Amritsar Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle by Mark Tully

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On 5th June 1984, the Indian army begats attack on the complex at Amritsar

which housed the two most sacredshrines of the Sikh community: theGolden Temple and the Akal Takht.Generals who had pledged to minimuorce, and on no account to violate the

shrines, were not prepared for the fierce

and adept resistance they encountered.Having suffered severe casualties, thenfantry were driven back, and as a lastesort–with approval from Delhi–tanks

were ordered in. The Akal Takht wasvirtually reduced to rubble. It is doubtfulf Mrs Gandhi would have initiated

Operation Blue Star had she known how



bloody and devastating would be theconsequences of that 24-hour conflict.Yet up to that point she had resisted anyarmed intervention in what had literallybecome a reign of terror in the Punjab.Perhaps, as many, including her sonRajiv, suggested, she waited too longbefore her attack on the fundamentalistSikh preacher Sant Jarnail SingBhindranwale.

Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, whoan the BBC's bureau in Delhi, hererace the long build-up to the storming ohe Sikh stronghold, the shifts of power

within the Sikh community and theefforts of central government both toutilize and control them; the rise oBhindranwale—initially put forward by





o fill in this remarkable picture of whatoccurred and present their thought-provoking analysis with eloquence.

Mark Tully, who talked toBhindranwale the day before the finalcurfew was clamped on Amritsar andwas ordered out of the Punjab by thearmy on the day Operation Blue Star began, was presented with the 1984Richard Dimbleby Award given by

BAFTA for the Most Important PersonalContribution on Screen to FactualTelevision and the 1984 Award of theBritish Television Critics Guild for Outstanding Personal Contribution. Iwriting this book he and Satish Jacobhave extended what began as brilliantnews coverage into a work of great



historical importance.

Born in Calcutta, educated in England,Mark Tully joined the BBC in 1964 andn 1972 became Chief of the Bureau i

Delhi. Among the many major stories hehas covered are the Bangladesh War,Mrs Gandhi's Emergency, the executionof Bhutto and the Russian Occupation oAfghanistan. He is now retired fro

BBC and stays in Delhi.

Satish Jacob was born in Delhi, begahis journalistic career with theStatesman, worked in Ethiopia for eightears, and joined the BBC to work wit

Mark Tully in 1978. He recently retiredas Deputy Bureau Chief of the BBC i



Delhi after having worked for theCorporation for 26 years. During thiseventful time, he and Mark Tully madehe BBC's Bureau in Delhi a household

name in India. Jacob broke the story oMrs Gandhi's assassination to a stunnednation on 31st October 1984. However,Jacob considers his coverage of the USed war to topple Saddam Hussein to behe most moving assignment he has ever

done. He was the only Indiacorrespondent stationed in Baghdadhen. He is currently doing a TV series

on the history of Old Delhi.



AMRITSAR Mrs Gandhi's

Last Battle

Mark Tully & Satish Jacob





Copyright © 1985 by Mark Tully andSatish Jacob

First Published 1985Fifth Impression 2011

Published by

Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd.

7/16, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002

Sales Centres:

Allahabad Bengaluru ChennaiHyderabad Jaipur Kathmandu

Kolkata Mumbai



All rights reserved. No part of this

publication may be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system, or transmitted, inany form or by any means, electronic,

mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission

of the publishers.

Printed in India by

Rekha Printers Pvt. Ltd.A-102/1, Okhla Industrial Area,Phase-II

New Delhi 110 020



Contents

Illustrations and Picture Cre ditsPreface to the Indian Edition

Note to Readers1. The Assassination of a Prime Minister2. The Sikhs3. The Grievances of the Sikhs4. The Rise of Sant Jarnail SingBhindranwale5. The Arrest of Bhindranwale6. Mrs Gandhi Attempts to Negotiate



with the Sikhs7. The Asian Games and their Aftermath8. Two Brutal Killings – Mrs GandhiActs at Last9. President's Rule Fails10. Last Ditch Negotiations11. Mrs Gandhi Gives the Go-ahead12. Operation Blue Star 13. The Golden Temple, 6th June14. The Aftermath

15. Conclusion NotesBibliographyIndex



Illustrations

PLATES

1. The Golden Temple in Amrit sar 2. The Golden Temple3. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, the President

of the SGPC4. Harcharan Singh Longowal, the

Morcha Dictator 5. The Akal Takht in the days before



Operation Blue Star

6. Amrik Singh, the President of the AllIndia Sikh Students Federation

7. Major-General Shahbeg Singh8. Bhindranwaie with his disciples9. Bhindranwale speaking in Delhi at a

memorial ceremony10. Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi11. Zail Singh with Bhindranwale

12. The Akal Takht in flames13. The damaged dome of the Akal

Takht14. Rubble at the foot of the Akal Takht15. Indian troops inside the Golde

Temple complex after Operation BlueStar



16. Bodies of Bhindranwale's men laidout in the Golden Temple complex

17. The body of Major-General ShahbegSingh

18. The body of Bhindranwale19. Sikhs taken prisoner by the army

during Operation Blue Star 20. President Zail Singh visiting the

Golden Temple

21. Rajiv Gandhi in Calcutta on themorning of his mother's assassination22. Mrs Gandhi on her funeral pyre

MAPS

Sketch map of Punjab and neighbouringstates



Sketch map of the Golden Temple andhostel complex



Picture Credits

The authors and publishers are gratefulo the following for permission toeproduce copyright illustrations:

Camera Press Ltd (nos 1 and 22);Patrice Habans, John Hillelson AgencyLtd (no. 2); India Today (no. 5)Sandeep Shankar (nos 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9);

he Telegraph, Calcutta (no. 21). Allother photographs come from theauthors' own archives.



Preface to the IndianEdition

The publication of an Indian editiogives us the opportunity to tell thePunjab story up to the elections, to bring

t to what we hope will prove to be ahappy ending.

On 20th August 1985 Sant HarchandSingh Longowal was shot dead in agurudwara near his home village. His



death threatened the accord he hadsigned with the Prime Minister, RajivGandhi. Longowal was killed by youngSikh fanatics who wanted to prevent aeconciliation between their community

and Hindus. Part of the establishment iDelhi who felt threatened by RajivGandhi's modern style of governmentwas not unhappy at this apparentsetback. The Times of India, fo

nstance, saw the assassination oLongowal as evidence of the need for political skills of the highest order and

not what the Americans call 'knee-jerk'eactions and public relations

exercises."Rajiv Gandhi ignored the advice o

he armchair pundits in Delhi and



accepted the assurances of Governor Arjun Singh that elections to the PunjabAssembly and the Punjab Parliamentaryconstituencies could and indeed muststill go ahead. The Governor told me ian interview that the assassination oLongowal had "shocked the vastmajority of Sikhs". He believed it hadstrengthened their desire that the accord

should work". He realised that Sik

extremists would still attempt to disrupthe elections and that not even the onehundred and fifty thousand extraparamilitary police drafted into Punjabcould guarantee that there would be noerrorism. As he said, "In the end we can

only fold our hands in prayer." TheGovernor's prayers were answered. The



elections were remarkably peaceful. TheAkalis, for the first time in their historywere able to form a government on their own. Once again India had voted itselout of a crisis as it had done eight yearsearlier when the electorate rejected Mrs.Gandhi's Emergency.

Mrs. Gandhi blamed the Punjab crisison external forces which did not want tosee a strong and united India. No doubt

hey played a role and will continue toplay a role by aiding and abetting sik extremists wedded to terrorism. Butexternal forces alone could not andcannot threaten a country as potentiallystrong and stable as India. Indians mustnow look at their own country and theweaknesses in its body which brought



Punjab to the brink of political disaster.The world's largest democracy is

still governed and administered by thenstitutions of the British Raj. The India

Administrative Service, whicdominates the administration, is a carbocopy of the Raj's ICS, and the IndiaPolice Service is a carbon copy of the.P. Macaulay's Penal Code is still inorce. The hired witnesses who used to

estify in favour of the Raj now testifybefore magistrates in favour ondependent India's police. The legal

system bequeathed by the British is usedby the wealthy and influential to frustratehe intentions of the government. The

poor regard the police and the courts asheir oppressors.



The Punjab crisis showed just howunsuitable the institutions of the Rajwere for coping with the problems omodern India. The police were helplessbecause their ranks had been underminedby years of inadequate pay and itscorollary, corruption – both features ohe Raj's police force too. Police

officers knew that there was no point ibringing the few extremists they did

arrest before the judges, because itwould take years to obtain convictionsn their moribund courts. So theyesorted to murder disguised by the

words "killed in an encounter". Thoseencounters justified Bhindranwale's callor revenge. The Congress Party, which

should have been Mrs. Gandhi's



messenger in the Punjab villages,combating the hatred Bhindranwale wasspreading, consisted of time-serverswhose eyes were always on Delhi, theountain-head of power, not on their

constituencies. The civil service wasdominated by time-servers too, preparedo break any rule to please their political

masters. Parliament was powerlessbecause only the most courageous o

Mrs. Gandhi's MPs dared to speak outagainst her Punjab policy. Mrs. Gandhinever tried to reform the institutions ondia and she paid the price for it whehe police became so slack that her

personal security force was penetrated.This is a harsh judgement on aemarkable leader who had preserved





Note to Readers

Amritsar, Mrs Gandhi's last battle, was

not a battle against the Sikhs, acommunity Mrs Gandhi always regardedwith great affection. It was a battle iwhich infantry, armour and artillery wee used against a small group of Sikhswho had fortified the Go den Templecomplex and used it as a base frowhich to defy the authority of the India



government. The tragedy is that manySikhs do not accept this definition. Theymaintain that it was indeed a battleagainst their community. Satish Jacoband I followed the events which led upo the army action in the Golden Temple

very closely, reporting every twist andurn for the BBC's External Services,

which have a vast audience in Indiatself, and for BBC radio and television.

We started work on this book beforeMrs Gandhi's assassination because wewere convinced that 'Operation BlueStar' would have the gravestconsequences for the unity of India if itwas not recognised that the Sik eadership was as much responsible ashe government for that disaster. The



ragedy of Mrs Gandhi's assassinatioproved us right. She was killed becausesome Sikhs were convinced that she haddeliberately and unjustifiably wagedwar on their most sacred shrine. Thedanger of the alienation of a largesection of the Sikh community wasmagnified by the government's failure tocontrol the violence unleashed againstSikhs after Mrs Gandhi's assassination.

We therefore felt there was all the moreneed to tell the story of Bhindranwaleand the mistakes which led up to thedisaster in the Golden Temple.

If this book leads to a greater understanding among Sikhs and Hindusof the forces that were at work, it willsurely strengthen the hope o



econciliation. We have tried to showhat neither side wanted that final

confrontation.When it came to telling the story,

Satish and I faced a problem. We hadworked so closely together that it wasunthinkable that Mark Tully or SatishJacob alone should tell the story. At thesame time we soon found that twopeople cannot actually write a book. The

ndian governments decision to ban alloreigners from Punjab provided us wita satisfactory division of labour. Wedecided that Satish, being an Indiacitizen, should spend his time in Punjabalking to army officers, Sikhs and others

who had been eyewitnesses of OperatioBlue Star and the events whic



ollowed, while I got on with thewriting. That is why I have written in theirst person. The work itself is in every

sense a joint work, from the originaloutline to the final corrections. At everystage I have been dependent on SatisJacob for facts and interpretation.

We are both deeply indebted toGillian Wright for her many invaluablecontributions and suggestions. She did

much of the historical research, saw thebook through the publishers while wewere in Delhi, and compiled the index.We also wish to thank the many Indianournalists who unselfishly shared their nformation. We are particularly gratefulo Harbir Singh Bhanwer, Sanjeev Gaur,

Raju Santhanam, Tavleen Singh, Rahul



Bedi and D.K. Vashisht. Five of our riends read the manuscript and

prevented us from falling into manyraps. They were Ian Jack of the Sunday

Times, Viqar Ahmad of the BBCExternal Services, Abdul Gafoor

oorani, lawyer and journalist oBombay, Sant Bux Singh, politician andphilosopher, and the Sikh historian andhead of the Guru Nanak Foundation,

Mohinder Singh. Of course, they bear noesponsibility for the views expressed ihe book.

Satish and I hope that this book willnot be seen as perversely critical. It isan honest attempt to relate, beforememories and the actors in the dramascatter, an important chapter in the



history of a country we both love deeply.

elhiugust I985

MARK TULLY





1

The Assassination of aPrime Minister

At 9.15 on the morning of 31 st October 1984 Indira Gandhi, the woman who haddominated Indian politics for nearlywenty years, stepped out of the side-



door of her bungalow to cross thecompound to her office. Throughout her Premiership she had lived at Number One, Safdarjang Road, a simple, white,colonial-style bungalow built by theBritish as one of many homes for their administrators when they moved thecapital from Calcutta to Delhi. Therewas nothing vulgar, garish or ostentatious about the Prime Minister's

house. In sharp contrast to many heads ogovernment, good taste was the hallmark of Mrs Gandhi's lifestyle. Although shecontrolled vast political funds, she liveda very simple home life with her soRajiv, his Italian wife Sonia and their wo children.

The Prime Minister always chose her



saris with great care That morning shewas wearing saffron because it showedup well on television. She was on her way to a television interview with Peter Ustinov, the playwright, actor andhumorist. Ironically, in Sikhism saffrons the colour of martyrdom. Mrs Gandhi

did have her vanity. She was veryconscious of her status as a worldeader, and enjoyed it hugely. Although a

bitter critic of the Western media, sheesponded to visiting celebrities'equests for interviews with remarkable

alacrity.Most days the Prime Minister started

her public engagements with a darshan,or audience, at which selected groups,often very poor and from remote parts o



ndia, were taken into the compound oumber One, Safdarjang Road to meet

her 'informally'. No darshan had beearranged for 31st October. Mrs Gandhihad returned the night before, cuttingshort a tour of Orissa. In her last publicspeech, made on that tour, Mrs Gandhiappeared to foresee her own death. Shesaid, 'I do not worry whether I live or not. As long as there is any breath in me,

will go on serving you. When I die,every single drop of my blood will givestrength to India and sustain unitedndia.' Mrs Gandhi had come back early

because her grandchildren had beenvolved in a car accident in Delhi. The

whole of her family had been receivinghreatening letters from Sikhs enraged by



he army attack on the Golden Temple inAmritsar and Mrs Gandhi feared theaccident might have been an attempt oher grandchildren's lives.

The compounds of Mrs Gandhi'shome and her office were separated by aence with a wicket-gate. As the Prime

Minister, accompanied as usual by her Personal Assistant, R.K. Dhawan,approached that gate, she smiled at

Beant Singh, the Sikh Sub-Inspector oPolice on duty there. As she did so hedrew his revolver and fired at her. Sheell to the ground and Constable Satwant

Singh, the Sikh on duty on the other sideof the gate, emptied his sten gun into her body. Many of his bullets missed andicocheted off the concrete path.



After shooting the Prime Minister hehad been appointed to guard, BeantSingh hung his walkie-talkie on theence, lifted his hands above his head

and said, 'I have done what I had to do.ow you do what you have to do.' He

had taken revenge for the Indian army'sattack on the Golden Temple inAmritsar, the shrine which stands at theheart of Sikhism.

The two bodyguards were bundled intohe police post in the office compound

where an altercation started with thecommandos from the Indo-TibetanBorder Police who provided the outer security ring for the Prime Minister'shouse. Beant Singh was shot dead and



Satwant Singh was seriously wounded.ronically, Beant Singh was a Mazhabi

Sikh, a descendant of Untouchables whohad been converted to Sikhism and weredespised by the dominant caste of thateligion.

There were no ambulance, no bloodsupplies and no special medical team ostandby; so Dhawan and Mrs Gandhi'stalian daughter-in-law, Sonia, had to put

he Prime Minister into an Indian-madeAmbassador car for the three-mile driveo the All India Institute of Medical

Sciences. There she was received bypanic-stricken junior doctors. Wheheir seniors arrived Mrs Gandhi was

put on heart/lung bypass machinery, andblood was pumped into her. The doctors



did not declare her dead until 2.20 in theafternoon, but she was in fact clinicallydead when she arrived at the hospital.The Superintendent of the All Indianstitute of Medical Sciences later saidhat more than twenty bullet wounds had

been found in her body. They puncturedher liver, kidney and arm, and somearteries and veins on the right-hand sideof her body. The government-controlled

All India Radio did not receivepermission to announce the death until 6n the evening, five hours after millions

of Indians had learnt from local newsagencies and the External Services of theBBC that their Prime Minister had beeshot dead.

One of those who listened to the BBC



or news of the Prime Minister'sassassination was her only survivingson, Rajiv. On 31st October he wascampaigning for the Congress (Indira)Party in the Hooghly Delta belowCalcutta. A police patrol stopped hiscavalcade and told him that he musteturn to Delhi immediately because

something very serious had happened.Rajiv Gandhi drove to a helipad fro

where he flew to Calcutta airport. Therehe tuned in to the twelve-thirty bulletiof the BBC's World Service to hear Satish Jacob report that Mrs Gandhi'scondition was grave. A few minutesater Satish Jacob confirmed to Londohat the Prime Minister had died. Rajiv

Gandhi flew from Calcutta to Delhi





meet him. I will tell you about him." It isa marvellous thing that he was able tohink about the person next to him, about

his friend in spite of everything that hadhappened to him. His spirit wasunbowed and he could still think abouthis friend.'

There was a report that Rajiv Gandhidid in fact break down when he firstheard that his mother had died. He

denies this. 'Let me say that somenewspapers or magazines reported thatwhen I heard the news I went to the looand had a bawl. That's all rubbish. I wasairly upset but that is not the way I give

expression to my emotions . . . I wassitting in the cockpit with the pilotsactually when they took off; it was a



ndian Airlines plane. When I heard thisthat Mrs Gandhi had passed away), I

came back and told Dikshit Ji [UmaShankar Dikshit, present Governor oWest Bengal] and others. And I just satdown one seat apart.' 1

Mrs Gandhi was the first IndiaPrime Minister to be assassinated but thehird to die in office. When her father,

Pandit Nehru, and his successor, Lal

Bahadur Shastri, died, a senior minister was sworn in as interim Prime Minister until the Congress Party could elect anew leader. This time senior Congresseaders, including the Finance Minister

Pranab Mukherji, who had beecampaigning with Rajiv Gandhi that day,

decided that the succession must be



assured immediately. So the 39-year-oldormer airline pilot, who had beenvolved in politics for only four years,

was sworn in that evening in the Darbar Hall of the Presidential Palace by theSikh President of India, Giani ZailSingh. Although opposition leaderscriticised this breach of custom, itproved to be a very wise decision.

Mrs Gandhi had deliberately

decimated the leadership of her owparty. She had brooked no rival, and sohere was no member of her Cabinet

with the stature to see India througn thedangerous and uncertain days ahead. Theonly hope of maintaining stability washe charisma of the Nehru/Gandhi family

and Rajiv, although he held no post in



he government, was heir to that dynasty.The evening after Mrs Gandhi died,

anti-Sikh riots broke out along the maioad leading to the All India Institute o

Medical Sciences. The next day Indiaseemed to be going up in flames. Almosthe only state which was not affected byhe communal frenzy was the Sikhs'

homeland, Punjab. There Hindus waitedanxiously for the Sikhs to take their

evenge, but extensive deployment of thearmy and the responsible behaviour omany Sikh leaders prevented thebacklash.

In the capital for two days gangs ohooligans, often led by local CongressParty workers, roamed the streets,killing, burning and looting at will. I



some cases the police actively joined ihe mayhem, in others they turned a blind

eye. Reports of Sikh railway passengersbeing butchered were ominouseminders of the holocaust of partition.

Reporting by police stations toheadquarters was so limited andnaccurate that the Commissioner o

Police did not know what was going on.Deliberate rumour-mongering by some

Hindus created further confusiodesigned to enflame feeling against theSikhs. Exaggerated stories of Sikhsejoicing at Mrs Gandhi's death were

spread, although there is no doubt that isome cases Sikhs did infuriate Hindusby celebrating her assassination. Onesenior official insisted that a train fro





eached the block the first thing he sawwas three charred bodies laid out on theverandah of a small brick house. As hewalked down the narrow lane he foundbodies on the verandahs of almost everyhouse. They were obviously Sikhsbecause their long hair had been cut after hey had been killed and it was stillying beside their bodies. Satish Jacob

could smell the fumes of the kerosene

which had been used to burn the bodies.Some of them had been pierced witron bars. Most of the houses had beeansacked. The dazed women and

children of the Sikh families were stilln their houses. Many of them were

weeping. Most were too stunned to talk.However one elderly Sikh woma



elated her experience. She said,Hordes of people, mobs in their hundreds invaded this block. They killedand burned all Sikh men they could find.There was no way of escaping. Theywere like wild beasts, not humans. Wehad done them no harm.' A crowd of Hindus gathered as Satish Jacob wasalking to that elderly Sikh woman. Theyold him they were residents o

Trilokpuri but had had nothing to dowith the massacre. They said that gangsof goondas (hooligans) had swarmednto the suburbs and committed the

atrocities.Then Dr Ashfaq, an elderly Muslim

Satish Jacob knew from his home in theold city of Delhi, called him aside. He



old Satish that the slaughter had lastedor four hours and confirmed that gangsrom outside Trilokpuri wereesponsible for much of the bloodshed.

He added that some local residents hadalso taken part. Apparently the gangs hadirst attacked the nearby Sik urudwara, or temple, and then moved

nto Block 32. The Sikhs put up a fightbut were hopelessly outnumbered. Dr

Ashfaq said that the police officer icharge of the area and three other policemen had stood and watched allhis happening.

Satish Jacob went to the policestation where he asked Sub-Inspector Suryavir Singh why he had not taken anyaction. The police officer replied, 'We



were helpless. We only had batons toprotect ourselves.' Just as Satish waseaving, Deputy Inspector-General

Hukam Chand Jatav arrived from policeheadquarters. He was beside himselwith anger and shouted at the localpolice officer, 'Why didn't you reportwhat was happening in your area toheadquarters?'

'Sahib, what could we do?' replied

Sub-Inspector Suryavir Singh. 'We werehopelessly outnumbered. We couldn'tdefend ourselves.'

'What do you mean? All right, youhad lost your guts. Had you lost your voices too? Don't you have a wireless or a telephone?'

'Sahib, we did not know what to



eport. We didn't know what washappening. How could we give details?'

'That's not true. You were either toorightened or too involved yourselves toet us know the true position. Everyone

else here knew what was happening.Why didn't you?'

'Sahib, it isn't that easy . . .''Shut up, you are under arrest,'

shouted the Deputy Inspector-General

and ordered his men to take the Sub-nspector away.Rahul Bedi, a reporter for the Indian

xpress, also entered Trilokpuri on theafternoon of 2nd November. He was toldby residents that the slaughter had lastedor thirty hours. At one local police

station he was told that nothing o



consequence had happened. When heasked about a lorry with charreddecomposing bodies in it parked in theard, a police officer said, 'The Statio

House Officer Sahib knows about thesedeaths but he is in Delhi and will dealwith them on his return.' Bedi did notind the armed forces any more helpful.

He informed two army officers about theghastly happenings in Trilokpuri and

hey promised to send help, but three anda half hours later there were still nosoldiers in the area. An airforce officer stationed on the bridge over the Jumnalatly refused to help. A secondieutenant on the city's main ring-road

said, 'I have no orders to intercede iany emergency.'



The government itself admits thathroughout India more than 2,717 people

were killed in the anti-Sikh riots. Almostall of them were Sikhs. Some 2,150 ohem died in Delhi. There the rioters

were mainly brought in from the slums tohe areas they attacked. Many Sikhs saidhat local Hindu residents sheltered therom the mobs. Still, according to

official estimates, 50,000 Sikhs fled

rom the capital of their country toPunjab for safety. Another 50,000 took efuge in special camps set up by the

government and voluntary agencies.In the absence of an official inquiry,

hree different groups of eminent citizensconducted their own inquiries. Theyound evidence that local policing had



collapsed and that in five places localeaders of the Congress Party hadnstigated the violence. One of the

groups, the Citizens' Commission,consisting of a former Chief Justice ondia, a former Home Secretary, aormer Secretary of the Commonwealth,

and a former Secretary of the ExternalAffairs Ministry, said, 'The remarkableuniformity in the pattern of crimes

committed, with some local variations,strongly suggests that at some stage theobjective became to teach the Sikhs aesson.' The report also spoke of 'thencredible and abysmal failure of the

police, the instigation [of riots] bydubious political elements, theequivocal role of the information media



the government-controlled radio andelevision services] and the inertia,

apathy and indifference of the officialmachinery.'

The People's Union for DemocraticRights and the People's Union for CivilLiberties were even more specific iheir report. It said, 'In the areas whic

were most affected, such as Trilokpuri,Mangolpuri and Sultanpuri, the mobs

were led by local Congress Indirapoliticians and hoodlums of thatocality.'

Rajiv Gandhi came under strongpressure to hold an official inquiry intohose allegations. He eventually agreedn April, five months after the violenceook place. Members of the Sik



eligious party, the Akali Dal, claim thathe delayed the announcement of thenquiry until after the general electio

and the elections to state assemblieswhich he needed to win convincingly toestablish his position as Prime Minister.According to the Sikh politicians, RajivGandhi feared that an inquiry would beunpopular with Hindu voters. Thegovernment at first maintained that a

nquiry would be dangerous because itwould 'reopen old wounds'. When theHome Minister did eventually announcehe inquiry, it was said to be part of a

package of concessions designed toestore normality in Punjab. By that timehe riots had left a deep scar on relations

between Sikhs and Hindus. In his book



ndia: The Siege Within, M.J. Akbar haswritten that Mahatma Gandhi'sassassination by a Hindu 'shocked thecountry out of its communal madness'.Mrs Gandhi's assassination by two Sikhsmight well have shocked the communityout of its anger over the attack on theGolden Temple. The Delhi riots put anend to that hope.

There is no knowing how long the

anti-Sikh violence in Delhi would havecontinued if Rajiv Gandhi himself hadnot visited the worst affected areas veryearly on 3rd November, only hoursbefore the start of his mother'scremation. That visit appears to haveconvinced the new Prime Minister thatserious and co-ordinated measures were



necessary to restore the writ of thegovernment.

The Information Minister told me thathe new Prime Minister himself orderedhe Chief of the Army Staff to take some

drastic steps to restore order. By middayracked armoured personnel carriers

were parked by the India Gate in thecentre of New Delhi and lorry-loads osoldiers were patrolling the streets. But

he army had arrived too late for MrsGandhi's funeral.Vast crowds tad turned out to see

Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and Shastri'suneral processions, but the streets oew Delhi were almost empty as Indira

Gandhi's body, laid out on a gun carriagewith the face exposed, wound its way



slowly to the cremation ground. Indiansused to flock to see their Prime Minister,but fear kept them away from her lastourney.

As Rajiv Gandhi, a sombre anddignified figure, stood by his mother'spyre, he must have wondered how hewas to cope with the legacy she had lefthim. He was aware of his mother'sweaknesses as well as her strengths, and

he knew that the weaknesses had, in nosmall measure, been responsible for her death. He already knew that there hadbeen glaring omissions in the securityarrangements for his mother, amountingalmost to criminal negligence. For nstance, according to the police

guidelines on the Prime Minister's



security, Mrs Gandhi should have beensurrounded by a ring of security men ohe morning she died. This was not the

case. Satwant Singh had no business tobe on duty inside the Prime Minister'shouse that day. He had just returned fromwo months' leave in the Gurdaspur

district of Punjab, a hotbed of Sik extremism on the border with Pakistan.He should therefore have been kept o

he perimeter until his superiors wereconfident that he had not been affectedby the violent hostility of many Sik villagers, who felt that Mrs Gandhi hadcommitted the grossest form of sacrilegeby sending the army into the GoldeTemple complex. Satwant Singh hadarranged to be put on duty beside his



accomplice simply by claiming to havean upset stomach and so needing to benear a lavatory. Beant Singh's superior officers knew that he had been meetingSikh extremists in one of Delhi's maiSikh temples, and had removed him frohe Prime Minister's security squad ohe Delhi Armed Police; but Mrs Gandhi

herself had insisted that he be reinstated.Rajiv Gandhi had become suspicious o

Satwant Singh's behaviour and had onceeven had him removed from the inner guard at the Prime Minister's house.Four months after the assassination, in anterview with M.J. Akbar, Rajiv

Gandhi said, 'You see, I used to havemeetings at Akbar Road [the PrimeMinister's office] at night, and often as





witnesses, were shot by the company ohe Indo-Tibetan Border Police did not

say much for the latter's disciplineeither. They had been brought in to helpguard Mrs Gandhi when the threats oher life became too serious to leave tohe Delhi police alone. Inevitably some

have drawn a parallel with the shootingof Lee Harvey Oswald, PresidentKennedy's assassin. The police.map o

he assassination, drawn by a Sikh,Balbir Singh, the Assistant DraughtsmanCrime), shows three bullet marks on theoof of Mrs Gandhi's house. The marks

also indicate that the plot went deeper han just the schemings of Satwant and

Beant Singh. According to P.N. Lekhi,Satwant Singh's lawyer, the post-mortem



eport says that Mrs Gandhi was alsoshot seven times in the back; that is, shewas shot from behind as well as In front.But it is possible that shots from the twoguards hit the Prime Minister in the back when she was lying crumpled on theground.

It was not only the securitysurrounding the Prime Minister's persowhich had become disgracefully lax. A

ew months after Mrs Gandhi's death her Principal Secretary resigned when itwas discovered that junior members ohis staff had been photocopying secretdocuments and selling them to foreigembassies. This laxity had come aboutbecause Mrs Gandhi had fallen into therap of so many oriental potentates: she



had surrounded herself with sycophantswho told her what she wanted to hear,not what she ought to have heard.Although a democratically elected PrimeMinister, she in fact presided over anold-fashioned darbar, or court, theperfect breeding ground for gossip andntrigue. Rajiv Gandhi was well aware

of the problem. I once asked him what hehought about the widespread criticis

of his mother's courtiers. He replied,You cannot do without a caucus.Anyone in power will have to have one,but it depends on who is in that caucus.'He also knew that the attack on theGolden Temple could have beenavoided if his mother had acted earlier against the Sikh fundamentalist Sant



Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who hadbeen spreading violence, hatred andcommunal poison in Punjab, India's mostprosperous state. The sant, or holy man,had turned the sacred Sikh shrine into aortress from which he had defied the

might of the Indian government and thendian army. The Prime Minister's son

had publicly criticised the government'sailure to arrest Bhindranwale before he

ortified the Golden Temple complex,but his mother had not listened.Why did Mrs Gandhi not act earlier?

There are plausible politicalexplanations. During her last period ioffice Mrs Gandhi abandoned her party'sraditional supporters – Muslims and

Harijans or Untouchables – and tried to



orge the majority Hindu community intoone solid vote block. This had never been achieved before because of thedeep divisions of caste. The catalyst for his new political synthesis was the

Hindu revivalism sweeping througndia. Hindus were beginning to seehemselves as the victims of more thahirty years of secularism in whic

Muslim family law had been protected.

Sikhs had been given a state of their owand Harijans or Untouchables had beegiven special opportunities for educatioand employment, all at the expense ocaste Hindus. As M.J. Akbar put it,Hindu revivalists began saying that iHindu-majority India it was Hinduism,

not Islam, that was now in danger.'3



Such was the impact that even MrsGandhi began to believe there wasbound to be a 'Hindu backlash' againsturther pampering of the minorities. Far rom challenging such revivalism, she

decided to ride it as far as it would takeher. Mrs Gandhi's change from secular o Hindu politics has led some to suggesthat she delayed taking action against

Bhindranwale because she was happy to

have such an obvious challenge toHinduism by a minority community. Ithelped her to weld the Hindu communityogether.

Some proponents of this theorywould have us believe that Mrs Gandhionly took action when the Bhindranwaleactor turned against her and whe



Hindus started to doubt her capacity toprotect them. Others take an even morecynical view. They believe that MrsGandhi actually wanted to inflict acrushing defeat on the Sikh community iorder to win applause from the Hindus.A general election was due at the end o1984. It was argued that Mrs Gandhineeded a spectacular achievement toestore her image as Durga, the Hind

goddess of destruction, an image she hadacquired by defeating the Pakistan armyn 1971 and breaking that country in two.

The possibility of Mrs Gandhiordering another attack on Pakistan toefurbish her image was being discussedn the press. We never believed this to

be a serious possibility. Mrs Gandhi,



who was by then the Chairperson of theon-Aligned Movement, was far too

conscious of her international role toattack Pakistan without first carefullybuilding up world opinion, as she haddone in 1971. General Zia, the militaryuler of Pakistan, was much too clever to

give her casus belli. In fact he did theexact opposite. He went on what hecalled 'a peace offensive'. So, the cynics

argue, Mrs Gandhi had to look elsewhere for an election spectacular,and she found it in Punjab.

Satish Jacob and I have a far lesssinister explanation for the attack on theGolden Temple which led directly tondira Gandhi's death. Indians may have

called Mrs Gandhi 'Durga' and the



Western press may have called her 'theron Lady' or 'the Empress of India', butooking back over the preceding twentyears it is possible to argue that Mrs

Gandhi was not a decisive woman, thatshe was very reluctant to act, and thatshe only fought back when she wasirmly pinned against the ropes. The first

great crisis of her Premiership came i1969 when she split the Congress Party

o free herself from the chains witwhich her father's senior colleagues hadshackled her. During her first three yearsn office she had made very little efforto escape from her imprisonment. It was

only when it looked as though 'the grandold men' of the Congress Party mightactually be going to throw her out that



she reacted. Then she reacted with sucpolitical violence that she destroyed theCongress Party, creating in its place aootless body of time-servers, dependent

entirely on her charisma. It was aorganisation quite incapable oproviding that most invaluablecommodity for any ruler – informatioabout the implementation and effect oher policies.

Mrs Gandhi did handle theBangladesh crisis with a superb sense oiming, but within four years she was ohe floor again. This time the corruptio

and inefficiency of her government hadso damaged her credibility that, wheshe was found guilty on a charge oelectoral corruption, even her ow



enfeebled party made an attempt to getid of her. The charge was little morehan a technicality, and Mrs Gandhi

could easily have withstood the pressureon her to resign if she had not allowedhe reputation of her government to sink

so low. When she did fight back sheisked Indian democracy itself by

declaring a state of emergency, muzzlingParliament, the courts and the press, and

arresting all her leading opponents.Once again with Mts Gandhi it proved tobe a case of not 'too little, too late', buttoo much, too late'.

Thanks to the incompetence andoverweening ambition of some of her opponents, Mrs Gandhi did manage toecover from the defeat inflicted on her



when she asked India to endorse her Emergency in a general election. Butwhen she returned to power in 1980 sheonce again showed a strange reluctanceo act decisively.

By 1984 her reputation had slumpedonce more. Unrest over illegalmmigration in the north-eastern state o

Assam had been allowed to drift todisaster, with three thousand people

being massacred in an election MrsGandhi forced on the Assamese people.n Uttar Pradesh, the heartland of India,

Muslims had been the victims of some ohe worst violence since independence.

Punjab appeared to be ruled by aanatical fundamentalist preacher who

was being talked of as the 'Khomeini o





ntrovert rather than an extrovert,nstinctive rather than empirical, but

now she seemed to be genuinely at a lossand more melancholic than I'd ever known her. I took away the impressionhat she no longer knew whom to trust,

or what advice to act on. I think she'dbegun to doubt her own judgment. I feltworried and sorry for her.'

She was not the only person to sense

hat Mrs Gandhi might be losing her grip. There was much talk in the CentralHall of Parliament, where membersgather to exchange political gossip, ohe possibility of an electoral defeat for he Congress. The press were not

optimistic about Mrs Gandhi's prospectseither. So, we believe, Mrs Gandhi,



acing disaster once again, was forced toake drastic action against

Bhindranwale. This time, tragically, shedid not get away with 'too much, tooate'.

By her death Indira Gandhi hadensured the succession, but she left her son a nation more bitterly divided than atany time since partition. The Sikhs, themost prosperous and progressive

community in India, had been humiliated.Mrs Gandhi had played into the hands ohe Sikh fundamentalists, and many ohem were now openly separatist. Theiots which followed her death caused

many Sikhs who had never thought osecession to wonder whether they weresafe within India.





2

The Sikhs

The population of Delhi hasmushroomed since independence. Thet was 300,000; now it is nearly seve

million. This alarming populatioexplosion started with the arrival of Sik

and Hindu refugees from Pakistan at the



ime of partition. Until 1984 they hadalways lived in complete amity. Ever since independence there have beeHindu-Muslim troubles, but no one ever hought of the possibility of Hindu-Sik

clashes. The two lived as onecommunity.

Nowhere was this more apparent thaoutside our office on the tarmac squareset back from the main road to Agra. It is

an open-air automobile workshop, petrolstation and taxi stand. Bhim Sen Pollai, aHindu, runs the mechanical workshop,but for electrical repairs we go to aSikh, Harbans Singh Saini. Our punctures are also repaired by a Sikh,Jarnail Singh. The taxi drivers spendmost of their days sitting on charpoys o



string beds, playing cards or gossiping.Fares are hard to come by. Some of theaxi drivers are Hindus, others Sikhs.

Among the Sikhs are three brothers,Hardev Singh, Sukhdev Singh andBaldev Singh Bhinder. On the morningof 1st November 1984, the day after MrsGandhi's assassination, Hindu mobswent on the rampage in the nearbymarkets of Bhogal and Ashram. Seeing

he smoke rising from the burning shopsand houses of the Sikhs, Hardev Singdecided to remove his taxi from thestand before the mobs came down theAgra road. Discretion being the better part of valour, he had the first haircutand shave of his life so that he would notbe recognisable as a Sikh. Sukhdev



Singh valued his religion more than hisivelihood, so he took refuge in a nearby

house, leaving his taxi to the mercy ohe mobs. They burnt three taxis on our

stand that day.By good fortune Baldev Singh was i

he family's village home in Punjab; sohe too still wears the beard and turban oa Sikh. His youngest brother HardevSingh was the only member of the family

who had to bear the taunts of his mother and father for denying his faith. He said,I felt utterly miserable and guilty. Myather was shocked when he saw me ihe evening. He abused and cursed me.

My mother and other relatives wereappalled when they saw me in our village of Mominwal. But what could I



do? I had to save my life. Baldev'sbrother-in-law was roasted alive i

and Nagri [East Delhi], so were twooung cousins. My cousins' grandfather,

when he saw his two young grandsonsbeing thrown in the fire by mobs, jumpednto the pyre himself from the roof of his

house.'The three brothers are all back on the

axi stand with their Hindu friends. The

Hindu mechanic, the Sikh electrician andhe puncture-mender are back at work oo. But none of them will ever forgethe day when Hardev Singh deserted the

symbols of his faith, decreed by the lastof his Gurus.

The Sikhs are the people of theGurus. The word 'Sikh' means disciple,





bound and dominated by Brahmin priestsand their rituals. However, religiousorthodoxy was not unchallenged.Several Islamic and Hindu movementshad grown up which stressed mysticisather than ritual. The first Sikh Gur

was deeply influenced by that mysticradition. Mysticism is the search for the

heart of religion, and so there isnevitably much in common betwee

mystics of all beliefs. After all, when therappings of dogma are cut back, everyaith seeks to meet the same desire o

man, his desire for a god to worship andgive purpose to his life. Guru Nanak wasa mystic and so he inevitably combinedmuch of those two apparentlyrreconcilable religions – monotheistic



slam and Hinduism with its pantheon – nto his teaching. The Sikh scriptures,he Guru Granth Sahib, contain the

verses of Guru Nanak, who wroteprolifically in Punjabi, and hissuccessors, but they also include versesby Hindu and Muslim mystics.

Guru Nanak took the doctrines oeincarnation and karma from Hinduism.

According to Hindu beliefs, a man's

condition in this life is governed by hisactions in his past life, or, as Guruanak put it, 'one reaps what one sows

and one eats what one earns.' But he took he Islamic doctrine of brotherhood,ejecting totally the Hindu caste system.

The Guru also appears to have beenfluenced by Islam in his fir



commitment to monotheism. In fact thecentral teaching of Sikhism is theoneness of God. He is eternal, ineffableand never incarnate like the gods oHinduism or, indeed, the God oChristianity. Nanak described Godas 'nirankar', or formless, andcondemned the Hindu practice oworshipping images of the deity. Butmagery has a way of creeping back into

eligions; that is perhaps why Sikhs paysuch reverence to their shrines andcopies of their holy book. The Gur believed in approaching God througdevotion and meditation, and had noime for ritual observances, as this story

about his visit to one of the most sacredHindu pilgrimage centres clearly shows.



When he visited Hardwar on theGanges, he saw Hindus throwingwater towards the east for the relieof the ' manes ' [spirits] of their ancestors. He joined his hands so asto form a cup, and began to throwwater to the west. The crowd wasastonished, and inquired what manner of man it was who, contrary to all

ancient custom, threw water towardsthe setting instead of towards therising sun. He told them he wasthrowing it to irrigate a field he hadsown in his native village. Thespectators thought he was crazy andtold him the water could never reachis field, which was too far away. He



replied that their departed ancestorswere much further away, and thewater he threw was more likely toreach his field than the water theythrew was to reach their ancestors.'You call me a fool,' he said, 'but ye

are much greater fools yourselves.'1

Guru Nanak also strongly rejected the

caste system. He instituted the Guru ka

angar, or Guru's kitchen, where hisollowers would all eat together in order o break down the barriers of caste.

For all the differences betweeanak and brahminical teaching, Hindus

have always regarded the Sikhs as partand parcel of Hinduism. They believe

hat anyone born a Hindu remains a





city of Amritsar. Amritsar means 'poolof nectar' and refers to the sacred pool,or sarowar , excavated by the fourtGuru. The Golden Temple itself, theHari Mandir or Temple of God, wasbuilt in the middle of the sarowar by theifth Guru, Arjun. Although 'Hari' is a

name of the Hindu god Vishnu, the HariMandir was, and still is, very differentrom a Hindu temple. The foundatio

stone was laid by a Muslim mystic, theSufi Mian Mir of Lahore. The templehad four doorways instead of the usualone, to indicate that it was open to allhe four main caste divisions of Hind

society. Devotees had to step downwards to enter the temple, to remindhem of the humility necessary to come



close to God.Guru Arjun realised the necessity o

providing an authorised version of thescriptures to enshrine Guru Nanak'seaching. He it was who compiled the

holy book of the Sikhs, the 'Adi Granth',or first book, which later became knowas the Guru Granth Sahib, and installedt within the Golden Temple. Amritsar

and its Golden Temple are as central to

Sikhism as Mecca and the Ka'aba are toMuslims. That is why the Indian army'sattack caused such profound shock hroughout the Sikh community.

Guru Arjun, the builder of the GoldenTemple, was also the Sikhs' first martyr.He fell foul of the Emperor Akbar'ssuccessor, Jehangir, who suspected the





simple-hearted Hindus, and even othe ignorant and foolish followers oIslam, by his ways and manners, andthey had loudly sounded the drum ohis holiness. They called him 'Guru',and from all sides stupid peoplecrowded to worship and manifestcomplete faith in him. For three or four generations (of spiritualsuccessors) they had kept this shop

warm. Many times it had occurred tome to put a stop to this vain affair or to bring him into the assembly oIslam. 2

That 'vain affair' and those 'stupidpeople' grew into one of the world's

major religions, long outlasting



Jehangir's Mughal Empire.Guru Arjun's young son and

successor, Hargobind, constructed theother important shrine within the GoldeTemple complex, the Akal Takht or Eternal Throne, to be a symbol of theemporal power of Sikhism. As a gesture

of defiance to the Mughal Emperor, heheld court there from a throne higher han that of the Emperor's. The

martyrdom of Guru Arjun changedSikhism into a more militant andmilitaristic faith. From then on Sikhsmaintained, literally, an army of theaithful.

This army was welded into aormidable fighting force by Gur

Gobind Singh, the tenth and last of the



Gurus, who also commanded hisollowers not to cut their hair or shaveheir beards, thereby giving Sikhs a

distinctive physical appearance. It wasn 1699 that he took measures to protecthe Sikhs' identity, not only fromeabsorption into Hinduism, but alsorom the religious persecution of the

Muslim rulers, who were by now openlyhostile to the Sikhs. He summoned a

grand assembly at Anandpur in Punjabwhere he announced the formation of anew order of Sikhs called the 'Khalsa' or pure ones. To distinguish them fromother men and women, the Guru orderedmembers of the Khalsa not to cut their hair ( kes) or shave their beards, to carrya comb ( kangha ), to wear a steel bangle



kara ), and breeches ( kach ), and tocarry a dagger (kirpan ). These becamehe five 'k's' by which an orthodox Sik

can still be identified today. The Gurunstructed all men who joined the Khalsao take the name 'Singh' or lion. Women

were also baptised into the Khalsa,aking the name 'Kaur' or princess.

Sikhism has always respected women'sndependence and there are several

ormidable Sikh women politiciansoday.The pure ones became the core of the

Sikh army. Their cry was 'Raj karegaKhalsa' – 'The Khalsa shall rule!' Sikhsstill repeat this cry which, if takeiterally, inevitably leads to a conflict ooyalties in a modern secular state like



ndia. One of the central tenets oSikhism is that spiritual and temporalpower, religion and politics, arendivisible. The Khalsa did not succeedn ruling the Punjab or defeating the

Mughal Emperor. During the eight yearsbetween the formation of the Khalsa andhe death of Emperor Aurangzeb theyought a series of desperate butndecisive battles with Mughal armies.

When Guru Gobind Singh wasassassinated in 1708, he left behind hihe legend of a poet, preacher and guide,

skilled in warfare, courageous, defiantand unbowed, to fire the imagination outure generations of Sikhs. Wheollowers of Bhindranwale were asked

why they found him so attractive a



eader, they said, 'He is just like another Guru Gobind Singh.' Before he died theGuru decreed that there would be noother Guru after him. The holyscriptures, the Guru Granth Sahib, wouldprovide spiritual guidance in place of aiving Guru, while the temporal affairs

of the community would be in the handsof the 'Panth', the community of theKhalsa and their representatives.

Gobind Singh taught the Sikhs thathey must preserve their identity at allcosts. In his time the beard and long hair were symbols to identify those Sikhswho were prepared to fight the Muslichallenge to their faith. ToBhindranwale the five 'k's were thesymbols of those Sikhs who were



prepared to fight the Hindus.By the middle of the eighteent

century the Mughal Empire was idecline and had become so weak that theEmperor ceded the Punjab to the Afghanuler Ahmad Shah Abdali. The Mughalulers could not even defend their

capital against the Afghan marauders.But Ahmad Shah Abdali found the Sikhsa very different matter. As one Indian

historian put it: 'The simple, untrainedpeasant of Guru Hargobind had nowbecome a regular, well-equipped soldier of the Khalsa, adept in the use of armsand trained in the methods of guerrillawarfare. The Khalsa had further tastedhe sweets of victory and acquired a

ove of plunder.'3

The Khalsa found



ustification for plundering the Afghansn the saying of their last Guru thatRobbing the robber is no sin.'

The Sikhs' attacks on his troops andbaggage trains led the Afghan king toake revenge by raiding Amritsar. He

blew up the Golden Temple, whichepresented the spiritual power of God,

and filled the holy pool with thecarcasses of slaughtered cattle. The Akal

Takht, which stood opposite the GoldenTemple and represented the temporalpower of God, was razed to the ground.Each time the Sikhs, undaunted, rebuiltheir holy places and maintained the

until the Afghan power was spent andAbdali retreated from the Punjab for ever. From that day onwards no army



has entered the holiest shrines oSikhism – until, that is, Mrs Gandhi sentn the troops in June 1984 to remove theundamentalist preacher Bhindranwale

who had turned the Akal Takht into aortress.

George Thomas, an Englisadventurer, who established his ownprivate kingdom at Hansi in the moder state of Haryana not far from Delhi,

wrote an eye-witness account of the Sik warriors who had been the scourge ohe Afghans.

After performing the requisite dutiesof their religion by ablution and

prayer they [the Sikhs], comb their hair and beard with peculiar care,



then, mounting their horses, ride forttowards the enemy, with whom theyengage in a continued skirmisadvancing and retreating, until maand horse become equally fatigued;they then draw off to some distancefrom the enemy, and, meeting withcultivated ground, they permit their horses to graze of their own accord,while they parch a little grain for

themselves, and after satisfyingnature by this frugal repast, if theenemy be near, they renew theskirmishing; should he have retreated,they provide forage for their cattle,and endeavour to procure a meal for themselves . . . Accustomed fromtheir earliest infancy to a life o



hardship and difficulty, the Sikhsdespise the comforts of a tent; in lieof this, each horseman is furnishedwith two blankets, one for himself,and the other for his horse. These

blankets which are placed beneatthe saddle, with a gram-bag and heelropes, comprise in time of war, the

baggage of a Sikh. Their cookingutensils are carried on tuttoos

[ponies]. Considering this mode olife, and the extraordinary rapidity otheir movements, it cannot be a matter of wonder if they perform marches,which to those who are onlyaccustomed to European warfare,must appear almost incredible. 4



The departure of the Afghans left theield open for the Sikhs. One of their

misldars, or chieftains, Ranjit Singh,helped by the decline of all major military powers – except the British – ihe north-west of India, became

Maharaja of Punjab at the age of twenty-one, and went on to prove, in a wayunique in Sik history, that the Sikhscould create and rule an empire.

Illiterate and blind in one eye after achildhood attack of smallpox, Ran jitSingh extended his empire from Kashmir and the borders of China and Tibet to theKhyber Pass and down to the frontiers oSindh in the south-west. The British, byhen ensconced in Delhi with the Mughal

Emperor as their pensioner, prevented



Ran jit Singh from expanding his empireo the south but they never had theemerity to attack the Sikh monarch.

Their relationship with Ranjit Singh wasone of equals. During the last years ohis reign the Governor-General of India,Lord Auckland, paid an official visit tohe court in Lahore.

By that time Ranjit Singh was aeastern potentate with a court of a

splendour that would have matched theMughals at their best. Lord Auckland'ssister, Emily Eden, wrote that theMaharaja looked 'exactly like an oldmouse, with grey whiskers and one eye'and observed that although he arrivedwith two stockings on he contrived toemove one so that he could sit



comfortably, his foot in one hand, cross-egged on a chair. Her brother's military

secretary, William Osborne, was morempressed with the old man when he met

him. The coup d'oeil was most striking;every walk in the garden was linedwith troops, and the whole space

behind the throne was crowded wit

Runjeet's chiefs, mingled with nativesfrom Candahar, Caubul, andAffghanistan, blazing with gold and

jewels, and dressed and armed ievery conceivable variety of colour and fashion. Cross-legged in a golden chair,dressed in simple white, wearing no



ornaments but a single string o pearls round the waist, and thecelebrated Koh-y-Nur, or mountain olight, on his arm – (the jewelrivalled, if not surpassed, i

brilliancy by the glance of fire whicevery now and then shot from hissingle eye as it wandered restlesslyround the circle) – sat the lion oLahore. 5

Ranjit Singh had a passion for fine

ewels, and had managed to extract theKoh-i-Noor from the deposed king oAfghanistan, Shah Shuja, in return for reeing him from imprisonment i

Kashmir. The Maharaja wore it on all

public occasions and carried it



wherever he went. But the Koh-i-Noor was soon to be lost to the Punjab. QueeVictoria gained the diamond when theBritish captured the Punjab. She had itcut and polished to less than half itsoriginal size.

