Amended Rules on Employees

7/27/2019 Amended Rules on Employees

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AMENDED RULES ON EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION

Statement of Authority

By virtue of the powers vested upon the Employees'

Compensation Commission under the Labor Code of the

Philippines, the following Rules are hereby adopted to implement

the provisions of Title II, Book IV of this Code.

RULE I

Coverage

Section 1. Nature — Coverage shall be compulsory.

Sec. 2. Scope — (a) Every employer shall be covered.

(b) Every employee not over sixty (60) years of age shall be

covered.

(c) An employee over sixty (60) years of age shall be covered if

he had been paying contributions to the System prior to age sixty

(60) and has not been compulsorily retired.

(d) An employee who is coverable by both the GSIS and SSS

shall be compulsorily covered by both Systems.Sec. 3. Employer — (a) The term shall mean any person, natural

or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines

any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind

and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as

regards the employment.

(b) Any employer shall belong to either:

(1) The public sector covered by the GSIS, comprising the

National Government, including government-owned or controlled

corporations, the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the Philippine

National Red Cross and the Philippine Veterans Bank; or

(2) The private sector covered by the SSS, comprising all

employers other than those defined in the immediately preceding

paragraph.

Sec. 4. Employee — (a) The term shall mean any person who

performs services for an employer as defined in Section 3 hereof.

(b)An employee shall belong to either:

(1) The public sector comprising the employed workers who are

covered by the GSIS, including the members of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, elective officials who are receiving regular

salary, and any person employed as casual, emergency,

temporary, substitute, or contractual.

(2) The private sector comprising the employed workers who are

covered by the SSS.

Sec. 5. Foreign Employment — (a) Filipinos working abroad in

the service of an employer as defined in Section 3 hereof shall be

covered by the System, and entitled to the same benefits as are

provided for employees working in the Philippines.

(b) Medical services, including appliances and supplies for

Filipinos employed abroad rendered or provided in such place of

employment, shall be paid in accordance with, and subject to the

limitations fixed in, these Rules; provided that the Rules on

Accreditation shall not apply in these cases.

(c) The notice requirement under these Rules shall be strictly

applied.

(d) Medical certifications of physicians, and statement of

accounts of hospitals, when duly authenticated, are acceptable as

basis for payment, provided that the standards and rates payable

by the System shall be those provided for under these Rules.

Sec. 6. Effectivity — (a) Coverage of employers shall take effect

on the first day of operation but not earlier than January 1, 1975.

(b) Coverage of employees shall take effect on the first day of

employment.

RULE II

Registration

Sec. 1. Requirement — (a) Every employer shall register with the

System by accomplishing the prescribed forms.

(b) Every employee shall be registered with the System through

his employer by accomplishing the prescribed forms.Sec. 2. GSIS — The following guidelines shall apply to the

public sector:

(1) Every employer operating before January 1, 1975 shall

register not later than March 31, 1975;

(2) Every employer operating on or after January 1, 1975 shall

register within one month from the first day of operation; and

(3) Every employee shall be registered through his employer

within one month from the date of employment.

Sec. 3. SSS — (a) The following guidelines shall apply to the

private sector:(1) Every employer already registered need not register again, for

he is automatically registered.

(2) Every employer not yet registered shall register not later than

the first day of operation;

(3) Every employee already registered need not register again, for


(4) Every employee not yet registered shall register not later than

the date of employment; and

(5) Only one registration is needed for SSS, Medicare and

Employees' Compensation.

(b) In case the employee has not yet been registered, he shall be

reported by his employer according to the following guidelines:

(1) Every employer already registered need not register again, for


(2) Every newly hired employee shall be reported by his employer

not later than thirty (30) days from the date of employment; and

(3) Every employee shall be deemed as having been duly reported

for coverage if the System has received a report or written

communication paid in his name by his employer, before a

compensable contingency occurs.

Sec. 4. Penalty — Any violation under this Rule shall be

penalized as follows:

(1) In case of failure or refusal to register employees, the

employer or responsible official who committed the violation

shall be punished with a fine of not less than P1,000 nor more

than P10,000 and/or imprisonment for the duration of the

violation or non-compliance or until such time that rectification of

the violation has been made, at the discretion of the Court.

(2) In case a compensable contingency occurs after thirty (30)

days from employment and before the System receives any report

for coverage about the employee or EC contribution on his behalf,

his employer shall be liable to the System for the lump sum

equivalent of the benefits to which he or his dependents may be

entitled.

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RULE III

Compensability

Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability

or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of

accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. (ECC

Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be

compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupationaldisease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions

set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk

of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

Sec. 2. Occupational Diseases — (a) The diseases listed

in Annex "A" [herein below] of these Rules are occupational

when the nature of employment is as described therein.

(b) The employer shall require pre-employment examination of

all prospective employees; provide periodic medical examination

to employees who are exposed to occupational diseases and take

such other measures as may be necessary.(c) The periodic medical examination for the early detection of

occupational diseases shall be in accordance with the minimum

standards prescribed in Annex "B" hereof.

Sec. 3. Authority of the Commission — The Commission is

hereby authorized to determine and approve additional

occupational diseases and work-related illnesses with specific

criteria based on peculiar hazards of employment.

RULE IV

Liability

Sec. 1. Limitation — No compensation shall be allowed to the

employee or his dependents when the injury, sickness, disability,

or death was occasioned by any of the following:

(1) his intoxication;

(2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or

(3) his notorious negligence.

Sec. 2. Extent of Liability — (a) Unless otherwise provided, the

liability of the state insurance fund, shall be exclusive and in

place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee or his

dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on

behalf of the employee or is dependents.

(b) The payment of compensation under this title shall not bar the

recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised

Administrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended,

Republic Act No. 6111, as amended, Republic Act No 1161, as

amended, Republic Act No. 610, as amended, Republic Act No.

4864, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are

administered by the System or by other agencies of the

government. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984),

Sec. 3. Third Parties — When disability or death is caused by

circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party, the

disabled employee or the dependents in case of his death shall be

paid benefit from the System under these Rules. In case benefit is

claimed and allowed under these Rules, the System shall be

subrogated to the rights of the disabled employee or the

dependents in case of his death in accordance with existing laws.

Sec. 4. Unauthorized Changes — The System shall not be liable

for compensation for unauthorized changes in medical services,

appliances, supplies, hospitals, rehabilitation services, or

physicians. Should there be any reason for such changes, the

employee or his dependents shall notify the System and secure its

prior consent before the change may be effected.

Sec. 5. Medical Reports — (a) An employee enjoying temporary

total disability benefits shall submit to the System a monthly

medical report on his disability certified by his attending

physician, otherwise his benefit shall be suspended until such

time that he complies with this requirement.

(b) An employee enjoying permanent disability benefit where thedisability resulted from a disease shall submit to the System a

quarterly medical report on his disability certified by his

physician, otherwise his benefit shall be suspended until such

time that he complies with his requirement.

RULE V

Employer's Contribution

Sec. 1. Rate and Amount — Subject to the following conditions,

contributions under these Rules shall be paid in their entirety bythe employer and any contract or device for the deduction of any

portion thereof from the wages or salary of the employees shall be

null and void:

(1) For a covered employee in the public sector, his employer

shall remit to the GSIS a monthly contribution equivalent to one

percent of the actual wages or salary received by him as of the

last day of the month but not to exceed P30 per employee. (ECC

Resolution No. 1451 dated December 27, 1979).

(2) For a covered employee in the private sector, his employer

shall remit to the SSS a monthly contribution equivalent to one

percent (1%) of his monthly salary credit as of the last day of the

month, in accordance with the following schedule:

Salary Range of Wage Monthly Employer's

Bracket or Salary Contribution

I bra P1 P49.99 P25 P0.25

II br 50 99.99 . 75 0.75

III 100 149.99 125 1.25

IV 150 199.99 175 1.75

V b 200 249.99 225 2.25

VI 250 349.99 300 3.00

VII l 350 499.99 425 4.25

VIII 500 699.99 600 6.00

IX 700 899.99 800 8.00

X b 900 over 1,000-3,000 10.00

(3) When a covered employee dies during employment, or is

separated from employment, his employer's obligation to pay the

monthly contribution arising from that employment shall cease on

the last day of the month of contingency.

(4) When a covered employee becomes disabled during

employment, his employer's obligation to pay the monthlycontribution arising from that employment shall be suspended

during such months that he is not receiving salary or wages.

(5) No refund of contribution shall be allowed under these Rules.

Sec. 2. Remittance — Contributions shall start in January 1975

and every month thereafter for as long as the employee has

earnings. The initial contribution for the month of January 1975

shall be remitted by employer to the System in February 1975,

unless some other arrangement has been agreed by the System

and the employer.

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Sec. 3. Penalty — Any violation of the provisions on

contribution under these Rules shall be penalized as follows:

(1) Any employer who is delinquent in his contributions shall be

liable to the System for the benefits which may have been paid to

his employees or their dependents, and any benefit and expenses

to which such employer is liable shall constitute a preferred lien

on all his property, real or personal, over any credit except taxes;

(2) The payment by the employer of the lump sum equivalent of

such liability shall absolve him from the payment of thedelinquent contributions due and payable during the calendar year

of the contingency and penalty thereon with respect to the

employee concerned, but said employer shall be subject to

criminal liability;

(3) In case of such delinquency, the employer or responsible

official who committed the violation shall be punished with a fine

of not less than P1,000 nor more than P10,000 and/or

imprisonment for the duration of the violation or non-compliance

or until such time that a rectification of the violation has been

made, at the Court's discretion;(4) If any contribution is not paid to the SSS as prescribed under

these Rules, the employer shall pay, besides the contribution, a

penalty thereon of three percent (3%) a month from the date the

contribution falls due until paid.

