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      q       u       a       r       t       e       r       l       y www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC Aa S Qal  Vs, Sag, Dalg Jaa 2012 Norm Augustine: HE RE SEARCH AND DEV ELOPMEN G AP  Jo hn Adams & Chris Cour tney:  ADD CARROS O IRAN POLICY MENU  Andrew Ho lland: FUSION FOR HE FUUR E Stephen A. Cheney: HOW O BREAK HE CHOK E HOLD OIL HA S ON OUR NAI ONAL SECUR I Y  Josh ua Foust: HE BRILLIA N , UN WO RK ABLE NEW SILK ROAD and Matthew Wallin: FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOR HE 2012 PRESIDENIAL ELECION
Transcript
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www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC

Aa S Qal Vs, Sag, Dalg

Jaa 2012

Norm Augustine: HE RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMEN GAP

 John Adams & Chris Courtney:

 ADD CARROS O IRAN POLICY MENU Andrew Holland: FUSION FOR HE FUURE

Stephen A. Cheney: HOW O BREAK HE CHOKE

HOLD OIL HAS ON OUR NAIONAL SECURIY 

 Joshua Foust: HE BRILLIAN, UNWORKABLE NEW SILK

ROAD

andMatthew Wallin: FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOR HE 2012 PRESIDENIALELECION

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introDuction

 Welcome to the rst edition o American Security Quarterly !

Tis new e-magazine is a collection o our board members, ellows and members o the Consensus or American Security writings over the last quarter. In the ollowing editions we will be publishing originalcontent as well as a round up rom our other key work.

Tis edition o the American Security Quarterly shows that the last quarter o 2011 was packed ull with thkey issues that are acing our nation.

 We have a signature article by our board member Norm Augustine on the growing research anddevelopment gap acing America. As a percentage o GDP, the U.S. ranks eighth, behind Japan, SouthKorea, and even Iceland. He notes: “China is investing in science, engineering, manuacturing, energy andtransportation…. It now dominates the United States in the manuacture o clean energy technologies.China has leaped over its global competitors, both in the United States and in Europe, in the making o 

 wind turbines and solar panels.”

Consensus members - Brig. Gen. John Adams and Lt. Col. Chris Courtney – discuss the need to have a

ull strategic plan in dealing with Iran. Tey state: “We must choose policy options likely to prevent both anuclear-armed Iran and the outbreak o regional war.” Tis will be a key issue or 2012. We need to makesure we work to achieve both these aims, and not walk blindly into military action.

On the energy ront we have articles on the potential or usion power, the need or international emissionsreductions, and how we can break the choke hold o oil. ASP Senior Fellow Andrew Holland noted:“America aces a series o signicant challenges regarding how we produce energy over the next severaldecades. Our current energy system undermines our national security, is economically unstable, andenvironmentally unsustainable.”

Te last quarter also marked the 10-year anniversary o action in Aghanistan. We published a major reporrom ASP Fellow, Joshua Foust , discussing the need to properly dene strategy and metrics in the conict

there. In an accompanying piece, he argues: “Te real challenge in Aghanistan is that the American eort(as measured by money, people and attention) has ocused almost exclusively on the military, while thealiban has ocused on politics…Te aliban is winning the war or hearts and minds.”

 As we saw the year out, Te Atlantic, in conjunction with ASP published a 12 essay series on the 20thanniversary o the all o the Soviet Union. In the introduction piece, ASP Chairman, Sen. Gary Hart ,

 wrote: “We spent a hal-century army-to-army and missile- to-missile. Te time will come, and none toosoon, when it will be benecial to both o us to stand shoulder- to- shoulder.”

 We hope you will continue to read and ollow our work throughout 2012 and ollowing years. We believethat is only with sustained non-partisan engagement, setting out the national security issues, explaining thechallenges, and oering strategic advice can we spur real constructive action.

BG Sh A. ch uSmc (r.)

CEO American Security Project

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CONENS

NAIONAL SECURIY SRAEGY 

Russia and Te United States in the 21st Century Page 6

Gary Hart 

Dening Victory in Aghanistan Page 7

 Joshua Foust 

Foreign Policy Issues or the 2012 Presidential Election Page 9

 Matthew Wallin

CLIMAE AND ENERGY SECURIY 

Fusion or the Future Page 12 Andrew Holland 

  Why We Can’t Let Solyndra Fail Kill Support or Solar Page 13

 Andrew Holland 

U.S. Military’s Eforts to Reduce Exposure to Energy Security Risks Page 15

 Andrew Holland 

It’s ime or International Emissions Reductions Page 16

 Andrew Holland 

How o Break the Choke Hold Oil Has on Our National Security Page 17

Stephen A. Cheney 

  A Bigger Bang or Our Buck? Page 19

Veronique Lee 

 AMERICAN COMPEIIVENESS

Te Research and Development Gap Page 21

Norm Augustine 

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ERRORISM AND ASYMMERIC WARFARETe Brilliant, Unworkable New Silk Road Page 25

 Joshua Foust 

Foreign Aid Shouldn’t be the First thing on the Chopping Block Page 26 Matthew Wallin

  Are Private Contractors undermining the Intelligence Community Page 27

 Joshua Foust 

Kyrgyzstan’s Promising but Uncertain Political Future Page 29

 Joshua Foust 

Hearts and Minds: Al-Qaeda’s Visit to Somalia Page 30

Lara Getz 

NUCLEAR SECURIY   Add Carrots to Iran Policy Menu Page

 John Adams and Chris Courtney 

Deense Spending in an Age o Austerity Page 34

 Joshua Foust 

Further Reading   Page 36

20 Years Ater the Fall: Te U.S. and Russia in the post-Soviet World

 ASP Major Reports:

 ASP Fact sheets and Perspectives

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NAIONAL SECURIY SRAEGY 

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Russia and the United States in

the 21st Century Gary Hart

HE ALANIC

December 12, 2011

 20 years ater the all o the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Russia are ar rom the trusting partners that we perhaps 

should be.

In October 2011, the Institute or World His-tory in Moscow held an unprecedented coner-ence concerning President Tomas Jeerson and

Czar Alexander I. Leading American historians Gor-don Wood, Peter Onu, and others, as well as lead-ing Russian historians, including Academician Alexei

Chubarian and Proessor Vladimir Sorgin, partici-pated. Some o the presentations and discussions o-cused on the correspondence between the two headso government between 1804 and 1808, on Napo-leon’s invasion o Russia and the British invasion o the U.S., both o which occurred in 1812, and onthe consequent torching o the two capitols, Moscowand Washington, thereater.

  Alexis de oqueville’s amous prediction in 1835that America and Russia, two great continental pow-ers, would someday play leading roles in the world

 was predated by Russian exploration o the Western  American continent as ar south as today’s Calior-nia and thereater qualied by the landing o a smallU.S. expeditionary orce in Siberia during the Rus-sian Revolution. But throughout the Cold War, deoqueville seemed prescient indeed.

Te shared global leadership between America andRussia ended two decades ago. Te 74 year Russiandetour into communism can be viewed only as i rapidly retreating in a rear-view mirror. But the endo the Cold War revealed a curious anomaly in U.S.oreign policy thought. Much to the surprise o Rus-

sians and many Americans, including mysel, insteado rushing to embrace Russia and drawing it closely into Western economic, political, and security circles,

 we have resorted to reliance on personal relationshipsbetween American and Russian presidents as the ba-sis or our bilateral relationships. And we continue tohold Russia suspiciously at arm’s length.

Tere has been little, i any, explanation o this suspicion toward Russia and its roots in the Americanmind, or at least in the minds o certain oreign policy experts. Arguably, we have better relations withChina than Russia and spend a great deal more eorin tending to that relationship. In gauging how closor how distant to remain regarding another nation

or power, the measure ought to be whether there armore interests in common than in opposition. Bythat measure, our relationship to Russia ought to beamong our closest.

 We both are committed to reduction o weapons omass destruction. We both have immediate interestin combating terrorism. Russia stands on the bordeo ve signicant Islamic republics and shares concerns with us regarding stability in the Balkans andthe Black Sea region. Russia possesses immense natural resources (especially energy), supplies many o ouallies in Europe, and oers an alternative source to

precarious Persian Gul supplies. Russia has worldclass scientists, physicist, and mathematicians. Wuse Russian rocket propulsion systems to launchspace missions and cooperate on manned space missions. Russia oers a vast market or American and

 Western products and services, an opportunity morappreciated by European enterprises than Americanones.

Further, Russia can be o considerable help to uand our allies in venues as disparate as Iran, NorthKorea, and the Middle East. In each o these cases

they stand to lose at least as much as we do, i nomore, rom war in these regions. We should treat thRussians as partners, not subordinates, and appeal tothese and other common interests.

Te American Security Project oers a series o essayconcerning the U.S.-Russian relationship post-Cold

 War and post-Soviet empire. It is timed to coincid  with the 20th anniversary o the all o the SovieUnion, which ormally dissolved on December 251991. We consider here Russia’s energy pictureour mutual arms control eorts, our role in NAOand NAO’s relationship to Russia, and a numbe

o other topics addressed by qualied experts somo whom have studied these issues or years. Eortsuch as this very much characterize the charter andpurpose o the American Security Project -- to explore new and productive ways o pursuing Americaninterests, especially those that increasingly coincid

 with old and new allies, that will enhance the securityo Americans and others.

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For mysel, it is sufcient to prophesy, even with lit-tle tangible evidence, that sometime in this century,sooner rather than later, the United States and Russia

 will identiy a common destiny that requires a degreeo mutual understanding and cooperation seen only by de oqueville almost two centuries ago. We spenta hal-century army-to-army and missile-to-missile.

Te time will come, and none too soon, when it willbe benecial to both o us to stand shoulder to shoul-der.

You can fnd other essays in this series at:www.americansecurityproject.org 

Dening Victory in Aghanistan Joshua Foust

PBS: NEED O KNOW 

November 9, 2011

On Monday, a roadside bomb exploded in north- western Aghanistan, killing 11 people. Te in-

cident was unremarkable in most aspects: insurgentshid among civilians, targeted Aghans instead o theinternational troops nearby and managed to cause ashocking amount o bloodshed.

