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Appendix A
AU/ACSC/7595/AY07
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
Back to the Future Americas Forgotten Lessons
in Visual Reconnaissance
by
Joseph W. Locke, Maj, USAF
A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisor: Dr. James W. Forsyth
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 2007
Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
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Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air
Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Abstract
Americas experience in Vietnam provides many insights into tactical innovations that are
directly applicable to current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future battlegrounds in the Global War
on Terror (GWOT). The Vietnam experience, however, is littered with examples of high technology
reconnaissance platforms that emerged, floundered, and died. Unlike the ill-suited technological
solutions of the day, the Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a low-tech enigma that flourished in the
Vietnam conflict. Lauded by the infantry and ridiculed by fighter jocks, FACs effectively bridged the
gap between the ground and air war over South Vietnam like nothing seen since. Re-introducing a
simple Forward Air Control aircraft into the Theater Air Control System will significantly enhance the
Air Force contribution to military success in the Global War on Terrorism.
The FACs ability to both live with the supported ground unit and utilize the aerial perspective to
provide focused intelligence will be a force multiplier for the U.S. military in future low-intensity
conflicts. Harnessing long loiter times and a broad field of view, FACs span of influence will increase
to coincide with the ground units entire area of operations. FAC proximity to the local populace
combined with one-year deployments would allow them to build the cultural awareness required to
execute effective visual reconnaissance required to root out insurgents. The habitual knowledge of their
area will be the crucial ingredient enabling FAC to simultaneously observe and evaluate subtle events to
determine if they are normal or potential indicators of insurgent activity. Simple, reliable aircraft
provide the best balance between cost and effectiveness by enabling FACs to forward base with minimal
support while harnessing existing firepower to attack targets when needed. While this capability is
directly applicable to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this will not be the end of their utility.
Developing a standing forward air control capability to provide persistent visual reconnaissance is
essential to future flexibility and success in the Global War on Terror.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Table of Contents
Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................... i Abstract...................................................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Figures........................................................................................................................................ iv Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 1 Scope........................................................................................................................................................... 4 Evolution of the FAC Concept................................................................................................................. 5 FAC Organization..................................................................................................................................... 8
Visual Reconnaissance............................................................................................................................ 13 FAC Effectiveness and Results .............................................................................................................. 15 Capabilities, Limitations, and the Evolution of FAC Aircraft ........................................................... 20 Vietnam FAC Lessons Learned............................................................................................................. 23 Recommendations for the Future.......................................................................................................... 27 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 31
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Table of Figures
Figure 1 .................................................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 19
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Introduction
Nearly six years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Department of Defense is starting to
realize counterinsurgency (COIN) requires a fundamentally different mindset than conventional military
tasks. Insurgencies are by their very nature a personal struggle for the hearts and minds of the
indigenous population. This is not to say that the military struggle is unimportant, rather it is the
sideshow forcing residents to support one side or the other. Since the publics trust is the center of
gravity, our entire effort must focus on community safety and government legitimacy. With personal,
family, and community security at such a premium, harnessing the lessons of previous
counterinsurgency efforts is essential to finding a road to success in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Having borne the lions share of the effort in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the U.S. Army
and Marines are leading the push to rediscover Americas hard fought lessons of counterinsurgency.
Correctly, the new Army Field Manual 3-24 envisions a ground centric focus for combating an
insurgency and places airpower in a distinctively supporting role. It suggests airpower will have the
greatest effect when used for strike, reconnaissance, and airlift.1 The Air Force, however, has remained
largely aloof to the fundamentally different effects required for counterinsurgency operations. As a
result, Air Force methodologies have remained strikingly similar to conventional operations in Kosovo
or even Desert Storm. Fighters and bombers remain on station to kill targets, ISR assets orbit the
battlefield focusing on high value targets or assessing battle damage, and airlift hauls men and material
from one place to another. Effort, however, is not the key to success. Harnessing airpowers strengths
for maximum effect against an irregular enemy will make the difference between victory and defeat.
Thankfully, the tactical airlift mission fits naturally into counterinsurgency operations. As a
result, C-130s and C-17s are working overtime to support the requirements of the Global War on Terror.
In an effort to avoid the hazards posed by roadside bombs and incessant insurgent ambushes,
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commanders maximize the movement of supplies to forward operating bases using tactical airlift instead
of the traditional surface convoys. This solution eliminates a lucrative target for insurgent attacks and
forces them to alter their focus away from the vulnerable supply fleet. Other technological innovations,
such as the joint precision airdrop system, have allowed the re-supply of small outposts without airfields
by GPS guided parachutes. The monumental airlift successes supporting ground forces are only one part
of a larger Air Force contribution.
While not an Air Force doctrinal term, strike is the essence of what the combat arm of the Air
Forces has focused upon since the inception of American airpower in World War I. Decades of
visionary thought, however, did not predict the capabilities of our modern Air Force. With todays
advances in technology, aircraft inflict discrete destruction against pinpoint targets at the time and place
of our choosing. Weapons are even becoming so precise that smaller weapons are being used in an
effort to decrease collateral damage. Some munitions even contain no explosive charges, relying instead
on kinetic energy to kill their target. Despite the seemingly omnipotent ability of U.S. aircraft to hit
virtually any target with little prior planning, the enemys ability to use propaganda and apparent civilian
casualties can transform a rapid tactical victory into a strategic defeat. As a result, airpowers other
inherent strengths must be harnessed to tip the war in our favor.
While complete situational awareness will never be a reality on the battlefield, detailed
intelligence can focus military operations on the most significant targets. The dispersed nature of an
insurgency drives the focus of intelligence collection towards human sources combined and verified
with other means. Cold war technologies, like JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System), worked extremely well against Saadams Republican Guard, but are struggling to find a niche
in the current insurgency fight. Conversely, the Predator unmanned aerial system (UAS) is so vital for
real-time video for immediate support of current operations that it can no longer spend time for its
designed reconnaissance mission. Finally, with so little doctrinal emphasis on reconnaissance virtually
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 all Air Force intelligence assets are low density, high demand. As a result, reconnaissance assets are
sparingly parceled out to commanders to meet only the most critical needs.
