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AOO-37277AIAA Modeling and Simulation

Technologies Conference and Exhibit14-17 August 2000 Denver, CO

AIAA-2000-4488

Using Virtual Simulation for Tactics Development forConstructive Simulation

Stephen E. ThomasAFRL/IFSD, WPAFB, OH

Cindy MartinVeridian, Dayton, OH

ABSTRACT

The development of tactics to exploit the advantagesof new systems is one of the most important uses ofvirtual simulation. Due to resource constraints,virtual simulation is rarely used to performexhaustive testing, and constructive simulation mustbe used to get statistically significant results.Translation and coding of tactics developed in virtualsimulations into constructive simulations is a verydifficult problem for analysts to perform. There arethings that can be done during virtual testing whichcan make this process go more smoothly. Having agood questionnaire can help the analyst translatewhat the pilot did during the simulation in theconstructive analysis tool. Most constructive toolshave basic offensive tactics, defensive tactics, andweapon employment philosophies already coded inthem. Variations in these tactics are controlledparametrically, and a well-structured questionnairecan help the analyst get this information. Thisquestionnaire can be maintained by the pilots, or byobservers during the test. It is also important to havethe ability to replay the simulation. This is veryvaluable for ensuring that the tactical informationgathered during the test is accurate. It is alsonecessary if completely new tactics have to be coded,since any written information gathered during the testis probably not adequate for implementation.Capturing threat tactics is equally important, andhaving some structure to the threat tactics employedin virtual simulation can aid in this process.

This paper is a declared work of the U.S.Government and is not subject to copyrightprotection in the United States.

The technical capabilities of the threat aircraft andweapons have an obvious effect on the effectiveness of asystem, and the tactics used to employ it. But equallyimportant are the capabilities of the pilots employing thethreat system. It is very helpful if when implementingtactics in constructive simulation if the level ofaggressiveness, sophistication, and coordination of thethreat tactics used during the virtual simulation is welldefined, and is recorded for each run.

INTRODUCTION

Man in the loop air to air engagement simulation is animportant tool during the acquisition and development ofaircraft, systems, and sub-systems. It can be used forrequirements definition, concept of operationsdevelopment, system effectiveness analysis, and analysisof alternatives. One of the major strengths of MILsimulation is that the operator is involved in the processdirectly, and can provide feedback to the developers andacquisition team. The problem with MIL analysis is thatthe number of runs that can be completed is very limited,and getting statistically significant results from thislimited number of runs can be a problem. One way toaugment the number of runs from a MIL simulation test isto translate the concepts of operation and tactics used ordeveloped in the MIL simulation into a constructivesimulation. Then you can use the constructive analysis togenerate enough runs to validate the results andconclusions from the MIL event. This paper will highlightinformation that should be gathered from the MILsimulation and from the pilots who participate in theevent, and show how to use that information inconstructive analysis.

SCENARIOS & MISSIONS

There are many general categories of scenarios. Adefensive counter air (DCA) scenario is a catch all for anytime of defensive mission over home territory. A fightersweep (FS) scenario is an offensive scenario where the

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objective is to enter enemy territory and destroy asmany enemy aircraft as possible. The Strike Escort(SE) mission is an air to surface mission withdesignated escort aircraft providing protection tostrike aircraft whose primary mission is surface targetattack. A Pure Self-Escort (PSE) mission is similar tothe SE mission, but all of the aircraft are primarilysurface attack, with enough air to air weapons todefend themselves on the mission. Cruise MissileDefense (CMD) is a variation of the DCA mission,where the objective is stopping a CM attack, whiledealing any enemy aircraft sent to provide cover forthe penetrating bombers of cruise missiles. HighValue Asset Attack (HVAA) is an offensive air to airmission where the target is some specific airborneasset.

DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR MISSION

would usually precede some sort of strike mission, thepurpose being to soften up enemy air defenses. Theprimary objective of the CAP aircraft is this scenario is tosurvive, while destroying as many of the attacking FSaircraft as possible. The airborne early warning aircraft isproviding is providing command and control information,as well as situation awareness information on incomingaircraft via data link.

Figure 2MX

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Thwrt Four SNp inStrike MJ*ti on withAIMo-Surteo* WnponsLoad Out

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Threat AirborneEarly Warning

STRIKE ESCORT MISSION

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A defensive counter air (DCA) scenario is a catch allfor any time of defensive mission over hometerritory, m Figure 1, two combat air patrol (CAP)points with two fighters each are defending an areaagainst eight enemy aircraft. An airborne earlywarning aircraft is providing is providing commandand control information, as well as situationawareness information on incoming aircraft via datalink.. The eight enemy aircraft are divided by role.Four are escort aircraft, loaded with short range andmedium range missiles, which are providing air coverto the attack aircraft. The surface attack aircraft areloaded with bombs and short range self-defensemissiles only. The primary objective of the CAPaircraft in this scenario is to protect their target areaby diverting or destroying the bombers, whileavoiding being killed by the escort aircraft.

FIGHTER SWEEP MISSION

A fighter sweep (FS) scenario, as,shown in Figure 2,is an offensive scenario where the objective is toenter enemy territory and destroy as many enemyfighter aircraft as possible. This type of mission

The Strike Escort (SE) mission is an air to surface missionwith designated escort aircraft providing protection tostrike aircraft whose primary mission is surface targetattack. The eight SE aircraft in Figure 3 are divided byrole. Four are escort aircraft, loaded with short range andmedium range missiles, which are providing air cover tothe attack aircraft. The surface attack aircraft are loadedwith bombs and short range self-defense missiles only.The escort aircraft will attempt to divert or destroy thedefending aircraft, thereby allowing the strike aircraft tofulfill their mission and destroy the target. Two combatair patrol (CAP) points with two fighters each aredefending an area against enemy aircraft. Upon detectionof invading aircraft, two more fighters are strip launched

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into the scenario. An airborne early warning aircraftis providing is providing command and controlinformation, as well as situation awarenessinformation on incoming aircraft via data link.

SELF ESCORT MISSION

Figure 5

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A Pure Self-Escort (PSE) mission is similar to the SEmission, but all of the aircraft are primarily surfaceattack, with enough air to air weapons to defendthemselves on the mission, see Figure 4. This type ofmission would be attempted when the enemy airthreat is not perceived to be great enough to requireescort aircraft. The surface attack aircraft are loadedwith bombs and a limited number of medium and/orshort-range self-defense missiles. The objective is toget through the enemy air defenses and attack thetarget, avoiding engagement if possible. Two combatair patrol (CAP) points with two fighters each aredefending an area against enemy aircraft. Upondetection of invading aircraft, two more fighters arestrip launched into the scenario. An airborne earlywarning aircraft is providing is providing commandand control information, as well as situationawareness information on incoming aircraft via datalink.

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) in Figure 5 is avariation of the DCA mission, where the objective isstopping a CM attack, while dealing any enemyaircraft sent to provide cover for the penetratingbombers of cruise missiles. This scenario is designedto represent a single air-to-air engagement in a firstday of the war barrage attack with cruise missilesagainst a single target. Off-board surveillance andtwo CAP's of two fighters protect the target. Tencruise missiles have been sent against a single targetcomplex. The objective of the Blue CAP fighters is toprotect the target.

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HIGH VALUE ASSET ATTACK MISSION

High Value Asset Attack (HVAA) is an offensive air toair mission where the target is some specific airborneasset. Figure 6 shows the four invading aircraft are loadedwith short range and medium range missiles. Theirobjective is to avoid the defending fighter aircraft, destroythe airborne early warning aircraft, and return safely. Twocombat air patrol (CAP) points with two fighters each aredefending an area against enemy aircraft, and defendingthe airborne early warning aircraft as well. Upondetection of invading aircraft, two more fighters are striplaunched into the scenario. The airborne early warningaircraft is providing is providing command and controlinformation, as well as situation awareness information onincoming aircraft via data link.

