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CIMSEC

Articles By

Steve Wills · Javier Gonzalez · TomMeyer · Bob Hein · Eric Beaty

Chuck Hill · Jan Musil ·Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

Edited By

Dmitry Filipoff · David Van Dyk · John Stryker

Alternative NavalForce Structure

A compendium by

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Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Unmanned­Centric Force Structure

By Javier Gonzalez

Proposing AModern High Speed Transport – The LongRange Patrol Vessel

By TomMeyer

No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire CapabilityInnovation in Today’s Navy

By Bob Hein

Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing MaritimeService Specialization

By Eric Beaty

Augment Naval Force Structure By UpgunningThe Coast Guard

By Chuck Hill

A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to be Building

By Jan Musil

Closing Remarks on Changing Naval Force Structure

By Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

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The Perils of Alternative Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By Steve Wills

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PrefaceBy Dmitry Filipoff

From October 3 to October 7, 2016, CIMSEC ran a topic week where contributors proposedalternative naval force structures to spur thinking on how the threat environment is evolving,what opportunities for enhancing capability can be seized, and how navies should adaptaccordingly. Contributors had the option to write about any nation’s navy across a variety ofpolitical contexts, budgetary environments, and time frames.

Relevant questions include asking what is the right mix of platforms for a next­generation fleet,how should those platforms be employed together, and why will their capabilities endure? All ofthese decisions reflect a budgetary context that involves competing demands and where strategicimperatives are reflected in the warships a nation builds. These decisions guide the evolution ofnavies.

In a modern age defined by rapid change and proliferation, we must ask whether choices madedecades ago about the structure of fleets remain credible in today’s environment. Navies will beespecially challenged to remain relevant in such an unpredictable era. A system where an averageof ten years of development precedes the construction of a lead vessel, where ships are expectedto serve for decades, and where classes of vessels are expected to serve through most of a centuryis more challenged than ever before.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org.

About Us

The Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) is a 501(c)3 non­partisan think tankincorporated as a non­profit in the state of Maryland. CIMSEC was formed in 2012, and as of2015 has members and chapters in more than 30 countries. CIMSEC does not take organizationalpositions, and encourages a diversity of views in the belief that a broad range of perspectivesstrengthens our understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain.

If you are interested in forwarding the discussion on safeguarding prosperity on the sea, considerbecoming more involved in our organization at www.cimsec.org.

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COVER PHOTO: The guided­missile cruiser USS Gettysburg fires a Harpoon anti­ship missile at the ex­USNS Saturn during a sinking exercise October 27, 2010. (Navy Visual News Service/Photo by SeamanApprentice Leonard Adams)

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The Perils of Alternative Force Structure

By Steve Wills

Navies have historically sought alternativeforce structures in response to changes intheir nation’s grand strategy, rising costs ofmaintaining existing force structure,advances in technology, and combinations ofthese conditions. While initially appealing interms of meeting new strategic needs, savingmoney, and gaining offensive and defensivesuperiority over an opponent, such changesare fraught with danger if undertaken tooquickly, are too radical in tone, or do notaccount for the possibility of further change.Some are built “from the bottom up” on idealtactical combat conditions, but do notsupport wider strategic needs. Even the bestalternative force structure that meetsstrategic needs, is more affordable thanprevious capabilities, and outguns the enemycould be subject to obsolescence before mostof its units are launched. These case studiesin alternative force structure suggest effortsare often less than successful in application.

The American Civil War Ironclads

One of the most familiar alternative forcestructures was that of the United States Navyin response to the revolutions in steampower, armor, and rifled cannon in the late1850s. The impending appearance of therebel warship CSS Virginia (the formersteam frigate USS Merrimac) during theAmerican Civil War triggered a crash coursein ironclad warship experimentation in theFederal Navy. When Virginia did appear, theonly one of these experiments ready forbattle was Swedish engineer John Ericsson’sUSS Monitor, a revolutionary craft in

comparison to both the Federal fleet’scurrent force structure and otherexperimental craft. The success of Ericsson’scraft against the Virginia spawned over 60other low freeboard armored vessels withone, two, and even three turrets. Despiteseveral losses, including that of thenamesake ship, to weather conditions, andone (USS Tecumseh) to a torpedo (mine) hit,the monitor type ships had a remarkablerecord of combat success in coastal andriverine environments during the Civil War.

Unfortunately, the return of peace and theneed to maintain overseas naval squadronsto protect U.S. economic interests spelled anend to the dominance of the monitor in U.S.naval force structure. One conducted a high­profile overseas visit to Europe while asecond managed to sail around Cape Hornonly to be immediately decommissionedupon arrival in San Francisco. Monitor­typeships had poor seakeeping capabilitiesoutside coastal waters and did not carryenough coal for extended operations. TheU.S. had not developed the high­freeboardsail and steam warships that other powershad constructed, and in any case U.S.strategic interests had changed to wheremonitors were no longer necessarycomponents of naval force structure. Nearlyall were decommissioned and scrapped orlaid up in long­term reserve by 1874.

The “Jeune Ecole” (Young School)Torpedo Craft and Commerce Raiders

The “Jeune Ecole” (Young School) of French

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naval strategy was the brainchild of ViceAdmiral Hyacinthe­Laurent­Theophile Aubeand developed in the mid to late 19th centuryin response to the growing battleship fleet ofFrance’s primary adversary, Great Britain.Rather than build a competing battlefleet,French strategists derived an alternativeforce structure designed to offset Britishbattleship superiority and attack a perceivedweakness in Britain’s global maritime tradenetwork. French designers planned formasses of small, torpedo­armed craft tolaunch large salvos of underwater weaponsat the exposed, unarmored lower sides ofBritish battleships. Torpedo craft were muchcheaper and easier to build in numbers asopposed to battleships. They also had asuccessful combat record with spar­mountedweapons in the American Civil War, andlater successes in the Russo­Turkish War,South American conflicts, and in the Russo­Japanese War.

Commerce raiding conducted by fastcruisers, as conduced by rebel naval forcesduring the American Civil War, was alsoseen as an asymmetric tool for combatingglobal maritime powers with vulnerabletrade routes. Defending naval forces couldnot be everywhere and took time to assemblein areas threatened by a surface raider.

Unfortunately, the march of technologicaladvance that supported the tenets of theJeune Ecole also served to undermine them.Nations whose battleships were threatenedby torpedo boats developed the larger andmore capable torpedo boat destroyer toescort their battleships, destroy enemytorpedo boats, and launch their own torpedoattacks against opposing forces. Advances inbattleship gunnery in the first decade of the20th century allowed capital ships to openfire at ranges greater than that of thetorpedo, making daylight attacks suicidal fortorpedo craft.

Surface commerce raiding also ran upagainst new technologies that made it largelyineffective. First, undersea communicationcables and later radio allowed for long­rangecommunication between naval leaders athome and their forces deployed around theworld. Commerce raiders that had to stop totake on coal and provisions would have theirlocations reported much more rapidly thanin past centuries, allowing naval forces toconcentrate and destroy them. Radiointercepts also allowed pursuing forces totrack surface raiders. British naval forcesquickly identified and eliminated Germancruiser formations engaged in commerce

raiding once radio communications reportedtheir positions. Raiders disguised asmerchant ships persisted into the SecondWorld War, but submarines that couldsubmerge and operate undetected becamemuch more effective commerce raiders.

The Jeune Ecole was also in effect a tacticalconcept elevated to the rank of strategy.While torpedo attacks might sink Britishbattleships attacking French coastal watersand commerce raiders might weaken Britishcommerce, how did the force structurepromote French strategic goals? How wouldthese formations protect France’s own far­flung possessions; a colonial amalgamatethat was second in size only to that of GreatBritain’s? How would lightly armed andarmored commerce raiders and generallyunseaworthy torpedo boats carry the fight toBritish shores if needed? The Jeune Ecoledid not answer these questions of strategicemployment of French naval forces.

France also reached a political settlementwith Great Britain in the early 20th centuryand the French fleet of raiding cruisers andtorpedo boats was left without an enemy.France would likely have benefited from amore balanced fleet in the First World Warand struggled to catch up in the dreadnoughtbuilding race that commenced shortly afterits “Entente Cordiale” agreement with GreatBritain.

Jackie Fisher’s Fleet

Great Britain experimented with its ownalternative fleet force structure at the outsetof the 20th century. This was the “fleet thatJack built;” the pre­World War 1 fleet ofbattlecruisers, large destroyers, submarines,and other revolutionary warships thatsprang from the fertile mind of BritishAdmiral Sir John Fisher. The fiery Fisher,who in U.S. service might have resembled acombination of Admirals Hyman G. Rickoverand Arthur Cebrowski, was selected to beFirst Sea Lord (British equivalent of the U.S.Chief of Naval Operations) in 1904 with amandate to cut costs and increase combatcapability. Fisher’s answer to this problempartially involved a revolutionary new forcestructure of hybrid ships that combinedexisting classes in order to meet Britishstrategic needs while lowering navalestimates. The battlecruiser that combinedthe firepower of a battleship with the speedand range of armored cruiser would speed tothreatened areas of the globe and destroyslower, less well­armed enemies at longrange. Defense of the United Kingdom itself

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would be left to torpedo­armed largedestroyers and submarines. Fisher was astrong advocate of new technologies andsupported naval aviation, steam powered­submarines, director firing of warship guns,and cleaner, more efficient oil fuel forwarships in place of coal.

Despite being innovative and well connectedto British grand strategy, Fisher’s fleet waslargely obsolete in less than ten years.Britain’s primary enemy changed fromFrance and its Jeune Ecole­based tradewarfare fleet to Germany that built a similarfleet of battleships and battlecruisers foroperations in European waters. Apparently,Fisher never expected anyone to create amirror image of his battlecruiser fleet.Fisher’s big ships were instead assigned asheavy scouts for a British fleet expecting afleet battle in the close confines of the NorthSea.

Technology also advanced beyond Fisher’sinitial concepts. The fast battleship, whichcarried heavy guns, was well armored andhad a decent turn of speed obviated the needfor the specialized battlecruisers. Fisher’ssteam­powered submarines were ahead oftheir time, but plagued by technologicalissues that limited their effectiveness. TheGerman surface fleet only made rareappearances and Germany’s merchant fleetwas largely interned or destroyed by the endof the first year of war, leaving few targetsfor Fisher’s submersibles. The Battle ofJutland, the one great naval encounter of thewar, did not offer proof that Fisher’s forcestructure was right or wrong. Instead, poortactical doctrine (not a lack of armor) causedsignificant casualties among Fisher’sbattlecruisers. The less than satisfactoryresults left the Royal Navy with a hauntingexperience of frustration and regret thatwould not be extirpated until the SecondWorld War. He was out of power and officeby 1916 due to his repeated clashes with hisprotégé Winston Churchill over the conductof the Dardanelles campaign. Fisher’srevolution achieved much for the Royal Navyin its first five years, but was effectively overafter the first two years of the First WorldWar.