  Areas like Baghdis province, where that bomb ex-ploded, y under the radar o many pundits andpop-analysts o the war. Part o the supposedly saenorthern regions o the country, Baghdis has neverbenetted rom the largesse slathered on more prob-

lematic provinces like Kandahar or Helmand.

Nevertheless, northern Aghanistan has undergonepossibly the most drastic change o ortune over thelast two years or so. It has gone rom being a relative-ly quiet, unremarkable place to the scene o increas-ingly violent bloodshed. Despite this transormation,much o the popular discussion o the war ocuses onthe southern region, where a massive inux o troopsand an even more massive inux o money have sup-posedly reduced violence.

Max Boot is one o the most visible o these boosters. In a

cover story or the Weekly Standard, he argues that i only the troops are given enough time and money, they canturn the change in southern Aghanistan into victory orthe war. Te only thing between the troops and victory,he argues, are naysayers in Washington, D.C., who think things are hopeless.

It’s an enticing argument: Te country blames Washing-ton or everything else that is going wrong in the country,so why not blame Washington or the war as well? But inreality, Boot misdiagnoses the problem, and thus misas-signs blame.

Looking at Aghanistan only through the prism o Kan-dahar and Helmand would leave one with the impressionthat the war is winnable, because blanketing a region withMarines and lots o cash actually will dramatically aectthe environment. But the current method o “paciying”the south is unsustainable: According to Te Washington

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Post, over the course o one year the military spent $1.3billion on a single district o 80,000 people in Helmandprovince. Tat’s $16,250 per person in that district, wellabove Aghanistan’s per capita GDP o $900 (and abovethat o most other countries on the planet). Worse still, aSenate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that 97percent o Aghanistan’s GDP comes rom oreign aid. Te

current path is too expensive and too unlikely to work tokeep up or much longer.

Realistically, the United States cannot spend that muchmoney orever, in the hopes that somehow along the way 

 Aghanistan will x itsel. Tis is the weakness o the casethat war boosters like Boot put orward: they assume thati only the military is given enough time to do whateverthe military does – killing bad guys and handing out un-athomable sums o money to impoverished armers – thenvictory, however nebulously dened, will happen.

Te sad reality o Aghanistan is that victory is not achiev-

able with our current strategy and policies. Last month, Ireleased a report with my think tank, Te American Secu-rity Project, which tried to assess President Obama’s goalsor the war. Te current strategy boils down to three broadgoals: deny al Qaeda sae haven, prevent the aliban romoverthrowing the government and build up the Aghangovernment so it can unction on its own.

From these goals, we can derive what the victory analystslike Boot don’t dene might look like. Te challenge is thatthis victory is dened mostly by absence – things that mustnot happen, like al Qaeda not returning. But a big part o the strategy is actually political: preventing a aliban take-over, building up a sustainable and unctional government,creating the rule o law, and so on.

  A political conict does not necessarily require a hugenumber o troops. But when pundits talk about “victory”in Aghanistan, the discussion invariably centers on arbi-trary troop numbers and not on the politics o the conict.Tere is no sense o allowing Aghans to chart their owncourse, make their own decisions, and yes, even disagree

 with American policymakers along the way.

Te real challenge in Aghanistan is that the American

eort (as measured by money, people and attention) hasocused almost exclusively on the military, while the ali-ban has ocused on politics. Tat is why they target the

 Aghan police with their IEDs – they are sowing uncer-tainty, trying to show the people o Aghanistan that theirgovernment is worthless, and that international orces aretoothless to stop them. Te aliban is winning the war or

hearts and minds.

Looked at this way, the war in Aghanistan doesn’t needbunch o troops lumbering across the countryside. It neea political strategy that might have a military componebut would be primarily ocused on Aghanistan’s politibalancing local needs with national needs, establishing

collaborative relationship between Kabul and the urtheung regions o the country, and cutting deals with locpower brokers to establish peace and a measure o economic activity.

Unlike the seemingly endless number o troops and amoney needed to execute our current military stratein Aghanistan, a politically oriented strategy would achievable at a low cost, and would not require 65,00troops to make it work. Rather, a political strategy requirpatience, savvy and the understanding that politics are dcult and messy – sometimes almost as messy (i not bloody) as warare itsel.

 Aghanistan is not a lost cause i we change our strategBut debating how many troops should stay on a certadate, which still dominates the discussion in Washingtomisses the point. Te number o troops doesn’t matter; tstrategy does. And the strategy is not working. It’s time change.

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Foreign Policy Issues or the2012 Presidential ElectionMatthew Wallin

HE HILL

November 7, 2011

One year beore the 2012 General Election,

 Americans should keep an eye out or someo the key issues characterizing the debate

over oreign policy. Recognizing the various challeng-es the United States aces overseas, here is a list o 8issues that require careul consideration by the 2012presidential candidates:

• Te defense budget is extraordinarily large, andhas nearly doubled since 2001. Tere are a number o challenges in reducing the budget, including person-nel costs, equipment repair and replacement, and thedevelopment o new weapons systems to replace theaging US inventory. Congress and the Department o Deense will have to seriously consider which o ourassets are most important or 21st Century deense,both conventional and nuclear, and allocate reducedunding appropriately.

• Te wars the United States has been engaged inover the last decade have been expensive in terms o blood, equipment, and treasure. As the US withdrawsrom Iraq and plans ahead or withdrawal rom A-

ghanistan in 2014, it must ocus on preparing or theconsequences o these actions. Tese include the very real possibility that the current Aghan governmentmay collapse or that the successes o the Arab Springmay not ourish. While the U.S. should assist in thedevelopment o political processes in these countries,there must also be back-up plans should the situa-tions ail to be resolved avorably.

• Te reset with Russia got o to a rocky startrom the moment Secretary o State Clinton present-ed Foreign Minister Lavrov with a “reset button” thatmistakenly read “overload” in Russian. It’s time the

US got serious about engaging Russia. From missiledeense to oil pipelines, there is a lot to be gained by engaging Russia as a partner rather than as an adver-sary. And don’t orget, 2012 is a presidential electionyear in Russia as well.

• Iran’s nuclear program has been the subjecto much international scrutiny. Beore employing amilitary option to prevent Iran’s potential acquisitiono a nuclear weapon, the US must engage in a seriouscost-benet analysis. A military strike is extremely unlikely to signicantly delay or prevent Iran romdeveloping a nuclear capability i they chose to do so,

and runs the extreme risk o exploding into a muchlarger, protracted conict. Instead, the US should o-cus on working with the international community toachieve an acceptable outcome.

• Climate change is a settled scientic consen-sus based on overwhelming evidence. Te goal nowshould be reducing our environmental impact by investing in green technology, reducing waste, and

 working with partners worldwide to create innovativesolutions that are better or the environment whilestill serving people’s needs.

• Energy security is a collective challenge that facesnot only the US, but the world as a whole. It requiresboth brainpower and nancial resources to manage.One promising technology still under development isnuclear usion, a clean and sae type o energy utiliz-ing the same principle that powers the sun. Despitethe recent accident at Fukushima, the prospect o eliminating ssion-based nuclear power is unviable,and will remain an important part o energy produc-tion or the oreseeable uture. In the meantime, theUS should continue working to alleviate dependenceon vulnerable energy sources by taking steps such as

increasing uel-economy standards and incorporatingnext generation biouels.

• Te Southern Border has been receiving a loto attention over issues ranging rom immigrationto drug wars and arms trafcking. Te United Statesmust get serious about addressing some o these is-sues, including immigration reorm that comprehen-sively addresses abuses o the law while simpliyingand augmenting the visa system. Tough the borderitsel has seen relative calm in recent years, violencesouth o the border and the allout over the Fast andFurious asco urther emphasize the need to develop

enorceable policy.

• China is not as big of a threat as some havemade it out to be. Rather than worrying about Chi-na’s edgling orce-projection capabilities such asits reurbished Russian-built aircrat carrier, the US

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should look or ways to engage the Chinese in waysthat create areas o cooperation rather than conron-tation. Economic interdependence between the twocountries osters a situation in which the cost o con-ict ar outweighs its benet, increasing the likelihoodthat both countries will seek peaceul resolutions tocurrent and uture disputes.

 Matthew Wallin holds a Master’s in Public Diplomacy  rom the University o Southern Caliornia, and is anintern at American Security Project, a non-partisanthink tank in Washington, D.C.

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CLIMAE AND ENERGY SECURIY 

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Fusion For Te Future Andrew Holland

 AOL ENERGY 

September 20, 2011

 A merica aces a series o signicant challengesregarding how we produce and use energy overthe next several decades. Our current energy 

system undermines our national security, is economi-cally unstable, and environmentally unsustainable.

 Although the recession has reduced energy demand,in the longer term the US is expected to see a 20%increase in total energy demand and a 30% increasein electricity demand by 2035.

Meanwhile, our existing inrastructure is aging. O 

the approximately 1400 coal-red generators, 104nuclear reactors, and over 5000 natural gas powerplants, almost all will have to be replaced or substan-tially retrotted over the next 40 years.

Tese challenges will require our politicians, scien-tists, and business leaders to make a series o choicesabout what we want our energy system to look like in2030 and 2050.

Fundamentally, this represents a choice: either busi-ness as usual or a new course that rmly establishes

 American leadership in clean, sustainable energy pro-

duction.

Renewable power, like wind and solar, together withincreased efciency and conservation measures, mustbe a part o the new energy paradigm. But, when youlook beyond the medium term, there are real ques-tions about whether a modern grid can support theintermittency and unpredictability o a grid that ismore than hal-powered by renewables.

Electricity rom usion could provide the baseloadpower necessary to overcome this.

Fusion energy is obtained by orcing together atomicnuclei rom deuterium, a orm o hydrogen easily sep-arated rom ordinary seawater, and tritium (anotherorm o hydrogen).

 A single gram o uel can yield 90,000-kilowatt hours

o energy. Put another way, it would take 10 milliopounds o coal to yield as much energy as one pouno usion uel. Tis energy will become heat to masteam running a conventional electric generator.