(Note: Under ECC Resolution No. 1243 dated Jan. 18, 1979, the

System shall pay the employee or his dependents all benefits due

them under P.D. No. 626, as amended, without prejudice on its

part to proceed against the erring employer).

RULE VI

Definitions Related to Credited Earnings

Sec. 1. Quarter — A period of three consecutive calendar months

ending on the last day of March, June, September and December.

Sec. 2. Semester — A period of two consecutive quarters ending

in the quarter of contingency.

Sec. 3. Monthly Salary Credit — The wage base for

contributions or the actual salary, as provided in Section 1 of Rule

V hereof. If earnings are derived from more than one

employment, it shall be determined on the basis of the aggregate

earnings from all employments, but not exceeding P1,000 in the

case of SSS and P3,000 in the case of GSIS.

Sec. 4. Wages or Salary — Insofar as they refer to the

computation of benefits, means the monthly remuneration as

defined in Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for SSS and

Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, for GSIS,

respectively, except that part in excess of Three Thousand

Pesos. (ECC Resolution No. 3682, July 21, 1987).

Sec. 5. Average Monthly Salary Credit — (a) In the case of the

SSS, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of the monthly

salary credits in the 60-month period immediately preceding the

semester of death or permanent disability, injury or sickness, by

the number of months of coverage in the same period, except:

(1) Where death or permanent disability falls within eighteen (18)

months from the month of coverage, it is the result obtained by

dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits paid prior to the

month of death or permanent disability by the number of calendar

months of coverage in the same period; and

(2) Where death or permanent disability falls within the month of

coverage, it is the actual salary received during the calendar

month or its corresponding monthly salary credit.

(b) The day of injury or sickness which caused the disability shall

be vested as the reckoning date for the purpose of computing the

average monthly salary credit.

(c) In the case of the GSIS, the average monthly salary credit is

the quotient after dividing the aggregate compensations received

by the member or employee for the last three years immediately preceding his death, permanent disability, injury or sickness, by

the number of months he received said compensation, or three

thousand pesos, whichever is smaller.

Sec. 6. Average Daily Salary Credit — (a) In the case of the SSS,

it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of the six (6) highest

monthly salary credits in the 12-month period immediately

preceding the semester of sickness by 180, except for the

following cases:

(1) Where the injury falls within 12 calendar months from the

month of coverage, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits by 30 and by the number of months of

coverage, excluding the month of injury; and

(2) Where the injury falls within the month of coverage, it is the

actual salary received during the calendar month or its

corresponding monthly salary credit divided by 30.

(b) In the case of the GSIS, the average daily salary credit shall be

determined as follows:

(1) If the salary or wage is based on an hourly rate, it is the hourly

rate times the number of hours required to work during the month

of contingency divided by 22.

(2) If the salary or wage is based on a daily rate, it is the daily rate

times the number of days required to work per month divided by

22.

(3) If the salary or wage is based on a monthly rate, it is the

monthly rate divided by 22.

(4) If the employee has worked for less than one month, his daily

salary credit is the actual daily wage or salary of the monthly

wage or salary divided by the actual number or days worked

during the month of contingency.

Sec. 7. Replacement Ratio — In the case of the SSS, it is the sum

of twenty percent (20%) and the quotient obtained by dividing

three hundred by the sum of three hundred forty and the average

monthly salary by credit.

Sec. 8. Credited Years of Service — For a member covered prior

to January 1975, nineteen hundred seventy five minus the

calendar year of coverage, plus the number of calendar years in

which six or more contributions have been paid from January

1975 up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the

contingency. For a member covered in or after January 1975, the

number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have

been paid from the year of coverage up to the calendar year

containing the semester prior to the contingency.

Sec. 9. Monthly Income Benefit — (a) In the case of the SSS, it

is the amount equivalent to one hundred fifteen percent (115%) of

the sum of:

The average monthly salary credit multiplied by the replacement

ratio and one and a half percent (1-1/2%) of the average monthly

salary credit for each credited year of service in excess of ten

years: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall in no case

be less than P250. Provided, However, That the monthly pension



of surviving pensioners shall be increased automatically and

simultaneously to the extent that the fifteen percent (15%)

difference in monthly income benefit between EC and SS and the

twenty percent (20%) difference in monthly income benefit

between EC and GSIS, be maintained. (L.O.I. 1286; ECC

Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

(b) In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit shall be

the basic monthly pension as defined in PD 1146 plus twenty

percent (20%) thereof, but shall not be less than P250, nor morethan the actual salary at the time of contingency. (ECC Resolution

No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

RULE VII

Benefits

Sec. 1. Types of Benefits — The benefits under Employees'

Compensation are in the form of income or services, and consists

of the following: (1) medical services, appliances and supplies;

(2) rehabilitation services; (3) temporary total disability benefit;(4) permanent total disability benefit; (5) permanent partial

disability benefit; (6) death benefit; and (7) funeral benefit.

Sec. 2. Disability — (a) A total disability is temporary if as a

result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform

any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120

days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury

or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful

occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as

otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury

or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the

use of any part of his body.

Sec. 3. Income Benefit — The disability or death resulting from

the injury or sickness is compensable by cash payments, and not

the injury or sickness itself, except in the case of permanent

partial disability.

Sec. 3-A. Income Benefit for Permanent Partial Disability — In

the case where the period covered for payment of income benefit

for permanent partial disability does not exceed twelve (12)

months, the System may pay in lump sum or in monthly pension,

otherwise income benefit shall be paid in monthly pension.

Sec. 4. Services — The injury or sickness is compensable by

medical services, appliances, supplies and rehabilitation services.

Sec. 5. Deprivation — No contract, regulation or device

whatsoever shall operate to deprive the employee or his

dependents of any part of the income benefits, and medical or

related services, except as provided under these Rules. Existing

medical services being provided by the employer shall be

maintained and continued to be enjoyed by his employees.

Sec. 6. Prescriptive Period — No claim for compensation shall

be given due course unless said claim is filed with the System

within three years from the time the cause of action

accrued. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

RULE VIII

Medical Services, Appliances, and Supplies

Sec. 1. Condition to Entitlement — Any employee shall be

entitled to such medical services, appliances and supplies as the

nature of his disability and the progress of his recovery may

require, subject to the expense limitation as contained in Annex

"C" hereof, if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) He has been duly reported to the System;(2) He sustains an injury or contracts sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness.

Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement — The medical services,

appliances, and supplies shall be provided to the afflicted

employee beginning on the first day of injury or sickness, during

the subsequent period of his disability, and as the progress of his

recovery may require, subject to Section 5 of Rule IV.

Sec. 3. Extent of Services — (a) The employee is entitled to the

benefits only of the ward services of an accredited hospital and

accredited physician. However, if the employee choosesaccommodations better than ward services the excess of the total

amount of expenses incurred over the benefits provided

under Annex "C" hereof, shall be borne by the employee. For this

purpose, "ward" means a hospital room that can accommodate six

or more patients.

(b) The hospital shall provide all the medicines, drugs, or supplies

necessary for the treatment of the employee at a cost not

exceeding the retail prices prevailing in local drug stores.

(c) Payments shall be made directly to the providers of such

services in such amount as are prevailing in the community for

similar services or provided under the schedule set forth in Annex

"C" of these Rules, whichever is less.

RULE IX

Rehabilitation Services

Sec. 1. Definition of Terms — As used in this Rule unless

otherwise indicated by the context, the following definition of

terms are hereby adopted.

(a) Rehabilitation. The process by which there is provided a

balanced program of remedial treatment, vocational assessment,

and preparation, designed to meet the individual needs of each

handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment,

including assistance as may be within its resources to help each

rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational, or social potential.

(b) Rehabilitee. A disabled individual undergoing rehabilitation

(student-rehabilitee or trainee) or who has finished a prescribed

course in rehabilitation in which he is known as a graduate-

rehabilitee or trainee.

(c) Rehabilitation Center. An organized service of varied

rehabilitation measures usually located in one site for

rehabilitation of disabled individuals. (E.g.: the WRCC-the

Center).

(d) Rehabilitation Facility. An organized service offering one or

more types of service for the rehabilitation of the handicapped

individual.

(e) Governing Board. For this purpose, the Workers

Rehabilitation Center Complex shall receive policy guidance

from and shall be under the general management of, the

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Employees' Compensation Commission, which is hereby

constituted as its Governing Board.

Whenever necessary, the Governing Board may create an

Advisory Council that shall act as a Consultative and Advisory

Body, to be composed of representatives from the National

Commission on Rehabilitation, the Ministry of Health, the

Institute of Public Health of the University of the Philippines, and

such other specialized associations and organizations on

rehabilitation as may be needed.(f) Placement Officer. A person practicing the allied medical

profession or discipline specialized in psychology of the

handicapped and whose responsibility is to personally advise and

guide the disabled individual to acceptance into a job.

(g) Suitable Employment. Remunerative occupation giving the

rehabilitee earnings at least equal to the statutory minimum wage.

Sec. 2. Nature and effectivity of coverage. — (a) Coverage under

this Rule shall be voluntary.

(b) Coverage under this Rule shall take effect upon completion of

registrationSec. 3. Condition to Entitlement — Any employee shall be

entitled to rehabilitation services, if all of the following conditions

are satisfied:

(1) He has been reported to the System;

(2) He sustains a permanent disability as a result of a

compensable injury or sickness as defined in these Rules;

(3) He has not been placed in suitable employment.