Zumwalt’s High/LowMix

Finally, there is the 1970s era U.S. Navyattempt at an alternative force structurelaunched by revolutionary Chief of NavalOperations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr. LikeFisher who faced reduced naval estimates

due to the costs of the unpopular Boer Warand a rising welfare state, Zumwalt also hadto contend with a U.S. naval budget limitedby the expenditures for the VietnamWar andfor President Johnson’s social welfareprograms. In response, Zumwalt conceivedof a high/low concept for U.S. naval forcestructure where, in the words of retired navalofficer and Hoover Institute scholar CaptainPaul Ryan, “A few high­performance shipsand many low­performance ones wouldavoid wrecking the budget but not exposethe nation to risks represented by largeemerging fleets of small, fast, cruise missile­armed combatants.”

Zumwalt’s program included reducedfunding for large, nuclear aircraft carriersand guided missile escorts, but greatersupport for a number of low­end vesselsincluding the Sea Control Ship, the patrolfrigate (which later became the FFG 7 Perryclass frigate), and the Pegasus class hydrofoilcombatant. Zumwalt intended that the low­end ships would operate in support ofgeneral sea control in low threat areas ratherthan focus on the Navy’s power projectionconcept developed after the Second WorldWar.

Zumwalt’s program found favor with thosein Congress who were happy to spend less onthe fleet, but met stiff opposition from withinthe Navy’s own ranks, especially from carrieraviators unhappy with reduced investmentin carriers. Strategy­minded individuals alsoopposed the high/low force structure as theyfelt it failed to appreciate the Navy’s vital,carrier­based strike capability as the real warwinning capability fielded by the fleet. Navalhistorian Norman Friedman, for example,labeled high/low as, “An un­Mahanianexcursion,” and former 6th FleetCommander Vice Admiral Gerald E. Millerremarked that, “the Sea Control ship mightdeny the Soviets access to the ChesapeakeBay,” but that its effective use ended there.

Zumwalt’s low­end ships had faults of theirown that were difficult to overcome. Inaddition to the operational limitations of theSea Control Ship, the patrol frigate (Perry)class went from a $50 million dollarcombatant to an average cost of $193 milliondollars by the end of the 51­ship program.The patrol hydrofoils were short­ranged andwere focused more toward offensive actionthan the peacetime patrol and presenceoperations the Navy required. Estimates ontheir operating costs vary, but only 6 of theintended 30 were completed with Zumwalt’s

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successors.

Changes in the strategic situationconfronting the U.S. across the 1970s servedto bring the high/low alternative forcestructure to an end by 1980. Intelligencegathered from taps on Soviet Navyunderwater communications cablessuggested the USSR was not planning a 3rdBattle of the Atlantic where Zumwalt’s forcewould have been most useful. TheCommunist superpower instead intended tokeep its submarines close to the homeland toprotect its ballistic missile submarines andattack U.S. carriers threatening Soviet bases.Response to this plan called for more high­end warships such as large aircraft carriersand their escorts. While ultimately notsuccessful, Zumwalt’s efforts did lead tobetter armament for U.S. Navy surface shipssuch as the Harpoon missile.

Modern Parallels

These case studies suggest that alternativeforce structures are born from a desire toachieve strategic advantage over anopponent, take advantage of technologicaladvances, and save costs in the execution ofstrategic policy. Current proposals foralternative force structures follow similarpathways. Concepts for arming a newgeneration of warships with directed energyweapons and railguns, thereby capturing thehigh ground of advanced technology, aresimilar to the U.S. Navy’s monitor programof the Civil War. Like the monitors of the1860s, current designs for railgun anddirected energy weapons are in their infancybut potentially very powerful. Initial versionswill be expensive and likely to be rapidlyoutmoded by technological advance.

Proposals for large fleets of smaller, moreexpendable warships that can be built at lowcost mirror the French Jeune Ecole. Thosesame proposals are also an attempt to builda strategic plan from a tactical or operationalconcept.

Hybrid warships that combine thecapabilities of multiple ships on a commonhull, like the U.S. littoral combat ship (LCS)are reminiscent of John Fisher’sbattlecruisers. Fisher’s later entrants into thebattlecruiser category later found gainfulemployment in the Second World War asrefitted fast capital ships or as aircraftcarriers. The long­term success of the LCSmay also depend on its ability to adapt tonew missions.

Alternative force structures can also meetchallenges from within their host navies.Admiral Zumwalt’s high/low mix facedconsiderable opposition from carrieraviators within the U.S. Navy hierarchy. Thelow costs with Zumwalt’s low­end ships weremuch greater than first estimated and thestrategic situation changed as in past casesmaking the alternative force structure muchless attractive. The U.S. LCS design,conceived as a low­ end combatant in aperiod of lower threats and fiscal austerity,faces similar challenges in ensuringrelevance in a new period of Cold War­likepeer/near peer competition.

Conclusion

Alternative force structures offer the promiseof harnessing new technology, overcoming aspecific opponent platform, and cost savingsin defense procurement. Naval leadersshould be wary in their adoption. Periods ofrapid technology as those that occurred inthe second half of the 19th century and thoseoccurring in the present can rapidlycondemn today’s alternative force to an earlyreserve fleet or scrapyard. High costsincurred in the construction and fielding of arapidly obsolete alternative force are noteasily recouped. Alternative forces inspiredby tactical requirements may findthemselves at odds with current and futurestrategies. Finally, even the best alternativeforce crafted to meet current strategicrequirements can be reduced to irrelevancewith the stroke of a pen in a diplomaticagreement. Historically, balanced fleets ofmixed capabilities have fared better in navalbattles and maintained relevance throughevolving threat environments. Navies shouldconsider all of these points before embarkingon the perilous quest for the perfectalternative force structure.

Steve Wills is a retired surface warfareofficer and a PhD candidate in militaryhistory at Ohio University. His focus areasare modern U.S. naval and militaryreorganization efforts and British navalstrategy and policy from 1889­1941.

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Featured Image: The USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) isunderway for the first time conducting at­sea testsand trials in the Atlantic Ocean Dec. 7, 2015. (U.S.Navy photo courtesy of General Dynamics Bath IronWorks/Released)

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Unmanned­Centric Force Structure

By Javier Gonzalez

The U.S. Navy is currently working on a newFleet Structure Assessment, the results ofwhich will eventually help inform the long­term force structure goals of the Navy’s 30­year shipbuilding plan. This ongoing analysiswas generated due to the realization thatsome of the assumptions used to develop thecurrent goal of 308 ships have changedsignificantly since its proposal in 2014. TheRussian resurgence and China’s rapidmilitary buildup defied expectations, and areview of the Navy’s force structure wasabsolutely warranted. The conundrum andimplied assumption, with this or similarfuture force structure analyses, is that theNavy must have at least a vagueunderstanding of an uncertain future.However, there is a better way to build asuperior and more capable fleet—bycontinuing to build manned ships based oncurrent and available capabilities while alsofully embracing optionality (aka flexibilityand adaptability) in unmanned systems.Additionally, and perhaps the betterargument, is that a new, unmanned­centricfleet can be more affordable whilemaintaining its relevance over the expectedservice life.

Optionality

A relevant fleet is one that is robust, flexible,and adaptable—one that embracesoptionality to anticipate uncertain andchanging requirements. The author NassimTaleb describes optionality as “the propertyof asymmetric upside with correspondinglylimited downside.” The implication here is to

clearly identify which options will providethe best ability to achieve this “asymmetricupside.” Systems such as the vertical launchsystem provide a certain degree of flexibilityby allowing for the rapid fielding of anyweapons that fit inside a missile. In addition,the concepts of modularity (Littoral CombatShip program), modular hulls, containersinterfaces, flexible infrastructures, andelectronic modular enclosures are otherexamples of the Navy’s explicit efforts to addflexibility and adaptability into the fleet. Theupsides of adding flexibility are self­evident—by having options added early inthe design process, the Navy can quickly andaffordably react to new geo­politicalsituations and adjust to technologicalinnovations. However, adding optionality isnot an easy proposition, especially becausetoday’s capabilities fielding process valuesoptimization, affordability, and a discernablereturn on investment over adaptability andflexibility.

Optimization is contrary to optionality, but itis a main factor in today’s ship design. Forinstance, space optimization is intuitive—thebetter optimized a space, given today’scapabilities, the smaller the ship needs to beand, consequently, the more affordable itshould be. However, this approach infers alevel of certainty and inflexibility to change,contrary to optionality. The reality is thatoptimization is at times necessary on amanned warship. However, new unmannedsystem designs can provide a canvas to shiftthis focus to one that values optionality andtakes advantage of uncertainty. The

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suggestion is to make the long­terminvestment on the unmanned “bus,” not thecapabilities. These new unmanned busesmust be designed to maximize powergeneration, cooling, and space availability.The design also needs a robust commandand control system to enable theemployment of multiple unmanned systemsin a cooperative environment.

Affordable Fleet

The affordability of the fleet is not simply afunction of budget availability. In 2014, theChief of Naval Operations, Adm. JonathanGreenert, testified to Congress that the Navyneeded a 450 ship fleet to meet the globaldemands by the Combatant Commanders.This 450 ship number is likely betterequipped to meet future CombatantCommanders’ needs than the currentproposal of a 308 ship Navy. At a minimum,a 450 ship Navy provides more options tofulfill future requirements. However, thecurrent and expected future fiscalenvironment suggests that building moreships is not an option unless a radical changeoccurs. Also, the enemy has a crucial vote onthe affordability of the fleet. The fall of theUSRR can be traced back to the U.S.strategy, in the 1970s and 1980s, to imposegreat costs on the Soviets by makinginvestments to render their warfightingsystems obsolete. This obsolescence createdan incentive for the Soviets to make costlyinvestments in an attempt to match thetechnology introductions by the UnitedStates. This strategy’s success was achievedin great part due to the apparent U.S.technological advantage over the Soviets.

Today, the United States finds itself in asimilar predicament as the Soviets in theCold War, where technology is leaping innew and unexpected ways and China, inparticular, is fielding systems that makemany U.S. systems obsolete. The rapidfielding of “game changing” technology byChina, such as the first quantumcommunications satellite or the DF­21Dmissile, results in a predictable reaction bythe DoD to invest in more capable andexpensive advancements to counter theirefforts. If the Soviets are any indication ofthe dangers of this strategy, especially if theUnited States acknowledges that thetechnological edge over near competitors inthe 20th century will no longer be assured,then the United States needs to shift itscompetitive model to one flexible enough torapidly and affordably adjust to unforeseenchallenges.

Additionaly, long­term shipbuilding isinherently expensive and dependent oncurrent and mature capabilities. Trying tobuild a ship with immature technologies canresult in unnaceptable acquisition blunders.For instance, the Navy’s next­generationnuclear carrier, CVN­78 Gerard P. Ford, hasresulted in massive cost overruns due ingreat part to the risk incurred in trying toinclude new and immature technologies intothe shipbuilding plan. An unmanned­centricfleet provides the flexibility to value buildingmanned ships based on current andavailable capabilities while also fullyembracing optionality in unmanned systems.