Ranjit Singh was not only fond obeautiful jewels. He engaged some ohe prettiest women of the Punjab,

Kashmir and Persia to be soldiers in a

egiment he formed solely of womewho regularly drilled before him iuniform. William Osborne refers to themas the 'Amazons'. He said the Maharajaadmitted to him with a laugh that theywere the only regiment he couldn'tmanage and gave him more trouble thahe rest of the army put together.



Elephants were kept for ceremonialoccasions at court but the Maharajahimself was much more interested ihorseflesh. His own horses werecaparisoned in a finery which seemedalmost outrageous to sedate Englisastes. Emily Eden recounts that at one

elaborate presentation ceremony aparticular horse took his fancy and 'hequite forgot all his state, and ran out i

he sun to feel its legs and examine it.' 6The glitter of the Lahore darbar, o

court, was the embodiment of aormidable empire built upon the

personality of Ranjit Singh and the mightof his armies. His ministers includedHindus and Muslims. The Maharaja was

well aware that the majority of his



subjects and much of the army were non-Sikh, and out of respect for them hecelebrated the festivals of all the maieligions. It was all very far from theheocracy of Guru Gobind Singh. In his

personal life Ranjit Singh was not arreligious man; he regularly listened toecitations from the Guru Granth Sahib,or instance. But he certainly did notollow the tenth Guru's injunction o

alcohol, being extremely fond of acertain 'fire water' he had especiallyprepared and which reputedly containedground pearls. He candidly admitted thathe drank for excitement and developed apartiality for Scotch whisky.

The Maharaja was as secular in hischoice of wives as in his choice o



ministers, several of the twenty-twobeing Muslims. The bachelor status ohe Governor-General, Lord Auckland,

attracted his curiosity. Emily Edenecorded a conversation with Lord

Auckland on the subject. The Governor-General explained that he did not have awife because, 'only one was allowed iEngland, and if she turned out a bad one,he could not easily get rid of her.

Ranjeet said that was a bad custom; thathe Sikhs were allowed twenty-fivewives, and they did not dare to be bad,because he could beat them if they were.G. replied that was an excellent custom,and he would try to introduce it when hegot home.' 7

The Maharaja inspired devotion i





o the Akal Takht when it had alreadyhung in his court for a couple of days.They could not complain, however, thathe neglected Amritsar. The town becamea flourishing trading centre because theMaharaja encouraged merchants to settlehere. He constructed the upper threeloors of the Akal Takht and altered the

design and decoration of the HariMandir, turning it into the 'Golden'

Temple we know today. He made a grantof half a million rupees for the Temple,and invited the most skilled craftsmen ohe age, many of them Muslim, to work

on it.Ranjit Singh's army was the backbone

of his empire. Sikhs recall its exploitswith pride even today. The Khalsa army



before Ranjit Singh had been mainlycavalry, armed with matchlocks andusing undisciplined hit-and-ruechniques. Sikh soldiers despised thenfantry. Ranjit Singh soon realised that,

with the advent of European-style armiesn India, well-drilled infantry, coupled

with artillery, was the secret of asuccessful army. He set abouteorganising his forces from'top to

bottom on European lines, givinginancial incentives to overcome Sik prejudice against the infantry. He invitedable European officers like Allard andVentura, of Napoleon's defeated armies,o train his men. The policy of incentives

worked and by the end of Ranjit Singh'seign Sikhs had taken to infantry



soldiering and were becoming thedominant community in the regular army.

Within ten years of the death of RanjitSingh, the British, helped by endlesssquabbling over the succession, haddefeated the Sikh Empire and annexedhe Punjab. During the hundred yearshey ruled the Punjab there were manyorces undermining the Sikhs' separatedentity.

The most formidable foe of Sikhiswas the Hindu revivalist, SwamiDayananda Saraswati, the Luther oHindu Protestantism. He founded theArya Samaj or Aryan Society in 1875.ts slogan was 'Back to the Vedas', theirst and most ancient of the Hind

scriptures. The Arya Samaj was that rare



phenomenon in a religion as tolerant asHinduism, an energetic proselytizingorce. The Arya Samajis maintained that

both Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs hadbeen converted from Hinduism in one oheir earlier lives and so it was perfectlyegitimate to win them back to their

original faith.The social customs of those times

would seem to have justified the Arya

Samajis' contention that Sikhs wereeally just Hindus. There was a greatdeal of intermarriage between the twoaiths, and Hindu families often brought

up their eldest sons as Sikhs. Hinduswould adopt Sikhism in one generatioand drop it in the next. The Mehras arenow one of the great Hindu business



amilies of Amritsar, but the grandfather of the present head of the family startedife as a Sikh. At the age of seven his

head was attacked by a 'plague of boils'.The barber who in those days doubledas a surgeon, advised that the boy's hair should be cut off so that the boils couldbe treated. His father, who was a first-generation Sikh, took the barber's adviceand the Mehra family lapsed gently back

nto Hinduism. Besides close family tieswith Hindus, many of the mahants opriests in charge of Sikh temples weremore Hindu than Sikh. They helped tobring many Hindu customs back intoSikhism, customs like the practice oUntouchability, idol worship andeverence for the cow.



Of course there were Sikh leaderswho took vigorous action to defend their aith from what they saw as the insidioushreat of Hinduism. The outstanding Sik

movement of the time was that of theSingh Sahhas (assemblies), founded i1873 by a group of rich, landed andorthodox Sikhs. Their aim was toeducate Sikhs and make them moreaware of their religion, to free them fro

Hindu practices and to remind them oheir cultural heritage. They declaredwar on the Arya Samaj by actively tryingo convert Hindus. The Sikh community

at the time was scattered andpredominantly rural. It was not onlymiles of countryside that separated them.Caste divisions had arisen in a religio



ounded to eradicate caste. Several newunorthodox sects were also drawingSikhs from the path of the Khalsa. Buthe Singh Sabha movement grew rapidly,

setting up a network of Khalsa schoolswhere the study of the Guru GrantSahib and Gurmukhi, the Punjabianguage written in a script devised byhe second Guru, Angad, were

compulsory. In 1902 the first

specifically Sikh political organisatiowas founded – the Chief Khalsa Diwan.t started as a co-ordinating body for the

Singh Sabhas and was controlled by aoyalist elite.

The British had a vested interest iencouraging Sikhs to preserve their dentity. In the Anglo-Sikh wars which



ed to the annexation of the Punjab, theBritish had discovered what excellentsoldiers the Sikhs were and, within adecade of their final defeat, the Sikhswere helping the British to put down thendian Mutiny. This strangeransformation came about partly

because the Sikhs had nothing butcontempt for the sepoys of the East IndiaCompany who, under British officers,

had formed the major part of the armywhich had defeated them. As PhilipMason put it in his book on the Indiaarmy, the Sikhs 'resented the presence oEastern troops in the Punjab; their embryo nationalism had been Punjabi,not Indian, and they were eager to takeany chance of getting their own back o



he Bengal sepoy, this time with theBritish on their side.' 8

When the Mutiny broke out, however,t was far from certain that the Sikhs

would remain loyal to their masters.Karl Marx, reporting on the Mutiny for

he New York Daily Tribune, argued thatthe Sikhs, like the Mohammedans, weremaking common cause with theBrahmins, and that thus a general unio

against the British rule, of all thedifferent tribes, was rapidlyprogressing.' He was proved wrong.With the British thrown out of Delhi, theast Mughal Emperor placed unwillingly

at the head of the rebels and most onorthern India in turmoil, Frederic

Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner o



Amritsar during the Mutiny, admittedhat he too had his doubts. However he

had to hide them at the time to maintaihe citizens' confidence in British rule.

The urgency of the situation had to beexplained frankly, while the hope othe eventual triumph, under Providence, had to take the garb ohuman certainty . . . The population,

swelled by the sudden stoppage othe current of traffic from the north,must have increased to nearly onehundred and fifty thousand souls.Every class, creed, grade, and climeof Asia were represented. The tradeoperations were intimately mixed upwith Delhi; the great commissio



brokers and capitalists who never thought of politics beyond how itaffected the money market and whohad always steadily backed the . . .Government, experienced a rudeshock when it was announced that theGrand Trunk Road was (for the firsttime since British rule) impassable . .. It remained to be seen whether the

poisonous matter, which had for the

first time produced temporarycohesion and unity of action amongHindoos and Mahomedans, would beabsorbed in the Sikh system. But notwithstanding the thriving missioschool and church [gurudwara , oSikh temple] close abutting on theholy temple . . . from first to last no



symptom of wavering betrayeditself. 9

The Sikhs were rewarded for their oyalty with a special place in the

British Indian army which was radically

eformed after the Mutiny. The Britishnsisted that all recruits from thecommunity wore the five 'k's and sworean oath of loyalty on the Guru Grant

Sahib. The army regulation said: The paol, or religious pledges, of theSikh fraternity, should on no account

be interfered with. The Sikh should be permitted to wear his beard, andthe hair of his head gathered up, as

enjoined by his religion. Any



invasion, however slight, of theseobligations would be construed as adesire to subvert his faith, lead toevil consequences, and naturallyinspire general distrust and alarm.Even those who have assumed theoutward conventional characteristicsof Sikhs should not be permitted,after entering the British army, todrop them. 10

The intention was to build up the

Sikhs' identity as a separate martial racewhich was loyal to the crown.

Sikh participation in the Britisndian army reached a peak in the First

World War, as Khushwant Singh wrote

n his History of the Sikhs:



The number of Sikhs in the servicesrose from 35,000 at the beginning o1915 to over 100,000 by the end othe war, forming about a fifth of thearmy in action . . . Sikh soldiersfought on all fronts of the war iEurope, Turkey and Africa, and didcredit to their race by their bravery.Of the 22 military crosses awarded

for conspicuous gallantry to Indians,the Sikhs won 14. 11

After the Great War the loyalty of the

Sikhs to the British crown becamestrained. Punjab's response to MahatmaGandhi's first civil disobedience

movement was enthusiastic. When the



Mahatma was arrested on his way to thePunjab the violent protests followed,culminating in the tragic JallianwalaBagh massacre, a landmark in the historyof India's freedom movement.

On 13th April 1919 General R.E.H.Dyer, a member of a well-known familyof north Indian brewers, marched aplatoon of infantry to the JallianwalaBagh – a dusty, brick-walled square

only a minute or two's walk away frohe Golden Temple itself. A largegathering had assembled in theJallianwala Bagh to attend a politicalmeeting, defying a ban imposed by Dyer.He blocked the only entrance with hisroops and ordered them to open fire.

Some 379 people were killed and more





disgust of the Sikh community at large,by the priests of the Akal Takht and theGolden Temple. By now the two holiestSikh shrines were in the hands ogovernment nominees. They presentedGeneral Dyer with a robe of honour andnitiated him into the Khalsa. Theollowing conversation, quoted by

Mohinder Singh in his book The Akalovement, is reported to have take

place in the Golden Temple on thatoccasion. 'Sahib,' they said, 'you must become aSikh.' The General thanked them for the honour, but he objected that hecould not, as a British officer, let hishair grow long. Arur Singh (the



Sarbrah or manager of the GoldeTemple) laughed. 'We will let you off the long hair,' he said. General Dyer offered another objection. 'But Icannot give up smoking.' The priestconcluded, 'We will let you give it upgradually.' 'That I promise you,' saidthe General. 'At the rate of onecigarette a year.' 12

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre and theeting of General Dyer by priests loyalo the British, led to the agitation for theeform of Sikh temples, or gurudwaras.

The agitation, which continued over fiveears between 1920 and 1925, shatteredhe myth of the loyal Punjabi once and

or all.



The movement's aim was to wrestcontrol of temples from the hands ocorrupt and Hinduized mahants opriests, many of whom had managed tomake themselves the legal owners of theshrines of which they were originallymerely guardians. Mohinder Singh givesa description of the reputed goings-onside the Golden Temple at the turn ohe century:

Costly gifts to the temple slowlyfound their way to the homes of theSarbrah and other priests. The

precincts began to be used by punditsand astrologers; idols were openlyworshipped in the Gurudwara

premises. According to contemporary



accounts, on Basant and Holifestivals the whole place degeneratedinto a rendezvous for local thievesand bad characters. Pornographicliterature was freely sold, and

brothels were opened in theneighbouring houses where innocentwomen visiting the holy templeswere made victims of the lust olicentious Sadhus (ascetics), Mahants

and their friends. 13 In 1920 prominent Sikhs started

organising groups of protestors todemonstrate against the corrupt priests.Their first major victory came that year when, in the face of a threat by the

agitators to hold a mock funeral



procession for him, the manager of theGolden Temple submitted hisesignation. The other British nominees

soon followed and the protesters wereeft in possession of the holiest Sik

shrine.This success produced the two

nstitutions which dominate Sikh politicsn the Punjab today – the Shiromani

Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee and

he Akali Dal. The SGPC was created asa committee to manage the newlyiberated Golden Temple. It developednto a kind of Sikh parliament, wit

control over temples in the Punjab andheir huge annual incomes. The Akali

Dal, later to become a fully fledgedpolitical party, began by training and



organising volunteers to fight for thecause of the SGPC.

In 1925 the British governmentsurrendered to the Gurudwara agitation,giving the SGPC control of over 200shrines in the Punjab. That number hasnow risen to 700, and their revenueprovides the finance for the politicalactivities of the Sikh religious party, theAkali Dal. It was the Akali Dal leaders'

surrender to Bhindranwale which was toead to the attack on the Golden Templecomplex fifty-nine years later.

The Gurudwara movement also taughthe Sikhs the value of Mahatma Gandhi's

non-violent tactics, tactics they were touse so effectively against the Indiagovernment during the days o



Bhindranwale. The Rev. C.F. Andrews,an Anglican priest and follower oMahatma Gandhi, described the Britiseaction to the Akalis' non-violent

protests in this account of an incident hehimself witnessed.

There were four Akali Sikhs with

black turbans facing a band of abouttwo dozen policemen, including two

English officers. They had walkedslowly up to the line of police just before I had arrived and they werestanding silently in front of them atabout a yard's distance. They were

perfectly still and did not movefurther forward. Their hands were

placed together in prayer and it was



clear that they were praying. Then,without the slightest provocation otheir part, an Englishman lungedforward the head of his lathi [stick]which was bound with brass. Helunged it forward in such a way thathis fist which held the staff struck theAkali Sikhs, who were praying, justat the collar bone with great force. Itlooked the most cowardly blow as I

saw it struck and I had the greatestdifficulty in keeping myself under control . . . The blow which I sawwas sufficient to throw the Akali Sik and send him to the ground. He rolledover and slowly got up and at oncefaced the same punishment again.Time after time, one of the four who





safety must have saved the lives oEnglishmen who had been wounded.

Now they were felled to the ground atthe hands of the English officialsserving in the same governmentwhich they themselves had served. 14

After the Akalis had triumphed in theGurudwara movement, they were facedwith a dilemma. On the one hand, they

elt bound to continue supportingMahatma Gandhi and the freedomovement. On the other, they did notwant to be swallowed up by theCongress Party. The Mahatma saw theCongress as the party of all Indians – Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and believers i

he many other faiths which flourish i



he subcontinent. Like Jinnah and theMuslim League, many Akalis saw this asa ruse to establish Hindu Raj (rule) india. This should have made the Akalis

and the Muslim League natural allies,but Sikhs still retained their antipathy toMuslims, brought up as they were ostories of the Mughal persecution of theGurus. So Akalis for the most partsupported Mahatma Gandhi and the

Congress Party's struggle for ndependence.One of the legendary martyrs of the

ndependence movement was a Sikh,Bhagat Singh. He was executed by theBritish for the murder of a British policeofficer who was believed to havebrutally beaten one of the stalwarts o



he freedom movement, Lala Lajpat Rai.Lala Lajpat Rai died a few weeks after he assault and Bhagat Singh, as one ohe three young men who avenged his

death, captured the imagination of thendian people. As Jawaharlal Nehru

wrote: Bhagat Singh ... did not become

popular because of his act o

terrorism, but because he seemed tovindicate, for the moment, the honour of Lala Lajpat Rai, and through hiof the nation. He became a symbol . .. and within a few months each towand village of the Punjab, and to alesser extent in the rest of norther India, resounded with his name.



Innumerable songs grew up abouthim, and the popularity that the maachieved was something amazing. 15

The outbreak of war posed a dilemmaor the Sikhs. With so many of their

community in the armed forces, howcould they support the Congress stand onon-cooperation with the government?Many chose not to. One of them was

Master Tara Singh, who had dominatedAkali politics since the 1920s. Born intoa Hindu home, he converted to Sikhisat school. After taking his B A hebecame a schoolmaster. He soondeserted the classroom for the Akaliostrum, although he never lost his title

Master'. Master Tara Singh broke with



he Congress over the war issue andbacked Britain, even being photographedwith a steel helmet over his turban toboost recruitment.

In spite of the Akali stand, Sikhs inhe army were influenced by

nationalism. Belonging to acomparatively prosperous, go-aheadcommunity with strong links with their villages in the Punjab, they were,

according to Philip Mason, 'conscious opolitics to a higher degree than any other element in the Indian Army'. 16 Themutiny of the Central India Horse i1940 showed this. A Sikh squadron of he Central India Horse was on its wayo Bombay for posting overseas. At

Bombay the squadron's train was



shunted into a siding for twenty-four hours. This gave four soldiers, who hadcome under the influence of the KirtiLehr, a group preaching incendiarypeasant communism, an opportunity toencourage the others to mutiny. Thesquadron refused to go overseas, wascourt-martialled and its leaders deportedo the Andaman Islands. The incident

seriously disturbed army headquarters

and there was even talk of disbanding allSikh units. Sikhs were to mutiny agaiafter the Indian army action in theGolden Temple complex.

Sikh soldiers also played a prominentole in the Indian National Army. The IN

A was raised by a Sikh, Captain MohanSingh, from Indian army prisoners o



war taken by the Japanese in Singapore.According to Mohan Singh, a third of the20,000 men who joined the INA to fighthe British and free India were Sikhs.

As the war drew to an end the Akalieaders faced a bleak prospect. It was

clear that Britain was going to offer ndependence but it was equally clear hat Britain was going to insist o

satisfying Muslim demands for a

homeland of their own, either bygranting them provincial autonomy or ull independence. One possibility washat the whole of the Punjab would be

Muslim-ruled. This was an anathema tohe Sikhs. The other alternative was thathe Punjab would be divided. As the

Sikhs were spread throughout the



province, this was an even worseprospect. It would mean their communitywould be split and they would be aenfeebled minority in both halves. Thatwould be a threat to the very existenceof the Sikh religion.

The Akalis pressed for their ownhomeland; but the Sikh leaders were sodivided and confused about what theyactually meant by homeland that their

demand was seen as nothing more thaan attempt to prevent the creation oPakistan. As Khushwant Singh wrote inhis History of the Sikhs: 'The way theSikh spokesmen worded their demandor a Sikh state – not as somethingnherently desirable but simply as a

point in an argument against Pakistan –



obbed the suggestion of any chance oserious consideration.'

When the British ended their brieole in the long drama of Indian history,hey divided the Sikhs, the community to

which they had offered their specialprotection. Around 40 per cent were onhe Pakistan side of the border and 60

per cent on the Indian side. IndiaPunjab was left with thirteen districts,

ncluding the whole of the Jullundur andAmbala divisions and Amritsar, whichamounted to 40 per cent of the land area.A bitter blow to the Sikhs was the lossof Lahore, Maharaja Ranjit Singh'scapital, to Pakistan.

Partition itself unleashed a holocaustunparalleled in history. The Sikhs living



n Pakistani Punjab were among theworst sufferers, but they took their evenge on Muslims living in East

Punjab. Nobody will ever know howmany people died, although the estimateof half a million has not been effectivelycontested. Millions of people fled their homes on both sides of the new border.Muslims all but disappeared from EastPunjab and Sikhs and Hindus from the

West. The Akali leader Master TaraSingh's home became part of MusliPakistan – so did several historic Sik shrines including Guru Nanak'sbirthplace, Nanakana Sahib. TheCongress, which now ruled India, hadplayed just as decisive a role in denyinghe Sikhs a homeland as the Musli



League. However, at least the vast Sikhmigration into East Punjab hadconsolidated the community. The AkaliDal leaders now saw it as their task towin rights and privileges for Sikhswhich would safeguard their religion independent India, which they believed

would be a Hindu-dominated nation.This crisis of identity was the sore

rom which Bhindranwale squeezed suc

hatred of Hindus. His fundamentaliswas founded not on love or fear of God,but fear of Hinduism.





ecovery and flourished in independentndia. In the years followingndependence the rest of India saw the

as models of energy and initiative. Theybecame the most prosperous of the major communities, raising Punjab's per capitancome to the highest in the country.

They also made Punjab India's mostprogressive and productive stateagriculturally and spread on to the new

ands being opened up by deforestatioand irrigation in the neighbouring states.The tractor and combine harvester eplaced the bullock and the woode

plough. First the cinema, then transistor adios and then videos spread the

message of modernity throughout thePunjab. Sikh farmers responded to it. As



he journalist M.J. Akbar said, 'Theenterprise of the farmer has lifted Punjabaway from the quagmire of third worldprosperity into at least second worldcomfort.' Sikhs who had moved to other parts of India, and indeed to other partsof the world, added to Punjab'sprosperity by sending remittances back home. Sikhs had always been travellersand had thus established themselves i

almost every corner of India beforendependence. They had also emigratedo other parts of the Empire, to places

such as Burma, East Africa and Canada.After independence they were in theorefront of the emigration boom whic

ended when Britain, Canada andAustralia closed their doors.



So why did the Sikhs become sodisenchanted with life that they felt theyhad to take on the Indian government?The short answer is that most Sikhs didnot. But there was an important sectioof the Sikh community, identified withhe Akali Dal, which saw the modernismhat came with prosperity as a menace toheir faith, a threat to their identity.

Terry-cotton shirts, jeans, motor cycles

and whisky do not go with theobservance of the five 'k's. Modern lifes too fast for cumbersome processesike tying turbans, and washing waist-ength hair. So to many Sikhs the safetyazor became the symbol of modernity,

and this alarmed the orthodox.Then, of course, there was the old





birth. Hinduism absorbed the Buddha,converting him into an incarnation of thecreator god Vishnu. Jainism, also born india, has fared little better. Sikh societys divided on caste lines. Outcaste

Hindus whose forefathers wereconverted have still not been fullyaccepted by other Sikhs. Christiamissionaries have found Hinduism hardgoing. What little progress they have

made has been marred by their inabilityo persuade converts to drop their casteprejudices. In the Roman Catholicarchdiocese of Pondicherry churchesused to have screens to divideUntouchables from the rest of thecongregation until the 1930s, when thecrusading French Archbishop Colas



hreatened to close all churches whicdid not remove their screens. Somepreferred to close. The Jesuits did notecruit Untouchable novices until after he First World War and in Goa, the

bastion of Roman Catholicism, castestill divides the Church. Even Musliclerics have to fight a continual battle toprevent Hindu practices creeping intoheir worship and their social customs.

From the start of independence theAkali Dal leader Master Tara Singhdecided that the only way to preventmodernism and Hinduism drowning theSikhs' identity was to demand officialecognition as a separate community. Heold the new government, 'If you are true

nationalists then, for the sake of the



nation, you must let the Sikhs livehonourably. You will err in attempting toextinguish, in the name of nationalism,he distinctive entity of the Sikhs. We

value our honour. If we have no separateexistence, we shall have nothing to beproud of . . .'

Other Akali leaders also consistentlywarned Sikhs of the dangers of Hindcommunalism. In 1952 a leading Akali,

Hukam Singh, even attacked thecredentials of that arch secularist, PanditJawaharlal Nehru. Hukam Singh, whowas later to become a member of thesecular Congress Party and Speaker oParliament, wrote: 'Pandit Nehru is, tosay the least, the spearhead of militantHindu chauvinism who glibly talks about



nationalism, a tyrant who eulogisesdemocracy and a Goblian [i.e. likeGoebbels] liar – in short, a politicalcheat, deceiver and double dealer in theservices of Indian reaction.'

The Akalis did have evidence tosupport their campaign against Hindcommunalism. Hindu and Sikh refugeesrom West Punjab had to fight to re-

establish themselves in the truncated

ndian Punjab, and their struggle arousedcommunal prejudices, as the Tribunehe leading English language Punjab

newspaper, reported in 1948. It is useless to pretend that what isdescribed as communal poison hassuddenly developed . . . Let us be



honest and admit that it has been thereand it has been growing. Its presenceand its growth have impededrehabilitation. Displaced persons arenot settling down for fear that theymay again be displaced. Communalfeeling has not only retardedrehabilitation, it has given it a falseaccentuation. The two communitiesthat have come across the border are

thinking and acting in terms ocompetitive rather than co-operativerehabilitation. They stand in fear oeach other and in fear of the local

population. Militant Hinduism took political

shape with the formation in 1951 of the



Bhartiya Jan Sangh, a right-wing Hindparty which stressed the Vedic origins ondian civilisation. Its membershiplourished among Punjabi Hindus

because of the influence of the AryaSamaj.

But the Akalis' claim that Sikhismwas in danger received its greatest boostrom the movement for a Punjabi-

speaking state. In 1953 Pandit Nehru set

up the States ReorganisatioCommission in order to consider demands from many parts of India thatstate boundaries should be redrawn on ainguistic basis. Some linguistic groupseceived satisfaction, but not the Akalis.

The Commission rejected the Sikh claior a Punjabi-speaking state, on the



grounds that Punjabi was not sufficientlydistinct from Hindi, and that furthermorehe movement lacked 'the general

support of the people inhabiting thearea'.

Punjabi Hindus claimed that thedemand was communal. The three maianguages of the undivided Punjab had

been Urdu, Hindi and various forms oPunjabi. Of the three, Punjabi was by far

he most widely spoken by allcommunities, including Hindus. But theAkalis argued that the state's languageshould be Punjabi written in theGurmukhi script. This was the scriptdevised by the second Guru for the Sik scriptures. It was not widely taught or used outside Sikh religious institutions.



Hindus were therefore able to maintaihat the demand for the Gurmukhi script

was a religious demand. Because of thePunjabi Suba movement and the link between language and communalism, ihe 1961 census many Punjabi-speaking

Hindus declared Hindi as their mother ongue. Bhindranwale used to refer tohem scornfully as 'people prepared to

deny their mothers'. The Prime Minister,

ehru, remained resolutely opposed tohe creation to a Punjabi Suba or stateuntil the end of his life. He too wasconvinced that the Akalis' demand wascommunal. He told Parliament: 'There isno doubt that it [Punjabi Suba] hasgrown up not as a linguistic issue but asa communal issue.' Whether the demand



was communal or not, there is no doubthat the Akalis' political ambition was to

have a state they would always rule. Buthey had forgotten that by no means all

Sikhs are Akalis, and that they could nothope to rule a Sikh majority statewithout the support of some Hindus.

Master Tara Singh called the StatesReorganisation Commission's rejectioof the demand for a Punjabi-speaking

state a 'decree of annihilation'. Beforehe Commission even submitted itseport the Sikh leader launched a

agitation for the Punjabi Suba. Everymorning jathas – the name given tosquadrons in the army of Ranjit Singh – would go first to the Akal Takht to sayheir prayers and receive a blessing.



They would then pour out of the Templeshouting slogans, to be arrested by thewaiting police. The 4th of July 1955went down in Sikh history as the day thepolice entered the hostel complex acrosshe road from the Golden Temple itselo raid the offices of the Akali Dal andhe SGPC, across the road from the

Golden Temple itself. The DeputyCommissioner of Amritsar told the press

hat the police had raided the offices ohe two Sikh organisations to arrestabsconders and proclaimed offenders iconnection with the Akali agitation'.That day also went down in historybecause, according to members of theSGPC, police had committed sacrilegeby firing tear-gas shells to disperse



crowds of Akalis, shells which hadanded on the sacred marble pavement

surrounding the sarowar or pool in thecentre of the complex. Nearly twentyears later when Bhindranwale and his

supporters set up their headquarters ihe hostel complex, the government o

Mrs Gandhi refused to send in the policeon the grounds that it would 'offend Sik susceptibilities'. But this earlier

agitation ended with the Akalis winninga minor victory: the lifting of the ban oshouting slogans in favour of a PunjabiSuba. However, the Prime Minister,

ehru, remained adamant on the basicprinciple. He maintained the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state was communal.

By 1960 Master Tara Singh felt the



Sikhs were ready to support another agitation for the Punjabi Suba. On 24tJanuary, therefore, 132 members of theSGPC took an oath at the Akal Takht.They promised to sacrifice their bodies,souls and property (tan, man, dhan) fohe achievement of the Punjabi Suba.

This time the leaders of the agitatiowent one step further – they set up their headquarters not in the offices outside

he central part of the Golden Templecomplex but in the Akal Takht itself, asA jit Singh Sarhadi, a prominent Akalipolitician, reported.

The repressive measures of theGovernment were such that theorganisers had to choose Sri Darbar



Sahib [the Golden Temple] as thecentre of the movement from whicthe volunteers came out and courtedarrest. The leaders were in the AkalTakhat . . . The decision of theorganisers to have Sri Darbar Sahibas a hide-out and headquarters had

become the subject of criticism eve by well-meaning friends withoutappreciating the theo-political status

of the Gurudwaras, particularly theGolden Temple, in the religion,history and traditions of the Sikhs. 1

The Punjabi Suba agitation gaveBhindranwale a precedent for hisoccupation of the Akal Takht.

After a year Master Tara Singh



decided to step up the pressure. Hemade a dramatic announcement: 'I do notwant to die but while living I do notwant to see the Sikh Panth insulted andhe Sikhs treated as inferior to other

communities. I shall begin my fast untodeath from August 15th, and continue itill the demand for the Punjabi Suba is

conceded.'Unfortunately it was only too true that

he Master did not want to die. Nehr emained resolute in the face of hishreat and after forty-three days Tara

Singh gave up his fast. He was arraignedbefore the Akal Takht and sentenced toive days' penance. He was ordered to

perform the most menial of tasks,cleaning the shoes of the pilgrims who



came to worship at the Golden Temple.The schoolmaster from Rawalpindidistrict who had guided the Akalishrough the freedom movement and theirst fourteen years of independence

ended his political career in ignominy.For the last six years of his life he wasnothing more than the leader of a smallbreakaway group of Akalis.

The leadership of the Akali Dal

passed to the Master's lieutenant, SaFateh Singh. This was a significantchange because Fateh Singh was a Jat,he peasant caste dominant in East

Punjab. His succession set the seal on aprocess which had started atndependence – the gradual dominatio

of the Akali leadership by Jats. Large



numbers of the Jat peasants of Punjabhad been converted to Sikhism in thedays of the Gurus. They had formed thebackbone of Ranjit Singh's army andater of the Sikh forces within the Eritisndian army. But until independence theyended to remain subservient to the more

sophisticated Sikhs of the trading castes,most of whom were from West Punjab.Under Sant Fateh Singh's leadership the

Jats at last came into their own and theAkali Dal became first and foremost aparty representing the interests of thepeasant farmers of Punjab – the interests,hat is, of the Jats.

Nehru remained adamantly opposedo the Punjabi Suba until his death i

1964 but in 1966 his daughter Indira



Gandhi agreed to the formation of aPunjabi-speaking state. Fateh Singhelped her by stating unequivocally thathis demand was for a linguistic not aSikh state. Mrs Gandhi was undoubtedlynfluenced by the gallant role of Sik roops and the mainly Sikh rural

population of the border areas of Punjabn the war with Pakistan in 1965.

Addressing the Punjab Assembly after

he 1965 ceasefire, the Governor oPunjab, who was the representative ohe central government, said:

Whereas our armed forces personnelenhanced their prestige by their manydeeds of daring, courage andsacrifice, our people in the Punjab –



cultivators, traders, workmen, andeven women everywhere – exhibitedrare qualities of resourcefulness,forbearance and fortitude, and gavevaluable assistance to the army andthe police in many ways, and the

public services of all categories played their role magnificently. Thezeal, enthusiasm and the daring spiritdisplayed by the truck drivers,

conductors and cleaners in drivingtheir vehicles against all odds tocarry supplies to the army, our policeand home guards in fighting theenemy and apprehending the

paratroopers, were trulycommendable.



Almost all the truck drivers were Sikhs.Shrewd politician that she was, Mrs

Gandhi also undoubtedly saw the Akalisas potential allies in the fight she washaving with the Congress party bossesher father had left behind. Mrs Gandhiwas brought to power in 1966, justwenty months after her father's death.

She was brought to power not bypopular demand but by a group o

elderly politicians known as 'theSyndicate' who had dominated politicsn their home states during Pandit

ehru's premiership. When Lal Bahadur Shastri, Nehru's successor, died inTashkent, where the Soviet Union hadsuccessfully mediated between India andPakistan and persuaded them to sign a



reaty formally ending the 1965 war, theSyndicate could not agree on which ots members should become Prime

Minister. They fell back on Nehru'sdaughter because they believed her nexperience would make her their

puppet. But they misjudged IndiraGandhi. She very soon realised that ishe was to survive she would have tobreak the Syndicate by wresting control

of the party machine in the states from itsmembers. To do that she needed all theriends she could find.

Under the Punjab settlement the Hindispeaking plains became the new state oHaryana with its border running up toDelhi. The foothills of the Himalayasbecame the new state of Himachal



Pradesh, and the rest remained Punjab.Punjab had a narrow Sikh majority of 56per cent, but language not religion washe basis for the division. Sant Fate

Singh was overjoyed. A bachelor, withypical Sikh rustic humour, he

announced, 'A handsome baby has beenborn into my household.'

However the Punjabi Suba proved ahollow victory for the Akalis. Because

he Sikh vote was split they still couldnot hope to become the natural party opower in the Punjab. The only way theycould form a government was in alliancewith the Hindu Jan Sangh party. Thiswas tried after the elections in 1967 and1969 but the coalition governmentsproved hopelessly unstable. So the



Akalis had their homeland but could notgovern it. In order to maintain their support while out of office they had toevive a sense of grievance among the

Sikhs-by returning to agitational politics.n spite of their victory over the Punjabi

Suba the Akalis had always kept thisoption open. Within months of thePunjab settlement Sant Fateh Singh hadstarted a fast unto death to force Mrs

Gandhi to concede the city oChandigarh to the Punjab.After partition, Nehru, to the chagri

of many Sikhs, had decided thatAmritsar, the second city of undividedPunjab, was too near the Pakistan border o be the capital of an Indian state.

Pakistan had no such fears about Lahore



which was even nearer the border thaAmritsar but remained the capital oPakistani Punjab. Nehru decided that anew city, Chandigarh, should be builtwell away from the border to be thecapital of Indian Punjab. The new citywas sited on the banks of an artificialake within sight of the Simla hills. The

architect was Le Corbusier and he laidout the new city on the grid pattern. Its

administrative buildings are seen bymany as among the best of LaCorbusier's work as the American

orma Evenson has written: the most successful aspect of the cityis' to be found in Le Corbusier'smonumental government complex, for



it would appear that Chandigarh,whatever its faults, has succeeded igiving the modern world its most

powerful conception of civilarchitecture. It is this, of course,which has given the city itsinternational prominence and madeit,virtually a place of pilgrimage for Le Corbusier's admirers 2.

Chandigarh was therefore a prizedpossession and Mrs Gandhi baulked athe difficult decision of allocating it to

either Punjab or Haryana. Temporarily,or so it was said, Chandigarh was to beadministered by the central governmentbut at the same time it was to house the

state assemblies and the secretariats o



both Punjab and Haryana – a messysolution if ever there was one.

Sant Fateh Singh called off his firstast without achieving his aim. Then i

1969 the Sant was really put on hismettle by a veteran non-Akali Dalpolitician, Darshan Singh Pheruman. Heactually did fast to death for Chandigarh.To avoid being upstaged the Santannounced that he would sacrifice his

ife by burning himself to death if MrsGandhi did not award Chandigarh toPunjab. A bowl five feet in diameter was set up on the roof of one of thebuildings near the Akal Takht, steelchains were provided to bind the AkaliDal leader so that he did not try toescape the flames, and tins of kerosene



and petrol were piled up to fuel thoselames. But Mrs Gandhi stepped i

before the Sant was put to the final testand announced that Chandigarh would goo Punjab. She also insisted that Punjab

would have to surrender two tahsils,Abohar and Fazilka, to Haryana. Thiswas a messy award too. The onlyustification for giving the two tahsils –he smallest Indian revenue unit – to

Haryana was that they were Hindmajority areas. They were Punjabi, notHindi, speaking. So the award wentagainst the spirit of Pandit Nehru's standon the alteration of state boundaries on aeligious basis. The award was never mplemented and Chandigarh became thessue on which negotiations finally broke



down just before Operation Blue Star.The years following the

unimplemented Chandigarh agreementwere dismal years for the Akali Dal.Mrs Gandhi was at the height of her popularity and power after the defeat ohe Pakistan army and the liberation o

Bangladesh in 1971. In 1972 sheriumphed in the elections to the state

assemblies. The party bosses of her

ather's day were humiliated andopposition parties, including the AkaliDal, were consigned to the wilderness.To make matters worse Mrs Gandhi'sChief Minister in the Punjab, Giani ZailSingh, later to play a prominent role ihe Bhindranwale saga and become theirst Sikh President of India, was



stealing the Akalis' thunder by takingevery opportunity to placate Sik eligious sentiments. He went so far that

more than one senior member of his owparty complained to Mrs Gandhi that thePunjab gove-nment was communal.

To protect their position the AkaliDal decided to draw up a list ogrievances which they hoped wouldconvince Sikhs that even Zail Singh was

not going to meet their 'legitimate'demands. The Akali leaders thereforeset up a committee of eminent Sikhs andcharged them with 'redrawing the aimsand objectives of the Sikh Pantcommunity) to give a more vigorousead for their achievement . . . because

of the anti-Sikh policies of the Congress



government.' In 1973 the Akali DalWorking Committee adopted the eminentSikhs' proposals at a meeting iAnandpur Sahib, where the last Gur had founded the Khalsa. The committee'seport was subsequently known as the

Anandpur Sahib Resolution and becamehe basis for the demands that Akalis

were to raise in the agitation whicended with the Indian army storming the

Golden Temple. The Anandpur SahibResolution was also to provideBhindranwale with a weapon to seizecontrol of the agitation from the AkaliDal leaders.

Unfortunately for the Akali Dal, thecommittee which they set up to write theResolution was long on politicians and



very short on lawyers; so they made thecardinal mistake of being too specificwhen it came to stating their demands for greater autonomy. They proposedestricting what, in the Englisranslation of the Resolution, they

described as the central government'sinterference' to 'Defence, ForeigRelations, Currency, and GeneralCommunications'. No Prime Minister, let

alone one with as firm a conviction asMrs Gandhi that India needed a strongcentral government, could ever accepthose terms. To concede that demand

would have meant threatening the unityof India. It could well have destroyedhe whole economy because each state

would have been able to set up tarif



barriers impeding the free movement ogoods within the country.

The post-independence economy hasbeen carefully constructed on the basisof self-sufficiency, with imports beingkept to the bare minimum. This has ledo the growth of many industries whic

are only competitive in the protected butexpanding Indian economy. Thisavowedly protectionist policy has

solated India from the storms in theworld economy which have blown other developing countries off course. Indiahas enjoyed years of steady iunspectacular growth.

The Indian economy has also givePunjab a guaranteed market for itsagricultural produce. More than half the



grain which goes into India's publicdistribution system comes from thePunjab. Under the Akali constitution thecentral government would not have hadhe powers to set up and regulate a

public distribution system. The morebackward states of India would not havehad the resources to buy wheat and rice;other states might have chosen to buygrain elsewhere. Sikh farmers did and

still do complain about the price thegovernment pays for their produce. Butn the world conditions prevailing in the

1970s and early 1980s they would haveound it very difficult to sell their grai

on the international market. During thenegotiations with Mrs Gandhi betwee1982 and 1984 the Akali Dal leaders



acitly agreed not to press the demand toimit the central government's powers to

defence, foreign relations, currency andgeneral communications. However Bhindranwale continued to insist onothing less than the full implementatioof the Ariandpur Sahib Resolution,undermining the Akali Dal leaders'support among their more simpleollowers who naturally could not

understand why they were surrenderingheir demands.In the Anandpur Resolution the Akali

Dal baldly stated its claim to be theparty of all Sikhs. It said, 'TheShiromani Akali Dal is the veryembodiment of the hopes and aspirationsof the Sikh nation and as such is fully



entitled to its representation.' This claiwas of course undemocratic. Indiademocracy has given the Sikhs the righto reject it, and many have. In no

election so far has the Akali Dal got 50per cent of the total Sikh vote. In factonly one section of the Sikh communityhas consistently supported the Akali Dal– the Jat caste of peasant farmers. Thiss why, in spite of the Akali Dai's claim

o be the party of all Sikhs, rural andurban, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution isso heavily biased in favour of thearmers and against the traders andndustrialists. It said that the Akali Dal

would 'ensure perceptible improvementn the standard of living of all rural

classes, more particularly of the poor



and middle-class farmers.' TheResolution called for land reforms andor loans to be made available to

middle-class and poor farmers. Itwanted the prices of agriculturalproduce to be fixed 'on the basis of theeturns of the middle-class farmer.'

The Anandpur Sahib Resolutionshowed its bias against traders bydemanding 'the complete nationalisatio

of the trade in food grains'. Mrs Gandhidid nationalise the wholesale foodgrairade briefly, with disastrous results for armers and consumers. The bias againstndustrialists was illustrated in the

clause saying: 'The Shiromani Akali Dalstrongly advocates that all key industriesshould be brought under the public



sector.' In resolutions the party passedive years later the Akali Dal said: 'The

historic Anandpur Sahib Resolution hasaid particular stress on the need to

break the monopolistic hold of thecapitalists foisted on the economy byhirty years of Congress rule.' At the

same time the resolutions called for theestablishment of a stock exchange in thendustrial capital of Punjab, Ludhiana. It

seems unlikely that the stock exchangewould have attracted much capital in thenvestment climate the Akalis favoured.

For all their bias in favour oagriculture, the result largely of their dependence on the support of Jatpeasants, the Akalis consistentlymaintained that Punjab had been unfairly



reated by the central government in thematter of industrial development. It isrue that Punjab gained very little frohe central government's massivenvestment in large-scale industry suc

as steel and heavy electrical plants. Butwhen the Anandpur Sahib Resolutionwas passed industrial investment in thePunjab was booming, and by the time thearmy entered the Golden Temple the

state's industrial output was growing at8.4 per cent a year – double the nationalaverage. Punjab was also changing froa land of villages to a modern urbanisedstate. It had become the fifth mosturbanised state in India, even overtakingWest Bengal which includes the vast cityof Calcutta. It is true that the new



ndustries employed a lot of labour frooutside the Punjab and so did not solvehe state's own problem o

unemployment. This appeared to supporthe Akalis' claim that Punjab was under-ndustrialised. It was probably moremportant from the Akali point of viewhat most of the industry was owned by

Hindus.In spite of the progress Punjab

armers had made, agriculture proved aertile ground for the nurturing of Sik grievances too. When the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was drawn up,agricultural production in Punjab wasstill expanding rapidly in the GreeRevolution which made the state thegranary of a self-sufficient India. But, by



he time the Akali Dal launched its longagitation for the implementation of theAnandpur Sahib Resolution nine yearsater, the Green Revolution was

beginning to run out of steam. Nearly 85per cent of the Punjab was by therrigated and there was little room for

bringing more land under cultivation.More than 65 percent of the farms wereess than five acres and, with the rising

price of fertilisers and other moder nputs, they were not large enough toproduce much of a marketable surplus.There was certainly not enough money ihe kitty at the end of the year to provide

adequately for more than one son to stayback on the farm. So younger sons had togo to the new towns in search of jobs



and there they came up againstcompetition from labour which hadmmigrated from other areas of India. To

make matters worse many of the youngvillage men who had been displacedrom their family farms were educated,

and there is no more fertile ground for evolution than the educated

unemployed.The Akali Dal maintained that the

government was even deliberatelykeeping Sikhs out of their traditionalprofession -soldiering. The governmenthad adopted a new recruitment policy togive opportunities to communities andareas of India where there was noradition of joining the army. Iigorously implemented this policy



would have cut the Sikhs' share oecruitment down to 2 per cent, as they

were only 2 per cent of the totalpopulation of India. But the policy never was rigorously implemented and, whehe Akali Dal launched its agitation for he Anandpur Sahib Resolution, the

Sikhs still formed over 10 per cent of thearmy. There was also evidence tosuggest that Sikhs themselves were no

onger so eager to sign on. India'sDefence Ministry is very secretive aboutts recruitment figures but Lt-General

Sinha, Vice-Chief of Army Staff at theime of the agitation, maintained that not

enough young Sikhs were comingorward to fill the quota. Life in thendian army has not changed much; a



awan, or soldier, still has to live ahighly disciplined and restricted life,especially in the 'teeth arms' which arehe traditional regiments for Sikhs tooin. However, life in Punjab has

changed and the cantonment has becomea much less attractive place for a youngSikh. This of course has not made aalteration in the recruitment policy anyess emotive an issue to Sikhs who

support the Akali Dal, especially JatSikhs who have a tradition of more thaone hundred years of serving in the armyand regard recruitment as their right.

The most emotive and misunderstoodof all the economic issues raised in theAnandpur Sahib Resolution was water.The waters of three of the united



Punjab's five rivers were allocated tondia in the post-partition Indus Water

Agreement signed with Pakistan. Theivers are the Sutlej, Ravi and Beas.

Sikh farmers regarded these waters asheirs by right. In a land which was once

near desert that was perhaps notsurprising, but it was hardly asatisfactory basis for distributingsomething as essential as water in a

modern democracy. Unfortunately theong and tortuous negotiations which hadaken place had been conducted on that

basis too. As the Centre for Research inRural and Industrial Development iChandigarh has pointed out in the book

unjab Crisis, 'the controversy stemsrom the principle of considering water



o be property . . . the issue ought to behe optimum harnessing of the existing

water resources.' But to the Sikh farmer the optimum harnessing' of Punjab'shree rivers meant stealing his water and

giving it to the new 'Hindu state oHaryana' and to the state of Rajasthan.There was no immediate shortage. Iact while the arguments dragged ondian water was flowing unutilised into

Pakistan because the government couldnot get on with its planned irrigatioschemes. Sikh farmers were worriedabout the long-term implications of theseschemes and the central governmentmade matters worse by basing its caseon the legal rights of the other statesnstead of trying to persuade Sikhs that



here was enough water to go round.These were the grievances the Akali

Dal highlighted in the Anandpur SahibResolution to convince Sikhs that theywere a deprived minority in India, aminority which must stand up for itselor sink into a Hindi morass.

On many occasions the governmentwas to refuse to negotiate on theAnandpur Sahib Resolution, claiming

hat it was 'a secessionist' document. Theoriginal resolution makes it quite clear hat the Akalis were only demanding

greater, admittedly much greater,autonomy. The Akali Dal President,Harchand Singh Longowal, himself said:Let us make it clear once and for all thathe Sikhs have no designs to get away



rom India in any manner. What theysimply want is that they should beallowed to live within India as Sikhs,ree from all direct and indirectnterference and tampering with their eligious way of life. Undoubtedly the

Sikhs have the same nationality as other ndians.' After the army had attacked the

Golden Temple complex Longowal stillsaid that the Akali Dal had never

demanded, and was not demanding,secession. That one of the Akali Dai'smotives was power within India wasshown when the party was a partner ihe government of Punjab between 1977

and 1979. The Akalis did nothing aboutmplementing the Anandpur Sahib

Resolution beyond 'emphatically urging'



he Janata party government at the centre,of which they were also a part, 'to recasthe constitutional structure of the country

on real and meaningful federatioprinciples'. Once out of power agaihey launched a full-scale agitatio

against Mrs Gandhi's government for themplementation of the Resolution, or ateast for a long list of demands whic

enshrined the Resolution. Many Sikhs,

particulaily the unemployed universitygraduates and the farmers, did feel thathey had genuine economic grievances

against the rest of India. The Akali Dalmixed those economic grievances witeligious ones and so created a

dangerous brand of fundamentaliswhich the party's leaders eventually



could not control. In a pamphletHarchand Singh Longowal, the leader ohe last agitation against Mrs Gandhi,

sent to all members of Parliamentexplaining the Akali stand, he said:

India is a multi-lingual, multi-religious, and multi-national land. Isuch a land a microscopic minoritylike the Sikhs has genuine

forebodings that, like Buddhism andJainism earlier, they may also losetheir identity in the vast ocean of theoverwhelming Hindu majority.

Bhindranwale fanned the flames of theuprising in Punjab with that foreboding,but it was the Akali Dal which started



he fire.



4

The Rise of SantJarnail Singh

Bhindranwale

Jarnail Singh was born in 1947, the year of Indian Independence, into the familyof Joginder Singh, a comparatively poor



armer. But that was no disadvantage toa potential sant, or holy man. In factBhindranwale could hardly have chosehis family better if he had tried. Hisather was Jat by caste, the caste whic

dominates the Sikh community, and hisoccupation, farming, was the onlyoccupation apart from soldieringconsidered worthy of a Jat. He had amilitary connection too. One o

Bhindranwale's half-brothers joined thearmy and by the time of Operation BlueStar he had risen to the rank of subedar-major, the approximate equivalent osergeant-major in the British army.Bhindranwale's own name Jarnail washe Punjabi transliteration of the Englis

word 'general'. Sikh fathers often call



heir sons after ranks in the army.Bhindranwale's family village o

Rode was near the town of Moga, whics in the heart of the Jat Sikh country, andhe village of Bhindran where the

missionary movement the farmer's sowas to join as a young schoolboy wasounded. Jarnail Singh was helped on his

way to becoming a preacher by hisather's piety. Joginder Singh went

egularly to the gurudwara to hear theGuru Granth Sahib recited and he madesure that his son was nurtured in the Sik scriptures. Joginder Singh describedJarnail Singh, when a young boy, asSomeone who could fell a tree in asingle blow and at the same timememorise whole chapters of the



scriptures and recite them a hundredimes a day.' Jarnail Singh was alsoortunate to be born the last of seve

sons. That meant his father had plenty osons to work his land and to guaranteehim a secure old age. The farmer wasprobably happy to send Jarnail Singh tohe Damdami Taksal missionary schoolo learn the profession of preaching,

because his land would certainly not

have supported his seventh son.The word Taksal means mint and isused to describe the Sikh schools whicpreach the pure and unalloyed messageof the Gurus. The Damdami Taksal is annfluential school founded by one of the

great heroes of Sikhism, Baba DeepSingh. He was the leader of one of the



bands of warriors who had sworn todefend the Golden Temple during theime the Afghan Ahmad Shah Abdaliuled the Punjab. Baba Deep Sing

swore to atone for the Sikhs' failure todefend the Golden Temple after the firstdesecration by the Afghan army. Hecollected together a force of some 5,000villagers armed with the most rustic oweapons. His peasant army was

ntercepted on its way to the GoldeTemple by a hurriedly assembledAfghan army. The Sikhs fought so hardhat the Afghan general had to call for einforcements, but in the end he was

able to prevent the army of Baba DeepSingh getting to the Golden Temple. Thegeneral desecrated the Temple again as



a lesson to the Sikhs. Tradition has ithat Baba Singh's head was cut off buthat he still managed to fight his way tohe Golden Temple with his head in one

hand and his sword in the other. Picturesof the decapitated Baba Deep Singh areas common in Sikh households aspictures of the Gurus. The DamdamiTaksal he founded had been in thevanguard of the fight against Sik

apostasy for 200 years by the time thatJarnail Singh joined as a young boy.Most young Sikhs who go to religious

schools end their lives in comparativeobscurity, reciting the Guru Granth Sahib

n gurudwaras or travelling aroundvillages preaching. Bhindranwale,however, soon became a dominant figure



n the Damdami Taksal. Standing anmpressive and lean six feet tall, hisooks went with a prophetic role. He had

a strong nose and deep-set eyes whicalmost disappeared when he broke into aoothy grin, and yet had a sinister quality

which meant his audiences waited for he Sant to smile first. There were a few

white hairs in his thick black beard byhe end of his life. Bhindranwale always

wore a blue or saffron turban tied iiers, not in the jaunty fashion of a Sik ayman. He also wore the traditional

Sikh loose knee-length shirt, under which were the shorts prescribed byGuru Gobind Singh. As the Gurunstructed, he wore a dagger in a belt

slung over his shoulder. Whenever I saw



him he carried a more modern weapooo, a revolver, in a bandoleer stuffed

with live ammunition.Jarnail Singh became the favourite o

he head of the Taksal, Kartar Singh. Hisbreak came when Kartar Singh wasatally injured in a road accident.