Sec. 4. Period of Entitlement — Rehabilitation services shall be

provided during the period of the disability unless such services

are suspended or terminated under any of the following

conditions:

(1) Upon suitable employment;

(2) Upon suspension or termination of such services by the

Rehabilitation Center;

(3) By self-termination.

Sec. 5. Extent of Services — Rehabilitation services shall consist

of medical-surgical management, hospitalization, necessary

appliances and supplies, vocational training, and assistance for

placement. (Transportation allowance between place of residence

and the rehabilitation facility, lunch, and dormitory allowances in

appropriate cases may be included in the extent of services).

Sec. 6. Rehabilitation Centers — There shall be established a

Workers Rehabilitation Center Complex, and such other

rehabilitation centers or services as the needs of occupationally

disabled employees, whether from private or public sector, may

require.

Sec. 7. Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities — Hospitals

accredited under Rule XVII of these Rules; rehabilitation

facilities, vocational and training centers and their personnel

participating in the work of rehabilitation accredited by the

Philippine Academy of Rehabilitation Medicine (PARM) may

apply for accreditation.

Sec. 8. Liability Limitations — The System shall not be legally

responsible when the injury, sickness, disability, or death during

the rehabilitation is occasioned by any of the following: (1) his

intoxication; (2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or

another; (3) his notorious negligence.

Sec. 9. Suspension, Termination and Appeal —

(a) Grounds. For adequate and duly proven causes and upon

recommendation of the rehabilitation counselor, the student-

rehabilitee may be suspended or terminated by the Center.

(b) Appeal. The decision of the Center may be appealed within

fifteen (15) days from notice thereof to the Governing Board

whose decision shall be final and executory.

Sec. 10. Placement — Arrangement for placement of the

rehabilitee shall be an integral part of the rehabilitation program.

Sec. 11. Participation of the System — As incentive to the participating employers in the on-the-job training and possible

employment of the rehabilitee, the System may enter into

agreement with the employer to participate in the payment of

wages of the placed rehabilitee as follows:

(1) 50% of the wages for the first two weeks after the start of the

on-the-job training;

(2) 25% of the wages for the third and fourth weeks of the on-the-

job training;

(3) 10% of the wages for the fifth and sixth weeks of the on-the-

job training;(4) 0% of the wages for the rest of the period of the on-the-job

training.

Sec. 12. Reports — Reports to the Governing Board on the

progress of activities of rehabilitation program shall be submitted

by the Center once every 3 months as often as necessary.

RULE X

Temporary Total Disability

Sec. 1. Condition to Entitlement — An employee shall be

entitled to an income benefit for temporary total disability if all of

the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) He has been duly reported to the System;

(2) He sustains the temporary total disability as a result of the

injury or sickness, and

(3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness

which caused his disability.

His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such illness or

injury occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage

to the system.

Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement — (a) The income benefit shall be

paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an

injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive

days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical

attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from

onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total

disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the

total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of

continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the

degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental

functions as determined by the System.

(b) After an employee has fully recovered from an illness as duly

certified to by the attending physician, the period covered by any

relapse he suffers, or recurrence of his illness, which results in

disability and is determined to be compensable, shall be

considered independent of, and separate from, the period covered

by the original disability. Such a period shall not be added to the

period covered by his original disability in the computation of his

income benefit for temporary total disability (TTD). (ECC

Resolution No. 1029, August 10, 1978).



Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit — Any employee entitled to benefit

for temporary total disability shall be paid an income benefit

equivalent to 90 percent (90%) of his average daily salary credit,

subject to the following conditions:

(1) The daily income benefit shall not be less than P10.00 nor

more than P90.00 nor paid longer than 120 days for the same

disability, unless the injury or sickness requires more extensive

treatment that lasts beyond 120 days, but not to exceed 240 days

from onset of disability, in which case he shall be paid benefit for temporary total disability during the extended period.

(2) The monthly income benefit shall be suspended if the

employee fails to submit a monthly medical report certified by its

attending physician as required under Sec. 5 of Rule IV

hereof. (Resolution No. 3682, July 21, 1987).

RULE XI

Permanent Total Disability

Sec. 1. Conditions to Entitlement — (a) An employee shall beentitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability if all of



(2) He sustains the permanent total disability as a result of injury

or sickness; and



His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such injury or

sickness occurred before the employee is duly reported for

coverage to the System.

(b) The following total disabilities shall be considered permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than

120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X hereof.

(2) Complete loss of sight of both eyes;

(3) Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrist;

(4) Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs;

(5) Brain injury resulting in incurable imbecility and insanity,

and

(6) Such cases as determined by the System and approved by the

Commission.

Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement — (a) The full monthly income

benefit shall be paid for all compensable months of disability.

(b) After the benefit under Employees' Compensation shall have

ceased as provided under the preceding paragraph, and if the

employee is otherwise qualified for benefit for the same disability

under another law administered by the System, he shall be paid a

benefit in accordance with the provisions of that law. This

paragraph applies to contingencies which occurred prior to May

1, 1978.

(c) Except as otherwise provided for in other laws, decrees,

orders, or letters of instructions, the monthly income benefit shall

be guaranteed for five (5) years and shall be suspended under any

of the following conditions:

(1) Failure to present himself for examination at least once a year

upon notice by the System

(2) Failure to submit a quarterly medical report certified by his

attending physician as required under Sec. 5 of Rule IV hereof;

(3) Complete or full recovery from his permanent disability; or

(4) Upon being gainfully employed.

Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit — (a) In the case of the SSS:

(1) Any employee entitled to permanent total disability benefit

shall be paid by the System a monthly income benefit as defined

in Sec. 8 (a), [sic] Rule VI of these Rules.

(b) The number of months of paid coverage shall be the number

of monthly contributions remitted to the System including

contributions other than for Employees' Compensation if paid

before March 31, 1975. The full monthly income benefit shall be

paid for all compensable months of disability.

(c) The first day preceding the semester of temporary totaldisability shall be considered for purposes of computing the

monthly income benefit for permanent total disability.

Sec. 4. Amount of Benefit for Dependent Children. — (a) Each

dependent child, but not exceeding five, counted from the

youngest and without substitution, shall be entitled to ten (10%)

percent of the monthly income benefit of the employee. These

Rules shall not apply to causes of action which accrued before

May 1, 1978.

Sec. 5. Entitlement to the New Income Benefit Under PD 1641

— (a) The new amount of the monthly income benefit computedunder these amended Rules shall be applicable to all

contingencies occurring on or after January 1, 1980. However, for

contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1978, the limitation

of P12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced.

In the case of the SSS, the present monthly income benefit of

current pensioners shall be increased by twenty percent (20%)

effective January 1, 1980.

In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit of current

pensioners shall be adjusted and recomputed to reflect the twenty

percent (20%) increase over the benefit under PD 1146 effective

January 1, 1980.

Sec. 6. Aggregate Monthly Benefit Payable — Except the benefit

to dependent children under Section 4 of this Rule, the aggregate

monthly benefit payable, in the case of the GSIS, shall in no case

exceed the monthly wage or salary actually received by the

employee as of the date of his permanent total disability. (ECC

Resolution No. 2819, August 9, 1984).

RULE XII

Permanent Partial Disability

Sec. 1. Conditions to Entitlement — (a) An employee shall be

entitled to an income benefit of permanent partial disability if all

of the following conditions are satisfied:


(2) He sustains the permanent partial disability as a result of the

injury or sickness; and



His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such injury or

sickness occurred before the employee is duly reported for

coverage to the System.

(b) For purposes of entitlement to income benefits for permanent

partial disability, a covered employee shall continue to receive the

benefits provided thereunder even if he is gainfully employed and

receiving his wages or salary.

Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement — (a) The income benefit shall be

paid beginning on the first month of such disability, but not

longer than the designated number of months in the following

schedule:



Complete and permanent No. of loss of the use of Months

One thumb 10

One index finger 8

One middle finger 6

One ring finger 5

One little finger 3

One big toe 6

Any toe 3One arm bra 50

Complete and permanent No. of loss of the use of Months

One hand 39

One foot 31

One leg bra 46

One ear bra 10

Both ears b 20

Hearing of one ear 10

Hearing of both ears 50

Sight of one eye 25

(b) A loss of a wrist shall be considered a loss of the hand, and a

loss of an elbow shall be considered a loss of the arm; a loss of an

ankle shall be considered a loss of the foot, and a loss of a knee

shall be considered a loss of the leg; a loss of more than one joint

shall be considered a loss of the whole finger or toe, and a loss of

only the first joint shall be considered a loss of one-half of the

whole finger or toe. Other permanent partial disabilities shall be

determined by the Medical Officer of the System.

(c) The degree of permanent disability shall be equivalent to the

ratio that the designated number of compensability bears to 75.

Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit — (a) Any employee entitled to

permanent partial disability benefit shall be paid by the System a

monthly income benefit for the number of months indicated in

Section 2 hereof. If the indicated number of months exceeds

twelve, the income benefit shall be paid in monthly pension;

otherwise, the System may pay income benefit in lump sum or in

monthly pension.

(b) In case of permanent partial disability less than the total loss

of the member, the same monthly income shall be paid for a

portion of the period established for the total loss of the member in accordance with the proportion that the partial loss bears to the

total loss. If the result is a decimal fraction, the same shall be

rounded off to the next higher integer.

(c) In case of simultaneous loss of more than one member or a

part thereof, the same monthly income shall be paid for a period

equivalent to the sum of the periods established for the loss of the

member or part thereof but not exceeding 75. If the result is a

decimal fraction, the same shall be rounded off to the higher

integer.