An added benefit of having optionalitycombined with unmanned systems is that itallows for prospective capabilities to be morerapidly prototyped while offering a robustmeans for experimentation both fortechnology and future concept of operationsdevelopment. Unmanned systems couldfunction similarly to a smartphone and itsmany applications. The benefit of thisapproach is that it provides an environmentwith stressors that will allow new technologyto fail early and facilitate rapid change,evolution, and dramatically quicken theresearch and capabilities fielding cycles. Thenext Fleet Structure Assessment should alsoembrace optionality by finding the optimalmix of manned and unmanned vessels thatwill yield an asymmetric upside.

Unmanned­Centric

An unmanned­centric force structure will bedramatically different than today’s Navy, andit will require a departure from the 450 shipmanned Navy ideal or the current 308 shipgoal. The right mix of manned versusunmanned systems can be derived from aconcept of operations that promotesjudicious force structure discussions. Thebasis of this new concept is a fleet with moreunmanned systems than manned systemswhere these platforms are fully integrated.For instance, instead of having a SurfaceAction Group (SAG) comprised of threemanned ships, new SAGs could becomprised of a manned ship and at least twounmanned surface vehicles. Incorporatingvehicles like DARPA’s ASW Continuous TrailUnmanned Vessel or General Dynamics’Fleet­class unmanned surface vessel couldadd capabilities that will immediatelyincrease lethality and adaptability. In theamphibious realm, the Navy could leverageunmanned platforms as resupplydistribution systems for Marines on thebeach. This could be of particular

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importance in a contested environmentwhile supporting multiple fronts in anarchipelago­like scenario. Further in thefuture, instead of having eleven 100,000­tonaircraft carriers, a mix of eight traditionalcarriers with eight to ten smaller (~40,000ton) all­unmanned combat air vehiclecarriers will provide the flexibility andpresence that all Combatant Commandersare desperately seeking.

Presence is about having the right capability,in the right place, at the right time. Toaccomplish this the Navy will essentiallyneed more assets. A plausible solution couldbe a force structure where the mainemployment of unmanned systems will bearound unmanned­centric Surface ActionGroups as the smallest force package tofulfill theater needs. The current 308 shipNavy plan is structured as follows:

CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN11 88 52 48 0 12

AWS CLF SUPT TOTAL34 29 34 308

(CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large SurfaceCombatants, SSC – Small SurfaceCombatants,USV – Unmanned SurfaceVessel, SSN – Fast attack submarines,SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS –Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – CombatLogistic Force, SUPT – Support vessels.)

A future force structure could start withtrading large and small surface combatantsfor a new fleet of Unmanned Vessels. Theaffordability comes from the added presenceafforded by the nature of an unmannedautonomous system and the need for fewerpersonnel to support their operations. Theadded capability comes from theintroduction of 19 capable Surface ActionGroups comprised of a manned ship withtwo unmanned vessels as depicted below:

CVN LSC SSC USV SSN SSBN11 84 50 38 48 12

AWS CLF SUPT TOTAL34 29 34 340

(CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large SurfaceCombatants, SSC – Small SurfaceCombatants,USV – Unmanned SurfaceVessel, SSN – Fast attack submarines,SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS –Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – CombatLogistic Force, SUPT – Support vessels.)

Conclusion

The most important attributes for futureforce structures are relevance andaffordability. This goal can be achieved bypivoting from the traditional to place theemphasis on developing unmanned capablebuses that can accommodate all currenttechnologies and have the capacity to flexand adapt to future technologies. Optionalityto ship­building and unmanned systemsintegration can provide the flexibility andadaptability the Navy requires to remainrelevant in an uncertain future. The result isa force structure that is more capable andconceptually more affordable. All great plansstart with the end in mind – the upcomingFleet Structure Assessment needs toshowcase what the end of the Navy’s 30­yearvision looks like. The suggestion is anunmanned­centric, man­led fleet.

Commander Javier Gonzalez is a NavyFederal Executive Fellow at the JohnHopkins University Applied PhysicsLaboratory and a career Surface WarfareOfficer. These are his personal views and donot reflect those of John Hopkins Universityor the Department of the Navy.

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Featured Image: Rear Adm. Mat Winter, then­chief ofnaval research, offers remarks during a christeningceremony for Sea Hunter, an entirely new class ofunmanned ocean­going vessel during a ceremonyheld in Portland, Oregon, April 7, 2016. The DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) inconjunction with the Office of Naval Research (ONR)is working to fully test the capabilities of the vesselwhich is able to travel thousands of miles over theopen seas for months at a time without a crew, andwith a high degree of autonomy in operation. (U.S.Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)

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Proposing AModern High Speed Transport – TheLong Range Patrol VesselBy TomMeyer

The U.S. Navy achieved extraordinarysuccess in the 20th century – playing keyroles in winning WWII and the Cold War.The U.S. Navy earned theseaccomplishments with forces structuredaround an exceptional fleet oftechnologically superior ships and aircraft.The U.S. Navy’s “ships of the line” duringthis era represented the height of ourtechnological and industrial capabilities –and no expense was spared to create,construct, and operate this world­leadingfleet.

As the United States and the U.S. Navy moveinto the 21st century, the United States facesthe duel challenge of engaging in a “longwar” against Islamofacism and meeting thethreat of emerging “peer competitors” in aperiod of economic and fiscal constraints.Meeting these dichotomous challengesrequires a fundamental rethink of the natureof naval forces and their roles. Is the U.S.Navy moving from an era of exceptional“ships of the line” – including LHA’s &LPD’s, FFG’s, CG’s, DDG’s, SSN’s and CVN’s– to one filled with USV’s, UAV’s, LCS’s,CV’s, SSK’s and perhaps something new –Long Range Patrol Vessels (LRPV’s)? Butwhat exactly is an LRPV?

The LRPV represents the 21st centuryversion of the WWII APD – High SpeedTransports. To better understand the 21stcentury LRPV, let’s take a look at the historyand capabilities of the 20th century APDs.

Historical Connections

During WWII and the Korean War, Crosley­class APDs based on the Rudderrow class ofdestroyer escorts were pressed into a varietyof roles and performed missions includingamphibious assault, UDT operations andraids, ASW, long­range patrolling, andsearch and rescue– i.e. rescue of USSIndianapolis survivors.

The ability to successfully complete thesevarious missions resulted from theinherently flexible design of the APDs. Tobegin with, the designers of the Crosley classAPD’s provided these ships with a strongorganic armament, including one 5″/38 dualpurpose gun mount, three twin 40 mm gunmounts, six single 20 mm gun mounts, andtwo depth charge tracks. The Crosley classAPD’s were equipped to carry and support 12officers and 150 enlisted men. Furthermore,the Crosley’s were equipped with 4 LCVPs toconvey troops and equipment ashore.

Finally, the Crosley APD’s could carry acombination of the following material onboard:

6 x 1/4 ton trucks2 x 1 ton trucks4 x ammunition carts4 x pack howitzers6,000 cubic feet ammunition3,500 cubic feet general cargo1,000 cubic feet gasoline

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The capabilities and flexibility of the APD’sare the inspiration for a new line of vessels –the Long Range Patrol Vessels (LRPVs).

The LRPV Concept

The modern LRPV would build upon andupdate the concept of High Speed Transportfor the 21st century. The LRPV wouldcombine new technologies, capabilities, andprocesses to create regionally­focused LRPVsurface action groups (SAGs) supportingU.S. national and U.S. Navy strategic goalsand objectives.

The modern LRPV would operate as amember of a two ship LRPV sag. The SAGwould leverage recent innovative work by theU.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratoryto design, create, and test a new CombatLanding Team organizational model –COLT.

The COLT organizational model creates aunique USMC amphibious landing teamconsisting of three infantry platoons, oneweapons platoon, an enhanced scout section,and an enhanced command element.

The specific Concept of Operations (ConOps)would be two LRPVs operating togetherwhile jointly carrying one USMC COLT (orU.S. Army equivalent) and their organicvehicles while conducting extended patrolsin specific geographic areas (i.e. SouthAmerica, Africa or SE Asia). These patrolswould provide the opportunity for theseLRPVs to operate in close, sustainedpartnerships with local maritime forces byconducting numerous extended jointoperations, exercises, and securitycooperation engagements.

To meet the challenges emerging in the 21stcentury, LRPV SAGs would focus on specificgeographic regions including South America,Africa, SE Asia, and the Middle East.Forward presence could be enhanced byconducting crew swaps in forward operatinglocations, including Guam, Japan,Singapore, Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Naples,Guantanamo Bay, and other locations yet tobe identified.

Through the use of long­term forwarddeployments, regionally­based crew­swapping, and the strong organic capabilitiesof the LRPVs, the specific numericrequirements for the LRPV constructionprogram could be limited to 30­34individual ships to support regional LRPVsquadrons. The number of ships required to

support the program is based on a projectedneed to support at least 4 regionally­focusedLRPV SAGs plus their training andmaintenance requirements. In addition tocarrying a USMC COLT or U.S. Armyequivalent formation, the LRPV SAGs couldcarry a composite unit tailored to suit patrol­specific planned interactions with localnational military forces.

For example, the afloat forces for a LRPVSAG deployment to multiple countries over a6­8 month period within the SOUTHCOMAOR could consist of:

2 platoons of U.S. Army Infantry (plus theirStryker vehicles)2 platoons of U.S. Army Engineers (and theirheavy equipment)A contingent of U.S. Army MedicalpersonnelAn air contingent of 3­4 UH­60’s plus UAV’sdrawn from U.S. Army Aviation

An anti­piracy patrol off of East Africa couldsee the LRPV Squadron deploy with:

2 U.S. Coast Guard LEDET detachmentsplus several container configured asdetention facilities4 CB 90H or 25′ Response boat­small(Defender­Class) or 25′ Transportable PortSecurity Boat (TPSB) or 23′ Over the horizon(OTH) boat or 23′ USCG Short RangeProsecutor (SRP) (See Small BoatCapabilities in LRPV Characteristics section)3­4 USCG HH­60 or HH­65 Dolphinhelicopters plus several small UAVs

In addition to carrying out these types oflong­duration, presence missions, theflexibility of the LRPV design would enableadditional missions to be undertaken,including: short term “summer cruises” tosupport training missions, rapid response tohumanitarian crisis, sanctions/blockadeenforcement, convoy escort, and search andrescue.

LRPVs would not be amphibious warfareships per se but are intended to sustain long­range, forward presence patrols supportingU.S. national interests. However, whennecessary, LRPV SAGs could conductcounter­terrorism or counter­proliferationraids at the direction of the NCA or couldsupport an ESG by providing additionalraiding or striking capabilities during a crisis– thereby increasing the level of difficultyconfronting an adversary of the UnitedStates. By combining the right mix oftechnology, capabilities, organizational

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structures and sound processes, the LRPVwould support key U.S. national interestsand provide a visible expression to theconcept of a “1000 ship navy” previouslyexpressed by the U.S. Navy and the OSD.

