby two nationsisthe sum of the squaresof the probabilityof each type: (.031)2 + (.364)2 + (.605)2 = .499. Theprobabilityof an asymmetricallianceis just thecomplementof thisprobability, 501. The statisticaltests comparethese randomprobabilities o the observedfrequencies n the data.

'2Compositecapabilitiesscores used in the analysiswereobtainedfrom the Correlatesof Warprojectdirected by J. David Singer at the Universityof Michigan. They are based on six differentindicatorsof military capabilities:militaryexpenditures,militarypersonnel,totalpopulation,urbanpopulation,iron and steel production,andenergyconsumption.For each indicatorand each year, anation's hare of that indicator s calculatedby dividingits score on that indicatorby the sum total ofall nations' scores on that indicator or a given year. A nation's ompositecapabilities s the averageof its share of these six indicators,providinga measureof a nation'srelativecapabilities.

Composite capabilitiesare a crude indicatorof existing and potentialmilitary capabilities.They varyfromyearto year,often throughessentiallyrandomvariationof theunderlying ndicators.To reduce the importanceof this randomvariationwhen determining he change in a nation'scapa-bilities, the strategyof regressingfive yearsof capabilitiesagainsttime was adopted.The slope of aregression ine gives anaveragechangeacross the five-yearperiod,smoothingout year-to-year aria-tions in compositecapabilitiesto tapthe long-termchangesin capabilities.


22/31

924 James D. Morrowcapabilities are hypothesizedto increase the chance that an alliancewill break,the absolute value of the slope coefficients was taken to finda nation'schangeincapabilities across each five-yearperiod.Two measuresof the changes in capa-bilities of the membersof an alliance (the sum total change of all members ofthe alliance and the maximumchange experiencedby any one member)werecalculated from these absolute values of estimatedchanges in relativecapabili-ties. The secondmeasureof capability s used as a checkon multilateral llianceswhere the first measure could make many small changes appearlarge whenaddedtogether.Probitanalysiswas runto differentiatehose periods n whichalliancesweredissolved from those where they were not. Because composite capabilities in-dices are very unstableduring periodsof majorwars, all five-yearperiods thatoverlappedwith at least one yearof WorldWarI or H were eliminatedfromtheanalysis. 3 Two analyses were run,one for each of the two measuresof changesin capabilitiesin an alliance. Each analysisalso included a dummyvariable forwhetherthe alliancewas symmetricor asymmetric coded 1 if the alliance wasasymmetricand 0 if it was symmetric).The autonomy-securityrade-off modelpredictsthat the coefficientfor the type of alliance should be negative(all elseequal, asymmetric alliances should be less likely to breakthansymmetricalli-ances) and the coefficientfor the change in capabilitiesin the alliance positive(the greaterthe change in the capabilities of the members of an alliance, themore likely the alliance will be broken).The capabilityaggregationmodel pre-dicts that bothcoefficientsshouldbe positive.Table 2 gives the results of the two analyses. In both analyses the coeffi-cients are in the directionpredictedby the autonomy-security rade-offmodeland significant, with the coefficient for changes in capabilities being highlysignificant.The fifthhypothesisstates that increases n capabilities or second-rankma-jor powers increasesthechanceof theirforming anasymmetricalliance, andthesixthhypothesisstatesthatsuch increasesareirrelevant or first-rankmajorpow-ers. Both of these hypothesescan be testedwith one probitequationthatrelateschanges in major powercapabilitiesto the likelihood of formingan asymmetricalliance. The periodfrom 1816to 1965 was divided into five-yearperiods(e.g.,1816 to 1820, 1821 to 1825, etc.). Foreach period the averagecapabilities andaverage rate of changeof capabilitieswere calculatedforeach majorpowerdur-ing that period as in the previous analysis (the intercept of the regression ofcapabilities on time gives the averagecapabilities and the slope coefficient therate of change). The rate of change of each majorpower'scapabilities and theinteractionof its averagecapabilitiesand rate of change were used to predict

'3Analysesthat includethe periods thatoverlap WorldWarI andII produceessentially identi-cal results to thosereported n the text.