In an effort to augment the limited intelligence resources, fighters fill their time in an alternate
role, known as non-traditional ISR. Using the latest targeting pod (TGP) technology, fighter crews
attempt to locate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or enemy activity by comparing their sensor
footage with maps and satellite imagery. While the intention is great, there are huge problems that
thwart even the most proficient pilots and weapons system operators. First, much like the Predator, the
field of view of the targeting pod is narrow. Similar to a set of binoculars, the magnification provided
aids in determining details about a specific point. This is a critical capability in the fleeting seconds
before weapons release to ensure the surgical strike is in fact on the correct target. The same capability,
however, poses a significant challenge when covering a large area to find the proverbial needle in a
haystack. Adding to the difficulty, aircrews are tasked to areas across the AOR based on limited assets
and a gigantic area to cover. Predictably, they usually find nothing. In the few occasions when
anomalies are found, they are passed through intelligence channels and reach ground commanders too
late to make a difference. In short, the Air Force reconnaissance efforts are focusing on working harder
instead of smarter.
Despite the obvious lack of tactical reconnaissance, finding a solution has remained on the back
burner. The rapid proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) across the service components is
evidence enough that the Air Force is not supplying enough aerial reconnaissance to support surface
forces. The limited steps forward are focused entirely on technological solutions to gather more
information for the Joint Force Commander and his staff. In order for the Air Force to become more
effective in the counterinsurgency fight, successful methods of tactical reconnaissance must be
established. They must directly provide ground forces with persistent, detailed, and tailored aerial
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 reconnaissance dedicated to the individual ground commanders objectives and intent. This capability,
however, is not new to COIN doctrine, nor is it revolutionary to the American military.
Americas experience in Vietnam provides many insights into successful tactical innovations that
are directly applicable to current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future battlegrounds in the Global
War on Terror. The Vietnam experience, however, is littered with examples of high technology
reconnaissance platforms that emerged, floundered, and died. Unlike the ill-suited technological
solutions of the day, the Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a low-tech enigma that flourished in the
Vietnam conflict. Lauded by the infantry and ridiculed by fighter jocks, FACs effectively bridged the
gap between the ground and air war over South Vietnam like nothing seen since. Re-introducing a
simple Forward Air Control aircraft into the Theater Air Control System will significantly enhance the
Air Force contribution to military success in the Global War on Terrorism.
Scope
This paper will focus on the counterinsurgency effort of U.S Air Force and Vietnamese Air
Force (VNAF) FACs in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1969. Limiting its scope will serve several
purposes. First by focusing on the conflict in South Vietnam, the scope of the conflict will be consistent
with an insurgency instead of the larger conventional air war that raged in North Vietnam. This is not to
suggest that North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops never fought in South Vietnam, but rather their
tactics and support mirrored insurgent methods until late in the war. Additionally, the anti-aircraft
weapons used against American aircraft in the south were similar to those currently available to
insurgents in the GWOT. Second, the missions, tactics, and manning of USAF and VNAF FACs were
similar enough to use as a single entity for this analysis. The largest difference stemmed their area of
responsibility. USAF, or Free World FACs, were attached directly to coalition ground units while
VNAF FACs, also referred to as Sector FACs, were assigned specific geographic areas and supported
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local government officials.2 While their focus was slightly different, the specific elements of their
tactical missions and reporting structure were virtually identical.
The period of 1964-1969 was chosen to focus military structures, manning, and mindset as
closely as possible to current GWOT realities and an American-centric coalition doctrine. Prior to 1964,
U.S. military involvement was limited to advisors and covert units supporting South Vietnam. The lack
of large American fielded forces during that time mitigates the current realities of Iraq and Afghanistan.
While those early methods offer many lessons that could and should be harnessed in future conflicts,
they are disconnected from todays situation and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Finally,
after 1969 Vietnamization was in full swing, which resulted in structures evolving away from
American primacy and toward South Vietnamese independent operations. Despite the obvious parallels
with todays political debate over Iraq, the evolution of American tactics in South Vietnam atrophied
significantly with the implementation of Vietnamization. The change in objective from winning the
war to returning with honor resulted in tactical changes beyond the scope of this analysis.
Evolution of the FAC Concept
The concept of Forward Air Control was not new to the American military in Vietnam. In fact,
its roots can be traced back to the earliest days of aviation and the aerial spotters of World War I. In
those days, spotter aircraft circumvented gravitys barriers and allowed militaries to observe the
movements of enemy troops and adjust artillery fire. By World War II, their role on the battlefield had
fundamentally changed. With increasing weapons payloads, airpower eclipsed artillery as the
preeminent source of firepower in war. Airpowers increasing range also allowed it to affect the enemy
at the time and location of our choosing across the theater of operations. Additionally, the inherent
speed and flexibility of fighter-bombers allowed them to keep pace with the rapid advances of armored
units. The advantages of Close Air Support (CAS) however, did not come without a price.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Rapid ground advances and the fog of war combined with the relative inaccuracy of World War
II bombs created several early incidents of fratricide that decreased or negated the advantages airpower
brought to the table. Realizing the advantages and inherent risks of CAS, visionaries such as Brigadier
General Elwood Pete Quesada developed the basic framework to control and employ airpower in
close proximity to ground troops. Major innovations like Air Liaison Officers stationed with ground
commanders, ensured aircraft sorties focused on decisive points.3
Combining this synchronization with
direct radio contact between pilots and ground-based forward air controllers produced a system that
generated broad effects and yet could focus on a specific enemy tank when needed. This revolutionary
capability had decisive consequences at the company and platoon level.4
Although there were no
designated airborne FACs during World War II, dedicated tactical reconnaissance units worked in front
of advancing troops. These assets conducted systematic visual reconnaissance (VR) locating targets for
artillery strikes. If significant targets were located outside of artillery range, tactical reconnaissance
aircraft coordinated attacks of opportunity and led strike aircraft to the objective.5 The tactical
efficiency of harnessing airpowers potential in the close ground battle, however, did not survive the
budget crunch of post-war demobilization.