Ship Characteristics

What specific attributes and capabilitieswould a LRPV have? Here are some keycharacteristics:

Weight: 7,000­9,000 tons

Length: 450­500ft

Beam: 50­60ft

Draft: 10­16ft

Propulsion: CODAG (minimum 4 LM­2500sor 2 LM­6000s) plus 2 diesel engines – somethought should be given to alternatepropulsion systems (i.e. Podded Electricpropulsion?) – commercial standardsperhaps?

Speed: Max 28 knots (stretch 32 knots) –cruise speed – 14­16 knots (stretch 18­20knots)

Range: 10,000 NM – Stretch 12,000 atcruising speed

Combat Systems: Aegis SPY­1F(V),(proposed for export­version of LCS) or eventhe SPY­5 proposed for lighter warships; 2illuminators (1 fore & 1 aft); CEC­enabled;open architecture networks & C3I systemsallow “plug & play” of new weapons andsensors.

ESM/ECM: SQS­32V or newer version

Sonar: Bow­mounted sonar standard; TowedArray – optional

Communications: High­bandwidth satellitecommunications

Crew:

140­180 (190 is acceptable)Additional berthing (permanently installed):120 Marine (1/2 of USMC COLT insert link)Additional crew considerations: SOF,humanitarian personnel, noncombatantevacuation, search and rescue.

Weapons

Guns:

1×5” Gun2x25MM Remote EO­controlled mounts4­6 .50cal manned weapons – asoperationally required

Missiles:

1 Mk 41 VLS system with 48 launch tubes (or2×24) which could include:24 Standard Mk 2/3 SAM’s6 Harpoons6 VLA (Vertical Launch ASROC’s)48 ESSMs (12×4)Use of VLS enables the introduction of newmissiles over the life of the LRPV.

ASW Torpedoes: 2×2 Mk 32 Mod 9 mounts

Aircraft:

Landing Spots: Operation of 2 helicopterssimultaneously (4 would be a stretch goal)Hangar Space: 4 medium helicopters (SH­60’s specifically 2 SH­60R & 2 SH­60S).Ability to provide hangar space for 3 SH­60size helicopters plus 2 additional Fire Scoutswould be a stretch goal

Flex Deck:

Square Footage: 16,800 Sq Feet per shipWeight Capacity: Reinforced to support upto M1A2 tank (Up to 70 Tons)Suggested vehicle load across two LRPVscould include a reinforced Light ArmoredReconnaissance Platoon (or comparable U.S.Army Stryker unit):

8 LAV­25’s/M­1126 Strykers2 LAV/R or M­1132,2 LAV­C or M­1130, 2 LAV/M or M­11292 LAV(TOW Launcher) or 2 M­1134 StrykerAnti­Tank Guide Missile Vehicle14 Humvees14 10 5­7 Ton FMTV’s including 2­3 Tankers3 155MM Towed Artillery Guns plus Movers(Stretch)6 Additional 40’ Containers – Supplies &Training Simulators

Notes on Flex Deck:

Flight deck access would be ideal with eitherramp or elevator (Ramp is preferred due tosimplicity)Ability to load LCM or LCVP via 30 toncrane is requiredRo/Ro capability is required (via a ramp or amexeflote style ramp at stern and ramp toport or starboard) – with 100 ton carryingcapacityFlex deck must support the installation of

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habitability containers to support additionaltroops or temporary medical facilitiesFlex deck must provide electrical andcommunication network interfaces acrossentire flex deck floor space – both high­speed direct connectivity and wirelessconnection

Small boat capabilities:

2 x LCM­6s – LCM would be able to carry 25tonnes (30 tonnes stretch goal) – this willenable carriage of LAVs or Strykers2 x LCVPs or 2 x DOCKSTAVARVET ABCB90Hs – Carried in separate davits fromLCM­6sNote: The LCVPs must be capable ofcarrying Uparmored Humvees, an exampleof a possible LCVP which could be used isthe Royal Navy LCVP Mk5. The Mk5 is 15.5meters long and 4.4 meters wide and capableof carrying a company of 30 fully equippedtroops or vehicles such as: BV206, JCB410,ATV’s and towed artillery. The Mk5 cantravel up to 25 knots and has a range of over210 nautical miles.

Note: LCM davits must be flexible enough tosupport LCVPs, RHIBs, CB 90Hs, CSSCs orUSCG small craft. LCVP davits must beflexible enough to accommodate RIB’s, CH90Hs, CSSCs or USCG small craft.

2 x RHIBs – Standard ship’s complement –separate from landing craft listed above.

Additional capabilities:

Excess fresh water production capacityStrong organic, on­board medical facilitiesExcess toilet and showering facilities tosupport combined baseline shipcomplement, USMC/U.S. Army/otheradditional complement plus additionalpersonnel house in habability containers onflex deckOnboard synthetic training facilities forCOLT team members including infantry &tankers (Perhaps 2×20 or 40 foot containersconfigured to provide simulation facilities onFlex Deck)

With a lifelong interest in aviation, navaland all manner of military affairs, TomMeyer graduated from Florida StateUniversity with a BA in Political Science &International Relations and an MS inPolitical Science. He spent over a decadewith Top 3 US Airline working in Ops,Technology, the Low Cost Carrier unit andEmployee Relations. Tom has now worked

almost 10 years for a majorTelecommunications company in variousroles. Home is Atlanta, GA. You can followTom on Twitter at @tkmeyer0524.

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Featured Image: USS Crosley (APD­87) anchored offPhiladelphia Navy Yard, 30 October 1944. US NavalHistory and Heritage Command photo #NH 91584.Courtesy of A.D. Baker III.

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No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to InspireCapability Innovation in Today’s NavyBy Bob Hein

Imagine a day sometime in the near futurewhere tensions between the United Statesand Russia are high and ships are at sea,ready to strike each other at a moment’snotice if given the word. As his ship glides tothe surface of the ocean, the enemysubmarine commander raises his periscopeand with it the electronic surveillanceantennae. It picks up multiple signals of U.S.aircraft in the immediate vicinity. But thecommander is not worried. These aircraft,their radar, and their weapons are optimizedfor attacks against land targets; they won’tsee his periscope, and even if they did, theywouldn’t have the weapons to do much aboutit. As long as he can avoid U.S. ships andsubmarines, which are spread out and inshort supply, he knows he and his comradeshave the upper hand in gaining control of thesea. As he leaves the surface, he worksunimpeded toward his target, the Americanaircraft carrier.

At the same time, hundreds of miles away, aU.S. submarine commander is movingtoward the enemy’s surface action group. Heknows if he can get close enough and sinkthese ships, he can help ensure control of thesea for the rest of the force. Suddenly, thesound of weapons dropped from enemyhelicopters fills the ship. He runs deep andaggressively, maneuvering to negate thethreat. But in doing so, he loses contact withthe group. And without an ability to shootthe helicopter, he misses an opportunity totake down an archer, who will now be able to

shoot future arrows at him and hiscompatriots.

Ten years ago, this scenario would have beena work of pure fiction, unimaginable to mostnational security experts and militaryleaders. But today, the rapid spread oftechnology, the rise of near peercompetitors, and the proliferation ofadvanced weapons make this scenario moreplausible than ever. If the Navy is to counterthe above scenario, it must start emphasizingsea control while retaining power projectioncapability. That change will require the Navyto accelerate its approach to this mission set,both in strategic terms of shifting mentalfocus and in more tactical terms of rapidrepurposing of current platforms andpayloads. While the Navy works todetermine its future force structure, it mustinnovate beyond the traditional roles thatships and aircraft currently play. Designingand building new naval platforms takes timewe don’t have, and there is still abundantopportunity to make the most of existingforce structure. Fortunately for the Navy,histories of previous wars are a good guidefor future action. World War II is anexcellent model in particular, but the Navymust first recognize the historical context ofits current predicament.

Bringing the Navy Back to the Sea

Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote extensively onhow nations throughout history have used

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control of the seas to spread national powerby ensuring freedom of trade and access.Over the course of the last century, theNavy’s primary focus of force application hasshifted from sea control to power projection.

Arguably, the battle for control of the seasculminated in WWII, when massive navy­on­navy engagements raged in enormousclashes such as the Battles of the Atlantic,Midway, and Leyte Gulf. Navy strike groupswere challenged by Axis Powers throughoutthe world’s oceans.

Following WWII, the U.S. had a massivenavy and no real threat to its control of theoceans. The Navy and the nation were nowunsure of the Navy’s role in this new world.The Navy received assistance from a 27­year­old theorist, Samuel Huntington. Writing in1954, he had a clear vision for how the Navyshould evolve in the second half of the 20thcentury: “Its purpose is not to acquirecommand of the sea, but rather to utilize itscommand of the sea to achieve supremacy ofthe land.” The Navy began shifting its focusto power projection, refining amphibiouswarfare techniques, developing a long rangeland attack missile, and building generationsof air wings capable of delivering ordnanceashore. Even so, as the Cold War intensifiedand the Soviet Navy grew throughout the50’s and 60’s, this focus ashore was balancedby the continuing requirement ofmaintaining control afloat.

Following the end of the Cold War and thedissolution of the Soviet Navy, the U.S.Navy’s focus on sea control diminished andthe pendulum swung squarely over to powerprojection. Anti­surface missiles wereremoved from ships, Trident missilesubmarines were converted to fireTomahawks, and the carrier’s S­3 Vikinganti­submarine aircraft were stripped ofmuch of their anti­submarine warfare gearand were later retired. Major force structureinvestments were made in ships gearedtowards littoral power projection such as theLCS and Zumwalt­class destroyer.Generations of Sailors during the Cold Warwere trained to achieve sea control – it waspart of their DNA. When the Cold Warended, and with it the Soviet Navy, that DNAwithered away.

As Bob Dylan tells us, once again, the timesthey are a changin’. The world is returning toa period of great power competition, andother nations’ desire to influence the worldstage is forcing the Navy to rethink its focus.In the coming decades, the U.S. Navy may

not have its current luxury of safelytraversing the world’s oceans and projectingpower. The rise of foreign capability couldthreaten carrier strike groups when theyleave their harbors. The Navy must expandits focus from the last 25 years of projectingpower, and strengthen its historic mission ofsea control.

Make the Old New Again

When trying to convert this shift in focus tothe platforms that will execute sea control, itis time to heed the old dictum, “If you want anew idea, read an old book.” Just as the Navyhad to do in WWII, it is time to focus onrepurposing platforms it already has ratherthan relying on new platforms.