Bhindranwale's teacher was such aanatical Sikh that he refused to allow

doctors to cut his hair so that they could

operate on him after the accident. BeforeKartar Singh died he made it clear thathe wanted Jarnail Singh, not his own soAmrik Singh, to succeed to theeadership of the Taksal. So Jarnail

Singh became a Sant or Saint, and headof the Damdami Taksal. He took thename Bhindranwale as many of his



predecessors had done, after the villageof Bhindran. Amrik Singh was studyingat university at the time and wanted toemain there. He later became

Bhindranwale's right-hand man andPresident of the All India Sikh StudentsFederation, whose members wereesponsible for many of the atrocities

committed in Bhindranwale's name.The headquarters of the Damdami

Taksal are in a comparatively newurudwara in the village of Chowk Mehta, some 25 miles from Amritsar.The gurudwara stands apart from thevillage, like a fortress of the faith.Behind its high walls, young Sikh boysrom the age of seven upwards are taughto defend that faith with arms and wit



words. Many deride the education iSikh missionary schools as primitiveobscurantism, the teaching of blind faith.Much time is certainly devoted toearning the scriptures by heart, but

when I visited Chowk Mehta I foundmyself involved in a deep argumentabout monotheism with one of the youngeachers who had studied theology at

university. He had 'read, learnt and

nwardly digested' the Bible and theQur'an as well, of course, as the Gur Granth Sahib. I was unable to counter his argument that Christianity's doctrinesof the incarnation of Christ and theTrinity were not pure monotheism,especially when compared with theSikhs' doctrine of the one God to who



man cannot ascribe any form.Bhindranwale's appointment as head

of the Damdami Taksal coincided with achange in the political scene in thePunjab. In 1977 Mrs Gandhi surprisedndia and the world by calling a general

election and accepting the electorate'sverdict against her Emergency. WhenMrs Gandhi took emergency powerseighteen months earlier, arrested

opposition leaders and censored thepress, it had been interpreted as the endof one of the last surviving democraciesn the developing world. Mrs Gandhi's

motive in declaring the Emergency hadundoubtedly been to protect her owposition. The Allahabad High Court hadound her guilty of corrupt electoral



practices. Although ii was generallyadmitted that the charge against her wasa technicality, many of her owncolleagues advised that she shouldesign temporarily until her appeal was

heard by the Supreme Court. Theopposition, under the leadership oJayaprakash Narayan. the man manyndians regarded as the inheritor o

Mahatma Gandhi's moral authority, had

mounted a campaign to highlightgovernment corruption. This campaigseriously damaged Mrs Gandhi and theCongress Party's image. Those of MrsGandhi's colleagues who argued that sheshould step down temporarily said thato do anything less would be playing intohe hands of Jayaprakash Narayan's



movement. At one stage Mrs Gandhi wasswayed by this argument, but her ounger son Sanjay dissuaded her froesigning. He told his mother that she

could not trust any of her colleagues tohand the job back to her if she wascleared by the Supreme Court, asseemed likely from its interim judgment.

Sanjay had failed to complete aapprenticeship with Rolls Royce and

was in the process of setting up a car manufacturing plant, a scheme which henever got off the ground. Only twenty-eight when the Emergency was declared,he had no political experience and heldno party office. However, inexperiencedid not stop him u:ing the Draconiapowers his mother had taken to terrorise



he administration, setting up what wasn effect a police state. The Indian police

needed the restraint of the civil servants,he courts and Parliament to curb their

veniality. Without that restraint they ranamok, committing widespreadexcesses'. The worst excesses werecommitted in the family planning drive,aunched by Sanjay Gandhi. In many

areas of northern India, government

servants, including even school teachers,were forced to collaborate in aprogramme of compulsory sterilisation.

It is doubtful whether with a censoredpress and a party silenced by fear oSanjay, Mrs Gandhi knew the full extentof the Emergency excesses and their effect on the electorate's support for her.





wanted to restore democracy. She wasalways conscious of her standing in theworld and it had been much reduced byhe undemocratic Emergency. She

maintained that democracy wassuspended and not terminated and shewas determined to disprove theallegation that she had become adictator. There is also no doubt that MrsGandhi was unhappy about governing

ndia on such a tight rein. She was wellaware of the value of elections for etting off the head of steam whic

builds up against any administration.The post-Emergency election was a

unparalleled disaster for the Congressand Mrs Gandhi. She was heavilydefeated in her own home constituency



n Uttar Pradesh and her party did notwin even a single seat in northern India,he area worst affected by Sanjay's

Emergency programmes. In Punjab, theAkali Dal formed a coalitiogovernment with the new Janata Party,which found itself in power in Delhi. Itwas a hurried merger of the non-communist opposition parties which fellapart because of rivalry between the

hree elderly politicians who vied to behe Prime Minister. In the Punjab themain strength of the Janata Party camerom the former Jan Sangh. The Akali

Dal had, of course, earlier experience ohe difficulties of a coalition with this

pro-Hindu party, but they did not hesitateo form a government with Jan Sang



politicians again.At first, Mrs Gandhi seemed inclined

o accept her defeat as the end of her political career. Sanjay certainly wasnot. He realised how fragile the unity ohe new Janata Party was and set out to

break it by playing on the rivalriesbetween the leaders of the differentparties which had merged so hurriedlyand so recently. It took him less than

hree years to bring down the Janatagovernment and see his mother restoredo power.

To achieve the break-up of thePunjab coalition, Sanjay took the adviceof the experienced Sikh politician ZailSingh, who had been Chief Minister ohe state from 1972 until the Congress



Party's electoral defeat in 1977. ZailSingh advised Sanjay to try to break theAkali Dal, not the Jan Sangh. The AkaliDal was dominated by three men -Prakash Singh Badal, a rich farmer andan experienced politician who hadsucceeded Zail Singh as the ChieMinister; Harchand Singh Longowal,ike Bhindranwale a religious teacher

who had led an agitation against the

Emergency; and Gurcharan Singh Tohra,a cunning but unsophisticated politiciawith communist connections. He headedhe Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak

Committee. At first, Sanjay thought oplaying these three against each other.But Zail Singh, with his deep knowledgeof the complexities of Sikh politics,



ealised that displacing one of the AkaliTrinity would only lead to a strongalliance of the other two. Heecommended Sanjay to look for a neweligious leader to discredit theraditional Akali Dal leadership. Sanjay

sent some of the young men, who hadbeen his aides during the Emergency, tosearch for a sant or holy man to do theob. There is no shortage of sants i

Punjab, and the young men came up wita list of twenty. Some were unwilling,others were unsuitable. The choiceeventually fell on Bhindranwale. Ashead of the historic and widelyespected Damdami Taksal, he had aeady-made status in the Sik

community. As a rigid fundamentalist, he



could capitalise on the compromiseswith Sikh religious interests that theAkali Dal leaders were bound to makeo stay in power. There was, however, a

difficulty. Bhindranwale needed anssue, a cause. When Sanjay's young meound him, he was travelling round

Punjab with his followers preachingagainst the threats to the Sikh religion;but the evils of shaving beards and

cutting hair, of drinking and drugs, werehardly political issues. So Sanjay andZail Singh looked for a cause which wasboth political and religious.

They found it in the Nirankaris, aheretical sect of Sikhs who are verynfluential in the Punjabi trading

community. The Nirankaris started as a



evivalist group in the last century. Their ounder, Baba Dayal Das, preached

against the growing tendency of Sikhs toevert to Hindu practices like idolatry,

Brahmin rituals, and pilgrimages to theGanges. The Baba stressed the Sik doctrine that God could not be describedbecause he was formless. Nirankarimeans formless. The movement split andheresies crept in. The larger group o

irankaris started to revere their ounder and his successor as Gurus, ispite of Guru Gobind Singh'spronouncement that he was the last Guru.They forgot their founder's stricturesagainst idols too, and even worshippedhis sandals; but most offensive of all toorthodox Sikhs, were the scriptures



which the Nirankaris have added to theSikh canon. Some passages in them areegarded as blasphemy against the Gurus

and the Guru Granth Sahib. Faced withe growing popularity of the sect, the

Sikh High Priests had issued a religiousedict, a hukmnama, denouncing the

irankaris as heretics. Sikhs were toldo ostracise Nirankaris and prevent the

movement growing. Tension between the

irankaris and the orthodox Sikhsmounted and there were several riots.Then in 1978, the Akali Dal

government played into the hands oSanjay Gandhi and Zail Singh. Theyannounced that the Nirankaris would beallowed to hold a convention in the holycity of Amritsar. Raja Harmit Singh



Batra, a wealthy young Sik businessman, was inside the GoldeTemple on 13th April 1978, the day of hat convention. He heard Jeevan Sing

Umranangal, the Revenue Minister in theAkali Dal government, trying to explaio an agitated Sikh congregation that his

government could not stop the Nirankariconvention taking place. The reason washat the Nirankari traders had links wit

he Hindu traders supporting the JaSangh, the Akalis' coalition partner. Buthe Revenue Minister could not use that

as an explanation to the congregation,consisting mainly of Sikh farmers who,ike fahners the world over, regardraders as exploiters. Bhindranwale

stood up and shouted, 'We will not



allow this Nirankari convention to takeplace. We are going to march there andcut them to pieces!' This was the firstime Batra, and probably many other

members of the congregation, had seeBhindranwale. Batra was not impressed.He said, 'I detested the man's behaviour.'

Bhindranwale, and an agriculturalnspector of the Punjab government

called Fauja Singh, then marched out o

he Temple at the head of a processionshouting slogans against the Nirankaris.Along the two-mile route to the

ihangon ka Bunga or Nihang's shelter,one of the agitated Sikhs cut off the ar of a Hindu sweetshop owner. Still thepolice made no attempt to stop theprocession. When the Sikhs reached the



convention, Fauja Singh drew his swordand swiped at the neck of the NirankariGuru, Baba Gurbachan Singh. One of theGuru's bodyguards shot Fauja Singdead, and a battle broke out in whicwelve Sikhs and three Nirankaris were

killed. The twelve Sikhs became martyrsand Sanjay Gandhi and Zail Singh hadhe issue they needed.

Sanjay Gandhi and the Congress

Party used the martyrdom of the twelveSikhs to whip up the Nirankari agitation.The Akali Dal were in a dilemma whichhey never resolved so long as theyemained in power. As the defenders of

Sikh orthodoxy, they could notdisassociate themselves from amovement against a heretical sect. As



coalition partners in the Punjabgovernment, they could not openlysupport lawlessness. The Akali Daleaders did little to encourage the

agitation against the Nirankaris so longas they remained in power. Most of thedemonstrations took place in Delhi,organised by the local committee icharge of gurudwaras which wascontrolled by the Congress Party.

The Congress publicity machineprojected Bhindranwale as the hero ohe attack on the Nirankari convention,

but there are considerable doubts abouthis. Fauja Singh's widow, Bibi Amarjit

Kaur, claimed that Bhindranwaleslipped away before the processioeached the convention. After her



husband's death she retired to the GoldeTemple, where she led a small group oextremists called the Akhand KirtaniJatha, remaining a thorn iBhindranwale's flesh until his death. Shewas one of the few people inside theTemple who had the courage to criticisehim openly, blaming his 'cowardice' for he death of her husband.

Sanjay Gandhi and Zail Singh also

needed a party to promote Bhindranwaleand harass the Akalis. So a new partywas formed on 13th April 1978, just aweek before the attack on the Nirankariconvention. The party was called theDal Khalsa, the party of the pure, thename of the Sikh army in the days beforehe empire of Ranjit Singh. The



naugural meeting was held in the AromaHotel and, according to the staff of thehotel, the bill of 600 rupees was paid byZail Singh. A stenographer who hadbeen associated with the publication of aecent pamphlet advocating Khalista

was elected president.The establishment of Khalistan was

discussed. Khalistan means 'the land ohe Khalsa' and is the name Sik

separatists have given the independentcountry they are fighting for. TheGovernment White Paper on the armyaction in the Golden Temple admittedhat 'The Dal Khalsa was originally

established with the avowed object odemanding an independent sovereigSikh State.' However, Zail Singh, the



man who had been Chief Minister oPunjab and was to go on to becomeHome Minister in the central Cabinetand then President of India, continued topromote its cause. Journalists iChandigarh remember how he used toing them up and ask them to publis

news of the Dal Khalsa on the frontpages of their newspapers.Bhindranwale was never openly

associated with the Dal Khalsa. Until hisdeath he maintained that he was a man oeligion, not a politician; but the Dal

Khalsa was always known asBhindranwale's party.

A year later Bhindranwale and theDal Khalsa were involved in their firstelections. The elections were for the



nfluential Shiromani GurudwaraPrabandhak Committee, the SGPC. Itwas vital for the Akali Dal leaders toetain control over the SGPC because itinanced their party and controlled theurudwaras throughout the Punjab,

where the party message was put across.Sanjay Gandhi and Zail Singh had highopes of Bhindranwale. He had becomehe most prominent leader of the anti-

irankari agitation and he had built up aname for his preaching in the villages ohe Bhatinda, Faridkot and Ferozepur

districts, which were the strongholds ohe Akali Dal. They were to be

disappointed.Candidates supported by

Bhindranwale only won four out of the



140 seats in the SGPC election. TheAkali Dal leaders retained acommanding majority. Sanjay Gandhiand Zail Singh persevered, promotingBhindranwale's name through themovement against the Nirankaris andhrough the Dal Khalsa. Fortunately for he two Congressmen, the fighting

between the leaders of the Akali Dalbecame more bitter, giving them another

ield to operate in. In 1979 the PunjabChief Minister, Badal, opposed thebreak-up of the Janata Party, which ledo the downfall of the Janata government

of the octogenarian Prime Minister,Morarji Desai. Tohra, the President ohe SGPC, sided with the breakaway

group in the Janata Party.



Although the divisions within theanks of the Akali Dal and the collapse

of the Janata Party drastically weakenedhe Sikh religious party when it came toight the general elections in 1980, Zail

Singh still thought it worth his while tobring in B lindranwale on the Congressside. For all his protestations that hewas not a politician, Bhindranwalecampaigned actively fcr the Congress i

hree constituencies. His name wasalready so influential that two of thecandidates printed posters sayingBhindranwale supports me.' One of thecandidates Bhindranwale supported washe Hindu R.L. Bhatia who was the

President of the Punjab Congress Party.Another was the wife of Pritam Sing



Bhinder, a senior police officer whoplayed a controversial role in theEmergency. Mrs Gandhi later madeBhinder the police chief of Punjab andgave him the job of eradicatingBhindranwale's terrorists.

The Janata candidate in MrsBhinder's constituency of Gur-daspur,Pran Nath Lekhi, alleges that MrsGandhi herself actually appeared on the

same platform as Bhindranwale in theelection campaign. Following an officialdenial after Bhindranwale's death thatMrs Gandhi or the Congress Party hadhad any links with the Sant, the Janatacandidate wrote a letter to the PrimeMinister in which he said:Bhindranwale was accompanying yo



during your election tour of Gurdaspur constituency during the general electioo the seventh Lok Sabha [Pirliament]

held in January 1980.' The nearest MrsGandhi ever came to admitting anyconnection between Bhindranwale andher party was in an interview for theBBC television current affairsprogramme Panorama. In that interviewshe was asked whether her party had

helped the preacher to come toprominence. She replied, 'Certainly not.didn't know him. I never knew him.'

But she did say, 'Mr Bhindranwale didgo and speak for one of our candidatesn the elections. I don't know whic

candidate it was. I don't know whether he knew him personally or he was



annoyed with the local Akalis.'



5

The Arrest of Bhindranwale

When. Mrs Gandhi returned to power Zail Singh was rewarded with the post



of Home Minister in her Cabinet. Theman who like Bhindranwale had startedoff as an obscure preacher but unlikeBhindranwale had never made it to theop of that profession, had now reachedhe second most important office in hendian Cabinet. But Zail Singh's

happiness was to be short-lived. Later ihe year Congress was returned to power n the Punjab State Assembly elections

oo and Mrs Gandhi chose Zail Singh'sarch-rival Darbara Singh as the newChief Minister. In India all politicians,except members of the Gandhi family,have to protect their base. Only with astrong base in one of the states capoliticians hope to commandndependent influence in Delhi. It was



ust because Mrs Gandhi did not wantpoliticians to be able to command anyndependent influence that she did her

best to prevent any of her colleaguesbecoming too powerful in their homestates. If Home Minister Zail Singh'snominee had been appointed ChieMinister of Punjab, Zail Singh himselwould have been king of Punjab in allbut name and that was the last thing Mrs

Gandhi wanted. Hence the appointmentof his rival Darbara Singh as ChieMinister.

Politically the two men were polesapart. When Zail Singh was ChieMinister of Punjab from 1972 to 1977 heried to fight the Akali Dal with its own

weapon, religion. He went out of his



way to show Sikhs that he was as devoutas any Akali leader. He made a point of attending the celebrations of all Sik estivals, and of preaching sermons athem. He had developed a flair for

preaching at the Sikh MissionaryCollege at Amritsar where he wasrained to propagate the faith. Zail

Singh's deeds matched his words. Heinked all the places where the last Gur

had preached by a road which he calledGuru Gobind Singh Marg. The ChieMinister then set off to drive the 400miles from Anandpur in the east, whereGuru Gobind Singh had given the Sikhshis historic charge to defend their faitwith arms and to wear the five emblemsof their faith, to the western borders o



Punjab. The cavalcade of tractors andrailers, trucks, buses and cars took four

days to reach its destination, stopping atall the gurudwaras which marked thepoints where the Guru himself hadstopped. Even the Akali Dal leadershiphad to accept that the Guru Gobind SingMarg had been a stroke of genius. ButDarbara Singh went to Mrs Gandhi andold her that Zail Singh was risking the

Congress Party's reputation for secularism by 'indulging in communalpolities'. Mrs Gandhi, who was lessaverse to religion than her father Pandit

ehru, backed Zail Singh's brand of Sik politics against Darbara Singh'ssecularism. So Zail Singh continued toorganise religious congregations and to





Zail Singh and most other Congresspoliticians, had never been a member ohe Akali Dal. He was bitterly opposedo any compromise with communalism.

He once said to me, 'You can't fight aman with his own weapon.' Although aSikh himself, in an interview givewhile he was Chief Minister, hecandidly stated his opinion that therewas no longer such a thing as Sik

culture: 'There was a Sikh culturebefore. That Sikh culture has noweached the limit. Sikh culture is now

dead . . . Now the Sikh culture has beeconverted into a composite culture. Thats what I am doing.' 2

Not surprisingly, orthodox Sikhs saw

hese remarks as proof of their worst





ines drawn up between Darbara Singh,he head of the Punjab government, and

Zail Singh, the Home Minister in Delhi.Three murders during Mrs Gandhi's

irst year back in office highlighted theensions within her party and brought the

preacher Sant Jarnail SingBhindranwale to the forefront of Punjabpolitics. On 24th April 1980 BabaGurbachan Singh, the Guru of the

irankari sect, was shot dead in hishouse in New Delhi. Ever since theattack on the Nirankari convention iAmritsar, Bhindranwale had kept up hiscampaign against the sect. He had beenfuriated when the Akali Dal

government had allowed the case againsthe Nirankaris who were accused o



killing Sikhs during that attack to beransferred to a court in the neighbouring

state of Haryana, and was even angrier when the Haryana court found them notguilty. The Nirankaris had pleaded thathey would not get justice from a Punjab

court. So it was no surprise thatBhindranwale's name figured in thepolice report on the murder of BabaGurbachan Singh.

When Bhindranwale got wind of thishe took sanctuary in one of the hostels ohe Golden Temple. He stayed there until

Zail Singh told Parliament that the Santhad nothing to do with the murder.Shortly after that statement,Bhindranwale announced that the killer of the Guru of the Nirankaris deserved to



be honoured by the High Priest of theAkal Takht, the most senior priest oSikhism. Bhindranwale also said that hewould weigh the killers in gold if theycame to him. These remarksembarrassed Zail Singh but heoverlooked them because Bhindranwalewas still useful to him in his strugglewith Darbara Singh.

The second murder had more serious

consequences for Bhindranwale. On 9tSeptember 1981 Lala Jagat Narain, theproprietor of a chain of newspaperspublished in the Punjab city of Jullundur,was shot dead. His influential daily, the

unjab Kesari, was bitterly critical oBhindranwale and sided with the

irankaris. In hard-hitting editorials



arain himself had argued thatminorities in the Punjab – that is iPunjab terms mainly Hindus – wereiving in fear of ever getting justice fro

a government and police force who, heclaimed, were siding with Bhindranwaleagainst the Nirankaris in thenvestigations into the attack on the

irankari convention. There is no doubthat Lala Jagat Narain's papers played a

ole in fanning the flames of communalhatred between Hindus and Sikhs. In hiseditorials his theme was often thesupport for Khalistan among Sikhs in thePunjab. He gave the impression that thissupport was far more widespread than itactually was, heightening Hindsuspicions of the Sikh community.



Warning that the Khalistan demand wasno joke, he urged the government to takedrastic action against its supporters.

arain believed that the Anandpur SahibResolution of the Akalis was part of thesame movement. As he once wrote:Sardar Sukhjinder Singh [a Khalistasupporter] has not raised the slogawilly-nilly. He knows very well that theAnandpur Sahib Resolution too is, in a

way, making that very same demand for a separate state for the Sikhs.' Narain'spartisan attitude was typical. In fact thewhole of the Punjab press was dividedon communal lines.

Needless to say, Bhindranwale wasan outspoken critic of Lala Jagat Naraiand once again the police reported that



he had conspired to commit a murder. Inkeeping with his hardline policy oeligious communalism, the Chie

Minister of Punjab, Darbara Singh,decided to arrest Bhindranwale. Thatwas easier said than done.

Four days after the murder of LalaJaga Narain All India Radio announcedhat a warrant for Bhindranwale's arrest

had been issued. When the police

arrived in Chando Kalan, whereBhindranwale had been preaching, theyound he had already fled. Despite theact that the government-controlled radio

had announced that Bhindranwale was awanted man, the police failed to stophim driving some 200 miles back to thesecurity of his own gurudwara.



Chando Kalan is in Haryana. TheChief Minister of that state, Bhajan Lai,was at that time very anxious tongratiate himself with the leaders of the

Congress Party. He had been ChieMinister of a Janata Party governmentwhen Mrs Gandhi returned to power.She dismissed the Janata-run stategovernments but the Haryana ChieMinister saved his political neck by

coolly transferring his and hisgovernment's loyalty to the new party ipower in Delhi, the Congress. He wasegarded with suspicion by Congresseaders. They justifiably thought that a

man who had shown himself to be soickle would let them down if they ever

got into trouble. There was a premiu



on loyalty in the Congress Party at thatime because many politicians, who had

deserted Mrs Gandhi when she was idifficulties and the Janata governmenthad set up a commission of inquiry intohe Emergency, were now trying to

climb on her bandwagon again. Thosewho had stood by Indira Gandhiesented this and did all they could to

keep those Mrs Gandhi did allow back

out of office. So Bhajan Lai never missed any opportunity to obligeministers in the central government. Itherefore seems highly unlikely that he

would have allowed Bhindranwale toescape unless he had instructions frohe central government to do so.

The veteran Indian journalist, Kuldip



ayar, reported that the Home Minister Zail Singh rang Bhajan Lai and told hinot to arrest Bhindranwale. A senior police officer told Satish Jacob that theHaryana Chief Minister went so far as tosend an official car to Chando Kalan todrive Bhindranwale back to his

urudwara. He certainly left in a greathurry because he did not take the vanscarrying the copies of his religious

discourses with him.When the Punjab police eventuallyarrived at Chando Kalan and found thathe Haryana police had allowed

Bhindranwale to flee, they were furious.According to villagers, they deliberatelyset his vans on fire. According to theofficial version: 'The police went to



Chando Kalan to arrest ShBhindranwale in connection with thecase relating to the murder of Lala Jagat

arain but Shri Bhindranwale hadalready left. There was subsequentviolence when some followers of ShriBhindranwale fired upon the policeparty. There was an exchange of fire andncidents of arson occurred.' Thosencidents of arson were to cost the

government dear. Bhindranwale used tohave a secretary with him wherever hepreached whose job was to copy dowevery word he said so that it could beecorded for posterity. It was themmortal words of Bhindranwale whic

went up in flames at Chando Kalan andhe preacher never forgave the



government for that. In fact it was theburning of his sermons, not his arrest,which turned Bhindranwale against hispolitical godfather, Zail Singh, andagainst Mrs Gandhi. He used to refer tohe incident in all his diatribes againsthe government. He would ask his

audiences, 'What would you do isomeone killed your nearest anddearest? They have insulted my Guru by

burning my papers.'When it became public knowledgehat Bhindranwale had fled to theurudwara at Mehta Chowk, it was

surrounded by police and paramilitaryorces. Darbara Singh insisted that

Bhindranwale must be arrested, althoughe central government feared there



would be violence because largenumbers of Sikhs had gathered at the

urudwara to protect him. Three senior police officers were sent to negotiatewith Bhindranwale for his surrender andive days after his escape from the

police at Chando Kalan he did agree togive himself up. He said that he wouldsurrender to the police at one o'clock ihe afternoon on Sunday 20th September.

He told police that he and other Sik eaders would first address a religiouscongregation. The police meeklyaccepted his terms. Before his arrest,herefore, Bhindranwale preached aiery sermon against the Punjab

government which was going to arresthim and then, having worked his



ollowers into a frenzy, he told them noto become violent when the police took

him away. As soon as Bhindranwale hadgone, his supporters opened fire on thepolice and a battle ensued in which ateast eleven people were killed.

The very day Bhindranwale wasarrested the violence began which waso bring down Darbara Singh's

government and lead eventually to the

army action in the Golden Temple.Three Sikhs on motorcycles fired atHindus in a market in Jullundur, killingour people and injuring twelve. The

next day one Hindu was killed andhirteen people injured in a similar ncident in the town of Taran Taran near

Amritsar. Five days later a goods train



was derailed near Amritsar. Two other attempts were made to derail trains byampering with the track. On 29t

September, nine days after Bhindranwale was arrested, Sikhshijacked an Indian Airlines plane toLahore just across the Pakistan border.This indicates that Bhindranwalealready had an effective organisatiobehind him. The most significant

ncident of all was the explosion in theoffice of the Deputy Inspector-Generalof Police in Patiala. The Deputynspector-General was one of the

officers sent to arrest Bhindranwale atChando Kalan. He escaped unhurt in thebomb explosion but Bhindranwale hadstarted his campaign of vengeance



against policemen who took actioagainst him or his supporters – acampaign he pursued with the utmostuthlessness.

During his brief spell in Ferozepur ail Bhindranwale insisted on being

guarded only by Sikhs with flowingbeards. He was always obsessive aboutbeards and even objected to the habitadopted by some Sikhs of rolling their

beards up into a net. The governmentgave in to Bhindranwale although hisdemand had no legal sanction in secular ndia, where men of all religions areecruited by the police and priso

service.On 14th October, less than a month

after the Punjab government had gone to



all that trouble to arrest the turbulentpreacher, Zail Singh told Parliament inDelhi that there was after all noevidence that Bhindranwale wasnvolved in the murder of the newspaper

proprietor, Lala Jagat Narain. Thedecision to release Bhindranwale wasaken by the government. It was not the

verdict of a court. It was argued by somehat Zail Singh decided to release

Bhindranwale in the hope that theviolence his arrest had sparked of would stop. If that was so the HomeMinistry's hopes were to be belied. Theday after his release a senior civilservant who was a Nirankari was firedon in the Punjab government secretariatn Chandigarh and his brother was



killed. That incident was followed byattacks on the police and bombexplosions.

Darbara Singh had a more credibleexplanation for the strangecircumstances surroundingBhindranwale's arrest when I met hiafter Mrs Gandhi had dismissed hisgovernment. Being a wily politician, hewould not mention his rival Zail Sing

by name but there was no doubt whohe was referring to in this conversation.I asked the former Punjab Chie

Minister first who had ordered thearrest. He replied, 'I wanted to arresthim at Chando Kalan.'

'Is it true that the Haryana ChieMinister sent an official car to drive



Bhindranwale from Chando Kalabefore the police could get there?'

'If you know it's true why do you ask me?'

'Why was he released after hisarrest?'

'Don't ask me. You know. Why washe allowed to come back to Delhi withis guns. Why was he not arrested then?'

When Bhindranwale came to Delhi to

celebrate his release he openly floutedhe law. He drove around the capitalwith eighty of his supporters, many ohem sitting on the roofs of their buses

brandishing illegal arms. It was ZailSingh's responsibility to arrest hibecause the Delhi police are controlledby the Home Ministry. During that visit



Bhindranwale and his companions,accompanied by thousands of Sikhsdrummed up by the Delhi GurudwaraManagement Committee, drove in ariumphant procession from aurudwara on the northern outskirts o

he capital to Gurudwara Bangla Sahib,Delhi's main Sikh temple situated justbehind Parliament. The DelhiGurudwara Management Committee was

controlled by the Congress Party. Itspresident, Santokh Singh, had closepersonal links with Mrs Gandhi. TheHome Minister also allowedBhindranwale to go to the Tihar jail tovisit a Sikh politician imprisoned there.

There is therefore considerableevidence to suggest that Bhindranwale's



elease was ordered by the HomeMinister. He certainly still enjoyed ZailSingh's patronage. But a senior Congresspolitician from Punjab told Satish Jacobhat it was Mrs Gandhi herself who

actually ordered the Sant's release. Thiss also confirmed by a member of theamily of the President of the Delhi

Gurudwara Management Committee,Santokh Singh. He told me that Santok

Singh himself went and pleaded witMrs Gandhi for Bhindranwale's release,hreatening that it would not be possibleo keep the Delhi Gurudwara

Management Committee loyal to theCongress if Bhindranwale was not freed.

Bhindranwale's release was theurning-point in his career. He was now









civil servant and planted a bomb in theoffice of a deputy inspector-general opolice. There had been several other bomb explosions and attempts to derailrains, one successful. An airliner had

been hijacked too. Nevertheless ZailSingh, the Home Minister of India, andRajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister's son,both agreed to attend memorialceremonies for Santokh Singh, knowing

ull well that Bhindranwale would behere. Rajiv Gandhi was already beingalked of as the heir apparent to the

ehru/Gandhi dynasty, a position madevacant by his younger brother Sanjay'sdeath in 1980. Sanjay had crashed hisight aircraft when he was stunt-flying

over central Delhi.



At Santokh Singh's memorial serviceZail Singh was even photographed in thecompany of Bhindranwale. However Bhindranwale was not pleased to see theHome Minister. The wound caused byhe burning of his sermons was by nowestering in his mind. While preaching tohe congregation he made an obviouseference to the fact that Zail Singh dyed

his beard, another sin to an orthodo

Sikh. The preacher said: 'In a villageanyone who has his face blackened andsandals hung round his neck and is madeo sit backwards on a donkey is being

punished because he has molestedsomeone's sister or someone's mother. Iam surprised to see here that somepeople have blackened their own faces. I



do not know whose sisters they havemolested.'

Although Bhindranwale had falleout with the Congress, the Congress hadnot yet fallen out with him. In spite oBhindranwale's insulting remarks abouthis dyed beard Zail Singh still thoughthat Bhindranwale might be useful to

him. But a new bidder for the Sant'ssupport had already entered the ring, the

Akali Dal.



6

Mrs Gandhi Attemptsto Negotiate with the

Sikhs

The Akali Dai's decision to adoptBhindranwale was rank politicalopportunism. The party leaders paid a



heavy price for it. After their defeat inhe parliamentary and the state assembly

elections, the Akali Dal reviewed their strategy. Kudip Nayar, who is himself aPunjabi, described the Akali Dai'sindings. 'They [the Akali Dal leaders]

believed their "secular" image during thecoalition with [the] Janata had damagedheir equation with the Sikhs, whohought that their own [Akali Dal]

government did little for them. Theycame to the conclusion that to get abetter image they must woo the Sikhs;hey must rely on the traditional stand o

combining religion with politics.' 1 Noone could be less secular thaBhindranwale and there could be no

more effective way of the Akali Dal



eaders demonstrating to Sikhs that theyhad shed their 'secular image' than byenlisting his support. His movementagainst the Nirankaris which the Akalishad not supported when they were ipower had, by the time the Akalisconducted their policy review,demonstrated that Bhindranwale was aorce to be reckoned with among the

Sikhs. He had also organised a massive

demonstration against tobacco iAmritsar, as part of a campaign to gethe sale of tobacco banned in their holy

city.Although the Gurus banned allnarcotics, for some reason Sikhs are far more obsessed with tobacco than witother narcotics like alcohol and opium.Opium eating is common among the Sik



peasantry. As for alcohol, when India'servent teetotaller Prime Minister,

Morarji Desai, visited Punjab in 1978he Akali Dal Chief Minister, Badal,

announced that in Morarji's honour thePunjab government would introduce aweekly dry day (a day when liquor shops and bars are closed). MorarjiDesai replied tartly, 'You need to.Punjab has the highest per capita

consumption of alcohol in the country.'In order to return, yet again, toagitational politics as the champion oSikh grievances, the Akali Dal leadershad first to define those grievances in theshape of specific demands. They had theAnandpur Sahib Resolution but it waswrapped in too much rhetoric and so



hey presented Mrs Gandhi with a list oorty-five specific demands based on the

Resolution. That list was drawn up iSeptember 1981. It was hurriedlyevised when Bhindranwale was

arrested and another list, this time oonly fifteen demands, was presented toMrs Gandhi in October 1981. Top of theist, demand number one, was the

unconditional release of Sant Jarnail

Singh Bhindranwale. This was the firstbid that the Akali Dal made for Bhindranwale's support. They were wellaware of the sort of man Bhindranwalewas but they did not hesitate to enlisthim on their side.

Mrs Gandhi was worried by theAkali Dai's threat to launch an agitatio



against her government. The Akali Dalhad shown its muscle during theEmergency. It was the only oppositionparty courageous enough to defy theDraconian Maintenance of InternalSecurity Act, which gave the policevirtually unlimited powers to arrest anddetain without trial. In the tradition ohe Gurudwara Reform Movement and

all subsequent Akali Dal agitation, every

day parties of Sikhs would march out ohe Golden Temple complex, shoutingslogans against the government, to bearrested by waiting policemen. The cryRajKarega Khalsa'' – 'The Khalsa shallule' – rang out from the Golden Temple

complex to match the Sikh farmers'slogan ' Tanashahi nahin chalegi –





he possibility of forming a coalitiogovernment with the Congress but theAkalis rejected the proposal.

Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, theman who organised the campaign againsthe Emergency, was now the President

of the Akali Dal. He was therefore incharge of the party organisation andmaster-minded the new movementagainst Mrs Gandhi's government.

Longowal was an unlikely person toead an agitation. Smaller than the other Akali Dal leaders, with a round bellyand a straggly beard, he was soft spokeand modest. He came into politicshrough the religious network. He had

originally been the guardian of aurudwara in the village of Longowal i



Sangrur district, where he had achieveda reputation for piety. This reputationand links with the left-wing of the AkaliDal got him the party ticket for the stateassembly elections in 1969. But until theEmergency he remained a 'hand raiser',which is Indian terminology for lobbyodder. The arrest of the establishedeadership during the Emergency created

a vacuum which Longowal stepped into.

Faced with the prospect of another agitation led by the surprisinglyormidable Longowal, Mrs Gandhi

hurriedly started talks on the Akali Dai'sdemands. The demands were for themost part loosely worded and notproperly thought out. The Akali Dai'sirst list submitted in September



contained forty-five demands. The listwith Bhindranwale's release at the top,which they submitted only one montater, contained only fifteen. They were

divided into two categories, religiousand political.

The religious demands included thegrant of holy city status. to Amritsar, onhe pattern of Hardwar, Benares and

Kuruk-shetra, three historic Hind

pilgrimage towns. The Akali Dal had notdone their homework – no city in Indiahas been given holy city status. TheSikhs also wanted the recitation of theholy scriptures in the Golden Temple tobe broadcast; but they could never decide whether they wanted it broadcastby the government on All India Radio or



whether they wanted their own radiostation. Perhaps the best example of their own confusion was the demand for enaming the 'Flying Mail' from Delhi to

Amritsar the Golden Temple Express. Inspite of its name and a generousallocation of making-up time provided its running schedule, the Flying Mail's

punctuality record was not good. After putting forward this demand, Sik

eaders began to realise that passengersenraged by the train's 'late-running' mightcurse the name of the Hari Mandir. Theyalso realised that non-Sikhs might drink and would certainly smoke in the trainamed after their most sacred shrine,where even the carrying of tobacco isegarded as desecration. The demand for



he Hari Mandir Express was quietlydropped. The old demand for Sikhs to beallowed to carry their symbolic daggerson domestic and international flightsalso came up.

The only religious demand whiccaused serious difficulties was that for a

urudwara act to cover historic Sik emples throughout the country. The act

passed by the British only gave the

SGPC control over gurudwaras iPunjab. Mrs Gandhi was not at all happyabout extending the SGPC's powers anyurther, especially because with those

powers would come even more money.The SGPC's revenue was alreadyeckoned to be over 120 million rupees

a year, the equivalent of 8 million



pounds sterling, and that money wasavailable to finance activities of theAkali Dal.

The Akalis political demands weremore difficult than the religious ones.The three main stumbling blocks werehe Punjab river waters, Chandigarh and,

of course, the demand for greater autonomy.Three years after theAnandpur Sahib Resolution, Mrs Gandhi

had announced an award for sharing thewaters of the Rivers Ravi and Beasbetween Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthastates. When the Akali Dal came topower, they filed a case in the SupremeCourt challenging the centralgovernment's right to make an award.This case stuck in the Supreme Court,



delaying the implementation of theaward. On her return to power MrsGandhi got round that one by orderingher Chief Minister, the luckless DarbaraSingh, to withdraw the Punjabgovernment's case. At the same time itwas announced that work on the canal tocarry the water from Punjab's River Sutlej to Haryana's River Jumna wouldstart. There was no way that Mrs Gandhi

could go back on her basic commitmento provide adequate water supplies for Haryana and for the £400 millioRajasthan canal project which wasunder construction.

The status of Chandigarh remained aproblem because the Akalis would notagree to cede the two tahsils of Abohar



and Fazilka, which had been the quidpro quo for getting Chandigarh under Mrs Gandhi's award. Mrs Gandhinsisted that Punjab should cede the two

prosperous tahsils to satisfy thedemands of Haryana, even though neither of them were contiguous to Punjab andhe majority of the population were

Punjabi not Hindu speakers. If she hadchanged her view on this there would

have been a settlement with the AkaliDal a year before Operation Blue Star.Haryana had a double claim on MrsGandhi. Its stand on Chandigarh wasepresented by a Congress (Indira) state

government, while the Punjab demandwas represented by the opposition AkaliDal. Haryana was also very much a



Hindu majority state and throughout theAkali Dal agitation Mrs Gandhi wasmaking a definite bid for the Hindu vote.

The demand for autonomy was aepetition of the Anandpur Sa lib

demand to limit the central government'sesponsibilities to foreign affairs,

defence, currency and communication.Once again the Akalis were very unwiseo spell out that demand so specifically.

They were never to get anywhere near ts acceptance and Bhindranwale was tomock them for their failure. This demandalso strengthened the hands of Hindcritics of the Akali Dal who had alwaysmaintained that the Anandpur SahibResolution was in effect a demand for andependent Khalistan.



One of the Akali demands which wasdropped in the second list was for thegovernment to stop 'projecting Sikhs ian improper way in films, TV, etc.' Thisappeared to be a reference to the senseof grievance some Sikhs understandablyhad about being the butt of the rest ondia's humour. Jokes portraying the

Sikhs as particularly stupid abound india, and, in fact, are often told by

Sikhs themselves. One story, for nstance, concerns a Sikh minister iehru's Cabinet who flew with his

Prime Minister on an official trip. Thecabin was rather cool so the minister asked Pandit Nehru whether he wouldmind if the pilot turned off the punkhaor fan. Nehru replied testily, 'Which



an?' The Sikh minister pointed out of thewindow to the propeller. In Delhi it isstill very common to call twelve middayardarji, or Sikh time. The theory is thathe temperature inside a Sikh's turba

gets so hot at midday that he goes 'on theboil'. During Bhindranwale's heyday Iwas often asked, 'Why should Indiawelcome Khalistan or Sik ndependence?' The answer was,

Because India and Pakistan need aduffer state between them.' A poor joke,but typical of those about Sikhs.

Mrs Gandhi first met the Akali Daleaders in Parliament House on 16t

October 1981. That was the day after Bhindranwale was released and so theAkali Dal leaders' first demand had



already been met. According to one ohe negotiators, Balwant Singh, theormer Finance Minister in the Akali Dal

government, the Prime Minister was in avery good mood although she did speak sternly about Bhindranwale. The Akalieaders told the Prime Minister that he

was her party's creation, not theirs.Another round of talks with the PrimeMinister followed the next month. The

water issue dominated these two rounds.The talks were broken off temporarilybut the Akali Dal leaders were stilloptimistic. The Prime Minister seemedo be in an understanding frame of mind,

according to Balwant Singh. Then, iDecember, Mrs Gandhi suddenlyannounced another water award without



consulting the Akali Dal. It was anmprovement on the 1976 award in that

Punjab was now to get more water thahe neighbouring state of Haryana. Buthe lion's share of the water was still to

go to the desert state of Rajasthan. It wasat this time that Mrs Gandhi ordered thePunjab Chief Minister to withdraw thecase the Akali Dal had filed in theSupreme Court.

Mrs Gandhi resumed her talks withe Akali Dal leaders in April 1982. Thevenue was again Parliament House. Buthis time Mrs Gandhi was at her mostrosty. According to Balwant Singh, allhe Prime Minister would offer wasunspecified alternative ways of makingup the loss of water'. This was the last



ime the Prime Minister played a directole in negotiations with the Akali Dal.

Kuldip Nayar saw the breakdown ohose talks as a watershed. He wrote,From that day onward the distancebetween the government and the Akalisbegan to increase. And like a Greek ragedy both sides relentlessly slippednto a situation that spelt disaster.' 2

The most obvious explanation for the

change in Mrs Gandhi's attitude is thatpolitics came before statesmanship. Theollowing month elections to the state

assemblies were due in Haryana and ihe Himalayan state of Himachal

Pradesh, which also borders on Punjab.Both states had sizeable populations o

Punjabi-speaking Hindus who would



certainly not have favoured concessionso the party of the Sikhs. Haryana was o

course also involved in the water dispute, and that political contortionist,he Haryana Chief Minister, Bhajan Lai,

had warned Mrs Gandhi that he alreadyhad enough problems on his handsbecause of her new water award, whichad reduced his state's share.

To keep up the pressure, Longowal

announced a movement to prevent thedigging of the canal to link the Sudejwith the Jumna. He did not remind hisollowers that when the Akali go

vernment was in power it had drawn upplans to start work on this canal. But for once Longowal, the master of morchas,or agitations, misjudged the situation.



The 'NaharRoko' , or 'Stop the Canal'agitation, flopped because the Akaliswere not strong in the eastern border oPunjab and the issue did not have theeligious overtones of other Akali Dal

agitations.Meanwhile Bhindranwale's campaig

of violence was continuing and the AkaliDal leaders felt the need to match hisextremism with their own. By the end o

April 1982, just six months after thecampaign of violence associated withe arrest of Bhindranwale started, the

situation was so bad that Parliamentpassed a special resolution expressingdeep anguish and concern' over thesituation in the Punjab. The resolutiosaid: 'The House reiterates that the law



shall take its course to bring the culpritso book speedily.' The tragedy of the

Punjab was that the law did not 'take itscourse' and the culprits were notbrought to book speedily'.

The month in which Parliamentpassed that resolution was the month iwhich Bhindranwale was allowed todrive round Delhi with his supportersbrandishing automatic weapons.

Harkishan Singh Surjeet, a Sikh member of the Upper House of Parliamentbelonging to the Communist PartyMarxist), accused the Congress Party o

actually organising Bhindranwale's visito Delhi. He said in Parliament, 'I wanto tell the House that he [Bhindranwale]

gets protection from both the Akali Dal



and the Congress (Indira). It is a tragedyhat he was in Delhi for ten days last

month. Who invited him? Who organisedhis function? I want to tell you that ipolitical parties for their narrownterests allow these persons to poisohe whole atmosphere, you cannot keep

communal peace in the state.' Whether he Congress Party was involved or not,here is no doubt that the Congress

government's Home Minister, Zail Singh,could have arrested Bhindranwale. TheHome Ministry does claim that a warrantwas issued for Bhindranwale's arrestwhen he went on to Bombay but that heescaped before the police could get him.Mrs Amarjit Kaur, a Congress Member of Parliament from Punjab, has claimed



hat Bhindranwale was tipped off. Shesaid, 'Bhindranwale had planted his owpeople in government offices, in thepolice and in the intelligence agencies.'f that was so, it made it all the more

urgent for the Home Minister to act

swiftly, but he did not.What should by now have beecausing particular concern to thegovernment was a campaign by

Bhindranwale to stir up hatred betweeHindus and Sikhs. In order to inciteHindus, heads and other parts of theanatomy of cows were thrown intoemples – the cow is of course sacred to

Hindus – and the Dal Khalsa claimedesponsibility. One of the most sinister

aspects of Bhindranwale's strategy was



his attempt to cause such communalension that Hindus would leave Punjabn fear. He hoped this would provoke a

Hindu backlash elsewhere which wouldconvince many Sikhs that they wouldonly be safe in Punjab. Around 20 per cent of the Sikh population lived outsidePunjab. Bhindranwale wanted as manyas possible back to weaken thecommunity's links with the rest of India

and to increase the Sikh proportion oPunjab's population. To the great creditof Hindu leaders no lasting threat toSikhs living outside Punjab did developduring Bhindranwale's lifetime.



1 & 2 Two views of the

Golden Temple in



Amritsar. Above, lookingfrom the Akal Takht sidetowards the langar, or dining hall and the hostelcomplexes. Below,showing the parikrama,or pavement, surroundingthe Holy Pool and theclose proximity of the

buildings outside the

complex which added tothe army's problems





3-4 Above, two members of

the Akali Trinity: left,



Gurcharan Singh Tohra,the President of theSGPC; right, HarcharanSingh Longowal, theMorcha Dictator

5 Below, the Akal Takht in

the days beforeOperation Blue Star. The

paved, marble courtyard

in front of the shrine became a 'killing ground'during the army action inthe Temple complex



Although the government made no

move against Bhindranwale himself, hisight-hand man and the son of his Gur



was arrested on 19th July 1982.According to Sanjeev Gaur of the Indian xpress who was posted in Amritsar,he Governor of the Punjab personally

ordered the arrest because Amrik Singhhad insulted him by demanding theelease of some members of the Allndia Sikh Students Federation. Amrik

Singh was President of this Federation.Although nominally an Akali Dal body,

he Federation was by now iBhindranwale's hands. There werealready several charges against Amrik Singh, including attempting to murder a

irankari leader near Amritsar, but byhen in Punjab it needed more than theiling of cases to get the police to arrest

a prominent Bhindranwale supporter.



Bhindranwale was infuriated by thearrest of his lieutenant, but beforechallenging the government he took theprudent step of taking up residence again the hostel complex of the Golde

Temple. He moved into Room Number 47 in the Guru Nanak Rest House. TheGuru Nanak Rest House is one of anumber of offices and hostels which areseparated from the main Temple by a

public road. The Chief Minister oPunjab always maintained that the RestHouse was not part of the GoldeTemple complex and therefore there wasnothing to stop the police entering it.They did not because others in thegovernment in Delhi were opposed to it.There is no record of Bhindranwale ever



eaving the surroundings of the GoldeTemple again until his death.

After securing himself in the Gur anak Rest House, Bhindranwale

announced a morcha or movement todemand the release of Amrik Singh. Buto Bhindranwale's chagrin, the morcha

was not a great success. The responseshowed that Bhindranwale's followingn the villages was not as great as the

press had led him to believe. IBhindranwale's morcha had beeallowed to flop it would have been aatal blow to his prestige. But the Akali

Dal, cynical as ever, had other ideas.They wanted to relaunch their owmorcha which had failed in the east.They believed it would succeed if it was



elaunched in Amritsar where Akalisupport was strong and where, ocourse, there were the required religiousovertones. The way to guaranteesuccess, Longowal thought, would be toake up Bhindranwale's cause too. So o

4th August 1982 in the Golden Templen Amritsar, Longowal announced

a' Dharam YudK or religious war to fightor the implementation of the Anandpur

Sahib Resolution. Bhindranwaleannounced that his morcha for theelease of Amrik Singh was merging

with the Akali morcha.The new Morcha was a great

success. Once again hundreds of Sikhswould gather daily inside the GoldeTemple and listen to sermons about the



eligious duty to fight for the Akalis'demands. Longowal spoke almost everyday, Bhindranwale occasionally. Theathas (groups) wearing saffron (the

colour of martyrdom) bands in their urbans, would then march out of the

Temple and down to the police stations,shouting traditional religious slogansike ' Raj Karega Khalsa !' – 'The Khalsa

shall rule!' Many women, with daggers

slung over their shoulders, used to takepart in these demonstrations too. Thewhole operation was organised byLongowal who was known as 'MorchaDictator'. He made sure that zjatha froone part or the other of Punjab came tohe Golden Temple each day. Within two

months the jails were overflowing and



special prisons had to be established ischools and other government buildings.On one occasion a thousand Akaliprisoners refused to stay in an old fortwhere the government had set up aemporary jail. They said the fort wasnfested with snakes. When other Akalisound it was a case of no room at theail, they made their buses their prisons.

The police did not need to guard the

because the Akalis had no intention oelieving the government of itsembarrassment by escaping.

On 11th September, thirty-four members of a jatha were killed when abus in which they were being taken toail crashed with a train as an unmannedailway crossing near Amritsar.



Bhindranwale and Longowal botalleged that the thirty-four had beedeliberately killed by the police, andhey were declared martyrs. The Sikhsike to mark every historic occasion wit

a gurudwara, and so now they arebuilding a gurudwara at the site of theaccident. They are calling it GurudwaraTakkar Sahib (Gurudwara of theCollision). That accident led to a violent

demonstration in the heart of Delhi itself.On 10th October a vast processiowound its way through the streets oDelhi carrying the ashes of the 'martyrs'.That procession passed off peacefullybut the next day thousands of Sikhs triedo storm Parliament itself to protest toheir MPs about the accident. They set



ire to buses, tore down street lightingand uprooted road signs. Police andparamilitary forces battled with them for several hours, firing tear-gas to dispersehem.

