FAMA E REPUTAÇÃO: THE PROVINCIAL PORTUGUESE

NOBILITY, THE CHALLENGES OF THE RESTORATION

ERA, AND IMPERIAL SERVICE IN THE

ESTADO DA INDIA, CA. 1661-1683

GLENN J. AMES

The University of Toledo, OH

ABSTRACT

Based on extensive archival research in Lisbon and Goa, this article examines the sym- biotic relationship between the newly independent Portuguese Crown and the rising provincial nobility in Portugal during the late seventeenth century. The provincial nobil- ity had been a prime supporter of João, duke of Braganza, in his revolution against Habsburg Spain in 1640. Thereafter, the new dynasty and the provincial nobility assisted each other in meeting the political, military, economic, and imperial challenges of the post-1640 period. By examining the careers of roughly a dozen nobles originally from the pre-1640 provincial nobility, the article shows that this relationship proved to be mutually beneficial and advantageous. The house of Braganza preserved its indepen- dence and was able to overcome many daunting challenges, in particular stabilizing the precarious position of the Asian empire, the Estado da India, during these years. At the same time, the members of the provincial nobility, through their serice to the Crown at home and in the empire, were able to rise in the social hierarchy, sometimes enter- ing the lofty ranks of the titulares or "titled ones" in the process.

As Carl A. Hanson and others have shown, the December 1640 revo-

lution in Lisbon, directed against the 60 year long "captivity" at the

increasingly shaky hands of the Spanish Habsburgs, owed much to the

support of the provincial nobility in Portugal.' Philip II had originally

promised merely a personal union of the Crown to his vast imperial

holdings along with a good deal of Portuguese autonomy in his con-

quest and consolidation of power from 1580-1582.? Both Philip III

' Cf. Carl A. Hanson, Economy and Sociery in Baroque Portugal (Minneapolis, 1981), 23- 24 ; and Dicionário de História de Portugal, ed. Joel Serrao (4 vols., Lisbon, 1971), vol. III: 154-55.

2 For details on Philip II's conquest and consolidation of power in Portugal, among others, cf. Geoffrey Parker, Philip II (3rd ed., Chicago, 1995), 142-47; Parker, The Gland Strategv of Philip II (New Haven, 1998), 166-68; Henry Kamen, Philip of Spain (New Haven, 1997), 169-77; David Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal (Cambridge, 1993), 10- 34 ; A.H. Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal (2 vols., New York, 1972), vol. I: 300-19; and H.V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1976), 150-62.

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(1598-1621) and Philip IV (1621-1665), however, had violated this pledge. A complex conjuncture of factors had ultimately culminated in the "rev-

olution" of 1640. Resentment against the centralization plan of Olivares, economic crisis, deep-seated nationalism, a rejection of six decades of

cultural Castilianization, as well as imperial losses in Asia, Africa, and

America occasioned by the tie to Madrid all played a part.3 The Habsburg

strategy to maintain control in Portugal during the reigns of the three

Philips had revolved in part around pre-empting any possible revolt on the part of the privileged classes in general and the nobility in partic- ular. The indigenous court nobility of the Aviz period had been reduced

to impotence during the Habsburg years through favoring the presum- ably less dangerous provincial nobility at their expense, in combination

with a concerted campaign of intermarriage. As A.H. Oliveira Marques has argued, one result of such policies was to deprive Portugal of a true

"court culture" and court nobility in Lisbon during these years.4 The

de facto Lusitanian court of the dukes of Braganza at Vila Vi?osa may have sought to fulfill this role, but it was no competition for the ear-

lier Aviz courts or the Habsburg court at Madrid; quite simply, royal power and largesse did not reside in the Alentejo. This political ambi-

guity on the part of the Portuguese nobility had been exacerbated by the fact that many great nobles had initially accepted and served the

Habsburgs in the expectation of further social and economic advance-

ment, or fell prey at least temporarily to the lure of Crown patrimony lands.'

The initial reluctance of the duke of Braganza to embrace his role

in the events of 1640 reflects the power of such inducements. Nevertheless,

prompted by provincial nobles like Pedro de Mendon?a and others he

had finally accepted the challenge.6 The overthrow of Duchess Margaret of Mantua and her advisors, of course, only revealed how difficult it

was to maintain Portugal's independence at home and in the empire

against a plethora of enemies. But, as V.M. Godinho put it some 40

years ago, Joao IV, his wife and later Queen-Regent D. Luisa de

3 On the reasons for the 1640 revolution, among others, cf. Livermore, .A?c History, 163-72; Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I: 318-26; and J.H. Elliot's chapter, "Thc Spanish Peninsula, 1598-1648" in the New C,ambrid?e Modem History IV, The Decline of Spain and The Thirty Years War, 1609-48/59, ed. J.P. Cooper (Cambridge, 1970), 435-73.

4 Cf. Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I: 323. 5 On this tendency, cf. Birmingham, Concise History, 36-37. 6 For details on the negotiations that ultimately convinced Joao of Braganza to join

the uprising of 1640 perhaps the best source remains, Luis de Menezes, count of Ericeira, Historia de Portugal Restaurado (4 vols., Lisbon, 1710, Porto, 1945-46), vol. I: 56-120.

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Gusmao, and his sons Afonso VI and Pedro II would succeed by ca.

1683 in firmly establishing the house of Braganza on an independent

Portuguese throne.' This was no mean achievement given the difficulties

confronting them in 1640. One aspect of this consolidation process that

has not received extensive attention in the historiography was the need

to re-establish a new court and administrative nobility in the wake of

the revolution of 1640. By examining roughly a dozen noble careers

during the Restoration years, this article will argue that Joao IV and his immediate successors logically sought to rebuild this court and admin- istrative nobility with the sons of the provincial nobles who had origi-

nally supported the revolution of 1640. It will argue further that a common model of career advancement characterized the rise of these

young nobles, and that this model was a clear reflection of the chal-

lenges and structures of seventeenth-century Portugal. Finally, it will maintain that one of the main challenges confronting the Braganza dynasty was to restore some semblance of wealth to Portuguese Asia, the so-called Estado da India. This Asian Empire, stretching from Mozam-

bique in southeast Africa to Macau in China, had won glory and riches for the Aviz dynasty while attracting the jealousy of European rivals.

The office of Viceroy of India remained a coveted position, and a fitting culmination for provincial nobles on the rise under the Braganzas. In

fact, no indigenous Portuguese dynasty would ever be considered legit- imate and solid without fulfilling the task of restoring to viability this "most glorious" of the conquests. At the same time, no provincial noble

family would consider its mission of social advancement fulfilled until it had reached the ranks of the titulares or "titled ones." Between ca. 1661-1683 both the Braganzas and selected noble families would achieve their ambitions by trying to salvage what remained of Portuguese Asia.

During these years, the Braganza dynasty would devote increasing atten- tion to this "most glorious" imperial possession and, in doing so, offer

much largesse to those nobles who agreed to take on the challenges of the office of Viceroy in Goa.

What were the main challenges confronting Joao IV and his succes- sors in the decades after 1640? Winning the independence war with

Spain was certainly the immediate problem. But the need to find an

acceptable end to the struggle with the Dutch for overseas empire, and

to rebuild a moribund military and economy severely taxed by six

' Cf. Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire" in The New Cambridge Modern History V' The Ascendancy of France, 1648-88, ed. F.L. Carsten (Cambridge, 1961), 384-97.