23/31


Table 2. Probit Estimates of the Relationship between Changesin Capabilities and the Break-up of AlliancesModel 1 Model 2

Constant -1.07 - 1.02Standard rror .11 .11

Alliance asymmetric? -.26 -.26Standard rror .15 .15Significance .04 .04

Changein capabilitiesSum of all allies 51.71

Standard rror 14.19Significance .0001

Maximumof all allies 46.83Standard rror 16.79Significance .003

-2 x Log likelihood ratio 14.55 8.69Significance .0007 .01

Note: N = 454 for both models. All significancetests for coefficients are one-tailed tests basedon theirpredictedsign.

whetherthatmajor power formedan asymmetricallianceduringthat five-yearperiod. Once again, time periodsthatoverlappedeitherWorldWarI or II wereomitted from the analysis.Hypotheses5 and 6 predictthat the signs of the coefficientsshouldbe posi-tive andnegative, respectively.Increases n capabilitiesshouldincreasethe like-lihood of a majorpowerformingan asymmetricalliancewith the effect of thoseincreasesdecreasingwith the major power'saveragecapabilities.Furthermore,the joint effect of the two variables shouldbe negligible for the most powerfulnations (e.g., GreatBritain n the nineteenth enturyand the UnitedStatesin thetwentiethcentury).Table 3 presentsthe results of this analysis. Both coefficients are in thepredicteddirectionsand statisticallysignificantat the .01 level. Dividing thecoefficient for changes in capabilitiesby the coefficient for the interactionofcapabilitiesand their change producesa break-even evel of about .16. That is,changes in capabilitiesare irrelevant or the formationof asymnmetriclliancesfor nations with average capabilitiesgreaterthan .16. Only GreatBritainfrom1816 to 1900, Russia from 1816 to 1850, the United Statesfrom 1900 to 1965,and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1965 reach this level consistently. As thetheory predicts, changes in capabilities are irrelevantfor the most powerful


24/31

926 James D. MorrowTable3. ProbitEstimates f theRelationshipbetweenChangesn MajorPowerCapabilitiesand theFormation f AsymmetricAlliances

Constant -0.77Standardrror .12Changencapabilities 125.86Standardrror 52.40Significance .009(Capabilities)(Changencapabilities) -730.06Standardrror 294.69Significance .007-2 x Loglikelihood atio 8.34Significance .015

Note: N = 148. All significanceestsforcoefficients reone-tailedestsbasedon theirpredictedign.

nations;for second-rankmajorpowers, like France, Italy, andAustria-Hungary,changes in capabilitiesdrive theirformationof asymmetricalliances.Summarizing he empiricalanalysis, hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are allsupported. The evidence presentedhere supportsthe autonomy-security rade-off model over the capabilityaggregationmodel. Of course, this evidence is notdefinitive, but it suggests thatasymmetricalliances are more common and du-rable than the capabilityaggregationmodel wouldlead us to believe. Hypothesis2 is also supported, but it follows from both models, so it cannotdifferentiatebetweenthe two.Further Implications of the Argument

Havingestablishedsomeempiricalsupport or the autonomy-securityrade-off model of alliances, let us turn o its consequencesfor otherconclusionsaboutalliances andthe international ystem.Balance of Power versusPower TransitionViews of Alliances

Opposingsystemic theories of international olitics argue for differentcon-ceptions of the fundamentalrole of alliances. In the balance of power theory(Morgenthau1973), nations formalliances to offset growingpowers andrestorethe balance. Alliances in a balance of power system should be nonideologicalandlast as long as the immediate hreat.This view is the capabilityaggregationmodel. Prospectiveallies arejust capabilities hatcan be addedthroughalliance,