When the Korean War kicked off on 25 June 1950, the coordination and synchronization
structures that allowed the Army and Air Force to effectively employ CAS during World War II no
longer existed. As a result, many early tactical opportunities in Korea were missed while the Army and
Air Force relearned how to work together. After discovering that radio jeeps developed in World War II
were unable to reach useful locations in Koreas rugged terrain and persistent enemy fire, the ground
based FACs of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) attempted to take their mission into the air. 9 July 1950
saw the first planned use of American airborne FACs using borrowed U.S. Army L-5G liaison aircraft
with modified radios to allow both air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. When accolades began
pouring in from the 24th Infantry Division and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, the Air Force began
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pressing T-6 Mosquito aircraft in the FAC mission. The T-6s short takeoff and landing capability
coupled with its low stall speed ensured FACs could operate directly at the front and get a good view of
the battlefield. Their speed and agility also made them survivable despite the heavy anti-aircraft artillery
and North Korean fighters near the front.
6
While the Mosquitoes primary mission was controlling high performance aircraft for CAS, their
special missions included visual reconnaissance, convoy escort, and distributing leaflets. Their
effectiveness in the reconnaissance role was so decisive that within five months after their first missions,
ground commanders insisted upon continuous FAC coverage from sunrise to sunset in front of their
lines.7 The airborne perspective also enhanced the effectiveness of forward air controllers by allowing
them to locate and attack enemy units beyond the visual range of ground troops. The Mosquito FACs
were so effective at finding and engaging North Korean units that they controlled 93 percent of all CAS
strikes in the first 18 months of the Korean conflict.8 Undoubtedly, the focused application of airpower
before direct contact with ground forces reduced the ferocity of the North Korean and Chinese
opposition. In spite of their stellar performance, FAC personnel and equipment again fell victim to the
post war drawdown.
Despite the lack of funds, the USAF established the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS) to
formalize the methodology and instruction for its Forward Air Controllers. FAC airframes, however,
were eliminated between 1954 and 1962 until U.S. participation in Vietnam again forced the Air Force
to refocus on close air support. Starting afresh with AGOS institutional knowledge, a new cadre of
FACs attempted to make a difference in South Vietnam. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, covert
efforts inside Vietnam focused on helping the VNAF to become more effective. Relying on simple
aircraft, such as T-28s, C-47, and B-26s, a covert unit referred to as Jungle Jim quietly applied low
tech, rugged aircraft to help stem the tide of the Viet Cong insurgency.9
The first VNAF liaison
squadron began to operate the O-1A as early as 1957 with initial duties that included artillery spotting,
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courier service, and border patrol. By 1962, with a full compliment of USAF advisors that role had
significantly evolved to include airborne control of fighter strikes, visual and photographic
reconnaissance, and aerial liaison service with the South Vietnamese Army.10 Hamstrung by tenuous
rules of engagement and a limited number of aircraft, Jungle Jim was an insufficient force to produce
significant results, but it proved successful at refining tactics for COIN. The role of the O-1 and the
FAC, however, was set for the remainder of the war.
With the deployment of U.S. Air Force F-100s, F-102s, and B-57s in August 1964, the role of
the forward air controller took on a completely new meaning.11
Initially, American FACs attempted to
operate from the ground in accordance with their training and the inter-service agreements of the time.
Almost immediately, they realized that, much like Korea, their jeeps would be inadequate for the task.
FACs were faced with a problem that required out of the box thinking. Their limited numbers did not
allow FACs to operate with every unit where their ability to control CAS was needed. Additionally, the
terrain was so problematic that even being close to the battle could not provide sufficient situational
awareness to confidently employ ordnance in close proximity to friendly troops.12 The dense jungle,
with visibility as low as 5 feet, required most patrols to proceed on foot.13
In a joint effort to enhance
combat effectiveness, FACs coordinated to use U.S. Army L-19 liaison aircraft to increase their
visibility and ability to help the dispersed small units. Their success eventually led to the Air Force
purchasing the L-19 and designating it as the O-1 Birddog FAC aircraft in 1963.14
FAC Organization
The mobility of the airborne FAC was only one small part of a larger system that made the
tactical application of airpower lethal in Vietnam. The intimate knowledge of the ground scheme of
maneuver and a dedicated process to bring weapons to the target was equally significant. Two parallel
organizations existed to control tactical air operations against the Viet Cong and NVA within South
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Vietnam: Free World FACs worked in direct support of coalition fielded ground forces and Sector
FACs performed Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) missions away from friendly troops.15
The
504th Tactical Air Support Group (TASG) was the single organization that controlled U.S. Tactical Air
Control Parties (TACP) across South Vietnam, working both the CAS and SCAR missions. It was an
immense organization, authorized 3,422 personnel, supporting operations at 6 Field/Corps Headquarters,
20 Divisions, 34 Brigades, 43 Provinces, 119 Battalions, and 63 Special Forces Camps (See Figure 1).16
The task of supplying and controlling such a diverse and geographically dispersed organization
presented a significant challenge. However, providing a coherent method of requesting and
coordinating the air effort would require most of the time and energy.
The 7th Air Force Commanders Tactical Air Coordination Center, forerunner of todays Air
Operations Center, orchestrated the daily allocation and tasking of tactical combat sorties across South
Vietnam. The 504th TASG provided a Direct Air Support Center (DASC), the predecessor of todays
Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), for each Corps or Field Army to choreograph the continuous
flow of aircraft for CAS, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical airlift in support of the ground
commanders needs. The DASC possessed a robust communications structure that allowed continuous
communications between TACPs, aircraft in flight, and other Theater Air Control System (TACS)
elements.17 Below the DASC, a variable hierarchy was required to incorporate conventional, special
operations and provincial requests for air support within the corps area of operations (See Figure 2).
Tactical Air Control Parties were tailored specifically to meet the needs of each successive echelon to
ensure both the liaison and control missions were met.