Fusion is clean, sae, and sustainable. Te supply uel (extracted rom seawater and lithium) is essenti

ly limitless, due to the small amounts o uel requireUnlike traditional nuclear power, there is no chareaction and there is no possibility o a meltdown.usion reaction releases no pollutants or greenhougases and leaves no dangerous spent uel.

Fusion is happening in laboratories in America anaround the world. But, achieving a commercially vable usion reaction remains a great engineering chlenge. Te problem is that initiating usion requirbringing the uel to extremes o heat or pressure. Iniating and containing that reaction – commonly do

 with either magnets or lasers – has always requir

putting more energy in than comes out.

However, experiments planned or this year and ne  within the National Ignition Facility at LawrenLivermore National Laboratory are expected to yiepulses o usion energy greater than that used by thuge laser array to trigger them. Achieving this “igntion” will be an important milestone on the way commercialized power rom usion.

Te leaders o the main US national labs say they anow ready to start building pilot plants to test how progress toward commercialization. For the rst tim

  we can oresee a road to commercial usion powplants.

Even though usion energy can provide ultimate eergy security or America, a lack o leadership, polical will, and strategic planning by the US governmecould allow China or others to be the rst to succeully commercialize this new industry. Only a e

 weeks ago the Chinese announced that they are planing to train 2,000 scientists to pursue research andevelopment into usion. We could choose to sit baand let other countries lead – but that would cede t

 world’s next great industry to oreign companies aoreign workers.

Fusion is not a panacea, and it is not without coBut, we know that our aging energy inrastructu

 will require America’s utility companies to replace t

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current generation o power plants with something. Why not a true energy o the uture?

Tis is not some ar-away dream; the choices we maketoday will shape the energy system o tomorrow.

  Andrew Holland is the Senior Fellow or Energy and Climate at the American Security Project, a bi-partisanthink-tank examining the big strategic choices acing the Unites States.

 Why We Can’t Let Solyndra Failure Kill Support or Solar

 Andrew Holland

HE ALANIC 

September 15, 2011

Yes, one Obama-backed solar energy company that got a huge government loan went belly-up. But the sector 

still needs support or it will wither.

he solar rm Solyndra led or bankruptcy two weeks ago -- two years ater it received a$535 million loan rom the U.S. government.

Immediately, the rm’s Chapter 11 ling became themajor story in the clean energy community, and itcontinues to dominate talk this week. On Wednes-day, the House Committee on Energy and Com-merce held a hearing, “Solyndra and the DOE LoanGuarantee Program,” where a number o members o Congress questioned whether the U.S. governmentshould be subsidizing such “speculative ventures” atall.

Solyndra had raised nearly $1 billion in private capi-tal, but the reason that everyone in Washington isollowing its collapse so closely is because the $535million loan was given with stimulus unds throughthe reasury’s Federal Financing Bank -- and thenguaranteed by an increasingly controversial program

to support green technology run by the Departmento Energy (DOE).

It appears that the process or approving and vettingthis loan may have been short-changed due to pres-sure rom the White House. Whether this makes theloan “shady,” as some have said, will be determinedby the investigations ongoing through the FBI andCongress.

Either way, policymakers should be careul not to be-smirch the entire concept o clean energy subsidiesbecause o this one bad experience.

Te DOE’s loan guarantee program is the most im-portant o the government’s clean energy subsidies. It

 was the centerpiece o itle XVII o the Energy Policy  Act o 2005. Tis was the section o the bill devotedto creating incentives or new technologies that re-

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duced greenhouse gas emissions. It was oered as anamendment in the Senate, supported by both Repub-licans and Democrats, as the consensus method ormitigating climate change. Te argument at the time,put orth by Republican senators like Chuck Hageland Pete Domenici, was that we should ght climatechange by investing in new technology, not by gov-ernment mandates or a carbon price.

It shows how ar the debate on climate has allen thatthese arguments -- and voices -- are seldom heard any-more. Whereas six years ago it was a question o “how”government policy should address climate change andsupport the development o clean technology, today those who question the science dominate the climatedebate in Congress. Tat means that the question hasbecome “i” the government should create incentivesor clean technology or not.

In this new context, the argument has taken holdthat any spending and subsidies or clean energy area “boondoggle” or just throwing money down a ra-thole. Tere is a real danger that the short cuts thatmay have been taken on the Solyndra loan will poisonthis important subsidy program.

Te solar industry is in a period o rapid ux rightnow. It is seeing drastically reduced prices; they havedropped rom about $2 per watt in 2009 to about$1.40 today and are moving toward $1 per watt in2012. Tis rapid drop in prices will soon make install-ing new solar competitive with traditional electricity 

generation, like coal or natural gas. Firms such Solyn-dra, whose business models required a high price, willhave a hard time staying in business under such in-tense competition.

 An important comparison or the solar industry to-day is the auto industry a century ago. Have you everheard o the Lexington Motor Company, the KisselKar, or the Liberty Motor Car? Tese were all automanuactures that ceased to exist over the course o the Ford Model ’s 19-year production run, between1908 through 1927. Tey went bankrupt because

they could not compete on price, quality, or capac-ity with the standard set by the Model . You may,however, have heard o Pontiac, Cadillac, Oldsmo-bile, and Chevrolet -- they were all independent com-panies that were acquired by General Motors in thisperiod. As an industry matures, we should expect tosee a shakeout through bankruptcies and mergers thatleads to ewer, but bigger and stronger, companies.

oday, we are seeing this consolidation in the solindustry. Te U.S. Solar Energy Industries Assocition lists over 1000 member companies in the U.

 Around the world there are thousands more. Tat surely ar too many or an efcient industry. Alreadthe solar equipment industry has seen $3.3 billion mergers and acquisitions activity this year. Solyndis the most high-prole American solar bankruptthis year, but not the only one: Evergreen Solar anSpectraWatt have also led or bankruptcy this year

Tis consolidation should lead to a more mature idustry. As companies go bankrupt, their competito

 will secure their actories and equipment. Productiomanagement, and design will be standardized acrothe industry. Solar photovoltaic cells will becomecommodity, where the only competition is based oprice. All o this benets consumers around the worl

  And where American politicians are threatening discontinue solar subsidies over the misspending one loan, our competitors around the world are puting their thumbs on the scale to ensure that thebusinesses are the ones that survive the solar shakout. Te Chinese have announced plans to install 1gigawatts o solar capacity by 2015, supported byeed-in tari and government mandates; this is times the U.S.’s current installed capacity. Japan anEuropean countries, too, are promoting domestic slar companies.

 American consumers could still benet -- by simp

letting oreign governments subsidize their solar companies, who will then export the solar cells to the U.But i that is the choice that members o Congremake, then they shouldn’t complain in ve years ththere are no American companies competing in tglobal solar energy marketplace.

I America wants a globally competitive solar indutry, our government must make the choice to suppoinnovative new technologies developed by Americcompanies here in America. Te solar industry hproved over the last ve years that it should be a

important part o America’s energy uture. We shoube careul that this argument over Solyndra does nharm our long-term energy uture.

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U.S. Military’s Eforts to ReduceExposure to Energy Security 

Risks Andrew Holland

 ASP FLASHPOIN BLOG

October 4, 2011

Last week, there was an important article postedup on the Army’s website, “Scientists bring en-ergy solutions to the desert.” Te article discuss-

es how the Army has set up a small (one megawatt)smart-grid at the Army’s Camp Sabalu-Harrison in

 Aghanistan. Te smart grid uses 4 large diesel gen-erators to provide power or 66 structures. Tese 4system is an example o a ‘smart grid’ because it is

able to balance supply and demand throughout theday. Tis grid has replaced 20 separate generators that were required to be running all day regardless o de-mand. Whereas the old system required a uel truck to rell each generator throughout the day, the newsystem has one centralized reueling point.

Tis article is an example o how the dierent branch-es o the military are innovating ways to reduce theirexposure to energy security risks. I spent a ew daysdown at Maxwell Air Force Base last week or a con-erence on the military’s proposal’s to address energy security. At this conerence (held under Chatham

House rules – so I can’t quote anything or attribu-tion), it was clear that every branch o the military 

 was moving to reduce their exposure to energy inse-curity.

Mostly, this means that the military is trying to re-duce their use o oil. Tere are two big reasons todo this. Strategically, military leadership understandsthat scarce resources, like oil, are a potential spark o conict, and the military’s dependence on oil romunstable regions is a major strategic vulnerability. Atthe tactical level, the long logistical tail let by con-

voys carrying uel or water are the most vulnerable toattack, with some sources saying that one casualty istaken or every 24 convoys.

Reducing uel use means means dierent things toeach service. Te Navy and the Air Force don’t haveto operate orward deployed bases, so they are less

concerned about the vulnerability o their supply lines. Instead, they are concerned that uture short-ages o oil could impact their eectiveness. Te AirForce is testing biouels in an eort to secure ‘drop-in’ replacements or jet uel. Similarly, the Navy hasthe Green Hornet program or naval aviation to runon a 50/50 blend o biouel and traditional jet uel

and just last year it launched the USS Makin Island(pictured), the rst navy ship to run on a hybrid gasturbine with electric auxiliaries propulsion plant.

Like the Army, the Marines are concerned about re-ducing the logistics tail o orward-deployed units.However, they have also been getting a lot o pressrecently or their push to use solar on the battleeldto reduce the heavy load o batteries that each Marineis orced to carry into battle.

 All o this has led some policy people to talk about“Green Soldiers” or some such term, but the military’s

push to reduce uel use is not about being environ-mentally riendly, it is about helping the war ghtersto more eectively ght and win wars. However, itis an important bonus that the technology they aredeveloping could immediately be useul to Americancivilians. I a biouel mix turns out to be a drop-in re-placement or jet uel, I am sure that civilian airlines

 will jump on. Similarly, the Army’s microgrid couldprovide signicant experience or implementing alarger ‘smart grid’ here at home. Here’s hoping thatinnovations rom the battleeld can help civilians as

 well as the military.

 WWW.AMERICANSECURIYPROJEC.ORG

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It’s ime For InternationalEmissions Reductions

 Andrew Holland

 AOL ENERGY 

November 8, 2011

Last week, news rom the Department o En-ergy’s Carbon Dioxide Inormation AnalysisCenter announced that 2010 was a record year

or CO2 emissions. Not only did emissions reach arecord high, but the annual amount o growth wasunprecedented.