Figure 6Jt H

EXAMPLE SCENARIOFigure 7 give some details of a possible fighter sweepscenario. The initial conditions shown might be typical ofthis type of engagement. Many of the initial conditionsare fairly standard. Position, altitude, and speed of earlywarning aircraft and CAP aircraft to defend a designatedarea are pretty much standard based on system

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performance. Other factors may weigh in however.Initial separation between blue and red can be simplya function of detection range, a result of systemperformance. But if the detection range is longenough, the initial separation could be determined bythe time required setting up tactics. The same can besaid for CAP separation. It could be determined bysystem performance, such as data link range. It couldbe a function of the scenario, such as the width of thecorridor to be defended. Or it could be a function oftest objective, if a low threat density is desired withthe two sets of CAP aircraft being engaged as two4v2 engagements, rather than one 4v4.

Figure 7

THREAT DENSITY & CLUSTERINGLOGIC

Figure 8

as well. This type of target clustering will result in a highthreat density for the given scenario size, since allparticipants will be engaged at the same time. In Figure 8the two CAP's are far apart that the group of four fightersconsider them two groups, and will try to attack one CAPfirst, ignoring the other for the time being. The earlywarning aircraft is considered to be in a third cluster. Onthe other side, the group of four incoming fighters is veryclosely spaced, and will be attacked as a single group aswell. This type of target clustering will result in a lowthreat density for the given scenario size, since thescenario will result in two 4v2 engagements, rather thanone 4v4 engagement.

Figure 9

COORDINATION & INDEPENDENCE

Figure 10

Clustering is the grouping of targets based onseparation in range. If targets are close enough to begrouped into a single cluster, they are considered oneentity for long range tactics, hi this example the twoCAP's are close enough to each other that the groupof four fighters consider them one group, and will tryto attack all four at the same time. The early warningaircraft is considered to be in a second cluster. On (heother side, the group of four incoming fighters is veryclosely spaced, and will be attacked as a single group

There are a couple of other factors to consider whensetting up a scenario, the level of coordination betweenthe participants, and the level of independence eachaircraft is allowed to exercise. In Figure 10, the blue sideis flying a very simple straight in tactic, and is showing noindependence. They have one lead aircraft, they will stayin formation, and if the lead aircraft is killed the rest willreturn home. Also if one aircraft is force to defend, allwill defend together. The red side is flying a more highlycoordinated tactic, a pincer, to gain tactical advantage.

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However, they are still flying as a single group, willdefend as a group, and will abort if lead is killed.Figure 11 shows a more independent tactic. Blue isnow flying as two groups, each with a lead and awingman. The tactics are coordinated between thegroups, and they attempt to pincer the two redgroups. Each group however is still flying as a singleentity, and the wingman will abort if lead of hisgroup is killed, and each lead and wingman pair willstill defend as a group. On the red side, they are alsoflying as two groups, but are not flying a coordinatedtactic as a four ship. Each lead and wingman pair isflying a different tactic, the left pair doing a simplepoint at target tactics, while the right group is tryingto pincer the blue fighters. As with the blue aircraft,red will defend as a lead and wingman pair, and thewingman will abort if its lead aircraft is destroyed.

Figure 11

Figure 12

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In Figure 12, both side are flying completelyindependent of each other. Defense and abort criteriaare by individual aircraft, not lead and wingmanpairings. Red side is flying a relative uncoordinatedtactics, with each aircraft flying at its selected target.Blue is trying a more coordinated tactics by sendingtwo aircraft up the middle, with the other two tryingto pincer the threat aircraft.