(d) The new amount of the monthly income benefit computedunder these amended Rules shall be applicable to all



of P12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced.



effective January 1, 1980.

In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit of current


percent (20%) increase over the benefit under P.D. 1146 effective

January 1, 1980.

Sec. 4. Unlisted Injuries and Illnesses — (a) In cases of injuries

or illnesses not listed in the schedule under Section 2 hereof, the

benefit shall be an income benefit equivalent to the percentage of

the permanent loss of the capacity for work. (Non-Scheduled

Disabilities).

RULE XIIIDeath

Sec. 1. Conditions to Entitlement — (a) The beneficiaries of a

deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of


(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of an injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the

injury or sickness which caused his death.

His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage to the System.

(b) If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit

for permanent total disability at the time of his death, the

surviving spouse must show that the marriage has been validly

subsisting at the time of his disability.

Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement —

A. For primary beneficiaries:

(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning at the month of

death and shall continue to be paid for as long as the beneficiaries

are entitled thereto.

(b) The monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five years

which in no case shall be less than fifteen thousand pesos

(P15,000.00). Thereafter, the beneficiaries shall be paid the

monthly income benefit for as long as they are entitled

thereto. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

B. For Secondary beneficiaries:

(a) The income benefit shall be sixty (60) times the monthly

income benefit of a primary beneficiary which in no case [shall]

be less than P15,000.00, which shall likewise be paid in monthly

pension (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

Sec. 3. Amount of Benefit — (a) In the case of primary

beneficiaries, the monthly income benefit shall be equivalent to

the monthly income benefit for permanent total disability, which

shall be guaranteed for five years, increased by ten percent (10%)

for each dependent child but not exceeding five (5), beginning

with the youngest and without substitution: provided that, the

aggregate monthly benefit payable in the case of the GSIS shall in

no case exceed the monthly wage or salary actually received by

the employee at the time of his death; and provided further, that

the minimum income benefit shall not be less than fifteen

thousand pesos (P15,000.00). The death benefit shall be paid

during the entire period for which they are entitled thereto.

If the employee has been receiving income benefits for permanent

total disability at the time of his death, the primary beneficiaries

shall be paid the monthly income benefit equivalent to eighty

percent (80%) plus the dependent's pension equivalent to ten

percent (10%) thereof for every dependent child but not

exceeding five (5) counted from the youngest and without

substitution.



(b) In the case of secondary beneficiaries, the income benefit is

payable in monthly pension which shall not exceed the period of

sixty (60) months and the aggregate income benefit shall not be

less than P15,000.00

If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit for

permanent total disability at the time of his death, the secondary

beneficiaries shall be paid the monthly pension, excluding the

dependent's pension of the remaining balance of the five-year

guaranteed period. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984). Sec. 4. Entitlement to the New Income Benefit Under PD 1641

— The new amount of the monthly income benefit computed

under these amended Rules shall be applicable to all



of P12,000 or five (5) yeas, whichever comes first, shall be

enforced.



effective January 1, 1980.In the case of the GSIS, the monthly income benefit of current


percent (20%) increase over the benefit under PD 1146 effective

January 1, 1980.

Sec. 5. The new amount of lump sum benefit computed under

these Amended Rules shall be applicable to all contingencies

occurring on or after May 1, 1980, otherwise entitlement thereto

shall be governed by the immediately preceding Section.

RULE XIV

Funeral Benefit

Sec. 1. Entitlement to Funeral Benefit — A funeral benefit of

Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) shall be paid upon the death of

a covered employee or permanently totally disabled pensioner to

one of the following:

(a) the surviving spouse; or

(b) the legitimate child who spent for the funeral services; or

(c) any other person who can show incontrovertible proof of his

having borne the funeral expenses. (ECC Resolution No. 3682,

July 21, 1987).

RULE XV

Beneficiaries

Sec. 1. Definition — (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or

secondary, and determined at the time of employee's death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of

the employee's death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledgednatural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not

over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is

[sic] incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to physical

or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority;

Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child

shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are

no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for

monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or

more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from

the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding

five. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee

for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are

unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age,

or over 21 years of age provided that he is [sic] incapacitated and

incapable of self-support due to physical or mental defect whichis congenital or acquired during minority.

Sec. 2. Priority — (a) Primary beneficiaries shall have priority

claim to death benefit over secondary beneficiaries. Whenever

there are primary beneficiaries, no death benefit shall be paid to

secondary beneficiaries.

(b) If the deceased employee has no primary beneficiaries at the

time of his death, the death benefit shall be paid to his secondary

beneficiaries.

(c) If the deceased employee has no beneficiaries at the time of

his death, the death benefit shall accrue to the Employees'Compensation Fund.

Sec. 3. Primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a monthly

income benefit. In their absence, the secondary beneficiaries shall

be entitled to a monthly income benefit not to exceed sixty (60)

months and the death benefit shall not be less than

P15,000.00. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

RULE XVI

Employers' Records And Notices

Sec. 1. Notice by Employee — The notice of sickness, injury or

death shall be given to the employer by the employee, his

dependents or anybody on his behalf, within five (5) days from

the occurrence of the contingency. Said notice is not necessary

where the employer or his representative already had knowledge

thereof, or the contingency occurred during working hours at the

work place.

Sec. 2. Employer's Logbook — Every employer shall keep a

logbook to record chronologically the sickness, injury, or death of

his employees, within five (5) days from due notice thereof.

Sec. 3. Notice by Employer — The notice of sickness, injury, or

death for cases which the employer deems to be work-connected

shall be submitted to the System by the employer within five (5)

days from due entry thereof in his logbook in a form prescribed

by the System.

Sec. 4. Visitorial Power — The employer's logbook prescribed in

these Rules shall be made available for inspection to any duly

authorized representative of the System during working hours.

Sec. 5. Penalty — Any employer who fails to record in his

logbook the sickness, injury, or death of any of his employees

within five (5) days from knowledge or receipt of due notice

thereof as prescribed herein, gives false information or withholds

material information already in his possession, shall be liable to

fifty percent (50%) of the lump sum equivalent of the income

benefit to which the employee may be found to be entitled and/or

a fine of not less than P500 nor more than P5,000 and

imprisonment for not less than six (6) months nor more than one

(1) year, at the discretion of the Court. The sum paid by the

employer under this Section shall accrue to the Employees'

Compensation Fund of the System.



RULE XVII

Accreditation

Sec. 1. Minimum Requirements for Accreditation — (a) A

physician may be accredited for purposes of the Employees'

Compensation Program upon his application if he is a doctor of

medicine duly licensed to practice in the Philippines and an active

member in good standing of the Philippine Medical Association.

(b) A Hospital may likewise be accredited upon application if:(1) it is an institution primarily engaged in providing to in-

patients, by or under the supervision of physicians, diagnostic and

therapeutic services of their medical diagnosis, treatment and

care;

(2) it is adequately equipped with facilities for physicians to treat

injured or sick persons;

(3) it maintains clinical records on all patients;

(4) it has by-laws concerning its medical staff;

(5) it provides 24-hour nursing services by itself or is supervised

by a registered professional nurse; and has a licensed practicalnurse or registered professional nurse on duty at all times;

(6) it requires that every patient must be under the care of a

physician;

(7) it is licensed by the Bureau of Medical Services of the

Ministry of Health;

(8) it meets the health and safety requirements of the Ministry of

Health and Ministry of Labor;

(9) it maintains a Utilization Review Committee as provided for

in Section 3 of this Rule; and

(10) it is a member in good standing of the Philippine Hospital

Association.

(c) A rehabilitation facility may be accredited upon application if:

(1) it is an institution engaged in providing to in-patients, by or

under the supervision of physicians (specialized in rehabilitation

medicine, in neurology, or in neuro-surgery, or in internal

medicine, or in orthopedic surgery), diagnostic or therapeutic

services in rehabilitation practice;

(2) it is adequately equipped with facilities for physical medicine

rehabilitation (PMR);

(3) it maintains clinical records on all patients;

(4) it has by-laws concerning its medical staff;

(5) it requires that every patient must be under the care of a

physician;

(6) it is licensed by the Bureau of Medical Services of the

Ministry of Health;

(7) it meets the health and safety requirements of the Ministry of

Health and Ministry of Labor and Employment; and

(8) it maintains a Utilization Review Committee as provided for

in Section 3 of this Rule.

Sec. 2. Conditions on Accredited Hospitals or Rehabilitation

Facilities and Physicians or Rehabilitation Specialists — (a) An

accredited hospital or rehabilitation facility binds itself:

(1) not to collect from the patient any amount for ward services;

(2) to provide adequate services on a non-discriminating basis;

(3) to limit charges for ward rates approved by the Commission,

including, but not limited to, laboratory ward rates, laboratory

facilities, x rays, stools, drugs, medical attendance and the

Relative Value Scale (RVS) for surgical procedures, etc.;

(4) to abide by these rules on accreditation;

(5) to have its house rules conform to the requirements of the

Commission;

(6) to subject its facilities to inspection at any time by duly

authorized representatives of the Commission or the System.

(b) An accredited physician binds himself:

(1) not to collect from the patient any amount for ward services;

(2) to provide adequate services on a non-discriminating basis;

and

(3) to abide by these rules on accreditation.Sec. 3. Utilization Review — (a) Every hospital or rehabilitation

facility shall have a Utilization Review Committee, composed of

at least two physicians or rehabilitation specialists, to help assure

the most effective use of rehabilitation facilities, hospitals, and

services by reviewing admissions each day on a sample basis and

all long-stay cases.

(b) The Committee shall decide in every specific case being

reviewed, whether or not care in a hospital is medically necessary.