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Figure 118
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Figure 219
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The Air Liaison Officer (ALO) was primarily responsible for advising the Army commander on
the capabilities, limitations, and employment of airpower. Additionally, the ALO commanded the
TACP and managed local flying operations.20 Finally, the ALO maintained FAC currency, both on the
ground and in the air, and could therefore control strikes as conditions required to support the ground
commander. The remaining personnel of the TACP adjusted to fit the necessities of the supported unit.
Often it included an appropriate number of FACs, enlisted ROMADs (Radio Maintainer, Operator, and
Drivers), and occasionally a limited number of crew chiefs to perform basic maintenance on assigned
aircraft. Typically, the brigade was the lowest echelon assigned a TACP, but FACs occasionally
deployed for patrols at the battalion level or below.
This level of fidelity was essential in order to gain a better perspective on the ground picture and
the methods and constraints of maneuver. The deeper understanding carried over to FAC effectiveness
in the air as indicated by Capt James A. Anderson, FAC with the 3 rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division,
After my six days, Capt Donald Washburn relieved me on station. Shortly thereafter, I was in the air in
an O-1 as a FAC. My six-day experience on the ground with the Control Element of the Brigade and
Battalions was valuable to me as I did the actual strike controlling. I knew the problems of the
battalions intimately and I hope I communicated the urgency of the situation to the strike pilots.21
Capt
Andersons experience did more than simply allow him to bond with his Army counterparts and
understand the mission. His newfound perspective also ensured that his efforts in the air were truly
focused on lending relevant help to the troops on the ground.
Once back in the air, FACs repeatedly delivered precise support by escorting fighters directly to
the critical point on the battlefield. One battalion commander reported, TACAIR is often looked upon
as the panacea after the tactical situation has already become hopeless. With a little imagination and
ingenuity, it can be the infantrymans Ace-in-the-Hole. It is the Tactical Arm that tips the scales of
battle heavily in favor of the US combat soldier and should so be employed.22 The resulting trust
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knowledge of their respective AO became the crucial ingredient in the success of the visual
reconnaissance program. Most accounts suggest that a new pilot required a minimum of one to two
months flying missions in a specific AO to become truly productive. Col Whitehouse, after returning
from his ALO tour in Vietnam, went even further by suggesting that even moving an experienced pilot
to a new AO reduced his effectiveness for several weeks until he could acquire a feel for the specific
environment25
Using their familiarity, FACs operated according to the priorities combining MACV Directive
95-11 (general priorities for O-1 and O-2 aircraft) and 381-1(visual reconnaissance):
1. Quick response missions necessary to tactical success at the sector level
2. Air strike control
3. Artillery and naval gunfire adjustment
4. Convoy/ship escort
5. Visual reconnaissance and surveillance
a. FAC missions directly supporting ground or air operations.b. Daily surveillance of all areas of known Viet Cong activity and critical terrain such as
national borders.
c. Twice daily sampling of other areas6. Radio Relay
7. Others
With these priorities in mind, scheduling of assigned sectors for FAC visual reconnaissance missions
was handled by the division ALO or below. Often VR missions were executed either before or after
scheduled strike missions to maximize the efficiency of every sortie. Their effects were so highly
regarded by ground units that 85% of O-1 and O-2 sorties were employed for FAC or VR missions at
the expense of artillery adjustment and convoy escort. The programs decentralized nature provided
great flexibility to meet ground commander needs at the tactical level. 26
This same flexibility led to some inefficiency as some sectors received repeated coverage, while
others were potentially left neglected. While this apparent neglect may seem a significant shortcoming
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of the decentralized system, further analysis reveals the flexibility was necessary for the local
counterinsurgency effort. The close association of the TACP with the ground units allowed sorties to be
focused at critical points in the tactical environment. Had a larger institution centrally coordinated the
requirements, the system would have suffered from the unnecessary dilution of effort simply to cover
sectors on a map. Instead, decentralized control and execution allowed tactical commanders to make
timely decisions about the location and tasking for their resources to match the local intelligence picture.
Even more vital to mission success was the FACs detailed understanding of his environment
and the subtleties that could indicate the presence of enemy forces. The 21st
Tactical Air Support
Squadrons forward air control manual reveals the subtleties FACs dealt with to locate enemy forces in
Vietnams dense foliage. Not only does the manual recommend an in-depth study of the terrain and
most current intelligence before launching on a mission, but it also emphasizes the importance of
recognizing habit patterns of the local populace in order to detect subtle changes that could be indicators
of activity. Social routines, harvesting and agricultural practices, and daily changes in dust from dry
roads were all potential indications to focus the reconnaissance effort toward enemy concentrations.27
With nothing more than topographic maps of the area, FACs recorded their findings for debrief after the
mission. Once back in the Army command post, intelligence personnel then collected and introduced
the data into the traditional army and air force intelligence networks for further analysis. These
consolidated observations developed patterns of potential enemy activity for further investigation.
FAC Effectiveness and Results
With the intelligence analysis complete, ground commanders then developed a plan of attack.
Realizing his FAC had an unequaled feel for his AO; Battalion Commanders like LTC William Miller
regularly used their knowledge and insight during mission analysis. I would say the FAC had the
AO memorized better than anybody else. He knew that this stream crossing was a certain coordinate, he
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 knew that this trail junction was a certain coordinate28 This level of detail was essential for accurate
planning of large ground operations. Additionally, the trust between FAC and the ground commander
ensured the synergistic coordination of ground and air capabilities during execution.
While some instances required large conventional forces and the requisite close air support,
many situations were best handled by airpower alone. In these instances, FACs were sent to specific
locations of postulated enemy activity. Target coordinates often had significant errors that made the
FACs job of finding a valid target all the more difficult. A comprehensive Air Force study of tactical
airpower in Vietnam concluded that over 70 percent of the target coordinates for FAC investigation had
at least 100 meters of target location error.29 Additionally, some target positions were completely wrong
due to inaccurate navigation or misinterpreting terrain features. Although a known problem, little could
be done to increase the accuracy of manual map and compass target location in Vietnams dense jungles.