Mrs Gandhi was worried. It lookedas though the Akalis had brought their Morcha to Delhi and if there is one thingwhich always alarms the Indiagovernment, it is the prospect o

prolonged violence and disturbances ihe capital. So it was not surprising that,within days of the riot outsideParliament, Mrs Gandhi ordered theelease of all the Akali demonstrators

and sent a special envoy to Amritsar toe-open negotiations with the Sik eligious party's leaders.



Her envoy was Swaran Singh, whohad earlier served for many years in her Cabinet. He came up with a formulawhich did satisfy the Akali Dal leadersand Mrs Gandhi's Cabinet colleagues.Swaran Singh thought that it hadsatisfied Mrs Gandhi too. But she turnedt down at the last moment. The former

Cabinet Minister was bitterlydisappointed and never became

nvolved in the negotiations again.However, it would not be long beforehe talks were resumed. They wereesumed because the Akali Dal leaders

came up with another highly effectiveway of keeping the pressure on MrsGandhi.



7

The Asian Games andtheir Aftermath

On 6th November, the day that the talkswith Swaran Singh broke down, MorchaDictator Longowal announced that theAkali Dal would demonstrate in Delhi



during the Asian Games due to start iness than three weeks. Mrs Gandhi's

cabinet colleagues and senior officialspanicked because the prestige of RajivGandhi was at stake. The PrimeMinister's eldest son had enteredpolitics following Sanjay's death and itwas already clear that Mrs Gandhiwanted to assure his succession to thedynasty founded by her father. At first

politics and Rajiv did not seem to googether. Politicians and journalistswere saying that Rajiv was 'too nice' tobe an effective politician. He won praiseor what he did not do, becoming know

as 'Mr Clean' in the international press,but there was no praise for what he diddo. Rajiv Gandhi badly needed a



achievement to his name and so MrsGandhi decided that he should take over he management of the Asian Games.

At that stage Rajiv Gandhi appearedo have more of a flair for managementhan politics and the Games became hisirst big test. No effort was spared.

Labourers were brought in from thesurrounding states to build an Olympicvillage, with seven new stadiums and

whole crop of five-star hotels. NewDelhi underwent a facelift. Sevelyovers were built; neem, jamun and

banyan trees were massacred to widehe leafy avenues the city is justlyamous for, and a ring railway was

opened.Much thought was given to the



welfare of the athletes and the spectatorsbut none to the labourers building theacilities for them. They were housed i

shacks without even adequate water supplies. Contractors took a cut of their meagre wages, and did not bother toprovide them with any protectiveclothing. When the labourers from theneighbouring states, who had someknowledge of their rights under India's

elaborate but all too ofteunimplemented labour laws, became toodemanding, contractors went further afield. They scoured the villages ostates as remote as Orissa on the eastcoast and brought in inexperiencedmanpower which they hoped would begnorant of their rights. They did all they



could to keep the capital's hyper-activevoluntary social workers out of thecamps but the Supreme Court orderedhe government to appoint three

ombudsmen to protect the Asian Gamesworkers' rights. The press alsohighlighted the plight of the workers. Aot of hot air was generated, and not

much more. Just before the Gamesstarted one of the most active social

workers, Inder Mohan, wrote: 'Theplight of workers employed in AsianGames construction has to be seen to bebelieved. Alongside imposing buildingsdescribed as visual treats, there arecamps where the workers have beeiving in hovels without any sanitary

arrangements. There is no privacy for



women. Unlike in their villages theyhave to squat beside the men. Childresquat all over the jhuggis [shacks]. Thestench can be felt from a distance.' Inder Mohan thought that the hue and cry abouthese conditions had been worth while:Certain voluntary workers andorganisations have taken it upohemselves to organise the constructio

workers . . . A process of change has

been initiated. It may take some years toachieve substantial results. But they willbecome a force to reckon with.' 1

Rajiv Gandhi and his team hadroubles with architects too. The

badminton and volleyball stadium nearlydid not get its roof because the builders

said the design was faulty. A British



engineer was called in and the stadiueventually got its roof. The swimmingpool was not so lucky. It was convertedrom 'indoor' to 'outdoor' half-wayhrough its construction because the

architects and the builders could notagree whether the structure wouldsupport the roof or not. A section of oneof the flyovers collapsed while it wasbeing built. There was of course trouble

with accountants too. The governmentmaintained that it was only spending 700million rupees, about £46 million, on theAsian Games but independent assessorsmultiplied that figure by ten. It cost230,000 rupees, that is £15,000, just toprovide a special train, staff and foodor thirty-four elephants to travel the



ength of India to take part in the openingextravaganza.

Opposition politicians inevitablycriticised the selection of the Indiaathletes, claiming that it was their politics and not their prowess which hadcounted. It was certainly the politics oCharanjit Singh, a Sikh businessman andCongress Member of Parliament, whiccounted in the award of a prime site i

he middle of New Delhi to build a five-star hotel to house Asian Games guests.That hotel was not completed in time

or the Games but all the most importantacilities were. In spite of all the

difficulties Delhi was ready for the 9tAsiad. Rajiv Gandhi had bulldozed hisway through the Indian bureaucracy and



achieved what by the standards of anycountry was a miracle: starting fronothing he had built all the facilities for he largest ever Asian Games within twoears.

When Longowal dropped hisbombshell there was consternation at thehighest levels of the Indian government.There was widespread resentment in theHindu community too at the threat to

disrupt the greatest sporting spectacleever seen in India. The police wereordered to throw a cordon round Delhio prevent any Akali demonstratorseaching the Asian Games. Most roadso the capital pass through Haryana andhere the Chief Minister, Bhajan Lai,

once again lost no opportunity to



demonstrate his loyalty to Mrs Gandhi.o one was spared the attention of the

Haryana police. The former head of thendian Air Force, Air Chief Marshal

Arjun Singh, was told to prove that hewas not going to demonstrate at theGames. Lieutenant-General Jagjit SingAurora, who took the surrender of thePakistan army after the Bangladesh war,suffered the same indignity. A judge of

he High Court was searched so manyimes that it took him eight hours insteadof four to get from Chandigarh to Delhi.A businessman told me he was made toake off his turban so that police could

search underneath it. Even Mrs Gandhi'sown supporters were not spared.According to Kuldip Nayar, the



Congress Member of Parliament, MrsAmarjit Kaur was in tears in the CentralHall of Parliament when she related toournalists and fellow politicians the

way Bhajan Lai's police had treated her and her husband.

The sealing off of Delhi and thearrest of more than 1,500 Sikhssuspected of intending to demonstrate athe Asian Games was grist to

Bhindranwale's mill. From then onwardshe used to ask those who came to hisdaily darshan or audience: 'You want toknow what are the signs that Sikhs areslaves of the Hindus? The first is thatSikhs were prevented from attending theAsian Games in Delhi.' This was to beby no means the last disastrous





amily's lands and business. The former army captain entered Parliament as amember of Mrs Gandhi's party. He wasan old schoolfriend of Rajiv Gandhi. Itwas Rajiv who suggested thatAmarinder Singh should be involved ihe negotiations.

According to Amarinder Singh,agreement was reached between theAkali Dal leaders and Mrs Gandhi's

eam of negotiators on 18th November 1982 in Delhi. The Akali Dal leaderswanted to fly back to Chandigarh buthey were advised to wait until it was

confirmed that Mrs Gandhi hadapproved the agreement. Unfortunately,according to Amarinder Singh, news ohe agreement leaked out to Bhajan Lai.



He managed to persuade the PrimeMinister that settling the water and theChandigarh disputes without first beingseen to consult his state would bedisastrous. The Chief Minister oRajasthan, the other state affected by thewater dispute, also happened to be iDelhi on that night. He was persuaded tosupport Bhajan Lai's stand and MrsGandhi took their point. For the second

ime that month the Akali Dal leaderswere let down at the last moment.Bhindranwale was delighted because

he did not want a settlement at any cost.He had often said that there was no pointn dealing with that 'Brahmin woman' or Pandit's daughter', as he disparaginglyeferred to Mrs Gandhi. When he was



proved right twice in one month hisauthority and influence waxed while thatof Longowal and the Akali Dal leaderswaned. The failure of the Asian Gamesnegotiations marked the start of the splitbetween Bhindranwale and the AkaliDal leaders, a split which was to lead tohe total isolation of Longowal and his

colleagues, leaving Mrs Gandhi witonly two options – to go into the Golde

Temple to get Bhindranwale or tonegotiate with him. However, thegovernment's immediate problem wassolved. The stick worked even if thecarrot failed and the Asiad passed of peacefully. Rajiv Gandhi had passed hisirst test.

The serious consequences of the





After leaving the army [they] returnedto the Punjab to find how values hadchanged. Their dissatisfactiostemmed from the fact that the retiredservicemen were accorded littlerespect or consideration by the civiladministration. To add fuel to thefire, during the Asiad in 1982, whenall Sikhs travelling to Delhi from the

Punjab were stopped and weresearched regardless of convictions,they felt aggrieved and some of thecame under Sant Bhindranwale'sinfluence. 2

Another retired Sikh General,

Jaswant Singh Bhullar, also pointed to



he Asian Games as a factor whichcontributed to the success of Longowal'sappeal to ex-servicemen. He wrote: 'Thereatment meted out to Sikhs by the

Haryana government during the days ohe Asian Games has badly jolted the

Sikh psyche.'3

Bhullar was to joiBhindranwale, leaving the GoldeTemple just before Operation Blue Star.He has since set up an organisation i

he United States to propagate Sik ndependence.

Among the senior retired officerswho attended Longowal's conventiowas Major-General Shahbeg Singh, ahero of the Bangladesh war who hadbeen dismissed the service on corruptio

charges the day before he was due to



etire and had been nursing a grievanceever since. He was to becomeBhindranwale's military adviser and toplan the defence of the Golden Temple.

arinderjit Singh Nanda, the scholarlyand gentle public relations officer of theSGPC, was present at the convention.He told Satish Jacob that Longowal wassurprised by the turnout of officers andmen. Journalists put the figure at 5,000

but Nanda said it was nearer 30,000.Bhindranwale and Shahbeg Singadvocated an armed uprising against thegovernment to force it to grant Sikhsheir rights. Other retired officers,

however, said that an armed uprisingcould never succeed on the open plainsof Punjab. Nanda suggested that the



Sikhs should combat the governmentwith, in his words, 'the power of thepen', by launching a newspaper. Many ohe senior officers approved of his

suggestion but Bhindranwale shot itdown brutally. 'You literate moron,' hesnarled, 'do you think this governmentwill give you anything unless you snatct from them?'

The government was thoroughly

alarmed when it received intelligenceeports of the convention because manyof the ex-servicemen had sons serving ihe armed forces. As a result, on 24th

January 1983, negotiations with theAkali Dal were hurriedly resumed. Itwas at this stage that Rajiv Gandhibecame a member of the 'Think Tank'



which was to end up virtually runningPunjab. The irony was that there was nota single Sikh in the Think Tank. At thestart of the 1983 negotiations the threemost important members were all civilservants. Two of them came from theopposite end of India to Punjab – thesouth. There was Mrs Gandhi's PrincipalSecretary P.C. Alexander, a Christianrom Kerala at the south-western tip o

ndia. The Cabinet Secretary,Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib, was a Hindrom Andhra Pradesh in the south-east.

The third civil servant was the Secretaryof the Home Ministry, Mr T.N.Chaturvedi. He was a Brahmin froUttar Pradesh. Sikhs are deeplysuspicious of Brahmins, seeing them as



ntellectual enemies of their religion. Hewas replaced in March by M .M. K.Wali, another Brahmin, this time fromKashmir. Longowal and Bhindranwaleboth used to say in public that Wali hadbeen brought in because Mrs Gandhiwas herself a Kashmiri Brahmin.

The opposition parties were alsobrought into this round of talks.Harkishan Singh Surjeet, the Punjabi

Communist Member of Parliament, toldme that much progress was made at thesealks. He alleged that they would have

succeeded if the government had onlyagreed to allow the Punjab to continuedrawing off the amount of river water itwas actually using at that time until aribunal had decided the issue. The



government did in fact agree to that iJuly, but by then it was too late.

The talks involving the oppositioeaders broke off in February and Mrs

Gandhi announced two unilateralawards. She went to the mai

urudwara in New Delhi, Bangla Sahib,which is near Parliament, and announcedhat she had accepted all the Akali DaFseligious demands. The next month she

announced the setting up of a one-macommission to study the constitutionalarrangements between the central andstate governments. Greater powers for he states was of course the mai

political demand of the Akali Dal. Theone man' was a retired Sikh judge of theSupreme Court, R.S. Sarkaria. But these



wo gestures did nothing to helpLongowal. If the concessions hademerged from talks with the government,Longowal could have claimed them as avictory for the Morcha, and this wouldhave strengthened his hand againstBhindranwale, who bitterly criticisedhe Akali Dal leaders for negotiating at

all.The Sikh MP Harkishan Singh Surjeet

maintained that another agreement waseached in the negotiations early in 1983but that Mrs Gandhi reneged on it again.Harkishan Singh Surjeet said to me,Three times in six months an agreementwas reached and three times the PrimeMinister backed out. Each time thenterests of the Hindus of Haryana



weighed more heavily with her than asettlement with the Sikhs.' Although acommunist, Harkishan Singh Surjeet wasone of the most trusted advisers oGurcharan Singh Tohra, the President ohe SGPC and of course one of the Akali

Trinity. Tohra at this stage was stillplaying his own game. He was stillhoping to use the Akali Morcha andBhindranwale to discredit the second

member of the Akali Trinity, the former Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal, andake over himself as head of the political

wing of the Akali Dal, becoming theparty's candidate for the chief-ministership.

The strain these negotiations wereputting on the relations between the third



member of the Akal Trinity, Longowal,and Bhindranwale was becomingncreasingly obvious. Bhindranwale was

bitterly critical of Longowal's tacticsand he despised the non-violence thatLongowal still preached. He used todescribe Longowal's office in theTemple complex disparagingly asGandhi Niwas' or Mahatma Gandhi'shouse. But when pressed Bhindranwale

would never say exactly what it was thathe wanted.It was early in 1983 that I first met

he Sant. He was sitting on a string bedn his small room at the Guru Nanak

hostel surrounded by young men, somearmed with automatic weapons, somewith old-fashioned Lee-Enfield rifles



which are still used by the Indian police,and some with traditional spears. Hisanswers to my questions could at best bedescribed as enigmatic. For instance Iasked the preacher to comment on theallegations that he was responsible for he continuing violence in Punjab. Heeplied, 'It's the government who is

doing all the killing. Isn't it thegovernment which killed those martyrs

n the bus?' The martyrs he was referringo were of course the Akalidemonstrators killed in an accident whea train crashed into their bus at a levelcrossing. Thinking I might tackleBhindran-wale on a more philosophicalevel, I asked him whether he thought

violence in a good cause was justified.



He replied, 'Yes, if to preach Sikhism,and to stop young boys from cutting their hair and shaving, is to believe iviolence.' Then I thought I would get hiwith a specific question and asked, 'Doou or do you not support the demand for

Khalistan, Sikh independence frondia?' The preacher answered, 'I a

neither in favour of it nor against it. Ihey give it to us, we won't reject it.'

Bhindranwale had by now built up aconsiderable organisation aroundhimself. Its leading members were to beseen in the Golden Temple on most days.One of them was Harminder SingSandhu. He was the General Secretaryof the All India Sikh StudentsFederation. One of the few i



Bhindranwale's entourage who spokeEnglish, he used to act as his interpreter.Having studied law he used to injectsome coherence into the ramblinganswers of his leader when interpretinghem. Nevertheless when a young Sik

once questioned Sandhu's interpretatioBhindranwale turned on him and said, 'Ihave implicit faith in him. He canterpret the way he likes. You have no

dea what sacrifices he has made. Hewas hung upside down and he didn't sayanything.' In fact Sandhu's loyalty wassomewhat suspect. He had, asBhindranwale said, been arrested, andortured by the police but his rapidelease was never explained. Towardshe end of Bhindranwale's time reports





n the Golden Temple.One man whose loyalty to

Bhindranwale has never been questionedwas his secretary Rachpal Singh. LikeSandhu he was about thirty years old.Rachpal Singh was a thin-lipped,worried-looking man. He had been amember of Bhindranwale's mission andhad been the scribe of some of thepreacher's sermons which were burnt by

he police when they failed to arrest hiat Chando Kalan. Inside the Temple heused to look after Bhindranwale'scorrespondence and keep a detaileddiary of the Sant's visitors.

Bhindranwale's political adviser athis time was Dalbir Singh, a former ournalist. He was for many years a



member of the Communist Party but hadgradually been drifting back towardsorthodox Sikhism. He had been in theGolden Temple on the day of theprocession which he insisted thatBhindranwale had led against the

irankaris in 1978. He used to say thathe clash that ensued was the turning-

point in his life. From that day onwardhe became a devoted follower o

Santji'. Dalbir Singh used his contactswith the press to promote Bhindranwale.He also used to advise Bhindranwale ohis dealings with die Akali Dal leaders.He was a hawk, strongly opposed tocompromising with Longowal or, ocourse, the government.

The most outstanding of the young



Sikh extremists was Amrik Singh, theson of Bhindranwale's Guru, Kartar Singh, who had appointed Bhindranwaleo succeed him as head of the Damdami

Taksal. Amrik Singh was very quiet, andarely spoke to journalists, but whe

decisions had to be made about whoshould interview Bhindranwale or whoshould be allowed to film his audienceshey were always referred to Amrik

Singh. As President of the All India SikhStudents Federation he was responsibleor organising many of the murders,obberies and attacks on government

property which were almost dailyoccurrences in Punjab. However at thisime, early 1983, he was in jail.

By no means all the young men who



had gathered in the Golden Temple weregenuine supporters of the Sant or evedevout Sikhs. There were many policeand army deserters, smugglers and other criminals enjoying the Sant's protection.There were also some Naxalites, left-wing extremists who believe in atheisticcommunism and violent revolution.Harminder Singh Sandhu once gaveSatish Jacob the names of what he called

he killer squad. They included four deserters from the Punjab police,Amarjit Singh, Sewa Singh, Kabul Singand Gurnam Singh, an escaped convict,Talwinder Singh, and Surinder SinghSodhi.

Sodhi was one of the terrorists whohad joined Bhindranwale out of genuine



conviction, not because he was fleeinghe law. In his late twenties at this time,

Sodhi had been a radio mechanic in theown of Hoshiarpur until Bhindranwale

and Longowal launched their Morcha.He was a fine marksman and wasbelieved to have been responsible for some of the most audacious terroristattacks although he liked to bephotographed reading the Sik

scriptures. Sodhi was also known asBhindranwale's transport minister because he claimed that he could driveanything from a scooter to an aeroplane.

Surinder Singh Gill was another devout Sikh who took part in terroristactions. Aged about twenty-five, he wasonce an agricultural inspector but as a



orthodox Sikh he developed a violenthatred for Nirankaris and left the prizedsecurity of government service to joiBhindranwale, the scourge of thatheretical' sect. He was named as thehead of the Dashmesh Regiment, or egiment of the tenth Guru, whic

claimed responsibility for many of themurders towards the end oBhindranwale's time. Another man who

was inspired by a loathing of theirankaris was Ranjit Singh, who wasn his mid-thirties. He was notorious for

his intolerance and rudeness, and at onestage fell out with Bhindranwale. Singeft the Golden Temple under mysterious

circumstances and was arrested by thepolice in Delhi on the charge o



conspiracy to murder the Guru of theirankaris in 1980. Bhindranwale

accused Longowal and his associates osmuggling Ranjit Singh out of theTemple and surrendering him to Delhi.

All these terrorists were known byname to the shopkeepers and thehouseholders who lived in the narrowalleys surrounding the Golden Temple.They used to join in the conversation at

he tea-stalls and wander in and out oshops. The Punjab police must haveknown who they were also, but theymade no attempt to arrest them. By thisime Bhindranwale and his men were

above the law. It needed sanction fromhe Prime Minister's Think Tank beforehey could be arrested and that sanctio



was not forthcoming. Nirankaris continued to be the mai

argets of the terrorists. With the changen Bhindranwale's attitude to the

Congress Party, ministers and supportersof the government also came under attack. The Chief Minister himself wasattacked, a bomb was thrown into thehouse of the Punjab GovernmentEducation Minister and another into the

house of a Congress Member of thePunjab Assembly. Terrorists alsoattempted to disrupt the celebration ondia's national day in January 1983 i

Amritsar by throwing bombs. The dayafter Republic Day Bhindranwale's meobbed their first bank. It was a branc

of the Syndicate Bank in Amritsar itself.



There was another bank robbery iApril. The police believed theseobberies showed that Bhindranwale

needed money. They suspected that hewanted it to buy arms. Although theviolence was alarming, there was littleevidence yet of the careful selection oargets which was later to totally

demoralise the police and theadministration.

After being discredited by the failureof the negotiations in early 1983Longowal made an attempt to re-establish his control over the agitatiowhich was rapidly moving intoBhindranwale's hands. In April he calledor a' Rasta Roko '; which means literallyblock the roads'. From the point of view



of the Sikhs it was a success. Transportn Punjab was paralysed, and the police

suffered 175 casualties. Twenty-onepeople were killed in the violence. TheSikh response to the Rasta Roko gaveLongowal the courage to challengeBhindranwale openly. He ordered theSant to take an oath of loyalty to him ashe 'Dictator' of the Morcha. Dressed ihe knee-length blue shirt of a nihang o

Sikh warrior, Bhindranwale stood withsupporters of the Morcha who weregoing to court arrest, and swore loyaltyand obedience to Longowal. Thatcommitment did not last long.

Twelve days later a senior policeofficer was murdered in broad daylightust as he was coming out of the Golde



Temple. The whole of India wasoutraged and the short-lived treatybetween Longowal and Bhindranwalewas shattered.



8

Two Brutal Killings – Mrs Gandhi Acts at

Last

On the morning of 23rd April 1983Deputy Inspector-General A.S. Atwal,who was in charge of the police i



Amritsar, was among the worshippershronging the Golden Temple. Like any

other believing Sikh he first walkedound the parikrama, the marble

pavement which surrounds the sacredpool in the middle of the complex. Hestood and prayed before the Akal Takht,he shrine which symbolises theemporal power of God. He then turnedound and joined the queue in front of the

Darshani Deorhi, the ornate archwayover the entrance to the small viaducthat leads to the sanctum sanctorum – the

Hari Mandir itself. He made an offeringand took some prasad, the sweetwheaten porridge which is the sacramentof the Sikhs, and walked along theviaduct. Inside the shrine the 39-year-



old police officer prostrated himselbefore the Guru Granth Sahib, the Sik scriptures, stood up and then movedback from the rails so that he couldisten to the granthis, or priests,

chanting hymns to the accompaniment oa harmonium. After a few minutes Atwaleft the Hari Mandir and, holding therasad in a leaf so that he could offer it

o his family, the Deputy Inspector-

General walked towards the main gate.As he was climbing up the marble stepsunder the ornate clock tower, shots rangout and Atwal collapsed dead. Hispolice bodyguards, who were waitingor him outside, fled. The police post

about a hundred vards away did noteturn fire. Deputy Inspector-General



Atwal's body, riddled with bullets, layn the main entrance to the Sikhs' most

sacred shrine for more than two hoursbefore the District Commissioner couldpersuade the Temple authorities to handt over.

The Punjab Chief Minister, DarbaraSingh, told me later that Atwal had beenwarned not to enter the Golden Temple.The government had apparently received

nformation that he was a marked mabecause he had set a trap in which one oBhindranwale's key men was killed andhree others injured. The officer i

charge of the CID in Amritsar later toldSatish Jacob about that trap. He said thatAtwal, who was an unusually active andndependent-minded policeman, had





n the jeep, Hardev Singh, was killed.The driver of the jeep, Gursant Singh,was injured but he managed to get back o the sanctuary of the Golden Temple

with the body of Hardev Singh. ThereGursant Singh told the press a differentversion of the incident. He said therewas a lorry standing in the middle of theManawala bridge looking as though ithad broken down. When he slowed

down to pass it the police who wereying in wait opened fire. They managedo escape but later had to abandon their eep. Gursant Singh would not say howhey managed to get back to the Temple

with the body of Hardev Singh. Morehan twenty-four hours after the incidenthe Temple authorities rang the District



Commissioner and asked him to come tocollect the body from the Temple.Bhindran-wale issued a statementaccusing the police of the cold-bloodedmurder of one of his followers.

According to the CID officer,Bhindranwale became suspicious oAtwal's agent after the incident. Hewaited for some time and then torturedand killed him. The police found his

mutilated body outside the Guru Nanak Rest House which was Bhindranwale'sheadquarters. The CID officer suspectshat the agent might have revealed the

channel he used to communicate witAtwal and that Bhindranwale might haveused that channel to lure Atwal into theTemple. So it could be that the Deputy





worsening an already intensely troubledsituation.' It pointed out that the policehad already entered the hostel complewhen Mrs Gandhi's father was in power.The paper also made the very validpoint that the hostel where Bhindranwalehad his headquarters was quite separaterom the walled complex which housedhe actual shrines - the Hari Mandir andhe Akal Takht. One of the strangest

aspects of the government's handling ohis stage of the Punjab crisis was thatts information machinery made no efforto bring this point home to the Sikhs. The

Times of India ended its editorial bysaying, 'All this places an awesomeburden on the authorities in both NewDelhi and Chandigarh, for the laws o



he land cannot be allowed to be floutedso flagrantly under cover of religion andnatural respect for places of worship.'

According to the Chief Minister oPunjab, his government was anxious toake up that burden but the authorities i

Delhi were not. Darbara Singh told me,I consistently told the centralgovernment that the Guru Nanak NiwasRest House] was not part of the Temple

complex, that the police should be sentn There, but they told me they wereafraid of inflaming Sikh sentiments.'Darbara Singh's old rival Zail Singh hadby now been elected President of India,hat is to say the constitutional head o

state, and so he was no longer directlynvolved in the government. Still there is



no doubt that Mrs Gandhi continued toconsult him on Punjab.

The central government made adisastrous mistake by not entering theGuru Nanak Niwas and arrestingBhindranwale after the murder of Deputynspector-General of Police Atwal. Inhe national outcry that followed, veryew Sikhs, except those already

committed to Bhindranwale, would have

aised any objections. In fact manySikhs, especially those living outsidePunjab, would have welcomed it. Sikhsiving in the capital, Delhi, and other

pans of India were beginning to suffer rom the fact that Hindus were nowdentifying all those who wore Sik urbans and beards as followers o



Bhindranwale.Longowal and the Akali Dal Trinity

must also bear their share of the blameor the failure to arrest Bhindranwale. If,nstead of appealing to Sikhs the world

over to resist the entry of the police intohe Golden Temple, Longowal had toldhe government that he did not regard the

Guru Nanak Niwas as sacred, thegovernment would have had no reason to

ear Sikhs reaction to the arrest oBhindranwale. But Longowal got nosupport from Gurcharan Singh Tohra, themember of the Akali Dal Trinity whoheaded the SGPC which controlled thecomplex. According to Tohra'sconfidant, Harkishan Singh Surjeet, theSGPC President feared that the other



wo members of the Akali Dal Trinitywere getting together to oust him, and sohe still needed Bhindranwale as an ally.Secret negotiations with the governmentwere going on at that time with a view toesolving the Punjab crisis by forming a

Akali Dal/Congress coalitiogovernment with Badal as ChieMinister. That would have been the endof Tohra's ambitions. So he arranged a

meeting between Longowal andBhindranwale in his office in the Templecomplex to scupper the plan for acoalition government. Longowal fell intohis trap and the coalition plan wasdropped. Once that was achievedBhindranwale dropped Longowal too.

After that meeting the Sant's close



associate Amrik Singh, by now releasedrom jail (by mistake, according to the

government), called a meeting of the Allndia Sikh Students Federation. Although

Amrik Singh was the FederatioPresident and Bhindranwale'snterpreter, Harminder Singh Sandhu, its

General Secretary, the Federation wasnominally still an associate body of theAkali Dal. Nevertheless Longowal, the

Akali Dal President, was publiclyhumiliated at the meeting. The journalistTavleen Singh was there. She said,Bhindranwale, dressed in spotlesswhite and carrying a huge sword in ascabbard decorated with gold thread,was the star. Longowal was on theplatform but to Bhindranwale went the



honour of speaking last. The governmentwas attacked, Hindus were attacked, andMahatma Gandhi, the father of thenation, was mocked.' 1 According toTavleen Singh, one of the songs playedover the loudspeakers ran: 'Our bapu

father] (Guru Gobind Singh) had armsand fine arrows and their [the Hindus']bapu [father] had an old man's stick.'Longowal, sensing the mood of the

meeting, felt he had to say, 'It is to rulehat we are fighting and it will be a Rajrule] of the kind that Guru Nanak

dreamed of.' He also said, 'Sikhs"arenvolved in a fight for their owreedom.'

Although Longowal meekly towed the

Bhindranwale line at that meeting, it did



him little good. Bhindranwale was nowhe hero of the Sikh youth and Longowal

was in danger of becoming his prisoner.However he took no initiative to preventhis happening. From then on Longowalarely emerged from his room in the

block next to the Guru Nanak Niwas. Heplotted with Badal and with Tohra buthe lacked the courage to take the onestep which could have saved the

situation – to co-operate with thegovernment. In the end it was the Indiaarmy which rescued Longowal from hiscaptivity only to make him a prisoner oMrs Gandhi.

The row between Bhindranwale andLongowal was causing increasingension inside the Temple complex



where they both spent all their time. Thisension was soon to erupt into ope

violence and to lead to Bhindranwaleseeking sanctuary in the Akal Takht. For he present the mounting temperaturenside the Temple complex wasegistered by dead bodies found in the

drains outside. The SGPC's Secretary,Bhan Singh, told Satish Jacob that ateast five bodies were found in the

sewers in August and September 1983.When Satish Jacob asked him how theyhad died, he replied, 'Don't ask me. Youknow.' A police officer told SatishJacob that the post-mortem reportsndicated that the men had been tortured

before they were killed. Although thebodies were prima-facie evidence o



cases of murder, the police themselvesadmitted that they made no effort tonvestigate the deaths.

Bhindranwale was strengthening hisgrip over the rest of the Punjab too. Themurder of Atwal and the failure of thegovernment to do anything about itspread panic throughout the state.nevitably the public felt that if the

government was so weak it could not

ake action against the murderers of apolice officer as senior as Atwal, itcertainly would not be able to doanything to protect them. This was theime when stories of Bhindranwale's hit-ist started circulating. It was a list o

police officers, officials, Hindus andeven Sikhs against whom Bhindranwale



had a grievance. Much of the legendwhich grew up around the hit-list wasexaggerated. Each name was said to bewritten on a separate piece of paper andput in a clay pot kept in Bhindranwale'soom. Whenever anyone came to

Bhindranwale and asked if he couldserve the cause, Bhindranwale was saido have asked him to pull a piece o

paper out of the pot and read what was

written on it. The potential recruit wouldhen read out the name and address ohe paper and Bhindranwale would tell

him to go and eliminate that person. Thisseems to be a myth. Neither I, nor SatisJacob, nor anyone we have talked to,ever saw that pot: but the hit-list didexist. Tavleen Singh, was one of the





ater, she realised that she had witnessedhe signing of his death warrant.

There was also the much publicisedcase of Deputy Superintendent of PoliceBachan Singh. The All India SikhStudents Federation's President, Amrik Singh, claimed that Bachan Singh hadortured him while he was under arrest.

Bhindranwale let it be known that thepolice officer would have to pay for that

with his life. He did, and so did thewhole of his family. Bhindranwale andhis men also used to send threateningetters to their enemies – for example

newspaper editors and journalists whospoke out against him, men such asKhushwant Singh, the Sikh historian andcolumnist, and Prem Bhatia, the editor o



he Tribune, the leading Englisanguage daily of Punjab and Haryana.

Bhatia received so many threats to hisife that the police had to camp outside

his house in Chandigarh. After the killingof Lala Jagat Narain, one oBhindranwale's first revenge killings, noournalist could afford to take chances.

Bhindranwale himself often said that hesaw nothing wrong in killing an enemy

of the Sikh 'Panth' (community) and, likeevery religious fanatic, he saw all hisenemies as enemies of the faith.

As the legend of the hit-list grew sodid Bhindranwale's influence among thepeople of Punjab. They came to him tosolve their problems instead of going tohe courts or to the administration. Satis



Jacob once watched a middle-agedwoman and her grown-up son pleadingheir case before Bhindranwale. The

woman said that her husband haddeserted her and was refusing to supporther. She asked Bhindranwale to 'finish'him.

Bhindranwale replied, 'I only finishose who are enemies of the Sikh faitike policemen, government officials and

Hindus.'The son then asked, 'Can you give mea weapon so that I can go and do theob?'

Bhindranwale retorted, 'No. Go andbuy a gun yourself.'

'Will I be able to come back here for sanctuary if I do the job?'



'No, we only give sanctuary to thosewho come back after doing a job in thename of the movement. If you go andeliminate a policeman who has harassedmy people or a government official whos against us, then I will not only giveou sanctuary, I will welcome you with

garlands.'Eventually the Sant took pity on the

oung man and his mother. He asked the

name of the father's village and said, 'Allight. I will tell the thanedar [officer icharge of the police station] to break our father's legs.'

When Satish Jacob inquired oBhindranwale's interpreter how he coulddo that, the interpreter replied, 'No onecan refuse Santji's orders.'



The rich also used to come toBhindranwale for favours but they had topay. A Golden Temple priest told SatishJacob of a wealthy Sikh landlord whowanted to evict the tenant of one of hiswarehouses. Bhindranwale asked theandlord how much it would be worth to

him to get the warehouse vacated. Heeplied about one million rupees.

Bhindranwale told him to put 10,000

upees at his feet. The next day the tenantwas summoned to Bhindranwale'sdarshan or audience and ordered toclear out of the warehouse, and he did.Jagjit Singh Bawa, a Sikh propertydealer, said that Bhindranwale used toextort money by threats from his owcommunity too. Bawa once received a



etter demanding 20,000 rupees. He paidup at once. Small traders were alsoharassed, according to Bawa. YoungSikhs would, for instance, go up to clotdealers and say, 'Santji needs two balesof cloth.' They would then walk off withe cloth of their choice.

The personnel around Bhindranwalechanged as his operations spread. Themost obvious change was the return o

Amrik Singh. After his release it soonbecame clear to anyone who visitedBhindranwale that Amrik Singh wasnumber two in the hierarchy. GeneralShahbeg Singh, who was to play such acrucial role in the fortification of theTemple, was also seen inBhindranwale's company now. People



iving in the bazaars surrounding theTemple said that they used to hear shotsrom inside the Temple complex, and

had been told that some of the ex-servicemen were giving weapon trainingo young Sikhs. In June 1983 the

government also received reports thatSikhs were being trained to use firearmsn camps in Kashmir. The Chief Minister

of Kashmir, however, maintained that

he camps were merely religiousgatherings where young Sikhs brushedup their faith, not their weapon training.The Sikhs, with their martial tradition,are a violent community at the best oimes. 'Khun ka badla khun ,' or 'An eyeor an eye and a tooth for a tooth,' is theaw of the Punjab. So handling guns



came naturally to the Sant's young men.Another new face seen in the Gur

anak Niwas during the latter half o1983 was Gurtej Singh. He had been amember of the Indian AdministrativeService, the elite body which replacedhe Indian Civil Service or ICS of the

British. Gurtej Singh had left the serviceafter ten years because of his extremeviews on Sikh nationalism. Educated

and sophisticated, the former bureaucratwas a sharp contrast to the rusticeligious fanatics, deserters and

criminals surrounding Bhindranwale. Hehad invaluable links with theadministration and understood how thegovernment worked. Tavleen Singhbelieves that Gurtej Singh became one o



Bhindranwale's 'ideologues'.After the anti-Hindu slogans,

speeches and songs at the students'meeting in the Golden Temple,Bhindranwale concentrated his attentioon that community. He had to haveenemies to maintain the fervour of hisollowers and the Hindus were the

obvious candidates. Journalists andpoliticians who tried to prevent relations

between the two communitiesdeteriorating by writing and speakingabout the close links between Hindusand Sikhs, achieved the very opposite.Bhindranwale told his followers, 'Theseutterances show that Hindus want toundermine our nation and our faith.'There had been earlier incidents o



sacrilege by placing heads and other parts of the anatomy of cows in Hindemples, but in September 1983 a series

of far more savage outrages against theHindu community began. The first took place in Jagraon, near the industrial cityof Ludhiana, on 28th September wheoung Sikhs fired indiscriminately at

Hindus out for their morning walks. Aweek later came the attack which forced

Mrs Gandhi to act. On the night of 5tOctober Sikhs hijacked a bus iKapurthala district, separated the Hindpassengers from the Sikhs, and shot theHindus. Six Hindus died and one wasseriously injured. The bus was travellingrom Amritsar to Delhi 011 the Grand

Trunk Road, India's National Highway



umber One.The next day Mrs Gandhi suspended

he government of Darbara Singh andmposed President's Rule, or central

government rule, in Punjab. It was adifficult decision to take because itmeant admitting that her own party hadailed to rule Punjab. In 1980 Mrs

Gandhi had fought her way back topower with the slogan, 'Elect a

government that works.' In Punjab it wasnow clear that her government had notworked.

The Chief Minister, Darbara Singh,hought, with considerable justification,hat it was an unfair verdict on him. I met

him shordy after President's Rule hadbeen declared. He was still living in the



Punjab Chief Minister's house iChandigarh and was unwell. He had aslight impediment in his speech and onehalf of his face was bandaged. Theormer Chief Minister refused to speak

on the record, but he made it clear thathe blamed the faction in the centralgovernment loyal to Zail Singh for hisdownfall. A senior colleague of DarbaraSingh went so far as to claim that

President Zail Singh was still in dailycontact with Bhindranwale. There is nodoubt that Darbara Singh had wanted toake action against Bhindranwale, andhat it was the central government whic

had refused to allow him to send thepolice into the Temple Rest Housewhich the Sant had made his







men and demoralised the force. Theother problem was, of course, thatDarbara Singh's police were notallowed to tackle the problem at itsoots – the Guru Nanak Niwas.



9

President's Rule Fails

Within hours of the announcement thathe central government would now

govern Punjab, Mrs Gandhi had theparamilitary police marching through thestreets of Amritsar in a show of force.

She also promulgated a new ordinance



declaring parts of Punjab 'disturbedareas', giving the police almost totalreedom from the courts in those areas.

They could shoot who they wanted whehey wanted and search where they

wanted. Mrs Gandhi's government alsomade it clear that the police did have thepower to enter places of worship. Four senior civil servants were sent to run thePunjab government. Mrs Gandhi chose

B.D. Pande, one of the most experiencedetired civil servants, to head theadministration as Governor. During hisdistinguished career he had held manysenior appointments including the topob of all, that of Cabinet Secretary.

Pande was a man renowned for hisefficiency and incorruptibility, a man



with no political ambitions.Mrs Gandhi wanted to show India

hat she had not lost the will to act. Indiawas impressed but Bhindranwale wasnot. Two days after the imposition oPresident's Rule an assistantsuperintendent of jails was beaten up byBhindranwale's young men inside theGolden Temple; a Sikh who was aknown opponent of Bhindranwale was

shot dead near the industrial city oJullundur; elsewhere another man wasshot and injured; and, in a fourtncident, a Hindu's shop was looted.

Two weeks after President's Rulestarted, the Calcutta to Kashmir Expresswas derailed while passing througPunjab: nineteen people were killed and



129 injured. The next montBhindranwale openly defied Mrs Gandhiby repeating the incident which had ledher to impose President's Rule. On 18t

ovember 1983 another bus washijacked and four Hindu passengerswere shot in cold blood.

By this time Mrs Gandhi hadappointed her trusted lieutenant P.S.Bhinder to head the police in Punjab.

Blunder's wife was a Congress (Indira)Member of Parliament. Bhinder himself,hroughout his long and controversial

police career, had never wavered in hisoyalty to Mrs Gandhi – a quality whiche Prime Minister valued above all

others. However what was needed iPunjab was efficiency and independence



of mind, and Bhinder had not showhose qualities while in charge of the

Delhi police.Shortly after the imposition o

President's Rule I met Bhinder in thePunjab capital of Chandigarh. As part oMrs Gandhi's drive to restoreconfidence in her government, the presshad been fed reports about the policecombing' the Punjab countryside for

errorists. There were almost dailyeports of arrests. Bhinder told me thaten people he described asBhindranwale's do or die men' had beeshot by the police and that more tha1,600 people had been arrested. I askedBhinder where I should go to see thepolice in action. He suggested the area



surrounding Bhindranwale's own villageof Rode. But when I reachedBhindranwale's village, I was told byhis brother that no one had so much asseen the police. In the neighbouringvillages I was told that most of thepeople arrested were known to thepolice as' das namberi' , that is pettycriminals such as thieves and opiusmugglers, who are always brought i

or questioning whenever the policenvestigate a crime. It appeared thatBlunder's 'combing' was not quite aseffective as he had made out to the press.A senior official of the Punjabgovernment admitted as much to me. Hesaid, 'We must appear to be doingsomething. But the trouble is that the



Punjab police are demoralised. So manyof their colleagues have been killed byBhindranwale's men that they have noaith in our ability to protect them.' Whe

asked about the paramilitary policewho had been moved into the state tostiffen the backbone of the Punjabpolice, he replied, 'What can theparamilitary police do on their own?They do not know the state and have to

ely on the local knowledge of thePunjab police.' This was the first timehat I came across evidence of a conflict

within the police force which was tohave disastrous consequences. Theparamilitary police never believed thathe Punjab police were serious about

stamping out terrorism. In fact many



paramilitary police officers believed thePunjab police were on Bhindranwale'sside. As the months went by evidencegrew to suggest that they were right.

Bhinder later admitted to me that hisorce was demoralised by

Bhindranwale's successes in killingpolicemen who had taken action againsthis men, especially those involved iChief Minister Darbara Singh's

encounters. However he maintained thathe was taking steps to restore the moraleof his force. These steps were soneffective that, within two months of themposition of President's Rule, even Mrs

Gandhi's own members of Parliamentwere complaining about thegovernment's 'weak-kneed' policy i



Punjab. During a debate in Parliament,members on both sides of the Housedemanded the arrest of Bhindranwale.The Home Minister confirmed that thepolice had registered cases againstBhindranwale but he gave no assuranceshat the preacher would be arrested.

Once again Bhindranwale reacted tohe threat of arrest by seeking sanctuary.

He told Tohra that, after the debate in

Parliament, the government would not beable to withstand the political pressureo enter the hostel complex and arrest

him. He managed to persuade the SGPCPresident that the only safe place wouldbe the Akal Takht itself. The shrine,epresenting the temporal power of God,

stands within the walls of the Temple



complex, opposite the Golden Templetself. The last thing Tohra wanted wasor Bhindranwale to be arrested; so he

agreed to allow him to set up hisheadquarters in the Akal Takht. But theHigh Priest of the Shrine, Giani KirpalSingh, objected. He pointed out that noGuru or later Sikh religious leader hadever been allowed to live in the AkalTakht. The High Priest also said that

Bhindranwale would be committingsacrilege because he would be livingabove the Guru Granth Sahib. No Sikh isallowed to stand above the holy book.Throughout the day granthis, or priests,ecite the Guru Granth Sahib in the mai

hall of the Akal Takht and at night themost sacred copy of the holy book, the



one which is read in the Golden Templetself, is laid to rest in a room in the

shrine, below where Bhindranwalewanted to live. The Sant's needs wereoo pressing to allow such theological

niceties to stand in his way. Matterswere, in any case, taken out of the handsof the High Priest by an outbreak of civilwar in the hostel complex.

Longowal, who was still living i

another building of the hostel complex,had decided that he needed a privatearmy to defend himself froBhindranwale. He called in men frohe Babbar Khalsa, one of the many

splinter groups spawned by themovement against the Nirankaris. Theywere quite as violent in their hatred o



hose 'heretics' as Bhindranwale. Theyook their name from the Babbar Akalis,he group of terrorists who rejected the

Akali Dai's non-violent policy during theGurudwara Reform Movement in the1920s and killed many police informersand others they regarded as dalals, oouts of the British. Many of them were

arrested by the British and sentenced todeath or to long terms of imprisonment.

The leader of the new Babbar Khalsawas Jathedar Sukhdev Singh. Heclaimed that his group had killed forty-ive Nirankaris. Sukhdev Singh was,

however, strongly opposed to the murder of Hindus and to the violenceBhindranwale unleashed in Punjab. Iact he often described Bhindranwale as



a coward. He remained inside the hostelcomplex guarding Longowal, butmanaged to escape to Britain after thearmy action.

During the days that Tohra wasnegotiating with the High Priests for Bhindranwale's move into the AkalTakht, the Babbar Khalsa decided tochallenge their enemy openly. Theymarched into the Guru Nanak Niwas,

where Bhindranwale was based, andordered his men to get out. According toBhindranwale's men, they moved outvoluntarily in order to avoid a fight.According to the Babbar Khalsa, theyled. Where else could the Sant go now

except the Akal Takht ? So Tohraargued, and his argument was accepted.



Bhindranwale claimed that he had tomove into the Akal Takht because theMorcha Dictator was negotiating withe government for his arrest.

From the day that the preacher set uphis headquarters in the Akal Takht therewas open warfare betweeBhindranwale and Longowal.Unfortunately, however, Longowal didnot have the courage or good sense to

call in the government on his side. Buthe fault did not he entirely with him.Tohra who, as President of the SGPC,was technically responsible for theTemple complex, refused to lend hissupport to Longowal which meant that hecould not guarantee the full support ohe Akali Dal for action against



Bhindranwale. Tohra still had his eye onhat chief-ministership which for hi

was the ultimate objective of theMorcha.

The only entrance to the third-floor oom Bhindranwale now made his

headquarters was a narrow staircasebuilt into the wall. Armed men guardedhis entrance day and night. The rootself was dark and low-ceilinged. The

Sant used to sit on a mattress in onecorner with his legs stretched out in frontof him, surrounded by his followers.During the day he usually moved to theoof of the building which housed the

Golden Temple's 'Langar', or dining hall,where every day a free lunch was servedo all-comers, Sikh or non-Sikh. No one



was excitded, demonstrating the Gurus'eaching that all men are equal, no matter

what their caste or religion.Bhindranwale used to hold court

sitting on the roof of the Langar. Onceagain he was surrounded by his armedsupporters who lounged around in ahoroughly unprofessional manner.

Perhaps they were unprofessional or perhaps they did not fear an attack on the

Sant, although he would have been asitting target for a marksman firing froone of the many buildings surroundinghe Langar. At his morning darbars, o

congregations, on the roof of the Langar,Bhindranwale used to preach hatredagainst India and against Hindus. By thisime his doctrine of hate was also



spreading throughout the villages oPunjab by means of tapes thatBhindranwale's followers circulated.The tapes were openly on sale in theshops of the Golden Temple too. Thepolice never attempted to prevent theirsale.

A tape recording of one oBhindranwale's sermons which waswidely circulated started with a

allegation against the police: 'The policegot hold of Jagdip Singh, son of TharaSingh, made a cut in his thigh and filledt with salt.'

Bhindranwale then moved into hisavourite theme, the slavery of the Sikhs.I shall tell you how we are slaves in our own country. If a Hindu dies there is an



nquiry. If a Sikh dies there is no inquiry.f a Hindu dies the body is handed back o his kith and kin, but if a Sikh dies the

body is not given back to his people. If aHindu is killed it is not excusable but ia Sikh is killed the inquiry is scuttled.'

This was an indirect reference to theoutcry over the killing of Hindu buspassengers.

The preacher attacked Mrs Gandhi,

calling her disparagingly, 'the Brahmin'sdaughter'. He compared the PrimeMinister's attitude to two young men,who had hijacked an airliner at the timeshe was arrested by the Janatagovernment, with her attitude to theSikhs who hijacked an airliner wheBhindranwale was arrested.



He said, 'If the hijacking for theBrahmin's daughter can be done, why nothijacking for the Sikhs' sentiments, for he Sikhs' symbols, for the Sikh beard,or the Harmandir Sahib.'

Not surprisingly the sermon was fullof references to the beard,Bhindranwale's favourite symbol of hisaith.

The Sant asked members of the

congregation to raise their hands if theywanted the Anandpur Sahib Resolutionmplemented in full. After the

congregation had raised their hands,Bhindranwale said: 'You need not sayanything more. I am satisfied with your hand-raising only.'

He then went on to encourage all the



oung men to go to the sacred town oAnandpur Sahib, where the tenth Gur nstituted the Khalsa, and to take an oato implement the Resolution.

Bhindranwale was cutting the groundrom underneath the feet of Longowal,

who wanted a negotiated settlement withe government which would inevitably

have fallen short of the Anandpur SahibResolution.

He warned the congregation not to bemisled by what he called 'sustainedpropaganda' by the newspapers againsthe Sikh Morcha [agitation] and against

him in particular. He said, 'I plead withou to beware of attempts to malign myaksal [school]. They [the newspapers]

are bent upon turning the Sikh community



against me.'



6 Above left, Amrik Singh, thePresident of the All IndiaSikh Students Federationand Bhindranwale's right-hand man

7 Above right, Major General

Shahbeg Singh, who master-minded the fortification of the Akal Takht

8 Below, Sant Jarnail SinghBhindranwale with hisdisciples





9 Above left, Sant Jarnail

Singh Bhindranwale



speaking in Delhi at thememorial ceremonies for Santokh Singh, themurdered Sikh politician

10 Above right, Rajiv Gandhiwas present at one of the

ceremonies11 Below, Zail Singh ( second from right) is pictured withBhindranwale (far left) at

another of Santokh Singh'smemorial ceremonies



The Sant also accused the

government of spreading propaganda

against him. He said, 'The government is



rying to paint me as the agent of theCongress Party – a traitor to the cause -o divide the Panth [Sikh community]

and weaken the Morcha, so that thegovernment's chair is left intact.' 'Chair'n India is frequently used as a symbolor political power.

The Sant ended this section of hissermon by saying, 'Beware of their propaganda. They want us to fight among

ourselves like shrews. Beware!'This was actually a reference toBhindranwale's enemies among theSikhs who tried to discredit him byeminding their community that he was

originally a creation of the CongressParty.

Bhindranwale distanced himself fro



Longowal and the political leaders ohe Akali Dal by disowning all political

ambition himself. I have sworn it at the Akal Takht andI repeat the same at your request. Ishall never agree to become thePresident of the Akali Dal, or theHead of the SGPC, or a Minister, or a Member of the Assembly. I swear

that I am prepared to receive any punishment from the congregation if Ilie. I am only responsible for thecause of Sikhism, preaching thesymbols of the faith. Myresponsibility is to see that your

beards remain intact, your hair isuncut, and that you do not go after the



evil things in life, like alcohol anddrugs. Indians, disgusted by the blatant

misuse of office for personal profit by somany of their politicians, have a specialespect for someone who forswears

ambition. Mahatma Gandhi did, and sodid Jayaprakash Narayan, or J.P., whoed the movement against Mrs Gandhi

before the Emergency.Bhindranwale then returned to theheme of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

Reminding the congregation thatLongowal had also sworn to acceptnothing less than the fulfilment of all itsdemands, he warned: 'If any of our eaders accepts anything less than all the



Anandpur Sahib demands, I will exposehim in front of the sangatcongregation].'