25/31


and once the threat o the balancehas beencountered, he allianceis unnecessaryand should be broken.The power transitiontheory (Organski 1968; Organskiand Kugler 1980)postulatesan international ystem dominatedby one nation.This dominantstateformsa large alliance from thelesser powersthat share its ideology. Nations notin this satisfied coalition may form alliancesdedicatedto the overthrowof theexisting international ystem. Alliances in a power transitionsystem should beideological and long-lasting.From the perspectiveof the argumentof this paper, the theories are bothcorrectand incorrectbecause,as Bueno de Mesquita(1988, 641-42) points out,they make differentassumptionsabout the distributionof capabilitiesin the sys-tem. Balance of power theory assumes an international ystem composed of anumber of major powers with relatively equal capabilities. The role of minorpowers is ignoredbecausethey do not possess sufficientcapabilitiesto shift thebalance of power. In the international ystem postulated by balance of powertheory, only symmetricalliances can be formed because all possible allies haveequal capabilities.Alliances are formedonly to gain security (i.e., nonideologi-cal) and do not persist because they are symmetric. Power transitiontheory,however, assumes a system with one dominantstate holdinga preponderance fpower. Any alliancethatthe dominantstate forms is asymmetric.Alliances in apower transitionsystem are formed to advance the autonomyinterestsof thedominant state or challenger (i.e., ideological) and persist because they areasymmetric.4Both theories are right in the sense that given theirassumptionsabouttheinternational ystem and their focus on relations among equals or between thedominantstate and all others, their conclusions about alliances follow. However,widening our analysis of alliances shows that those conclusions are not general.Furthermore,the argument presented here also explains why both theoriesshould be able to find supportingevidence in the historical record. Scholarsgenerally see the nineteenthcentury as a balance of power period, while thepowertransitionmodel fits the twentiethcenturybetter(e.g., Singer, Bremer,andStuckey's 1972resultson the effects of systemicconcentration f capabilitieson war).The alliances examined reflectthisobservation; ymmetricalliancesareformedmore frequently n the nineteenthcentury(26 symmetricalliancesversus16 asymmetric alliances) than in the twentiethcentury (62 to 60). But in bothcenturies, asymmetricalliances last longer on the averagethansymmetricalli-ances. In the nineteenthcentury, symmetricalliances last an averageof 7.85 +

'4For Waltz's(1979) version of balance of power theory, a similar argumentexplains whyalliances in a multipolarworld should be flexible (they must be symmetric)and why alliances in abipolarworld shouldbe rigid (they must be asymmetric).


26/31

928 James D. Morrow10.40 years; asymmetric alliances, 12.81 + 14.76 years. The significanceprobabilityof this differenceis .128. In the twentiethcentury, symmetricalli-ances last an averageof 14.10 ? 13.40 years;asymmetricalliances, 16.44 ?12.27 years. The significance probabilityof this difference is .160. Althoughneither difference is statistically significant at the .05 level, the significanceprobabilitiesareclose, indicating hatthe difference betweenthe symmetricandasymmetricalliancesis not confined to one of the two time periods.BalancingversusBandwagoning

Walt (1985, 1987) draws a contrastbetween balancing(allying against athreat)and bandwagoning allying with the threat).He contends thatbalancingshould be more common thanbandwagoningandsupportshis contention with asurveyof alliancesin the Middle East. This conclusion is not surprising rom theperspectiveof the argumenthere. Threats arise from differencesin position onissueson which the threateningnationpursueschange. Becausealliancesrequireagreementbetween the allies over some set of issues, nations will generallynotally with nationsthatthreaten hem for the lack of areasof agreement.Balancingalliances have the common interestin resisting the threateningnationto bringthe allies together.

Bandwagoningalliances could form for two reasons:(1) because bothpar-ties face a common threat from a third nation or (2) because the threateningnationreceivesconcessions to deactivate the threat. The former leads to a sym-metricalliance; the latter,to an asymmetricalliance. An example of the formerfrom Walt's 1987 cases would be Jordan'salignment with Egypt on the eve ofthe Six Day War.Balancing alliancescan also be eithersymmetricor asymmet-ric. NATO is anexample of an asymmetricbalancingalliance.BurdenSharing and Free Riding

The questionof burdensharingwithin an alliance is another amiliarthemein the literature e.g., Beer 1972;MurdochandSandler1982; Olson and Zeck-hauser 1965). Accordingto this argument,security is a public good within analliance. Each member of an alliance will attemptto free ride on the militaryexpendituresof its allies, and so alliances should underproducemilitarygoodsunlessone dominantmemberprovidessufficientsecurityfor all.From the perspectiveof the argumenthere, the security as public goodarguments partlycorrectbut misses the mainpoint. The dominantpartnern anasymmetricalliance is willing to provide security for its allies if they provideautonomybenefitsfor it. The essentialnatureof those alliancesleads to a dispro-portionate haringof militaryexpenditures.What shouldbe contentious n asym-metric alliances is the composition of military forces, not the distribution ofmilitaryexpenditure.The dominant nation wants alliance forces configured to