In every case, the Committee shall discuss its findings with the

patient's doctor before making a decision.(c) The Committee shall advise in writing the patient, his doctor

and the hospital of its decision only if it has been decided that

care in a hospital is not medically necessary, in which case no

payment for room and board shall be made by the System.

Sec. 4. Coverage of Services — (a) Payment for services shall

ordinarily be made only to an accredited rehabilitation facility or

hospitals and accredited physicians.

(b) Non-accredited rehabilitation facilities or hospitals and non-

accredited physicians shall be paid only for emergency services.

No payment can be made to them for services rendered after the

emergency has ended.

Sec. 5. Emergency Services — (a) Those services which are

necessary to prevent the death or serious impairment of the health

of the individual, and which necessitate the use of the most

accessible hospital available and equipped to furnish such

services.

(b) An emergency no longer exists when it becomes safe from a

medical standpoint to move the patient to an accredited hospital,

or to discharge him, whichever occurs first.

(c) The determination that the patient's condition requires

emergency services or that an emergency has ended shall be

based on the physician's evaluation and, when appropriate, on the

patient's medical record and other additional data furnished by the

hospital.

(d) Claims filed by non-accredited hospitals and non-accredited

physicians for payment of emergency services shall be

accompanied by a physician's statement.

(e) The physician's statement shall describe the nature of the

emergency, furnish relevant clinical information about the

condition of the patient, and state that the services rendered were

necessary to prevent the death of the individual or the serious

impairment of the health. A bare statement that an emergency

existed is not sufficient.

(f) In addition, when in-patient services are involved, the

statement shall include the date when, it the physician's judgment,

the emergency ceased.

Sec. 6. Referral — Immediately upon knowledge by the

employer of his employee's injury or sickness at the work place,

he shall, in addition to the medical and dental facilities which the

pertinent provisions of the Code and these Rules on Accreditation



may require him to furnish, cause the employee to be brought by

the fastest available means of transportation to the duly accredited

physician or hospital nearest or most accessible to the employee's

place of work.

Sec. 7. Violation of Conditions and Requirements, Penalties —

(a) An accredited hospital or physician shall be disaccredited for

violation of any of the conditions and requirements under Section

1 and 2 hereof without prejudice to the imposition of penalties

under Rule XIX if applicable or to any other penalty which theCommission may impose.

(b) The cancellation or invalidation of accreditation of a physician

or hospital shall be effective on the date of notice of the

disaccreditation.

(c) In case of disaccreditation, the physician or the hospital shall

carry the disqualification wherever its physical identity is found.

Mere change of legal personality shall not defeat the

disqualification imposed.

(d) Disaccreditation shall be lifted only on application and upon

showing of good cause and effective upon approval by theCommission. As soon as accreditation is duly restored, the

hospital or physician concerned shall be allowed to participate in

the Employee's Compensation Program.

RULE XVIII

Settlement of Claims

Sec. 1. Services — (a) The claim for medical benefits shall be

filed in a prescribed form by the accredited physician or

accredited hospital directly with the System.

(b) The claim for emergency services shall be filed in a prescribed

form by any physician or hospital.

Sec. 2. Income Benefit — The claim for income benefit shall be

filed in a prescribed form by the employee, his dependents or his

employer, on his behalf, directly with the System. Failure to file

the claim within three (3) years from the time the cause of action

accrued, shall forever bar the right to benefits granted under these

Rules. (ECC Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984).

Sec. 3. Adjudication — Upon receipt of the claim, the System

shall process the same and determine whether or not the injury,

sickness, disability, or death is compensable.

Sec. 4. Additional Requirements — If the supporting papers of

the claim are insufficient to make proper determination, the

System shall require the submission of additional proofs from the

employee or his dependents, or from any office, entity, or agency,

public or private, or from any person, having knowledge of the

contingency.

Sec. 5. Appeal — Within ten (10) days from receipt of the letter

of denial or the affirmation of the denial, as the case may be, the

claimant shall inform the System in writing of his desire to appeal

the decision of the System. Upon receipt of such appeal, the

System shall within five (5) days forward the entire record of the

case to the Commission for review.

RULE XIX

Review by the Commission

Sec. 1. Decision En Banc — Within thirty (30) working days

from receipt of an appeal case, the Commission shall review and

decide said case. Four affirmative votes shall decide the case.

However, if only a quorum of four members are present, 3

affirmative votes shall decide the case. No motion for

reconsideration of the decision or resolution of the Commissionen banc shall be entertained.

Sec. 2. Payment of Awards — Decisions, orders, or resolutions

of the Commission en banc awarding compensation shall be

complied with by the System within fifteen (15) days from receipt

of the notice thereof.

Sec. 3. Other Decisions — In all other cases involving payments

to be made by the employer, decisions, orders, and resolutions of

the Commission en banc which have become final and executory

shall be enforced and executed in the same manner as decisions of

the Court of First Instance, and the Commission shall have the power to issue to the City or Provincial Sheriff or to the Sheriff it

may appoint, such writs of execution as may be necessary for the

enforcement of such decisions, orders, or resolutions.

Sec. 4. Failure to Comply — Any person or persons who fail or

refuse to comply with the writ of execution issued by the

Commission shall be punished for contempt by the proper court.

In the case of a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association,

or any other entity, the manager or officer-in-charge when the

offense was committed, shall be responsible.

RULE XX

Penalties

Sec. 1. Penalty for Failure to Install and Maintain Safety Devices,

etc. — The System shall determine for purposes of imposing the

penalty provided in Art. 200 of the Code, whether the employer's

sickness, injury or death was due to the failure of the employer to

comply with any health and safety law, or failure to install and

maintain safety devices in accordance with standards set by the

Commission, or take other precautions for the prevention of the

sickness, injury, or death. The requisite standards shall be set by

the Commission within six (6) months after the effectivity of

these Rules.

Sec. 2. Penal Provisions — (a) The penal provisions of R.A.

1161, as amended, and C.A. 186, as amended, with regard to the

funds as are thereunder being paid to, collected, or disbursed by

the System shall be applicable to the collection, administration,

and disbursement of Employees' Compensation Fund of the

System. The penal provisions on coverage shall also be

applicable.

(b) Any person who, for the purposes of securing entitlement to

any benefit or payment under these Rules or the issuance of any

certificate or document for any purpose whether for him or for

some other persons, commits fraud, collusion, falsification,

misrepresentation of facts, or any other kind of anomaly shall be

punished with a fine of not less than P5,000 and imprisonment for

not less than 6 months nor more than one year, at the discretion of

the court.

(c) If the act penalized is committed by any person who has been

or is employed by the Commission or System or a recidivist, the



imprisonment shall not be less than one year; if committed by a

lawyer, physician, or other professional, he shall in addition to the

penalty prescribed herein be disqualified from the practice of his

profession; and if committed by an official, employee or

personnel of the Commission, System, or any government

agency, he shall in addition to the penalty prescribed herein, be

dismissed with prejudice to re-employment in the government

service.

RULE XXIImplementing Provision

Sec. 1. Effectivity — These amended Rules and Regulations

shall take effect June 1, 1987.



GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS

FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD

1146 being violative of due process and equal protection clause.

When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for

survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse

has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse

contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years

before the pensioner qualified for the pension.

HELD: There is denial of due process when it out rightly denies

the claim for survivorship. There is outright confiscation of

benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an

opportunity to be heard. There is also violation of equal

protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of

togetherness in marriage before the employee’s death is valid to

prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is

3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this,

even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3

years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would

still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place

within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The

object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection

between the means employed and the purpose intended.

The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to

receive survivor’s benefits under a pension system. However,

statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married

the employee for a certain period before the employee’s death to

prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One

example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivor’s

annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state

employee for at least one year before the employee’s death. The

Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less

than one year before a member’s death and those married one

year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious

adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally

ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State

Employee’s Retirement System of Illinois, the Appellate Court of

Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in

situation and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose

of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional

guarantees of due process and equal protection. A statute based

on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional

guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for

a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on

substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of

the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus,

the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another

class provided there are real and substantial differences to

distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does

not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against

the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner

within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.

Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the

pensioner more than three years before the pensioner’s death, the

dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if

the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner

qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague.

There is no reasonable connection between the means employed

and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any

reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the

proviso is to prevent “deathbed marriages "then we do not seewhy the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date

the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the

pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial

distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages

contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for

pension as having been contracted primarily for financial

convenience to avail of pension benefits. Indeed, the classification

is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason

Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (“RA

8291”), otherwise known as the “Government Service Insurance

Act of 1997,” the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD1146).

Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse

who married the member immediately before the member’s death

is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS

proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to

receive the benefit. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume

that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or

death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of

survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not

automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving

spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three

years before the member’s retirement or death. The law

acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the

marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification

that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats

the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We

declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees

of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in

Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states

that “the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if

his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years

before the pensioner qualified for the pension.” The Government

Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O.

Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.



[A.M. No. P-95-1167. December 21, 1998]

CARMELITA L. LLEDO, complainant, vs . ATTY. CESAR V.

LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 94, Quezon City, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM :

Court personnel, from the judge to the lowest clerk, are

invested with the sacred duty to maintain the good name and

standing of the institution they serve. A court employee abdicatesthat duty when he abandons his family and openly cohabits with

his mistress. He aggravates his culpability by falsely representing

his paramour to be his lawful wife.

This principle is applied by the Court in resolving the

present Administrative Complaint for immorality, abandonment

and conduct unbecoming a public official. Filed on February 4,

1994 by Mrs. Carmelita Lledo against her husband, Atty Cesar V.