Looking back to its height of sea controlcapability, the Battle of Midway in WWII,carrier air wings (at the time known ascarrier air groups) consisted of about 72aircraft, one squadron each of dive bombers,fighters, torpedo bombers, and scout planes(which could also carry bombs). Comparethat with today’s air wing. While the numberof aircraft is about the same, its compositionhas changed dramatically, with fourfighter/attack squadrons, one electronicattack squadron, one command and controlsquadron, and two helicopter squadrons.The biggest difference is the shift in focus ofthe air wing from fighting other navies forcontrol of the seas to a focus on deliveringpower ashore.

At over 40 years old, the USS Nimitz is theoldest carrier in the U.S. inventory. Thereason she has survived is due to upgrades toher air wing. There is debate currently overwhether the Nimitz, and follow on carriersare still valid in a world of anti­access andarea denial. This debate centers on theNavy’s role in power projection but speakslittle to its return to sea control. While thecarriers are still the best platform fordelivering power without the need forforeign basing permissions, adding an anti­submarine and anti­surface role to its newestfighters is necessary. Similar to efforts by thesurface warfare community to modify theSM­6 anti­air missile for strikes againstships, the Navy should modify those ASWand ASUW weapons currently used by theMH­60R helicopter for use by its fighter­attack jets. Just as in WWII, not all aircraftwould be configured for surface orsubsurface missions, but providing thatlatent capability will certainly ensure enemyships and subs will think twice when they seethe radar signature of a U.S. fighter.

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Submarines are very effective at what theydo – sinking other submarines and attackingsurface ships – but many potentialadversaries have fleets of helicoptersdesigned to hunt them. Simply giving subs abasic anti­air warfare capability againstthese platforms would certainly giveadversaries cause for concern. This systemalready exists in the German Navy. TheInteractive Defense and Attack System forSubmarines (IDAS) is currently being builtfor the German Type 212 submarine. With a12­mile range, it will certainly makehelicopters think twice as they drop theirbuoy search patterns. Submarine attacksagainst aircraft are not a new concept. InWWII, 120 Allied aircraft were shot down byGerman U­Boats.

Military Sealift Command (MSC) isexperiencing great success in expanding therole of its fleet, and has been a leader increatively repurposing existing platforms.MSC has added intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance, and command and controlcapabilities to platforms such as theExpeditionary Fast Transport (formerlyJoint High Speed Vessel) and the dry­cargo/ammunition ships (T­AKE). MarineForces Pacific has experimented with the T­AKE extensively, using the ship for low­endoperations, and even as a potentialcommand and control platform. The MSChas shown there is a lot of opportunity in ourcurrent fleet. We just have to be creative.

Conclusion

As the challenges on the world’s oceanscontinue to rise, the challenge of sea controlrises with them. With rapid repurposing ofvarious platforms and payloads, the Navycan quickly adapt and overcome if and whenrequired to fight and win this nation’s wars.By looking back at history, sometimes wecan find the tools for the future.

Captain Robert N. Hein is a career SurfaceWarfare Officer. He previously commandedthe U.S.S Gettysburg (CG­64) and the U.S.SNitze (DDG­94). You can follow him onTwitter @the_sailor_dog. The views andopinions expressed are his own and do notreflect those of the Navy or the Departmentof Defense.

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Featured Image: A U.S. Navy Lockheed S­3A Vikingaircraft (BuNo 159755) assigned to anti­submarinesquadron VS­32Maulers on the aircraft carrier USS

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America (CV­66), on 6 May 1982. (W. M. Welch,USN)

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Enhancing Existing Force Structure by OptimizingMaritime Service SpecializationBy Eric Beaty

The factors which color our view of the worldhave changed significantly since the end ofthe Cold War. That overarching conflictpolarized the world’s politics and drove theUnited States to build a naval force focusedon blue­water combat against a peercompetitor, but the demise of the SovietUnion left a much more complex worldwhere the United States must be prepared tosimultaneously counter myriad threats atmultiple levels. There is not a uniformsolution to every problem and there is not auniform fleet for every theater. Luckily, theUnited States has three maritimeservices—the Navy, Coast Guard, and MarineCorps—with different core competenciescovering a broad range of naval missions.Current investments in force structure canbe maximized by focusing the maritimeservices on their preferred missions.

Some missions have historically beenassigned according to service and platform,rather than warfare areas, which has led tosmall, orphaned communities in someservices. These communities are too small tohave many high­ranking alumni in overallservice leadership. The resultingconsequences include them being oftenmisunderstood and undervalued, poorfunding, poor career opportunities, few ifany champions in service leadership, and soon. Even when they are appreciated andfunded, niche communities lack economiesof scale. Therefore, the way to ensuremissions are properly funded and manned is

to task an interested party to advocate forthem, and each of the maritime services hasmissions they are most passionate about.

The naval force of the future would see aNavy endorsement of the territorial patrolmissions of the Coast Guard and expandingthe role of the Navy­Marine Corpsamphibious team, but there would be noradical course corrections. Instead, navalmissions would be assigned to “centers ofexcellence” within the services to manage theorganization, training, and tactics of the jointforces which would execute such missions.

Navy – Combat on the High Seas

The U.S. Navy would manage the missions ofblue­water combat: submarine andantisubmarine warfare, carrier aviation,surface warfare, air defense, and sealift.These missions are already clearly within theNavy aegis, so there would be no majorchange in their execution. By focusing onthese core mission sets, and shedding theremainder which the Navy has beenunenthusiastic about, the leadership wouldbe refocused on areas where Navy doctrine,tactics, and procurement have been mostrefined. As such, the platforms of the blue­water Navy would not deviate much fromtheir present and planned configurations.

Coast Guard – Patrolling Offshore

The U.S. Coast Guard would be the mission

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manager for coastal and offshore patroloperations, for both law enforcement andmaritime safety. Under the umbrella ofmuscular law enforcement, the Coast Guardwould manage not only patrols of theAmerican coast, but also patrols off SouthAmerica and Africa as well. Most of thesevessels would be frigates, both U.S. Navy andallied, rather than white­hull Coast Guardcutters, but all would be dedicated to low­intensity constabulary missions. By keepingthe peace along much of the world’scoastline, the Coast Guard­led maritimepatrol enterprise would free up high­capability vessels to deter peer competitors.

The worldwide maritime patrol enterprisewould be led by the United States, with thenonjudgmental aim of maintaining theworld’s seaways under the control ofaccepted and functional governments,because even reticent governments makeeasier negotiating partners than ungovernedchaos. The simplest way to lead such anenterprise is to help equip and train it, so theUnited States Navy and Coast Guard wouldhave extensive foreign military sales,partnership programs, and personnelexchange programs with allied maritimenations.

To make such a broad endeavor morepractical, the Coast Guard’s offshore cutters,the Navy’s patrol frigates, and allied nations’warships would need to be common. Theprincipal requirements would be low cost,ease of maintenance, and margins forgrowth. The basic warship would have asimple power plant, enough systems tooperate as a minimalist patrol ship, andsubstantial space and weight left availablefor additions. Buyers could add additionalfuel tanks and provisions storage, a variety ofweapons, helicopter or boat facilities, or ahost of other standardized modifications.While these frigates would be too small toadd all options to every vessel, they wouldalso be inexpensive enough that customersof modest means could still purchase them,and customers like the United States couldpurchase lots of them.

Built cheaply and in large numbers, flotillasof these semi­modular ships would patrol forpirates off Africa, drug smugglers in the Gulfof Mexico, or vessels in distress off NorthAmerica. For patrol locations far fromsuitable ports, the Navy would reawaken theconcept of tender vessels; usingreplenishment ships to establish at­sea basesto extend the on­station time of frigates andcutters. These tenders would provide fuel,

provisions, spare parts, and a base for theflotilla’s command element. By performinglower­threat missions economically, thesefrigates would free up the destroyers,cruisers, and carriers to concentrate in high­threat theaters, thereby maximizing combatpower.

Marine Corps – Seizing the Littorals

While the Navy prepares to fight wars on thehigh seas and the Coast Guard leads patrolefforts in more stable theaters, the MarineCorps would manage naval missions acrosscoastal seas and coastal lands. As the servicetasked with crossing from sea to land, theMarine Corps is concerned with anythingwhich could affect or impede an amphibiousaction, including the obvious amphibioustasks, but should now focus on missions likemine countermeasures and small boatoperations. Afloat Marine forces are carriedto battle by Navy amphibious assault shipsand delivered to the beach by Navy landingcraft, so there would remain a substantialNavy influence in certain elements, but theMarines would be the lead advocates forcoastal mission capabilities.

Navy destroyers, cruisers, and carrier battlegroups would be responsible for clearing apath to the coastal area for the amphibioustrain, but the amphibious ships and theirdirect escorts would be responsible forfighting their way to the beach and enablingthe landing force to cross it. To defeat smallboat threats and provide fire support untilthe Marine landing force could establishartillery ashore, the amphibious train wouldbe escorted by frigates (based on thecommon hull introduced above) specializedwith the maximum number of naval gunspossible. With these frigates, the amphibiousforce would be able to defeat enemy forces inwaters too constricted for the blue­waterwarships to operate effectively.

Closer to the beach, mines would be the nextthreat to an amphibious landing. Ratherthan operate a separate fleet ofminesweepers and mine countermeasuressupport ships, the Marine Corps­centeredlittoral force would base counterminedetachments aboard the same amphibiousassault ships carrying the landing force.Assault ships are designed with large welldecks, copious storage, and substantialberthing space, making them best­suited tooperate divers and unmanned counterminevehicles of all sizes. Furthermore, they havethe flight decks to operate the CH­53K KingStallions that would take the airborne

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minesweeping mission from the Navy’s MH­53E Sea Dragons as these aging helicoptersare retired. Saving the Navy the purchase ofnew mine countermeasures ships would payoff in funding for extra amphibious landingships and CH­53Ks, a doubly effectivereorganization for the amphibious mission.

The Marine Corps would also take overallresponsibility for the related riverinemission set. Outside of port securitymissions (which would fall under CoastGuard leadership), all coastal and riverineboat operations would become part of thepermanent Navy­Marine Corps amphibiousenterprise. Effective riverine operationsinclude the same elements as amphibiouslandings—afloat mobility, fire support, andpower projection ashore—so consolidation ofthe riverine and amphibious communitieswould create a deeper and more diverse baseof experience for both missions. Integrationwith Marine Corps infantry, aviation, andartillery would make the riverine squadronsmore effective in combat than they could bealone. Also, increased small­boat landingand raiding capability would increase theMarines’ naval presence and take advantageof their unique maritime capabilities.

The Joint Naval Force in Action

This joint naval force of the future wouldperform in a very similar fashion to thepresent­day and historical naval forces,insofar as the various forces have capabilitiesavailable. Where the future naval forcewould excel is in peacetime administrationand presence: more efficient management ofmissions would reduce redundancy andincrease the number of forces available whenand where they were needed for combat anddeterrence. Transitory advantages liketechnology or brilliant leadership wouldcome and go, but the future naval forcewould be organized to make the mostefficient use of these advantages on the seasto achieve America’s long­term goals.