27/31


advance its autonomyinterests rather than the security of the alliance. Whenautonomyand security interests demand different force structures,we shouldexpect to see conflict in asymmetricalliances over the appropriateorce struc-ture. In symmetricalliances burden sharing should not be a great problembe-cause each nation wishes to increase its security and is capable of making asignificantcontribution o its own security. Consequently, neither ally will beinterested n free ridingon the alliance.Theis (1987) provides evidence that supports the argument that unequalburdensharingshould only be present in asymmetricalliances. He examinedseven pre-World WarII alliances for patternsof burdensharing. Every alliance(i.e., Franco-Czechand Franco-Belgianbetween the wars) thatshowed any evi-dence of free riding was asymmetric. However, the Franco-Polishalliance be-tween the warsdid not show evidenceof free riding by Polanddespite its asym-metricnature.ConflictbetweenAllies

Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 73-83, 159-64) contendsthat allies are morelikely to fighteach other thanenemies are to fighteach other.Ignoringthe ques-tion of relative frequency,what types of allies are likely to fight? Symmetricalliances bind togethernations with very similarinterests, whetherthey be se-curity or autonomyinterests. It is unlikely that the kind of policy differencesnecessaryto start a war could develop within a symmetricalliance. If such dif-ferencesdid emerge, the alliancewould fail to providethe desiredbenefits, andone nationwould break the alliance beforegoing to war. In an asymmetricalli-ance, the parties gain differentinterests.The differencein interestscould leadtheparties ntoconflict while preserving heiroverall interest n the alliance. Waramong allies should occur only in asymmetricalliances. Three patternsof warwithin an asymmetricalliance (with historicalexamples) suggest themselves:first, the dominantally disciplines a straying minor power(the Russianinvasionof Hungary);second, two minorpowers fight over a minorissue withinthe alli-ance (the Soccer War);and third, a struggle over the dominantposition in thealliance(the Seven Weeks' War; ee Bueno de Mesquita1990).Cycles of HegemonyandAsymmetricAlliances

The argumentalso provides a clue to the underlyingdynamicsof cycles ofgeneral wars (e.g., Levy 1985). According to argumentsadvanced to explaingeneral wars (e.g., Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1983; Organski 1968), a hegemonemerges aftersuch a war and extends its control over the international ystem.Over time its power declines, allowing a challengerto catch up to the hegemonin power. Eventually,anothergeneral war is triggered, and thecycle startsover.Asymmetricalliances areone of the tools hegemons use to extend theircontrol


28/31

930 James D. Morrowoverthe internationalystem. The hegemonprovides ts allies with securityfromtheirneighborsandreceivesboth some control over the allies' policies andstra-tegic locations to advance ts interests urther.The UnitedStatesbestexemplifiesthis strategyfor extendinghegemony throughthe networkof asymmetricalli-ances thatit establishedafter WorldWarII. These alliancesbothprotectedU.S.allies andprovidedthe UnitedStateswith bases for the projectionof powerandthe position to intervene on behalf of friendly governments.Great Britaindependedon its empire to extend its control duringthe Pax Britannica,but italso extended its control of India through asymmetric alliances with nativeprinces.

What are the long-run power consequences of developing a network ofasymmetricalliances?They help to createthe territorial rap thatThompsonand Zuk (1986) discuss. Like the financial costs of an empire, supportinganetworkof asymmetricalliances raises the hegemon'smilitary expenditures. Inthe long run,these increasedmilitaryexpendituresdrain he hegemon'seconomyand hasten its decline in power (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). These allianceshelp drive the cycle of rise and decline of nations. Hegemons make a commit-ment to enjoy short-runpolitical benefitsby reshapingthe international ystemto fit theirview of the system and pay the price of long-termrelative decline inpowerandsecurity. Conclusion