MISSION PHASES

One way to implement tactics is to divide the mission upinto "mission phases" based on range. The initial phase,neutral, is where an aircraft has not detected any threataircraft, and is continuing with its initial tactic. This isusually following a defined penetration path, of flying aCAP orbit until something is detected. Once a target isdetected, the aircraft will begin tactics to set up its attack.Early in the set up phase, the aircraft may simple continueit CAP orbit or penetration path. Once it has closed on thethreat sufficiently, it will transition into tactics designedto gain positional advantage on the threat. As it continuesto close, the aircraft will select its target, the move intoposition to launch a weapon at the target. This is thebeginning of the attack phase. Once the target is attacked,some tactic will be required to support the weapon, whilemaintaining maximum advantage over the threat. Afterthe weapon is autonomous, if the threat has not beendestroyed, or another threat is still present, then some newclose in tactic must be used, or the threat may bedisengaged and set up for attack once some amount ofseparation has been achieved. If at any time during thissequence a missile is encountered, evasive action may berequired, which may or may not take precedence over thecurrent tactics.

NEUTRAL TACTICS

Figure 13

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Mission@30KH0.7M«

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In the example FS scenario shown in Figure 13, theinitial tactics are for red to remain on CAP at 25,000 feetand 0.9 mach with their sensors in passive mode. They aredepending on airborne controlled intercept from the earlywarning aircraft to alert them to incoming threat aircraft.The blue aircraft are following a predeterminedpenetration path, flying at 30,000 feet and 0.9 mach.Since the have no ground or airborne surveillancesupport, they have all of their sensors active, in search ofthreat aircraft to attack.

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EARLY SET UP TACTICS

Figure 14

Figure 16

Once targets have been detected, the aircrafttransitions into the set up phase, hi Figure 14 thedotted lines represent the clustering of the targets andthe groups the opposing aircraft has put them into.The solid lines represent the aircraft groupings ontheir own side. Here both sides are grouped into totwo ship formations, lead and wingman. All of theaircraft are fairly closely spaced, so both sides havegrouped the threats in one cluster, so the engagementwill be a high density 4v4. hi this phase both sideswill continue with Iheir neutral tactics, maintainingthe same speed and altitude. Sensor status will alsoremain the same, passive for the red fighters andactive for the blue fighters. The size of the solid ringsrepresents the range at which the aircraft willtransition into the next tactics. Blue will changetactics before red in the example, as shown by thelarger solid blue rings.

LATE SET UP TACTICS

Figure 15

Fly CAPSensor* Pa **lvt

DCA Mission9 25K ft 0.9 Mach

Swtaor* Passim

hiFigure 15 blue side has closed sufficiently on the targetthat it has changed mission phase and moved on to a newtactic. Blue side has changed from follow penetration pathto point at target as its primary tactic. Altitude hasincreased to 35,000 feet, and speed has increased to mach1.2. Sensors are all in full active mode. Since all four redaircraft are still in one cluster, the attacking blue aircraftwill point to the center of the cluster. Red side has yet totransition from the early set up phase, so its tactic remainsfly CAP orbit. In Figure 16 blue side has closedsufficiently on the target that it has changed missionphase and moved on to a new tactic. Blue side haschanged from follow penetration path to flank target as itsprimary tactic. Altitude has increased to 35,000 feet, andspeed has increased to mach 1.2. Sensors are all in fullactive mode. This tactic tries to gain an advantage bykeeping the known threats on one side of the formation,helping to make the engagement less dense. It also leavesblue in a better tactic situation after the initial merge thandoes the previous straight point at target tactic, since blueis less likely to end up surrounded. Since all four redaircraft are still in one cluster, the attacking blue aircraftwill try to put all four red aircraft to one side. Red sidehas yet to transition from the early set up phase, so itstactic remains fly CAP orbit.

Figure 17

Fly CAPSensors Passlv.