LT Eric Beaty is an E­2C/D Hawkeye NavalFlight Officer, presently working ashore inD.C. The views express herein are solelythose of the author and are presented in apersonal capacity on his own initiative.They do not reflect the official positions ofthe Department of Defense.

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Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 18, 2016) ­Cpl. Ryan Dills communicates with other assault

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amphibious vehicles while traveling from amphibiousassault ship USS America (LHA 6) to Royal AustralianNavy Canberra class amphibious ship HMASCanberra (L02). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by SSgt.Christopher Giannetti/Released)

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The Navy has been talking a lot aboutdistributed lethality lately, and “if it floats, itfights.” There is even talk of mounting cruisemissiles on Military Sealift Command (MSC)ships, even though it might compromisetheir primary mission. But so far there hasbeen little or no discussion of extending thisinitiative to include the Coast Guard. TheNavy should consider investing high­endwarfighting capability in the Coast Guard toaugment existing force structure and providea force multiplier in times of conflict. A morecapable Coast Guard will also be better ableto defend the nation from asymmetricalthreats.

Why Include the Coast Guard?

A future conflict may not be limited to asingle adversary. We may be fighting anotherworld war, against a coalition, perhaps bothChina and Russia, with possible side showsin Africa, the Near East, South Asia, and/orLatin America. If so, we are going to neednumbers. The Navy has quality, but it doesnot have numbers. Count all the Navy CGs,DDGs, LCSs, PCs and PBs and other patrolboats and it totals a little over a hundred.The Coast Guard currently has over 40patrol ships over 1,000 tons and over 110patrol craft. The current modernizationprogram of record will provide at least 33large cutters, and 58 patrol craft of 353 tons,in addition to 73 patrol boats of 91 tonscurrently in the fleet, a total of 164 units.

Very few of our allies have a fleet of similarsize.

Coast Guard vessels routinely operate withU.S. Navy vessels. The ships have commonequipment and their crews share commontraining. The U.S. Navy has no closer ally.Because of their extremely long range,cutters can operate for extended periods inremote theaters where there are few or evenno underway replenishment assets. TheCoast Guard also operates in places the USNdoes not. For example, how often do Navysurface ships go into the Arctic? The CoastGuard operates there routinely. Virtually allU.S. vessels operating with the Fourth Fleetare Coast Guard. There are also no U.S. Navysurface warships home based north of theChesapeake Bay in the Atlantic, nonebetween San Diego and Puget Sound in thePacific, and none in the Gulf of Mexico withthe exception of mine warfare ships.

In the initial phase of a conflict, there will bea need to round­up all the adversaries’merchant ships and keep them from doingmischief. Otherwise they might lay mines,scout for or resupply submarines, put agentsashore, or even launch cruise missiles fromcontainers. This is not the kind of work wewant DDGs doing. It is exactly the type ofwork appropriate for Coast Guard cutters.Coast Guard ships enjoy a relatively lowprofile. Unlike a Carrier Strike Group orNavy SAG, they are less likely to be tracked

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Augment Naval Force Structure By UpgunningThe Coast GuardBy Chuck Hill

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by an adversary.

If we fight China in ten to twenty years, theconflict will likely open with China enjoyinglocal superiority in the Western Pacific andperhaps in the Pacific in general. If we fightboth China and Russia it may be too close tocall.

Coast Guard Platforms

National Security Cutter (NSC)

This class of at least nine and possibly ten,418 foot long, CODAG powered, 28 knotships, at 4,500 tons full load, are slightlylarger than Perry­class frigates. Additionally,they have a 12,000 nautical mile cruisingrange. As built they are already equippedwith:

­ Navy certified helicopter facilities andhangar space to support two H­60helicopters­ A 57 mmMk110 gun­ SPQ­9B Fire Control Radar­ Phalanx 20mm Close in Weapon System(CIWS)­ 2 SRBOC/ 2 x NULKA countermeasureschaff/rapid decoy launcher­ AN/SLQ­32 Electronic Warfare System­ EADS 3D TRS­16 AN/SPS­75 Air SearchRadar­ A combat system that uses Aegis Baseline 9software­ A Sensitive Compartmented IntelligenceFacility (SCIF)

In short, they are already equipped withvirtually everything needed for a missilearmed combatant except the specific missilerelated equipment. They are in manyrespects superior to the Littoral CombatShips. Adding Cooperative EngagementCapability might even allow a Mk41equipped cutter to effectively launchStandard missiles targeted by a third party.

The ships were designed to accept 12 Mk56VLS which launch only the Evolved SeaSparrow missiles (ESSM). Additionally, thebuilder, Huntington Ingalls, has shownversions of the class equipped with eightMk41 VLS (located between the gun andsuperstructure) plus eight Harpoon, andMk32 torpedo tubes (located on the stern).Adding missiles to the existing hulls shouldnot be too difficult.

The Mk41 VLS are more flexible in that theycan accommodate cruise missiles, rocketboosted antisubmarine torpedoes (ASROC),

Standard missiles, or Evolved Sea Sparrowmissiles (ESSM). Using the Mk41 VLS wouldallow a mix of cruise missiles and ESSM withfour ESSMs replacing each cruise missile, forexample eight cells could contain four cruisemissiles and 16 ESSM, since ESSM can be“quad packed” by placing four missiles ineach cell. Development of an active homingESSM is expected to obviate the need forilluminating radars that are required for thesemi­active homing missiles. Still, simplerdeck mounted launchers might actually offersome advantages, in addition to their lowerinstallation cost, at least in peacetime.

Cutters often visit ports where thepopulation is sensitive to a history of U.S.interference in their internal affairs. In somecases, Coast Guard cutters are welcome,while U.S. Navy ships are not. For thisreason, we might want to make it easy foreven a casual observer to know that thecutter is not armed with powerful offensiveweapons. Deck mounted launchers canprovide this assurance, in that it isimmediately obvious if missile canisters are,or are not, mounted. The pictures belowshow potential VLS to be considered.

Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)

The OPC program of record provides for 25of these ships. A contract has been awardedto Eastern Shipbuilding Group for detaildesign and construction of the first ship,with options for eight more. The notionaldesign is 360 feet long, with a beam of 54feet and a draft of 17 feet. The OPCs will havea sustained speed of 22.5 knots, a range of10,200 nautical miles (at 14 knots), and anendurance of 60 days. Its hangar willaccommodate one MH­60 or an MH­65 andan Unmanned Air System (UAS).

It will have a space for a SCIF but it is notexpected to be initially installed. As built, itwill have a Mk38 stabilized 25 mm gun inlieu of the Phalanx carried by the NSC.Otherwise, the Offshore Patrol Cutter will beequipped similarly to the National SecurityCutter. It will likely have the same LockheedMartin COMBATSS­21 combat managementsystem as the LCS derived frigates. Theycould be fitted with cruise missiles andpossibly Mk56 VLS for ESSM as well. Theseships will be ice strengthened, taking surfacelaunched cruise missiles into the Arctic.

Fast Response Cutter (FRC)

The FRC program of record is to build 58 ofthese 158 foot, 28 knot, 365 ton vessels. 19

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have been delivered and they are being builtat a rate of four to six per year. All 58 arenow either built, building, contracted, oroptioned. They are essentially the samedisplacement as the Cyclone class PCs albeita little slower, but with better seakeepingand a longer range. Even these small shipshave a range of 2,950 nm. They are armedwith Mk 38 mod2 25 mm guns and four .50caliber M2 machine guns.

They are already better equipped than theCoast Guard 82 foot patrol boats that wereused for interdiction of covert coastal trafficduring the VietnamWar. If they were to beused to enforce a blockade against largervessels, they would need weapons thatcould effectively stop medium to largevessels.

Marine Protector Class

There are 73 of these 87 foot, 91 ton, 26 knotpatrol boats. Four were funded by the Navyand provide force protection services forsubmarines transiting on the surface in andout of King Bay, GA and Bangor, WA.

If use of these vessels for force protectionwere to be expanded to a more hostileenvironment, they would likely need morethan the two .50 caliber M2 machine gunscurrently carried. The four currentlyassigned to force protection units arecurrently equipped with an additionalstabilized remote weapon station.

Weapons

Cruise Missiles

The U.S. Navy currently has or is consideringfour different surface launched cruisemissiles: Harpoon, Naval Strike Missile(NSM), Long Range Anti­Ship Missile(LRASM), and Tomahawk. Of these, LRASMappears most promising for Coast Guarduse. Tomahawk is the largest of the four andboth Harpoon and NSM would be workable,but they do not have the range of LRASM.The intelligence and range claimed for theLRASM not only makes it deadlier inwartime, it also means only a couple of thesemissiles on each of the Coast Guard’s largestcutters would allow the Coast Guard’s smallbut widely distributed force to rapidly andeffectively respond to asymmetric threatsover virtually the entire U.S. coast as well ascompliment the U.S. Navy’s efforts tocomplicate the calculus of a near­peeradversary abroad.

Small Precision Guided Weapons

It is not unlikely that Fast Response Cutterswill replace the six 110 foot patrol boatscurrently based in Bahrain. If cutters are tobe placed in an area where they face aswarming threat they will need the sametypes of weapons carried or planned forNavy combatants to address this threat.These might include the Sea Griffin used onNavy’s Cyclone­class PCs or LongbowHellfires planned for the LCS.

Additionally, a small number of thesemissiles on Coast Guard patrol craft wouldenhance their ability to deal with small, fast,highly maneuverable threats along the U.S.coast and elsewhere.

Light Weight Anti­Surface Torpedoes

If Coast Guard units, particularly smallerones, were required to forcibly stoppotentially hostile merchant ships for thepurposes of a blockade, quarantine,embargo, etc. they would need somethingmore than the guns currently installed.

The U.S. does not currently have a lightweight anti­surface torpedo capable oftargeting a ship’s propellers, but with ElonMusk building a battery factory that willdouble the worlds current capacity and carsthat accelerate faster than Ferraris, buildinga modern electric small anti­surface torpedoshould be easy and relatively inexpensive.

Assuming they have the same attributes ofASW torpedoes, at about 500 pounds theseweapons take up relatively little space. Sucha torpedo would also allow small CoastGuard units to remain relevant against avariety of threats.

Conclusion

Adding cruise missiles to the Coast GuardNational Security Cutters and OffshorePatrol Cutters would increase the number ofcruise missile­equipped U.S .surface ships byabout 40 percent.

Coast Guard Patrol craft (WPCs) and patrolboats (WPBs) significantly outnumber theirNavy counterparts. They could significantlyincrease the capability to deal withinterdiction of covert coastal traffic, act as aforce multiplier in conventional conflict, andallow larger USN ships to focus on high­endthreats provided they are properly equippedto deal with the threats. More effective,longer ranged, and particularly more precise

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weapons could also improve the CoastGuard’s ability to do its homeland securitymission.