Theautonomy-securityrade-offmodel of alliancesimpliesthatasymmetricalliancesshouldbe easierboth to form andto maintain hansymmetricalliances.In an asymmetricalliance, the stronger partnergains autonomyand providessecurity to the lesser partner.Because this trade of commitmentsproduces amoreeven mix of autonomyandsecurity for bothpartners,asymmetricalliancesshould be attractive to both. Symmetric alliances provide both partners withsecurity (or occasionally autonomy), which requiresgreateragreementon theinterests hat the alliance advances.Because symmetricalliances betweenmajorpowers increasetheiralready high security,they move their members towardaless even mix of autonomyandsecurity.This model also suggests that alliances are more likely to breakas theirmembers'capabilitieschangeandthat second-rankmajorpowersare morelikelyto form asymmetricalliances as their capabilitiesincrease. Statisticalanalysisof alliances formed between 1815 and 1965 strongly supportsall the abovehypotheses. The supportfor all the hypotheses lends credit to the autonomy-securitytrade-offmodelof alliances.Alliancesrequirea critical choice betweenconflictinggoals of securityandautonomy.The pursuitof one exacts sacrificeson the other. Crediblecommit-mentsrequirea carefulmatchingof interestsbetweenallies; however,those in-


29/31

ALLIANCESNDASYMMETRY 93Iterestsneed notbe identical,just complementary.Predicting ndividualalliancescalls for carefulanalysis of the interests hat the alliance advancesand the abilityof each side to carry out its end of the bargain.In the end, alliances are choicesof which interestsshould be pursuedat the cost of otherinterests.Manuscript ubmitted24 July 1989Final manuscriptreceived 20 November1990

REFERENCESAlbrecht-Carrie,Rene. 1958. A DiplomaticHistory of Europe since the Congress of Vienna. New

York:Harper.Altfeld, Michael F. 1984. The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test. WesternPolitical Quarterly

37:523-44.Beer, Francis A. 1972. The Political Economyof Alliances: Benefits, Costs, and Institutions in

NATO. Beverly Hills: Sage.Berkowitz, Bruce D. 1983. Realignment in InternationalTreaty Organizations. International

StudiesQuarterly27:77-96.Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. The WarTrap. New Haven:YaleUniversityPress.

. 1985. The WarTrap Revisited:A Revised Expected Utility Model. American PoliticalScience Review79:156-77.

. 1988. The Contribution f ExpectedUtility Theoryto theStudyof InternationalConflict.Journal of InterdisciplinaryHistory 18:629- 52.

. 1990. Prideof Place: The Origins of GermanHegemony. WorldPolitics 43:28-52.Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and J. David Singer. 1973. Alliances, Capabilities,and War:A Review

and Synthesis. In Political Science Annual: An InternationalReview, vol. 4, ed. CorneliusCotter.Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.

Dingman, Roger V. 1979. Theoriesof, andApproaches o, Alliance Politics. In Diplomacy:NewApproaches n History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren. New York:Free Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. Warand Change in WorldPolitics. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.Holsti, Ole R., P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan. 1973. Unityand Disintegrationin

InternationalAlliances: ComparativeStudies.New York:Wiley.Kaplan, LawrenceS. 1984. The UnitedStates andNATO:The FormativeYears. Lexington:Univer-

sity Press of Kentucky.Kaplan,MortonA. 1957. Systemand Process in InternationalPolitics. New York:Wiley.Kennedy,Paul M. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military

Conflict rom 1500 to 2000. New York:RandomHouse.Kraehe,Enno E. 1963. Metternich'sGermanPolicy. Vol. 1. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Lalman, David, and David Newman. 1991. Alliance Formationand NationalSecurity. Interna-

tional Interactions16:239-54.Levy, Jack S. 1981. Alliance Formation and WarBehavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers,

1495-1975. Journal of ConflictResolution25:581-613.. 1985. Theoriesof GeneralWar. WorldPolitics 37: 344-75.Li, RichardP. Y., and William R. Thompson. 1978. The Stochastic Process of Alliance Forma-

tion. AmericanPolitical Science Review72:1288-1303.Liska, George. 1962. Nations in Alliance:The Limitsof Interdependence.Baltimore:JohnsHopkins

UniversityPress.