DCA Mission® 26K n 0.9 Ml

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FS Mission'«36Kn 1.2 Mach

Fly CAPSensors ActiveEarly Warning

Fly CAPSensors Passive

DCA Mission«2SK«.».9Maoh

In Figure 17 blue side has closed sufficiently on the target

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that it has changed mission phase and moved on to anew tactic. Blue side has changed from followpenetration path to pincer target as its primary tactic.Altitude has increased to 35,000 feet, and speed hasincreased to mach 1.2. Sensors are all in full activemode. This tactic tries to gain an advantage bysurrounding the known threats, making theengagement denser. It will also leave red in a poortactic situation after the initial merge, most likelyending up surrounded. Since all four red aircraft arestill in one cluster, the attacking blue aircraft will tryto bracket the four threat aircraft. Red side has yet totransition from the early set up phase, so its tacticremains fly CAP orbit.In Figure 18 red side has closed enough on blue tocome off CAP and begin setting up their attackagainst the incoming threats. Both pairs of CAPaircraft change tactics at about the same time, sincethe blue aircraft air coming in between the two CAPpoints. Li this case both pairs of red aircraft fly asimple point at target tactic. Altitude is increased to30,000 feet, and speed to 1.5 mach. Sensors remain inpassive mode, with the intercept being flown fromGCI and own ship passive sensor information. Bluehas not yet close to the attack phase, and willcontinue to close on the red aircraft, using the leadtarget tactic.

Figure 18

Figure 19 shows red side has closed enough on blue tocome off CAP and begin setting up their attack against theincoming threats. Both pairs of CAP aircraft changetactics at about the same time, since the blue aircraft aircoming in between the two CAP points, hi this case theCAP aircraft effectively pincer the incoming threats byboth pairs of red aircraft fly a flank maneuver in oppositedirections to the target Altitude is increased to 30,000feet, and speed to 1.5 mach. Sensors remain in passivemode, with the intercept being flown from GCI and ownship passive sensor information. Blue has not yet close tothe attack phase, and will continue to close on the redaircraft, using the lead target tactic, hi Figure 20 red sidehas closed enough on blue to come off CAP and beginsetting up their attack against the incoming threats. In thiscase both pairs of red aircraft try to flank the incomingaircraft to the same side. Altitude is increased to 30,000feet, and speed to 1.5 mach. Sensors remain in passivemode, with the intercept being flown from GCI and ownship passive sensor information. For this tactic to beeffective, one CAP must come off station earlier than theother, so they can join up before the incoming threatsbegin to engage the red aircraft as they cross their path.Blue has not yet close to the attack phase, and willcontinue to close on the red aircraft, using the lead targettactic.

Figure 20

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Figure 19

Fly CAPSensor* ActhnEarly Warning

Mission930K«0.7

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Mission$ 3DK.lt 0.7

tad Selected TargetSensors Active

FS Mission3SKI11.2 Mach

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Figure 21 shows that red side has closed enough onblue to come off CAP and begin setting up theirattack against the incoming threats. Both pairs ofCAP aircraft change tactics at about the same time,since the blue aircraft air coming in between the twoCAP points. In this case both pairs of red aircraft flya pincer maneuver against the incoming threats.Altitude is increased to 30,000 feet, and speed to 1.5mach. Sensors remain in passive mode, with theintercept being flown from GCI and own ship passivesensor information. The result of this is a low densityattack by red, where all four incoming threats areengaged first by the two red aircraft moving directlytowards the incoming aircraft, and later by the twored aircraft going to the outside of the incomingthreats. Blue has not yet close to the attack phase, andwill continue to close on the red aircraft, using thelead target tactic.

PRE-ATTACK TACTICSHere the engagement has closed sufficiently to whereeach aircraft has selected an individual target, and isbeginning to position itself for a shot. In this case thethreat aircraft have been trying to bracket theincoming blue aircraft, so to set up the interceptgeometry correctly, the red aircraft are being leadrather than pointed at directly. Sensors remain active,and speed and altitude remain 35,000 feet, and mach1.2.

