Alpha Gamma Hot Cell FacilitySprinkler System Upgrade

Presented by:

Betsy Grom, Argonne National Laboratory

Don Mershon, Nexus Technical Services Corp.

2

Project Description

The Alpha Gamma Hot Cell Facility (AGHCF) Sprinkler Upgrade corrected sprinkler and water supply system deficiencies, upgrading protection to comply with DOE requirements.

3

212 Reference Plan

4

Building 212 Utility Plan

N

5

Building 212 Layout

6

AGHCF Operations

AGHCF Mission:– At project start: R&D for safe and reliable fuel systems for advanced

commercial power reactors. (1964 – 2006)– At project end: Radioactive and hazardous material handling,

management & storage. (2006 – Present) AGHCF is located within Building 212, F-Wing, and runs from the

basement through the second floor Covers approximately 20,000 square feet F-Wing includes the Alpha Gamma Hot Cell, support,

maintenance, and office areas. Primary Constraint in AGHCF during installation was to maintain

an hourly fire watch.

7

Project Background

Nuclear facility FHAs were updated The updated AGHCF FHA identified that:

– Past sprinkler modifications were inadequate– The existing water supply was questionable

Hydraulic calculations confirmed that the existing water supply was inadequate

Temporary fix - operability determination– Replaced sprinkler heads– Restored compliance with SAR requirements

A project plan for resolution was developed The project plan was implemented

8

Fire Hazards Analysis

Exposure Hazards – Machine shop– Offices– Storage and support areas

AGHCF Internal Hazards (water not welcome)– Nuclear fuels– Metals– Swarf– Cutting oils, lubricants– Trash

Seismic interaction was not considered in the existing sprinkler system design

9

Service Level Trash was Cleared

10

Sprinkler and Water Supply Analysis

Existing design– Occupancy classifications were unclear– Design criteria were inadequate– Areas beneath obstructions were unprotected– Multiple phased sprinkler modifications were unfinished and

inadequate for the hazards Flow tests were conducted Hydraulic calculations were performed Results – system could not function as designed, the water supply

was inadequate due to undersized building supply feeder

11

F-101 Hallway Obstructions

12

Key Decisions

Classification of:– Nuclear Hazard Category (HC-2)– Performance Category (PC-3)

How to apply seismic requirements Detailed design or performance specification? First project under ISO 9001 - 65 step project management procedure

13

Key Decisions

Hazard and Performance Categories– Defined in DOE 420.1B– Further defined in:

• DOE-STD-1020-02, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities• DOE-STD-1021-93, Natural Phenomena Hazards

Performance Categorization Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components

14

Performance Category 3

PC-3 SSCs are those for which failure to perform their safety function could pose a potential hazard to public health, safety, and the environment because radioactive or toxic materials are present and could be released from the facility as a result of that failure. PC-3 SSCs would prevent or mitigate criticality accidents, chemical explosions, and events with the potential to release hazardous materials outside the facility. Design considerations for these categories are to limit facility damage as a result of design basis natural phenomena events so that hazardous materials can be controlled and confined, occupants are protected, and the functioning of the facility is not interrupted. When safety analyses determine that local confinement of high-hazard materials is required for worker safety, PC-3 designation may be appropriate for the SSCs involved. PC-3 NPH provisions are consistent with those used for reevaluation of commercial plutonium facilities with conservatism in between that of model building code requirements for essential facilities and civilian nuclear power plant requirements.

15

Where to Use Seismic BracingShades of Grey…

16

Key Decisions

Detailed design or performance specification? Why a detailed design?

– Intricate scope of work with operational sensitivities during installation

– Ensure the final installation meets all design requirements– More accurate cost estimates– Control costs by:

• Limiting the number of contractor change orders• Encouraging an open relationship with contractors to

alleviate their anxiety with respect to unknowns

17

Key Decisions

First project under ISO 9001 – 65-step project management process Why use the 65-step process?

– Required by Argonne site engineering program

– Complicated scope of work requiring diligent coordination

– Control work to ensure appropriate outcomes

– Ensure design AND installation meet ALL requirements

– Predictable costs and results Features of project management process:

– Aggressive documentation and follow-up

– Checklists to ensure activities completed

– Milestones or deliverables tied to each step

– Traceable results

18

Team Resources

19

Procedures

20

Issues

Operations– Work adjacent to hot cell to be

performed within one week

– Hourly fire watch during construction

– Protection of Zinc Bromide(ZnBr2) filled windows

21

Design Objectives

Correct design criteria for occupancies Increase water supply Protect areas under obstructions Design for seismic interactions

22

Design Requirements

Water supply to remain operable during the day Work to be pre-planned and pre-fabricated to minimize exposures

and speed installation ZnBr2 windows to be protected from mechanical damage during

installation Work to be sequenced to allow testing and return to operability of

AGHCF sprinklers immediately following installation

23

212 F-Wing Main Floor FHA Sketch

24

212 F-Wing Second Floor FHA Sketch

25

212 F-Wing Service Level FHA Sketch

26

AGHCF Layout

27

Sequencing required:– Water supply was shared between fire protection and

domestic water distribution systems– Initial out-of-services rendered both water distribution systems

inoperable during water supply upgrade– Operations required domestic water during the day, allowing

shutdown on Saturdays only– After separation from domestic water, cross connections to the

service tunnel feed main would leave multiple areas of 212 unprotected if not sequenced

– Sequencing allowed the project to manage fire watch costs

Sequencing Played a Key Role

28

Fire protection water

Domestic water

Shared water supply feeder

North Water Supply EntranceShared Service with Domestic Water Supply

29

Sequencing Plan

30

Seismic Bracing

Required by DOE 420.1B and DOE-STD-1020

Seismic bracing required to avoid interaction with AGHCF ZnBr2 filled windows

Seismic bracing design details were developed and complied with NFPA 13 requirements

Contractor decided to ignore and invent their own unsubstantiated restraints

Contractor ultimately complied with the design details provided

31

Pipe Support and Seismic Brace Details

32

Correct Seismic Braces

Seismic braces

33

Incorrect Seismic Braces

No stability in horizontal or longitudinal planes

34

Can you spot the difference?

35

Seismic Brace vs. “Seismic Brace”

36

Interesting Pipe Supports

37

Correct Pipe Support

38

Incorrect Pipe Support

39

Service Tunnel Swivel Seat

40

Post Mortem

Detailed design provided an accurate cost estimate with contractor costs coming in within 2% of cost estimate

Contractor change orders were minimized and extras were held to less than 4%

Complete documentation was received

Lesson - involve construction and operation types in design phase to capture innovations to make the job go easier

41

Post Mortem (cont.)

Project management process– Prepared management for complete cost estimate and

alleviated the need for “value engineering”– Original project scope estimate was for a different scope of

work, it did not include upgrading the water supply, thus original cost estimate was low

– Original project scope would not have fixed the problem– Lesson – make sure funding requests and GPP estimates

match the scope required to fix the problem– Lesson – well defined project made it easy to obtain

management backing

42

Post Mortem (cont.)

Lesson – watch the contractor all the way to the end– Pipe supports were fabricated from all thread rod rather than

following design details for pipe saddles– Seismic braces were homemade with no basis for design, nor

installation, persistence forced them to follow the design and install qualified seismic braces

43

AGHCF Sprinkler System Upgrade

For more information contact:– Betsy Grom (630) 252-8274 or;– Don Mershon (630) 893-2277 x-14

Questions ?