Bhindranwale went on to appeal toSikh villagers to organise and supporterrorism. He said, 'For every villageou should keep one motorcycle, threeoung baptised Sikhs and threeevolvers. These are not meant for

killing innocent people. For a Sikh to

have arms and kill an innocent person isa serious sin. But, Khalsaji [members ohe Khalsa], to have arms and not to getour legitimate rights is an even bigger

sin. It is for you to decide how to usehese arms. If you want to remove the

shackles of your slavery you must have aplan.'



Bhindranwale also pleaded, 'I onceagain, with my hands folded at your feet,appeal to you – if you have not enteredhe Anandpur Sahib House, if you do not

have the five 'k's (symbols of Sikhism),f you are not armed with a rifle and a

spear, you will be given the beating oour lives by the Hindus.'

The sermon ended with thecongregation shouting, ' Wahe Guruji ka

halsa, Wahe Guruji ki Fateh ' – 'TheKhalsa belongs to the Lord – all victorys HIS!'

Bhindranwale's open support for violence eventually led to a protest froLongowal, who was, after all, stillmeant to be leading a non-violentagitation. He issued a statement to the



press criticising Bhindranwale's call toarm young motorcyclists. But the nextday one of the national news agenciescarried a denial of Longowal'sstatement. In order to clarify the situatio

asked Sanjeev Gaur, an Amritsar-based journalist, to go to the MorchaDictator and ask him outright what hehad said. Longowal wavered, buteventually he did agree that he had

criticised Bhindranwale for encouragingSikhs to support terrorism. One oBhindranwale's spies in the Akali Dalcamp immediately reported thisconversation. Sanjeev Gaur was stabbedand seriously wounded as he left theTemple complex, and Longowal never again publicly criticised his rival.



Another incident which illustratedLongowal's unwillingness to exert hisauthority took place in January 1984 ondia's Republic Day. A Khalistanindependent Sikh land) flag was flowrom one of the buildings near the

Golden Temple itself. To the endLongowal maintained that his Morchawas not an independence movement andhat the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was

not a demand for independence; but noaction was taken about the Khalistalag.

In fact on the very day that theKhalistan flag was flown the Akali Daleadership issued a new demand. Theyold the government that article twenty-ive of the Constitution, which according



o the Akalis implied that Hindus andSikhs were one and the same, should beamended. The article guaranteedreedom of religion. In an attempt to

break caste barriers, which had keptUntouchables out of Hindu temples, thearticle said that Hindu religiousnstitutions of a public character must be

open to all classes and sections oHindus. The article explained that the

eference to Hindus included 'personsprofessing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhisteligion'. Constitutional lawyers differ

on their interpretation of the implicationsof this explanation, but the Akali Daleaders had hit on an emotive issue

because, of course, of the fears of mostorthodox Sikhs that their religion would



go the way of Buddhism and Jainism india, and be virtually swallowed up by

Hinduism. Nevertheless the demand had not

been included in the Akalis' original list,and did not appear in the controversialAnandpur Sahib Resolution. Thisstrengthened Mrs Gandhi's position. ThePrime Minister always argued that itwas not she who had scuppered earlier

agreements with the Akalis but the Sikheaders themselves who, she said, werealways changing their minds. M.J. Akbar n his book India: The Siege Within

said, however, that the new demand waseally a desperate search for a victory

which would restore the Akali Daleaders' prestige and enable them to



wrest control of the movement froBhindranwale. As Akbar saw it, 'Whathe moderate Akalis really wanted was avictory" over Delhi which would

enable them to take the initiative awayrom the extremists by restoring their

credibility as "champions of the Sikhs".'He went on to say, 'Even a blindgovernment in Delhi could have seehat and offered a way out.' 1

Balwant Singh, the former FinanceMinister of Punjab and one of the mostmoderate of the Akali Dal leaders, waspresent at the meeting when it wasdecided to raise this new demand. Heand some others opposed it for the veryeason that it would be playing into Mrs

Gandhi's hands by providing her wit





and were sent to jail, which was exactlywhere they wanted to go. What better way was there for them to demonstrateo the Sikhs that they were quite as

extreme in their demands asBhindranwale, who was still free insidehe Golden Temple? They left Longowalo withstand the heat of the battle.

Before they went to jail the Akalieaders also decided to revive the

agitation for their original demands in aattempt to rival Bhindranwale. Theycalled for a general strike in Punjab o8th February. With the experience of theviolence caused the last time the Sikhscalled for a Rasta Roko , or 'Block theRoads' day, the government decided toimit the damage, cancelling all train and



air services. But Sikhs brandishing their raditional swords did march o

government offices in many places andorced them to close. The Punjab police

also stood by and watched Sikhs makeHindu traders close their shops. Becauseof the government's refusal to rise to thechallenge, the day passed of comparatively peacefully with only onebomb explosion and ten people injured.

But the strike did have seriousconsequences. It gave the Hindus,particularly the Hindu Chief Minister oHaryana, the excuse they needed toscupper the next round of talks due tostart the same month. Bhajan Lai wantedo scupper the talks because he was still

afraid that any settlement with the Sikhs



would be seen as a sell-out by theHindus of Haryana.

The talks started on 14th February,almost exactly one year after the lastound. Once again Mrs Gandhi involved

all opposition parties. On that very dayan organisation called the HindSuraksha Samiti, or Hindu DefenceCommittee, called for its own generalstrike in Punjab. Its leader was Pawa

Kumar who was a young man with acriminal record brought into politics bya Sikh Congress (Indira) Member oParliament. Pawan Kumar also hadclose links with the Haryana ChieMinister. Fourteen people were killedduring the Hindu strike in what theTimes of India described as 'one of the



worst outbreaks of rioting and groupclashes in the Punjab since partition'.The next day the Akali Dal leaderswalked out of the talks, saying that theywould only resume negotiations whepeace' returned to Punjab. They knewhat Bhindranwale would discredit thef they continued to negotiate after the

violence which the preacher mmediately seized upon as yet further

evidence of 'Sikh slavery'.The strike in Punjab was followed byhe first serious outbreak of anti-Sik ioting in Haryana – rioting which the

Chief Minister provoked by a speech hemade in the industrial town of Faridabadwarning the Akali leaders that theHindus' patience was running out and



hat retaliation was near. Satish Jacobsaw police looking on as Hindu mobsburnt down the gurudwara in Panipat; healso saw Sikhs being pulled off busesand forcibly shaved, and Sikh-ownedshops being looted. Eight Sikhs wereclubbed to death. The situation becameso grave that the police had to halt allraffic on the Grand Trunk Road.

Many of the national papers feared

hat this was the start of the long-awaitedHindu backlash. The Hindustan Times,which supported the government,headlined its editorial 'The CauldroBoils Over'. It went on to say, 'Theeruption of violence in Punjab andHaryana on an unprecedented scaleconstitutes the most painful phase of the



deepening Akali crisis. Theepercussions of the agitation are noonger confined to one state or one

community.' The Tribune, which ispublished in Chandigarh, the jointcapital of Haryana and Punjab, said,There is some truth in the explanatiohat the violence in Haryana is a

backlash to the excesses committed byhe "extremists" in Punjab.' But the

violence died down almost as suddenlyas it arose and from that day onwardshere was no sign of that backlash, whic

suggests that it was not quite asspontaneous as it appeared at first sight.Bhajan Lai had shown his strength andHaryana's position was not ignoredagain.



Why did Mrs Gandhi allow theHaryana Chief Minister to have his wayat the expense of a possible solution tohe Punjab crisis which by now was

seriously damaging the credibility of her government? Several explanations havebeen put forward. The most cynical ishat Mrs Gandhi did not want tontervene because she herself was goingor the Hindu vote. Another is that she

was by now committed to a militarysolution to the Punjab crisis but felt thathe situation must be allowed to get

worse before she could justify thatsolution. It is certainly true that about theime of the Hindu violence there wasenewed talk of police or even troops

entering the Golden Temple. Tohra, the





arge model 01 the Temple complex hadbeen built at a camp of the SpecialFrontier Force at Chakrata in theoothills of the Himalayas. The

government had started preparing for themilitary option but that does not meanegotiations were ruled out. In fact thegovernment was negotiating right untilhe bitter end.

One of the reasons the government

was now forced to consider the militaryoption was the deterioration of thepolice force. President's Rule andBhinder's morale-boosting drive in thePunjab police had made no impact on theerrorists. Throughout February incidents

were reported almost daily. There wereaids on Hindu temples and attacks o



government offices, including a bombhrown at the Jullundur televisio

station, bank robberies, firings at thepolice and, of course, at Hindus. Oneattack not recorded in the GovernmentWhite Paper on Punjab gives andication of the state of morale in the

police at the time. On the day of theHindu strike, young men from the GoldeTemple attacked a small police post

near the Temple's entrance. Sixpolicemen were dragged inside witheir firearms, including three sten guns

and a walkie-talkie. The next day themost senior police officer in Amritsar had to go to Bhindranwale's room in theAkal Takht and plead with him toelease the policemen and their



weapons. Bhindranwale agreed toelease the body of one of the policeme

who had been killed. He later releasedhe others who were still alive, but he

held on to the sten guns and the walkie-alkie.

Mrs Gandhi's problems werecompounded by the growing rowbetween the Punjab force and theparamilitary Central Reserve Police

CRP). The CRP wanted to searchvehicles and people going into theGolden Temple but they were not evenallowed to post pickets within twohundred yards. With such lax security itwas like allowing enemy headquarters tooperate freely within your own territory.Mrs Gandhi's Think Tank was obsessed



by the fear of provoking an uprising byJat Sikh peasants and so listened toBhinder's advice that interfering witaccess to the Golden Temple would startvillagers marching on Amritsar todefend their shrine.

The CRP's patience snapped after abomb was thrown at one of their patrolsn the border district of Gurdaspur. The

next day there was a row outside the

Golden Temple when some paramilitarypolice did attempt to search young Sikhsand Bhindranwale's men fired on them.The CRP took up positions on the roofsof buildings overlooking the Temple andeturned fire. Panic broke out. Longowalelephoned Bhinder and told him to stophe firing. Bhinder said he was unable to



get the paramilitary police to withdraw.The Home Minister, who was theminister in charge of the CRP, passedhe buck by ringing Longowal and telling

him to bring the situation in the Templeunder control. Longowal of course hadno influence at all with Bhindranwale'soung marksmen. The firing only

stopped when there was a telephone callrom the President's palace to the CRP,

ordering them to withdraw. ThePresident is constitutional head of state,so no member of his staff had any righto intervene.

Later in the week the Home Secretarywas sent to Amritsar to try to restoreelations between the CRP and the localorce which had reached near breaking



point. There was a patch up, but it didnot last long. Home SecretaryChaturvedi was a member of MrsGandhi's Think Tank and so he decidedo take the opportunity of his visit to

Amritsar to call on Longowal. However he Akali Dal leader refused to see him,

saying, 'Chaturvedi is responsible for deploying the CRP in Punjab and for killing innocent Sikhs. His hands are

choked with the blood of Sikhs. I willnot see him.' By now the police had spliton communal lines. Sikhs regarded theCRP as hostile and Hindus regarded thePunjab police as hostile. Another rowbroke out between the two forces twoweeks later. A bomb was thrown at aHindu temple in Amritsar and the CRP



arrested a Sikh suspect. They wereprevented from taking him away by thePunjab police. Officers of the CRP hado withdraw their men to prevent a clas

with the local police. The dispute wasofficially patched up again, this time bya buna khana (great dinner), but theCRP remained deeply suspicious of thePunjab police.

The CRP is far more disciplined than

he local police forces. Its companiesare recruited from all over India andsent anywhere law and order breaksdown. CRP officers are used toopposition from local police forces, buteven they were taken aback by thesituation in Punjab. A senior CRPofficer said to Satish Jacob, 'I usually



ind that the local force takes sides icommunal disputes but I have never known anything as blatant as the partisabehaviour of the Punjab police.'

Another reason for the failure oPresident's Rule in Punjab was thebackseat driving from Delhi. MrsGandhi's advisers would not allow theefficient Governor Pande to run his owgovernment. During a discussion wit

one of Pande's senior officials SatisJacob said, 'You people in Chandigarhdo not seem to know what is happeningn Amritsar.' The official replied, 'We

know what is happening. Everybodyknows that Mr Pande has a good track-ecord as an administrator. But Punjab isun by Delhi.' By 'Delhi' the official



meant Mrs Gandhi's Think Tank whichwas remarkable for its lack of thinkerswith experience of the Punjab. Theofficial quoted the example of someocal administrators and police officers

who were known to be in the pocket oBhindranwale. The Governor anted toransfer them but 'Delhi' over-ruled him.

Governor Pande's patience wasurther tried by a fault in the hotline

between Delhi and Chandigarh. Theextension in his bedroom used to ring ots own accord in the middle of the night,

but no one would reply when thegovernor picked up the receiver.

The confusion in the Governor'sHouse in Chandigarh was made worseby Mrs Gandhi's maintaining contact



with Bhindranwale. Her go-betweewas the President of the PunjabCongress Party, Raghunandan LaiBhatia. He had come close toBhindranwale during the 1980 generalelection when the preacher activelysupported his candidature in theAmritsar constituency. A member of Bhatia's staff told Satish Jacob that thePunjab Congress President remained i

contact with Bhindranwale unul within amonth of Operation Blue Star, wellbeyond the point when Mrs Gandhi hadany hope of influencing him. In the lastdays the contact was maintained througAmrik Singh, Bhindranwale's right-handman. The same member of Mr Bhatia'sstaff said that a car used to be sent



egularly to the Golden Temple tocollect Amrik Singh. This link whichwas well known to officials enhancedBhindranwale's status and made theadministration even more reluctant tograpple with him.



10

Last DitchNegotiations

Taunted by the opposition and the pressor the failure of President's Rule, all

Mrs Gandhi could think of doing was toake more Draconian powers. The whole



of Punjab was declared a disturbed area,giving the police even wider powers oarrest. The National Security Act wasalso amended, allowing police to holdpeople for a year without bringing thebefore a court. But of course theproblem was not lack of powers, it washe reluctance of the police to use their

powers and the inability of thegovernment to sum up the political will

o force them to do so.Once again the new powers made nodifference to Bhindranwale. Just beforehe powers were announced a prominent

Sikh, H.S. Manchanda, was shot ibroad daylight when his car stopped atraffic lights in the middle of Delhi.

Manchanda was the President of the pro-



Congress (Indira) Delhi Sikh TempleManagement Committee, and aoutspoken critic of the Akali DalMorcha. On the day the new powerswere given to the police Hindus weretaught a lesson' by the killing of theprominent politician Harbans LaiKhanna in Amritsar. He was a leadingmember of the right-wing BhartiyaJanata Party, the successor to the Jan

Sangh. The next day supporters of MrsGandhi were given a 'sharp' warning byhe killing of V.N. Tiwari, a professor of

Punjabi who was a Congress (Indira)Member of Parliament. He was shot ihis house in Chandigarh. On 22nd Aprilan air-force officer was hacked to deatn his home. This was the first time that a



serving officer of the defence forces hadbeen killed.

On 30th April one of the primeargets on Bhindranwale's hit-list, theormer Deputy Superintendent of Police

Bachan Singh, was shot dead iAmritsar. He was riding in a cycleickshaw when two young Sikhs came up

and opened fire at his guard. They thesnatched away the guard's sten gun and

ired on Bachan Singh. After killing theedred police officer the terrorists shothis wife and daughter who were ridingn a rickshaw behind him. They died i

hospital-. Bhindranwale had oftechallenged the police to save BachaSingh who, according to the preacher,had tortured his right-hand man, Amrik





Romesh Chander. On the eve of hisdeath Romesh Chander had written in aprophetic vein, 'No one knows whoseurn will come next. All Punjab has

become a slaughter house.' Thegovernment's failure to protect a targetas prominent as Romesh Chander was anear fatal blow to India's confidence iMrs Gandhi's ability to control Punjab.The Times of India , in its editorial,

commented on the freedom with whicBhindranwale could now select hisvictims. It said, 'Mr Romesh Chander,whether through his editorial columns,hrough television and radio, or at public

gatherings, strove ceaselessly to voicehe distress of the common Punjabioday. His was a still powerful voice o



eason in the engulfing fog of mindlesserror. Eliminating him therefore meant aot to the terrorists who seem to have

become the main arbitrators to decidewho opposes the Panth [Sik community] and should consequently bekilled.'

These were the most outrageousmurders. During March and April ateast eighty other people were killed and

107 injured in terrorist attacks byBhindranwale's men.At the end of April a senior official

briefing journalists admitted that, ispite of all the special powers, thepolice had only succeeded in catchingvery few of the 'hardcore' oBhindranwale's men. The official



estimated the strength of that hardcore atbetween 400 and 500. He said that onlyabout a quarter of them were studentsand the rest were Naxalites (communistsoutside the mainstream of communiswho believed in violent revolution),smugglers and other criminals. Theofficial admitted that the government'seputation was at stake but went on to

say that the government had to resist

pressures to resolve the Punjab crisis byorce.For some time Bhindranwale had

been having his doubts about thegovernment's willingness to resist thosepressures. He believed that Mrs Gandhimight be forced to overcome her eluctance to enter the Golden Temple



and decided to make that decision asdifficult as possible by fortifying theTemple complex. The preacher wantedo make sure that the military optioeally was a military option by making itmpossible for the police to raid his

headquarters in the Akal Takht.On 10th March Satish Jacob and I

visited the Golden Temple to check eports that Bhindranwale and his me

had started fortifying it. As weapproached the main entrance we sawsandbag emplacements on either side ohe clock tower. To the left was a high

water tower. We noticed that youngSikhs with automatic rifles had taken uppositions on the top of it because it gavea good view of the low buildings and



narrow alleys surrounding the Temple,as well as the open square in front of themain entrance.

We went first to the office of arinderjit Singh Nanda, the Public

Relations Officer, on the outside of theTemple, next door to a shop sellingBhindranwale tapes. Nanda's assistantwas a worried man.

'Don't go inside with your camera

until you have checked witBhindranwale's men,' he said.'But I thought that we had to get

permission from you, not them, beforewe filmed,' I replied.

'Well that, as you say, is the position.But I am not going to say anything untilou talk with them. There are very



strange things happening inside theTemple now. You don't know the half of t.'

So Nanda's assistant rangBhindranwale's room in the Akal Takhtand asked for someone to be sent dowo speak to us. A few minutes later aoung Sikh appeared and agreed to take

us to see the preacher.When we walked down the mai

steps on to the pavement whicsurrounds the sacred tank, we saw thathe buildings inside the complex were

being fortified too. Sandbags were beingbuilt up on the roof of the Langar or dining hall where Bhindranwale held hiscongregauons. The buildings on either side of the Akal Takht where he had his



headquarters were also being preparedor a siege. In spite of armed followers

of Bhindranwale strutting officiouslyaround the tank like young turkey cocks,he religious life of the Temple

continued. Sikhs, young and old, werestanding in their shorts in the poolannointing themselves with the water and saying their prayers. The sound oGurbani, or the chanting of the holy

scriptures, in the Golden Temple itselwas being relayed from all four cornersof the complex. Bhindranwale and hisortifications had not yet succeeded i

destroying the serenity of the GoldeTemple – a serenity which those Hinduswho find their own temples too noisyand commercial also valued.



After walking all the way round thepavement as tradition demands, witwhite handkerchiefs on our heads andour cigars safely lodged with the PublicRelations Office (it is a sacrilege eveo bring tobacco into the Golde

Temple), we came to the Akal Takht.We entered the open hall facing the pooland the causeway to the Golden Temple,passed the priests reciting the scriptures,

and moved towards the back where itwas quite dark. Our guide told the youngSikhs guarding the entrance to thenarrow staircase to let us pass, and weclimbed up to Bhindranwale's room. Hewas, as usual, sitting with his legsstretched out in front of him talking tosome young Sikhs who included Amrik



Singh, the President of the All India SikhStudents Federation, Harminder SingSandhu, Bhindranwale's interpreter, andRachpal Singh, his secretary. Bhindran-wa^e enjoyed the attention that Westernournalists were now paying to him; so

when he was reminded that it was theB B C wallahs again he smiled andnvited us to sit beside him.

I explained to the Sant that we would

ike to film his congregation the next dayand interview him. He liked the ideauntil I told him that the interview wouldonly last about ten minutes. 'Tenminutes,' he replied. It should be at leastwo hours. There are lots of Sikhs i

England, you know, who would like tosee me for two hours.' I had some



difficulty in explaining the limitations oelevision news bulletins and scheduleso Bhindranwale; but eventually he

agreed when I suggested that it wasbetter for the Sikhs of England to see aittle of him than nothing at all.

The next day we were taken on to theoof of the dining hall by one o

Bhindranwale's men. There was acongregation of about 300 people sitting

at the feet of the Sant. His armed guardswere lounging casually against theparapet. Sitting beside Bhindranwalewas an elderly Sikh with a long, whitebeard and an immaculately tied turban.He had a thin, intelligent face. I took hior a scholar or a priest – he was in fact

a soldier, He was Major-General



Shahbeg Singh, the man who wasesponsible for the fortification of the

Golden Temple and the man who was todirect the resistance to the army whehey entered the complex just three

months later.During the campaign which led up to

he Bangladesh war of liberation i1971, Shahbeg Singh had trained and ledhe so-called Mukhti Bahini, or

Bangladesh freedom fighters. It was asecret role because India never admitted, and in fact still does not admitofficially, that it trained the MukhtiBahini or fought in the guerrillaoperations which bogged down thePakistan army in the damp delta of EastBengal for nine months. But Lieutenant-





have known him. When he was workingn that way I think he also dressed

himself in that manner, looking more likea sort of "catch me alive" type of persoather than a regular soldier.' But the

war hero's career ended in disgrace.After Bangladesh, Shahbeg Sing

was given two postings as an areacommander, which is an administrativeob. During his second posting the army

brought three charges against him.According to the first charge, he hadbuilt a house in the army town of DehraDun and was unable to show where hehad acquired the resources to do so. Thesecond charge was that he had used hisposition to acquire an army truck whicwas being disposed of. The third charge



was that he had accepted a silver salver as a memento.

Major-General Shahbeg Singh wasdismissed the service without a court-martial on the day before he was due toetire. He lost his pension. This

dismissal preyed on Shahbeg Singh'smind and made him bitterly hostile to thegovernment. He did fight, and win, twocases in the civil courts to prove his

nnocence, but that did not alter hisattitude to the government. As hebrooded on what he regarded as hisunjust fate, the former guerrillacommander turned to religion for solaceand inspiration. His son, Prabpal Singh,said he was not very religious until theast two or three years of his life. That



was also when he fell under Bhindranwale's spell. Shahbeg Singirst met the preacher when the Akali

Morcha started in 1982.The government already knew that

Shahbeg Singh was inside the Templeand that he was masterminding theortifications and the training o

Bhindranwale's terrorists; but ShahbegSingh himself always denied this up to

he very end. In a letter sent to his sorom Room Number 8 in the Akal RestHouse, ten days before the army action,he General said:

I am all right. The press has tried torun me down by absolutely wrongand blatantly communal reporting. I



have absolutely nothing to do witany killings Or the DashmesRegiment. I have no idea about such aregiment [Dashmesh or 10th Gur Regiment was one of the namesadopted by some of Bhindranwale'sterrorists when claimingresponsibility for assassinations]. Itis to my mind government efforts tokeep buried deep the gross injustice

done to one of their top army war leaders, who had rendereddistinguished service of the mostexceptional order. The governmenthigh-ups want to hide their sense oshame under such a press offensive.Anyway the more dishonest approacthey have towards me, the more my



community love and respect me. His letter does not read like the letter

of a man who was about to command aheroic, if foolhardy, resistance to themight of the army he knew so well – aesistance which he must have know

would end with his death.On 26th May he was still concerned

with family matters. He also wrote in the

etter to his son: 'I learn from your amman [mother] that owing to Kabir his grandson] being also with you theres need to boost your financial side aittle bit. Please therefore send/write to

me your bank account number etc. so thatcan give standing instructions to our

bank to divert rupees five hundred to



our account every month.' ShahbegSingh was also concerned about thehealth of his grandson. He wrote: 'I hopeour small room in Delhi is helpful and

Kabir is all right. He will need a lot oprotection from the current hot weather until it starts raining.' The General's owwife's health was also causing hiconcern. She \vas with him in theTemple complex at that time but,

according to Shahbeg Singh's son, leftbefore the army action started. In hisetter Major-General Shahbeg Singh just

said: 'Your amman reached here twodays ago. She is on medicine but allight.'

Bhindranwale, too, consistentlyaccused the government of maligning



him. On that morning in March he toldme that it was the government, not he,which was indulging in violence. Heepeated his litany of woes to

demonstrate that Sikhs had become theslaves of Hindus, starting with thecomplaint that Sikhs had not beeallowed to watch the Asian Games. Hegave his standard reply when Iquestioned him about Sik

ndependence: 'I am neither for ndependence nor against it, but if I aoffered it I will not refuse it.' In spite ohe steps that his men were taking toortify the Temple, Bhindranwale did not

seem to be unduly worried about theuture. He was too busy enjoying all the

attention he was attracting in the present.



During that interview I nearlycommitted a sacrilege. I was sittinguncomfortably on the ground next to thepreacher. When I stretched my leg toelieve the cramp, my foot nearlyouched the metal arrow, the symbol ohe tenth Guru, which Bhindranwale took

with him wherever he went. GeneralShahbeg Singh dug me in the ribs andsaid angrily, 'Watch your feet. Santji

will not be amused if you touch thatarrow.'Satish Jacob and I also saw the

sinister side of Bhindranwale'soperation that morning. A young boy,who could not have been more thaifteen, was dragged up in front of the

preacher by a burly six-foot tall Sik



dressed in the blue robes of a nihang, oSikh warrior. The nihang explained thathe boy had run away 'on a job'. The

congregation started to mutter angrily.Bhindranwale calmed them down byelling the Sikh to 'take the boy away and

deal with him'. He did. The young boywas taken round the corner and we sawhim being thrashed with the shaft of aspear.

Bhindranwale used thesecongregations to hear petitions. Theeplies he gave to these petitions

showed that by now he had penetrateddeep into the Punjab administration andpolice. One senior Punjab police officer,Simranjit Singh Mann, used to admitopenly that he was a supporter o



Bhindranwale. The authorities also hadevidence that Mann was helpingBhindranwale's terrorists to smugglearms across the border when he was icharge of Faridkot district; but all theydid was to transfer him to Bombay. Noattempt was made to question Mann or discipline him. It was only after MrsGandhi's death that the authoritiessuddenly woke up to his importance, and

arrested him as he was trying to escapeacross the border into Nepal.Gurdev Singh, the Deputy

Commissioner of Amritsar, the manesponsible for the entire civil

administration of the area, was asupporter of Bhindranwale too. He itwas who consistently opposed the





professors from the medical college atAmritsar were summoned to the GoldeTemple to discuss one of their studentswho was having difficulty in passing hisexams. Bhindranwale explained verypolitely that the student was a follower of his and that he thought it might be agood idea if he did a little better in hisexams. Next time round the studentpassed both subjects.

The telephone exchange was also iBhindranwale's control. After the armyhad taken over responsibility for security in Punjab, a general wassurprised to learn that the Sant's callsalways used to get priority. At no timewas Bhindranwale's telephone cut off,nor was the telephone of the head office



of the All India Sikh Students Federationnside the Golden Temple. The police

appeared to make no use of thenvaluable intelligence they could have

got from the telephones. Satish Jacobonce heard the preacher talking to someof his followers who had soughtsanctuary inside a gurudwara iFerozepur. The police had surroundedhe gurudwara and were demanding that

he young men surrendered. They rang uphe Sant to ask his advice and he toldhem to stick it out.

By now the terror had spreadhroughout the countryside. This wasargely because of the young men who

had taken seriously the Sant's injunctioo buy arms and motorcycles and attack



he enemies of the Sikhs. On 26th April,or instance, voung Sikh motorcyclists

shot a Hindu commission agent in thevillage of Bhikiwind in Amritsar districtand a Hindu shop-keeper in the villageof Samadh Bhai in Faridkot district.Satish Jacob visited the village oBhikiwind and found the doors of mostof the Hindu shops locked. The ownersand their families had fled to the

neighbouring state of Haryana.Bhindranwale's plans to alter thepopulation of Punjab in favour of theSikhs were bearing fruit.

By April 1984 it began to look ashough he might succeed in clearing the

Hindus out of Punjab. Not only were thesmalltime traders, money-lenders and



shopkeepers in the villages fleeing,confidence among Hindu businessmen ihe cities was collapsing too. A bank

manager in Amritsar told me that Punjabndustry had been badly hit by the

violence because customers from other parts of India were not willing to comeo towns like Jullundur and Amritsar to

do business. He said that manyndustries were dependent on advances

but businessmen were unwilling to payadvances because they feared theywould never see their goods. Themanager also admitted that the largenumber of bank raids had affectedbusiness confidence. As a result manyHindu industrialists were planning tomove their factories to the neighbouring



state of Haryana where the ChieMinister, Bhajan Lai, was only tooanxious to welcome them. Fear evedrove many Hindus to adopt Sikh dress.A retired school teacher in Amritsar toldSadsh Jacob that he now wore a turbawhen he went out for a walk. YoungHindus working at petrol stations, whicwere targets for attack byBhindranwale's supporters, started

growing beards and wearing turbans, sooo did Hindus who used to travelegularly by bus. By the end of April

Bhindranwale's reign of terror haddriven the Akali Dal leaders back intoMrs Gandhi's hands. At last the Sikhpolitical leaders realised the appallingisk they had taken by trying to play



Bhindranwale off against the government– but it was too late.

Longowal finally accepted thatBhindranwale would have to beeliminated when civil war broke outnside the Golden Temple and the hostel

complexes again. It broke out this timebecause of the murder of one oBhindranwale's most trusted assassins,Surinder Singh Sodhi. He was shot o

14th April while drinking tea in a shopust outside the Temple. Men like Sodhi,well known to be murderers, were stillable to move freely in the alleyssurrounding the Temple because theCRP had been ordered not to comewithin 200 yards of the complex. Sodhi,amous for his marksmanship, was said





after 'interrogation' Baljit Kaur admitted' that she and Chinda had beegiven money by a close associate oLongowal's to kill Sodhi. Baljit Kaur notonly implicated her lover but also theSecretary of the Akali Dal, GurcharanSingh, and one of Bhindranwale'sollowers, Malik Singh Bhatia. Bhatia

appeared before Bhindranwale'scongregation on the morning after the

murder. He confessed that he hadprovided a jeep for the assassiChinda's escape and pleaded for orgiveness. The Sant did forgive hi

and told him to go and make an offeringat the Golden Temple. A much relievedBhatia went down to the gatewayeading to the Temple, made an offering



and took some of the sticky sweetporridge, known as prasad, inside forblessing. Unaware of what was beingplotted, he then returned to the roof ohe Langar to ask Bhindranwale to takehe prasad. Bhindranwale, apparentlystill in a forgiving mood, accepted it andBhatia left the congregation. Some oBhindranwale's young followers werewaiting for him on the stairs. As he

passed by they slashed at him with their swords. Bhatia ran towards the safety ohe hostels controlled by Longowal.

Blood was pouring from gashes on botshoulders and his turban had fallen off.He had nearly reached the entrance tohe Guru Ram Das Hostel when a shotang out. The man who Bhindranwale







guard standing outside GurcharaSingh's room and speak to him. Hedenied being involved in Sodhi's death,saying: 'The charge is totally cooked up.The sole purpose is to discreditHarchand Singh Longowal and the AkaliDal party. Bhindranwale's mind hadbeen poisoned against me by the Allndia Sikh Students Federation because I

was responsible for raising the yout

wing of the Akali Dal, whichBhindranwale's friends who lead theStudent Federation regard as a rival.'

Longowal, fearing that Bhindranwalemight invade his offices, called for helpand two Sikh leaders sent their ollowers to his rescue. In an attempt to

calm the atmosphere he also told



Gurcharan Singh to resign, even though aspecial committee had cleared him. TheMorcha Dictator had surrendered hisauthority again.

In a last minute bid to restore hisauthority Longowal called a meeting osenior Sikh politicians to confirm hiseadership of the Morcha. But events had

moved too far for the Morcha Dictator.Sixty of the 140 people present walked

out and went to Bhindranwale's roowhere they swore loyalty to him. TheSant was delighted, but he stillmaintained that he had no interest ipolitics, that he was just a preacher. Heold the politicians, 'I will not give yoickets for any office.' On the day beforehat meeting Longowal had a long



elephone conversation with Mrs Gandhiduring which he admitted that he had lostcontrol of the situation. He beseechedher to make some concession for whiche could claim credit so that he couldcall off the Morcha and isolateBhindranwale. Unfortunately for Longowal, that phone call was reportedn the press. Bhindranwale immediately

picked upon it as yet one more

ustification of his claim that Longowalwas selling out the cause.The Temple clergy too were now

becoming thoroughly alarmed. They didnot want control of their shrine and their ivelihood to fall into the hands o

Bhindranwale for good. His young mehad scant respect for their grey beards.





disobey an edict of the five High Priests,which by tradition is binding on allSikhs. But he had his own answers to thenew problem.

The preacher issued a statementhreatening that the priests would beorced to resign their offices if theyssued an edict against him. He gave a

grim meaning to this threat by killinghree of his Sikh opponents in one week.

One of them, Giani Pratap Singh, was aormer High Priest of the Akal Takht, thehighest seat of religious and temporalauthority of the Sikhs. The eighty-year-old scholar had openly criticisedBhindranwale for storing arms andammunition in the Akal Takht, and hadsaid that Bhindranwale's presence in the



shrine was sacrilege. The hukmnamaagainst Bhindranwale was never issued.When the High Priest of the Akal Takhtwas asked, after the army action, why hehad not issued an edict, he replied, 'Noone complained to me about this matter.'

Not all the High Priests wereopposed to Bhindranwale. Giani SahibSingh, the High Priest of the GoldeTemple, agreed to preside over the

wedding of six of Bhindranwale's youngmen in the Temple complex. The mostprominent of them was Harminder SingSandhu, the Secretary of the All IndiaSikh Students Federation and the Sant'snterpreter. Invitations were sent out to

all and sundry. Sandhu made sure thathe international press knew of the event



oo.So it came about that one month to the

day before the army entered the GoldeTemple, six young men who had beenopenly defying the might of the Indiagovernment, who had brought thecountry's most prosperous state to astandstill, who had been responsible for murders, bank robberies, extractingmoney by threat, preaching secession,

and almost every other crime in thebook, walked four times round the HigPriest of the Golden Temple, who wassitting in front of the holy scriptures.Each of the young terrorists wasollowed by his young bride – Sandhu's

was the daughter of a wealthy Bombayransport contractor. The ceremony o





money. When I asked him whether it washe collection from the wedding service

he just smiled.Mrs Gandhi was not smiling. The

credibility of her party was now atstake, as she found out early in Maywhen her party was humiliated in aound of by-elections. The most serious

setback from the Prime Minister's pointof view was in the constituency o

Malihabad near Lucknow, the capital oUttar Pradesh, where, in spite of everyeffort that her party could make, her estranged daughter-in-law ManekaGandhi's party won the seat. ManekaGandhi had quarrelled with her mother-n-law after the death of Sanjay Gandhi,

her husband, and walked out of the



amily home, taking Mrs Gandhi'sgrandson with her. The quarrel was over he succession. After Sanjay's death

Maneka thought that she should becomehe political member of the next

generation. The Prime Minister,however, chose her elder son Rajiv.After walking out of the house Manekamounted a brash but surprisinglysuccessful campaign against her late

husband's family, portraying herself ashe injured young widow and MrsGandhi as the spiteful mother-in-law. Tokeep the spotlight on her Manekaannounced that she would fight the nextgeneral election from Amethi, which hadbeen Sanjay's constituency and was nowRajiv's. Amethi is near Lucknow too and



Mrs Gandhi's term of office was comingo an end in eight months' time. So the

defeat at Malihabad was a threat toRajiv Gandhi's future. His politicalcareer had been slow to get off theground, and it was generally acceptedhat he would have difficulty i

surviving defeat in Amethi. It wasbecoming increasingly clear that MrsGandhi had to resolve the Punjab crisis

quickly to re-establish her government'scredibility before the next generalelection and save both her and her soRajiv's political careers.

The Prime Minister realised this butshe was still reluctant to go for themilitary solution. She knew, from talkshat her team of negotiators had held



with the other two members of the AkaliDal Trinity while they were in jail for burning copies of the Constitution, thatall they were now demanding wasChandigarh. The two rivals for theeadership of the Akali Dal, Prakash

Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra,he President of the SGPC, insisted thathey must have this one positive

achievement if they were to wrest

control of the Morcha froBhindranwale.Mrs Gandhi had been insisting that

Punjab could only have Chandigarh ihe Akalis were prepared to surrender he two tahsils of Fazilka and Abohar to

Haryana in exchange. These were theerms of her original settlement, whic



had never been implemented. She nowagreed that only the town of Abohar need be surrendered but maintained thathis award should be made by a

commission so that the Hindus oHaryana would not see it as a surrender.She promised that the findings of thecommission would be guaranteed iadvance. This was not good enough for he Akali leaders. They needed an

announcement of the settlement by thegovernment, not a commission, if theywere to convince their followers that theMorcha had been a success and could becalled off. In the end, however, evenTohra, who was of course the hardliner,did agree to a commission provided theerms of reference made it quite clear



hat Chandigarh would go to Punjab andonly Abohar town to Haryana. Heaccepted that face had to be saved oboth sides in the tradition of Indianegotiations.

This last round of negodations wasconducted on Mrs Gandhi's side by her External Affairs Minister, NarasimhaRao, with the team of threeadministrators who were the members o

he Punjab Think Tank – KrishnaswamyRao Sahib, the Cabinet Secretary, P.C.Alexander, the Prime Minister'sPrincipal Secretary, and M.M.K. Wali,he Home Secretary. The Maharaja o

Patiala had dropped out of the picture iFebruary because he no longer believedhere was any chance of a settlement.



Amarinder Singh was bitterly critical ohe way that the negotiations had bee

conducted. He told me that Mrs Gandhi'sThink Tank was far too bureaucratic ints attitude to the demands for river

waters and Chandigarh, and did notunderstand the political pressures on theAkali leaders. It was typical of MrsGandhi's disregard for the traditions oministerial responsibility that the

External Affairs Minister, not the HomeMinister P.C. Sethi, led the last team of negotiators. Certainly P.C. Sethi'shandling of the Punjab crisis iParliament had shown that he was notexactly the best man for the job; but MrsGandhi still kept him as her nam kewaste , or nominal Home Minister, until



after the army action. It was notmportant who occupied the Home

Minister's seat at Cabinet meetings; whatwas important was who actually advisedMrs Gandhi, and here, as usual, sheelied on trusted bureaucrats, not

politicians. Narasimha Rao did ocourse represent the Cabinet, but he wasnoted for his loyalty to Mrs Gandhiather than for his independent stature as

a politician.After reaching this agreement thegovernment announced on nth May thathe charges of sedition against the Akali

Dal leaders for burning copies of theConstitution were being withdrawn, andhey were released. Four days later

Badal and Tohra met the third member



of the Akali Dal Trinity, Longowal, inhe Golden Temple complex.

Bhindranwale was now the key to thesettlement. The government hadstipulated that he must agree before theywould announce it, and Tohra was theonly man who could sell it to the Sant. Iall earlier rounds of negotiations he washe only one who had supported

Bhindranwale's line that nothing short o

he full implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution would do. Tohra wasparticularly anxious to push thesettlement through. During the lastnegotiations the two sides had discussedhe possibility of forming a coalition ohe Akali Dal and the Congress (Indira)o govern Punjab. Tohra believed that



Bhindranwale would back him for thechief-ministership of the coalition. Sohis life's ambition seemed within hisgrasp, if only he could persuade thepreacher to accept the settlement.

At the meeting of the Akali Trinity inhe Temple complex Tohra got an

agreement to approach Bhindranwale,and the next day he went to discuss thesettlement with the Sant in the Akal

Takht. Tohra told him that Chandigarhwas a major victory for the Sik movement and that the other issueswould now be decided in the Sikhs'avour by the commissions the

government was setting up. But Tohrawas hoist with his own petard.Bhindranwale would not accept that the



setdement met the Morcha's demands.He had seen through Tohra's game andold him that he was betraying the

Anandpur Sahib Resolution in the hopeof becoming Chief Minister. The SGPCPresident then tried threatening to throwBhindranwale out of the Akal Takht. Hewas the man who had persuaded theHigh Priest of the Akal Takht to allowBhindranwale to move into the shrine.

He had also used his influence toprevent the five High Priests issuing aedict against the Sant. But threats did notwork either. Bhindranwale knew that thepriests were by now more afraid of hihan they were of their patron, Tohra,

and so the whole settlement collapsed.The following day Tohra went to see



he Governor of Punjab to tell him thathe had failed and that there was no hopeof Bhindranwale agreeing to anegotiated settlement. A week later Longowal announced that the Morchawould be resumed with an agitation toprevent grain movements in the state.That announcement gave the governmenthe excuse it needed for tightening up

security around the Golden Temple as a

prelude to the army action. Many Sikhsbelieve that this was Longowal's reasoor announcing the renewal of the

Morcha. They claim he realised that themilitary solution was now the onlyanswer to Bhindranwale. A senior Congress Member of Parliament alsoold Satish Jacob that Longowal started



o 'cooperate' with the government after Bhindranwale rejected the settlement. Itwas certainly a remarkable coincidencehat the day after the announcement thathe Akali Dal planned to stop the

movement of grain in Punjab, the CentralReserve Police took up positions ibuildings surrounding the GoldeTemple for the first time.

Unfortunately many of the best

vantage points had already beeoccupied by Bhindranwale's men. Thegovernment knew they had moved intostrategic positions in the housessurrounding the Temple two monthsbefore. Inspector-General of PoliceBhinder had issued a circular to allofficers, including those of the CRP,



saying that he had received reports ohouses near the Temple being fortified.He ordered officers not to take actiobeyond observing and reporting.

othing, Bhinder said, was to be donewhich might disturb the local population.The army was to pay a heavy price for he Punjab police's failure to prevent the

spread of Bhindranwale's fortifications.The White Paper on the Punjab

Agitation, published to explain the armyaction in the Golden Temple, said:Seventeen houses in the civiliaesidential areas had been selected byhe terrorists at distances of five hundredo eight hundred metres from the outer

periphery of the temple complex andheld by approximately ten men each.



These lookout and early warning postswere veritable arsenals of light machineguns and other automatic weapons withuge caches of ammunition. The postshad been given common communicatioequipment to be in instant touch witheir command posts.'

More than a month before the CRPook up positions surrounding the

Golden Temple, the prelude to

Operation Blue Star, the government hadexperimented with a different type ooperation – a siege. The paramilitaryBorder Security Force in the town oMoga, which is the nearest town toBhindranwale s own village, was giveorders to lay siege to the Sikh templeshere and not to lift the siege until the



errorists who had sought sanctuarynside them had surrendered. Five days

after the sieges started the Sikh HigPriests threatened to lead a march oMoga if they were not lifted. The HomeMinister replied by telling the priests toget the terrorists out of the templeshemselves if they wanted the sieges to

be lifted. All seemed set for the first realconfrontation between the government

and the High Priests. But then suddenlyhe government changed tack again andifted the sieges. The head of the Punjab

police, P.S. Bhinder, told journalistswho arrived in Moga the next day thatsixteen terrorists had surrendered andhat was why the siege had been lifted.

However I could find no evidence i



Moga that anyone had surrendered.Suspicions diat it was the governmentwhich had unconditionally surrenderedwere heightened by a series of confusinganswers to questions in Parliament byhe Home Minister.

Lieutenant-General Sunderji, whocommanded the eventual assault,admitted that he had considered layingsiege to the Golden Temple to starve out

Bhindranwale and his followers, andhat one reason he had decided against itwas the fear of uprisings in thecountryside. That lesson was learnt atMoga. With the settlement rejected byBhindranwale and a siege ruled out byhe army, Mrs Gandhi had no alternativeeft – she had to raid the Akal Takht.





11

Mrs Gandhi Gives theGo-ahead

On 2nd June Mrs Gandhi finally decidedo press the button. The political risks o

sending the army into the Golden Templecomplex were enormous. Mrs Gandhi



knew the risks to her own family too.Rajiv Gandhi had already been told byhe Prime Minister's security advisers to

withdraw his son and daughter froheir boarding schools. Rahul was at the

Doon School, India's Eton, where hisather had studied. The advisers said thathe children's security could only be

guaranteed if they lived in the PrimeMinister's house in Delhi.

On that 2nd June Mrs Gandhi's diaryncluded a speech to a conference oeaders of her party from district

headquarters throughout India. Theconference was one of a seriesorganised by Rajiv Gandhi as part of hisdrive to revive the Congress Party as apolitical organisation. He himsel



admitted that during the long years thathis mother had dominated the party itsoots had cried up. It had become little

more than a bandwagon on whicpoliticians jumped at election time. MrsGandhi was very anxious to supportRajiv Gandhi's efforts because theebuilding of the party was his first

political undertaking. Nevertheless shearrived two hours late for this meeting. It

was meant to be held behind closeddoors but three journalists managed toget in. One of them, Anand Sahay, said:When Mrs Gandhi walked up to theplatform she appeared to be limping.Her shoulders were hunched. She lookeddishevelled. Her face was drawn. Shechoked as she spoke. I was so surprised



hat I thought someone in her family musthave died.' However by the time he gotback to his office Sahay had concludedhat the normally immaculate Mrs

Gandhi's downtrodden and dishevelledappearance must mean that 'somethingbig had been decided'.

Just before eight o'clock that night thegovernment-controlled radio andelevision services did interrupt their

programmes to announce that the PrimeMinister would make a specialbroadcast at 8.30. When 8.30 came therewas a silence on the airwaves. After twominutes announcers apologised for thedelay in the Prime Minister's broadcast.Mrs Gandhi eventually came on the air hree-quarters of an hour late. She had



made several last-minute alterations tohe script.

The Prime Minister appealed to theeaders of the Akali Dal to call off the

next stage of their Morcha, the attempt toprevent grain movements in Punjab dueo start the following day. She said,Even at this late hour, I appeal to theAkali leaders to call off their threatenedagitation and accept the framework o

he peaceful settlement which we haveoffered.' She also outlined thatsettlement, confirming that thegovernment had suggested setting up acommission to decide the fate oChandigarh. Mrs Gandhi said,Government has suggested that thewhole territorial dispute including



Chandigarh, Abohar and Fazilka shouldbe referred to a commission whosedecision should be binding on botstates. Unfortunately the Akali Dal hasnot accepted the suggestions regardinghe transfer of areas to Haryana in lieu o

Chandigarh or of the whole dispute to acommission.' Mrs Gandhi did nothowever tell the nation that thegovernment had even gone so far as to

guarantee to fix the commission so that itdecided in the Akalis' favour. She didell the nation that the real problem was

not the terms of the settlement but theact that the Akali Dal Trinity –

Longowal, Badal, and Tohra – had letcontrol of the Morcha fall into the handsof Bhindranwale. She said, 'The reality



hat has emerged is not the adequacy or otherwise of the terms of the settlementoffered by the government on the variousdemands of the Akali Dal but the facthat the agitation is now in the hands of aew who have scant regard for the unity

and integrity of our country or concer or communal peace and harmony or the

continued economic progress of thePunjab.'

The Prime Minister offered to renewnegotiations but at the same time shewarned, 'While the government iscommitted to solving all pendingproblems through negotiauons, it shouldbe obvious that no government can allowviolence and terrorism in the settlementof issues. Those who indulge in suc



anti-social and anti-national activitiesshould make no mistake about this.'

Mrs Gandhi's own politicalpredicament was clear. The people ondia were losing faith in her capacity to

act. She virtually admitted this in her broadcast when she said, 'Punjab isuppermost in all our minds. The wholecountry is deeply concerned. The matter has been discussed and spoken about

ime and again. Yet an impression hasbeen assiduously created that it is notbeing dealt with.' The Prime Minister ended her broadcast to the nation with ainging appeal: 'Let us join handsogether to heal wounds. The best

memorial to those who have lost their ives is to restore normalcy and harmony



n Punjab wh ch they loved and served.To all sections of Punjabis I appeal – don't shed blood, shed hatred.' But thePrime Minister had already decided shewould shed blood if necessary.

Shortly after that broadcast All IndiaRadio announced that the army had beecalled into Punjab 'in aid of the civilauthority', the phrase used in the militarymanual left behind by the British whic

still regulates most of the activities ohe Indian army. The army had beencalled in to aid the civil authorities manyimes since independence but this washe first time the government of a major

state had handed over totalesponsibility for security to soldiers.

All India Radio announced that



Lieutenant-General Ranjit Singh Dayal,Chief of Staff, Western Command,would hold the key post of Adviser Security) to the Governor of Punjab andhat the police who usually work to the

government would be under the overallcommand of the army. What that was tomean became clear the next day when Iwent to the Golden Temple.

I found that the complex had bee

encircled by soldiers of the Bihar egiment who had moved into the areaovernight. Curfew had been relaxed andHindus were chatting happily to theawans (soldiers). The Hindus were

delighted to see the army. They wereconfident that their nightmare was over.A shop-keeper said to me, 'Now at last



we will get revenge on those Sikhs.'When I asked him what he thought thearmy would do he replied, 'Oh surelyhey will go in now, won't they?' The

Hindu shopkeeper proved to be right.The President of India, Zail Singh,

who is by virtue of his officeCommander-in-Chief of the armedorces was not informed that the army

was going to be sent into the Golde

Temple to arrest or kill the man that hehad raised from an obscure preacher to aeader who was now threatening the

unity of India. The President had cutshort a visit to north-eastern Indiabecause he was worried about thencreasing number of murders in Punjab

villages, and on 30th May he did receive



Mrs Gandhi at the vast sandstonePresidential Palace in Delhi. However,according to Zail Singh's officials, thePrime Minister did not mention thepossibility of sending the army into theGolden Temple. She spent one and threequarter hours discussing a new formulaor reaching an agreement with the

Akalis.The day before Mrs Gandhi's

broadcast, firing between paramilitarypolice and Bhindranwale's followers iand around the Golden Temple complexstarted at twelve-forty and lasted untilseven o'clock in the evening. Anexperienced CRP officer told me that hehad never been under such heavy firebefore. The next day I saw the marks o



he bullets in the Golden Temple andhostel complexes. There were bulletholes in the Langar building whereBhindranwale was holding his usualmorning congregation when the firingstarted and there were bullet holesbelow the window of Longowal's office.The marble pavement surrounding thesacred tank in the centre of the GoldeTemple complex was chipped in many

places, and angry Sikhs showed meholes marked with red rings in theGolden Temple itself. Some of the holeshowever were far too large to have beecaused by bullets. They appeared to behe result of gradual wear and tear

suffered by the structure long beforeBhindranwale was ever heard o



although they were dutifully ringed wited paint.



12 Above, the Akal Takht on



fire after being bombardedwith squash-head shellsduring Operation Blue Star

13 Below left, the damage tothe gold-plated dome of theAkal Takht was extensive

14 Below right, rubble at thefoot of the Akal Takht. Oneof Shahbeg Singh's gunemplacements can be seencut into the marble wall.







15 Above left, Indian troopsinside the Golden Templecomplex shortly after the



defeat of Bhindranwale andhis followers

16 Above right, bodies of Bhindranwale's men laidout on the parikmma, themarble pavement

surrounding the GoldenTemple17 Above, the body of Major-

General Shahbeg Singh. The

ropes around his feet andthe marks on his armsindicate that he wasdragged out of the AkalTakht.