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decades of subservience to the foreign policy vicissitudes of the Habsburgs, did not lag far behind. The erstwhile duke of Braganza, however, also

possessed not insignificant internal weapons in fighting for his nascent

dynasty. The vestigial power of the Aviz dynasty and Crown largesse would serve him well. The still extant administrative apparatus for both

the kingdom (reino) and empire (imperio) would also prove useful. Perhaps most importantly, as V.M. Godinho and Oliveira Marques have main-

tained, Joao of Braganza had the solid "nationalist" support of the peo-

ple (o povo) in this difficult campaign.s The multifarious powers of the

Catholic Church and its various organs, like the Inquisition, were use-

ful, as were the still important military orders, especially those of Christ

and Santiago.9 Significantly, most of these key institutions also had direct

connections to the model of career advancement that characterized the

accession of the provincial nobility to the ranks of the court nobility and titulares from ca. 1640-1683. The independence crusade against

Spain in the Alentejo offered the young sons of these noble houses a

chance to "win their spurs" in combat, much as the sons of Joao I, the

founder of the house of Aviz in 1385, had won theirs fighting against the "Moors" in North Africa. Given meritorious service in the fight

against Spain, Crown largesse in the form of pensions, lands, offices, or a knighthood or commandery in one of the military orders would

follow.'° The Council system, which Joao IV expanded in Lisbon begin-

ning in 1640 to administer the war, the kingdom, and his empire, afforded an even greater array of honors to covet." Finally, the tri-

dimensional struggle against the Dutch in Brazil, Africa, and the Estado

da India offered an opportunity to serve the Crown, God, and Mammon

all at once, through vice-regal appointments that marked the apogee of

the social and career advancement model of the early Braganza period. The first stage of the independence struggle lasted for twenty years.

During this period, Portugal was able to rebuild the economy and mili-

tary, while gaining generally favorable results in the war with Philip IV,

8 Cf. "Portugal and her Empire," 389-90, 96-97; History of Portugal, vol. I: 322-23. `-' On the challenges confronting, and resources available to, Joao IV, cf. Godinho

"Portugal and her Empire," 385-89; Birmingham, Concise History, 34-43; Livermore, New History, 173-79; and Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I: 327-31.

'° On the importance and functioning of the military orders in Portugal, cf. Francis A. Dutra, "Membership in the Order of Christ in the Seventeenth Century," The Americas 27 (1970): 3-25.

" For details on the Council system of Joao IV, cf. V.M. Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire," 390-92.

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who admittedly had other battles to fight as well." Overseas, Joao IV

had to make a painful choice among imperial priorities. Given the lim-

ited resources of the kingdom, the king had to decide which parts of

the empire to defend actively, and which parts could be allowed to fend

for themselves. The traditional view holds that Joao devoted most of

his overseas resources to his "milch-cow" of Brazil, which was indeed

regained from the Dutch by 1654." It was certainly no coincidence that

it was precisely during these years that the Estado da India suffered its

most grievous losses to the Dutch VOC and to various indigenous pow- ers : Melaka (1641), Ceylon (1640-1658), Muskat (1650), and Mangalore

(1652) were all lost. 14 By the early 1660s, the second stage of the inde-

pendence struggle had begun, fueled by a generational shift within the

Portuguese ruling family as well as many of the noble houses in the

kingdom. Joao IV had died in 1656. Since his twelve-year-old son Afonso

VI was beset by emotional and physical problems, the Cortes delayed his formal accession to the throne, and named D. Luisa de Gusmao as

Regent. A jealous and more talented younger brother, Pedro, waited

anxiously in the wings.?" Meanwhile, the nobles who acclaimed Joao IV

in 1640, including Pedro de Mendon?a, had also died off, giving way in the provincial noble houses of the realm to their sons, who began to reach, in the words of Ortega y Gasset, their own "generation of

dominance." 16 Under Joao IV's sons and the sons of Pedro de Mendon?a and others like him, the struggle against Spain shifted from a desper- ate quest for survival to a period of consolidation and reform, culmi-

nating in a measure of economic and imperial re-birth. One key aspect of this process was an increasing desire to rehabilitate what still remained

12 On the initial stages of the Restoration war, cf. Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire," 392-93; Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I: 330-33; Livermore, New History, 176- 80 ; Birmingham, Concise History, 41-49; and C.R. Boxer, Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686 (London, 1952), 333-58.

13 Cf. Boxer, A India Portuguesa em meados do século XVII (Lisbon, 1980), 18; Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I: 338.

14 On the losses, cf. C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825 (New York, 1969), 106-28; h'.G. Danvers, Vie Portuguese in India (2 vols., London, 1894), vol. II: 143- 362 ; and Glenn J. Ames, Renascent Empire?: The House of Braganza and the Questjbr Stability in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, ca. 1640-1683 (Amsterdam, 2000), 17-38.

15 On Afonso's problems and the Regency years from 1656-1662, cf. Boxer, Salaador de Sa, 333-45; Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, vol. I: 331-33; Birmingham, Concise History, 48-49; Livermore, New History, 184-95; and Ames, Renascent Empire?, 26-38.

16 On this theory and its possible relevance to historical change, cf. jos6 Ortega y Gasset, Man and Crisis (En Torno A Galileo) translated by Mildred Adams (New York, 1958, 1962), 30-84.

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of the Estado da India. By the mid-1660s, victory in the battle of Montes Claros (June 1665) had largely blunted the Spanish threat, while peace had been reached with the Dutch in Brazil and Asia, at a price, and the treaty of 1661 with Charles II and England had also been arranged. These developments afforded the Portuguese Crown a chance to address the festering sore of the losses in the Asian empire."

It is worth noting that even during the generally disastrous years of

the mid-seventeenth century, "the viceroyalty of Goa [had remained] one of the most lucrative patronage appointments in the gift of the

Portuguese Crown Like the service nobility who had served the

Habsburgs in Asia, those who would serve the Braganzas sought to obtain "two of the career objectives most commonly pursued" by their class.'9 The first was, in a sense, communal: to preserve and advance the interest of one's noble casa (house) and family. The second was more individualistic: to advance one's own fama and reputafdo by performing notable deeds in the service of the Crown. For a nobleman, the most

acceptable means for adding to one's reputation related to fama do valor

(reputation for military glory) and fama do cabedal (reputation for wealth). A Viceroy found ample opportunities to achieve both types of fama dur-

ing an appointment in Goa. Fighting against the armies of the Muslim

king of Bijapur, the Mughal emperor, or the great Hindu leader Shivaji provided ample "fields" for glory and fama do valor. The plethora of

entrepreneurial opportunities found in Goa offered plenty of opportu- nity for fama do cabedal. Viceroys traditionally used casado (married

Portuguese subjects permanently resident in the Asian empire) and indige- . nous third party merchants to become involved in private trade through-

out the Indian Ocean basin. Socially, the most acceptable of these trades were the horse trade with the Persian Gulf, and the rice and grain trade with the Kanara coast. For the nobility, these commodities provided familiar links with their quintas (estates) in Portugal and did not involve

social dirogeance. Upon a Viceroy's departure for the Reino (kingdom), the proceeds of entrepreneurship were generally converted to diamonds and other precious stones.2°

" For details on this reformation campaign from ca. 1665-1683, cf. Ames, Renascent Empire?, especially 35-38.