Tis is a worrying rise. It means that emissions areexceeding the Intergovernmental Panel or ClimateChange’s (IPCC’s) worst-case scenario. It means thatthe world could be heading or dangerous, unprec-edented, and irreversible climate change.

Te AP’s story on this noted that “extra pollution inChina and the US account or more than hal the in-crease in emissions last year.” Tat statement is true,but misleading. China alone accounted or 41% o the world’s emissions growth. Because o the size o the growth in Chinese emissions, the story could justas truthully have said that China and India (9.5% o 

 world growth) accounted or more than hal o lastyear’s increase in emissions.

Tis act hints at a larger, and more important story that is buried within the numbers: the growth in emis-sions is no longer coming rom the developed world.It is the developing world that is now the driver o emissions growth.

Emissions in the United States were still below their2007 peak. Similarly, the EU is below 2008 levels, asare Russia, Japan, and Australia.

Te reductions in emissions in these developed coun-tries have been driven by the economic downturnstemming rom the nancial crisis, elt more strongly 

in the developed world than the developing world.However, their emissions reductions have their rootsin longstanding governmental policies, like the EU’sEmissions rading Scheme or Japan’s efciency e-orts. In addition, governmental policies to developand deploy clean energy generating technology meanthat these reductions could prove durable.

On the other hand, a return to energy-intensive ecnomic growth, in large developing countries like Chna, India, Brazil, and Egypt--whose emissions weup by 10%, 9%, 12%, and 5%, respectively--makemuch less likely that the world can stabilize emissioat a level that the IPCC says would preclude dangeous climate change.

Te world needs an eective global mechanism or rducing emissions. Unortunately, the Kyoto Protochas not proved eective.

Kyoto’s greatest ault was that it divided the worinto developed and developing countries. Under tUN’s Framework Convention on Climate Chan(UNFCCC), the negotiating body or reducing emsions, the world is divided between “Annex 1” (dveloped) and “Non-Annex 1” (developing) countri

 At a historic meeting in Berlin in 1995, two years bore Kyoto, the principle o “common but dieren

ated responsibilities” was agreed to that separated t world into two. Te idea was that developed countri were principally responsible or the historic emissionso they should be principally responsible or reducintheir emissions. In practice, though, this has meathat developed country signatories are responsible reductions, while developing countries ace no succonstraints. Te divide between developed and deveoping countries was the reason that the United StatSenate never ratied the Kyoto Protocol.

In 1994, the year beore the principle was put in

place, non-annex 1 countries accounted or 40% the world’s emissions rom energy use. Since thehowever, the developing world, and China in particlar, have gone on a growth spurt. oday, the ratio halmost ipped, with Non-Annex 1 countries accouning or 56% o emissions, and growing ast. O tgrowth in emissions measured in 2010, 68% camrom non-annex 1 countries.

  As the world prepares to gather in Durban, Sou Arica in December or another round o UNFCCnegotiations, negotiators should work towards aagreement that provides a realistic and eective w

to reduce dangerous climate emissions. Te curreapproach, embodied in the Kyoto Protocol, is clearineective.

Te Copenhagen Accord, agreed two years ago at tCopenhagen conerence, was a step in the right diretion. It asked, or the rst time, that all countries su

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mit targets or controlling emissions that would beveriable by the UN. However, it has never been ully embraced by negotiators: European countries want astrict legally binding treaty, no matter the cost, whilemajor developing countries continue to adhere to theprinciple o common but dierentiated responsibili-ties.

Tis report shows that i a new approach--one thatpromises to actually reduce total global emissions,not just the slowest growing subset--is not reached,the world could be in or dangerous levels o climatechange.

  We need an approach that shares technology andbest-practices around the world, while asking all butthe Least Developed Countries to take some orm o measurable, reportable, and veriable limits on theiremissions. Only then will the world be able stabilizeemissions. But- we must hurry; it could soon be too

late.

 Andrew Holland is the Senior Fellow or Energy and Climate at the American Security Project, a bi-partisanthink-tank examining the big strategic choices acing the Unites States. His previous articles on AOL Energy in-clude Fusion For Te Future.

How o Break Te Chokehold Oil Has On Our NationalSecurity Stephen A. Cheney 

 AOL ENERGY November 30, 2011

Oil is a global commodity--it is easy and cheapto ship it around the world. Tat means thatthe security o its distribution network is just

as important as the security o its supply. Tis dis-tribution network--including port terminals, hugeoil supertankers, and lengthy pipelines--is vast andcostly. It is also vulnerable to conict, piracy and ter-rorism.

 About one th o America’s oil imports come romthe Persian Gul, passing through the Strait o Hor-muz as it is shipped to our shores. Over 15 millionbarrels o oil per day pass through the Strait, a 21mile-wide body o water vulnerable to Iranian anti-ship missiles. Iran has repeated its threats to close theStrait and is well positioned to carry out attacks on oiltankers in transit. Te very threat o closing the Straito Hormuz to shipping is enough to give the Iranianregime more leverage in the region than they are due.

Further along oil’s journey rom Arabian oil wells tothe gasoline pump is either the Strait o Bab el-Man-dab or the Strait o Malacca, both o which have arecent history o piracy. Tese chokepoints betweenthe horn o Arica and the Middle East and the In-dian Ocean to the South China Sea, respectively, arevulnerable to regional powers and to piracy. In 2009the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy ReportingCentre in Malaysia recorded 42 attacks on oil tankersaround the world, a 40% increase rom 2008. Temajority o pirate attacks occurred o the coast o Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula.

errorist attacks on energy inrastructure have also

been on the rise. Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil process-ing acility-where two-thirds o the country’s outputis rened-was the target o a suicide bomb attack inFebruary 2006. In early October 2010, the Pakistanialiban claimed responsibility or attacks on oil tank-ers en route to Aghanistan, vowing to attack again.

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Inormation seized during the May 2 raid that killedOsama bin Laden in Pakistan revealed Al Qaeda’scontinued interest in targeting oil tankers and com-mercial oil inrastructure at sea.

Piracy and terrorism are o greatest concern at thesegeostrategic chokepoints ar rom home, but Amer-

ica’s own oil inrastructure provides similar threats.Over 40% o total US petroleum rening capacity lies along the Gul Coast, an area extremely suscep-tible to natural disasters. In 2004, Hurricane Ivandestroyed seven platorms in the Gul o Mexico,signicantly damaged 24 others, and hurt over 100pipelines.

Te ollowing year, Hurricane Katrina wreaked hav-oc in the Gul, destroying more than 100 platormsand damaging 558 pipelines. O the approximately 20 reneries and production acilities along the Gul Coast in 2005, Katrina temporarily closed nine a-cilities and shut down two completely. As a result,US oil supplies saw a reduction o up to 1.4 millionbarrels a day - 8 percent o total US production. In

 January o this year, below-reezing temperatures in Alaska orced BP, ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobilto suspend 95% o production rom the North Slopearea.

Te tempting solution is to say that it is necessarily to drill or more oil in the US – but a “Drill, Baby,Drill” strategy would not protect us. Even i the USimported no oil rom the Persian Gul, a closure o 

the Strait o Hormuz to shipping would devastateour economy by driving up global oil prices to re-cord highs. Instead, the solution must be to reduceoil consumption by working with the automotive in-dustry to bring orward more uel-efcient vehicles

 while simultaneously expanding our use o alterna-tive energy.

So, to prevent our dependency on oil rom distortingthe decisions we make, both abroad and at home, wemust aim to reduce our need or all oil.

Te Administration’s proposal, announced on No-

vember 16 to bring Corporate Average Fuel Econo-my (CAFE) standards up to 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025 comes rom an agreement between the Auto-makers (including Ford, General Motors, Chrysler,oyota, and others), the United Auto Workers andthe Administration. Tis new standard will reduce

  America’s oil dependence and will signicantly in-

crease our national security.

Te United States is the greatest nation in the worldIts national security should not be beholden to th

  whims o unstable regimes that happen to controaraway sea-lanes. It is time or America to wrest itnational security back rom the chokehold that oi

has on our economy and our national security. Tesstandards will increase America’s national securitand reduce the threat that oil poses to our way o lie

Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney USMC (Ret.) the CEO o the American Security Project a non-partisan think-tank. During his over 30 years within thUS military he has held numerous leadership positionsincluding Inspector General o the Marine Corp anCommanding General o Parris Island.

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 A Bigger Bang or our Buck? A Look at the Naval Research Lab’sLaser Fusion Program

Veronique Lee

 ASP FLASHPOIN BLOG

November 11, 2011

Most international usion research to date has ol-lowed the tokamak model, which uses magneticelds to heat and squeeze the hydrogen plasma:

the United Kingdom’s Joint European orus (JE), Ja-pan’s J-60, and the world’s largest tokamak, IER, cur-rently being assembled in France, are among the most

 well-known—and most expensive—usion projects.

Some scientists in the U.S. have taken the inertial conne-

ment usion (ICF) route, using lasers to initiate a reactionlike the usion that takes place inside the sun or a hydro-gen bomb. An ICF experiment is underway at the Law-rence Livermore National Laboratory’s National IgnitionFacility (NIF). But another laser usion acility exists, andit’s located right here in Washington.

Steve Obenschain’s team o researchers and developers atthe Naval Research Lab’s (NRL) Laser Fusion Program arespearheading a directly driven target approach to inertialusion energy using an intense array o krypton uoride(KrF) lasers. KrF has the deepest UV light o all high en-

ergy ICF lasers and can provide the most uniorm target il-lumination, qualities that could substantially help towardsobtaining high target gains needed or uture usion powerplants.

Te direct drive approach directs laser beams straight tothe tiny uel pellet (usually made rom a blend o two Hy-drogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium), which the NRLteam says is simpler and more efcient than indirect drive,in which the pellet is placed inside a cylindrical container,called a hohlraum, that converts the driver laser beamsinto x-rays to compress the uel. Te main disadvantageo indirect drive is that the hohlraum uses a considerable

amount o energy to heat itsel, signicantly reducing theoverall efciency o laser-to-target energy transer.