The CRP firing took place four days

before the army actually entered the



Temple. Military experts believe that itwas a deliberate attempt to drawBhindranwale's fire so that he wouldeveal his dispositions and hisirepower. If that was so the exercise

was not a great success. When the armydid eventually go into the Temple theGenerals were, on their own admission,aken by surprise and forced to fight a

batde on a scale they had never

magined. I believe that the CentralReserve Police firing was the start of aattempt to frighten Bhindranwale intosurrendering, an attempt which lastedalmost to the hour that the army dideventually go in four days later.

I saw Bhindranwale the day after theiring. He was in the Akal Takht and had



not been on the roof of the Langar thatday although he said he would beesuming his morning congregations.

When I asked him about the firing heeplied, 'The firing shows that the

government wants to insult the GoldeTemple and cannot tolerate the faces oSikhs and their way of life.' Hepromised that he would give the army afitting reply' if they tried to enter the

Temple, and a fitting reply he certainlydid give them. But Bhindranwale wasnot his usual relaxed self. He wasobviously tense and did not joke witournalists as he usually did. Normallyhe Sant liked nothing better than beingilmed, but this time he became verympatient when a television team asked



him to wait until they managed to getheir lights into the room. The preacher

said angrily, 'You'll have to hurry up. Ihave got more important things to do.'

By the following day Bhindranwalehad recovered his sangfroid. SubhasKirpekar was one of the journalists whowent to see the Sant after the army hadsurrounded the Temple complex.Bhindranwale did not believe an attack

was imminent. He told Kirpekar, 'Thearmy will hang around this place like theCRP and the BSF [Border SecurityForce] have been doing for the last twoears.' He qualified that remark slightly

by saying, 'It is premature to say anythingabout the timing of the entry of the armyand its possible impact. Their behaviour



and intention will be known in a fewdays.' Kirpekar went on to ask Bhindranwale, 'Will you not beoutnumbered by the army which hassuperior weapons too?' The Sant, like agood preacher, replied with a parable:Sheep always outnumber lions. But oneion can take care of a thousand sheep.

When the lion sleeps the birds chirp.When it awakes the birds fly away.

There is silence.' Right to the end hensisted that he was not responsible for he murders which had brought the armyo the gates of the Golden Temple. When

Kirpekar asked what could be done tostop the violence he replied, 'Ask thosewho are responsible for it.' When askedwhether he feared death the Sant said,



He is not a Sikh who fears death and hewho fears death is not a Sikh.'

Major-General Shahbeg Singh, theman who was masterminding the defenceof the Temple, was in the room too. Withis long years of experience of thendian army, the disgraced general didealise what the soldiers were up to.

When asked by Kirpekar when heexpected the action to start he replied,

Maybe tonight.'Major-General Shahbeg Singh was toight to the bitter end but about 200oung Sikhs escaped from the Golde

Temple that morning when the civilauthorities lifted the curfew to allowSikhs to celebrate the martyrdom oGuru Arjun, the builder of the Golden



Temple. Giani Bakshish Singh, whoived just behind the Akal Takht, sawhem going. To celebrate the martyrdom

of the Guru he had set up a stall givingglasses of sherbert to all comers. Hesays that the young men escaped dowhe gall or alley known as 'Baghwali' or Garden Gali, which leads out of the back of the hostel where Bhindranwale wasiving before he moved into the Akal

Takht. According to the Giani, womeniving in the nearby alleys took the youngmen in so that they could change froheir traditional Sikh clothes into bus

shirts and jeans or trousers. The womeburnt the Sikh robes to prevent thepolice or the army finding them. The

oung Sikhs stopped at Giani Bakshis



Singh's stall where he offered thesaffron-coloured sherbert because hecould not get the traditional redcolouring. They joked with him, saying,Gianiji, you have made us drink thecolour of martyrs.' The Giani said manyof them were carrying wads obanknotes.

When news of the young men'sescape reached the army the Generals

were livid. They ordered curfew to beeimposed and immediately transferredhe District Commissioner, the senior ocal administrator, who throughout theast months of the crisis had ofte

seemed more loyal to Bhindranwale thao the government. Most of the young

men who escaped were either criminals



or those left-wing extremists known asaxalites. It was the members of the

Sikh Students Federation, and iparticular the members oBhindranwale's own sect, the DamdamiTaksal, who stayed behind to fight.Some Sikhs who were inside the hostelcomplex at the time say thatBhindranwale deliberately sent thecriminals and Naxalites out of the

Temple so that they could conunue theight in the countryside. As one of thearmy's main tasks was to mop up theerrorists operating in Punjab villages,

allowing those 200 young men to escapewas a serious mistake. According to thegovernment's figures, Bhindranwale'serrorists had already killed 165 Hindus



and Nirankaris in the twenty-two monthssince the launching of the Akali Morcha.They had also killed 39 Sikhs becausehey had opposed Bhindranwale. Theotal number of deaths in violentncidents, including so-calledencounters' between the police andSikhs, riots, and the accident at the levelcrossing in which 34 supporters of theMorcha were killed, was 4IO. The

njured numbered 1,180.Operation Blue Star was conductedby the 9th Division commanded byMajor-General Kuldip Singh Brar. Noone could have been more offensive toBhindranwale than the good-looking,grey-haired war hero. He was a Sik rom the same area and the same caste as



Bhindranwale, who had committed thecardinal sin in the Sant's book of shavinghis beard and cutting his hair. Brar wasordered to move his Division froMeerut, the cantonment where the IndiaMutiny broke out, to Amritsar by 30thMay. On the next day, before the firingbetween the CRP and Bhindranwale'sollowers broke out, Brar wasecognised walking around the parikra-

ma, or pavement, surrounding the sacredank in the Golden Temple complex. Hemust have seen that the Temple and thehostel complexes were unusuallycrowded because pilgrims had alreadyarrived to celebrate the martyrdom oGuru Arjun. Sikhs were particularlyanxious to attend the festival that year



because it was followed by the fifth dayof the lunar month, an auspicious day tobathe in the Temple tank. General Brar must also have realised that theunusually large number of pilgrims in thewo complexes would make his task o

getting Bhindranwale out of the Templewithout killing or injuring innocentpeople very much harder. But theoperation went ahead.

Two distinguished retired Sikhgenerals of the Indian army havecriticised the decision to start theoperation on Guru Arjun's martyrdomday. Lieutenant-General Jagjit SinghAurora, the hero of Dacca, has said quitesimply that it was 'a bad choice', whileLt-General Harbaksh Singh who was



Colonel-in-Chief of the Sikh Regimentor twenty years suggested that the

decision was one of the factors whiced some Sikh soldiers to mutiny after he army action in the Golden Temple. In

a statement to the press he said: 'Themartyrdom day of Guru Arjun, being theepitome of supreme sacrifice in the faceof extreme religious persecution, has aspecial significance for the Sikh soldier.'

The government's explanation for starting the operation on a day so sacredo the Sikhs with all the risks onvolving innocent pilgrims in the battle

was that Bhindranwale was about tostart a well-organised campaign tomurder Hindus in villages throughout thePunjab. A senior official of the Home



Ministry told Satish Jacob thatntelligence officers had intercepted

messages from Bhindranwale andShahbeg Singh instructing their ollowers to start killing 'en masse' o

5th June. He also said Bhindranwale hadplans to kill all Punjabi MPs andMembers of the State Assembly.Although the government has never provided any hard evidence to back up

ts allegation that Bhindranwale wasplanning a massacre of Hindus, it is trueo say that the pace of the killings was

accelerating alarmingly. Twenty-threepeople were killed in the twenty-four hours before Mrs Gandhi made her broadcast.

After curfew was reimposed on the



night of 3rd June the army opened fireor the first time. I could hear the firingrom the hotel where I was staying but it

was impossible to see anything becauseof the buildings surrounding the Temple.Journalists in another hotel said theycould see that the Temple complex wasloodlit. I thought the battle had started

but I was wrong. Next morning the firingstopped. It had been a softening-up

operation. Major-General Brar and hisseniors still hoped they could scareBhindranwale out of his fortress.

Gurcharan Singh Tohra,Bhindranwale's former mentor, alsohoped that the Sant could be persuadedo throw in the towel. When the firing

stopped he crossed the road from the



hostel complex, walked past the Langar building where Bhindranwale shouldhave been holding his morningcongregation and the Gurudwara ManjiSahib where frightened pilgrims werehuddled together in small groups, andentered the Golden Temple complextself The President of the SGPC walkedound the marble pavement and came tohe Akal Takht. Its windows and arches

were now blocked up with bricks andsandbags. Young Sikhs had taken upiring positions in the shrine itself and ihe buildings on all sides of it. The

President of the SGPC was taken up tosee Bhindranwale. He tried to convincehe Sant that resistance would be futile,hat the army was determined to capture



or kill him if he did not surrender. ButBhindranwale angrily dismissed Tohra,elling him that he was an agent of Mrs

Gandhi. Tohra was now no better inBhindranwale's eyes than the other twomembers of the Akali Dal Trinity – Morcha Dictator Longowal, who wasstill in the Temple complex, and theeader of the party in the State

Assembly, Badal, who was on his farm

miles from Amritsar.Tohra's final attempt to persuadeBhindranwale to surrender agaisuggests that both he and Longowal wereby now collaborating with thegovernment. They must have been iouch with the army otherwise Tohra

would not have had the authority to



negotiate a surrender. Tohra also knewhat the army would not resume firing

when he left the comparative safety ohe hostel complex to cross to the Akal

Takht. The President of the SGPC wasnot the man to risk getting caught in theAkal Takht during the final battle.

Bhindranwale must have known thathe game was up by now; so why did hensist on fighting to the bitter end? He

had to die or face ignominy. If the Santhad surrendered he would have beeexposed as a cowardly braggart. He hadeft himself no honourable retreat.

Bhindranwale did have genuineeligious motives too. He was, for all

his faults, a zealot who believed in aeligion with a tradition of martyrdom, a



radition honoured only the day beforehis last chance to surrender by thecelebration of the martyrdom of Gur Arjun. He was being given a chance todie in the most honourable cause of all,he defence of the Golden Temple. The

Sant must have thought of the glory thatmartyrdom would bring to his memory.He knew that if he surrendered he wouldbe forgotten but if he died defending the

Temple he would be remembered for ever in the annals of Sikh history.Bhindranwale was also by now a bitter enemy of India. In his last interview withe journalist Sub-hash Kirpekar he was

asked, 'Is it your contention that Sikhscannot live in India?' The Sant replied,Yes. They can neither live in nor with



ndia. If treated as equals it may bepossible. But frankly speaking I don'think that is possible.' Bhindranwale

knew how fervently Sikhs were devotedo the Golden Temple. He knew what

strains on the unity of India an attack ohe Golden Temple would impose. He

knew that he could force the army toattack. He knew, because Major-GeneralShahbeg Singh had told him, that he

could hold out until the army was forcedo do severe damage to the Akal Takhtand probably to the Golden Temple too.So Bhindranwale had a cause wortdying for and nothing to live for. That issurely why the Sant refused to surrender.

Why did Longowal and Tohra notsurrender before the action started? They



were certainly not made of the stuff omartyrs. They showed that when thearmy entered the hostel complex duringhe battle itself. The two politicians did

not surrender earlier because the armydid not give them a chance to do so. TheGenerals were to say later that theymade many appeals for surrender after hey had surrounded the Temple. But

Bhan Singh, the Secretary of the SGPC,

old Satish Jacob that the appeals couldnot be heard inside the hostel complex.At one stage Longowal and Tohra didhear a broadcast on the radio saying thatcurfew was to be lifted for two hours toallow people to surrender. They sentBhan Singh to find the Deputy-Superintendent of Police and negotiate



he surrender of the pilgrims and theAkali Dal supporters who had come toake part in the renewed Morcha. Bha

Singh did leave the hostel but by the timehe reached the end of the Baghwali Galiheavy firing had broken out again and hean back. The two leaders could not

negotiate a surrender themselvesbecause by now they were onlyeceiving incoming calls.

Ranbir Kaur, a nineteen-year-oldwoman who was staying in a room of theGuru Ram Das Serai, or hostel, witwelve children from a religious school

she helped to run, also told me that shedid not hear any appeals by the army tosurrender or to come out of the hostel.When I asked her whether she ever



hought of making an attempt to get outon her own she replied, 'We thought wewere safer inside. We never thought theywould attack the Temple.'

The pilgrims were terrified by theiring of rifles, machine guns and

mortars. They did not know when theiring would stop and when it would

start again. Neither Tohra nor Longowalwere providing any leadership. So it

was at the least naive of the Generals tomagine that they would get mucesponse to loudspeaker appeals. The

hostel complex was eventuallyevacuated in the middle of the attack ohe Temple itself. During that rescue

operation many innocent people werekilled, many were injured, and many



were wrongly arrested. It was the leastcreditable part of Operation Blue Star.The tragedy could only have beeavoided if the hostels had beeevacuated before the attack on theGolden Temple complex started; but thatwas easier said than done. To evacuatehe hostels first would have meant

separating the two complexes. But botBhindranwale's men and his old rivals

he Babbar Khalsa had taken uppositions overlooking the hostels andndeed inside the hostels themselves.

Bhindranwale had also sent hisnterpreter Harminder Singh Sandhu to

Longowal's office to prevent hisurrendering. So any attempt to separatehe two complexes would almost



certainly have led to a battle in thehostels. That batde could easily havespread to the Temple too, forcing thearmy to enter Bhindranwale's strongholdbefore it was ready to do so.

A more serious problem was that oime. Separating the two complexes

would have delayed the main battle andLieutenant-General Sunderji who was ioverall command felt he could not take

he risk. From the moment that the armyaid siege to the Golden Temple on 3rdJune he was obsessed with speedbecause he was afraid of that uprising ihe countryside. Lieutenant-GeneralSunderji explained his fears to the

press after the operation.



We knew that they had plans to utilisethe innocent people, the religious-minded innocent people in thecountryside. That plan was to incitethese people to come to the GoldeTemple in thousands and to literallyswamp the surroundings as well asthe inside, thereby preventing mosteffectively any action we could havetaken to flush the terrorists out. This

was confirmed information. We evenintercepted messages going out to thecountryside. So any extended cordoor siege would have ended up witthis type of mass movement. The army did have good reason to

ear the Sikhs in the countryside. The



night after the Golden Temple wassurrounded a crowd of angry Sikhs frovillages near Amritsar stormed into theSultanwind area of the city and burneddown the shops and small factories oHindus. The strict curfew imposed byhe army had proved ineffective. Asension built up throughout Punjab, army

helicopters also spotted groups of angrySikhs gathering in many different places.

Troops were able to disperse them butnot without loss of life.On the night of 3rd June Punjab was

cut off from the rest of India andmovement inside the state brought to astandstill to prevent an uprising. Rail,bus and air services were stopped, teleand telephone lines cut, and the Pakista



border sealed. The Golden Temple wasnot the only gurudwara to besurrounded. On the same night the armysurrounded thirty-seven Sikh templeswhere they believed Bhindranwale'sollowers had sought sanctuary. In

Patiala the army met with considerableesistance from inside the Gurudwara

Dukhniwaran and so they decided toattack it. The operation, like the

operation in the Golden Temple, wascommanded by a Sikh general who hadorsworn his beard, Major-General

Gurdial Singh. The army says that twentypeople were killed in the Patiala

urudwara, but doctors at Patialahospital say that at least fifty-six peopledied. The army was disappointed by the



number of terrorists they captured andkilled in the thirty-seven guru-dwaras.Either Bhindranwale's men were not aswidely spread as the army had been ledo believe or most of them fled beforehe soldiers came.

Because all communications hadbeen cut on the night of 3rd June, nonews of what was happening in Punjabwas reaching the outside world.

Journalists were told to stay in their hotels; so we spent most of the daysitting on the lawn of the Ritz Hotelistening to a joint army/police network

on the FM band of our transistor radios.Troops were clearly being deployed for a major operation, but just how major Idid not appreciate at the time. I heard a



officer reporting that the artillery hadeached its position but I could not

believe that the army would use heavyguns in an area as congested as the oldcity of Amritsar. I thought that soldiersof the artillery must be being used asnfantry to seal off the Temple. I was to

be proved wrong.That night, the night before the army

aunched its attack on the Temple itself,

Superintendent of Police Sital Das cameo the Ritz Hotel to tell us that we wereo be driven out of Punjab in a police

bus. Most of the other journalists agreedo go but a few of us decided it was

worth a fight to see if we could at leaststay on until the next morning when wewould be able to see what was



happening in Amritsar and the rest oPunjab. A blazing row ensued duringwhich some of the journalists sided witSital Das. I felt sorry for him because Iknew that he had been harassed all dayby the army who did not try to hide their contempt for the police. When a senior army officer had learnt that there wereoreign correspondents still in Amritsar

he accused the police of revealing

military plans to the press. But I still felthe battle was worth fighting and so Ishouted at the police officer, 'I am notgoing to leave. You can arrest me.' Heshouted back, 'Yes, I will arrest you.You British think you can still rule usand tell us what to do.' It was auncomfortable moment because the last



hing I wanted after some sixteen yearsn independent India was to be accused

of being an imperialist. However Indias a land where tempers die down as

quickly as they flare up. Sital Das saidhe would consult the army. A brigadier arrived at the Ritz Hotel and it wasagreed that we should leave early nextmorning. There was no skin off anyone'snose and Sital Das and I celebrated this

happy compromise together, I with oneof the last of the bottles of beer that TinyMehra, the vast and genial host of theRitz Hotel, had in stock, the policeofficer with a soft drink because he wason duty.

The official ruling was that onlyoreign correspondents had to go



because foreigners had been barred frohe Punjab under the new regulations

brought in when the army took over esponsibility for security. Before weeft that rule was stretched to cover ndians working for foreign papers too.

However Brahma Chellaney, an Indianworking for Associated Press, managedo stay behind. He had only arrived i

Amritsar that day so his name was not o

he police list of journalists.Early the next morning we werebundled into a Punjab GovernmentRoadways bus which, judging by itsstate of dilapidation, was not intendedor use beyond Amritsar city limits. We

started off on our long drive down theGrand Trunk Road to the border o



Haryana. We stopped for about fiveminutes at a hotel near the GoldeTemple where a journalist had left hisape recorder. There we were able to

hear intermittent small arms fire and theoccasional whoof of a mortar. Everyalley had been sealed off by troops andwe were stopped three times by armyoad blocks before we even left the city.

As the sun rose I saw a spectacle I

had never expected – the Grand Trunk Road empty. During the five and a halhours it took us to drive to the border Idid not see a single civilian vehicle, noteven a bullock cart. The shops in thevillages we passed through were allclosed and most of the villagers were iheir homes. The only trains I saw were



roop trains. At every important roadunction we were stopped by an army

check-post. Our escorting officer was aowly Sub-Inspector and my friend Sital

Das had not given him that mostmportant of all pieces of equipment india, official papers, and so he had the

utmost difficulty in persuading armyofficers unused to these sort of duties toet us pass. He succeeded in the end and

we finally crossed the Punjab/Haryanaborder just before midday. Punjab wascut off from the rest of the world ipreparation for the final assault whicwas to start that evening.



12

Operation Blue Star

At seven o'clock on the evening of 5tJune, tanks of the 16th Cavalry Regimentof the Indian army started moving up tohe Golden Temple complex. They

passed the Jallianwala Bagh, the

enclosed garden where General Dyer



massacred nearly 400 people. Thatmassacre dealt a mortal blow toBritain's hopes of continuing to rulendia and was one of the most powerfulnspirations of the freedom movement.

When Mrs Gandhi was told thatOperation Blue Star had started, shemust have wondered whether it wouldprovide the decisive inspiration for theSikh independence movement, a

movement which at that time had veryittle support outside Bhindranwale'sentourage and small groups of Sikhsiving in Britain, Canada and the United

States.Major-General Brar had addressed

his men before he ordered them to enter he Golden Temple complex. He was



commanding a mixed bag of troops,epresentative of the widespreadecruiting pattern of the modern India

army, which has broken with the Britishradition of limiting recruitment to

certain 'martial castes'. There wereDogras and Kumaonis from the foothillsof the Himalayas, India's norther border. There were Rajputs, the desertwarriors from Rajasthan. There were

Madrasis from Tamil Nadu, one of themost southern states. There were Biharisrom the tribes of central India, and there

were some Sikhs. Major-General Brar old his men that entering the Golde

Temple complex was a 'last resort', thathey had to do it to 'stop the country

being held to ransom any longer'.



Bhindranwale was identified as 'theenemy', and the attacking force was toldhat he had 'seized control of the

Temple'. Every man was told that hemust not fire at either of the shrinesnside the Temple complex, the Golden

Temple and the Akal Takht, withoutdirect orders.

It was almost thirty years to the daysince Brar had joined the Maratha Light

nfantry as a lieutenant. He had fought ihe Bangladesh war under Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the Sikhgeneral who was to be one of the mostoutspoken critics of Operation Blue Star.Brar had been decorated for gallantry.He had also held an important staff postn the Defence Ministry, and was now



commanding one of the crack InfantryDivisions, the 9th. Brar was a stylissoldier with curly grey hair emergingrom under the beret he wore pulled

well down over his right ear.Brar's superior officer was Lt-

General Krishnaswamy Sunder ji, theGeneral Officer Commanding-in-Chief,Western Command. He had joined theMahar Regiment, a new regiment

designed to bring a 'non-martial' castento the army. During the 1965 war withPakistan, Sunder ji commanded abattalion and during the Bangladesh war he was a brigadier on the staff in theEastern Sector. Sunderji had alsocommanded the College of Combat atMhow, one of the most important



raining institutes of the Indian army. Hehad a reputation as a strategist, and wasn the running for the number one job, the

Chief of the Army Staff.Sunderji asked his Chief Staf

Officer, Lt-General Ranjit Singh Dayal,o draw up the plans for Operation Blue

Star. Dayal, like Brar, was a Sikh, but hehad not shaved his beard or cut his hair,and still wore a turban. Dayal was also

an infantry soldier, having served in the1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment,which was to spearhead the attack on theGolden Temple complex. During the1965 war with Pakistan, Dayal became aegend by capturing a pass which had

previously been thought to bempregnable, and blocking off one of the



most important routes from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir into the Indian stateof Jammu and Kashmir. A frontal assaultwas impossible and so Lt-GeneralDaval climbed up the mountain toweringover the Haji Pir Pass and came dowon top of the Pakistanis. He describedhe operation himself:

I then sought permission of my

commanding officer to capture theHaji Pir Pass. The permission wasgranted, and then began the marcforward. The enemy fired from twodirections. I sent one platoon tosilence the enemy guns. I and the restof my men continued to advance andreached Hyderabad Nullah by 7 p.m.



From then on it was bad going. The pass from there was a 4,ooo-foot-steep climb. It was raining heavily.The ground was slushy. I left the

beaten track and took another route.In fact, it was not a route at all. It wasa steep climb. Despite the heavyodds, we reached the road leading tothe pass at 4.30 a.m. on August 28. Idecided to give my men carrying guns

and batteries the much needed rest.After two hours, we again startedclimbing and at 8 a.m. we reached a

bund [embankment] near the pass. Leaving some men there to keepthe enemy engaged, along with therest of the party, I climbed another hill feature and from there rolled



down and stormed the enemy positioat the pass. The enemy fled iconfusion leaving their guns. By10.30 a.m. we were in completecontrol of the pass. 1

When he briefed the press after Operation Blue Star, Lt-GeneralSunderji described the orders thegovernment had given him:

I was told to flush out the extremistsfrom the Golden Temple with nodamage if possible to the Harmandir Sahib [Golden Temple] and as littleas possible damage to the AkalTakht. I was told to use the bare

minimum of force required for



achieving this object and that I was tominimise casualties to both sides. Iwas to try to prevent internecinefi ghting between the two major groups which were lodged inside, theone that of Jarnail SingBhindranwale and the second that oMr Longowal and his followers. Lieutenant-General Dayal told the

press, 'The principle of minimum forcewas to be applied throughout.' Hedescribed Operation Blue Star as 'aypical infantry operation' Dayal also

stressed that all troops were ordered noto damage the Golden Temple. He was a

deeply religious man who had beecoming to the Golden Temple to pray



since he was fourteen years old. TheLieutenant-General told the press that henever doubted that his men would obeyheir orders not to damage the shrine.

As all of you know, the Indian armyis a very religious army. Once theorders are given to them they followthem to the letter and once it was toldto them [not to damage the Golde

Temple] I was sure they will obeythis and I am proud to say they diduntil the end. Dayal also gave an example of the

piety of Indian army soldiers from hisown experience.



In 1965 [the war with Pakistan] wewent into an objective. There we sawsome cows grazing. Suddenly theshelling started. One cow got hurt bya shell and I saw a jawan [soldier]

pulling out his field dressing andapplying it to the cow. Lieutenant-General Sunderji also

stressed the religious aspect of the

operation. He said, 'We went inside withumility in our hearts and prayers on our ips. We in the army hold all places of eligion in equal reverence.'

To achieve his objectives of 'flushingout' the extremists from the GoldeTemple complex, doing minimumdamage to the shrines, and preventing a



battle breaking out in the hostel complex,Dayal drew up a twofold plan. Theessence of the plan was to separate thehostel complex from the Templecomplex, so that the hostels could beevacuated without becoming involved ihe main battle. To achieve his prime

objective of getting Bhindranwale out ohe Temple complex, Dayal had planned

commando operations. The commandos

were to be supported by infantry. Tankswere only to be used as platforms for machine-guns to neutralise fire on troopsapproaching the Golden Templecomplex, and to cover the Temple exitsn case anyone tried to escape.

Armoured personnel carriers were to bepositioned on the road separating the



hostels from the Temple complex tokeep the two potential battle fields apart.

The three Generals succeeded iachieving only one of their objectives.The Golden Temple complex wascleared, but to say that Bhindranwalewas flushed out would be, to put itmildly, an understatement. He wasblasted out of the Akal Takht by the 105mm. main armament of Indian Vijayanta

Victory) tanks. In the process much ohe Akal Takht, the shrine whichaccording to the original orders was tosuffer 'as little as possible damage', waseduced to rubble. At the start of the

operation troops had even beeorbidden to use automatic weapons

against the Akal Takht. The evacuadon



of the hostel complex was completed butnot without heavy civilian casualties.

The first task was the destrucdon oMajor-General Shahbeg Singh's outer defences. Much of this had beecompleted in the preliminary firing wheMajor-General Brar had hoped torighten Bhindranwale into surrendering.

These defences included the seventeehouses which the police had allowed

Bhindranwale's followers to occupy ihe alleys surrounding the GoldeTemple. Some of them were as far as800 yards away from the complex.These outposts were all in wirelesscontact with Shahbeg Singh's commandpost in the Akal Takht. The TempleView Hotel outside the Temple complex



had also been occupied. As its namemplies, it gave the Sikhs an excellent

vantage point from which to keep watcover the main entrance to the GoldeTemple, as well as a clear arc of fire.

ext to it was Brahmbuta Akhara, aarge building housing the headquarters

of a Sikh sect. This building alsocommanded the approach to the Goldei;Temple. Then there were three towers

which had been fortified to makepositions from which Bhindranwale'smen could fire into the Golden Templecomplex. Because they stood well abovehe rest of the buildings, the towers were

also excellent observation posts for watching the movement of troops in thenarrow alleys surrounding the Temple.



One of them was a water tower. Theother two were eighteenth-century brick watch towers which resembled minarets.The old towers stood eighty feet higand were near the Langar or dining hallon whose roof Bhindranwale hadaddressed so many congregations.

Major-General Brar said that heordered artillery to blast off the tops ohe three towers. However he decided

not to capture the seventeen housesbecause he did not have 'the resources todo so'. Firing continued from thesehouses for days after the Golden Templecomplex had been captured. The use oartillery in an area as crowded anddensely populated as the old city oAmritsar proved, not surprisingly, to be



very costly. Artillery is an 'areaweapon', used to kill and suppress fireover a wide area, and is not commonlyused against special targets. Severedamage was caused to several bazaars,but Brar had to secure the postscommanding the entrance to the Templeand the inside of the Temple itselbefore he could send his soldiers intohe historic headquarters of the Sik

eligion.It was only when he was convincedhe approaches to the Temple complex

were clear that Brar ordered the tanks tomove into the square in front of thenorthern entrance to the Golden Temple,known as the ghantaghar , or clockower entrance. One of the tank



commanders said, 'As soon as I turnedight from Jallianwala Bagh I heard theik-tik sound of shells landing on myank. Over the headphones I got the order o neutralise the fire.' According to the

Lieutenant of the 16th Cavalry, therewere four tanks and three armoured cars.He said that Shahbeg Singh appeared tobe monitoring their movements because,once the armour was in position, firing

rom the walls of the Temple stopped.The Lieutenant reported back to hiscommanding officer that the firing hadbeen neutralised. But as soon as theassault on the Temple started it becameclear that Shahbeg Singh's firepower was far from neutralised.

Meanwhile in the narrow alley



behind the Akal Takht, thoseparamilitary commandos who hadrained on the model of the Golde

Temple complex were trying to get intoBhindranwale's fortress. This operatiowas a dismal failure. Some commandosdid get on to the roof of the shrine, buthey were caught in the crossfire and hado withdraw. For some reason this part

of the operation was not mentioned at all

by the Generals when they briefed thepress after it was all over.It was between ten and ten-thirty i

he evening that Major-General Brar decided he must launch a frontal attack on the Akal Takht. Commandos from the1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment,wearing black denims, were ordered to



un down the steps under the clock tower on to the parikrama , or pavement, tur ight and move as quickly as they couldound the edge of the sacred tank to the

Akal Takht. But as the paratroopersentered the main gateway of the Templehey were mown down. Most of the

casualties were caused by Sikhs witight machine-guns who were hiding o

either side of the steps leading down to

he parikrama. The few commandoswho did get down the steps were driveback by a barrage of fire from thebuildings on the south side of the sacredpool. In the control room, in a house ohe opposite side of the clock-tower

square, Major-General Brar was waitinganxiously with his two superior officers



o hear that the commandos hadestablished positions inside thecomplex. When no report came throughe was heard over the command network saying, 'You bastards, why don't you gon.'

The few commandos who survivedegrouped in the square outside the

Temple, and reported back to Major-General Brar. He reinforced them and

ordered them to make another attempt togo in. The commandos were to beollowed by the 10rh Battalion of the

Guards commanded by a Muslim,Lieutenant-Colonel Israr Khan. Thisbattalion had Sikh soldiers in its ranks.The second commando attack managedo neutralise the machine-gun posts o



either side of the steps and get down oo the parikrama. They were followed

by the Guards who came under witheringire and were not able to make any

progress towards their objective, theAkal Takht. Lt-Colonel Israr Khanadioed for permission to fire back at the

buildings on the other side of the tank.That would have meant that the GoldeTemple itself, which is in the middle o

he tank, would have been in the line oire. Brar refused permission. He stillbelieved it would be possible to achieveall his objectives, including preservinghe Golden Temple and the Akal Takhtntact. But then he started to get

messages from the commander of theGuards reporting heavy casualties. They



had suffered almost 20 per centcasualties without managing to turn thecorner of the parikrama to the wester side of the complex where the AkalTakht is situated. The Guards were notonly being fired at from the northern andwestern sides. Sikhs would alsosuddenly appear from man-holes in the

arikrama the Guards were fightingrom, let off a burst of machine-gun fire

or throw lethal grenades, made in thecomplex itself, and disappear into thepassages which run under the Temple.These machine-gunners had been taughto fire at knee-level because Major-

General Shahbeg Singh expected thearmy to crawl towards its objective. Buthe Guards and commandos were not



crawling, and so many of them receivedsevere leg injuries.

Brar then decided on a change oplan. As he said after the battle, 'Iealised that it was difficult for this

battalion to progress operations anyurther and there was no point in theemaining at the ground-floor level.

Unless you got on to the first floor and tohe rooftop, and got it to control the

situation, you would continue sufferingcasualties. So the task given to thewas, under all circumstances, to get aodgement in spite of all the casualtieshey had suffered and I must give full

credit to the battalion commander, a verydashing young soldier, Lt-Colonel Israr Khan, who rallied his boys together and



worked his way up and did succeed igetting an allotment in this particular area.' That allotment enabled the Guardso neutralise some of the positions on the

south side of the tank, but they were stillhampered by the order not to fire in anydirection which would endanger either of the historic shrines.

In spite of the very heavy firing, someof the commandos did manage to get

ound that corner of the parikrama andmake their way to the courtyard in frontof the Akal Takht. But they fought their way into a lethal trap. The Akal Takhttself was heavily fortified; there were

sandbag and brick gun emplacements its windows and arches, and holes had

been made in its sacred marble to



provide firing positions. On either sideof the shrine are buildings whicoverlook the courtyard. They had beeortified too, as had the Toshakhana or

Temple Treasury opposite the AkalTakht and the houses which overlookedhe building from behind. So when the

commandos got into that courtyard,bullets rained down on them from allsides. They were driven back suffering

30 per cent casualties. The courtyard iront of the Akal Takht had been turned,n Major-General Brar's words, 'into a

killing ground'. To make matters worse,here was no sign of the Madrasis who

were meant to be entering the GoldeTemple complex from the southern sideo form the other half of a pincer



movement on the Akal Takht. When itbecame clear that the Madrasis hadeither got bogged down or lost in thenarrow alleys, Brar asked his superiorsor permission to use troops fro

another Division, the 15th. The infantryrom his own division was fully

deployed. The Guards were inside theTemple on the northern side, theMadrasis were trying to make their way

o the eastern entrance, the Kumaonswere clearing the hostel complex, andhe Bihars had thrown a cordon roundhe Temple. Their main responsibility

was to ensure that neither Bhindranwalenor any of his followers escaped.

Sunderji and Dayal agreed toeinforcing the operation and so two



companies of the 7th Garhwal Rifleswere put under Brar's command. TheGarhwals also come from the foothillsof the Himalayas in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Brar ordered them to enter theTemple from the southern side and try toelieve the pressure on the Guards andhe commandos on the northern side. As

soon as they entered the southern gatehey came under heavy fire. An officer o

he Garhwals said, 'They seemed to beiring on us from everywhere. It wasmpossible to know where to fire back.'

But the Garhwals did manage toestablish a position on the roof of theTemple library. Their commandingofficer reported this to his Brigadier,A.K. Dewan.



Dewan was very much a soldier'ssoldier, always wanting to be in thehick of it. His nickname was,

surprisingly, Chicken. Apparently hewas called Chicken when he was aofficer cadet because he had a very longand thin neck. The Brigadier should haveeft the fighting inside the complex to the

battalion officers, but he could not resisthe temptation to join in himself. The

Lieutenant-Colonel commanding theGarhwals tried to dissuade him, sayinghat his men were under very heavy fire,

but this was an added attraction for Dewan. When he got into the Temple heeported to Major-General Brar on the

wireless. Brar, whose temper waswearing a little thin by this time, could



be heard over the whole network shouting at Dewan: 'What the hell areou doing in there? I am in command ohis operation. You don't move without

my orders.'Then Brar calmed down and asked

Dewan to stay inside and let him have asitrep as soon as possible. Dewaealised that it was very unlikely that the

Guards and the commandos would be

able to achieve their objective. But hedid reckon that his position on thesouthern side was fairly secure and thatf he could reinforce it, he might be ableo storm the shrine. When he reportedhis back to Brar he was give

permission to call up two companies ohe 15 th Kumaons. By this time the



operation had been in progress for aboutwo hours and Brar was nowhere near

achieving his objective. His short, sharpcommando operation had got boggeddown; so he decided to allow Dewan toight his own battle inside the Temple

complex.Dewan made repeated attempts to

storm the Akal Takht but each time theKumaons or Garhwals turned the corner

of the parikrama and ran into thecourtyard in front of the Akal Takht, theycame under withering fire and had toetreat. Dewan himself was striding up

and down the southern side of thearikrama encouraging his men. But

heir task was impossible. Although bothhe northern and southern sides of the



arikrama were by now in the control ohe army, they had not been able to make

any impression on the main fortress andhe defences surrounding it, and the four

companies had suffered 137 casualties.Of course they were still hampered byhe order not to fire in any directio

which would endanger the GoldeTemple.

Dewan decided to wait for the

Madrasis who were still trying to get tohe Temple complex and then make oneast attempt to storm the Akal Takht. The

Madrasis eventually made it at abouthree o'clock in the morning, some five

hours late. They came into the Templecomplex through the gate on the hostelside. When they entered heavy firing



was still going on and it was dark. In theconfusion the Madrasis opened fire oDe-wan's troops. The Brigadier shouted,Don't shoot! I am the deputy GOC!'When that little 'cock-up', as one officer put it, had been sorted out, Dewaaunched his final attack.

There was no way anyone could getnto that fortress without taking out its

defences first. Dewan's repeated charges

were as futile as the charge of the LightBrigade, and he now realised it. He goton the wireless and told Brar that hewould have to call up tanks to bombardhe Akal Takht. He said, 'I can't afford toose any more men. I can't accept defeat.'

Brar later told the press his version owhat happened next:



The infantry was in danger of beingmassacred . . . Hesitatingly I had toask my superiors that I must take atank in. I cannot allow the infantrynow to get massacred. The infantry

just cannot carry on doing theimpossible task. I must say that thereaction was instantaneous and thatwas due to the fact that both my

commanders were sitting barelyfifteen metres away as the line osight is from the scene of action. Sunderji's reaction was not

nstantaneous. He first contacted Delhiwhere a special operations room hadbeen set up to keep track of the battle.





would have disastrous consequences ihe villages of Punjab and among Sikhsn the army. The only answer seemed to

be tanks. They were the only equipmentwith the firepower and the accuracy toblast a way into Bhindranwale's fortress.But tanks meant that the army would failn one of its tasks – the preservation ohe Akal Takht. They also meant the

horrifying prospect of one mistake by a

gunner seriously damaging the GoldeTemple itself. In the end Delhi agreedhat the tanks should be used and a

message was sent back to Lieutenant-General Sunderji, nearly two hours after Chicken Dewan had asked for them.

In the meanwhile Major-GeneralBrar had made one more effort to get his



men into the Akal Takht. He called up aSkot OT64 armoured personnel carrier.Tanks had to break down the stepseading to the parikrama from the hostel

side so that the eight-wheeled, Polish-built APC could get in. The aim was todrive the APC right up to the Akal Takhtso that the men from the mechanisednfantry, one of the newest units of thendian army, could get into the fortress

under the cover of its wall. But as thearmoured personnel carrier approachedhe Akal Takht it came under fire fromwo Chinese-made, rocket-propelled

grenade launchers. One of the grenadesound its target and the armoured

personnel carrier was knocked out. TheCaptain commanding the platoon was



wounded.This forced the Generals to rethink

heir strategy once again. They had nontelligence reports of Shahbeg Sing

having armour-piercing weapons at hisdisposal. Even the tanks, which had bynow made their way on to the parikramao await government clearance to opeire, were now at risk, although the

maximum armour of the tanks was more

han twice as thick as the APC's. Theanks had been trying to blind themarksmen in Bhindranwale's fortresswith their searchlights. As soon as Brar ealised that the enemy had armour-

piercing weapons, he ordered the tank commanders to switch off their searchlights. The tanks had ploughed up



he parikrama, each of whose marbleslabs was inscribed with the name of thedevotee who had donated it to theTemple.

The Vijayanta was the army's mainbattle tank, being an Indian-built versioof the Vickers 38-ton tank. When theorders came, they opened up with their main armament. Photographs of theshattered shrine indicate quite clearly

hat the Vijayantas 105 mm. mainarmaments pumped high-explosivesquash-head shells into the Akal Takht.Those shells were designed for useagainst 'hard targets' like armour andortifications. When the shells hit their argets, their heads spread or 'squash' oo the hard surface. Their fuses are



arranged to allow a short delay betweehe impact and the shells igniting, so that

a shock-wave passes through the targetand a heavy slab of armour or masonrys forced away from the inside of the

armoured vehicle or fortification.Lieutenant- General Jagjit Singh Aurora,who studied the front of the Akal Takhtbefore it was repaired, reckoned that asmany as eighty of these lethal shells

could have been fired into the shrine.The advantage of a tank's main armaments that it fires with pinpoint accuracy.ndian army officers talk of the

Vijayanta's ability to post shells throughetter-boxes.

The effect of this barrage on the AkalTakht was devastating. The whole of the



ront of the sacred shrine was destroyed,eaving hardly a pillar standing. Fires

broke out in many of the different roomsblackening the marble walls andwrecking the delicate decorations datingrom Maharaja Ranjit Singh's time. Theyncluded marble inlay, plaster and

mirror work, and filigree partitions. Thegold-plated dome of the Akal Takht wasalso badly damaged by artillery fire. At

one stage during the night Major-GeneralBrar had ordered his ColonelAdministration) to mount a 3.7-inc

Howell gun on to the roof of a buildingbehind the shrine and fire at the dome ian attempt to frighten the Sikhs intosurrender. Brar explained to hisColonel, 'Maybe the noise and the sting



will have its effect.'The artillery did not scare

Bhindranwale's men; but the tank barrage was a different matter. Theeffect it must have had is impossible tomagine. As shockwave after shockwaveocked the building, the gallant, i

misguided, defenders must have feared itwas going to come down on top of them.Deafened by the explosions, they were

driven to the back of the building by thelames and falling masonry. The deadlymachine-gun fire which had been rainingdown on the army stopped.

Still sporadic resistance continuedrom some of the buildings overlookinghe courtyard in front of the Akal Takht.

By now it was light and Brar decided it



was too dangerous to make the finalassault necessary to re-establish controlover the shrine from whicBhindranwale and Shahbeg Singh hadwithstood the Indian infantry attack. SoBrigadier Dewan was ordered not toollow up the tank attack until darknessell again. The three Generals at the

command post knew that they hadknocked out Bhindranwale's fortress, but

hey still faced the agonising possibilitvhat the Sant himself might have escaped.After the battle Brar told the press

hat only one tank had been driven on tohe parikrama , and that it had only firedts secondary armament, a 7.62 mm.

machine-gun. But the dam age to theAkal Takht tells a different story. There



was no machine-gun which could havebrought down so much masonry, and theshell marks were clearly those of high-explosive squash-heads. As for thenumber of tanks involved, other officersSatish Jacob talked to said that as manyas six were brought into the complex. Asone Vijayanta only carries forty-four ounds of main armament ammunition, its certain that more than one was used. It

also seems likely that the gunners firedrom more than one position because theGolden Temple itself was in their arc oire, standing as it does in the middle ohe sacred tank.

The battle for the Akal Takht was nothe only one raging that night. Across theoad running along the eastern side of the



Golden Temple complex, another battalion of the Kumaon Regiment wasnvolved in the second operation that

Lieutenant-General Sunderji had beeordered to carry out. He had been toldby the government to 'prevent internecineighting between the two major groupsodged in the Temple and the hostel

complexes, the one of Jarnail SingBhindranwale and the second of Mr

Longowal and his followers'. To preventhe two groups fighting each other, theGenerals had decided that the hostelcomplex housing Longowal and his memust be cleared at the same time as theGolden Temple.

The first problem was to get into thecomplex. The iron gates at the top of the



public road between the hostels and theTemple had been barred. A tank had tobreak them down. Armoured cars werehen positioned along that road to

separate the two battlefields, and the 9tKumaons moved in. They came under ire from the roofs on both sides of theoad but unlike their colleagues insidehe Temple complex, they managed toight their way into the buildings they

had been ordered to clear.Most of the terrified pilgrims,supporters of the Akali Morcha, and ocourse the two members of the AkaliTrinity with their staff were huddledogether in two buildings. They were

without water because the water tower had been destroyed during the



preliminary operations, and withoutelectricity. Longowal, Tohra, and someof their senior colleagues were iTohra's office on the ground floor of theTeja Singh Samundari Hall. The SGPCSecretary, Bhan Singh, later describedhe situation in that building:

They cut our electricity and water supplies. It was very hot in the

rooms. There was no water. We hadonly two plastic buckets of water.Longowal had to place two people asguards over the buckets. Many peoplewould squeeze their undershirts todrink their sweat to quench their thirst.



The army entered the Teja SinghSamundari Hall at about one o'clock ihe morning. According to one officer,

Tohra and Longowal were in their vestsand underpants. The army says theysurrendered. Bhan Singh did not accepthat statement. He said, 'We did not give

ourselves up. The army forced its way iand took us prisoners.' That is really justa matter of semantics. What is absolutely

clear is that Longowal and Tohra madeno attempt to resist the army.The Akali leaders were kept inside

one of their offices. The rest of thepeople in the building were ordered tocome out and sit in a courtyard of theGuru Ram Das Hostel. According toBhan Singh, there were about 250 o



hem. Some terrorists, seeing the peoplepouring out of the offices andsurrendering, threw a grenade at them.Bhan Singh explained what happened.

Suddenly there was a big explosion.All hell broke loose. It was pitcdark. People started running back intothe verandah and the rooms. I andAbhinashi Singh were sitting next to

Gurcharan Singh, the former Secretary of the Akali Dal whomBhindranwale accused of murderingSodhi. Gurcharan was shot as hetried to run inside. We realised thatsoldiers were shooting at us. Theythought someone from among thecrowd had exploded the grenade. But



it was probably thrown by extremistson the water tank overlooking theGuru Ram Das Serai [Hostel], Weran to Tohra's room and toldLongowal what was happening.Longowal came out and shouted atthe Major. He said, 'Don't shoot these

people. They are not extremists. Theyare employees of the SGPC.' TheMajor then ordered his men to stop

shooting. Later in the morning wecounted at least seventy dead bodiesin the compound. There were womeand children too. The White Paper admitted that

seventy people including thirty womeand five children died in that incident;



but the government put all the blame ohe terrorists, saying nothing about the

army firing.According to Bhan Singh, the

survivors were made to sit in thecourtyard of the Guru Ram Das Hosteluntil curfew was lifted the next evening.He said they were not given food, drink or medical aid. Some people, accordingo the SGPC Secretary, drank water

which had poured out of the tank thearmy had blown up and had formedpuddles in the courtyard. Karnail Kaur, a

oung mother of three children, who hadcome with sixty-five other people froher village to join in Longowal'sagitation, said, 'When people begged for water some jawans [soldiers] told the



o drink the mixture of blood and urineon the ground.'

Bhan Singh also told the journalistand historian, Khushwant Singh, that thearmy did shoot some of the young mehey had brought out from the Teja Singh

Samundari Hall. He said: I saw about thirty-five or thirty-siSikhs lined up with their hands raised

above their heads. And the major wasabout to order them to be shot. WheI asked him for medical help, he gotinto a rage, tore my turban off myhead, and ordered his men to shootme. I turned back and fled, jumpingover bodies of the dead and injured,and saved my life crawling along the



walls. I got to the room where Tohraand Sant Longowal were sitting andtold them what I had seen. Sardar Karnail Singh Nag, who hadfollowed me, also narrated what hehad seen, as well as the killing othirty-five to thirty-six young Sikhs bycannon fire. All of these young menwere villagers. 2

But not everyone the army rounded upn the Teja Singh Samundari Hall wasnnocent. Among those who surrendered

was Bhindranwale's talkative youngnterpreter, Harminder Singh Sandhu,

who was also the General Secretary ohe All India Sikh Students Federation.

When I had seen him on the day before



he army action started, he had boasted,Every one of Santji's followers will laydown their lives to save the GoldeTemple.' But when the time cameHarminder Singh Sandhu surrenderedmeekly.

Inside the Guru Ram Das Hostel,where the rooms were crowded witpilgrims, conditions were reminiscent ohe Black Hole of Calcutta. The school

eacher Ranbir Kaur and her husbandhad locked themselves into Room 141with the twelve children they wereooking after. Ranbir Kaur said:

We were all huddled together. Wedidn't know what was happening. Thenoise was terrifying. We had not bee



out of the room for more than twenty-four hours and we had no food or water. It was a very hot summer night. I told the children that we must

be ready to die. They kept on crying. The Kumaon Regiment also entered

he Hostel at about one o'clock in themorning and ordered everyone to comeout; but this was not the end of their

ordeal. Ranbir Kaur described whathappened next. Early on the sixth morning the armycame into the Guru Ram Das Seraiand ordered all those in the rooms tocome out. We were taken into thecourtyard. The men were separated



from the women. We were alsodivided into old and young womeand so I was separated from thechildren, but I managed to get back tothe old women. When we were sittingthere the army released 150 peoplefrom the basement. They were askedwhy they had not come out earlier.They said the door had been lockedfrom the outside. They were asked to

hold up their hands and then theywere shot after fifteen minutes. Other young men were told to untie their turbans. They were used to tie their hands behind their backs. The armyhit them on the head with the butts otheir rifles.



The people in the basement wereMuslims from Bangladesh who hadnothing to do with the Akali agitation.They were non-Bengalis known asBiharis, who had sided with the Pakistaarmy during the liberation struggle i1971, and had been living in refugeecamps in Bangladesh for the last thirteeears. The Pakistan government hadefused to accept responsibility for any

more Biharis and so Bhindranwale andhis followers were operating aprofitable sideline smuggling theacross the border.

Two young Sikhs, Sardul Singh andMaluk Singh, who had gone to theGolden Temple to celebrate GuruArjun's martyrdom day, were not



eleased when the army entered thehostel. An elder from their village wroteo the Sikh President of India, Zail

Singh, about their experiences. In hisetter the elder, Sajjan Singh

Margindpuri, said: The young men and some other

pilgrims were staying in Roo Number 61. The army searched all

the rooms of the Serai. Nothingobjectionable was found from their room. Nor did the army find anythingobjectionable on their persons. Thearmy locked up sixty pilgrims in thatroom and shut not only the door butthe window also. Electric supply wasdisconnected. The night between June



5th and June 6th was extremely hot.The locked-in young men felt verythirsty after some time, and loudlyknocked on the door from inside toask the army men on duty for water.They got abuses in return, but nowater. The door was not opened.Feeling suffocated and extremelythirsty, the men inside began to faintand otherwise suffer untold misery.

The door of the room was opened at8 a.m. on June 6th. By this time fifty-five out of sixty had died. Theremaining five were also semi-dead. The five survivors of that night o

horror were arrested by the army and

aken away to interrogation camps. So



were Ranbir Kaur, her husband, and thechildren in their care. Two months later hree of the children that Ranbir Kaur

had been looking after were releasedafter a well-known social worker hadiled a petition in the Supreme Court i

Delhi. Ranbir Kaur was released at theend of August. She rejoined the threechildren who had been released but noone could tell her what had happened to

he other nine.Speaking later of the battle of thehostel complex, Major-General Brar said:

The terms of reference given to me asfar as this side was concerned wereto take them to battle only if forced to



do so, to protect the maximunumber of lives, and to ensure that allinnocent people came out alive. I aglad to say that by isolating this areafrom the main complex we were ableto achieve that aim. That claim is not borne out by eye-witness accounts.



13

The Golden Temple,6th June

Throughout the battle for the GoldeTemple, Sewadar, or temple servant,Hari Singh had been hiding with abouthirty other people in the room in the



Akal Takht where the Guru Granth Sahibthe Sikh scriptures) is solemnly laid toest every night. Miraculously, althought is in the front of the shrine, it was not

badly damaged. After the tank barrageended Amrik Singh, who was the son ohe Sant's teacher and masterminded so

many of the brutal murders committed byBhindranwale's followers, came into theoom and said, 'Now we can't matc

anks. You can get out. We will stayhere.' Fifteen minutes later the Santhimself came into the room with forty-ive of his followers. He went into the

main hall where he prayed before theAkal Takht, the throne of the Gurus, andhen said to the survivors, 'Those who

want to be shahid [martyrs] can stay



with me. Those who want to surrender can leave now.'