18 Cf. Anthony R. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur: The Count of Linhares at Goa in the 1630s" in Emporia, Commodities, and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400-1750, ed. R. Ptak and D. Rothermund (Stuttgart, 1991), 427-44; and Virginia Rau, Fortunas ultramarinas e a nobreza portuguesa no siculo XVII (Coimbra, 1961). 19 According to Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur," 428.

20 For details, cf. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur," 429-44.

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The men who held the office of Viceroy of the Estado da India dur-

ing the years ca. 1661-1683 began their careers in the 1640s fighting in the war in the Alentejo against the Spanish. After winning their

"knightly spurs" in honorable combat, they enjoyed royal largesse in

the form of a pension or office in the developing administrative bureau-

cracy in Lisbon.2' Next, it was common for these young nobles to receive

a knighthood or commandery in one of the military orders, usually the

Order of Christ, followed by an initial imperial posting in Brazil, Africa

or the Estado da India. After returning to the reino following meritorious

service abroad, there would frequently be a post on the king's princi-

pal councils (state, war, overseas). Finally, given sufficient reputafao, per- sonal ties to the Crown, influence at court, and fortune, one might hope for an appointment as Viceroy of the Estado da India as the capstone of

one's career. This final step in career advancement under the early

Braganzas often involved entrance into the elite of the noble class in

Portugal, the ranks of the titulares. Overall, then, the break with Spain facilitated the rise of a group of hitherto relatively minor provincial noble families who, by their aggressive service to the Crown, would

come to dominate the administrative system of the Braganzan state. In

doing so, they not only helped to establish this dynasty, they also saved

what remained of the Estado da India.

In early 1661, at the outset of the second stage of the Restoration

struggle, Queen Regent D. Luisa wrote letters to the fourth governing Council of the Estado, warning of a large fleet of some "30 ships and

8000 soldiers" that the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was prepar-

ing to send to Asia.22 D. Luisa informed her Governors that for some

time she had hoped to report a peace with Holland, a pact that would

"improve things there." Unfortunately, the States-General and VOC

were proving obstinate. Meanwhile, the Governors were ordered to con-

tinue the policy of "the defense and conservation of the prafas and lib-

erty of commerce." On a more positive note, D. Luisa wrote that the

war with Spain was going well, despite the separate peace that France

had concluded, and that the kingdom would fight on until the last drop

21 The plethora of minor and major pensions and grants that these rising nobles received from the Crown can be traced most convincingly in Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [ANTT] Chancelarias Reais and Registro geral de Merces collections for the reigns of Joao IV and Afonso VI.

22 Cf. Historical Archive of Goa, Panjim, India [HAG] Livros das monções do Reino [MR] 28A, Count of Ponte to D. Luisa Gusmao: fo. 232, 7/11/1661; fo. 236, 14/II/1661. and MR 28A Count of Miranda to D. Luisa: fo. 238, 10/11/1661; and fo. 234, 1/111/1661.

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of blood !23 That same month, the Queen Regent reaffirmed her inten-

tion to appoint a new Viceroy as soon as possible and one "of such

quality" that one could justly expect that "his experience and valor would promptly procure a Remedy to the affliction" in which the Estado

found itself. Until major assistance could be dispatched, she was con-

vinced that "with your work and industry, and above all your valor, and that of your subjects," the impending challenge could be met.24

The members of this Governing Council were D. Pedro de Lencastre, Luis de Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque and D. Manoel Mascarenhas.25

Mascarenhas then held the lucrative post of Captain of Mozambique and had declined the honor of the Viceroyalty.26 The other two mem-

bers of the Council were both younger sons of provincial nobles who had championed the 1640 revolution. Lencastre was the fourth son of

D. Louren?o de Lencastre and D. Ines de Noronha. He had begun his

service to Joao IV "in the year of his happy acclamation in the province of the Alentejo." There, he had held the offices of Captain of the

Infantry, Captain of Cavalry, Commissario and Mestre de Campo. Lencastre

had served in the Restoration War until 1657. In that year, he first

traveled to India as capitiio-mor (captain-major) of the fleet that conducted his uncle, the Count of Vila Pouca de Aguiar, to Goa as the 29th

Viceroy of the Estado. Vila Pouca had died on the outward voyage and

never assumed his office. A Dutch blockade of the mouth of the Mandovi

had also prevented Lencastre from returning to the Reino until the spring of 1661, when he was named one of the Governors on the Council. 17

Luis de Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque was the son of Pedro de

Mendon?a. His father had been alcaide-mor of Mourdo, commendador (com-

mandery holder) of Santiago de Cassem and Vila Franca, senhor of

Seregeira, one of the principal nobles who had acclaimed D. Joao IV

in December 1640, and later guarda-mor for the king.28 Luis was the

eldest child of Pedro's second marriage to D. Antonio de Mendon?a, a lady-in-waiting of D. Luisa de Gusmao. Like Lencastre, he had begun

2s Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 212, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India, ll1IV/1661. 24 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 215, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India, 20/IV/1661;

and also HAG MR 28A fo. 218, 26/IV/ 1661. z5 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; J.F. Ferrcira Martins, Os hice-Reis da India, 1505-

1917 (Lisbon, 1935), 149-50. 2f Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martin, Os Vice-Reis, 149-50; and Biblioteca

Publica de Evora [BPE] Codex CXV/1-21 fo. 91v. 27 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martin, Os Vice-Reis, 149-50. 28 On Pedro de Mendon?a's notable role in the events of 1640, cf. Count of Ericeira,

Historia de Portugal Restaurado, vol. I: 104-13.

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his career in the 1640s fighting in the war in the Alentejo, where he

performed with "reputation" and "distinction." Luis had first traveled

to the Estado in 1651, as capitiio-mor (captain-major) of a three ship fleet that made a swift voyage to and from Goa. In 1653, he had repeated this impressive feat in an epoch of general maritime disasters for the

Estado by departing from Lisbon in March with two ships and reach-

ing Goa in October of that year. In 1657, Mendon?a Furtado had

returned to the Estado aboard the fleet carrying the count of Vila Pouca

and Lencastre, with the title of Admiral of the Indian Seas. Between

January and March 1658, he had also commanded with great skill the

Portuguese fleet that tried to break a Dutch blockade of the Mandovi

and relieve Jaffna, the remaining Estado outpost on Ceylon. According to the Jesuit Queiroz, Mendon?a Furtado had the most impressive

physique of all the Portuguese in India at that time. Throughout these

naval encounters with the Dutch fleet: "Great was the valour and wis-

dom [with] which the Portuguese Admiral acted ... infusing courage into all by his presence."29

On land, Mendon?a Furtado's fama do valor had also grown during his imperial service in the 1650s. In late 1658, the king of Bijapur, in

league with the VOC, had invaded the Goan province of Salsette with

some 400 cavalry and 4,000 infantry under the general Abdula Hakim.

The only Portuguese force then in Salsette was some 250 men in Rachol

under the command of Gaspar Carneiro Girao. In Goa, this news

prompted the dispatching of Mendon?a Furtado as general along with

some troops to meet the challenge. In a pitched battle fought near the

village of Arli, the Portuguese inflicted a decisive defeat upon Abdula

Hakim's army and obliged his men to retreat across the Western Ghats.