Completed in 1995, NRL’s Nike is the largest KrF laser a-cility being used or direct drive target experiments. NRLis using the adjoining Electra KrF laser acility to develop

efcient and durable high-repetition rate technologies. Al-ready capable o producing 90,000 continuous shots in aspan o 10 hours (about 2.5 Hz), the Electra laser is ex-pected to achieve the 5 Hz rate needed or usion energy in the coming years.

Te NRL team has made impressive progress in the de-velopment o direct drive IFE on relatively modest unds;NRL has requested $5 million or scal year 2012 tocontinue its experiments, compared to the University o Rochester’s $62.5 million request or its Omega acility and the $48 million Sandia National Laboratory’s Z acil-ity has requested. NIF has cost more than $3.5 billion,and the US contributed nearly $80 million to IER inscal year 2011, just a small raction o its $7 billion totalbudget.

It’s clear that the technologies or clean energy don’t comecheap. But it’s important to continue unding R&D orthese usion projects, which are steadily making progress

every day; i all goes well or the team at NRL, they couldbe just eight years away rom using a ull-scale KrF laserbeam in a usion test acility.

 WWW.AMERICANSECURIYPROJEC.ORG

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  AmericAn Security proJect

 AMERICAN COMPEIIVENESS

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Te Research and Development GapNorm Augustine

HE HILL

September 2, 2011

 A merica is in grave danger o loosing its edge.For over one hundred years, American leader-ship in science, technology, engineering, and

manuacturing has been unrivaled. It has created orus not only one o the highest standards o living any civilization has ever achieved, but also brought Amer-ican preeminence in the world and a strong nationaldeense.

Now, unortunately, this is all at risk due to the lack o long-term planning, little political will, and slow-ing investment in science and engineering research.

 As every business leader knows, prosperity tomorrowrequires investment today. Tis is true whether theeconomy is in a period o boom or bust. Te Unit-ed States will not simply “grow” its way out o eco-nomic malaise. We need a rebirth o innovation: newproducts, new ways o doing things, new scienticachievements.

Let’s looks at the acts about research and develop-ment (R&D). As a percentage o GDP, the U.S. ranks

eighth, behind countries like Japan, South Korea, andeven Iceland. In one o the most important areas—energy—in 2010 the Department o Energy invested

 just $2.27 billion on applied R&D, or just slightly more than 1/100th o one percent o GDP. As a pointo comparison, that’s nearly $1 billion less than theamount ($3.1 billion) we’ll spend in 2011 providinga tax benet or employee parking.

R&D is not the only area where we are alling be-hind. Over the past two decades there has been an 18percent decline in the number o students graduating

 with bachelor degrees in engineering, math, physics

and geosciences in the United States.

In 1986, the United States had 52 percent o the globaldoctorates in science and engineering. By 2003, thatnumber dropped to a staggering 22 percent. Te U.S.ranks 17th among developed nations in the propor-tion o college students receiving degrees in science or

engineering. It was 3rd just three decades ago.

o give a real-time example o why this matters, in theourth quarter o 2010, 20 percent o our trade decit

  was created by advanced technology, making it thelargest decit contributor. In that year, the advancedtechnology trade decit worsened by $82 billion.

 While our investment in our uture alls, other na-tions have learned rom the American way, and dras-tically increased their R&D.

China is investing in science, engineering, manuac-turing, energy and transportation. China plans tospend $1.5 trillion in seven strategic sectors, includ-ing alternative energy, alternative uel cars, and high-end equipment manuacturing (including high-speedrail and aviation). It now dominates the United Statesin the manuacture o clean energy technologies. Chi-na has leaped over its global competitors, both in the

United States and in Europe, in the making o windturbines and solar panels.

China invested $34.6 billion in clean energy in 2009;in the U.S. it was just $18.6 billion. Why do we won-der why China’s economy is growing so ast?

Fortunately, this isn’t how the story has to end. Amer-ica can control its own destiny. But to do so, we mustincrease our investment – both public and private –in R&D.

 America has done this beore. It put a man on the

moon within a decade o the challenge to do so; itbuilt the atomic bomb to help win the Second World War; and it built a waterway to connect the Atlanticand Pacic oceans.

Tis new investment should be centered on our trans-portation networks and next-generation energy tech-nology.

oday, there are scientists working on usion power inmany nations. Fusion power would be a sae, aord-able, clean, and sustainable energy.

Many scientists believe that an investment o $35 bil-lion over 10 years would build two pilot plants tomove orward with commercialization o usion pow-er over the next 30 years.

Other nations – China and South Korea – are eagerto win the race or commercialization o usion. I we

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  AmericAn Security proJect

don’t set a national priority ourselves, we are in dangero loosing this race, too.

I we recommit ourselves to science, technology, engi-neering, and manuacturing, we will lay the ounda-tions to uture growth and a secure American uture.Te alternative is not one that is pleasant to contem-plate.

Norm Augustine is a board member o the American Se-curity Project. He was chairman o the Council o the National Academy o Engineering, president and chair-man o the Association o the United States Army, chair-man o the Aerospace Industries Association, and chair-man o the Deense Science Board.

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ERRORISM AND ASYMMERIC WARFARE

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Te Brilliant, Unworkable New Silk Road

 Joshua Foust

HE ALANIC

October 11, 2011

ying Central Asia together with trade is a great ideathat needs a heavy dose o realism

ISANBUL, urkey -- urkey seems as good a placeas any to ponder the latest grand policy idea or

Central Asia ltering out o the U.S. government.Parag Khanna ably sums up the current zeitgeist orthe “New Silk Road,” as Secretary o State Hillary Clinton, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute chairmanFred Starr, and others are calling it:

In many respects, New Silk Road is the obvious ap-proach that should have been executed a decade ago:locally owned, private sector enabling and regionally ocused. Aghanistan may remain the poorest country in Eurasia or many years to come, but it stands a bet-ter chance o prospering as the “Asian Roundabout” -a crossroads or Euro-Asian commerce - than as a per-manent American protectorate. As Hillary Clintonrecently said in Chennai, the New Silk Road would“not be a single thoroughare, but an international

  web and network o economic and transit connec-tions.” Substituting a sel-sufcient economic model

or military occupation is the only way to achieve the“transition dividend” the administration is hoping or.

Tis is actually an amazing idea ... or would be, i it were workable. Te problems with it become appar-ent when you unpack the assumptions underlying it:that Aghanistan actually is well suited as a commer-cial hub, that any other country in Central Asia really 

 wants to trade with any other country in Central Asia,that the local governments would actually support“locally owned, private sector” economic initiatives(however those words are dened) and so on.

 As a brie example, let’s look at a requent subject o debate on my other blog, Registan.net, Uzbekistan. I

 warily support the policy o increasing U.S. Security  Assistance to the country to expand the NDN so thatpolicymakers will have alternates to relying on the armore toxic, abusive, and dangerous regime in Paki-stan. It is a least bad option to me, which doesn’t mean

it’s a good choice (and that was very sloppy phrasinon my part). Still, people like our own Michael Hacock disagree with even that, and that’s okay -- thisn’t easy, not by a long shot.

In order to tie Uzbekistan into a New Silk Roa which is necessary i the goal o making Aghanistancommercial crossroads to Eurasia is to become realitseveral things must happen. Te rst thing that muhappen is that Uzbek leader Islom Karimov wouneed to care, even a little bit, about Uzbekistan’s busness community. He clearly does not. And he’s nalone: urkmenistan also has a very business-hostclimate, and Kyrgyzstan is hardly a riendly place investment and business creation (I’m actually on m

 way to Kyrgyzstan right now to investigate some sues relating to local business issues).

So, on a basic level, the good idea o tying togethCentral Asia based on locally driven economic d

velopment runs up against the hostile (and, or tpast 20 years, unmovable) climate or business ivestment. Despite that reality, which is obvious anyone who spends even a short amount o time atually examining the business climate in this regiothe prospects o a New Silk Road driving regionprosperity already seems to be entrenched as ofcpolicy. Without a great deal o urther thought, yeao planning and diplomatic cajoling, and no expecttions or real change in anything less than a decadthis is pretty terrible magical thinking.

o wit: last year, Parag Khanna was pushing this samidea, only or China. Like the new, U.S.-driven moel, his Old New Silk Road Idea was plagued by magcal thinking, and seemed hopelessly at odds with thistor o economic and political development in thregion. I mean, look at this:

 Appropriately then, all o the anchor projects currenly being unded and considered in the New Silk Roprocess involve regional resource corridors, meaing they are ocused more on physically connectinoil, gas and minerals such as copper and lithium markets irrespective o which political borders th

lie within or across. Te API pipeline could carnatural gas rom urkmenistan’s Caspian Sea coast the way through Aghanistan and Pakistan to India.national railway system or Aghanistan, already suported by CENCOM, is already under constructioand would help transport Aghanistan’s abundamineral wealth to the emerging markets around

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 And the CASA-1000 project will transer electricity rom Kyrgyzstan and ajikistan via Aghanistan toPakistan. Te New Silk Road, then, is both North-South as well as East-West.

API (the Te rans-Aghanistan Pipeline) is not go-ing to happen anytime soon. China already has a gas

pipe running east; Russia controls the rest o themgoing west. Aghanistan is ar too unstable -- and willremain ar too unstable -- to support a massive, vul-nerable inrastructure development like a pipeline ora very long time. And by then, the economics just

 wouldn’t work out (just ask Unocal, who tried thisin 1998). Same with the railway system. Tere is agood reason China has not yet build railways to cartaway Aghanistan’s gold rom the mines it owns: theeconomics and security just don’t support it. ISAFcan barely keep its highways clear o IEDs.

 And don’t even get me started on the phantom re-

gional electrical grid. Aghanistan’s purchasing o electricity rom Uzbekistan is tenuous enough; trans-mitting electricity rom two electricity-poor coun-tries to a much less electricity-poor country makeslittle sense.

Tese ideas, like most o the New Silk Road theo-ries, sound easible i you don’t think about them toohard. It’s the Unicorn School o Geopolitics: I only everything were awesome and everyone got along, wecould totally build a new regional ramwork!