Figure 22

Figure 23

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Point at Seledad TargetSen *ws ActiveDCA Mission

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In Figure 23 the engagement has closed sufficiently towhere each red aircraft has selected an individual target,and is beginning to position itself for a shot. In this casethe threat aircraft have been trying to come between thered aircraft, and each red aircraft is pointing directly at itstarget in the threat group. Sensors are changed to activemode to provide higher track quality for weapon delivery,and speed and altitude remain 30,000 feet, and mach 1.5.

SHOT DOCTRINETo determine when to release a weapon, missilekinematics and effectiveness must be considered. Missilerange kinematics are a function of launch aircraft altitudeand speed, target altitude and speed, and relative launcherto target range and geometry. Some commonly used termsto describe missile launch range are Rmax and R,,e. Ramx isthe maximum range of the missile if the target does notmaneuver. Rae is the maximum range of the missile whereno matter what the target does it cannot get away from themissile. Another commonly used launch range is 80% ofUmax- Another thing to consider is how effective yourweapons are at destroying your intended target. If theweapons are very effective, the shot doctrine might beshoot, wait and see if the target is destroyed, then shootagain if needed (shoot-look-shoot). If the weapons are notvery effective, the shot doctrine might be to shoot twomissiles one right after the other, see what happens to thetarget, the shoot again if need (shoot-shoot-look).

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ATTACK TACTICS

Figure 24\\

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The attack phase shown in Figure 24 is the launchand missile support phase. Blue has taken a singleshot at each threat aircraft. After the shot the offsetfrom their target such that the missile can still besupported, yet maximum separation between the blueaircraft and the target can be maintained. The redaircraft are using a shoot-shoot-look doctrine, and arecontinuing straight toward the target after launchingtheir missiles.

DEFENSIVE TACTICS

25

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At any time during the mission, and aircraft maybecome aware that a weapon has been launchedagainst it. How offensive or defensive an aircraft'sreaction to a missile is going to have an importanteffect on the result of the engagement. Figure 25illustrates some examples. A very defensive tacticcould be to react to any threat aircraft that closeswithin a certain range. A large, slow aircraft with nooffensive weapons might have to react thisconservatively. A slightly more aggressive tactic is toobserve the threat aircraft, and only react if there issome indication that it may have launched a weapon,such as a change in relative offset. More offensive

missile reaction tactics may wait until a missile has beenobserved, observed within some range of own ship, isdirected at own ship, or missiles can be ignoredaltogether. When defending against a weapon, there are anumber of things to consider. Obviously the primaryconcern is evading the weapon that is attacking theaircraft. But speed, altitude, and relative geometry tothreats in the area are also important. If you overreact to athreat weapon and lose all of your energy, you may endup in a worse situation than was required. Many long-range shots can be avoided by a simple offset maneuver,without ever losing the offensive geometry against thelaunching aircraft. Some weapons can be defeated by abeam maneuver, which may allow a more offensive re-engagement than a full turn and run maneuver. If theweapon has a lot of energy however, the defeat of thatmissile may require an all out maneuver, with littleconcern for what happens afterward, since if you don'tbeat that one nothing else much matters. Other factors thatweigh in to missile reaction criteria are the state of anaircraft's own weapons. If the weapons are still in a statewere support from the launching aircraft is required, themissile will probably be wasted if a defensive maneuveris made. Obviously if no weapon is in the air requiringsupport, an aircraft is free to react as other criteria dictate.But if a weapon is in flight, the launching aircraft caneither wait until support is no longer required, or abandonthe weapon and defend against the threat.

POST-ATTACK TACTICS

Figure 2

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After the initial engagement has run its course as inFigure 26, the surviving aircraft must begin to set up thesecond attack. How this is done depend on themaneuverability of the aircraft, and the range of theweapons. If an aircraft is very maneuverable, but hasshorter-range weapons, trying to merge into close-incombat after the initial attack may be the most effectivething to do. On the other hand, if the aircraft is not verymaneuverable, but it has effective long-range weapons,disengaging from the fight to gain separation from the

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threats, then turning back in for a second attack maybe most effective.