Thanks to OS2 Michael A. Milburn forstarting the conversation that lead to thisarticle.

Chuck retired from the Coast Guard after 22years service. Assignments included fourships, Rescue Coordination Center NewOrleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group SanDiego, Naval War College, and MaritimeDefense Zone Pacific/Pacific AreaOps/Readiness/Plans. Along the way hebecame the first Coast Guard officer tocomplete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO)course and also completed the NavalControl of Shipping course. He has had alife­long interest in naval ships and history.Chuck writes for his blog, Chuck Hill’s CGblog.

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Featured Image: Photo: The U.S. Coast Guard highendurance cutter USCGC Mellon (WHEC­717)launching a RGM­84 Harpoon missile during tests offOxnard, California (USA), in January 1990. by PACKen Freeze, USCG

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A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to beBuildingBy Jan Musil

Rather than the usual discussion of what theU.S. Navy has and how to get Congress tofund more and better ships and systems, thisarticle concentrates on the fleet we ought tobe constructing in the decades ahead. 2045is a useful target date, as there will be veryfew of our Cold War era ships left by then,therefore that fleet will reflect what we arebuilding today and will build in the future.This article proposes several new shipdesigns and highlights enduring challengesposed by the threat environment.

A New Transoceanic Frigate Design

The retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry­class frigates has left a substantial hole, bothin terms of surface ship numbers and ASWcapability in the U.S. Navy’s warfightingcapabilities. This is an understandable moveon our part given recent budget pressures,but this author is convinced we are going tohave to replace the transoceanic escort andASW capability the class provided to thefleet.

Perry Replacement

Building a class of frigates that are 21stcentury versions of the Perry class is anobvious alternative for us to consider. Isuggest designing a slightly larger version,say 3800 tons, with a fighting ability heavilyfocused on the ASWmission. Since the Navyis building plenty of littoral capability in thevarious LCS classes, this new design should

be expressly built to operate effectively in thehigh sea states the North Atlantic and NorthPacific are notorious for generating atregular intervals.

Using the larger turbine engine already inuse with the LCS in the new design isexpensive, both in construction andoperating costs, but not so much more that itmakes sense to retain two support andmaintenance trails in the fleet and shipyards.Yes, the extra speed will be nice, but inreality is not really necessary. But with thelarger engine already baked into the Navy’soperating budget it is better to stick with iteven if the operating advantages of morespeed in deep blue waters are marginal.

Foremost is the wider beam the biggerturbine will force on the designers. Make avirtue of this fact by making the focus of thenew frigate design its helicopter deck,hanger, assigned Seahawk, two Fire Scouts,and ten to twelve TFS buoys. This ship classwill exist to provide ASW escort to the CSGs,ARGs and transoceanic convoys operating inthe deep blue.

There will be a 5″ gun to put aboard, thebasics of AAW self­defense and plenty ofVLS capability for ASW, AAW and thedeveloping distributed long­range strikeabilities the Navy has decided it requires.Other than those modifications, this shipexists primarily to screen against and/orhunt submarines.

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Those concerned over such a design’s lack ofmore substantial AAW and offensivecapabilities should understand the sameargument used to defend the purchase of theoriginal Perrys. Neither the Navy nor thenation can afford to put all three capabilitiesin substantial measure aboard this smallship build. We couldn’t afford it with a fifty­six ship build against the Soviet Union andwe cannot afford it with the thirty plusfrigates we need to build of this new designin the decades ahead.

Hull Design Opportunity

This author shares in the lack of enthusiasmfor the use of aluminum in the hulls of theIndependence class. But the potentialcapabilities of the trimaran portion of thatclass’s design are intriguing.

Whether made of steel or the still­to­be­proven aluminum, a trimaran hull properlydesigned could provide substantialimprovements in stability for helicopteroperations in high sea states.

Traditionally Mediterranean navies, theItalians in particular, turned to trimarandesigns for speed to use against heaviergunned opponents. With the U.S. Navy,speed is never going to be first on a skippersmind in heavily rolling waters, but safelyoperating the ships ASW equipment,helicopters, and buoys, frequently will be.

So let’s take the time in the design phase tosee what can be designed into the new classby utilizing a wide beam trimaran design,possibly a few more missile tubes and AAWassets can be squeezed in topside if the extrabeam is available forward of the hangardeck, even if merely above the waterline.Finally, the offshore oil industry has hadsome recent success reducing instability intheir workboats by moving the bridge all theway forward to the very front of the ship. Theresult is a vertical, or nearly vertical bowtopside with the amidships area given overto work, or in the Navy’s case, fighting space.

This frigate should cost the taxpayers under400 million dollars, probably well under thatfigure, making the construction of thirty plusships over the years ahead an affordableinvestment for the Navy in both the numberof ships and our ASW fighting capabilities.

A Flexible New Cruiser Design

In the decade ahead, the U.S. Navy is facingthe need to extend and eventually replace the

Ticonderoga class CGs now in service. Weshould look to a flexible new cruiser designthat can be adapted for varying purposesthrough the mid­21st century.

By using a basic class design incorporatingthe same propulsion plant installed acrossvarious adopted designs we will generatevery substantial lifetime cost savings.Additional lifetime savings can be gained byusing the same bow and forecastle steelframework across the ship classes. A third,smaller, but still meaningful set of savingscan be derived from using the same bridgeand AAW working spaces layout. This willprovide a great deal of flexibility in whattypes of guns, radars, VLS loadouts,helicopter deck and hangar layout details areselected to serve the purposes of a particularcruiser class.

Size

To meet the substantial electrical powerneeds of the fleet of the future, energize asingle railgun if installed, provide plenty oflength and beam for the radars of today andtomorrow, enough space to house computersand operators and adequate AAW warfarecapability, something from 15,000 to20,0000 tons is needed. Since every tonadded adds significant construction andmaintenance costs, this author suggestsconsidering a 17,000 ton modern version ofthe Baltimore­class cruisers built duringWW2. Utilizing a proven sea going designlike the Baltimore’s for a proven bow andforecastle design for all of the cruiser classeswill provide a cost effective way of providingships with good sea keeping abilities, withfewer design­from­scratch headaches andlower lifetime costs.

Engine Room

A non­nuclear electric power system such asthe permanent magnet motor (PMM)originally planned for the Zumwalt class isanother important design parameter thatneeds to considered and decided upon fromthe very beginning of the design process.Whatever the power plant settled on, itneeds to provide enough electrical power tooperate one railgun and associated radars, orthe extensive radars, computers andrefrigerated working space required by theCGs of tomorrow, or the power needs of along range ballistic radar if installed. All thatgeneration and conversion equipment needsthe space provided by a 17,000 ton sizeddesign.

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Bridge, CIC, and Working Spaces

This issue comes to the forefront for theAAW class of cruiser that will replace theTiconderogas. Computers are wonderfultools, capable of providing multiple ways toenable a fighting sailor. They are alsodemanding pieces of equipment that simply‘just have to be’ at the right temperature,humidity level, amount of electrical powerprovided and discharged, and are highlyintolerant of any variation in theseconditions. Sailors are much easier toprovide working space for.

But to be effective, the CGs of the future willalso need plenty of thoroughly refrigeratedspace in the bridge, CIC, electronicequipment spaces, and working space for thesailors operating and maintaining all of thisgear. And let us not forget the multipleradars that will be installed, ever growing insize and number, that also require space,power, and cooling inside the hull.

Therefore, designing a large, as uniform aspossible set of working spaces behind theforward gun and before the ventilation stack,helicopter deck, and hangar is stronglyrecommended as a third set of crucial designcriteria.

This author suggests applying thesuggestions above in the cruiser classeslisted and briefly described in the followingsections.

CS – Scout Cruiser

Putting one railgun on a scout cruiser, withplenty of VLS and helicopter space forneeded ISR drones, ASW oriented Seahawk,two Fire Scouts, and ten TFS buoys whilecompletely independent of a CSG is a veryuseful addition to NATO we can make at afar lower cost than any aviation orientedasset. Particularly since there is a very usefulmission for the cruiser class to perform,namely Backfire and Bear hunting in theNorth Atlantic, North Sea, or potentiallyeven the Barents Sea.

CG – AAW Cruiser

The Navy is going to need fifteen plus AAWcruisers as replacements for theTiconderoga­class as those Cold Warveterans wear out. This class design is easilydescribed as simply upsizing theTiconderoga to 17,000 tons. Give the classthe space and power the radars of today andtomorrow demand to be effective, plenty of

CIC and electronic room space for thecomputers and sailors aboard, and as manyVLS as practical and this ship class is readyto go.

CBD – Ballistic Missile Defense Cruiser

This author is far from convinced thatputting a long range ballistic missile radar tosea is a wise and prudent idea. It almostcertainly is not when in close proximity to aCSG, ARG, SSG or transoceanic convoy, atleast on a routine basis.

That said, the majority of the world's seasare, almost by definition, not in closeproximity to our primary ocean going assets.There very well may be occasions in thefuture when the U.S. Navy can provide a costeffective alternative for the president toconsider making use of by building threeCBD class cruisers.

This cruiser design is obviously dominatedby the enormous radar mast mountedamidships. It is unlikely that a non­nuclearpower plant will generate enough power forboth radar and a railgun, so it will go to seawith our standard 5” weapon, as much of thebase bridge, CIC, and electronic workingspaces that can be accommodated once thehuge ballistic radar requirements are met. Itwill also include as many VLS tubes that canbe squeezed in, and a standard, oneSeahawk­sized helicopter deck and hangar.

The reader can easily come up withalternative cruiser class designs of their own,whether improvements on the threesuggestions above or for other missionrequirements not considered in this article.But having a flexible base cruiser design onhand, available for development oralternation as the world changes around usseems to be an excellent investment incapabilities for the decades ahead.

CVLN, AORH, and CARN

The author has explored a variety of othership designs in previous articles that form apart of the fleet design described here.

The CVLN (carrier aviation light, nuclearpowered) is intended to operate with carriertask forces, providing a home for the manyISR drones, UUVs, UAVs and buoys neededin the increasingly dangerous A2/ADenvironment and to prosecute ASW.

The AORH (auxiliary oiler replenishmenthelicopter) is a ship class based on a

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modified AOR­sized and double hulleddesign without a full flight deck,approximately 25,000 tons and oil powered.This class is intended to provide verysubstantial helicopter and VTOL launchingand servicing capabilities for ASW,amphibious, special­ops or other missionsand then executing these missions alongsidea large variety of allied nation navies; hencethe built in patrol boat capabilities as well asat least one UNREP station port andstarboard.

The CARN (cruiser gun armor, nuclearpowered) will accompany the fleet’s capitalships to provide defensive AAW capabilitieswith a primary armament of twelve railgunsin order to realize favorable cost exchanges.

Strategic Demands of the ThreatEnvironment

For discussion purposes, this authorassumes the usual conventional wisdomabout the strategic intentions, announcedand anticipated fleet construction plans andpatrol utilization patterns of the variousmajor Eurasian major powers are mostlytrue and applicable.