Recent meetings around D.C. to push this idea --shepharded by Fred Starr, who’s been all about it orseveral years now -- are great at pulling together theterminal countries: Aghanistan and Germany, asthey did last September 29. What they have not yetsucceeded in doing is drawing together any o thecountries between, say, Aghanistan and Germany ...like Uzbekistan. Considering that this event was heldliterally up the road rom the Uzbek embassy, thissort o omission is pretty glaring.

Besides which, China is already developing trans-regional transportation networks. And it ain’t easy:

though the ground route takes hal as much time asit would to ship something rom China to Europeby sea, it is ar more expensive and difcult. I cansee the urge to look at that and say “let’s try to makethis easier and cheaper.” But until it really is cheaperto ship something 6,000 miles over land than it is toship it 10,000 miles on a container ship, the whole

thing is just not going to work.

Central Asia desperately needs a development poli-cy, and it wouldn’t hurt rom some U.S. leadershipon the issue. But utopian dreams o a Central AsianCustoms Union, or something, seem so ar out intolet eld I’m surprised it has gained as much traction

as it has. Central Asia needs logic and planning, butthe New Silk Road isn’t it.

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Foreign Aid Shouldn’t be theFirst Ting on the Chopping 

Block HE HILL

Matthew Wallin

October 20, 2011

In this scal climate, recent debates have broughta growing amount o attention and support to thenotion that the U.S. oreign aid budget should be

cut. Many Americans, concerned that the govern-ment is spending their hard-earned tax dollars abroad

 when there are so many pressing issues at home, arguethat we need to take care o ourselves beore we takecare o others.

Tere is validity to the argument. Ater all, how cansomeone help others i they themselves are bed-rid-den? Why should we as a country spend tens o bil-lions on oreign aid when our inrastructure crumblesand the government is desperately seeking ways toreign in our spending?

Te answer is: it is in our national interest to do so.

Foreign assistance creates long lasting partnerships with countries and oreign publics—partnerships thatbenet the national security o the United States. By 

helping to educate, empower, employ, and beriendpeople in other countries, we decrease instability that we have ended up spending trillions to combat.

So what are we spending to do this? Relatively little.Te entirety o non-military U.S. oreign assistancemoney or FY2011 is $34.7 billion. Tat amounts toless than one percent o the Federal budget. Let merepeat that again: one percent. Tat’s one percent

 we spend on the entire world. And as a percentageo GDP, the U.S. has ranked rather low on its gov-ernment-sponsored oreign aid, giving only 1/5th theamount Sweden does. (However, it is important to

note that in terms o private donations the U.S. ranksvery high.)

Consistently, the average American greatly misper-ceives the amount o U.S. spending on oreign aid.In a 2010 poll, the median assumption was that the

Federal government spends 25 percent o its budgon oreign aid. In the same pole, the median recommendation by Americans or spending levels was percent. Tat’s ar above the reality o the situation

Ok, so we don’t really spend much money on oreigaid. But why should we be spending any at all? Whdo we get out o it?

  According to USAID, money spent on combatimalaria has saved 1.1 million lives in sub-Saharan Arica. Maternal mortality has decreased rom 546,00in 1990 to 358,000 in 2008. In terms o nancbenets, in 2009, we exported more than $500 blion in goods to developing countries. Aid helps crates business, and that’s good or the prosperity o tUnited States.

But there’s more. In a recent publication by the Pressional Services Council, it is noted that develo

ment and diplomacy spending is directly linked 10 million American jobs. Every $4 spent by tState Department in Iraq has saved $45 in militaspending. PSC also cites the example o South Krea, which despite the massive exploitation o WWand the ollowing devastation o the Korean War, hevolved into a democracy and important trade partn

 with the U.S.—and we all enjoy Korean goods toda

Let’s also not orget that prominent members o thmilitary community, including ormer Secretary Deense Robert Gates, have called or increased uning to the State Department. Institution buildin

reduction o poverty, and helping meet basic healneeds all contribute to the establishment o more stble environments in which the American military less likely to be called into action.

Te U.S. also has a vested interest in remainingglobal, competitive leader. We should not cede oability to inuence people worldwide through dmocracy promotion programs, education, healthcarand supporting human rights, especially when it cosrelatively little to make a big impact.

In the end, it is important to recognize our nacial troubles and live within our means. We shourequire our oreign aid agencies to account or thmoney they spend and demonstrate its benet. Fomer British Prime Minister ony Blair has called or“Tird Way” between aid critics and proponents thplaces more responsibility on the leadership o o

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eign countries to ensure the best use o aid money.Te goal, as Blair explains, is to “use aid to end aid”by creating the building blocks or prosperity. Andmaybe, like South Korea, these countries and peoplecan be transormed rom recipients into donors.

So rather than ocusing on the one percent o spend-

ing on oreign aid, let’s get realistic and put our pri-orities in order.

 Matthew Wallin works or the American Security Proj-ect, a non-partisan think tank in D.C.

 Are Private ContractorsUndermining the IntelligenceCommunity?

 Joshua Foust

PBS: NEED O KNOW September 22, 2011

here is broad public agreement that the gov-ernment must take measures to respond to theexplosive growth o contracting in the intel-

ligence community during the past decade. Te gov-ernment tends to contract out services when it doesnot have employees with the skill set to perorm aunction (like building a surveillance drone), or whenit needs to rapidly ll personnel gaps in a new pro-gram area. In the ten years that have lapsed since

the September 11 attacks, however, contractors havegone rom lling gaps in the intelligence community to being a large percentage o the people working onbehal o the country’s intelligence agencies.

Te biggest problem acing the intelligence commu-nity is not that some contractors abuse the system,but that the government has designed a system thatencourages abuse. Ultimately, the government is re-sponsible or the conduct o the companies it con-tracts to perorm unctions; while violations o therules in place merit investigation and prosecution,contractor behavior labeled as “misconduct” is otenperectly legal and within the bounds o the contractagreements companies sign with their governmentclients.

Te current state o IC contracting is incoherent.Tere is broad conusion about the nature o ap-propriate government and contractor roles, along

 with inconsistent accountability and poor resourcingor accountability mechanisms. Contracts are oten

 worded vaguely or incompletely, and ever-changingrequirements, deliverables and perormance metrics(all o which are supposed to catalogue and record

how a company ullls a contract) create an environ-ment rie or exploitation by companies seeking toextract revenue rom the process.

Perhaps the most prominent example is the “blanket-purchase agreement” awarded by the Departmento the Interior (DoI) to the contracting rm CACI

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  AmericAn Security proJect

in 1998 to supply, among other services, inventory control or the U.S. Army. Te contract was wordedvaguely with poor government controls, and its struc-ture — the contract was awarded by the DoI but ad-ministered by the Department o the Army — madeaccountability difcult i not impossible. By 2004,CACI contractors, hired under this inventory and

logistics contract, had been assigned to the interroga-tion acility at Abu Ghraib in Iraq. While none o thecontractors involved in prisoner interrogation wereindicted or misconduct, the vaguely worded contractawarded by the government allowed or the contrac-tors it hired to be used inappropriately.

Most contracts never approach that level o ques-tionable conduct, however. Rather, through vaguelanguage, open-ended requirements and unclear per-ormance metrics these contracts allow companies tosend workers into government acilities without clearexpectations or work output and job perormance.

It is difcult in many cases or the government to keeptrack o all contractor activities on a given project.

Every contract the government issues or a company to perorm work is dened by the Statement o Work (SOW). Tis denes the parameters o the work thecontractor will perorm, including a description o theproject, expected duties the contractor must ulll,and the outputs and metrics by which perormance

 will be measured. Tese are oten poorly written, keptintentionally vague, and wind up not actually ad-dressing the stated intent o the contracts.

 As one example, every SOW I’ve had to either admin-ister, edit or write has stipulated the number o em-ployees the contractor should hire. Tat is, one o theprimary ways the government measures a contractor’sperormance is based rst and oremost on the num-ber o people hired to work on the contract. Tis hastwo serious consequences that aect the contractingenvironment: It ails to make a distinction between e-ective workers and their less eective counterparts; italso conuses head count with contract perormance.

Te SOW system is also unclear on what constitutesdeliverables and contract outcomes. In the intelli-gence community, this is most oten expressed as acertain number o reports required by each contrac-tor. Tis, too, is a poor measurement o perormance.It also misidenties what an outcome is.

Requiring the production o a required number o re-

ports rom a required number o contracted analysis not a measurement o output. Te reports the Igenerates each year are not just outputs rom the anlytic process but inputs to the policy process. I thoutput being measured by the SOW is irrelevant inconsequential to the decisions being made, thenit really measuring the eect o the contract, or mere

the paper it generated? I have written dozens o rports that counted toward my employer’s ulllmeo a contract, which had nothing to do with the goernment’s preerences or needs or making a decisio

 A basic sense o project design is absolutely necessato properly balance contractors and government employees. For example, in response to the rising threo terrorism rom Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsu(AQAP), the Deense Intelligence Agency decided dramatically expand the number o analysts workinon Yemen last year. However, this expansion was nnecessary, per se. Rather, the government decided th

studying Yemen was a priority, so it assigned extra pesonnel billets to study Yemen — and because hiringovernment employees is a time-consuming proceto begin with, but requires an intolerable amount time or the intelligence community, it asked contrators to bid or the opportunity to sta this new prioity research area. Te government could only sta thnew research area in a timely way with contractorBut the decision to increase the number o sta woring on Yemen did not direct correlate to the value etra analysts would bring to the table.

Many o the problems that exist within the intelgence contracting community begin with the goverment lacking the knowledge and means to design anmanage its contracts. Rather than ocusing on thnumbers and balance o the contracted workorce,

 would be better to examine the broader systemic issuthat require the use o contractors in the rst placBy addressing the need or contractors, and by maing the process o contracting both more transpareand more accountable, many, i not most, issues balancing contractor with government employees wresolve themselves.

 Adapted rom Joshua Foust’s testimony on uesday beothe Senate Homeland Security and Government AaCommittee Subcomittee on Oversight o Governme

 Management, the Federal Workorce and the DistrictColumbia.