Unfortunately, these errors ensured FACs expended significant effort with little or no chance of finding
their intended target.
The triple canopy jungle and deep elephant grass added an additional level of difficulty,
especially once the Viet Cong and NVA made a concerted effort to conceal and camouflage their assets.
Enemy troops wisely became weary of any approaching aircraft and used a variety of methods to hide
their position. In these instances, subtle indications of abnormality proved to be the deciding factor that
allowed FACs to locate enemy forces. In one area, a fleeting wisp of smoke would indicate a recently
doused cooking fire. In another area, obvious agricultural activity would appear normal without FAC
knowledge that the adjacent village had been abandoned for the last 3 months.30
The observation of
subtleties combined with current intelligence often proved to be the difference that allowed FACs to
positively identify 40% of their tasked targets, which often included imprecise descriptions as Known
Enemy Location.31
Obviously, 40% is a remarkable statistic given the difficult terrain and a mobile,
elusive enemy.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 In addition to the FACs capability to confirm enemy troop locations derived from the synthesis
of intelligence data, their ability to locate enemy forces during the mission was remarkable. In a sixty-
day period between 29 May and 30 July 1968, the 20th TASS coordinated 1,128 O-1 and O-2 visual
reconnaissance missions that produced 306 significant sightings. These sightings in support of I Corps
were so significant they generated 1,186 tactical air sorties for immediate attacks.32
The tasking of an
average of 18.8 sorties per day in the I Corps sector for visual reconnaissance netted 5.1 additional
enemy targets. Regardless of the types of targets, it is difficult to argue against any reconnaissance
platform capable enough to generate an additional 150 targets per month for a Corps Commander. Even
against small targets, repeated harassment and an occasional significant strike took its toll on enemy
resolve.
With the target positively identified, the FAC started the coordination process for an air strike.
The first step in the process included contacting the ground commander to ensure friendly deconfliction
and the current commanders intent. Rules of engagement also required Vietnamese Province Chief
approval to strike targets that were not actively engaging coalition forces.33 Once both the military and
local political leadership approved the strike, the FAC coordinated with his DASC for air assets. The
ASOC either scrambled ground alert fighters at a nearby base or diverted airborne assets from pre-
planned targets of lesser importance. This procedure proved extremely successful at providing timely
and sufficient air support across the spectrum of insurgent targets.
Responsiveness, however, is always a point of contention based on the perspective of the
individual. Airborne alert aircraft generally have the fastest response times, but expend huge amounts of
resources for limited usage. Ground alert aircraft ensure aircraft fuel and maintenance are generated to
support only validated requests, but this system adds critical minutes to immediate requests for airpower
when troops are in close contact with enemy forces. In an effort to minimize the response times and
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maximize efficiency, the USAF developed a system of distributed fighter bases throughout South
Vietnam with a constant ground alert posture.
In a detailed analysis of ground alert CAS missions, 1795 scrambles were analyzed for timing,
delays, and efficiency over the summer of 1969. Major findings indicated that ground alert scrambles
resulted in median response times of 40 minutes or less from the request to bombs on target with times
ranging between 20 and 80 minutes.34
The details of the report, however, highlight both the efficiency
and limitations of the system. The study identified DASC coordination (median 3 minutes) and FAC
coordination (median 5.5 minutes) as reasonably constant.35
A variety of delays, including FAC arrival,
weather, lack of clearance, communication difficulties, and Army coordination problems all played
some part in the immediate execution of the mission, but only added an average of 3.6 minutes to the
FAC coordination time. The three previous factors culminate in a total of 11.1 minutes and should be
relatively constant regardless of the alert posture of the aircraft.
The remaining 28.9 minutes is accounted for by a combination of scramble and flight time to the
target. Scramble median times ranged from 9.4 to 13.8 minutes. The timing variance was attributed
primarily to base infrastructure characteristics such as proximity of alert facilities, aircraft alert pads and
the runway as well as base loading and air traffic density.36 The base alert posture or the type of aircraft
(F-100, F-4, or AT-37) could also have affected the timing, but was not cited in the report. By far the
most significant amount of time identified in the study was the flight time to the rendezvous point with
the FAC (See Figure 3). The study indicated a median time of 15 minutes but identified 5% of flights
with flight times greater than 25 minutes. Flight times over 15 minutes usually resulted from either an
indirect routing due to adverse weather, or the dispatch of fighters from bases outside of their 15-minute
flight radius. These dispatch related issues were occasionally necessary to ensure proper ordnance for a
specific target or because no aircraft were available at the nearest base.37
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Figure 338
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The timeliness of the system is of the utmost relevance to the ground forces needing additional
firepower and every minute is significant. On the other hand, flying untasked missions significantly
affects the logistics picture and potentially decreases the available sorties for other important missions.
Striking a balance is essential to ensure the effective use of limited resources without adversely affecting
the trust between the ground and air components. Realizing the need to shorten the response time, the
Air Force had two potential options: either launch airborne alert aircraft for each sector or develop an
armed FAC aircraft capable of employing ordnance until fighters arrived. Unable to significantly
shorten ground alert response timing and unwilling to dedicate additional fighters for sorties without
targets, the Air Force committed itself to the armed FAC concept.
Capabilities, Limitations, and the Evolution of FAC Aircraft
Three aircraft provided the forward air controller duties in South Vietnam: O-1, O-2, and the
OV-10.39 Each aircraft had specific strengths and weaknesses that affected its use on the battlefield. All
three types provided long on station times and stable platforms that allowed pilots and observers to
identify potential targets on the ground. Each successive aircraft improved upon some of the
shortcomings of its predecessor, but like most challenges in aviation, improvement did not come without
a price. The performance tradeoffs combined with fiscal realities meant that despite the introduction of
the OV-10 in 1968, the O-1 continued to serve through the end of the conflict. Highlighting the pros
and cons of each aircraft will be useful to suggest an appropriate balance of capability for a future Air
Force COIN aircraft.