30/31

932 James D. MorrowMcGinnis,Michael D. 1986. Arms, Aid, and Allies in the SecurityPolicies of RegionalRivals.Presentedat theannualmeetingof the MidwestPolitical Science Association, Chicago.McGowan,PatrickJ., andRobertM. Rood. 1975. AllianceBehavior n Balance of PowerSystems:Applying a PoissonModel to Nineteenth-Century urope. AmericanPolitical ScienceReview69:850-70.Mansbach,RichardW., and John A. Vasquez. 1981. In Search of Theory:A Paradigm or GlobalPolitics. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Mares, David R. 1988. MiddlePowersunderRegionalHegemony:To Challengeor Acquiesce inHegemonicEnforcement. nternationalStudiesQuarterly32:453-71.Meissner,Boris. 1966. The Soviet Union'sBilateral Pact System in EasternEurope. In EasternEurope in Transition,ed. KurtLondon.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Midlarsky,Manus 1. 1981. Equilibriain the Nineteenth-CenturyBalance of Power System.

AmericanJournalof Political Science 25:270-96.. 1983. Absenceof Memoryin the Nineteenth-CenturyAllianceSystem:Perspectives romQueuingTheory and BivariateProbabilityDistributions. AmericanJournalof Political Sci-ence 27:762-84.. 1988. The Onsetof WorldWar. Boston: Unwin Hyman.Modelski,George. 1983. Long Cycles of WorldLeadership. In ContendingApproaches o World-SystemAnalysis, ed. WilliamR. Thompson.BeverlyHills:Sage.Morgan, T. Clifton. 1984. A SpatialModelof CrisisBargaining. InternationalStudiesQuarterly28:407-26.

Morgenthau,Hans J. 1973. Politics amongNations:TheStruggle or Powerand Peace. 5thed. NewYork:Knopf.Morrow,James D. 1985. A Continuous-OutcomeExpected Utility Theory of War. Journal ofConflictResolution29:473-502.

. 1986. A Spatial Model of InternationalConflict. American Political Science Review80:1131-50.

. 1987. On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes. InternationalStudiesQuarterly31:423-38.Murdoch,James C., and Todd Sandler. 1982. A Theoreticaland EmpiricalStudy of NATO.Journalof ConflictResolution26:237-63.Olson, Mancur,Jr., and RichardZeckhauser. 1965. An EconomicTheoryof Alliances. Reviewof Economicsand Statistics48:266-79.Organski,A. F. K. 1968. WorldPolitics. 2d ed. New York:Knopf.Organski,A. F. K., andJacekKugler. 1980. TheWarLedger.Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press.Riker,WilliamH. 1962. TheTheoryof Political Coalitions. New Haven:YaleUniversity Press.Rothstein,RobertL. 1968. Alliances and SmallPowers. New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press.Schroeder,PaulW. 1976. Alliances, 1815-1945: Weaponsof Powerand Tools of Management.In HistoricalDimensionsof NationalSecurityProblems,ed. KlausKnorr.Lawrence:Univer-sity Press of Kansas.Singer,J. David, StuartBremer,andJohnStuckey. 1972. CapabilityDistribution,Uncertainty,andMajorPowerWar,1820- 1965. In Peace, War,andNumbers,ed. Bruce M. Russett.BeverlyHills:Sage.Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1969. FormalAlliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the

Basic Data. Journalof Peace Research3: 257-82.. 1982. Resort to Arms:Internationaland Civil Wars, 1816-1980. BeverlyHills: Sage.Snyder,Glenn H. 1984. The Security Dilemmain Alliance Politics. WorldPolitics 36:461-95.Taylor,A. J. P. 1954. TheStruggle or Masteryin Europe, 1848-1918. New York:OxfordUniver-sity Press.


31/31


Theis, WallaceJ. 1987. Alliances and CollectiveGoods:A Reappraisal. Journal of ConflictReso-lution 31:298-332.Thompson,William R., and Gary Zuk. 1986. WorldPowerand the Strategic Trap of TerritorialCommitments. InternationalStudiesQuarterly30:249-67.Walt, Stephen M. 1985. Alliance Formationand the Balance of Power. InternationalSecurity

9:3-43.. 1987. TheOriginsof Alliances. Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Waltz, KennethN. 1979. Theoryof InternationalPolitics. New York:RandomHouse.

Ward, Michael Don. 1982. Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics. MonographSeries in World Af-fairs, vol. 19, book 1. Denver:GraduateSchool of International tudies, Universityof Denver.Webster,CharlesK. 1951. The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841. London:G. Bell.

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	joaquin-castillo
View:	219 times
Download:	0 times

Alliances and Asymmetry_ an Alternative to the Capability Aggregattion Model of Alliances_ JAMES...

Documents