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Kyrgyzstan’s Promising but 

Uncertain Political Future Joshua Foust

HE ALANIC

December 2, 2011

With a new President, the Central Asian country can claimthe frst peaceul transition o power in the region. But where 

does it go rom here? 

oday Kyrgyzstan inaugurated Almazbek Atambaev as their new president. It was a momentous event,the rst peaceul transition o power in Central

  Asia. Unortunately, Atambaev is inheriting a country  with a troubled recent past and an uncertain uture, in-cluding how it will relate to the United States.

Outgoing President Roza Otunbaeva recently apologizedor “ailing to prevent” last year’s ethic bloodshed, whichkilled hundreds o people, torched thousands o buildings,and let an ethnic minority dispossessed and marginalized.She is right to apologize: though understandably distractedby the on-going allout o Kyrgyzstan’s April Revolution,less than two months beore, the riots were the result o abuildup o ethnic tension and local government depreda-tion that she was obligated, as president, to address. Herresponse was so impotent she publicly contemplated seek-ing Russian help in establishing the peace in Osh.

 While Otunbaeva’s handling o the ethnic riots last year  was disappointing, she did usher in a new constitutionand spearhead the current orderly transition o power.Tis should not be downplayed. Despite October’s Presi-dential election’s obvious aws, establishing a precedentor an orderly transition is a huge accomplishment anddeserves praise.

But where Kyrgyzstan can go rom here is uncertain. Teethnic divide that erupted last year remains, and despite

 Atambaev’s pledge or ethnic unity no one knows i hehas the charisma and political capital to begin addressing

those divides. Krygyzstan aces numerous other challengesas well: a stagnating economy, pervasive corruption, andan uncertain regional orientation -- rom the lively debateover whether Bishkek is swinging toward Russia or Chinato the bigger questions about its trade arrangements, po-sition along Te New Silk Road, and its struggles withnarcotics trafcking.

Despite the seeming promise o Kyrgyzstan’s election, thecountry’s political class seem undecided about its outcome.

 Azimbek Beknazarov, the ormer Prosecutor General, justrejected a prestigious medal awarded him by outgoingPresident Otunbaeva. Beknazarov’s act o protest is sig-nicant: he led the rst round o protests in the northerncity o alas last April, sparking the revolution coup that

toppled the government o Bakiev. It makes sense or revo-lutionaries to be disappointed that their ideals aren’t met,but nevertheless seeing such a high-prole deection romthe cause is noteworthy.

So where does Kyrgyzstan go rom here? For starters, Presi-dent Atambaev has some basic hurdles to cross in makingKyrgyzstan a unctioning country. Te separation o pow-ers need to be solidied and gain broad acceptance, in-cluding the proper roles and responsibilities not just o thePresidency, but o the Parliament and the Courts and lo-cal governments. Kyrgyzstan’s basic government unction-ing also needs to improve: in ransparency International’s

2011 Corruption Perceptions Index Kyrgyzstan ranked162, nestled between Yemen and Guinea.

Lastly, President Atambaev needs to take some concretesteps to heal Kyrgyzstan deep regional and ethnic divi-sions. Some o these divisions have their roots in econom-ic problems, and there has to be some kind o economicreorm to simpliy and ormalize the process o property rights, business ownership, and taxation. Te deep North-South divide in Kyrgyzstan needs to be deused, whetherthrough proportional cabinet appointments, some ormo reconciliation process, or some additional politicaldevelopment. Tere has to be a ocus on seeking justiceor the victims o depredation o all kinds. And President

 Atambaev has to reimpose central accountability or localgovernments, particularly in the southwest.

Not a single item on that wishlist is simple to do or easy to achieve (or even easy to plan). Tat is why Kyrgyzstan’suture is so uncertain -- there are ar more questions thananswers at this point about the survivability o both thegovernment and Kyrgyz society as a whole. Added intothis is the grinding political contentiousness o the U.S.airbase at Manas. It is politically unpopular, but someleaders think it may have long-term utility or national

security.

In other words, Kyrgyzstan is a big question mark. It hastaken some very promising steps on the path to normalcy,but, sadly, the country still has a long way to go.

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  AmericAn Security proJect

Has ad mds: Al-Qada’sVs Sala

Lara Getz

ASP FLASHPOIN BLOG

December 12, 2011

Al-Qaeda’s recent appearance at the Ala-Yasir re-ugee camp in southern Somalia was certainly un-expected. While the camp is located in the large

expanse o territory controlled by al-Shabaab, a militantgroup associated with al-Qaeda, this was not only therst time the organization had spoken publicly in So-malia, but that it had distributed aid in this particularcountry.

A man claiming to be an American, named Abu Abdul-lah Muhajir, led the small al-Qaeda unit that distributed

rice, dates, our, milk and clothes, in addition to Islamicbooks and approximately $17,000 in Somali shillings tomore than 4,000 reugees residing in the camp. Muhajir,who identied himsel as al-Qaeda’s ocial representa-tive to Somalia, also arrived with a ully-staed ambu-lance and a number o other oreigners, including somewith English accents.

Somalia is no stranger to crisis and instability. It has beensuering rom civil war and severe internal strie or twodecades, and the “ocial” government is too weak andcorrupt to extend its authority beyond the capital o 

Mogadishu. Although al-Shabaab controls the drought-stricken south o the country, even this semblance o order may soon disintegrate as clans and other militias,ofen backed by oreign governments, have begun a vio-lent ght against al-Shabaab’s control o the region. Inthe Ala-Yasir reugee camp, however, al-Shabaab stillholds tight control, and with its dismissal o many aidorganizations, sometimes as a result o their support orthe government, al-Qaeda has evidently made the deci-sion to ll the void.

It seems sae to say that not many are surprised by al-Shabaab’s connections to al-Qaeda being conrmed with

the appearance o a small al-Qaeda ‘humanitarian’ unitat Ala-Yasir. What is surprising is the very boldness andpublic nature o the visit. Announcing that he carried amessage rom Ayman al-Zawahiri himsel, Abu Abdul-lah Muhajir conveyed the Muslim community’s supportor all those suering rom the drought in Somalia. Inreturn, many children told the reporters present that

they hoped al-Qaeda would be victorious over all theenemies.

With as many as 4 million people suering rom the curent drought, many o whom have been orced to moto reugee camps, a hearts and minds campaign by aQaeda is the last thing this already tumultuous and vilent country needs. I al-Qaeda is seeking to use smhumanitarian units, such as the one that visited AlYasir, as a means to gather support and possible uturecruits, this could be an extremely dangerous develoment or Somalia. Given the current environment in tcountry, al-Qaeda could very easibly build up urthsupport i it decides to use the drought to its advantagWhile it already has a close ally in al-Shabaab and toreign ghters supporting it within the country, addinyet another destabilizing element to the equation donot bode well or Somalia’s uture.

Tis unexpected and very public appearance o al-Qae

in southern Somalia raises three important points thshould be examined. First, it shows one o the ways which al-Qaeda is morphing as a result o its weakeninposition in Aghanistan. Teir appearance at the reugcamp proves once again the dynamic nature o this oganization and its ability to spread its ideology amonthose who live in violent and uncertain environmenAl-Qaeda may have been crippled in South Asia, butis by no means mortally wounded. Tere are many othturbulent environments, such as Somalia, that could ptentially all urther under al-Qaeda’s sway.

Secondly, al-Qaeda’s visit to Ala-Yasir exemplies ho

humanitarian aid runs the danger o becoming a policized issue, particularly in volatile environments. As Jmal Osman with Te Guardian reported, “In Somalword goes around quickly on which particular aid oganisations are unding certain political groups or clanand this ofen gives al-Shabaab and other militant grouthe uel to demonize some aid organizations while prmoting others. As long as al-Shabaab controls southeSomalia, and with it many reugee camps, it and othmilitant groups have the ability to control which groucan and cannot distribute aid in their backyard. Tmore voids that are created by expelling aid organiz

tions, however, the greater the likelihood that radicgroups, such as al-Qaeda, can arrive to ll the vacuum

Finally, the mixed nature o this single al-Qaeda unonce again demonstrates the group’s ability to promoits ideology and recruit members rom a wide range countries – including Somalia, Aghanistan, Iraq, Y

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men, Europe, and even the United States. By the time theal-Qaeda representatives arrived at the Ala-Yasir reugeecamp, the FBI had concluded that 30 U.S. nationals had joined al-Shabaab, which, as mentioned above, is a loyaland well-established supporter o al-Qaeda. Te diver-sity apparent in groups such as al-Shabaab and al-Qaedaposes serious challenges when tracking and targeting

terrorist organizations. Te power o any ideology lies inits ability to transcend all boundaries. Al-Qaeda’s ideol-ogy has proven that it is no exception, and is even moredangerous because o that.

It is certainly unreasonable to claim that Somalia willinevitably become a training ground or al-Qaeda ol-lowing its public aid mission to the drought-strickencountry. It is not oolish, however, to train our eyeson Somalia in order to make sure such a developmentdoesn’t happen. Over the years, it has become apparentthat al-Qaeda has a strong base o support within thecountry, particularly within al-Shabaab. Somalia and its

people suer rom violence and uncertainty every day, atragedy which has only been enhanced by a severe andenduring drought, and al-Qaeda has now marked it asa viable market in which it can trade its aid or support.It is an organization in a period o transormation andan adversary with many dierent aces. What this mostrecent development simply proves is that we cannot letour guard down because al-Qaeda has proven more thanonce that it is quick to adapt in order to survive.

 WWW.AMERICANSECURIYPROJEC.ORG

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  AmericAn Security proJect

NUCLEAR SECURIY 

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t Add cas iapl m

Brig. Gen. John Adams and Lt. Col. Chris Courtney 

POLIICO

December 6, 2011

alk o bombing Iran is again prolierating as atalking point among politicians who want tosound tough on national security. Tis happens

every election season. It will no doubt be among themost repeated oreign policy themes in the 2012 cam-paign. But sounding tough should not be mistaken orsmart policy.

We have to keep in mind that Iran’s development o anuclear-weapon capability has been motivated by itssense o vulnerability and the regime’s ear or survival.Te best way to motivate Iran to develop nuclear weap-ons is to keep threatening.