Again according to Queiroz, Mendon?a Furtado performed a notable

feat of valor on that day. As the armies deployed for battle, "one of his

[Abula Aquimo's] higher officers who was considered the most valiant

among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him [Mendon?a

Furtado]." The Portuguese general "sallied forth from the ranks to meet

him with only the dress sword which he had at his side and a round

target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, because

29 For background on Mendon?a Furtado's family and early career, cf. Gayo, Nobiliario de Familias de Portugal XX (Braga, 1939): 53-56; Caetano de Sousa, Historia Genealogica XI (Coimbra, 1953): 260-61; Martins Zuquete, ,Nobreza de Portugal (Lisbon, 1960), vol. II: 678; Braamcamp Freire, Brasies da Sala de Sintra (Coimbra, c. 1923), vol. II: 366-67; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; C.R. Boxer, A india Portuguesa, 43-44, 59-61; and Queiroz, The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, trans. S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930), 990.

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the buckles were not large enough for his arms." Thus armed, on foot,

Mendon?a Furtado had then engaged the mounted Muslim officer, "and

when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind

quarters of the horse and with his left foot he made the Moor's horse

stumble and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite shoulder, the Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength and darning.""

Unfortunately, Mendon?a Furtado's initial foray into governing the

Estado with Lencastre from June 1661 until December 1662 was an ane-

mic reflection of his military feats of glory. The root of many of his

problems related to a blood feud that developed with Bartolemeu de

Vasconcelos, who charged Mendon?a Furtado with various excesses after

the Salsette campaign.3' To avoid an open breach in Goa, Mendon?a Furtado was sent to the strategic fortress of Mormugao. Upon his return

to Goa as Governor, however, the simmering feud between him and

Vasconcelos erupted into street fights between their partisans.3z Meanwhile,

problems confronting the Crown and its Viceroyalty, notably the con-

tinuing aggressions of the VOC on the west coast of India, were largely

ignored. During the chaos of this eighteen-month period, the Dutch

captured Cranganor on the Malabar coast and turned their attention

to expelling the Portuguese from Cochin. :13

It was at this critical juncture that the long awaited Viceroy promised

by D. Luisa at last reached India. The fidalgo selected for this post, Antonio de Mello de Castro, had the pedigree necessary for this daunt-

ing assignment, as his family had an impressive and long-standing record

of service to the Crown in the Asian empire. His paternal grandfather and namesake had been Captain of the ships of India. Two of his

uncles, Diogo and Joao de Mello de Castro, had also served with dis-

tinction in the Estado, while his brother Fernao would serve as general of Ceylon. Antonio and his brother were the sons of Francisco de Jello

;° Cf. Fernao de Queiroz, The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, 1000-1002. For additional details on the 1658 campaign in Salsette, cf. Boxer, A india Portuguesa, 60 and the sources cited therein.

3' Cf. Martins Zuquete, Nobreza de Portugal, vol. II: 678. Among other things, Vasconcelos charged Mendonca Furtado with needlessly attacking local strongholds and the indige- nous populace on the pretext of being in league with the king of Bijapur, as well as the more inflammatory charge of summarily executing I 1 men.

32 As J.F. Ferreira Martins aptly noted on this Council, it was "always in discord, being sterile in [its] administrative action when precisely the opposite was indispensable." See Os Vice-Reis, 149-50.

33 Cf. Ferreira Martins, Os hice-Reis, 149-50.

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de Castro, who had himself held the posts of capitiio-mor of the seas of

India and Admiral of the Royal Fleet, and his second wife, D. Angela de Mendon?a, whose own father had died serving in the Estado. Like

Lencastre and Mendon?a Furtado, Mello de Castro had begun his ser-

vice to the Crown by fighting "with valour" in the war against Philip IV's armies in the Alentejo. He had been awarded the commandery of

Fornellos and the post of alcaide-mor of Colares. Eventually appointed to the Council of State, Mello de Castro was initially given the title of

Governor of the Estado by D. Luisa in Letters-Patent of 11 March 1662, with permission to assume the title of Viceroy a year later after suc-

cessfully reaching Goa.?4 The generally dismal state of Portuguese mar-

itime power at this time and the desire to exploit the terms of the 1661 1

treaty with England, including the cession of Bombay, ensured that

Mello de Castro sailed to take up his office aboard an English fleet

under James Ley, the earl of Marlborough. This fleet departed from

Lisbon in April 1662 and reached Bombay in late September. By mid-

December 1662, Mello de Castro reached Goa and officially assumed

the office of Governor. 35

In India, Mello de Castro confronted the dizzying array of difficulties

that Mendon?a Furtado and Lencastre had failed to address. Following a long period during which the Crown had paid little attention to its

eastern possessions, Mello de Castro's term of office represented a pro-

longed reconnaissance mission. The new Governor was expected to

report on the wreckage of the previous decades of neglect, to isolate

the most glaring problems, to suggest remedies and, if possible, to begin to address many of these difficulties. Viewed in this context, his Viceroyalty must be judged a success. While Antonio de Mello de Castro's tenure

is most noted for the fact that he refused for three years to turn over

Bombay to the English, in fact his administration embodied a good deal

more. He oversaw a comprehensive survey of the straining structures

34 On Antonio de Mello de Castro's family and early career, cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9v.; Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis, 151-52; and Gayo, Nobiliario de Familias de Portugal XI: 44.

" For the English account of this voyage, cfl The English Factories in India, 1661-1664, ed. William Foster (Oxford, 1923) [EF 1661-1664], 123-44. For Mello de Castro's side of the story, cf. J.FJ. Biker, Collecao de tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da India Portuguesa fez com os Reis e Senhores com quem teve relaçoes nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde a principio da conquista ati o fim do siculo XVIII (14 vols., Lisbon, 1881-87), vol. III: 3 HAG MR 28A, Mello de Castro to D. Luisa Gusmdo: los. 243-44, 16/X/ 1662; fo. 36, 28/XII/ 1662; and 28B fo. 469, 18/X/1662.

12

of the Estado and developed insightful suggestions and initiatives on how

to recuperate a semblance of its erstwhile power and wealth.3`;

The palace coup of the late spring 1662, that installed Afonso VI

and the count of Castelo-Melhor in power, ensured that the next Viceroy, Mello de Castro's successor, would be selected by the good count, and

reflect his priorities (or lack of them) for the Estado. On 11 March 1666, Letters-Patent named Joao Nunes da Cunha the 30th Viceroy of the

State of India. Created the first count of Sao Vicente by Afonso VI, Nunes da Cunha may have had close ties with the king and Castelo-

Melhor but he would demonstrate in Asia a rigidity that was decidedly out of step with the Machiavellian opportunism of the latter. With

respect to imperial service, Nunes da Cunha possessed an impressive familial heritage. His father, Nuno da Cunha, took part in the quest to

regain Bahia from the Dutch in the 1620s and died fighting in one of

the galleons of the armada of D. Antonio de Menezes two decades

later. Nunes da Cunha could also trace a direct family line to Tristao

da Cunha, ambassador to Rome for D. Manoel I, who had sailed for

the Indies in 1506, "discovered" the islands that bear his name, and

conquered Socotra; and to Nuno da Cunha, Vedor of the Fazenda of

D. Joao III and Governor of India. Joao Nunes da Cunha, born in

Lisbon in 1619, possessed a keen mind and an aptitude for letters, pub-

lishing two books in the 1650s and 1660s: Peregrinaçiio de D. -7odo IV and

hida de D. Pedro o Cruel Rei de Castela. Nunes da Cunha, like Castelo-

Melhor, had risen in court circles as much by his wits as by any fama de valor he had achieved on the battlefields of the Alentejo. By the early 1660s he was a member of the Council of War and da chave dourada

and Deputy of the Junta of the Three Estates. He had been a gentle- man of the Camara of the Prince D. Teodosio and later Afonso VI, and

had also obtained grants of the commanderies of Castelejo, Sao Romao

do Erdal, and Santa Nlaria de Vouzela from the Order of Christ. In

April 1666 he sailed from the Tagus with a four-ship fleet."