The O-1 was a civilian design by Cessna modified to enhance its capability in military operations.
The O-1s small size, extreme simplicity, excellent ground visibility due to its high wing and narrow
cockpit, combined with proven technology were its strongest suits. It had a cruise speed of about 100
knots and a range of 530 nautical miles. Most significantly, the O-1, with takeoff and landing rolls of
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 600 feet, could operate easily from a simple grass strip.40 This capability meant that the O-1 could be
forward based with little effort or preparation. Additionally, the O-1 was so reliable it averaged less
than 1 hour of maintenance per hour of flight and could often operate for weeks without anything except
fuel and oil. This rugged independence allowed the FAC to fuel and go without the need for a crew
chief at austere locations. Despite its strengths, the O-1 had two severe weaknesses. First, it was
equipped with a spartan navigation and communications system. This limited its ability to fly in adverse
weather conditions, and the O-1 often had difficulty communicating efficiently with all of the units
required to synchronize the mission. Second, it was plagued by its inability to protect itself.41 Its poor
rate of climb and slow speed often provided the enemy anti-aircraft artillery an easy target. Realizing
the shortcomings of the O-1, the USAF decided to develop the O-2, as an interim FAC aircraft, to fill the
gap until the eventual development and arrival of the OV-10.
The O-2 arrived on the scene as early as 1967 to address some of the O-1s weaknesses. It had
increased speed (150 knots), double the rate of climb, a robust communications and navigation system,
target marking capability, and twin-engine reliability. The additional systems were a definite step in the
right direction, but they came at a price. The O-2s side-by-side seating resulted in less visibility than its
predecessor, which decreased its effectiveness on solo visual reconnaissance missions. Additionally the
O-2s robust avionics and radios, weak landing gear, and rear propeller prevented it from operating on
short and unimproved airfields.42
These restrictions markedly decreased the FACs ability to liaise with
ground units and the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance mission. Finally, despite the O-2s
higher performance and assumed twin-engine reliability, the O-2 was not rugged enough to handle battle
damage. As a result, the O-2 loss rate was nearly twice the O-1 in 1967 and 1968.43
Luckily, the
introduction of the OV-10 was less than 2 years away.
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The introduction of the OV-10 to the theater in July of 1968 represented the pinnacle of
technology in forward air control aircraft in Vietnam. The advantages of the OV-10 were a quantum
leap above either the O-1 or the O-2. OV-10 capabilities included:
1. Excellent short take off and landing performance (takeoff 870 feet/land 500 feet)
2. 328 pounds of armor plating and ejection seats to protect the pilot and observer
3. Increased airspeed (dive @ 400 kts, cruise @ 150-180 kts)
4. Cargo bay with 3000lb load capacity (capable of delivering paratroopers)
5. Significant armament (4 M-60 machine guns and 5 stations for rockets, napalm, or CBU)
6. Self sealing fuel tanks
7. Smoke generating capability to assist in rendezvous with fighters44
These significant advantages ensured the OV-10s endearment by its pilots and the troops on the ground.
With its combined ability to professionally execute the visual reconnaissance mission as well as employ
ordnance, the OV-10 was able to significantly decrease response times for critical troops in contact
situations. On several occasions, it was able to respond from a VR mission and employ ordnance to
support ambushed ground forces in less than 5 minutes.45 From a forward air controller perspective the
OV-10 had few weaknesses for complaint. Logistically, however, the OV-10 represented a significant
increase in the level of required support. Its systems no longer were simple enough for a pilot to care for
himself. Additionally, the ordnance used by the OV-10 needed to be stored, prepared, and loaded.
Finally, the consumption of fuel reached an entirely new level. For example, the O-1 total fuel load was
42 gallons of aviation gasoline. This amount of fuel could easily be delivered and stored with the
normal logistics train required to sustain the army post. The OV-10s turboprop engines, on the other
hand, could consume nearly 400 gallons of JP-4 in the same sortie duration.46
In essence, the
performance of the OV-10 required a more traditional Air Force footprint to operate, despite its ability
to takeoff and land at austere locations. These additional considerations, while not prohibitive,
decreased the flexibility of the OV-10 to work from nearly any location without significant planning like
its predecessor the O-1.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Vietnam FAC Lessons Learned
At the core of the lessons learned to improve FAC efficiency in South Vietnam three main points
consistently float to the top. First, FACs needed to be intimately familiar with the current position of
troops on the ground and have a detailed understanding of the ground commanders needs and intent.
This familiarity requires a significant investment of time and cannot be achieved without collating with
the ground unit. Second, close air support must respond rapidly to ground commander requests.
Timeliness can be the difference between life and death during an ambush, but dedicating enough air
assets to respond immediately over a large geographic area can become untenable. Unfortunately,
timeliness will be the measure that can strengthen or destroy the ground commanders trust in the air
arm. Finally, persistent visual reconnaissance is an essential part of the counterinsurgency fight,
requiring months of constant observation to become successful. FACs integrating current intelligence
with a detailed familiarity of the local environment was one of the few tactically successful ways to root
out enemy activity during Vietnam despite the difficult terrain and vegetation.
On the first point, the Air Force preaches this party line by requiring FACs to have a habitual
working relationship with Army units, but only enacts it in a limited sense. Ground FACs are still
assigned to Army posts and maintain a daily interaction during war and peace, but their manning has
been insufficient to meet wartime requirements. This trend has reversed in the last couple of years, but
the time required to fully train ground FACs has prevented any immediate relief. Air FACs, however,
are rarely located in any proximity to Army posts let alone aligned with specific units for training.