Tere’s been a dearth o discussion about rational policy options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Preventing anuclear-armed Iran is part o preventing a regional war.A nuclear-armed Iran would tip the balance o powertoward ehran, reduce Israel’s qualitative military supe-riority and destabilize the entire region. Tis risks a warthat would engul our regional allies — not to mentionour own orward-deployed orces.

Let’s be clear: A U.S. attack on Iran runs a great risk o starting a regional war — our ourth war in 10 years.Isn’t that what we want to avoid in the rst place?

Here are U.S. policy options to stop this rom happen-ing:

First, tougher sanctions. Tough sanctions have inictedgreat costs on the Iranian economy, they haven’t stalledIran’s nuclear aspirations. We need to ratchet up sanc-tions by ocusing sharply on the Iranian petrochemicalindustry, the Iranian Central Bank and Revolutionary Guard assets.

Washington last month announced economic sanctionstargeting the petrochemical and nancial entities, whichrepresent a signicant step in the right direction. Buturther expansion o sanctions should increase pressureon these key Iranian vulnerabilities.

Tis will most likely weaken the hard-liners intent onreaching the nuclear threshold and encourage Iran’smoderate actions that oppose development o a nucle-ar-weapons capability.

Second, Washington should demonstrate U.S. and alliedair and naval capabilities in the region. Tis communi-

cates directly to ehran that its investment in the nuclearprogram creates clear risks, as well as increasing uncer-tainty about potential strikes against its nuclear inra-structure. U.S. military cooperation with urkey and theGul Cooperation Council can also reassure our allies inthe region.

Tis strategy is more eective than basing U.S. groundorces in the region. Our large military presence in theGul region has only heightened Iranian perceptionsabout U.S. threats. It may well have contributed to Iran’sincreased nuclear eorts.

In addition, U.S. ground orce bases in the Middle Eastincrease the vulnerability o our troops in the event o aregional war. Yet they also limit our use o these troopsin the event o real crises.

Most important, and most dicult to achieve, Iran mustnot only be dissuaded rom the bomb but perceive apositive stake in regional cooperation. We’re good atbrandishing “sticks” but should oer an array o “car-rots” as well.

For starters, the U.S. should:

• Open new lines of communication. Our policymak -ers suer rom a lack o inormation about the situationin Iran. Tere is no routine contact with Iranian deci-sion makers — much less opposition gures. It’s timeto change this oolish policy. Opening up routine dip-lomatic exchange — even at low levels — means a moreinormed policy, as well as the ability to react quickly incrises with a reduced risk o military conict. Engage-ment does not equate to endorsement o Iranian actions.But it does provide a new way to inuence Iran’s deci-sion making while better inorming our own.

• Refrain from military threats against Iran, explicit orimplicit — “all options are on the table,” afer all, is athreat. Our intent should be to deny hard-liners a rally-ing call and strengthen reormists in the internal politi-cal debate.

• Invite Iran to participate in Persian Gulf regional se-

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  AmericAn Security proJect

curity activities. Tere’s a lot o important groundwork to be laid beore this. But combined with demonstrationo U.S. and allied air and naval capabilities, even incre-mental steps in this direction would reduce the risk o regional conict.

We must choose policy options likely to prevent both anuclear-armed Iran and the outbreak o regional war.

Rather than hurling the chips o the table by going di-rectly to the war option, we need to keep our eyes on theprize: Reducing the risk o regional conict by a gradu-ated series o policy options that encourage ehran tochange direction in its march to a nuclear weapons ca-pability.

Brig. Gen. John Adams and Lt. Col. Chris Courtney, bothretired, served in the U.S. Army. Tey are members of theConsensus for American Security.

Deense Spending in an Age o  Austerity  Joshua Foust

PBS: NEED O KNOW 

November 16, 2011

Secretary o Deense Leon Panetta has been raisieyebrows with his aggressive public deense o tPentagon’s budget. Last week, he told a group o N

tional Guard ofcials that, should Congress slash his Dpartment’s budget, it would “invite aggression.”

  While some have rejected Secretary Panetta’s stark laguage, he isn’t necessarily wrong. Te U.S. military tasked with an extraordinary range o missions, and askiit to do so much with ewer resources would be a mistak

 At the same time, should the supercommittee enact tull slate o proposed cuts o $1 trillion over the next dcade, the Pentagon’s budget would in eect be capped 2007 levels — and no one in 2007 thought the budget wso low as to “invite aggression.”

Te debate over the size o the Pentagon’s budget largemisses the point. Discussing arbitrary budget numbeor even specic programs to expand, keep, or cut is aproaching the problem o deense spending backwarTe real debate in Congress and in the public should about America’s role in the world – rom that debate wcan structure an appropriate national security budget

satisy it.

In the last 20 years, American oreign policy has rareaced serious limits. A succession o presidents has rmrejected any nation-building exercises, only to undertathem as considered policies. Despite the deense reductioo the 1990s, the U.S. military spent almost the entire dcade engaged in small little wars in Europe, East Ariand the Caribbean. In the 2000s, the U.S. initiated twbig wars in Aghanistan and Iraq, and remained peripheally involved in a series o smaller ones in the Philippin

 Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere.

Indeed, Secretary Panetta is right that the U.S. will haa hard time ullling all the many commitments it h

 with a much smaller budget. But should the U.S. militabe tasked with all these commitments? No one denies rgional stability in, or example, the Arabian Peninsula igood thing. But is the United States military the best w

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to provide that? It’s unclear that the U.S. has played a con-structive role in reducing militancy in a place like Yemen– especially i you consider the strong correlation betweenincreased U.S. counterterrorism operations and the grow-ing Al Qaeda presence there. Te same question can beasked o U.S. involvement in the recent interventions inSomalia and Libya.

Te problem is whether you measure the national security budget by inputs or outputs. Looking at inputs – the over-all budget, the expenditure o a specic program like theF-22, or the development o a counterterrorism trainingprogram in an unstable country – can lend the impres-sion that Pentagon spending achieves amazing things. Butlooking at outputs – a smaller budget, the reduction o theU.S. ghter eet rom thousands o planes to hundreds,driving corruption and entrenching a hated tyrant – canlend an entirely dierent impression o that same spend-ing.

By starting with the eects we want our oreign policy toaccomplish, and rom that working backward to see whatprograms and budgets are needed to accomplish it, we candevelop a much sounder (and much smaller) Pentagonbudget. Tere is no reason to assume the military is nec-essary or, say, economic development – there are other,ar cheaper U.S. agencies that do that as well. Foreign aidrepresents less than 1 percent o the ederal budget, but ithas the potential to be as instrumental to America’s oreignpolicy as the Pentagon, which has 20 times the budget.Eectiveness is not measured by budget, but by outcome.

Te desire to be all things to all people – policeman, en-orcer and peacemaker – is powerul, especially when re-sources seem to be unlimited. But resources are not, andneither is the Pentagon’s budget.

On the other hand, the expansive presence o the U.S. mil-itary would be okay i there was a collective recognition o 

 what that represents: a global, quasi-imperial peacemakingorganization. Tat is a prospect that seems to discomortmany Americans, and so we should structure the publicconversation rst on what we want our country to be, andhow we want to be positioned in the world, and only thento worry about what kind o money we need to spend to

get there. Te answer is almost certainly less than what weare today, and it will thereore by design cost less.

Te cliché that cutting the budget requires hard choicesis true. But the choices we need to make go deeper thanany arbitrary budget cap or program budget. We need todecide what kind o country we are: one that is closely involved in the aairs o other countries, or one that is

not (or somewhere in between, and i so under what cir-cumstances). Without that debate, all the arguments andposturing over budgets won’t mean much to the uture o national security.

 Joshua Foust is a ellow at the American Security Project and a columnist at TeAtlantic.com.

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  AmericAn Security proJect

Further Reading 

20 Years Ater the Fall: Te U.S. and Russia in thepost-Soviet World

 A collection o essays rom our ellows, board members, and adjunct ellows analyzing the evolution o U.Soreign policy in the 20 years ater the collapse o the USSR. Published in partnership with Te AtlanticMonthly. Tese essays examine the last two decades o change in nuclear security, energy policy, the deenseindustry, regional and bilateral politics, and U.S. posture and geostrategy.

 You can nd a pamphlet containing the whole series here:

 ASP Major Reports:

Climate and Energy Security    America’s Energy Choices

Nuclear Security Initiative  Nuclear Security Index

Climate and Energy Security   Fusion Energy: An Opportunity or American Leadership and Security 

errorism  Measuring Success: Are We Winning? 10 Years in Aghanistan

 ASP Fact sheets and Perspectives

Nuclear Security Initiative   American Security Enhanced: Te Benets o the New SAR reaty 

Nuclear Security Initiative  Ballistic Missiles: A Serious and Growing Treat

Climate and Energy Security   Fusion Fact Sheet

 American Competitiveness  CRADA’s - Cooperative Research Development Agreements

c ASpWb: www.aassj.

tw: @asj

Fabk : www.fabk./aasj

eal: [email protected] 

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Bldg a nw Aa Asal

Te American Security Project (ASP) is a nonpartisan initiative to educate

the American public about the changing nature o national security in the

21st century.

Gone are the days when a nation’s strength could be measured by bombers

and battleships. Security in this new era requires a New American Arsenal

harnessing all o America’s strengths: the orce o our diplomacy; the might o 

our military; the vigor o our economy; and the power o our ideals.

We believe that America must lead other nations in the pursuit o our

common goals and shared security. We must conront international

challenges with all the tools at our disposal. We must address emerging

problems beore they become security crises. And to do this, we must orge a

new bipartisan consensus at home.

ASP brings together prominent American leaders, current and ormer

members o Congress, retired military ocers, and ormer government

ocials. Sta direct research on a broad range o issues and engages and

empowers the American public by taking its ndings directly to them.

We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex and diverse

as terrorism, the spread o weapons o mass destruction, climate change,ailed and ailing states, disease, and pandemics. Te same-old solutions

and partisan bickering won’t do. America needs an honest dialogue about

security that is as robust as it is realistic.

ASP exists to promote that dialogue, to orge consensus, and to spur

constructive action so that America meets the challenges to its security while

seizing the opportunities the new century oers.

www.aasj.g


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