About thirty people followedBhindranwale as he picked his wayhrough the rubble towards the front ohe Akal Takht. They jumped into the

courtyard and, according to the sewadar,were greeted by a burst of fire. Some ohem tried to make a dash for the

gateway leading to the Golden Temple,

others ran in the direction of thebuildings on the northern side of thecomplex. Amrik Singh fell immediatelybut some continued running. Then therewas another burst of fire and the templeservant saw twelve or thirteen moreoung men fall. After that he decided that

his position was too exposed and moved



nto the back of the Akal Takht to theoom of Ram Singh, one of the priests.

The Head Priest Pritam Singh was alsohiding there. Soon a group oBhindranwale's followers came into theoom and said, 'Amrik Singh has gained

martyrdom.' Asked about the Sant, theyeplied, 'We did not see him die.' Theoung Sikhs then took off their raditional clothes, put on bush shirts and

rousers, and escaped through the back of the shrine. There was a bambooadder connecting the Akal Takht withhe buildings outside. Whether any of theoung men managed to get through the

cordon of the Bihar Regiment is notknown.

Tarlochan Singh, a senior official o



he President of India, was told by oneof the priests of the Akal Takht thatBhindranwale was shot in the thigh whehe ran out of the Akal Takht, but wascarried back into the building. One of thesenior army officers inside the compleconfirmed to Satish Jacob that soldiersdid fire on a group of young men whoan out of the Akal Takht. He could not

say whether Bhindranwale was one o

hem. He also said that some young mewho had been holding out near theLangar, on the opposite side of thecomplex, jumped into the sacred tank and tried to swim to the Golden Templetself because they knew the army would

not fire on it. But no survivor actuallysaw Bhindranwale or Shahbeg Sing





Akal Takht It could be that the soldierswere simply reporting that they had seehe bodies lying in front of the Akal

Takht, and that they did not know wherehey had been found originally.

One of the most controversialncidents of the whole operation was the

burning of the Golden Temple librarywith its invaluable manuscripts,ncluding copies of the Guru Grant

Sahib handwritten by some of the Gurus.According to a senior army officer present at the time, Brigadier Dewan andhis men were eating puris , friedchapattis, for their breakfast just outsidehe library gate when a sniper fired athe Brigadier, narrowly missing him.

The Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the



Madras Battalion grabbed a machine guand returned the fire. The snipers rarom window to window of the library,aking pot shots at soldiers, and the army

did not manage to get the three men untilour o'clock in the afternoon. Accordingo the officer, the library caught fire

during this operation. However BhaSingh, the Secretary of the SGPC, saidhat he saw the library intact the next

morning.Many Sikhs believe that the armydeliberately set the library on fire. For nstance, Ashok Singh, who runs the Sik nstitute in Chandigarh, said, 'Any army

which wants to destroy ? nation destroysts culture That's why the Indian army

burnt the library.' According to the



Government White Paper, the librarycaught fire when the army entered theTemple complex through the southerngate, hours before General Dewan andhis men had their breakfast. The WhitePaper said:

The terrorists were firing from anumber of machine-gun positions ithe library building and were hurling

country-made grenades, lighting thewith match sticks. A fire was noticedat this stage in the library. Troop fire-fighting parties were repeatedlyrushed to put out the fire but theseattempts were foiled by the heavymachine-gun fire from the terrorists.By the time the terrorist positions



could be overcome, the library had been gutted. The conflict between the account

given by the officer who witnessed theburning of the library and the WhitePaper, inevitably casts doubt on theofficial version. Nevertheless it is verydifficult to believe that an army whicdid obey orders to refrain from firing at

he Golden Temple itself would havedeliberately set a building as importantas the library on fire.



18 Above, the body of

Bhindranwale laid out on



ice within the precincts of the Golden Temple

19 Below left, Sikhs taken prisoner by the army duringOperation Blue Star weremade to sit with their hands

tied behind their backs20 Below right, President ZailSingh, accompanied bysenior army officers,

visiting the Golden Templeshortly after Operation BlueStar, even though sniperswere still present







21 Above, Rajiv Gandhi inCalcutta on the morning of his mother's assassination,listening to the news on theBBC

22 Below, Mrs Gandhi on her

funeral pyre at thecremation site on the bank of the river Jumna in Delhi



By late afternoon on the sixth, the

army was in control of the situation iboth complexes and curfew was liftedor two hours. Major-General Brar, who



was inside the Temple complex by thisime, knew that people were still hidingn the Golden Temple itself and in some

of the rooms in the buildings surroundinghe parikrama. So he sent officers toorder them to surrender. One of thosenside the Golden Temple was the priest

Giani Puran Singh. He gave Satish Jacobhis description of what happened in the

Golden Temple.

I went to the Harmandir Sahib[Golden Temple] on 5th June around7.30 in the evening because I had toensure that religious ceremonieswere performed. The moment Istepped on to the parikrama stumbled across a body. Bullets were



flying and I had to take shelter behindeach and every pillar to reach theDarshani Deorhi [the arch at theentrance of the causeway leading tothe Golden Temple]. Another bodywas lying there. I ran a few yards andreached the Akal Takht. Night

prayers start at the Harmandir Sahibfive minutes after they start at theAkal Takht. I wanted to find out if the

path [recitation] had started there. Ihad a glimpse of Bhindranwale. Wedid not speak to each other. Around7.45 I came out of the Akal Takht andran into the Darshani Deorhi. I ratowards the Harmandir Sahib,unmindful of the bullets flying pastmy ears. I began night prayers. Soo



a colleague of mine, Giani MohaSingh, joined me. Seeing the intensityof the fire we decided to close all thedoors, barring the front door. Soonwe completed all religious rites. Wethen took the Guru Granth Sahib tothe top room to prevent any damageto the holy book. The Head Priest,Giani Sahib Singh, had given clear instructions that under no

circumstances was the Guru GrantSahib to be taken to the Akal Takht if the conditions were not right.

Looking through the window-panefrom the first floor of the Harmandir Sahib, I saw a tank standing on the

parikrama with its lights on. I thoughtfor a moment that it was the fire



brigade come to collect water frothe sarowar [holy pool] to put out thefire which was raging in almost everyroom. A few minutes later my belief was shattered when I saw the vehicleemitting fire instead of putting it out.By 10.30 or so around thirteen tankshad collected on the parikrama. Theyhad come after crushing the staircasefrom the eastern wing where Gur

Ram Das Serai, the Langar and theTeja Singh Samundari Hall aresituated. One after another the cannofire lit the sky. When the first shell hitthe bottom of the Darshani Deorhi,creating a hole in it, I saw the roowith the historic chandni [canopy]

presented by Maharaja Ranjit Sing



catching fire. One after another big bombs hit the Darshani Deorhi iquick succession, and what was oncea lovely building was now on fire.The Toshakhana [Treasury] was alsoon fire. Occasionally a bullet wouldhit the Harmandir Sahib. We weretwenty-seven people inside, mostlyraagis [those who chant thescriptures] and sewadars [Temple

servants].In the early hours of the morningon 6th June we took the holy book down and performed the religiousrites that are performed every day,like maharaj da prakash karrta[unfolding the holy book] and recitinghymns from the scriptures. The two



side-doors were closed and the frontand the back doors were open.Bullets kept hitting the wall botinside and outside, ripping off thegolden surface at various places.Soon after we finished reciting

prayers one of our colleagues, RaagiAvtar Singh, was hit. We pulled himinto a corner. Another bullet cameand hit the holy Granth Sahib. We

have preserved this book.In the meanwhile the pounding othe Akal Takht was continuing. Therewas no let-up in the fire in other

places either. We were thirsty anddesperate for water. We crawled tothe holy pool to get water for ourselves and for the wounded



colleague.Around 5 p.m. they announced o

loudspeakers that those hiding in theHarmandir Sahib should come outand that they would not be shot dead.While myself and Giani Mohan Singremained inside, others walked outwith the arms above their heads. Our colleagues informed Major-GeneralBrar that we were still inside. Brar

asked us to come out. Around 7.30 p.m. an officer and two soldiers cameinside to take us.

When we came out Major-GeneralBrar asked us why we did not obeyhis orders. We told him that we couldnot have left the costly belongingsand Guru Granth Sahib alone. We



asked him to let us go to the toilet. Heagreed to this. We were then escorted

back to the Harmandir Sahib by aSikh officer and some soldiers. Thisofficer was rude and he told us towalk in front to make sure that ianyone fired from inside, we wouldget killed. Since no one was hidingwithin and there was no gun in theHarmandir Sahib, we saw no harm i

doing what we were told. It musthave been around 8.30 that night. Inoticed Avtar Singh had moved out othe Harmandir Sahib and was lyingwith his head towards the HolyGranth and his legs stretched towardsthe eastern gate. The officer wasashamed of his behaviour when he



could not find any guns inside theHarmandir Sahib. By the time wecame down Avtar Singh was dead.Leaving two of us right there, theofficer and the soldiers, who hadtaken off their shoes before comingin, went out.

Next morning the two of us wereescorted to Giani Sahib Singh's house[the Head Priest of the Golde

Temple] in Atta Mandi. While wewere instructed not to move out or tospeak to anyone, Giani Sahib Singwas escorted to the Harmandir Sahib.

Giani Puran Singh's story is

confirmed by the fact that one of thecopies of the Sikh scriptures in the



Golden Temple that night did have bulletholes through its pages. But all theevidence goes to suggest that he wasconfused about the timing of the arrivalof the tanks. He said they were on the

arikrama by 10.30, while all other eports say they arrived later. He is alsohe only person to put the number oanks as high as thirteen.

Puran Singh insists that there were no

arms inside the Golden Temple, whilehe three Generals commanding theoperation maintain that the army wasired on from the shrine. The retired Sik

Lieutenant-General, Jagjit Singh Aurora,said he could find no evidence oprepared positions in the shrine when hevisited it, but he accepted that the shrine



might have been used 'as an occasionalire post by mobile pickets'.

What is certain is that there werebullet holes in the Golden Temple.Three hundred of them have beecounted. Some of those were caused byhe firing of the Central Reserve Police

before the army operation started. Manyothers must also have been the result oerratic firing by the defenders of the

Golden Temple complex. The mostmportant fact is that the structure of theGolden Temple remained intact, and thathe damage it did suffer was minimal

compared to the Akal Takht, the library,he Darshani Deorhi and many other

buildings of the complex. To that extenthe operation was a success and credit



must go to the discipline of the army.The 40-foot-square Temple stood in themiddle of the battlefield. The army wasired at from all sides. If soldiers had

disregarded Major-General Brar'sorders, the Harmandir Sahib wouldcertainly have been much more seriouslydamaged.

When curfew was lifted on theafternoon of 6th June, nearly 250 people

who had been trapped in rooms in theTemple complex overlooking thearikrama surrendered. One of the

was Narinderjit Singh Nanda, the PublicRelations Officer of the Temple, whohad once been described byBhindranwale as 'a literate moron' for suggesting that starting a newspaper was



a better way to secure the rights of theSikhs than armed revolution. Nandaelated his experience to Satish Jacob.

On the fifth night, the night of the realassault, mortars started throwing up

plaster. My wife and I and my twodaughters decided to go down froour flat on the first floor to the office,which is on the ground floor. At this

point I thought of surrendering but Iwas told by a Bhindranwale man,'One more step outside the compleand you are a dead man.' Faced witthis threat to my entire family plus theinsecurity of the office room, Idecided to move down to a small

basement where there was a fridge.





most of the walls. But luckily weescaped. We spent the night under thestaircase. Eventually at about 11 a.m.on the sixth my wife noticed aofficer standing outside. She calledout to him to attract his attention andrequested him to rescue us. She toldhim she had two young daughters.The officer behaved decently andsaid, 'Don't worry. I too have two

daughters. Nothing will happen toyou. Stay put.' He organisedchapattis, pickles and drinking water.He eventually let us out when curfewlifted.

We had to step over dead bodiesstrewn everywhere. We were takento the square in front of the



ghantaghar [the main, clock tower entrance]. The minute the soldierssaw me, a male member of the group,they positioned their rifles on their shoulders with the barrels pointing atme. I think they were about to shootwhen a brigadier who recognised meintervened. We were then led bysoldiers across the parikrama to thelibrary side. A lieu tenant

accompanied us. Upon reaching theother side he asked me to standagainst the wall and lined up a firingsquad. He asked me to say my

prayers. I requested to say goodbyeto my wife and the two daughters. Atthis point the brigadier showed upagain and shouted at the young



officer, 'What the hell are you doing!'The officer said, 'Sir, Imisunderstood your order. I thoughtthis man was to be shot.'

Now we were made to sit on theground. My hands were tied behindmy back. We were about seventy inthat lot. All of us were told to keepour heads down. A slight movementof the head resulted in a sharp rifle

butt. We spent the whole night sittingthere. After dealing with all the officials o

he Temple – the priests, the raagis, thewadars and the office workers likeanda – who had surrendered, the army

once again turned its attention to the



Akal Takht. The sniping from there haddied down but Major-General Brar wasstill not willing to risk losing any moreives by sending his men into the shrinen daylight. He waited for dusk to fall

before giving orders to stor Bhindranwale's fortress and shootanyone they found inside. The infantryencountered very little resistance andentered the charred Akal Takht. The

loors of the shrine were littered witspent cartridges (one officer said theywere nine inches deep); bodies laywhere they had fallen; the stench odeath was in the air. When the officer commanding the party reported thatBhindranwale's fortress had finallyallen, Brar set a guard on it and decided



o wait for daylight before starting tosearch the premises. According to thearmy, it was during that search on theseventh morning that Bhindranwale,Shahbeg Singh and Amrik Singh's bodieswere found in the basement.

Bhindranwale was cremated at sevehirty-nine on the evening of 7th June,

according to an army officer who was oduty at the cremation. A crowd of about

10,000 people had gathered near theTemple but the army held them back.The bodies of Bhindranwale, Amrik Singh and Thara Singh, the deputy headof the Damdami Taksal, were brought tohe pyre just outside the Temple. Four

police officers lifted the body oBhindranwale from the lorry which had



brought it from the mortuary and carriedt reverently to the pyre. According tohe officer, many of the policemen at the

cremation were weeping. One of theobjected to Captain Bhardwaj, theofficer in charge, smoking. He replied,Look up. At least thirty men arecovering me.' Bhardwaj insisted oifting the sheet to make sure it was

Bhindranwale. The officer overheard

Bhardwaj asking the police why theSant's body was so badly battered. Apolice officer replied, 'The extremistsbroke his bones.' There is however someconfusion over the timing oBhindranwale's cremation because hispost-mortem report says that the bodywas not brought into the mortuary until



seven-thirty and was not examined untileight o'clock. The report saidBhindranwale was 'alleged to have diedas a result of firearms' injuries'.

There are doubts about the accuracyof the post-mortem reports. According toMajor-General Shahbeg Singh'spostmortem, his body was not brought tohe mortuary until the ninth. The report

says that by then it was not possible to

do a full post-mortem because odecomposition and putrifaction. Butphotographs show that the armydiscovered Shahbeg Singh's body wellbefore it had started to decompose. It isdifficult to understand why the armywould want to keep the retired general'sbody until it had putrified. Both the army



and the police had an interest in gettingas accurate a post-mortem as possible. Itcould be that the army wanted to crematehe bodies at the first opportunity to

prevent any possibility of their beingdiscovered – there is a no more potentcause of a riot than a dead body – and sodispensed with the formality of the post-mortems. If this was so, the reportswhich were eventually seen and

photocopied must have been convenientafterthoughts.When Shahbeg Singh's son, Prabpal

Singh, rang the Governor of Punjab andasked to be allowed to attend his father'scremation, the Governor said that therewere thousands of others who wanted toattend the cremations and if he gave



permission to Shahbeg Singh's son toattend, all the others would also have tobe given permission, and that was notpossible. When Prabpal Singh askedwhether he could have his ashes, he wasold that the government would 'immersehe ashes in one of India's sacred rivers'.

There is no record of the last rites oShahbeg Singh. He may well have beecremated with the other bodies found i

he Temple and hostel complexes. Themunicipal sweepers at first refused toclear them away. They were eventuallypersuaded by offers of rum and by beingallowed to strip the bodies of allvaluables. They piled the dead intogarbage lorries and took them to thecremation ground.



The army, according to the WhitePaper, lost eighty-three men includingour officers. Twelve officers and 237

men were injured. Many people haveclaimed the army casualties were muchigher. The journalist Kuldip Nayar, inhis book Tragedy of the Punjab, saynearly 700 men and officers died in theoperation. He quotes a statement madeby Rajiv Gandhi three months after the

operation. But Rajiv Gandhi later withdrew that statement which certainlyseems far too high.

Estimates that we have made showhat the official figure is near the truth.

The only units to suffer significantcasualties were those which stormed theAkal Takht. The total number of infantry



companies involved in that sector of thebattle was six on the south side of the

arikrama and three on the north. Thestrength of one infantry company is about200. It is certain that not all the men ihe companies would have been obayonet strength'. The number of activenfantrymen could well have been just

50 per cent. The Para Commandos, whowere the only other troops involved i

he entry into the Golden Templecomplex, numbered eighty. That meanshe total number of troops taking part ihe attack must have been around 1,000.

The Government White Paper admits to332 casualties. That means, on thegovernment's own admission, thepercentage of casualties was about a



hird. That is well above the limit whics usually regarded as acceptable in any

army. Had the casualties beensignificantly higher it is difficult to seehow the units could have continuedighting. As it is the figures indicate

gallantry of the highest order.The Para Commandos, who came

rom the Parachute Regiment, sufferedhe most. Their casualties were nearly

50 per cent. The Regiment did notcelebrate its Raising Day that year as amark of respect for the seventeecommandos who died. The Guards alsosuffered very heavy casualties. Major-General Brar admits that twentyguardsmen were killed and sixty injuredn just one assault. A senior officer told



Satish Jacob that the six companies witBrigadier Dewan suffered 137casualties. Those figures indicate thathe official tell is about right. All of the

officers Satish Jacob talked to alsoaccepted the White Paper's figures.

Unfortunately the same cannot be saidor the civilian casualties. The proble

here is that the army and the police madeno attempt to identify the dead; they

were just cremated en masse. Fantasticumours started circulating about thenumber of people who died, someputting the figure as high as 3,000. Table1 shows the figures we have been ableo collect for people who were inside,he two complexes on 3rd June whehey were surrounded by the army.



We know that 200 followers of Bhindranwale escaped on 3rd June whecurfew was lifted. Some people alsosurrendered from the hostel side whehe army ceased firing temporarily on theifth just before the operation started.

Eye-witnesses put the figure at betwee200 and 400. That still means there weremore than 3,000 people inside the twocomplexes during the main battle.





According to eye-witnesses about

250 people surrendered in the Templecomplex and 500 in the hostel compleafter the two battles were over. TheWhite Paper says that 493 people werekilled and eighty-six injured. Theseigures leave at least 1,600 people

unaccounted for. It would obviously bewrong to assume that they were killed i

he battle, but there must be a bigquestion mark over the official figures ocivilian casualties in the operation, aigure which is appallingly high anyhowor an operation conducted by an army

against its own people.It is very doubtful whether Mrs

Gandhi would have ordered the army to



enter the Golden Temple if she hadknown that there would be such higcasualties and that tanks would have tobe used against the Akal Takht. So whatwent wrong? The most obvious factor was poor intelligence. The Generalswere misled about the arms, the militaryskill, and, above all else, the will toight of Sant Jarnail Sing

Bhindranwale's followers. Lieutenant-

General Sunderji himself admitted tome, 'There was some failure ontelligence.' The army did not eve

know the layout of the Golden Templecomplex. A junior officer told SatishJacob what that meant:

Our biggest problem was that we



didn't know the layout. We had ageneral picture of the inside of theTemple complex but we didn't reckonwith the myriad of niches, rooms,

basements and awnings. We werefired upon from literally every nook and corner. It is not clear why the army's

ntelligence about the layout of the

Temple was so poor. Right up to the daywhen the army surrounded the Temple,Bhindranwale never made any attempt toprevent pilgrims entering the Temple.They were expected to walk all the wayound the parikrama , whether they were

Sikhs or non-Sikhs. So trainedntelligence men could easily have



drawn up reasonably accurate plans ohe Temple complex. The army also hadhe model built by the paramilitary

commandos in the hills of Uttar Pradeso work on. As for the armaments,

everyone knew that Bhindranwale andhis followers had been smuggling armsnto the complex for many months. Twoears earlier Darbara Singh, the Chie

Minister of Punjab, had said in public

hat he knew arms were also beingmanufactured in the Golden Temple. Theonly weapons the army might not haveknown about were the Chinese rocket-propelled anti-tank grenade launchers,but they did not intend to use armour anyhow in their original plan.

The failure to estimate



Bhindranwale's will to fight is moreeasy to explain. Bhindranwale himselhad a reputation for cowardice. He waseported to have ducked out of the marc

against the Nirankaris at the start of hisise to fame, and he had three timesaken shelter in gurudwaras to avoid

arrest. If Bhindranwale had confirmedhis reputation for cowardice bysurrendering, the resistance would have

collapsed.It is also understandable that the armyunderestimated the training of theerrorists. The young men who used to

surround Bhindranwale when he held hismorning congregations were aunimpressive lot. They used to loaaround, leaning against the parapet of the



Langar and chatting with each other.They looked more like thugs than skilledighters prepared to give their lives for heir leader. However the Generals

should not have underestimated the skillwith which the defences were planned,and that they clearly did. They hadknown for some time that Major-GeneralShahbeg Singh was fortifying theTemple. They knew he was a brilliant

soldier, yet they fell into every trap heaid for them.What really surprised the officers

Satish Jacob spoke to was the courageand commitment of the followers of SantJarnail Singh Bhindranwale. One officer said, 'Boy, what a fight they gave us. If Ihad three Divs like that I would fuck the



hell out of Zia [the Pakistan President]any day.' Another told Satish Jacob: 'Ihave seen a lot of action, but I can tellou I have never seen anything like this.

Those extremists were pretty committed.They took a lot of beating from us. Theyshould have realised that they could notwin against the army. If one weaponailed we brought another. When thatailed we brought another.' A third put it

more succinctly: 'The bloody fellowswould not let us in.'Indian and foreign military experts

we have talked to believe that the plaas well as the intelligence were at fault.The retired Sikh Lieutenant-General,Jagjit Singh Aurora, for instance, saidhe plan 'smacked of ad hocism' . He told



me that the army had been asked to actoo quickly without adequateeconnaissance and planning. It seemshat the army was only given two weeks'

notice. Aurora also criticised the use ocommandos. He said, 'The use ocommandos in these circumstances wasof doubtful value. Unless there is someelement of surprise they are no better han ordinary infantry.' The retired

General believed that it should havebeen possible to take the Akal Takhtrom the narrow alleys running behind it.

Lieutenant-General Sunderji'sexplanation for his failure to do so washat terrorists had occupied houses

commanding those alleys.Retired Lieutenant-General Harbaks



Singh, for twenty years the HonoraryColonel of the Sikh Regiment, criticisedhe whole concept of an infantry attack:You don't send infantry into placeswhere they have no cover.' RetiredMajor-General S.N. Antia, writing in theStatesman newspaper added another criticism. He maintained there had beean erroneous civil and militaryassessment that the terrorists would

surrender'.A military attaché in one of theWestern diplomatic missions criticisedhe repeated attempts to storm the Akal

Takht with infantry when it was quiteclear that they were not going to be ableo get across the courtyard in front of it.

He said, 'Reinforcing failure went out



with the First World War.' The militaryattaché also believed it was a mistake tohave the three Generals in the commandpost. He said the operation should havebeen planned and commanded at brigadeevel. The Generals put the lower level

commanders in a strait jacket. Themilitary attaché did not accept that a 'fullrontal attack' was necessary. He

believed that the Indian army should

have asked for sophisticated moder equipment, including electric sensors,gas, smoke and equipment to jacommunications, and should then havemounted a commando operation. Themilitary attaché said the Indian army hadbeen 'arrogant because of its size andire power.' In the days of Entebbe and



he siege of the Iranian Embassy it iscertainly very difficult to understandwhy the Indian army chose such a clumsyand costly way of recapturing theGolden Temple. They might well havedone much better if they had gone in for a siege.

Lieutenant-General Sunderji gave aengthy explanation of his decision toeject that when he met the press after

he operation. Because he has beerequently criticised for that decision its important to give his reasons in full.

He asked himself: Would it be possible to lay siege, asit were, to the buildings and after duewarning and, if necessary, starving



out, wear them out? Would it be possible to persuade them to comeout? It seemed exceedingly attractiveon the face of it. But when I analysedfurther I found that it would beimpracticable for the followingreasons. First, cordoning off theGolden Temple area sounds verynice on paper, but in practice noamount of troops deployed for

effectively cordoning it off willsucceed, because those of you whoknow the area will realise that thereare buildings close up all around [theTemple]. Labyrinthine passagesunderneath, as well as through these

buildings, were already in fir control of the extremists. So a



effective cordon and siege wereexceedingly doubtful. Secondly, theywere fairly well stocked as far asfood was concerned. Exceedinglywell stocked as far as ammunitioand warlike material was concerned.And water was there in the sarowar [sacred tank]. So any hope of starvingthem in any of these categories and

persuading them to come out would

have been virtually impossible.Theoretically it might have bee possible at an extended period of amonth or more.

Now we also knew that they had plans to utilise the innocent people,the religious-minded, innocent peoplein the countryside. That plan was to





prevent this sort of thing we couldhave imposed curfew and enforced itstrictly, and made sure that such amovement didn't take place. But I'sure all of you realise that the most

practicable proposition for clampingdown curfew of this vigour for a

period of time which is required totackle this place [would have been]at the most three, four days. Anything

beyond that would have beeimpossible to enforce and therefore,with great sadness in my heart, Icame to the conclusion that there is amission to be accomplished. Therewas nothing, but nothing, other thaentering the Golden Temple.



Neither of the retired Sikh Generals Ispoke to accepted that explanation. Lt-General Aurora felt that the massivedeployment of the army throughoutPunjab was quite sufficient to preventmobs marching on Amritsar, while Lt-General Harbaksh Singh believed thatBhindranwale could have been starvedout quite quickly by cutting off the water supply to the sacred tank and by

separating the dining hall and kitchens,with their huge stocks of food, from theTemple complex.

The other question about the army'shandling of their mission to 'flush out theerrorists' which has to be asked is

whether their behaviour towards thennocent people in both complexes was



disciplined and humane. Eye-witnessesrom both complexes have been quoted

as saying that the men who surrenderedhad their hands tied behind their backsand some of them were shot. A deputysuperintendent of police who saw thedead bodies, and a doctor whoconducted post-mortems told BrahmaChellaney, the Associated Presscorrespondent who managed to stay i

Amritsar throughout the operation, thatseveral of the Sikhs who were killed hadheir hands tied behind their backs. We

have photographs which show prisonerswith their hands tied behind their backsand a post-mortem report which showshat at least one of them was shot.

evertheless the Indian government has



consistently denied those allegations.The government even went so far as tobring criminal charges against theAssociated Press correspondent for hiseporting. It does not seem surprising to

us that the army did tie the hands ooung Sikhs behind their backs. Whehey surrendered, soldiers had no way o

knowing whether they wereBhindranwale's followers or not. In the

ense and ugly atmosphere of the battlesn the two complexes it also seemshighly likely that some 'prisoners' wereshot. The senior officer who confirmedo Satish Jacob that Public Relations

Officer Nanda was threatened, said, 'Thesoldiers were in a very bad moodbecause of the casualties that



Bhindranwale's followers had inflictedon them and it was very difficult tocontrol soldiers in that sort of mood.'

Subhash Kirpekar, the correspondentor the Times of India who also

managed to stay in Amritsar, witnessedan example of the ugly mood of the armywhen curfew was relaxed on 6th June.He saw, 'some jawans kicking some ohe eleven suspected terrorists as they

knelt on their bare knees and crawled ohe red-hot road surface. Among theofficers directing this operation was aSikh, his face contorted in anger when heashed out at his fellow men who hehought were traitors.' 1

It was not just the casualties they had

suffered which en-flamed the soldiers'



empers. The defenders of the GoldeTemple had also committed atrocities.They threw grenades at the civilianswho surrendered in the hostel complex.They tortured two junior commissionedofficers. One was skinned alive and theblown up. They hacked to death an armydoctor who went to treat civiliacasualties. War is never pretty, and itwas full-scale war which broke out

between the Indian army and theollowers of Sant Jarnail SingBhindranwale.



14

The Aftermath

Operation Blue Star outraged the Sikhs.The anger spread far beyond theorthodox and the Akalis. Retired senior officers, such as Lieutenant-GeneralAurora and Lieutenant-General

Harbaksh Singh, and the former Chief o



Air Staff, Air Marshal Arjun Singh,were shocked. The historian andournalist Khushwant Singh, who had

been a courageous and outspoken criticof Bhindranwale and never regardedhimself as orthodox, handed back thedecoration Mrs Gandhi had awardedhim. Among other Sikhs who handedback their decorations was Bhagat PuraSingh, known as 'the bearded Mother

Teresa' because of his work among thepoor, especially lepers. The Maharaja oPatiala, Amarinder Singh, who had beenMrs Gandhi's go-between in thenegotiations with the Akali Dal andwhose family still commanded vastnfluence in Punjab, resigned from her

party and from Parliament, as did



another Sikh MP. However one of theew Sikhs who had the courage to accepthat her own community must bear a

considerable share of the responsibilityor the disaster was a Congress (Indira)

MP Mrs Amarjit Kaur. She wrote: Actually the blow to the Sik

community has been quite profound.We thought we were the cat's

whiskers. The saviour of all. But nowit was seen that we did not have theguts to face the situation. We theSikhs should have been the ones tothrow Bhindranwale out of the

premises of the Golden Temple. Weare now finding it difficult to admitour own failure. Our so-called



dynamism and bravery hasdisappeared. 1

The most crucial Sikh was now

President Zail Singh. He let Mrs Gandhiknow that he was deeply distressed by

he attack on the Golden Temple, and hisofficials let other Indians know that their irst Sikh President was thinking oesigning. That would have caused a

unprecedented constitutional crisiswhich even India's divided andenfeebled opposition might have beeable to take advantage of to force theesignation of Mrs Gandhi. Zail Singnsisted on seeing the Golden Temple.

Mrs Gandhi reluctantly agreed, althoug

he Generals had told her that even the



arikrama had not yet been cleaned andhat they could not be sure they hadecovered all the dead bodies. They also

warned that they could not guarantee thePresident's security. The President took he government-controlled televisio

with him. So three days after the attack,ndians saw on their television screens

President Zail Singh, his long, whitecoat buttoned up to the neck, entering the

most sacred shrine of his religion andpicking his way gingerly past soldiersscrubbing bloodstains off the marblepavement surrounding the GoldeTemple's sacred pool. They also heardhe bullets of the snipers still in position the buildings the army had not yet

cleared. Lieutenant-Colonel A.K.



Chowdhuri, accompanying PresidentZail Singh, was shot in the arm.Politically conscious viewers noticedMrs Gandhi's watchdogs followingwherever he went. One was her owPersonal Assistant, R.K. Dhawan, a manso close to Mrs Gandhi that he appearedn almost every news photograph of her.

He was at her side when she died. Theother was Arun Singh, Rajiv Gandhi's

closest adviser. He had been one ohose monitoring Operation Blue Star obehalf of Mrs Gandhi and her son. Thewo had been sent to make sure that the

President neither said nor did anythinguntoward. Later Zail Singh admitted thathe had hardly been able to control hisears when he saw the Golden Temple.



He also delivered a stinging rebuke tohe Governor of Punjab when he saw the

arsenal recovered from the Templecomplex, saying, 'It seems you havegiven your eyes and ears on loan tosomebody.'

When Zail Singh returned to Delhi hecancelled his commitment to present the

ational Film Awards, one of the greatevents of the year in India, but he

decided against resigning. Instead hensisted on writing his own broadcast tohe nation and he told Mrs Gandhi that he

would criticise the Congress governmentand his old enemy Darbara Singh. ToMrs Gandhi that seemed a small price tokeep the President in office.

The most serious reaction of all was



n the army, where Sikh soldiersmutinied in several different places. TheSikhs, in spite of all their protests aboutunfair discrimination, still comprise 10per cent of the army. Sikhs are also theonly Indians to have infantry regimentsmade up entirely of their owcommunity. The Sikh Regiment ismanned, although not officered, entirelyby Jat Sikhs. The Sikh Light Infantry is

manned entirely by Mazhabi or Scheduled Caste Sikhs.On 7th June, two days after the army

entered the Golden Temple complex,here was a mutiny in the 9th Battalion ohe Sikh Regiment. Six hundred soldiers,

almost the entire other-ranks' strength,broke into the regimental armoury i



heir cantonment on the outskirts of theown of Ganganagar, near the Pakistan

border. They drove through the streets oGanganagar shouting, 'Long live SantJarnail Singh Bhindranwale', and firingndiscriminately. One policeman was

killed and one injured. One group theurned towards Delhi and the other owards the Pakistan border. The

Rajputana Rifles were sent in pursuit o

he Sikh mutineers and managed to roundup most of them. They were broughtback to their cantonment in open lorriescovered with barbed wire. However ocal residents say that some of the

mutineers did manage to escape acrosshe border into Pakistan.

The largest mutiny took place in the



Sikh Regimental Centre at Ramgarh iBihar. The centre is the equivalent of aBritish infantry regiment's depot whereecruits for the battalions of the Sik

Regiment are inducted and trained.According to the report of the court onquiry presided over by a major-

general, the mutiny was led by SepoyGurnam Singh. He was a renownedbarrack-room lawyer whose religious

ervour had earned him the nickname oGiani or preacher. Earlier in the week Gurnam Singh had expressed his concer about events in the Punjab to the deputycommandant of the Regimental Centre.Although all the officers knew thatGurnam Singh was very influentialamong the other ranks, they made no



effort to set his mind at rest or to explaihe situation to the men. The court onquiry report said, 'No central durbarmeeting between officers and men to

discuss regimental morale and welfare]was held nor were any efforts made tokeep all ranks fully informed of thecurrent position in the Punjab.'

The last straw was, apparently, myeport on the BBC about the mutiny o

he 9th Sikhs near Ganganagar. On thenight of that report Gurnam Singh and aew senior NCOs finally decided to

mutiny and make for Amritsar. The nextday was a Sunday. The soldiersassembled in the gurudwara as usualThe Sikh Regimental Centre's Subedar-Major, whose job it is to provide the



same link between the other ranks andhe officers as a regimental sergeant-

major in the British army, noticed themen were restless. He reported this tohis fellow junior commissioned officersbut did not inform the commandant.

At about ten o'clock in the morningsepoys and NCOs attacked the armouryand the magazine. There was noesistance from any of the guards o

duty. The junior commissioned officersemained 'silent spectators' as themutineers loaded arms and ammunitionto regimental lorries.

The Subedar-Major did get in toucwith the commandant, Brigadier S.C.Puri, when the mutiny broke out. Thecommandant climbed into his car wit



wo other senior officers and droveowards the magazine. As the car

approached, the mutineers opened fire.The officers drove on towards the gateof the magazine where more shots wereired, seriously wounding Brigadier Puri

and his colleagues. Puri could not get outof the car but the other two officersmanaged to scramble clear. However,seeing that the situation was beyond their

control, they got back into the car anddrove to the military hospital whereBrigadier Puri died at 11.15.

Sepoy Gurnam Singh was one ohose who opened fire on his

commanding officer. After emptying thearmoury and the magazine and lootinghe station canteen, Sepoy Gurnam Sing



ed almost the entire other rank strengtout of the cantonment in a convoy oarmy vehicles. When they reachedRamgarh they hijacked civilian vehiclesand set off in the direction of Amritsar,which was 840 miles away. Armyhelicopters failed to spot the convoy butheir progress was monitored by the

police wireless.The Ramgarh cantonment appears to

have been in a state of panic. The courtof inquiry report said: 'There wascomplete loss of command and controlrom about ten o'clock until about 16.30n the Sikh Regimental Centre. Some

semblance of authority was regained byabout 18.30 hours.' The Sikhs'neighbours were the Punjab Regiment.



They were informed about the mutiny at10.45 but, according to the court onquiry report, 'They did not start to take

effective steps to control the situatiountil 17.30.'

When news of the mutiny reachedarmy headquarters, units all along theoute from Ramgarh to Delhi were

ordered to set up roadblocks. Theeaders of the mutiny divided the colum

ust before Benares because they hadheard that a roadblock had been sethere. One half of the column was

eventually engaged by the artillery atShakteshgarh railway station, 190 milesrom the Sikh Regimental Centre. A fewrucks escaped but they were rounded up

by the 21th Mechanised Infantry



Regiment.The other half of the column was

halted by the artillery again and bysoldiers of the 20th Infantry Brigade.Thirty-five people were killed in battlesbetween the mutineers and the soldiersmanning the roadblocks. The totalnumber of soldiers who joined themutineers was 1,461; 1,050 of thewere raw recruits. The court of inquiry

ound that many of them had been forcedo desert at gun-point.The court of inquiry bluntly rejected

efforts by the government to pin themutiny on 'outside agencies', a phrasewhich would be taken by most to meaPakistan. The report said, 'There is noevidence of any attempt to subvert Sik



roops at Ramgarh by outside agencies.'t placed the blame fairly and squarely

on the officers and junior commissionedofficers of the Sikh Regimental Centre.The report stressed the fact that it ismpossible to isolate soldiers from thenfluences at work in their home

villages. It said, 'The emergence oeligious fundamentalism and linguistic

chauvinism in many states, particularly

he Punjab, would no doubt have itseffect on troops hailing from that regioeven when they are emotionallyntegrated, particularly in a

organisation like the army.'After that comment the future of Sik

soldiers, one of the finest fightingelements in the Indian army, is bound to



be questioned. The comment also raisesan even more fundamental issue. Howmany more times can the Indian army beused to put out the fires of religious,communal and caste hatred before it toobecomes consumed in their flames?

There was further unrest among Sikhsn the army after Operation Blue Star.

There was a mutiny in another battalioof the Sikh Regiment in the Jamm

egion on the borders of Punjab, and amutiny of Sikhs serving in the PunjabRegiment at Poona. One party oPunjabis fought a pitched battle justoutside Bombay in which at least one ohe soldiers sent to arrest them was

killed and ten soldiers were injured.There were also three other, smaller



mutinies.This was the most serious crisis o

discipline the Indian army had facedsince independence. Its soldiers live icantonments separated from the civiliapopulation. Everything is provided for hem in these cantonments so that thendiscipline which is endemic in India

society does not infect the army. But thedecision to send soldiers into the Golde

Temple strained the loyalty anddiscipline of even the Indian army. It ismportant to remember that only about 3

per cent of the Sikh troops in the armydid mutiny, but that was enough in acommunity which is important to thearmed forces. The mutinies strainedelations between Sikhs and members o



other communities in the army, andaised doubts about the Sikhs' suitabilityor military service. It was a blow to the

pride of the army too.Retired officers believe that the

mutinies could have been avoided if themen had been fully informed aboutevents in Punjab. Lieutenant-GeneralHarbaksh Singh said, 'They thought their villages were being attacked when they

heard the announcement that the armywas being deployed in the Punjab.Regiments should have sent smallparties under the command of officers tohe Punjab to see what was happening

and report back to their colleagues.'Retired Lt-General S.K. Sinha, who

f luck (or some would say politics) had



gone a different way would have beeChief of the Army Staff at the time oOperation Blue Star, was veryoutspoken in his criticism of the officers.n a newspaper interview he said, 'Asar as the mutiny goes, I will squarely

blame the officer corps, because theyapparently did not know what their mewere thinking ... I am very clear in mymind on this issue. Officers must know

heir men better than their mothers. Ihis case they obviously did not.'Army Headquarters should also

accept their share of the blame. Theproblem of Sikh soldiers' morale shouldhave been anticipated and all officersshould have been warned through thenormal chain of command to be alert and





A spokesman, who described the Sikhsas deserters not mutineers, said they hadbeen 'misguided'. He went on to say, 'Weeel that some people are taking

advantage of the emotional state of theawans [men]. He also spoke oinstigators' narrating 'horror stories' owhat had happened in Punjab, andadded, 'We understand the feelings of theSikh jawans. ' Firmly bolting the stable

door after the Sikhs had fled, thespokesman announced that officers werebeing sent to explain, with the help ophotographs, that the Golden Templetself was unharmed, and that the

soldiers who took part in the operatiohad treated the shrine with the utmostespect. But Lt-General T.S. Oberoi,



commanding 80,000 Sikhs in Souther Command, said bluntly, 'The deserterswho have surrendered will be court-martialled and punished.'

One month after the mutinies theChief of the Army Staff, General A.S.Vaidya, took the unprecedented step of broadcasting to the nation. He announcedhat the conflict between those whoeared that severe action would do eve

more damage to the morale of Sik roops, and those who feared thateniency would damage disciplinehroughout the whole army, had beenesolved. The 'mutineers' were to suffer he full rigours of Indian military law.

General Vaidya said, 'I would like togive an assurance that those who acted



n a mutinous manner will be dealt witseverely under the law as enacted for thearmy, so that those who remain with usn the army and have the honour o

bearing arms for the country, would be aproud and disciplined body of soldiers.'This was the first time the army admittedhat mutinies had taken place; earlier hey had used the word 'desertions'.

But retired Sikh officers believed

General Vaidya was wrong. Five of hem, including Lieutenant-GeneralAurora and Lieutenant-GeneralHarbaksh Singh, went to see thePresident, who is Commander-in-Chieof the armed forces, to plead for specialreatment for the mutineers. They

explained to President Zail Singh that the





he army hierarchy to cover up their ailure to maintain the discipline and

morale of the Sikh soldiers - a verymportant function of the military

command - by forestalling their reactioo the extreme religious provocatio

caused by wanton (as rumoured)destruction of the Akal Takht, their holiest religious seat.' Rumour wascertainly the main cause of the mutinies

and Army Headquarters failed in notanticipating rumour-mongering.Lieutenant-General Harbaksh Singecommended that the Sikhs should not

be treated as deserters but be allowed toeturn to their units. He alsoecommended that action should be take

against their commanders for derelictio



of duty. But his advice was not taken. Inact Defence Headquarters never soughthe advice of Lieutenant-General

Harbaksh Singh despite his unrivalledexperience in handling Sikh soldiers.

Discipline and morale were not theonly problems facing the Indian army.Although the battle of the GoldeTemple was over, Lt-General Dayal wasstill the Adviser (Security) to the

Governor of Punjab and the army wasdeployed throughout the state to 'mop up'he terrorists believed to be hiding in the

villages. But 'mopping up' proved to beas inappropriate a term for dealing withe terrorists in the countryside asflushing out' was for the terrorists in theGolden Temple. The army soon found



hat terrorists don't just sit aroundwaiting to be 'mopped up'. Militaryntelligence hoped that they would getnformation about the identity and

whereabouts of the terrorists from thepeople taken prisoner in the twocomplexes at the Golden Temple.Although most of them were innocent,he army was not going to let them go

without a thorough investigation. Age

and sex did not matter, as the teacher Ranbir Kaur found out: We were taken to an army camp inAmritsar. The children wereseparated from us. The armyinterrogated us. They wanted to knowwho Bhindranwale's associates were.



They threatened to shoot us. I onlysaw Bhindranwale once when he waswalking back from his darshan[audience]. On 6th July we weretaken to Ludhiana jail. Again wewere separated. We wereinterrogated again. I was alwaysquestioned by men. We got no letters.Some police people told me I could

be bailed out. But I was warned that I

would be consistently called back toappear before court if I did that. I hadmy baby with me because my parentshad gone to the army and asked for my release so that I could look after him. When they refused, my parentsgave the baby to the army and said,'You had better give the baby to his



mother.' Even the children Ranbir Kaur had

been looking after when she wasrescued' by the army from the Templecomplex were interrogated. MehrbaSingh, aged twelve, said, 'We wereepeatedly asked if we were

Bhindranwale's men. They hit us atLudhiana jail, jabbing fingers into our

necks, wanting us to confess that we hadbeen filling magazines with bullets for Bhindranwale's men.' Shamsher Singh,aged eleven, said, 'We were given verydirty food in the army camp. The foodwas better in the jail. We were regularlybeaten in the jail. We were told we wereBhindranwale's people and they wanted



o know about Bhindranwale's friends.They asked us where Bhindranwale kepthis arms.'

Nanda, the Public Relations Officer of the Temple, who the army admittednarrowly missed being shot after he had

been 'rescued', escaped interrogation byhaving a heart attack. But apparently hishouse was searched, although anyonewho knew anything about life in the

Temple complex could have told thentelligence officers that he was noriend of Bhindranwale. He described

his experience: We were moved to a camp in thecantonment area the next day (7tJune). This camp was originally a



military school. The camp wasencircled with barbed wire. Therewere armed guards with dogs

patrolling. Massive searchlights litup the camp. Our room in this campcould be compared to the Black Holeof Calcutta. All seventy of us were

put in it. Due to suffocation threeelderly men died in the initial hoursof imprisonment. We spent about four

days there, during which time aagitated soldier kicked my ankle withis boot to near pulp. In themeanwhile I suffered a heart attack.After great efforts medical attentiowas received. The doctor, after examining me, felt I shouldimmediately be removed to a



intensive care unit. I was moved, butto an ordinary hospital ward. LuckilyI was noticed by the General Officer commanding Amritsar, Major-General Jamwal, who moved me toan inspection bungalow. At this

bungalow I had a brief encounter with General Brar. You see I hadaccumulated, during my two decadesof service with the SGPC, eighty-

eight grams of gold in the form o jewellery, two modest diamondnecklaces, one Minolta camera, one

National Panasonic two-in-one[radio/cassette], and one revolver.Most of this was for my daughter'sdowry. My wife, after a trip to thehouse, reported all this missing.



Other household items of furniture,television, fridge etc. werecompletely destroyed. The blades othe ceiling fans were bent. There wasalso cash both in my office as well asthe flat above it, amounting to rupees4,500, which was also missing.

I later shifted to a Delhi nursinghome for ten days. My bruised anklewas now fully septic. I hated

Bhindranwale who had insulted me by getting me frisked and asking hishenchmen to remove my trousers. Oanother occasion Bhindranwale toldme that within thirty days he wastaking over the SGPC and I wouldthen become his personal servant.Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was i



complete control of the GoldeTemple and its management. When Satish Jacob visited Amritsar

after the army action he met manyesidents of the old city who complainedhat their homes had been ransacked

during army searches for terrorists. Onewas Surinder Singh, who owns a shopnear the Akal Takht. He said to Satish

Jacob: When I returned to my shop on 17tJune I found the doors of myapartment above the shop had beeforced open. Steel cupboards whereclothes, money and jewellery werekept had been broken open. All my



money and jewellery was missing.The vegetables I had left in the fridgewere stewn all over the floor of thedining room. A small alcove used asa store was also ransacked. Surinder Singh insisted that it must

have been soldiers who broke into hishouse because the area was under their control. He did not leave his home until

curfew was lifted on 6th June.Members of the Temple staff withooms inside the complexes also

complained that their property had beeooted, but a senior officer told Satis

Jacob that no formal complaints hadbeen made. He said, 'Some soldiers mayhave indulged in small-scale pilferage.



The army takes a serious view of succonduct. If there had been officialcomplaints and soldiers had been foundguilty, they would have been punished.'

The High Priests complained to MrsGandhi and to the Generals about thebehaviour of the soldiers occupying theGolden Temple. They maintained thatsoldiers had used the sacred pool as abath, and had committed sacrilege by

smoking and drinking within theprecincts. The army denied theseallegations but when Khushwant Singvisited the complex he saw a noticeoutside the Akal Takht saying 'Nosmoking or drinking here'. That wouldseem to indicate that someone had beesmoking and drinking there, and the army



was in charge of the complex. The armycertainly had plenty of drink available.A notification of the Government oPunjab's Department of Excise andTaxation allowed for the provision o700,000 quart bottles of rum, 30,000quart bottles of whisky, 60,000 quartbottles of brandy and 160,000 bottles obeer, all free of excise duty. Thenotification specifically said that the

alcohol was 'for consumption by theArmed Forces Personnel deployed iOperation Blue Star'.

There were also allegations of armybrutality during their search for terroristsn the rest of Punjab. The journalist

Harji Malik wrote in the Economic anolitical Weekly about a 23-year-old



Sikh who was removed by the army frohis home in a village near Longowal'shome town of Sangrur. The young man'sdead body was returned to his familysome days later. The official explanationor his death was that he had been killedn an 'encounter'. A local lawyer who

had seen the body said that the youngman's fingernails had been torn out andhere were burn marks on his chest. The

awyer also told Harji Malik of a young,disabled Sikh who was arrested andbeaten up by the army.

An incident at Punjabi University,Patiala on 20th July was documented byseveral journalists. Sixty studentseturning from complaining to the Vice-

Chancellor about a comparatively trivial



administrative matter, were stopped byan army party under Major Uppal. Twomembers of the staff accompanying theold the Major that the students were noterrorists. He ignored the staff members

and ordered the students to get down oheir knees and crawl. They did so buthat didn't satisfy Major Uppal. He the

arrested three students and took theaway for questioning. One of the

alleged that he had been tortured duringhe interrogation.Harpal Singh, an executive engineer

of an electricity generating plant atBhatinda, told Satish Jacob that the armyhad beaten up any young Sikhs they sawon the streets in the immediate aftermatof the attack on the Golden Temple



complex. He also said soldiers guardinghe plant where he worked treated Sikhs

offensively. Gurkhas, for instance, onceordered two young men returning to their quarters to take off their kirpans, odaggers, one of the five 'k's of the Sikhs.When they refused, they were made to heon their bellies. Harpal Singh was askedo intervene. When he arrived he saw thewo young men lying on their bellies.

Soldiers were standing over them witboots on their backs.Senior officials and army officers

had always accepted that there would besome excesses when the army wasdeployed throughout Punjab. A senior officer explained to Satish Jacob, 'Veryew army officers are trained



nterrogators, which means inevitablysome will resort to unofficial methods oextracting evidence.' That was why manyofficers were very unhappy about their ask. They realised that soldiers acting

as policemen could destroy the army'seputation for fairness and integrity,

which they valued very highly. Theywere also afraid that the population oPunjab would turn against them wit

potentially disastrous consequences. Ashat senior officer explained, 'Punjab isbound to be a battlefield if Pakistan ever ries it on again and here we will needhe civilian population to be on our

side.' Army Headquarters were lesssensitive. An appeal was published inhe July issue of Batchit, an official



magazine circulated throughout the armyo keep officers and men informed o

current operations. Although [the] majority of theterrorists have been dealt with and[the] bulk of the arms and ammunitiorecovered, yet a large number of theare still at large. They have to besubdued to achieve the final aim o

restoring peace in the country. Anyknowledge of the 'Amritdharis' whoare dangerous people and pledged tocommit murder, arson and acts oterrorism should immediately be

brought to the notice of theauthorities. These people may appear harmless from the outside but they are



basically committed to terrorism. Ithe interest of all of us, their identityand whereabouts must always bedisclosed. 'Amritdhari' means baptised. So the

nstruction meant that all orthodox Sikhswere to be treated as suspects – hardlyhe best way to retain the affection of the

people of Punjab.

Lieutenant-General Gauri Shankar,who took over from Lt-General Dayal asAdviser (Security) to the Governor oPunjab, once said, 'They have beemaking a big noise about the so-calledarmy atrocities but so far they have notbeen able to point out a single specificcase in which the army committed any



such atrocities or arrested an innocentperson.' That was an exaggeration butwhen Satish Jacob visited Punjabvillages he only heard of isolatedncidents of army excesses. There was

no widespread repression, no organisedbrutality.