Lledo, branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Quezon City, said Complaint presented the facts as follows:

"That sometime last year (1993) I received some information that

he is keeping a paramour, which information I verified, as a resultof which, I personally came to know that my husband is living

with another woman named Katrina Narvaez with whom he has

children[. A] certified true copy of the Birth Certificate of his son

named Ryan Narvaez Lledo, is hereto attached marked as 'Annex

B';

"That the other children's birth certificates named Don and

Kathleen are still for release by the National Statistics Office;

"That when I was able to secure a copy of the Birth Certificate of

Ryan, I immediately went to see the specified address at 240 Rd. I

Pag-asa, Quezon City, only to be informed by Mrs. Songco, their

landlady that they transferred to another apartment in Burol I StaCruz Village, Balagtas Bulacan because they had a serious

altercation which resulted in the filing of three (3) cases namely:

IS No. 92-15883, Oral Defamation and Grave Threats, IS No. 92-

16957, Grave Threats, Malicious Mischiefs and Physical Injuries

and IS No. 92-15650 for Slight Physical Injuries, xerox copies of

which are hereto attached and marked as Annex 'C', 'D' and 'E'

respectively;

"That on November 12, 1992, Atty. Cesar Lledo executed an

affidavit subscribed and sworn to on [the] same date by the

Assistant City Prosecutor, Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo, Fiscal['s]

Office, Quezon City, attesting to the truth that Katrina is his wife

and that they are tenants or lessees of one of the rooms of thehouse of Mrs. Dolores Songco, xerox copy of which is hereto

attached as Annex 'G';

"That they lived as husband and wife at 240 Rd. I, Pag-asa as

evidenced by a contract entered into by his paramour K.N. Lledo,

xerox copy of which is attached and marked as Annex 'F' and that

Katrina and Atty. Lledo are known in the community as husband

and wife;

"That upon knowledge of my husband's infidelity which caused

irreparable psychological and emotional damage to the children

and gross humiliation I suffered as the lawful wife, I immediately

wrote a formal letter (xerox copy of which is hereto attached asAnnex 'H') to Judge Pedro Santiago, Executive Judge of the

Quezon City Regional Trial Court, copy furnished Atty. Lledo's

immediate superior, Judge Romeo Zamora, Regional Trial Court

Branch 94, requesting xxx a dialogue which never transpire[d]

because my husband refused to see me;

"That Atty. Lledo with his paramour Katrin had been transferring

their residence from 240 Rd. I Pagasa, Quezon City, to Burol I

Sta. Cruz Village, Balagtas, Bulacan and at present at Santol

Burol 5, Balagtas, Bulacan, maintaining their illicit relationship

up to the present;

"That such, actuations of Atty. Lledo [constitute] disgraceful and

immoral conduct violative of the provisions of Administrative

Code of 1987 (PD 807) and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); and,

"That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truthfulness of

the foregoing statements and as basis for my complaint against

my husband for immorality, abandonment and for conduct

unbecoming xxx a public official."[1]

In his Comment, respondent denied all the materialallegations of the complainant and stated:

"That since the birth of all their children, respondent has not been

remiss in his obligation to provide for their support as he is still

paying the matriculation fees of their youngest daughter who is

taking up [the] Degree of Bachelor of Psychology in an amount of

not less than P9,000.00 per semester, more or less. Additionally,

he (respondent) caused the employment of his two (2) sons, both

married namely Eric - employed at the sala of Judge Lucas

Bersamin, and Cesar, Jr., - employed at the National Power

Corporation.

"Additionally, the amount obtained on the maturity of his GSISPolicy was all utilized for the payment of all the debts incurred

due to advances made to pay the needs of his children especially

for payment of tuition fees and other miscellaneous needs of the

children.

"The filing of the case was triggered on the unfounded ground or

claim that the petitioner [would] not [get] her alleged one-half

share of the respondent's pension. The said ground is untrue and

bias[ed]. The truth of the matter is respondent will be paying the

amortized house and lot and will give the complainant her one-

half share of the pension."[2]

On August 28, 1996, the Court referred the Complaint and theComment to then Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago, RTC,

Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Finding that the Report of Judge Santiago was not

responsive, in fact totally irrelevant, to the issue in the case, the

Court on September 30, 1997 asked the new executive judge,

Hon. Estrella Trias-Estrada, to reinvestigate the matter.

After a thorough investigation, wherein both the

complainant and the respondent were accorded the opportunity to

present their respective causes and to cross-examine each other's

witnesses, Judge Trias-Estrada submitted her Report, the pertinent

portions of which are quoted hereunder:

"From the evidence on record, the undersigned has reason to

believe the claim of complainant Carmelita Lledo that respondent

ha[s] indeed abandoned her and their children sometime in 1987

without giving adequate support to their four legitimate children

and [that] he had established a second family with one Katrina

Narvaez and their own set of children. In the affidavit-complaint

dated November 12, 1992 which respondent Cesar Lledo filed

before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office executed under oath

(Exhibit 'J"), respondent Lledo gave the name [of] Katrina as his

wife and [of] xxx Don as his child. The complaint-affidavit was

filed in connection with a serious altercation he had with one

Dolores Songco, the landlady/administrator of the house at No.

240, Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City where he and Katrina lived

together as husband and wife with their children. The cases filed

by him were oral defamation through malicious mischief and

slight physical injuries. These cases, however, were dismissed by

Judge Tolentino of the MTC. The affidavit-complaint of

respondent is in effect an admission that he considered Katrina

Narvaez as his wife and Don as his child. Complainant was also

able to secure a birth certificate of one Ryan Narvaez Lledo

whose father's name is Czar Diaz Lledo with address at No. 240

Rd. I, Pag-asa, Quezon City. Although the name of the purported

father appears to be different, Czar Diaz Lledo, it is obvious that

it is a typographical error or perhaps, it was intentionally

misspelled that way because it was Katrina Narvaez who

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/dec1998/am_p_95_1167.htm#_edn1










furnished that dat[um] in said certificate of live birth. But despite

the erroneous spelling, said certificate of live birth became the

key to the discovery of the address of the respondent after he left

their conjugal dwelling.

"The complainant was able to get information through Dolores

Songco, the landlady of respondent and Katrina Narvaez Lledo

who gave a full account of the relationship of respondent and

Katrina who[m] she personally observed to have conducted

themselves as husband and wife; that Don was four years old

when he was brought to said residence as their son and where the

two other children Ryan and Kat[h]leen were conceived and

born. Dolores Songco categorically stated that respondent and

Katrina lived in the house where she is the administrator together

with her from June, 1988 up to November 7, 1992.

"Respondent Lledo did not make any [categorical] denial of the

charges. His answers were only that he did not know said

Katrina, that he did not also [know] Ryan, but the only reason that

he left the conjugal dwelling [was] that his wife was a complete

nagger and was not performing her duties as a responsible wife

and mother, that it was he who performed the household chores

and often he would bring to his office one of his children to take

care of. He also denied that he was not giving financial support

but his wife who never spent any single cent. He admitted thatthe signature appearing in the affidavit-complaint marked as

Exhibit 'J' which was the basis of the criminal charges against

Dolores Songco is his signature.

"Between the oral and documentary evidence of the complainant

and the oral denials and admissions made by the respondent, the

inevitable conclusion is that the charges against respondent Lledo

are true. The abandonment of complainant and their children

apparently came about when respondent Lledo was already at the

JDRC and had started to have drinking buddies and later on a

sweetheart. And in 1987 he already completely left the conjugal

dwelling to establish a second family and for the purpose, he and

Katrina with their son Don, established their residence in a roomin the house at No. 240, Road I, Pag-asa, Quezon City which was

being administered by one Dolores Songco for and in behalf of

her brother who is living in the United States. Such second

family stayed in said residence for four (4) years, lived as a

complete family without the benefit of marriage and therefore

was living in an immoral status which is a ground for dismissal of

a government official or employee. Considering that respondent is

holding a high government position which requires him to be of

good moral character and fit to perform his functions as Branch

Clerk of Court, his actuations [are] not a good example to his

subordinates.

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfullyrecommended that the corresponding penalty of dismissal from

the service be meted [out to] respondent Atty. Cesar V. Lledo."

In its September 2, 1998 Memorandum addressed to the

Office of the Chief Justice, the Office of the Court Administrator

(OCA) agreed with the findings of Judge Estrada and

recommended that Atty. Cesar Lledo be dismissed from the

service for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

The Court agrees with the recommendations of Judge

Estrada and the OCA that respondent should be sanctioned.

The Court has emphasized time and again that "the conduct

and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with

the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff

and to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy

burden of responsibility."[3] In a similar case, the Court has further

held that "a court personnel, being a public servant, must exhibit

the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the

performance of his official duties but also his personal and private

dealings with other people, to preserve the court's good name and

standing."[4] The Court has also admonished court personnel that

their conduct "should be geared towards maintaining the prestige

and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is

necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the

men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and

lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative and

sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good

name and standing as a temple of justice."[5]

In the present case, sufficient proof, both oral and

documentary, was presented to show that Respondent Lledo

abandoned his conjugal dwelling without providing support for

his legitimate children and subsequently cohabited with Katrina

Narvaez with whom he had three children. It is beyond dispute

that respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental

institution of marriage and his elementary obligation to provide

for his legitimate children. Worse, he executed several SwornStatements that he was lawfully wedded to his mistress.

Clearly, the respondent in this case has failed to comply

with the strict standards required of court employees. His

conduct betrays an unscrupulous streak that has, in turn, tarnished

the image of the judiciary.