Administratively, the air request system used in Vietnam survived the interwar period virtually
unscathed. As noted earlier in this paper, many of the names have changed, but the mission of liaison
and close air support is alive and well in todays Theater Air Control System. Except for a few minor
squabbles early in the GWOT, ground based forward air controllers met or exceeded inter-service
requirements for controlling close air support.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The air arm also successfully provides an adequate number of sorties to respond to ground
requests. This capability is a product of two elements unavailable during Vietnam. First, with no other
air campaign underway, tankers are available to support CAS operations. This allows a continuous
airborne alert posture capable of immediate response to ground requests. Second, precision munitions
like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) have allowed bombers to take a more active role in
providing close air support. Their increased payload and loiter time provide a continuous supply of
munitions. As long as a qualified controller is available, JDAMs can provide the firepower needed to
turn the tide of battle, even in bad weather. As long as both of these capabilities are available in theater,
armed FAC aircraft like the OV-10 will not be required. If future political or military needs reduce the
conventional U.S. Air Force presence, the armed FAC concept will once again become essential and
require a significant investment.
Vietnams final major lesson requiring dedicated visual reconnaissance in counterinsurgency
operations is the largest single element missing in current operations. Despite the fantastic capabilities
of our modern fighters and UASs, neither is able to operate from locations or in the numbers required to
execute the VR mission effectively. A simple platform capable of bridging the gap to provide U.S.
ground forces persistent aerial observation must be found. Using Vietnam as a starting point, aircraft
requirements are easily estimated. In 1966, Tactical Air Command (TAC) published a comprehensive
Required Operational Capability study that determined the appropriate number of aircraft to support
army operations. Each division would have two FACs continuously airborne in its AO either
orchestrating CAS missions or performing visual reconnaissance. It resulted in a requirement for 15
aircraft per division to provide the 24-hour coverage across the division AO. Individual aircraft were
required to fly an average of 3.24 hours per day or 96 hours per month, which accounted for neither
maintenance loss nor combat attrition. Using 15 aircraft as the baseline, TAC determined each division
required 24 FACs of various ranks to execute the required flights and the other ALO functions. Using
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 TACs calculations to estimate todays requirements, with approximately five divisions active in Iraq
and an extra division in Afghanistan the effort would require approximately 90 aircraft for combat
operations. TAC also expected an additional 25% would be required for training; resulting in a total
purchase of 112 aircraft.
47
There are many aircraft options to fill the void, but three examples will highlight a few of the
possibilities. Many American companies offer acceptable examples of aircraft capable of meeting the
intent, but their capability to handle the austere environment with high reliability will need to be
thoroughly tested. Each of the examples would require some modifications like military specification
radios and night vision goggle compatible cockpits. They are used merely to illustrate different
approaches to filling the niche while highlighting their relative cost and capability. Using an off the
shelf design ensures simplicity and minimal research and development costs.
On one extreme is the O-1 model. With minimal frills, the Pacific Aerosystem Sky Arrow is the
ultimate in simplicity with excellent visibility. It is a composite airframe capable of takeoff and landing
distances of less than 800 feet. Additionally its four hour of loiter time is accomplished with only 18
gallons of fuel. Much like the O-1, the Sky Arrow is extremely slow, 104 knots, and offers little in the
way of amenities. Another limitation is its 13,500 feet service ceiling. While that would easily be
satisfactory in most places in the world, the mountains of Afghanistan would severely limit its
effectiveness. The Sky Arrows price tag of approximately $125,000, however, makes it extremely
affordable.48 The Sky Arrow is only one example of extremely simple off the shelf technology
potentially capable of serving as a light observation aircraft.
Similarly, the Cessna Stationair could easily fit the profile. It is designed for use as a bush plane
and it regularly serves in Alaska and other austere environments around the world. It is larger than the
Sky Arrow, but with a maximum speed of 178 knots and virtually identical takeoff and landing
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performance, the Stationair is more conservative. Its service ceiling of over 20,000 feet would also
allow flight over all but the highest peaks in the world. Unfortunately, the added performance comes
with a cost. The Stationair will use nearly four and a half times (80 gallons) as much fuel as the Sky
Arrow on the same sortie duration. Additionally, the side-by-side seating arrangement would limit
visibility from both sides of the aircraft without an additional observer. With an online, unofficial price
tag of approximately $500,000, the Stationair represents mid-level performance with proven reliability.49
A final approach uses the Korean War example of the T-6 Mosquito FACs to fill the FAC
dilemma. Using todays USAF primary training aircraft, Raytheons T-6A, as a FAC platform would
have several advantages. First, its added speed and agility would make it more survivable against
known enemy threats. Additionally, its open architecture would allow for added growth towards the
AT-6 if tankers or bomb dropping aircraft were unavailable in theater. Unfortunately, the T-6A requires
a minimum of 1775 feet for takeoff and Raytheon suggests a 4,000-foot runway for operation with no
mention of any rough field capability.50
Additionally, with an initial price of $5 million the added
performance is completely outweighed by its cost. 51
With severe shortages in funding and the immediate need to recapitalize our existing airframes,
every effort must be made to ensure the viability of the concept outside of history and academia. Using
a synopsis of Vietnam era FAC techniques, tactics, and procedures, a comprehensive field test is the
only way to prove FAC viability in the current insurgencies. Money and manning will be the primary
obstacles to get this program initiated. Funding for the program will obviously be tight and require
some sacrifices to balance what the Air Force wants and what is actually required to get the job done.
The first two examples both show promise because of their simple designs and capability to operate in
austere conditions. Evaluating these and other similar designs can identify a clear winner. Additionally,
the acquisition price tag of $14-56 million is minimal and clearly worth the opportunity to enhance the
Air Force contribution to the GWOT.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 Augmenting Air Support Operations Squadron manning to allow for simple FAC aircraft
operations is the next hurdle. The TAC assumptions suggest 144 pilots for FAC duty and an additional
30 for instruction.52 Some of the pilots are easily found in the Air Support Operations Squadrons
already attached with Army units. ALOs would continue to execute their current mission of advising
the ground commander, but also return to their original mission of controlling close air support aircraft
and providing visual reconnaissance. This, however, would only be a start. Additional support will be
required to fill cockpits and will require creative sourcing to find the bodies. While sourcing the bodies
is beyond the scope of this paper, applying the lessons of Vietnam is essential. Using excess pilots
tasked to support the current AEF is appealing, but adhering to the 120-day cycle would negate the
familiarity required for successful visual reconnaissance. Having FACs on station for extended periods
in the same AO is the only way they will be able to identify the subtle differences indicating enemy
activity. Deployment for 1-year remote tours to specific locations is the best solution to perpetuate
lessons learned for the longest reasonable period.