After two months the army wasordered to pull back. Soldiers were stillheld in reserve to assist the paramilitary

and the Punjab police, but they stoppedcombing' the countryside for terrorists.By then they had arrested nearly 5,000people. Three thousand of them had beeeleased again. Terrorism had not been

eradicated. That, the army realised, wasnot to be expected, but the terrorists noonger had it all their own way. The law



was amended yet again. This time theaim was to make it easier to secure theconviction of those the army was stilldetaining. The government issued aordinance which made further inroadsnto India's tradition of respect for iberty, and turned on its head theundamental principle that a man must be

presumed innocent until proven guilty.Under the Terrorist Affected Areas

Special Courts) Act, in areas likePunjab which were declared 'disturbed',anyone found at places where firearmswere used to attack or resist members ohe law-enforcing agencies was

presumed to have committed an offenceunless the contrary was shown. Under he Act special courts were set up in



Punjab to try offenders.It was a sullen Punjab the army ruled.

Many Sikhs refused to believeBhindranwale was dead. Rumourscirculated that he would appear oPakistan television. In spite of thegovernment's propaganda barrage, tomany people Bhindranwale remained aant, or holy man, not a terrorist. The

attack on the Temple had deeply

wounded the pride of the Sikhs. Senior officials of the Punjab government knewhat the wound had to be healed if Sikhs

were to be reconciled with the rest ondia. They also knew that there could

be no long-term peace in Punjab, or ndeed in the rest of India, until thateconciliation took place.



The press was clamouring for econciliation. Immediately after

Operation Blue Star the Indian Expresswrote: 'It is imperative that a salve beapplied to the hurt collective psyche ohis proud and valiant community before

any lasting damage is done. What startedas a Punjab question and then gotenmeshed in terrorist violence cannot beallowed to fester and become a Sik

problem.' The paper went on to makesome practical suggestions for preventing damage to what it hadquaintly called 'the hurt collectivepsyche' of the Sikhs. The first was toallow free reporting on Punjab. Paperspublished in Punjab had been censoredand those coming from other parts o



ndia had been banned from the state.The Indian Express wisely pointed outhat rumour was an enemy, a lesson the

army learnt from the Sikh mutineers. Thesecond suggestion was the immediatewithdrawal of the army from the GoldeTemple complex. The third wasentrusting the repair of the Akal Takhtand other damaged buildings to theTemple authorities. The fourth was

estricting the army's involvement in thesearch for terrorists in the villages. Theifth was releasing the Akali Daleaders. The sixth was a broadcast by

Mrs Gandhi. The paper said, 'She needso go on the air and by her words and the

measures she proposes impart a healingouch to a wounded nation.'



Mrs Gandhi chose to reject theadvice of the Indian Express in itsentirety. The first time she said anythingo Indians about Operation Blue Star,hree days after the assault on the Akal

Takht, she spoke through the mouth of anofficial spokesman reporting a speecshe had made to officers of theparamilitary Central Reserve Police.There could hardly have been a more

nappropriate audience from the Sikhs'point of view. In that speech she waseported to have appealed for 'a healingouch to be given to the wounds inflicted

on the hearts of the people by the recentPunjab incidents'. There was apparentlyno direct reference to the hurt inflictedon the Sikhs. She went out of her way to



praise the army and the CRP. MrsGandhi followed that speech by rubbingsalt not balm into the wounds of theSikhs.

The Akali Dal Trinity were the onlyepresentatives of the Sikh community

she could have discussed the healingprocess with. Longowal and Tohra werearrested when the Kumaon Regimentcleared the hostel complex. Badal was

arrested as soon as he emerged from hisarm. More than thirty people werekilled in protests in Punjab and theneighbouring state of Kashmir in the firsthree days after Operation Blue Star; sot was perhaps a sensible decision toock them up for the moment. But theAkali Dal Trinity were still under arrest





he television service, Doordarshan.Under the guidance of a specialcommittee, dominated by a close friendof Rajiv Gandhi, Doordarshan mounteda series of programmes to justify theaction in the Golden Temple. Major-General Brar was seen standing outsidehe Harmandir Sahib itself, describing

Operation Blue Star like a victoriousconqueror. Other programmes

concentrated on proving the guilt of theSikhs. Pictures of naval diversecovering arms were shown and

allegations that drugs had beediscovered were also made. They had tobe withdrawn later because they couldnot be substantiated. A visibly unhappy.Head Priest of the Akal Takht was



orced to read out a statement saying thathe Golden Temple was undamaged,

when he knew there were bullet holes ihe Sikh's most sacred shrine. The leader

of a comparatively obscure Sikh sectwas produced before television viewerso justify the army action. Within days he

was arrested when arms werediscovered near his gurudwara. Evemoderate Sikhs were outraged. They

complained that the government wasportraying the whole Sikh community asenemies of India. However thenformation and Broadcasting Minister,

H.K.L. Bhagat, insisted that theelevision programmes were intended to

promote harmony between Sikhs andHindus. In an interview for the Calcutta



Telegraph, he said, 'So far as our elevision programmes on Punjab have

been concerned, the programmes weremounted with a view to promotingcommunal harmony . . . broadly thepurpose was communal harmony.'Strangely, Mrs Gandhi herself did notuse Doordarshan to appeal to the peopleof her own country. She did, however,give interviews to several international

broadcasting organisations, including theBBG, to justify her action to the world.After the heavy-booted officials o

Doordarshan had trampled Sik sentiments into the mud came theGovernment White Paper. Its publicationwas postponed several times becausehe mandarins of the External Affairs



Ministry insisted that diplomaticconsiderations were more important thadomestic. Officials of the HomeMinistry wanted a large share of theblame for all that had gone wrong iPunjab to be laid at the feet of Pakistan.This, they believed, would convincemany Sikhs that the government hadescued them from a plot which would

have delivered them back to the Musli

domination they had rejected at the timeof partition. The Home Secretary issueda statement after Operation Blue Star, inwhich he said, 'The obvious directioand thrust of the Movement [oBhindranwale] was towards andependent Khalistan fully supported by

neighbouring and foreign powers.' But



he External Affairs Ministry warnedhat mentioning Pakistan would

complicate India's relations with theUnited States. President Reagan sawPakistan's autocratic military ruler,General Zia-ul-Haq, as a gallant fighter or freedom, threatened by the Soviet

Union's invasion of neighbouringAfghanistan.

After lengthy deliberations the White

Paper was published without mentioningPakistan. The writer A.G. Nooranidescribed the White Paper as 'an abjectclimbdown'. It identified four factorswhich had 'threatened to undermine thesocial, political, and economic stabilitynot only of Punjab but the whole

country'.2

The factors were:



The agitations sponsored by the AkaliDal in support of certain demandswhich had been submitted to thegovernment and on whicnegotiations were in progress. A stridently communal and extremistmovement which degenerated intoopen advocacy of violence and

sanction for the most heinous crimesagainst innocent and helpless citizensand against the state. Secessionist and anti-nationalactivities with the declared objectiveof establishing an independent Statefor the Sikhs with external support.



Involvement of criminals, smugglers,other anti-social elements, and

Naxalites, who took advantage of thesituation for their own ends. The White Paper, in its anxiety to

highlight the threat which had forced thegovernment to take such drastic action,came near to describing the Akali Dal as

separatists too, which once agaioutraged the moderate majority of theSikh community.

When the White Paper was writteoff by the press and the Sikhs as anadequate justification of Operatio

Blue Star, diplomatic niceties werehrown to the wind and an all-out effort



was made to blame Pakistan and other foreign hands'. The only foreign armsisted in the White Paper were fifty-

seven 7.62 mm. Chinese rifles, but byhe dme the Congress Party itself cameo produce its own explanation o

Operation Blue Star, a pamphlet calledConspiracy Exposed', the foreign armsdiscovered by the Indian army had risedramatically to 'Chinese-made AK–47

gas-operated assault rifles capable oiring 600 rounds a minute at a range o300 metres; the Chinese-made RPG–7anti-tank grenade launchers capable openetrating armour up to a thickness o320 mm.; the German G-2 automaticifles generally used by NATO

countries; Israeli-manufactured bullet-



proof vests; anti-tank weapons oPakistani origin'.

In all their speeches, both MrsGandhi and Rajiv Gandhi highlighted theoreign hand in Punjab, but the effect

was often marred by their reluctance todentify that hand. Sometimes it

appeared to be the CIA, sometimesPakistan, and sometimes even Britain.The Prime Minister told Parliament that

he Punjab crisis was the result of 'thede-stabilising efforts of foreign powers'.She said direct evidence was hard toind but then continued, 'We know thatoreign powers instigate communal riotsor their own ends. When I went to

London to attend the coronation oQueen Elizabeth II, a former Britis



officer in India told me about his role instigating communal riots.'

These allegations did not convincehe press. The Indian Express wroteBhindranwale has now been assigned asecondary role in the Punjab drama witMrs Gandhi's reassertion of anternational conspiracy to do India

down with neocolonialism working toachieve its dirty aims through religious

undamentalism. St Joan had obviouslydonned her shining armour and one isexpected to be duly awed by what thevoices told her.'

Sikhs also wrote off the foreign hand.They knew that Mrs Gandhi had a habitof blaming India's problems ooreigners. Between 1972 and 1975,



when Mrs Gandhi was getting deeper and deeper into trouble, she and her colleagues dragged the CIA into almostevery speech they made. The troublewas that Mrs Gandhi had very littleevidence to offer for blaming the 'foreighand'. There certainly were Sikh groupsabroad who welcomed the turmoil iPunjab and supported Bhindranwale, buthere is nothing to suggest that they

wielded great influence in Punjab itself.The White Paper mentioned four Sik groups operating overseas. Only two ohose were significant. The first was theational Council of Khalistan led by Dr

Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a resident of GreatBritain and the self-styled President ohe land of the Khalsa. The second was



he Dal Khalsa. The White Paper said itwas established in India with theavowed object of demanding thecreation of an independent, sovereigSikh , state. The White Paper did notmention the connection between ZailSingh and the Dal Khalsa in its earlydays. The White Paper also failed toproduce any evidence to suggest thathese groups were directly involved i

errorism, except for one report in theVancouver Sun about attempts to recruitSikhs in British Columbia and train theunder a mercenary who had fought iRhodesia. The advocates of Khalistaiving abroad certainly did have contact

with Bhindranwale. His interpreter,Harminder Singh Sandhu, once wrote to



he self-styled President of Khalistan, Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan, appealing for helprom abroad:

Doctor Sahib you are a very wise andfar-thinking person and now utilisingthose energies of yours, please try toget maximum support and help frothe friendly nations and internationalcommunity in general. 3

That letter may have produced some

money, but not much else. It wasOperation Blue Star which brought JagjitSingh Chauhan to prominence. After theassault on the Akal Takht he threatenedMrs Gandhi and her family a number o

imes. In a broadcast by the BBC's



Radio 4 he 'prophesied' that she wouldbe killed, a prophesy which was seen asa threat. Although Radio 4 cannot beheard in India, the governmentsponsored a series of demonstrationsagainst our office in Delhi, and showedhe demonstrations on Doordarshaelevision. This brought Chauhan and his

activities to the notice of millions oSikhs who had never heard of hi

before.Did Pakistan play a role in the Punjabcrisis as Mrs Gandhi so often implied?n a minor way the answer is almost

certainly 'yes'. Smuggling is a well-established practice in the border areasof Punjab. Many Sikhs go toextraordinary lengths to equip



hemselves for that profession as weound once when we met a police officer

who had killed a Sikh 'extremist' on theGrand Trunk Road the day before. Thepapers had reported that the Sikh was aPakistani in disguise, but the Inspector aughed when we suggested that. He

said, 'Oh no, Sahib. He was a smuggler,have been to his village and they have

dentified him. He was not circumcised

because he was a Muslim but because hewanted to pee in Pakistan.'Arms were regularly smuggled

across the border, and it is more thanikely that President Zia turned a blinder

eye than usual. It is certain that he didnot object to Bhindranwale's terroristscrossing the border to seek temporary



efuge from the police, although most ohem had a safe sanctuary in the Golde

Temple complex or some other urudwara. But Zia adopted a very

cautious attitude to the Punjab crisis. Hisadvisers told him that Mrs Gandhi wasspoiling for a fight because she saw awar with Pakistan as a way of divertingher people's attention from Punjab andother difficulties they were facing. War

was the last thing General Zia wanted.He knew there was no guarantee that hewould be the first Pakistani ruler todefeat the Indian army and rememberedhe fate of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and

General Yahya Khan, who had both triedand failed. So although he would dearlyhave liked to avenge the Pakistan army's



surrender at Dacca in 1971, he didnothing which could give Mrs Gandhi aexcuse for going to war. He did notopenly support the Sikhs and we haveound no evidence he gave them covert

help. In fact he did the very reverse; heset out on what he called a 'peaceoffensive'. Winning almost everydiplomatic trick, General Zia convincedhe United States and the Western world

hat he genuinely wanted good relationswith India. Whether Mrs Gandhi ever seriously contemplated war or not,General Zia's peace offensive blockedhat option.

Although the allegations of foreignvolvement and so much of the other

government publicity had the effect o



dentifying the whole of the Sik community with Bhindranwale and hiserrorists, the White Paper itself did givehe Sikhs a clean chit. It said:

The action which the government hashad to take in the Punjab was neither against the Sikhs nor the Sik religion; it was against terrorism andinsurgency. The Sikhs are a well-

integrated part of the Indian nation.They were second to none in their contribution in achieving anddefending the country's freedom andthe building of the economic strengtof free India. The Sikh communitystands firm along with the rest of thenation in its resolve to preserve and



strengthen the unity and integrity othe country. Instead of redoubling her efforts to

strengthen that resolve, Mrs Gandhicontinued her battle with the leaders ohe Jats, the most powerful group of the

Sikhs, till the day she died. She was ather most aggressive over the repairing ohe Akal Takht. Sikhs believe the

maintenance and repairing of their shrines is a sacred duty. They call it kaewa, or the service of work. The work

must be carried out by pious Sikhs under he leadership of a recognised holy man.

The Sikh High Priests thereforedemanded that the army should bewithdrawn from the Temple complex



and that they should be allowed to repair he Akal Takht and other buildings

which had been damaged.Mrs Gandhi refused to withdraw the

army until the repairs were complete.She said she could not trust the Sikhs toepair their shrines because of the

suggestion by some eminent Sikhs thathe Akal Takht should be left in ruins as

a permanent reminder of its desecration.

She had appointed the only Sikh member of her Cabinet, Buta Singh, the WorksMinister, to negotiate with the HighPriests. It was not a happy choice. Hewas a Mazhabi Sikh regarded by mostJats as a Harijan, or Untouchable. Hehad also been a member of the AkaliDal; so he was regarded by Akali



eaders as a traitor. Nevertheless ButaSingh did eventually succeed in reachingan agreement with the High Priests oepairing the Akal Takht. He announcedhis in Amritsar, but within hours the

agreement had been denied by thegovernment in Delhi. A group of senior army officers also managed to reach aagreement with the High Priests. Itsatisfied their security concerns but it

did not apparently satisfy Mrs Gandhi'spolitical aims. So the army officers wereordered to renege on their agreement.

Mrs Gandhi's political considerationswere far from clear. Many Sikhs agreedwith Balwant Singh, the only senior member of the original Akali Dalnegotiating team not under arrest, who



said to me, 'She wants to rub our nosesn it.' Many newspaper commentatorshought Mrs Gandhi was humiliating the

Sikhs because she calculated that Hindvoters wanted that humiliation. The trutseems to be that Mrs Gandhi believedshe could use this opportunity to break he Akali Dal once and for all. She

ordered her officials to draw up a plaor taking the management and money o

he gurudwaras out of the hands of theSGPC, which was of course the AkaliDai's financier.

When it became clear that MrsGandhi was not going to allow theSGPC and the High Priests to repair heir shrines, Buta Singh turned to theeader of a sect of nihangs or Sik



warriors, Baba Santa Singh. He was aelderly and extremely portly Sikh whoseollowers were distinguished for their uggedness rather than their piety. Many

of them were fond of taking opium. SantaSingh had never supervised kar sewaunder the auspices of the High Priests or he SGPC. They inevitably rejected his

claim to be entitled to lead the kar sewa.Santa Singh and his followers would

also appear to have been disqualifiedrom such a sacred task by their addiction to cannabis. Sikhism forbidsall intoxicants but when Satish Jacobwent to visit Santa Singh's camp onemorning he found four of his youngollowers grinding cannabis seeds,

almonds, sugar and black pepper into a



ight-green paste. Two elderly Sikhswere stirring a vast cauldron of boilingmilk. The paste and milk were combinedo make bhang. Santa Singh's followershad no inhibitions about starting their day with a strong draught of thisntoxicant. One of the Sikhs stirring the

milk said, 'We are making mahaprasagreat offering to God]. It is almosteady; come and join us; you will feel

good.' Another disciple told SatishJacob that daily bhang brewing was oneof their most important rituals.

The repairs started without any of theraditional rituals. The High Priests

should have dug up the first of the rubblewith golden trowels and carried it awayn silver baskets, but the trowels and



baskets remained locked in the TempleTreasury. Santa Singh and his wild-ooking warriors were shown oelevision entering the Temple before

daylight and saying their prayershurriedly before the shrine to launch thekar sewa. They then moved to the

urudwara in Amritsar which had beenhanded over to them and let thegovernment get on with the work. The

nihangs put in ritual appearances iront of the television camerashroughout the kar sewa but all the work was carried out by contractors under thesupervision of the Public WorksDepartment. K. D. Bali, a retired chieengineer of the PWD, was put in charge.Most of the hard work of clearing away



he rubble was done by Harijaabourers. Muslim and other craftsme

skilled in marble work were broughtrom Rajasthan. Goldsmiths were

brought from Uttar Pradesh. A senior engineer working on the project said thatbetween nine and ten kilograms of goldwere used. The engineer said the repairscost between 30 to 40 million rupees – wo to three million pounds.

The High Priests excommunicatedSanta Singh. He brushed his sentenceaside haughtily, saying, 'Who are theseHigh Priests but the paid employees ohe Temple Management Committee?'-

The work went on. Santa Singh was wellpaid for his defiance. The senior engineer told Satish Jacob that the



ithang was given 100,000 rupees (over £6,500) every day to keep his 300ollowers happy. Buta Singh flew inrom Delhi regularly to make sure thathe work was proceeding rapidly and to

sort out any political problems whicarose. By the end of September theshrine was repaired. The balconies athe front of the building, which had beeeduced to rubble by the tanks, were

estored; the gaping hole in the gold-covered dome was covered up; the topof the tower shot away in the battle waseplaced. Sikhs admitted to Satish Jacobhat the exterior of the shrine had beeestored with sensitivity and respect for he original design. But no one had bee

able to restore the decorations inside.



As the repairs approachedcompletion, the question of managing theTemple arose again. Mrs Gandhi wasstill reluctant to hand back the shrine tohe SGPC. She organised an assembly o

Sikhs to endorse the kar sewa andoutflank resistance by the High Priestsand the SGPC. As it was the kar sewawas put in the shade by the WorldConference of Sikhs the High Priests

called on 2nd September. In spite ogovernment attempts to prevent Sikhsgetting to the assembly, large numbersdid turn up and passed a series odamaging resolutions. One declared thePresident and Buta Singh tankaiya oeligious offenders. That is in effect a

sentence of excommunication whic



enjoins Sikhs to avoid all contact withe offenders. The High Priests the

called for a peaceful march to Amritsar on 1st October to 'liberate' the GoldeTemple.

By now the pressure was becomingoo strong for Mrs Gandhi to resist. Eve

her own usually docile party membersbelonging to the Sikh community wereurging her to break the deadlock.

President Zail Singh was also exertingpressure again because he wanted hissentence to be lifted. There had beeanother terrorist attack on a bus on 7tSeptember in which seven passengershad been killed. It had revived unhappymemories of the days wheBhindranwale had virtually ruled



Punjab, and reminded Hindus of thedangers of Mrs Gandhi's continuingpolicy of confrontation with the Akalis.So on 25th September, just six daysbefore the march on the Temple, MrsGandhi announced that the army wouldbe withdrawn from the Temple and theSGPC would resume control over it.This was a setback for Mrs Gandhibecause at the same time she had to drop

her plans to amend the Gurudwara Actand remove control of the temples frohe SGPC. Mrs Gandhi did not accept

her defeat with good grace. In an abruptbroadcast to the nation she said, 'Thegovernment does not want to retaicontrol of the Temple. We are willing tohand it over soon to legitimate religious



authorities. But it is certainlygovernment's concern that whoever ooks after its management should ensurehat it would not be misused.'

A pardon for the President was partof the deal which had been negotiated isecret. He attended the ceremony in theGolden Temple when the army handed itback to the High Priests, and waseported to have said, 'I ask sincere

orgiveness from the Gurus for theunfortunate incidents which haveoccurred.' His spokesman later deniedhat the President had apologised for

Operation Blue Star. The President isalso reported to have said that alloutstanding problems between the HigPriests and the government would be



sorted out. His was a visit of goodwill inot of penitence. But the goodwill wasnot reciprocated by the High Priest ohe Akal Takht. Giani Kirpal Singh toldhe President that the government must

give up its anti-Sikh attitude and stopreating believers in his faith likesecond-class citizens'. He called for theban on the All India Sikh StudentsFederation, which had been the

backbone of Bhindranwale's movement,o be lifted and all its members releasedrom jail. He also demanded the release

of the Akali Dal leaders. The PrimeMinister clearly still had a lot onegotiating to do before Sikhs wouldaccept that her offer of the healing toucwas sincere. But the Akali Trinity, the



only people with whom she could havenegotiated, were still under arrest wheMrs Gandhi was shot one month later.



15

Conclusion

Who killed Indira Gandhi? 'I,' said Sub-nspector Beant Singh when he

surrendered to the commandos in MrsGandhi's garden. But he was a victihimself, carried away by the anger

which swept through the Sikh community



after Operation Blue Star - anger he haddone nothing to create. It was thecreation of those who had taken on theesponsibility for leading the Sik

community, of those who had taken onhe responsibility of governing India,

and of the times in which they wereiving. It is very tempting simply to

blame Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwaleand his brand of Sikh fundamentalis

which was nurtured by hatred of Hindus,but fundamentalism does not exist in avacuum. No Shah, no Khomeini; nondira and no Bhindranwale. That may

seem to be a very harsh judgment, and its in that Mrs Gandhi was in no way ayrant or an autocrat. However she waesponsible for the political atmosphere







bottom. It is significant that Amarinder Singh withdrew from his role as antermediary in the negotiations with the

Akali Dal because the bureaucratssurrounding Mrs Gandhi obfuscatedevery issue. It is significant that her coterie prevented B.D. Pande frounctioning independently as governor. Its most significant of all that Rajiv

Gandhi did manage to reach a settlement

with the Akali Dal within seven monthsof coming to power by dismissing,ransferring or by-passing all those who

advised his mother.At first Rajiv Gandhi highlighted the

hreat to the nation's unity posed by Sik extremism and the Akali Dai's demands,he Anandpur Sahib Resolution in



particular. In his campaign for thegeneral election he called immediatelyafter succeeding his mother, the onlyssue he put to the electorate was thehreat to India's unity. He sold himself ashe one leader who could withstand thathreat. His triumph in the general

election established the young heir to theehru/Indira Gandhi heritage as Prime

Minister in his own right. He then went

on to fight elections to state assemblieswhere his party did adequately, but lesswell than in the general election. Withhese two hurdles behind him, Rajiv did

a U-turn on the Punjab. Convenientlyorgetting his electoral rhetoric, he

started the search for a way to negotiatewith the Akali Dal.



Unlike his mother, Rajiv Gandhiealised that Punjab was a political

problem which should be handled bypoliticians and not by courtiers,bureaucrats, the police or the army. Hisirst, and as it proved wisest, step washe appointment of one of India's most

astute politicians, Arjun Singh, to takeover from the bureaucrat who hadsucceeded Pande as Governor of Punjab.

For the past five years Arjun Singh haduled India's largest state of MadhyaPradesh as Congress (Indira) ChieMinister. He had reduced the right-wingHindu Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP to aminor irritant in a state which had oncebeen its bastion. He had also neutralisedhe powerful sons of Ravi Shankar



Shukla, Pandit Nehru's Chief Minister oMadhya Pradesh. The Shuklas hadegarded the Madhya Pradesh Congress

Party as their own personal feudalestates. One of Rajiv Gandhi's aidessaid to Satish Jacob, 'Anyone who couldcope with the BJP on one side and theShuklas on the other ought to be able tocope with the Akalis too.' He wasproved right.

The Akali Trinity now came upagainst a powerful well-knit trinity ohe government side – Rajiv Gandhi,

Arjun Singh and Arun Singh. Arun Singhwas a former multinational executiveand had been a friend of Rajiv Gandhisince his schooldays. Rajiv Gandhibrought him into politics when he first







strategy was to isolate Longowal frohe other two members of the Akali

Trinity. Mrs Gandhi believed in dividingand ruling her opponents just as much asshe believed in dividing and ruling her own party. She had always seen theension in the Akali leadership as aactor in her favour. After studying the

situation Arjun Singh realised that theAkali leaders would never take a united

stand on a settlement. Their rivalries andvested interests would prevent them. Hepersuaded Rajiv Gandhi to deal witLongowal for two reasons. As theMorcha Dictator' Longowal was theman who had the authority to accept thesettlement and call off the agitation. Hisverdict would be accepted by the grass





Akali leaders should be arrested agaiand that all efforts to reach a settlementshould be dropped. Members of theCongress Party also warned the PrimeMinister that the Hindus would notolerate any concessions to the Sikhs

after the explosions. But Rajiv Gandhiand Arjun Singh refused to be deflectedrom their course. Just over two monthsater, on 21st July, they took India by

surprise in announcing that SantHarchand Singh Longowal was comingo Delhi to meet the Prime Minister.

The ground had been meticulouslyprepared in a series of secret talkshrough intermediaries. Arjun Singh

himself met Longowal just before theannouncement of the meeting to assure



him the settlement would go through. Thealks were conducted wit

determination, speed and efficiencywhich was in sharp contrast to thedilatory tactics adopted by both sideswhen they met under Mrs Gandhi. In lesshan forty-eight hours a settlement was

announced. Mrs Gandhi could haveesolved the main issues on the sameerms three years earlier. Then there

would have been no Operation BlueStar, no Sikh mutinies and noassassination.

Rajiv Gandhi's settlement coveredeleven points. Many of them referred toncidents which took place after

Operation Blue Star – the mutinies, theanti-Sikh violence and the security



orces' drive against terrorists. The threemajor issues which remained unresolvedn June 1984 were Chandigarh, the river

waters and the Anandpur SahibResolution. Rajiv Gandhi gaveChandigarh to Punjab and set up acommission to give a ruling on theborder disputes. The commission's termsmade it virtually impossible for Abohar and Fazilka to go to Haryana. That had

n fact been Mrs Gandhi's final offer, butby then it was too late to reach asettlement because Bhindranwale wasnsisting that the Anandpur Sahib

Resolution should be implemented iull. Rajiv Gandhi only agreed to sendhe Resolution to the one-ma

commission on centre-state relations set



up by his mother. The Akalis wouldhave accepted that, if Mrs Gandhi hadconceded their demands on Chandigar and the river waters. The river watersssue was also resolved on terms the

Akalis had accepted under Mrs Gandhi.Punjab retained its share of water until acommission presided over by a judgedecided on a permanent allocation. So ihe end it all came down to the one issue

Chandigarh. The others were, as aAkali leader said to me three monthsbefore Operation Blue Star, 'Just amatter of commissions.' It was MrsGandhi's tragedy to be guided bybureaucrats to whom nothing could ever be as simple as that 1.

One of the most remarkable



achievements of the new governmentrinity was secrecy. Mrs Gandhi could

not even keep a telephone call toLongowal a secret. In her days therewould have been a run of speculativestories based on leaks by bureaucrats or politicians using the press to sabotagenegotiations of which they did notapprove. Rajiv Gandhi and hiscolleagues kept their secrets to

hemselves. It was particularly difficulto keep those with direct interest iPunjab in the dark. Badal and Tohra,Zail Singh, Darbara Singh and BhajaLai were all active politicians witcontacts in every nook and corner oPunjab and the central-governmentbureaucracy, but their sources had dried



up.The two Akali leaders were deeply

upset when they learnt of the settlement.True to form, they both rejected it,proving Arjun Singh's decision to dealwith Longowal was correct. Bhajan Laicould not show his anger when he wasold Haryana must accept the terms it

had rejected all along. Oppositioeaders had conveniently presented

Rajiv Gandhi with a long list ocorruption charges against the HaryanaChief Minister and so he was in noposition to resist. Zail Singh was out oDelhi on a presidential tour when heearnt that the Prime Minister and

Longowal were going to meet. Evewhen he returned to the capital, Rajiv



Gandhi studiously ignored his presencen Delhi. No one gave a thought to

Darbara Singh who happened to be iBombay at the time.

When Rajiv Gandhi announced thesettlement to cheering Members oParliament, he said, 'I hope it [thesettlement] will be the beginning of anew phase of working together to buildhe country, to build unity and integrity.'

He knew that it was only the beginningof a process of reconciliation betweeSikhs and Hindus. He also knew thatmuch needed to be done to reconcileother Indian communities. At that verymoment Hindu-Muslim clashes werecontinuing in Mahatma Gandhi's homestate of Gujarat.



Rajiv Gandhi adopted modern crisismanagement techniques to reach thePunjab settlement. He set up a tight-knitcommand group, kept his own mindclear by working from brief positiopapers and maintained secrecy bynsisting that documents were only read

by those who needed to know. Theumours from all four corners of India

which used to waft around Mrs Gandhi's

darbar were kept out. This new stylecertainly worked in the case of the Akalisettlement. Will it work to solve themuch deeper problems which lie behindhe Sikh unrest and indeed the communalension in so many other parts of India?

Communal tension in modern India isoften caused by rising expectations. It is



at its worst in the more prosperous andadvanced parts of the country, showinghat mere economic growth is no answer o India's problems. Gujarat and Punjab

are the two most progressive states andet they were the scenes of religiousanaticism and communalism when Rajiv

Gandhi came to power, rather than thepoor backward areas like Bihar or eastern Uttar Pradesh. The poor of those

areas have seen so little change in their surroundings they have no hope of abetter life. Punjabis and Gujaratis haveseen remarkable progress. Some of theare frustrated because the benefits arepassing them by. Others fear that their raditional control over sources o

wealth is threatened. Twentieth-century



deologies like progressive capitalism,socialism and even communism existonly in name in India. They have notaken any genuine political form. Sohose who fear for their traditional

privileges and those whose expectationsof a better life are frustrated fall back ohe ancient divisions of Indian society,

caste and creed, to fight their battles.Rajiv Gandhi's decision to go all out

or a political solution in Punjab showedhat he realised the police and the armycould not provide the answer tocommunal strife. He found the politicalcourage needed to solve the immediateproblem of Punjab; he will need courageand determination of quite a differentorder if he is to tackle its underlying



causes. For that he will have to findways of modernising every aspect ondia's life and thought without

destroying the country in the process. Hewill have to re-create the Congress bymaking it once again a genuine secular national party, but this time with modernsocial and economic policies too. Hewill have to break the stranglehold of thepoliticians, bureaucrats and contractors,

he 'parasitic class' who are sucking theife blood out of the Indian economy.That will mean dismantling thecomplicated economic controls whichey have manipulated for their ow

ends. He will have to overhaul theamshackle administration, founding

modern institutions which can provide



he environment, education, housing andhealth services needed to change theives of those Indians still condemned toive in squalid slums or remote and

backward villages. There is no doubthat Rajiv Gandhi is committed to

modernising India. He made a good startby resolving his differences with theAkalis so quickly and efficiently, but itwas only a small beginning.





Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 197.

2 The Sikhs

1 M.A. Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion , pamphlet, London, 1910,

p. 6.2 H. Beveridge(ed.), Tuzuk-i- Jahangiri, or Memoirs o Jahangir, translated by A. Rogers,Royal Asiatic Society, London,1909, vol. 1, p. 72.

3 Sita Ram Kohli, 'The Army o

Maharaja Ranjit Singh', Journal o Indian History, vol. 1:1921-2,Department of Modern IndiaHistory, Allahabad University,

published in London.



4 William Francklin, Military Memoirs of George Thomas, published for the author by Hurkar Press, Calcutta, 1803, pp. 71–3.

5 Lord William Godolphin Osborne,The Court and Camp of Runjeet

Singh, Henry Colbum, London,1840, p. 72.6 Emily Eden, Up the Country,

Curzon Press, London, 1978 (thisedition first published by OxfordUniversity Press in 1930), p. 200.

7 Ibid., p. 218.

8 Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, itsOfficers and Men, Jonathan Cape,London, 1974, p. 236.

9 Frederic Coo er, Crisis o the



Punjab, Smith, London, 1858, pp.21–2.

10 Khushwant Singh, A History of theSikhs, vol. 2: 1839–1974,Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1966. Indian edition,

Oxford University Press, Oxford,1977 (page numbers from thelatter), pp. 112–13.

11 Ibid., p. 160.12 Mohinder Singh, The Akal

Movement, Macmillan, Delhi,1978, p. 14.

13 Ibid., p. 20.14 Rev. Andrews, articles publishedin the Manchester Guardian, 15tand 24th February 1924.



15 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Autobiography, this editio published by Jawaharlal Nehr Memorial Fund, Delhi, 1980, pp.175–6.

16 Philip Mason, op. cit., p. 514.

3 The Grievances of the Sikhs

1 Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba,U.C. Kapur & Sons, Delhi, 1970 , p327.

2 Norma Evenson, Chandigarh,

University of California Press,Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966, p.93.

5 The Arrest of Bhindranwale



1 Khushwant Singh and Kuldip

Nayar, Tragedy of Punjab:Operation Blue Star and After,Vision Books, 1984, p. 24.

2 Sunday magazine, Calcutta, 8th–

11th August 1982, p. 39.3 Pramod Kumar, MahmohanSharma, Atul Sood and AshwaniHanda, Punjab Crisis, Context anTrends, Centre for Research iRural and Industrial Development,Chandigarh, 1984.

6 Mrs Gandhi Attempts to Negotiatewith the Sikhs

1 Khushwant Sin h and Kuldi



Nayar, Tragedy of Punjab:Operation Blue Star and After,Vision Books, 1984, p. 38.

2 Ibid., p. 50.3 Amarjit Kaur, Arun Shourie, Lt-

Gen. J.S. Aurora, Khushwant Singh

et al., The Punjab Story, RolBooks International, Delhi, 1984, p.17.

7 The Asian Games and theirAftermath

1 Indian Express, Delhi, 17t Noyember 1982.2 Amarjit Kaur, Arun Shourie, Lt-

Gen. J.S. Aurora, Khushwant Singhet al., The Punjab Story, Rol



Books International, Delhi, 1984, p.98.

3 Illustrated Weekly of India,Bombay, 10th April 1983.

8 Two Brutal Killings – Mrs Gandhi

Acts at Last 1 Amarjit Kaur, Arun Shourie, Lt-

Gen. J.S. Aurora, Khushwant Singh,et al., The Punjab Story, RolBooks International, Delhi, 1984, p.39.

9 President's Rule Fails

1 J.Akbar, India: The Siege Within,

Penguin Books, Harmondsworth,



1985, p. 196.

12 Operation Blue Star

1 D.R. Mankekar, 22 Fateful Days,this edition published by Deep &

Deep, Delhi, 1968, pp. 73–4.2 Amarjit Kaur, Arun Shourie, Lt-Gen. J.S. Aurora, Khushwant Singh,et al., The Punjab Story, RolBooks International, Delhi, 1984, p.13.

3 Janata Weekly, Bombay, 23rd

September 1984. 13 The Golden Temple, 6th June

1 Amar it Kaur, Arun Shourie, Lt-



Gen. J.S. Aurora, Khushwant Singhet al., The Punjab Story, RolBooks International, Delhi, 1984, p.28.

14 The Aftermath

1 Amarjit Kaur, Arun Shourie, Lt-Gen. J.S. Aurora, Khushwant Singhet al., The Punjab Story, RolBooks International, Delhi, 1984, p.28.

2 Illustrated Weekly of India,

Bombay, 22nd July 1984.3 Shekhar Gupta, Arun Shourie,Rahul Bedi and Pranoy Roy, Th

Assassination and After, Rol

Books International, Delhi, 1985, p.



27.

15 Conclusion

1 Journal of the Indo-British Historical Society, Madras

December 1984.



Bibliography

AKBAR, m.j., India: The Siege Within,

Penguin Books, Harmonds-worth,1985.ANON, 'A Homage to Amritsar,' Marg,

vol. XXX, no. 3, Bombay, June 1977.BRASS , PAUL , Language, Religion an

Politics in North India, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1974.

COLE , W.H . and SAMBHI, PIYARA





AURORA, L T-GENERAL j.s.;SINGH, KUSHWANT; KAMATH,M . v . ; GUPTA, SHEKHAR;KIRPEKAR, SUBHASH;SETHI, SUNIL and SINGH,TAVLEEN, The Punjab Story, RolBooks International, Delhi, 1984.

KUMAR, PRAMOD; SHARMA, MAHMOHAN;SOOD, ATUL and HANDA, ASHWANI

Punjab Crisis, Context and Trends,

Centre for Research in Rural andIndustrial Development, Chandigarh,1984.

MACAULIFFE, MAX ARTHUR ; The Sikh

Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred Writingsand Authors, Clarendon Press,Oxford, 1909.

MCLEOD, W.H ., Guru Nanak and the Sikh



Religion, Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1968.

MASANI, ZAREER, Indira Gandhi: A Biography, Hamish Hamilton,London, 1975.

MASON, PHILIP , A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, itsOfficers and Men, Jonathan Cape,London, 1974.

MORAES, DOM, Mrs Gandhi, Jonatha

Cape, London, 1980.AYAR, KULDIP and SINGH,KHUSHWANT, Tragedy of Punjab:Operation Blue Star and After,Vision Books, Delhi, 1984.

SARHADI,AJITSING, Punjabi Suba,U.C. Kapur&Sons, Delhi, 1970.

SINGH, HARBANS, The Heritage o



the Sikhs, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1964.

SINGH, HARBANS, A History of theSikhs, vols 1 and 2, PrincetoUniversity Press, Princeton, vol. 11963* vol- 2 1966.

SINGH, KHUSHWANT, A The Akal Movement, Macmillan, Delhi, 1978.

SURJEET, HARKISHAN SINGH,'Happenings in Punjab', National

Book Centre, Delhi, 1984.WHITE PAPER ON THE PUNJABAGITATION, Government of India,10th July 1984.



Index

Akal Takht, built

by Guru Hargobind, razedto ground, under Ranjit Singh, priests honour Dyer, andPunjabi Suba movement,and Bhindranwale,and Operation Blue Star,repairs to,

Akali Dal,



in GurudwaraReform Movement, infreedom movement, after independence, inSuba movement, andAnandpur Sahib Resolution,during Emergency,in Janata coalition ,and Nirankaris, enlistsBhindranwale's support,

and negotiations withgovernment,agitations,andWhite Paper, and settlementwith Rajiv Gandhi,

Akali Dal Trinity,leadership of,



attitude to Bhindranwalleaders under arrest

Akbar, M.J.Akhand Kirtani JathaAlexander, P.CAll India Sikh Students Federation

leaders' connections withBhindranwale, GeneralSecretary surrenders

Anandpur Sahib Resolution

Punjabi list'of grievances drawn up, biasof towards farmers, andissue of water,andBhindranwale

Andrews, Rev. C.F.Antia, Maj.Gen. S.N.Arjun, Guru, martyrdom of



Arya SamajAsian Games, 9thAtwal, Deputy InspectorGeneral

A.S.Aurora, LtGen. Jagjit Sing

Babbar Akalis.Babbar KhalsaBacchan. Amitabh

Badal, Prakash SinghBatra, Raia Harmii SinghBBC.Bcdi. RahulBhagat. H. K. L.Bhartiya Janata PartyBhartiva Jan SanghBhatia, Prem



Bhatia, Raghunandan LaiBhinder. Inspector-General of Police

Pritam Singh,,Bhinder, Mrs P. S.Bhindranwale, Sant Jarnail Singh

childhood and early career promoted by Congressand Nirankaris and DalKhalsa; and SGPC electionscampaigns for Congress

and murder of NirankariGuru takes refuge ir GoldenTemple complex; and murderof Lala Jagat Narainarrest and release of and terrorismvisit to Delhi attendsSantokh Singh's memorial service;



wooed by Akalisstrategy to force Hindus out ofPunjab moves to Guru

Nanak Niwas; joins AkaliMorcha and Asian Gamesand Akali negotiationsaddresses ex-servicemenrelations with Longowal,and Khalistanfollowers of

swears allegiance to Longowaland death of D.I. -G. Atwaladdresses AISSFmeeting; hit list of influence in Punjabmaintains Congress linksand Babbar Khalsain Akal Takht,



sermonof, fortifies GoldenTemple; and Sodhi'smurderJ Akali

politicians'support for andwedding of followers in GoldenTemple; vetoes finalsettlement MrsGandhi alleges controls Morchaand CRPfiring last

meetings with press plans campaign to murder Hindus;Tohra tries to persuade togive up; and OperationBlue Star;death and cremationof rumours that hesurvived allegations of



foreign linksBhullarMaj.-Gen. Jaswant SinghBorder Security ForceBrarMaj.-Gen. KuldipSingh;

and Operation Blue Star

Central Reserve Policeexchange of firewith terrorists before Operation

Blue Star Centre for Research in Rural andIndustrial Development

Chander RomeshChandigarh disputeChaturvedi,T.N.Chauhan, Jagjit SinghChellaney, Brahma



Chowdhuri, Lt-Col. A.K.Citizens' CommissionCongress PartyCongress Party (Indira) (after )

supports Bhindranwale,Bhindranwale turnsagainst,

Cooper, Frederic

Dal KhalsaDamdami TaksalDashmesh RegimentDayal, Lt-Gen. Ranjit Singh

and Operation Blue Star Deo, K.P.SinghDesai, MorarjiDewan, Brig. A.K; and Operation



Blue Star Dhawan, R.K Dikshit, Uma Shankar

Eden, EmilyEmergency the,Evenson, Norma

Gandhi, Indiraassassination of receives threateningletters, nature ofgovernment of LIcremation of;security of, reasons for latereaction to extremists and



Congress Party, moodafter Operation Blue Star;agrees to Punjabi Suba; makesChandigarh award reachesheight of popularity; supportsZail Singh as Punjab ChiefMinister, and Emergency,and elections,links withBhindranwale,

returns to power in,holds talks with Akali Dal; andAkali Morcha; sends SwaranSingh to negotiate; promotesher son Rajiv as successor,sends Amarinder Singh tonegotiate Bhindranwale'scomments on, makes



unilateral awards; reneges onagreements and President'sRule, declaresPunjab disturbed area,appoints Bhinder as police chief;and talks ended by Hindu

backlash speaks toLongowal; by-electiondefeats and negotiationsled by Narasimha Rao

meets President before BlueStar; broadcast to nation by,and Operation BlueStar,agrees to President visitingTemple; and Pakistandeath 'prophesied' byChauhan; attitude to Akal



Takht repairs and armywithdrawal from Temple

Gandhi, MahatmaGandhi, ManekaGandhi, Rajiv

hears of MrsGandhi's assassinationsworn in as Prime Minister; andinquiry into riots; at MrsGandhi's funeral; visits riot-

affected areas; suspicious ofSatwant Singh; opinion ofdarbar system; attempts torevive Congress Party,attends Santokh Singh's memorialservice promoted as MrsGandhi's successor,organises Asian Games,



reaches settlement with AkalisGandhi, Sanjav; in Emergency

promotes Bhindranwaledeath of

Gandhi, SoniaGaur, SanjeevGolden Temple; fortification of

built byGuru Arjun blown up byAfghans; decorated by Ranjit

Singh; priests honour Dyer;corruption in andGurudwara Reform Movement;and Punjabi Suba movementdefended by Baba DeepSingh; and movement againstEmergency; demand for trainnamed after; Akali Morcha



launched from; extremists takerefuge in, Atwal's murder in;AISSFmeeting in, bodies foundnear weapons' training in;Rajiv Gandhi favours entryof; and CRP firingsand Sodhi's murderorder passed banningarms inside; Akali Trinity

meets there; securitytightened around;encircled

by army; pilgrims gather in;and Operation Blue Starlibrary burntPresident visits behaviour oftroops inside; TV coverage of



after Operation Blue Starand repairs to Akal Takht;call for 'liberation' of;army withdraws from

Hargobind, GuruHari Mandir see under Golden

TempleHaq, General Zia-ul-(President)

Indian army; British Sikh role in, post-independence,Sikh recruitment into,ex-servicemen meetBhindranwale rules outsiege of Golden Temple;



called out in Punjab;surrounds Temple; andOperation Blue Star mutinies in;'mopping up' terroristsliquor consumption in;Mrs Gandhi praises;reaches agreement on Akal Takhtrepairs; withdraws fromTemple; and anti-Sikh riots

Indo-Tibetan Border Police

Jack, IanJallianwala Bagh massacre,Janata Party,Joshi, Chand



Kaur, Mrs Amarjit,Kaur, BaljitKaur, Bibi AmarjitKaur, KarnailKaur, Ranbir Khalistan,

'President' of Khan, Lt ol. Israr,Khanna, Harbans Lal

Kirpekar, SubhashKumar, Pawan,

Lal, Bhajan,Lekhi, Pran NathLongowal, Sant Harchand Singh

early career;



and Nahar Roko; launchesMorcha; and Asian Games;calls meeting of ex-servicemen relations withBhindranwale,and Rasta Roko;warns against forcible entry ofTemple; and CRP firing;speaks to Mrs Gandhi;

LongowalSam - continued

meets Akali Trinity;announces new phase of Morcha;and Operation Blue Star.arrested; andsettlement with Rajiv Gandhi

Man chanda, H.S.



Mann Simranjit SinghMarx, KarlMason, PhilipMoga, sieges of Mohan, Inder Mukherji, Pranab

Nanak,Guru Nanda Narinderjit Singh

Narain Lala Jagat Narayan Jayaprakash Naxalites, Nayar, Kuldip

negotiations between the Indiangovernment and the Akali Dal;with Mrs Gandhi withSwaran Singh; with



Amarinder Singh,including opposition partiesMrs Gandhi reneges onagreements secret, MrsGandhi blames Akalis for failureof, second round withopposition parties withBadal and Tohra in jailwith Narasimha RaoBhindranwale rejects proposed

agreement, led by RajivGandhi and Punjab settlement Nehru Jawaharlal Nirankaris

convention in Amritsar ofmurder of Guruterrorist attacks on

Noorani, A.G.



Oberoi, Lt-Gen.Operation Blue Star; prelude to at

Moga CRP drawsextremists' fire armysurrounds Temple,young Sikhs escape,reasons for timing of

pilgrims gather in complex,

problems of storming,thirty-seven Sikh templessurrounded, communicationscut, press externed,assault and capture of hostel andTemple complexesreaction to,Mrs Gandhi speaks on and



White Paper Osborne, William

Pande, B.D.People's Union for Civil LibertiesPeople's Union for Democratic RightsPheruman, Darshan SinghPunjabi Suba movementPuri, Brigadier S.C.

Rao, NarasimhaRao Sahib, Krishnaswamyriotm santi-Sikh

Sahai, Anand



Sandhu, Harminder Singh,weds in Temple;

prevents Longowal fromsurrendering gives himselfup, writes to Chauhan

Sarhadi, Ajit Singh,Sarkaria CommissionSethi, P.C.Seton, MarieShankar, Lt-Gen. Gauri

Shastri, Lai Bahadur Shiromani Gurudwara PrabandhakCommittee

Sikh High Priests; andMoga sieges, protest againstarmy in Golden Temple and AkalTakht repairs

Sikhs history of the; lives of Gurus



Golden Temple blown up;empire of Ranjit Singh,collapse of empire; role inMutiny formation of Singh,Sabhas Chief KhalsaDiwan, recruitment intoBritish Indian army andJallianwala Bagh massacreGurudwara Reform Movement,and freedom movement

Bhagat Singh, and partitionSingh, Amarinder Singh, Amrik,

death during Operation Blue Star Singh, Air Chief Marshal ArjunSingh, ArunSingh, Deputy Superintendent of

Police Bachan



Singh, BalwantSingh, Sub-Inspector BeantSingh, Bhai Ashok Singh, Bhan and

Operation Blue Star Singh, ButaSingh, CharanjitSingh, Dalbir Singh, Darbara

becomes Chief

Minister andBhindranwale's arrestand President's Rule,and policy of 'encounters'

Singh, Baba Deep Singh,Sant Fateh-Singh,Fauja

Singh, Guru GobindSingh, Baba Gurbachan



Singh,GurcharanSingh, Deputy Commissioner GurdevSingh, Maj.-Gen. GurdialSingh, Sepoy GurnamSingh, GurtejSingh, Lt-Gen. HarbakshSingh, HukamSingh, Joginder Singh, Kartar Singh, Khushwant,

Singh, Giani KirpalSingh, Mohinder Singh, PrabpalSingh, GianiPratapSingh, Bhagat PuranSingh, GianiPuranSingh, RachpalSingh, Ranjit



Singh, Maharaja RanjitSingh, Giani SahibSingh, Baba SantaSingh, SantokhSingh, Constable SatwantSingh, Maj.-Gen. Shahbeg,

and Operation Blue Star,death and cremation of

Singh, Jathedar SukhdevSingh, Surinder (alias Chinda)

Singh, SwaranSingh, MasterTaraSingh, TavleenSingh, TralochanSingh, Giani Zail as

Chief Minister of Punjab promotes Bhindranwale becomesHome



Minister; differences withDarbara Singh,speaks to Parliament onBhindranwale's involvement in

Nirankari Guru's murder, andBhindranwale's arrest and releasefails to arrestBhindranwale in Delhi, and

Singh,Giant Zatl - continuedSantokh Singh, elected

President; intervention inCRP firing by his office notinformed of plan for OperationBlue Star; visits GoldenTemple after Operation Blue Starmakes broadcast to nation;meets retired Sikh generalsdeclared lankhaiya,



pardonedSinha Lt-Gen. S.K.Sodhi Surinder Singh,Sunderji Lt-Gen. Krishnaswamy;

and Operation Blue Star Surjeet Harkishan Singh

Terrorist Affected Areas (SpecialCourts) Act

terrorist attacks; on Guru of

Nirankaris on LalaJagat Narain afterBhindranwale's arrest; afterhis release; by time of SantokhSingh,'s death; anti-NirankariAISSFinvolvement in; by Sodhi;

by Dashmesh Regiment;



against government supporterson Republic Day; and

bank robberies; on A.S.Atwal, bodiesfound outside Golden Templeand hit-list; onBachan Singh, againstHindus in park and bus

passengers; after President'sRule imposed police

demoralised by;Bhindranwale encourages; inFebruary; on CRP;on Hindu temple;March-May; forceHindus to leave Punjab

business affected by; onSodhi. on former Sikh



priest; during twenty-twomonths of Akali Morcha; onday of Mrs Gandhi's broadcast;

plans for; afterOperation Blue Star;

pre-settlement bombingsThomas GeorgeTiwari,V.N.Tohra,Gurcharan Singh, allowsBhindranwale to move into Akal

Takht and finalnegotiations with governmentfails to persuade Bhindranwale toacceptgovernment's offer; tries to

persuade Bhindranwale to give upand Operation Blue Stararrested



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