36 For the relevant correspondence between Mcllo de Castro and the Reino, cf. HAG MR 28A-35; Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon [AHU] Documentos avulsos relativos a India [DAI] Boxes 25 (1661-1663) through 27 (1666-1668). Cf. especially, HAG MR 28A fo. 149, Mello de Castro to D. Luisa Gusmao, 30/XII/ 1662; MR 30 fo. 1 I 7, Mcllo de Castro to Afonso, 14/1/1664; MR 30 fos. 141-41 v., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 29/1/1664; MR 31 fo. 160, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 20/XII/1664; MR 31 fos. 3-6, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/XII/1664; and MR 35 fo. 165, Mcllo de Castro to Afonso, 29/1/1666. For a traditional treatment of Mello de Castro's tenure, cf. F.C. Danvers, The Portugue.se in India, vol. II: 327-56.

37 On Joao Nunes da Cunha's family background and early career, cf. Gayo, Nobiliario

13

Castelo-Melhor probably assumed that an intellectual like Nunes da

Cunha would continue the careful and frugal polices of his predeces- sor in Goa. If so, he misjudged his man. Taking power in October

1666, Sao Vicente pledged to restore the former greatness of the Estado

by "jèrro e fogo" (iron and fire).38 Thereafter, his energies revolved around

two misguided campaigns inspired by religion. First, he managed to

squander most of Mello de Castro's savings in outfitting a huge armada

of eighteen ships intended for the Straits of Hurmuz. This fleet was

charged with humbling the Sultan of Oman and re-conquering Muskat. 3g

As the Surat Presidency of the English East India Company (EIC)

reported to their Directors in London in a letter of April 1667: "There

arrived from Portugall in Setember last a new Viceroy to Goa, who

hath busied himselfe ever since his coming in providing & setting forth

a considerable fleet... but the designe is not completely knowne; Some

say for Muscat... others believe to Cong a Port a little above Gombrone

belonging to the King of Persia"4o

Second, Nunes da Cunha aimed his fire at those in Goa who had

long been critical of the overweening power of the Roman Catholic

Church, the abuses of the Goa Inquisition, and the multitude of reli-

gious orders established in Asia. Mello de Castro himself had decried

the power and abuses of the religiosos (members of religious orders):

"Among the greatest miseries that has existed for many years in this

State of India none is of less weight than the multitude of religiosos that

there are in it."4' Sao Vicente, on the other hand, did everything he

could to assist them and further entrench their social, political, and eco-

nomic power. In January 1667, the Viceroy maintained that the surest

means to improve administrative efficiency was to involve the religiosos in government, since "in all the regions where we do not have them"

administrative thefts were great. Sao Vicente's exceedingly low opinion of civilian administrators also led him to lament that "men without

God" now dominated the empire." That samc month, in opposition to

the advice of the Procurador of the Crown and the Treasury Council,

de Familias de Portugal X: 147-48; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza de Portugal, vol. III: 356; Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis, 153-54; and BPE Codex CXV/ / 1-21 fos. 93-93v.

38 Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 92, Sdo Vicente to Afonso, 25/1/1667. 39 Cf. AHU DAl Box 27, Document 99, Sao Vicente to Afonso, 21/IX/1667. 41 Cf. India Office Library, London [IOL] Original Correspondence rOC] 3213, President

and Council in Surat to Directors, 5/IV/ 1667. 41 Cf. HAG MR 35 fos. 149-49v., Mello de Castro to Albnso, 28/1/ 1666.

Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 21, 25/1/1667; and MR 33 fo. 92, 25/1/1667.

14

the Viceroy urged the King not to tax the assets of the Society of Jesus in Goa: "one should not take from religiosos who set such an example and show such zeal to the service of God and His Majesty in con-

serving this Estado."43 In February 1667, hoping to levy a temporary food tax (colecta) to finance more regular fleets, Sao Vicente won approval from the city council, nobles, and povo of Goa. But since the religioso.s of the Society of Jesus, the Dominicans, the Augustinians and the

Carmelites all opposed it, the Viceroy decided, in light of the "impor- tance" of these dissenters, to wait for advice from the Crown before

proceeding further." When Sao Vicente died in Goa in November 1668, his support of the religiosos was not forgotten: he was buried at the foot

of the Altar of S. Francisco Xavier in the Jesuit Church of Bom Jesus in Velha Goa.4'

The letter of succession named Luis de Miranda Henriques, Manoel

de Corte-Real de Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro as the

fifth Governing Council.4f Meanwhile, the uncertainties engendered by Prince Pedro's overthrow of Afonso VI in late 1667, the European machinations stemming from Louis XIV's invasion of the Spanish Netherlands, and the usual delays all conspired to delay the arrival

of a new Viceroy until May 1671. Fortunately, all three of the new

Governors on the scene in Goa had substantial experience in the Estado.

Corte-Real de Sampaio had served on the Council of State in Goa

under Sao Vicente, while Miranda Henriques was then the Captain of

D iu. 17 Antonio de Mello de Castro, a distant relative to the former

Viceroy of the same name, had perhaps the most impressive record of

service to the Crown. Son of Jeronimo de Mello de Castro, governor of the Castle of S. Filipe in Setubal, alcaide-mor of Villa Vicoza, and

capitiio-mor of the Armada to the Indies of 1588, his paternal grand- father and uncle had also served in the Estado. By the late 1660s, Antonio

had served and lived in Asia for more than twenty years; he had mar-

ried three times, had three sons there, and was considered a true casado.

43 Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 305, S. Vicente to Afonso, 29/1/1667. Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 330 (?), S. Vicente to Afonso, 3/II/1667.

45 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9v. 46 The "Auto da sucessao da Govcrnan?a da India e Via q. p.a ella se abrio na

Capela mor da casa profe?a da Comp.a de Jesus desta Cid.e p. falecimento do Ex.mo Sor. Joao Nunes da Cunha de Sam V.te V. Rey e cap.m g.l da India" from the Council of State records found in HAG Codex 9535, "Assentos do Concelho do Estado, 1655- 1676" (No. 6) is given in P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado, 1618-1750 [ACE] (5 vols., Bastora, 1953-57), vol. IV: 195-98.

Cf. ACE, vol. IV: 190-200.