Russia

Russia has been consistent in describing herintentions in fleet building and disposition.Given her need to disperse naval assets tofour widely separate parts of the world,establish and maintain her strategic ballisticmissile force, and meet the need forsubstantial littoral forces, there is onlylimited Russian ability to impact U.S.interests far from her shores, certainlynothing like in Soviet days.

The Russians have been quite open in theirintent to field enough attack submarines toreestablish a 21st century version of the oldSoviet anti­convoy abilities in the NorthAtlantic. They also are aware of theopportunities that present themselves indisrupting trade and generating geopoliticalinfluence in Northeastern Asian waters aswell as the North Pacific; though they arefrank that pursuing such a strategy in Pacificwaters is some distance down their prioritylist. Given the many needs the Russian fleethas, having enough assets to operateeffectively in the North Pacific may alwaysremain a hope and intent rather than areality.

As always with Russia, from the days of IvanIV or Peter the Great onward, there is an

enormous difference between Moscow’sperceived military needs and her ability tofund them. This will remain true far into the21st century, regardless of how much or littlechange Putin manages to introduce as aresponse to sanctions and the fall in theprice of oil.

That said, Russian naval ambitions andintentions have been clearly stated andcertainly include creating and maintaining asubstantial nuclear powered attacksubmarine force to be deployed in the NorthPacific, North Atlantic, and Arctic as needed.In addition, Moscow clearly intends tocontinue fielding enough A2/AD protectedassets in the Eastern Mediterranean.

China

China has been consistently and thoughtfullyexpanding the PLANs capabilities andmission choices for years now. Thisexpansion has been quite focused, foremoston improving China’s home defensesituation. The PLAN has also establishedabilities to protect and pursue her interestsin and around the two island chains. Finally,China has developed modest navalexpeditionary capability for ongoing use inthe Indian Ocean.

To date there does not seem to be anyinterest in creating additional substantialcapabilities in order to operate far fromhome waters, much less on the global scalelike the U.S. Navy.

Unlike Russia, China does have the financialcapability to expand the PLAN if desired,both today and in the decades to come. Thiscapability, if exercised to constructsubstantial additional surface and attacksubmarine assets that could be targeted farout into the Central Pacific, beyond theSecond Island Chain, would be the singlegreatest change in world conditionsrequiring a revision of the fleet building planpresented here.

Ships, and mission requirements, are flexibleand can easily be targeted in different areas,and the waters from Taiwan/Okinawa toGuam to Hawaii are an obvious alternativefor PLAN planners to study foropportunities. This author is not especiallyconcerned about China’s current fleet in thisregard, but if future PLAN submarinebuilding includes plentiful nuclear attacksubmarines beyond current needs andtasking, then the U.S. needs to seriouslyreassess how it will get fuel and munitions

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delivered to Guam or Okinawa.

The interlinked issues that Taiwan andChina’s substantial A2/AD capabilities raisecan be largely mitigated by adding thesuggested CVLN and CARN assets on anongoing basis to the CSG operating in theWestern Pacific. A significant amount ofdeterrence can be obtained by making thenecessary additional investment in these twonew ship classes and the associatedequipment and doctrine adjustments.

Other challenges presented by China’sincreasing presence and differing intentionsin the region should be manageable, at leastfrom the Navy’s point of view, by appropriatedeployment of the AORH, LCS, and othersmaller ship classes that need to be built.

Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean

The many complicated rivalries that rendthis part of the world show no sign ofdissipating, meaning that the U.S. Navy willneed to operate substantial assets on anongoing basis in the area for decades tocome.

The increasingly difficult challengespresented by the rise of Al Qaeda, IslamicState, and Iran’s threats to close the Strait ofHormuz suggest the need for routinedeployment of a task force operatingindependently of the CSG, centered on aAORH, one to two LCS, a LSD, and whateverassociated or Allied assets are locally presentat any given time for years to come.

NATO

The renewed challenge to NATO that isbeing made by Russia should be met with adifferent set of assets than were deployedduring the Cold War. Modern day challengesin A2/AD capabilities, a more substantiveEastern Mediterranean presence, resumedBackfire and Bear patrols, and the intent toresume routine attack submarine patrols inthe North Atlantic require a different set offleet assets now and in the future.

Much of these changes will have to comeashore in various locations across Europe. Asalways the substantial littoral assets neededshould be provided by our allies in NATO.

We do have unique abilities to provide,particularly the Aegis system whether at seaor installed ashore, and the new railgun.Establishing a routine task force centered onthe suggested scout cruiser (CS) class and a

handful of U.S. or other NATO nationfrigates in the North Atlantic or North Sea asBackfire and Bear hunters would be apowerful way to reinforce NATO, and at a farlower cost than deploying already very busyCVN assets.

Convincing the German Navy to build andoperate two or three ships similar in designas an AORH in Baltic waters or around theNorth Cape of Norway would alsosubstantially improve NATO’s ability to dealwith the challenge Russia presents.

Ever Expanding A2/AD Threat

Threats posed elsewhere, which will almostalways be less powerful than what China hasbuilt, will have to be met with a mixture ofthe new anti­drone, anti­missile weaponsystems under discussion, the assistance ofshore based assets or wide dispersal whenoperating in deep blue waters. All of our newassets should be built with the ability toflexibly add or subtract as needed newweapon systems as they are developed overthe decades to come.

Suggested Fleet

The following fleet should be able to handlethese challenges and threats well into themiddle of the 21st century.

SHIP TYPE CURRENT PROPOSEDSSBN 13 12SSGN 4 6SSN 3 0SSN 12 24SSN 0 12SSN 38 0SSN 0 24CVN 11 11CVLN 0 6AORH 0 9AORH 0 2CARN 0 9CS 0 3CBD 0 3CG 22 15DDG 3 3DDG 66 57FF 0 30FF 0 5FP 16 16FM 12 12FM 12 12EPF 12 12LHA/LHD 11 12LCC 2 2LPD/LXR 9 18LSD 12 18

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ESD 2 4ESB 2 4T­AO 15 17T­AKE 12 12AS 2 2

Conclusion

At just over 340 ships, this suggested fleetplan provides the U.S. Navy with anadequate number of vessels, whilesimultaneously adding needed new high­endsurface ship designs and providing thenumbers of smaller ships the nation needsnow and will need into the future. As always,the time to start planning ahead is now.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran,disenchanted ex­corporate middle manager,and long time entrepreneur currentlyworking as an author of science fictionnovels. He is also a long­standing student ofnavies in general, post­1930 shipconstruction thinking, design hopes versusactual results, and fleet composition debatesof the twentieth century.

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Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 22, 2016) ­The Nimitz­class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis(CVN 74) conducts a vertical replenishment with theMilitary Sealift Command fast combat support shipUSNS Rainier (T­AOE 7) during Rim of the Pacific(RIMPAC) 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by MC2 Ryan J.Batchelder/Released)

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Closing Remarks on ChangingNaval Force StructureBy Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

The biggest deficiencies in reformulating theU. S. Navy’s force structure are (1) a failureto take the shrinking defense budget intoaccount which (2) allows every critic orproponent to be like the blind men whoformulated their description of an elephantby touching only his trunk, tail, leg, or tusk.To get an appreciation of the size of theproblem you have to describe the wholebeast, and what is even harder, to get him tochange direction by hitting him over thehead repeatedly.

A good thesis to make the point is by LTJuan L. Carrasco, published in 2009, titled"A Manpower Comparison of Three U. S.Navies: The Current Fleet, a Projected 313Ship Fleet, and a More Distributed BimodalAlternative." It explores the number of fleetbillets in (1) the then current 285 ship fleet(2) the proposed, now defunct, 313 shipNavy, and (3) a new fleet of over 650 vesselsdesigned by nine members of the NPSfaculty that included more than 260 smallercoastal warships. Carrasco showed,remarkably enough, the NPS­designed fleetrequired the fewest afloat billets. Looking atthe details reveal why. One major reason wasthat the then­current Navy’s eleven CVNstook 46% of all fleet billets in 285 ship navy,so when the NPS­designed fleet cut thenumber of CVNs to six and added more thana dozen small sea­based air platforms, thenthey were more distributable 100,000 toncarriers. The smaller ones, more like a CVLin size, can operate in littoral waters where a

CVN wing is more than is needed for longterm littoral operations. Thus, there wereenough billets to more widely distributeacross the NPS fleet.

Those who haven’t thought about all theelements of a 600­ship navy will have a lot ofquestions about logistics, flying off smallercarriers, new tactics to accompany the newtechnologies, procedures to deal withwarships damaged from missile attacks, andso forth. The Navy must confront its budgetcrunch while needing to buy more expensivemissiles in greater numbers, restoring theSSBN fleet, sustaining the APN dollars tobuy ever­more expensive aircraft, supportingMarine expeditionary operations,structuring an offensively capable surfaceship fleet, building up—or merelysustaining—our increasingly valuablesubmarine forces, and maintaining enoughCLF ships to take some losses and continueto maintain the fleet forward. This will take alot more original thinking about the role ofunmanned and robotic vehicles of manykinds, more teaming with partner nations,forward bases that support our friends inEast Asia and Europe, applications ofoffensive cyber warfare, achieving morestealthy C2 ways to attack effectively first, allto achieve the end goal of building a moredistributable, combat ready 21st centuryU. S. Navy.

Captain Hughes is a designated professor inthe Department of Operations Research at

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the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,California. He is a graduate of the U.S.Naval Academy and holds a master ofscience degree in operations research fromthe Naval Postgraduate School. On activeduty he commanded a minesweeper and adestroyer, directed a large trainingcommand, served as deputy director ofSystems Analysis (OP­96), and was aide toUnder Secretary of the Navy R. JamesWoolsey. At the Naval Postgraduate Schoolfor twenty­six years, he has served in theChair of Applied Systems Analysis, as thefirst incumbent of the Chair of TacticalAnalysis, and as dean of the GraduateSchool of Operational and InformationSciences. Captain Hughes is author ofMilitary Modeling (1984), Fleet Tactics:Theory and Practice (1986), Fleet Tacticsand Coastal Combat (2000), and he is acoauthor of A Concise Theory of Combat(1997). He served as a member of the NavalWar College Press Advisory Board for overtwenty­five years, until 2012.

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Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 23, 2016)The forward­deployed Arleigh Burke­class guided­missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) steams information with, from left to right, the amphibioustransport dock ship USS Green Bay (LPD 20), theamphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard(LHD 6), the amphibious dock landing ship USSGermantown (LSD 42), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN76), the Arleigh Burke­class guided­missile destroyerUSS Benfold (DDG 65), the Ticonderoga­classguided­missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62),and the Arleigh Burke­class guided­missile destroyerUSS Stethem (DDG 63) during a photo exerciseduring Valiant Shield 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by MassCommunication Specialist 2nd Class Kevin V.Cunningham/Released)

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