We impose on respondent the penalty of dismissal, in line

with numerous similar cases. In Sicat v. Alcantara ,[6] the Court

dismissed a clerk of court and a judge for maintaining an illicit

amorous relationship with each other. In Castillo v.

Calano g [7] and in Dy Teban Hardware & Auto Supply v.

Tapucar ,[8] respondent judges were also dismissed from the

service for moral obtuseness in maintaining mistresses and for immoral advances against the complainants. These cases

demonstrate, as we do once again, that "exacting standards of

morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down

by the highest Court of the land in regard to those in the service of

the judiciary xxx."[9] "In fact, moral integrity is more than a

virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary."[10] Because respondent

clerk of court has failed to perform his imperative duty to

maintain the prestige and integrity of the judiciary, he has

forfeited his privilege to partake in the administration of justice.

Moreover, the conduct for which he is here penalized affects

not only his qualifications as a court employee, but also as a

member of the bar. For this reason, the Court hereby refers the

case to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of

Court.[11]

WHEREFORE, Cesar V. Lledo, branch clerk of court of

RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City, is hereby DISMISSED from the

service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits

and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or

instrumentality of the government, including any government-

owned or controlled corporation. This case is REFERRED to the

IBP Board of Governors pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of

the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.







































G.R. Nos. 98395-102449 June 19, 1995

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR.

MANUEL BARADERO, respondents.


petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and

MATILDE S. BELO, respondents

In our decision dated October 28, 1994 we held that governmentservice rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in

computing the length of service for retirement purposes. Thus, we

reversed the questioned resolutions and orders of the Civil

Service Commission (CSC) requiring the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) to consider creditable the services of

private respondents on a per diem basis.

However, private respondent Matilde S. Belo in G.R. No 102449

filed a motion for reconsideration dated 17 November 1994, of

this Court 's decision of October 28, 1994. She insists that the

services rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz, between

December 31, 1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as

creditable for purposes of retirement. The Government ServiceInsurance System likewise filed a motion for reconsideration on

November 22, 1984 in behalf of both private respondents Belo

and Dr. Manuel Baradero on essentially the same grounds. We

shall deal with both motions together.

While what respondents Belo and Baradero received were

denominated as " per diem," the amounts received were actually in

the nature of a compensation or pay. What should therefore be

considered as controlling in both cases would be the nature of

remuneration, not the label attached to it.

Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz

continuously between January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988.From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office

by virtue of an election and was paid a fixed salary. 1 From

December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the position

of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity, broken down

into two periods: 2

1. A period in which she was paid on a per diem

basis from December 31, 1976 to December 31,

1979; and

2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary

— from January 1, 1980 to February 1,1988.

In its June 7, 1989 Resolution 3 on the matter, CSC held that the

services rendered for the first holdover period between January

31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of

retirement. CSC noted that during the entire holdover period,

respondent Belo actually served on a full time basis as Vice

Governor and was on call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing with the

CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was

paid on a per diem basis should be credited in computing the

number of years of creditable service to the government, GSIS

subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before this court,

questioning the orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were

not compensation within the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A.

1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (GovernmentService Insurance Act), we granted the petitions in G.R. Nos.

98395 and 102449, 4 and reversed the CSC Orders and

Resolutions in question.

ISSUE

Whether or not regular service in government on a per diem basis,

without any other form of compensation or emolument, is

compensation within the contemplation of the term "service with

compensation" under the Government Service Insurance Act of

1987.

HELD

We are convinced that the " per diem" she received was actually

paid for in the performance of her duties as Vice-Governor of

Capiz in a holdover capacity not as the per diem referred to by

section 1(c) of R.A. No 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A.

No. 186 (Government Insurance Service Act). A closer look at the

aforecited provision, moreover, reveals a legislative intent to

make a clear distinction between salary, pay or compensation, on

one hand, and other incidental allowances, including per diems on

the other. Section 1(c) provides:

(c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be

construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems,

allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or

compensation given to the base pay of the

position or rank as fixed by law or regulations. 5

Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident

to the discharge of an office is not a salary of office, 6 it follows

that if the remuneration received by a public official in the

performance of his duties does not constitute a mere "allowance

for expenses" but appears to be his actual base pay, then no

amount of categorizing the salary as base pay, a " per diem" would

take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service

with compensation for the purpose of computing the number of

years of service in government. Furthermore, it would grossly

violate the law's intent to reward the public servant's years of

dedicated service to government for us to gloss over the

circumstances surrounding the payment of the said remunerations

to the petitioner in taking a purely mechanical approach to the

problem by accepting an attached label at face value.

In the sense in which the phrase " per diem" is used under the

Government Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily

allowance given for each day an officer or employee of

government is away from his home base. 8 This is its traditional

meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra

expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his

duties. 9 Under this definition the per diem intended to cover the

cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when

the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station. 10

The clear intent of the Government Insurance Law was to exclude

those extra incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis

covered by the traditional definition of the term per diem. An

important fact missed from our earlier decision was that, while

respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis during her first

holdover period as Vice Governor she was subsequently paid a

fixed salary, which apparently rectified an otherwise anomalous

situation. The services rendered by respondent Belo having been

continuous, the disputed period should be credited for purposes of

retirement.

The distinctions between salary and per diem made hereinabove

were in fact adverted to in our original decision dated October 28,

1994. In explaining the allowance of service rendered on a per

diem basis in the case of Inocencio vs. Ferrer of the Social

Security System, we noted with approval the Government Service

Insurance System's explanation that the per diem service which

was credited for purposes of retirement was Commissioner

Ferrer's full time service as Hearing Officer not his per diem

service for attendance at Board Meetings. Even then, we

indirectly noted the difference between per diem paid as

compensation for services rendered on a full time basis and per

diem as allowance for incidental expenses. Respondent Belo

asserts, with reason, that the per diems paid to her, while

reckoned on the basis of attendance in Board Meetings, were for

her full time services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz.

In fact, the same service, albeit still on a holdover basis, was

eventually paid with a fixed salary.



Cena v CSC

Facts:

Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law

Dep’t of Caloocan City. He was then transferred to the Office of

the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer

for 3 months. He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD

(Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered gov’t

service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his

65th bday, he requested the LRA Administrator that he be allowed

to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement

to enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC

denied the extension but Cena filed a motion for reconsideration.

This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still

filed a case against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it

granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the law(Sec

11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Gov’t Insurance Act) does

not limit or specify the maximum number of years the retiree may

avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has noauthority to limit through a memorandum the number of years.

In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency

of the gov’t, it is vested with power to grant or allow extension of

service beyond retirement age.

Issue:

Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the service to

complete the 15-year service requirement?

Held:

Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the

CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of service of employees

who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to

take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel

matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters not

covered. The CSC’s authority is limited only to carrying into

effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and

provisions of the basic law.

The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative

regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation

must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be

for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.

CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD1146.

RABOR V. CSC

Facts:

Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of

the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a

Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime

in May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao

City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement,

considering that he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor

responded by showing a GSIS certificate with a notation to theeffect that his service is extended for him to complete the 15-

years requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government

wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission,

Region XI, Davao City informing the latter of the foregoing and

requesting advice as to what action should be taken on Rabor’s

case. Director Caward replied by saying that Rabor’s continued

employment is contrary to OP M.C. No. 65 hence, it is non-

extendible. Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawad’s

letter and order him not to work anymore. Rabor asked Director

Cawad for extension of his job until he completed the 15-year

requirement but was denied. Rabor then asked OP for an

dextension. His request was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter

CSC denied Rabor’s request. Rabor asked for reconsidered of

CSC ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his

request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON Rabor request for extension should be granted in

view of Cena case

Held:

No. Cena doctrine overturned. In Cena v. CSC, the Court

reached its conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and

ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. WhileSection 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there

were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which

prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be

granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of

age. These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 and OP M.C. No.

65. The Court resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)

administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil

Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the

Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as

inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.

Nevertheless, the Court now ruled that the SC in Cena

made a narrow interpretation. It is incorrect to decide the issue on

the basis only of PD 1146. Reading the pertinent provisions theAdmin Code particularly the provisions governing the CSC, it is

clear that both the Admin Code and PD 1146 are the governing

laws relating to retirement of government officials and

employees. It was on the basis of the above quoted provisions of

the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission

promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the

Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the

government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and

guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel

administration in the government." It was also discharging its

function of "administering the retirement program for government

officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for

retirement." It is also incorrect to say that limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached

sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is

not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil

Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes

associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the

efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from

individual persons.

CSC Memo No. 27 is not invalid for having gone

beyond the parameters set by PD 1146. In fact what the

legislature intends is that the CSC should “fill in the details” in

the implementation of PD 1146.



Case title: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM vs COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA

ALEGRE

GR NO: GR No. 128524

Date: April 20, 1999

Petitioner: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM (GSIS)

Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and FELONILA ALEGRE

Ponente: ROMERO, J.;

Facts:

Felonila Alegre's deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A.

Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine

National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On

that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his

tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda

Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr.,

Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located

at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty.

SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and evendirected curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then

ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of

the deceased police officer.

On account of her husband's death, private respondent

seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7,

1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground

that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was performing

a personal activity which was not work-connected.

Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation

Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision

dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS.

Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the

Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, the appellate

court reversed 2 the ECC's decision and ruled that SPO2

Alegre's death was work-connected and, therefore,

compensable.

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on

certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre's death

lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, thatthe activity being performed at the time of death must be

work-connected.

Issue:

May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered

compensable?