15

In the service of His Majesty's Council, Mello de Castro had held the

posts of capitiio-mor of the campo of Ceylon (where he had distinguished himself in the defense of Colombo in 1655-56), and of the Armada of

the North; General of the Armadas of the Reino; Captain of the fortress

of Bassein; and, from 1664 to 1667, Captain of Mozambique and

Sofala. 41

The tenure of this Council was far less acrimonious than the previ- ous one. As the Minutes of the Goa Council of State reveal, Mello de

Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio made the major decisions and were

largely willing to allow the entrenched machinery of the Estado to func-

tion as before." The fact that only eight major Assentos (resolutions) of

the Council of State were taken during these years certainly suggests a

hands-off management style. so At the same time, both these men were

anxious to advance the long-term interests of the casado lobby in Goa

at the expense of the reinados, the service nobility from the Reino who

customarily held the post of Viceroy for a specified term and then

returned as rich men to Portugal. 51 'Their most notable military success

related to a 1669 fleet Mello de Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio sent to the Straits of Hurmuz. As they pointed out in a letter of January 1670 to Pedro, this fleet had been a "great credit to the reputation of

Your Arms:" bombarding Muskat, and defeating the Omani Sultan's

fleet off Bandar Kung, sinking five of his best ships and killing nearly 2,000 of his men. News of this great victory had "frightened the nations

of the East" and helped to restore the reputation of the Portuguese as

"Senhores do mar," friends had sent congratulations, enemies had sent

envoys to treat. 52

41 On the family background and previous experience of Antonio de Mello de Castro, cf: HAG Codex 650 fo. 10; Martins, Os Vice-Reis, 155-56; and Gayo, Nobiliario de Familias de Portugal XI: 39-40, 71.

49 Miranda Henriques never reached Goa to share in the duties of government, as the devastating attack of the Omani Arabs on Diu in December 1668 demanded all of his energies in the years that followed. Cf. HAG MR 34 fo. 203, Governors to Pedro, 284-84v., 26/I/ 1670.

Cf. ACE, vol. IV: 203-17. It is interesting to note that in a letter of 8 January 1669, the Governors pointed out that Sdo Vicente had also been responsible for "only" seven or eight consultas during his tenure. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 23.

5' One of the principal problems with the Estado, declared the pair in a letter of January 1669, was that such Viceroys and Governors placed "little authority" in the wise opinions of the casados and others with long years of service in Asia, and instead did "what seem[ed] best to [them]." This tendency "was not convenient to the service of Your Majesty," since the reinados proceeded for themselves only little advised of the matters of this State. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 17, Governors to Pedro, 8/I/ 1669.

52 Cf. HAG MR 34 fos. 277-77v., Governors to Pedro, 28/1/1670; and MR 34 fos. 303-03v., Governors to Pedro, 28//1/1670. For details on the naval warfare between the

16

While Pedro was cheered to receive these glad tidings, he was nev-

ertheless anxious to appoint a new Viceroy, one of his own, who would

once and for all reverse the decades of decline in the eastern posses- sions. The Prince Regent had already resolved upon a fundamental shift in Crown policy regarding the tripartite empire, and was committed to

initiating a series of reforms in the Estado in order to regain a sem-

blance of its former glory and economic benefit to the Crown .5' News

of Sao Vicente's death reached Lisbon in early November 1669.54 The

search for a suitable replacement took place amid a flurry of activity

regarding the approaching Dutch War, and Colbert's attempt to lure

Pedro into his war against the Netherlands by launching a campaign

against the VOC in Asia. In early 1670, the Prince Regent made two

important decisions regarding his quest to rehabilitate the Estado: he

rejected once and for all the often-repeated offers of an Asian alliance

against the Dutch proffered to him by Louis XIV's ambassador, the

marquis de Saint-Romain; and in March 1670 he selected Luis de

Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque as the 31st Viceroy. Mendon?a Furtado returned to Portugal in January 1663, and there-

after became involved with the clique of young nobles in Lisbon that

came to favor the removal of Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor and the

accession of Pedro to power. 55 He had already garnered an impressive cache of wealth from his service in Asia. Mendon?a Furtado was also

willing to favor the new Prince Regent with advice he did not want to

hear. In the immediate aftermath of the 1667 coup, he offered to repay D. Maria Fran?oise's dowry within the space of three days provided that Pedro would forego marrying his brother's wife. It was much to

the Prince Regent's credit that he did not hold a grudge for being

opposed on this emotional issue, for Mendon?a Furtado subsequently served on both the Council of State and the Council of Following

Estado and the Omani Arabs during this period, cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Straits of Hurmuz Fleets: Omani-Portuguese Naval Rivalry and Encounters, c. 1660-1680," The Mariner's Mirror LXXXIII (November, 1997): 398-409.

Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire" The Journal of European Economic History 20.1 (1991): 25-27.

5+ The ship Nossa Senhora dos Rernedios reached the Tagus from Goa at that time. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 7, Governors to Pedro, 8/1/1669; BPE Codex CXV/ 1-21 fo. 93v. and Ames, "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682," 19-22, and the manuscript sources cited therein.

55 On his actions in the 1667 coup against Castelo-Melhor and Afonso VI cfl Count of Ericeira, Historic de Portugal Restaurado, vol. IV: 444-45.

')6 On Mendon?a Furtado's return to the Reino and activities there from 1664-1670, cf. C.R. Boxer, Salvador da Sá, 352 ff.

17

a common step in the model of career advancement during these years,

Mendon?a Furtado was also elevated to the ranks of the titulares. Letters-

Patent of March 1670 bestowed the title of first count of Lavradio upon

him, thus completing the rise of another of the provincial noble fami-

lies that had supported the Revolution of 1640. Mendon?a Furtado and

his five-ship frota departed Lisbon in April 1670 and reached Goa in

May 1671.s7 His two triennial terms as Viceroy would mark one of the

most crucial periods in the history of the Estado.

Pedro's first Viceroy had experience, strength, force of will, as well

as fama do cabedal and fama do valor. He needed all of these qualities to

confront the entrenched interests that typically frustrated any campaign to reform the Estado's inefficient bureaucratic system. Mendonça Furtado, like most reinado.s, had always returned to the Reino after his imperial

postings. Unlike many of his predecessors, however, he had also spent

enough time living in Goa to appreciate as well as any casado the inher-

ent weaknesses of the imperial edifice.

Before his departure from Lisbon, Mendon?a Furtado had been

approached by Louis XIV's ambassador, the marquis de Saint-Romain,

regarding the possibility of joint actions in the Asian trade against the

much-despised Dutch East India Company. Despite his willingness to

discuss the soundest strategy for the French to pursue in their impend-

ing campaign against the VOC, Lavradio predictably demurred on the

question of Portuguese support for any overt actions against Batavia's

interests." Pedro and his new Viceroy, after all, had already decided

to reject these overtures as "diplomatically" as possible and instead to

undertake a series of reforms while their European rivals were busy

warring against one another beginning in 1672.

Lavradio's tenure witnessed the foundation of a new permanent T?er?o of 500 men and officers in Goa; the prompt dispatching of yearly fleets

z For details on Mendonca Furtado's assumption of his new titles and his voyage to Goa, cf. BPE Codex CXV/ 1-21 fos. 93-93v.; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis, 157-58; ANTT Registry de Mercês: Ordens Militares, Book 12 fo. 453 and Book 14 fo. 9v.; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza de Portugal, vol. II: 678; ACE, vol. IV: 217-23; and HAG MR 36 fo. 405, Mendon?a Furtado to Pedro, 14/X/ 1671 and GlennJ. Amcs, "A Noble Life: Luis de Mendon?a Furtado and the Quest for fama in Baroque Portugal and her Empire" Revista Portuguesa de História XXXII (1997-1998): 305-29.