Recommendations for the Future
The Global War on Terror will not end with Iraq or Afghanistan. The USAF must be ready to
employ airpower across the spectrum of conflict without notice. The continuing cycle of ignoring close
air support between wars, especially the tactical air control party, must be stopped. This core
competency is essential from the first day American ground forces are employed against the enemy.
Continually reinventing proven tactics at the expense of lives is unacceptable and should be avoided at
all costs. Unfortunately, funds are limited and budget choices must be made. Therefore, maintenance of
a functional FAC force needs to align itself with an eye to surviving the interwar budget crunch.
With modern conventional air-land battle requiring a large fighter force capable of delivering
precision munitions, it is difficult to justify the significant investment in research, development, and
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fielding another OV-10 like platform for FAC duty. When faced with modern fielded forces with
mobile surface-to-air defenses, FACs should operate from the ground to provide close air support. In
other conflicts where the enemy chooses an irregular methodology, like the current situation in Iraq,
FACs can utilize their aircraft to increase pressure on dispersed forces by locating, tracking, and
attacking insurgents with aircraft, artillery, or ground ambush.
The ability to both live with the supported ground unit and utilize the aerial perspective to
provide focused intelligence will be a force multiplier for the U.S. military in future low-intensity
conflicts. Not only would the FACs span of influence increase to coincide with the entire ground units
AO, but the exponential rise in ground FAC requirements would decrease with airborne FAC ability to
flow where needed. Additionally, FAC proximity to the local populace and longer deployments would
allow them to build the requisite awareness of the local culture and conditions to execute effective visual
reconnaissance in a manner similar to their Vietnam era predecessors. Simple, inexpensive aircraft
provide the best balance between cost and effectiveness. More important to future flexibility in the
GWOT is a standing capability to integrate forward air control duties with persistent visual
reconnaissance as soon as the need arises.
Endnotes
1 FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 15 Dec 2006, E-1.2
United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 2.
3 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical AirPower in World War II. (New York: Free Press, 1995), 133.
4United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and
James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 1.5 Lester, Gary Robert.Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997, 12.6 Ibid., 34-36.7 Ibid., 49.8
Ibid, 50.9 Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson.Airpower in Small Wars : Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists,
(Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 245.
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 10
Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations :1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969, 10.
11 Tilford, Earl H. Setup : What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.:Air University Press ; Washington D.C., 1991), 81-82.
12Cooling, B. Franklin, and United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the
Development of Close Air Support. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History U.S. AirForce, 1990), 431.13
LTC William H Miller (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969,transcript, 4, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.
14Lester, Gary Robert.Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller.
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 110.15 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.,
and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 2.16 Ibid., 8-9.17 Air Force Manual 2-7, Tactical Air Force Operations Tactical Air Control System (TACS).
Washington D.C. 5 June 1967. pg 12-13.18
United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 2.19 Ibid., 4.20
United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller TacticsManual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 1-1.
21 Capt James A. Anderson, interview by unknown historian, 13 December 1968, transcript, AlbertSimpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.
22 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 28.
23United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance.
Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. 111.24 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Interdiction.
Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. 52.25
Whitehouse, Wendell H., and Air University (U.S.). Air War College.Air Force Forward Air Controland Visual Reconnaissance. (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969), 51.
26 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance.Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968.121-125.
27 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller TacticsManual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 2-4.
28LTC William H Miller (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969,
transcript, 13, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL.29 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.
Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 20.30 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics
Manual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 2-5.31 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.
Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 20.32 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.
Visual Reconnaissance in I Corps, 30 September 1968. S.l.: s.n., 1968, 25.
29
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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 33
United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance.Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968, 125.
34 Sandborn, Richard T., and Lee E. Dolan.An Examination of Factors Affecting Tactical Air ResponseTime in South Vietnam. (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF Operations Analysis, 1970), 7.
35Ibid., 7,31.
36
Ibid., 10.37 Ibid., 17.38
Ibid., 14.39 Some fighters such as the F-100 and F-4 were also labeled as FAC aircraft, but their utilization was
focused on SCAR missions in North Vietnam to effectively defend themselves against NVAsurface to air missiles and MIG fighters. Their added performance aided in survivability, but atthe expense of slow speed visibility and loiter time. Additionally, their delicate systems and longrunway requirements prohibited any actual close coordination with army units. As a result,despite their identification as FAC aircraft, their roles was fundamentally different than themission previously discussed in this paper.
40Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations :
1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1969. pg 19.41 Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10a: It CanPerform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. pg 32-33.
42United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.
Supporting Documents FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. Vol II.: s.n. 898417,1968. Doc 32 pg 2.
43United States Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1968, 12.
44 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and Joseph V. Potter. OV-10 Operations in SEAsia : Special Report. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 16-17.
45Ibid., 14.
46Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10A: It Can
Perform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. pg 62.47 United States Air Force. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems.
Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966, 7-8.48 Pacific Aerosystems Inc. Skyarrow Downloadable Specs. http://www.skyarrowusa.com (accessed
16 April 2007).49
Cessna Aircraft Company. Turbo Stationair Specification and Description.http://turbostationair.cessna.com (accessed 16 April 2007).
50 Global Security.org. T-6A JPATS. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htm(accessed 16 April 2007.
51 Federation of American Scientists. T-6A JPATS. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htm(accessed 16 Apr 2007).
52United States Air Force. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems.
Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966, 7-8.
30
http://www.skyarrowusa.com/http://turbostationair.cessna.com/http:///reader/full/Security.orghttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htmhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htmhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htmhttp:///reader/full/Security.orghttp://turbostationair.cessna.com/http://www.skyarrowusa.com/7/31/2019 America's Forgotten Lessons in Visual Reconnaissance.pdf
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