Held:

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines

of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits,

namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where

his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must

have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if

the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have

been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to

understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be

denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter

SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death,

that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private

and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no

particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In

the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of

Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act

attended to by the policeman at the time he died even

without the explicit permission or directive of a superior

officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no

justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites

set forth in the ECC guidelines.

That he may be called upon at any time to render police

work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty

and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change

the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed

in a situation where he was required to exercise his

authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing

to render one pointing out that he had already complied

with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine,

as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an

after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the

scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to

benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their

deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not

be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstancescausing the death of a police officer but only to those which,

although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless

basically police service in character.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED

and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.



G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994

RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner, vs.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the

Employees' Compensation Commission which denied petitioner'sclaim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as

amended.

I

Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher

with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November 28 to

November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial

Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature

ventricular contractions.

On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary

School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three kilometers toand from said school as no transportation was available to ferry

her and other teachers from the national highway to the school.

During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion

and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial

Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work.

In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September

of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao Elementary

School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough

road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the

help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate

Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She

underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the sameday due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a

"prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when

she died.

Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for

compensation benefit with the Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus:

Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs

and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the

cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to

Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not

considered an occupational disease ascontemplated under the above-mentioned law

(P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing

that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had

increased the risk of contracting her ailment

( Rollo, p. 23).

Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the

denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation of the

claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the

GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter its previous action

of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is non-

work-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did

her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment( Rollo, p. 25).

Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission

(ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's

claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction

that in case the claim is denied once more by the System, the

entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS

reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim.

On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying

petitioner's claim. It said:

Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus

may occur in infants and nulliparous women as

well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and

in the basic integrity of the supporting

structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first

two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The

cervix usually elongates because the weight of

the nagging vaginal tissues pulls it downward,

whereas the attached but weak cardinal

ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree

or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the

body of the uterus have passed through theintroitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted.

(Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham,

Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585).

On the other hand Acute Coronary

Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a

syndrome characterized by prolonged

substernal pain, usually not relieved by

vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a

more severe inadequacy of coronary circulation.

The symptoms in this condition are more

intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris,

but abnormal ECG and other laboratoryfindings associated with myocardial infarction

are absent. The syndrome is covered by a

temporary inability of one's coronary arteries to

supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart

muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis &

Therapy, pp. 100-101).

Based on the above medical discussion of the

subject ailments, we believe that the

development of the fatal illness has no relation

whatsoever with the duties and working

conditions of the late teacher. There is no

showing that the nature of her duties caused thedevelopment of prolapse of the uterus. The

ailment was a complication of childbirth

causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late

stage. We also consider Acute Coronary

Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for

the reason that it is caused by temporary

inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply

oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is

no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we

have no recourse but to sustain respondent's

denial of the instant claim ( Rollo, pp. 29-31).

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, assertingcompensability of the death of his wife.

II

Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of

occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should proper

under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact

that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy,

he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato

protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such

condition was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her

place of teaching — Banadero Elementary School, which is

situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roadsleading to the school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the

rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that

inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a

public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed

uterus.

Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents

contravene the constitutional provision on social justice. He

alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social

legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor

of the employees whose rights it intends to protect.



Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting

death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show

either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under

Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation

with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of

contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions

(Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA

182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission,

203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of

aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old

Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies (Latagan v.

Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]).

Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is

not listed as compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his

claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of

contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working

conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus

imposed by law.

The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and

thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just to

reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such

condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner

did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claimthat Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her

vagina and rectum.

Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was

multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite beyond

the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child

— she was already forty years old. Novak's Textbook on

Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as

follows:

An extremely common condition, being far more

frequent in elderly than in young patients. This

is explained by the increasing laxity and atony

of the muscular and fascial structures in later

life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus

make themselves evident, in the form of uterine

prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy.

Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to

numerous complications, as noted by Piver and

Spezia.

The important factor in the mechanism of the

prolapse is undoubtedly injury or

overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially

of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the

bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with

this there is usually extensive injury to the

perineal structures, producing marked vaginal

relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia

or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with

the production of cystocele or rectocele.

Usually, various combinations of these

conditions are seen, although at times little or

no cystocele or rectocele is associated with the

prolapse.Occasional cases are seen for that

matter, in women who have never borne

children, and in these the prolapse apparently

represents a hernia of the uterus through a

defect in the pelvic fascial floor (Emphasissupplied).

The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes

the condition as follows:

Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a

delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic

floor (particularly the transverse cervical and

uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric

lacerations of the levator musculature and

perineal body augment the weakness.

Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging

and congenital weakness can accelerate the

development of prolapse.

The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus

developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is therefore

immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological

structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth.

With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's

prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare

legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant,(Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834

[1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and

interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the

pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as

amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for

the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the importance of the

services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of

their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their

immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the

youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation

Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]).

But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not

mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to

their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.



G.R. No. 90267 December 21, 1993

PERLITA LOPEZ, petitioner, vs.

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION,


DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND

SPORTS, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Article 181 of theLabor Code and Section 16 of the Interim Rules of 1983 of the

decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission

(ECC) dated June 28, 1989 in ECC Case No. 4331 entitled

"Perlita Lopez v. Government Service Insurance System," which

affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS) of the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, to

claimant-petitioner, Perlita Lopez.

Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public

school teacher at the Urdaneta National High School, Urdaneta,

Pangasinan, from

July 1, 1973 until his untimely demise on May 27, 1987.

On April 27, 1987, a memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by

the head of the school's Science Department and noted by Lino A.

Caringal, Sr. the principal, which reads:

In view of your long and competent teaching

experience as a PHYSICS Teacher and in

anticipation with (sic) the forthcoming Division

Search for Outstanding Improvised Secondary

Science Equipment for Teachers to be held at

the TAP Bldg. in Lingayen, Pangasinan on

October 8 and 9, 1987, you are hereby

designated to prepare the MODEL DAM , UNHS

official entry to said contest.

In this connection, you are further advised to

complete this MODEL DAM on or before

scheduled date of the contest ( Rollo, p. 54;

emphasis supplied).

Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an

improvised electric micro-dam, which he took home to enable

him to finish it before the deadline.

On May 27, 1987, at around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed

in his project, he in contact with a live wire was electrocuted. He

was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment butwas pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that

he died of cardiac arrest due to accidental electrocution.

Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS,

which was denied on the ground that her husband's death did not

arise out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion for

reconsideration was likewise denied.

She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed

the decision rendered by the GSIS and dismissed the same.

The sole issue for us to resolve is whether or not respondentcommitted grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of

death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore

it is not compensable under P.D. No. 626.

Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by

the school principal, Lopez at the time of the accident was

supposed to report for duty to help in the enrollment of the 4th

year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the

project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death

benefits failed to satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a),

Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

Said rule states:

For an injury and the resulting disability or

death to be compensable, the injury must be the

result of an employment accident, satisfying all

the following conditions:

1 The employee must have been injured at the

place where his work requires him to be;

2. The employee must have been performing his

official functions; and

3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the

employee must have been executing an order

from its superior.

The Employees Compensation Act is a social legislation whose

primordial purpose is to provide amelioration of the working class

of our society. As held in the case of Nitura v. Employees

Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991):

As an official agent charged by law to

implement social justice guaranteed and secured

by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a

liberal attitude in favor of the employee indeciding claims for compensability especially

where there is some basis in the facts for

inferring a work connection with the incident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and

substance to the compassionate spirit of the law

as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor

Code which states that all doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the Labor

Code including its implementing rules and

regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.

In the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co. , Inc. v. Quiroz ,

16 SCRA 784 (1966), we held:

xxx xxx xxx

An injury or accident befalls a man "in the

course of" his employment, if it occurs while he

is doing what a man may reasonably do within a

time during which he is employed, and at a

place where he may reasonably be during the

time, 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 28-29, And

it "arises out of" the work of the employer,

when it results from a risk or reasonably

inherent in or incidental to the conduct of such

work or business.

"In the course of" points to the place and circumstances under

which the accident takes place and the time when it occurs. Of the

two phrases on work connection, "in the course of" is deemed

broader than "arising out of" (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor

Standards and Welfare Legislation, 1964 ed., pp. 563-564).

While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in

his official work station, which is the school, he was still

discharging his function as the one in-charge of the project. He

was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of

time and he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house.

The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it

happened during the summer vacation. He was still under the

employ of the government and there still existed an employer-

employee relationship although teachers do not report for duty

during that period (Pepito v. Workmen's Compensation

Commission, 78 SCRA 35 [1977] ).

It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par.

(a), Rule III of the amended Rules on Employees Compensation,

have been complied with.



The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by

the employee at "the place where his work requires him to be"

and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must have

been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez

had to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on

October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was given

permission, if not direction, to perform his work at his house.

Respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had been

ordered by the school principal to report for duty to assist in the

enrollment of the fourth-year students on the day of the accident.

Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was working on

the model he was asked to build. To claim that he should have

been in school at the time he died in order to entitle his widow

any compensation benefits, is to strain good sense and logic.

For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause

therefor shall have taken place within the purview of his

employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or

incidental thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls

within the protection of the law regardless of the place of injury

(ECC Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Sec. 1; ECC

Resolution No. 2799, July 25, 1984; Enao v. Employees

Compensation Commission, 135 SCRA 660 [1985]).

The thrust of social justice is compassion for the poor. By

denying under the peculiar circumstances the claim of the

petitioner for benefits arising from the death of her husband,

public respondents ignored this public policy and committed a

grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the

decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission is

REVERSED. The Government Service Insurance System is

ORDERED to pay the death benefits to petitioner, with legal rate

of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid,

attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award and

costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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