58 Saint-Romain's summaries of these conversations and other information relating to the proposed Franco-Portuguese alliance can be found in Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris [AAE] Correspondance consulaire [CC] fos. 97-100v., "Extrait des Lettres de M. Saint- Romain," 22/XII/ 1669-12/V/ 1670; fos. 103-05, Saint-Romain to Colbert, 30/XII/ 1669; fos. 110-13v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 22/1/1670; and fos. 119-20, Saint-Romain to Colbert [in cipher], 4/II/ 1670.

18

in search of contraband shipping; a notable regularization of the sail-

ings of the once moribund Carreira da India; the re-establishment of reg- ular trading voyages to Macau and Timor; and a spirited attempt to take on the overbearing social and economic power of the religiosos. S9

By 1677, great strides were made towards placing the Estado on a solid

footing once again. 61 The work of consolidating these gains fell to Lavradio's immediate

successors: the Viceroy D. Pedro de Almeida and the Governor Antonio

Paes de Sande. D. Pedro de Almeida's family background and record

of service to the Crown mirrored that of Mello de Castro, Nunes da Cunha and Mendon?a Furtado. Born in March 1630, he was the son of D. Joao de Almeida and D. Violate Henriques. His father was of the Casas of Joao IV and Afonso VI, gentleman of the Cdmara Real, and alcaide-mor of Alcobaça, and his mother was the daughter of the third count of Arcos. Pedro de Almeida's family also had long traditions of

service in the Asian empire: his great-great grandfather, D. Lopo de

Almeida had been Captain of Sofala, while his great-grandfather and

namesake had served with "great distinction" in India, especially dur-

ing the notable defense of Diu by D. Joao Mascarenhas. D. Pedro de Almeida had begun his service to the Crown in the Restoration War in the Alentejo, where he held the posts of captain of Horse and mestre do campo in a 'Z?er?o of Infantry. Having received the commanderies of

Loures and Sal Salvador de Souto in the Order of Christ for his ser-

vices, D. Pedro then moved on to the rigors of court life in Lisbon. By the early 1670s he had become a Senator of the Cdmara Municipal of

the capital city, a deputy in the Junta of the Three Estates, Vedor of the

Casa Real, and a member of the Council of State. In Letters-Patent of

April 1677, the Prince Regent named him the 32nd Viceroy of the Estado and, as with Nunes da Cunha and Mendonca Furtado, Almeida was also elevated to the ranks of the titulares, as the first Count of

Assumar.61

59 Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Eftado da India, 16fi3-1677: Priorities and Strategies in Europe and the East" Revista Portuguesa de História XXII (1987): 38-46 and the manu- script sources cited therein.

b° As Gerald Aungier, the able English President in Bombay, wrote as early as 1674 on Lavradio's attempt to address the traditional banes of bad government and the abuses of the religious orders and nobles, "the prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much: both in one and in the other." Cf. IOL OC 3929, Aungier to Company Directors, 25/1/1674.

61 For details on the family background and early career of D. Pedro de Almeida, cf: Martins, Os hice-Reis, 159-60; Braamcamp Freire, Brasões, vol. II: 366-67; HAG Codex

19

One of the assumptions underlying Pedro's rehabilitation project was

a belief that development of the rich Rios de Cuama basin in Mozambique could compensate for earlier losses suffered in Melaka, Ceylon, and the

Malabar coast, and serve as the basis for a renascent and profitable Estado.62 Pedro was convinced that the time was at hand to colonize

the Rios de Cuama, and this was to be the main agenda for D. Pedro

de Almeida's brief Viceroyalty. The new Viceroy sailed from Lisbon in

late April and took power in Goa in October 1677. The following

January, he sailed for Mozambique to rendezvous with a fleet of four

ships that Pedro had outfitted to carry out the so-called enterprise of

Pate: a mission to establish colonists in the region, while subduing any

indigenous opposition that might be encountered. Despite some initial

successes, the expedition of Pate ended in failure. The new count Assumar

died in March of 1679 in the midst of the campaign.63

Shortly before Assumar's departure for Mozambique a sixth Governing Council had been named to rule in his absence .6' The members of this

Council were to be D. Frei Antonio Brandao, the Archbishop of Goa; Antonio Paes de Sande, then Vedor-Geral da Fazenda, and Francisco Cabral

de Almeida. But Cabral de Almeida was already dead and Brandao

died in July 1678. Hence, Antonio Paes de Sande acted as sole Governor

of the Estado for most of the period down to September 1681 when

Francisco de 1'avora, the count of Alvor would assume power as viceroy. Born in Extremoz in 1622, Paes de Sande had held various posts in

both Europe and the Estado. His familial background was also solidly of the provincial nobility. His father, Jeronimo da Gama de Sande, was

a fidalgo of the Casa Real, cavaleiro professo in the Order of Christ, Procurador

to the Restoration Cortes and generally "uma das principaes pessoas da

650 fo. 10; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza de Portugal, vol. II: 328; and Gayo, Nobiliario de Familias de Portugal, vol. II: 74-75.

62 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24. 63 For details on the Pate expedition, cf: ACE, vol. IV: 304-15; BPE Codex CXV/1-

21 fo. 95v.; HAG MR 43 fos. 208-09, Pedro to D. Pedro de Almeida, 5/IV/ 1677; HAG MR 43 fo. 218, Pedro to Governors, 8/IV/ 1677; Eric Axelson, 77? Portuguese in South East Africa, 1600-1700 (Johannesburg, 1964), 151 ff.; and AHU Documents avulsos rela- tivos a Mofambique [DAM] Box 3, Document 16, Consulta of the Overseas Council on the Pate Expedition, 23/VI/1677; and Glenn J. Ames, "An African Eldorado?: The Portuguese Quest for Wealth in Mozambique and the Rios de Cuama, c. 1661-1683," International Journal if African Historical Studies 31.1 (1998): 91-110.

64 The "Entrega que faz o exm.mno S.or Dom P.o dalmeida V. Rey da India da governanca della aos Il.mos Sores Dom Fr. Antonio brandao, Arc.o de Goa, e Primas da India e Antonio Paez de Sande, ambos do Concelho de S.A." is given in ACE, vol. IV: 311-13. The letters of succession were opened on 24 January 1678.

20

villa, e uivia [sic] das suas fazendas a lei da Nobreza." At the order and expense of his father, Antonio, like many of his noble contempo- raries, had been sent to fight in the Restoration struggle in search of

fama do valor and social advancement in September of 1643. He evi-

dently distinguished himself during the next two years in actions near

Badajoz with the Company of Andre de Melo de Albuquerque and at Valverde under the command of Joao de Mesquita Pimental. After

marrying D. Catarina de Castro Pereira Soutto-Mayor in 1645, and with the permission of the Crown, he spent several years in Spain serving as provedor and corregedor of Moncao. In 1666, he received a comman-

dery in the Order of Christ for his services and was named Secretary of the Estado da India."