DISENGAGE / RE-ENGAGE TACTICS

If after a disengage tactic a re-engage tactic isrequired, there must be criteria for when it is safe tore-enter the fight. If good information is availableabout the location of threat aircraft, then a re-engagement criterion based on range can be used. Butmany aircraft do not have that kind of informationavailable. One way to get around that is to define atime after last indication of a threat behind you towait to turn back into the fight, rejoin yourpenetration path, or return to your CAP point. If thedisengagement was due to missile defense, then youcould also turn back in after a period of time with nomissile indication, regardless of threat aircraft status.

ABORT & SUCCESS CRITERIA

There must also be criteria for when the battle isover. If you are out of fuel or out of weapons, themission must be aborted, and the aircraft return tobase. If the aircraft is on a DCA type mission, therewill be a limit on how far a threat aircraft will bechased from the area to be defended. In some cases,if an aircraft's wingman is destroyed that aircraft willreturn to base. If other cases, an aircraft may continueif its wingman is killed, but when the number of goodguys drop below a certain level, it's probably time tocall it a day. Another reason to abort is if the threatlevel is too high. Discretion is the better part of valorafter all. Mission success is also a good reason tohead for home. If the target is destroyed, or all of theenemy aircraft are destroyed or returning to base,your day is done as well.

DATA COLLECTION

During the MIL test, data will be collected to supportthe analysis objectives of the test. In addition to thisinformation, other data will be desirable if aconstructive simulation is to be set up for moreanalysis based on the MIL test results. It is useful tohave the ability to play back the simulationgraphically. This allows the analyst to quickly seehow the engagement developed, and can helpdetermine the criteria and tactics that need to beimplemented in the constructive simulation toduplicate the engagement. Collecting informationfrom the pilots about what the plan was going in isalso very useful in implementing a scenario. Thingsto look for are initial set up tactics, weapon launchcriteria, weapon defensive criteria, mission success

and mission abort criteria, sensor usage, etc. The pilotdebriefs after each run can also provide a wealth ofinformation. Import information is how well did theystick to their initial plan, what did they do different andwhy, what did they do right and wrong, and what wouldthey do if the situation came up again. Pilot perception isnot always right however, so it is important to collect harddata to determine what really happened during theengagement. Sensor state, sensor detection performance,sensor ID performance, aircraft state, weapon launchrange, etc are all important hard information forimplementing a constructive simulation of tacticsdeveloped in a MIL simulation. When doing theconstructive simulation runs, you will want to collect thesame MOE and MOP information as was collected duringthe virtual runs. This allows a direct comparison ofresults, to see if the constructive analysis back up whatthe MIL simulation indicated. It is also good to collect thesame performance data that was used to help develop thetactics implemented in the constructive simulation. Youwant the same sensor usage, sensor performance flightprofiles, weapon launch ranges, etc that occurred in thevirtual simulation.

CONCLUSIONS

Virtual simulation and constructive simulations usedtogether can reduce costs and improve the quality ofresults. Virtual simulation is the best place for tacticsdevelopment. Real pilots in the cockpit flying thescenarios provide the best source of concept of operationsand tactics. It is difficult to evaluate and develop tacticswithout a real time operator in the loop. Virtualsimulation can also quickly eliminate many parametricexcursions in a test matrix. The operators can usuallydetermine after a few runs what factors are driving theresults, and which ones have little effect. Constructivesimulation provides the number of repetitions required toeliminate anomalies in the results data. A single bad runin a virtual simulation can skew results, since so few runsare available. Constructive simulation is an excellent toolto provide the data to prove that such runs were in factanomalies. Constructive simulation can also be used tolook at further excursions in the test matrix that could notbe included in the virtual test. The only caveat to that isthat the excursions must be applicable to the developedand proven tactics, otherwise the results are probably notvalid.

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