Sailing aboard the Viceregal fleet of the count of Sao Vicente, Paes

de Sande reached Goa for this first time in September 1666, where-

upon Nunes da Cunha asked him to assume the office of Vedor-geral da Fazenda in addition to his original duties. When he returned to Lisbon in March 1671, the Prince Regent rewarded him for his services in the Estado by naming him Guarda-mor of the Ribeira de Goa, "supraanu- merario de Conselheiro de Capa e Espada, no Conselho Ultramarino," and the commander of Sao Mamede de Mogadouro in the Order of

Christ. His insightful memoranda, sent on to Pedro as consultas of the

Overseas Council during the crucial Viccroyalty of Mendon?a Furtado, no doubt helped to convince the Prince Regent to embrace many of the long overdue reforms that characterized those years. In the spring of 1677, in recognition of these services and his previous experiences in Asia, Paes de Sande was nominated as the Vedor da Fazenda Geral of the Estado, arguably the second most important position in the imperial edifice in the east, "one of the most powerful that the Estado has, exceeded only by that of Viceroy." Departing from Lisbon with D. Pedro

de Almeida aboard the Sio Pedro da Ribeira, Paes de Sande took office

on 4 November of that year and remained as Vedor until his appoint- ment to the Governing Council in January 1678. 16

65 For details on the family background and early career of Antonio Pacs dc Sandc, cf. Antonio Paes de Sande e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande: 0 Grande Govemador (Lisbon, 1951), 9-26.

66 On Antonio Paes dc Sandc's carecr in Crown service from 1666-1677, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande, 12-22; Martins, Os Vice-Reis, 159-61; HAG Codex 650 fo. 11; HAG MR 33 fo. 242, "Certidao dc Antonio Paes de Sande," 21 /I/ 1667; and ACE, vol. IV: 167-298.

21

Paes de Sande possessed a keen, orderly, and penetrating mind.6' As

an astute administrator, he was able to consolidate the long overdue

reforms of the preceding decade. Had it not been for the subsequent

policies of Paes de Sande, Assumar's reforms might not have survived,

especially given his disastrous expedition to Pate, a setback that could

easily have plunged the Estado back into chaos under a less competent Governors Paes de Sande did everything possible to overcome this set-

back and to entrench the bureaucratic and financial reforms of the

1 670s.?? The impact of Paes de Sande's capable stewardship, and more

broadly of the reform policies that began with Pedro's accession to

power in 1668, is well-reflected in the Orfamento or State Budget for

1680, which revealed a positive saldo of 271,164 xerafins for the Estado

as a whole, including a surplus of 148,094 for Goa and her depen- dencies. These figures compare very favorably with the huge deficits

that characterized the decades from the 1630s onward." In his docu-

ment of transfer to Francisco de Tavora in September 1681, Paes de

Sande was able to pass on to his successor more than 202,000 xerajins in the Royal Treasury, 12 "high seas" ships, another 20 galleys in Goa

and Bassein, and a regular Terfo with salaries paid!" This was a far cry from the lamentable financial, geo-political and military condition of the

Estado upon the arrival of Antonio de Mello de Castro aboard an English fleet some two decades earlier. It was also a fitting testimony to the

actions of the succession of Viceroys and Governors who served the

Crown in Asia during those years. The rehabilitation of the Estado dur-

ing these decades constitutes one of the greatest achievements of the

second stage of the Restoration period under the Braganzas. This suc-

cess reemphasized the importance of the ultramar for any indigenous

found passim in HAG MR 42-45, covering the years 1677-81. 68 On the war with Kanara, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande, 21-22;

ACE, vol. IV: 338-39; HAG MR 33 fo. 139 "Carta do rei da Canara" s.d. [c. 1666?] MR 33 fo. 15, S. Vicente to Afonso, 25/l/1667; MR 33 fo. 138, S. Vicente to Afonso, 26/I/ 1667; MR 35 fo. 17, Mello dc Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio to Pedro, 8/it 1669; and MR 43 fo. 239, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 17/I/ 1679.

69 On the religious policies of Paes de Sande, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande, 24-28. For a discussion of abuses relating to the "gentio" orphans during this period and the adverse economic impact these practices were having on the trade of the Estado, cf. Ames, "The Estado da India, 1663-1677," 41-42; and Ames, "Serving God, Mammon or Both?: Religious vis-a-vis Economic Priorities in the Portuguese Estado da India, c. 1600-1700," The Catholic Historical Review 86.2 (2000): 193-216.

70 For the 1680 figures, cf. HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27. These saldos are contrasted with the 1630 figures in Ames, "The Estado da India, 1663-1677," 46.

" This document is given in ACE, vol. IV: 350-54.

22

Portuguese dynasty, mirroring the notable re-capture of Brazil from the Dutch during the 1640s and 1650s. By the time of his formal accession as king in 1683, Pedro II, bolstered by these twin overseas successes, was assured of the support of the erstwhile provincial noble houses that had risen to the ranks of the titulares in meeting these challenges.

The careers of the men who assisted in accomplishing these difficult

tasks, especially the challenges in the Estado da India, reveal a discernable

pattern of accession for provincial noble families anxious to rise in the

hierarchy of the new Braganza State. It is significant that during this same period, as Nuno Gon?alo Monteiro has convincingly demonstrated, the noble estate in Portugal remained an exceedingly closed and self-

perpetuating class. Between 1650-1750 "very few houses were created and very few were abolished." Of the 50 titled houses that existed in

1750, "34 had been granted their titles over a hundred years earlier

and, of these, seven dated back to the fifteenth century."'2 As the con-

temporary work Nobiliario dos Ilustrissomos Senhores Marquez, e Marqueza de

,Niza (1662) reveals, nearly all, if not all, of these titled families were inter-related by marriage .73 Given this state of affairs, it is indeed wor-

thy of note that between 1666 and 1683, all three of the nobles selected for the office of Viceroy of India, Nunes da Cunha, Mendon?a Furtado, and Almeida, also received elevation to the status of the titulares as part and parcel of the appointment. Was the Crown forced to offer such an attractive inducement in order to recruit qualified nobles for the

Viceroyalty, given the inherent difficulties of the position? Or did the Crown's renewed commitment to the Estado engender a calculated policy of breaching the closed caste of the upper nobility? At least with respect to Prince Regent Pedro, beginning in 1668, it seems that the latter was the determining factor. As the Marquis de Fronteira reminded the Prince in a 1669 memorandum, the Estado was "the most glorious of all the

[Crown's] conquests ... and in India, Your Majesty pledges himself to the honor of God, the glory of the kingdom, [and] the interest and

remedy of your vassals. "74 Rehabilitating this imperial possession was

72 Cf. "Aristocratic Succession in Portugal (From the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries)" in Elites: Choice, Leadership and Succession, ed. Joao de Pina-Cabral and Ant6nia Pedroso de Lima (Oxford, 2000), 133-48; and 0 Crepusculo dos Grandes, A casa e o Pat?im6nio da Aristocracia em Portugal (1750-1832) (Lisbon, 1998). 73 Cf. Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, [BNL] Codex 1029, also published as an Edifao Facsimilada da Associaçào Portuguese de Genealogia (Lisbon, 1995). 74 Cf. BNL Fundo Geral, Codex 748, Instrucfdo da Secretaria de Estado e paraceres sobre a liga de Franca e Inglaterra, fos. 145-145v.

23

what Pedro strove to do, and with some success." As the deeds of Sao

Vicente, Lavradio, and Assumar demonstrate, a service nobility was

developing, willing and able to provide real serr?i?o for the pressing needs

of the Crown, in order to rise into the ranks of the titulares and the

most lucrative positions the court could bestow. It was a quid pro quo in

the truest sense of the word, an arrangement that benefited both sides:

the Asian empire received assistance that was badly needed after long decades of neglect, while a noble estate badly in need of periodic trans-

fusions received some fresh blood.

71 Cf. Ames, Renascent Empire?, especially 205-213.