An analysis of communicative strategies

employed by the President of the United States in

times of domestic and international crisis between

1933 and 2001;

with particular focus on literary and linguistic

devices used in presidential rhetoric.

Aidan O’Connor - Joint Honours American Studies & English

Q43128 (40 Credit Dissertation)

Dissertation Tutor: Professor Thomas Allcock

School of Cultures, Languages and Area Studies

Abstract.

This study examines the evolution of crisis rhetoric employed by the President of

United States between 1933 and 2001. Transcripts of public speech from former

Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush are

subjected to literary and linguistic analysis. Combined with intellectual and

contextual references, this information determines how and why crisis rhetoric has

evolved across the Great Depression, the Empire of Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor,

violent domestic civil rights demonstrations and al-Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The first chapter scrutinises Roosevelt’s ‘Fireside Chat’ responses to the nation’s

economic depression and Empire of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The

second chapter examines Johnson’s influence on the campaign for civil rights that

took place predominantly during the 1960s, specifically his 1965 “The America

Promise” speech. The third chapter inspects Bush’s televised responses to the 9/11

terrorist attacks in 2001.

Literary and linguistic devices in these speech transcripts, including narrative

voice, figurative language and cultural allusions, help understand the distinct forms

of each President’s crisis rhetoric. Frequent comparisons between the oratory styles

of Roosevelt, Johnson and Bush suggest crisis rhetoric’s basic function has changed.

Roosevelt favoured accurate information, Johnson adopted a more persuasive model

of speech and Bush chose to manipulate the national audience. This is evidenced by

a shift from informative, candid crisis rhetoric to an intimate and dramatic alternative.

To determine the motivations behind this shift in rhetorical style, contemporary

public reactions and existing academic criticism of these speeches have also been

accommodated in this study. From this research, the growth of mass media, the

population’s reduced faith in federal government and the revocation of the

intellectual’s political influence are all considered as potential causes.

13,592 words (including footnotes)

Contents

Page No.

Introduction 1

I - Franklin D. Roosevelt: Economic depression, international 5

conflict and direct interaction.

II - Lyndon B. Johnson: Civil rights, social reform and debate 15

rhetoric.

III - George W. Bush: ‘The War on Terror,’ globalisation and 30

emotive speech.

Conclusion 51

Bibliography 57

1

Introduction.

As the leader of a democracy, the President of the United States must maintain an

effective relationship with the American citizens he represents. Rhetorical strategies

in public speech are a significant part of this duty, conveying and promoting political

ideologies or government agendas. Academic professor Jeffrey Tulis cited this

association, where “the words [of public speech]…are regarded as mere ‘reflections’

of these doctrines.”1

During periods of threat to national security, domestic or international, between

1933 and 2001, the U.S. President’s communicative strategies, his means of

interacting with the national population, have become more pro-active and

‘intimately coercive’. Public addresses have shifted from a formal and staid rhetoric

to a more personal, colloquial and figurative alternative. The function of this rhetoric

has also evolved from accurate information, to rational persuasion and dramatic

embellishment. Throughout this hermeneutic study of public speech, ‘rhetoric’

relates to the linguistic and literary devices used in the President’s communication

with the national population. ‘Ideology’ refers to system of ideals that directs social,

economic or political policy.

Scholars Jeremiah Olson, Yu Ouyang, John Poe and Richard Waterman labelled

rhetoric’s significance in the President’s redirection of public policy and opinion as

one of “three principal powers…[with] the formal constitutional and statutory

powers defined in the Constitution and subsequent legislation [and] the political

1 Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987): p.13

2

power of being head of his party…”2 To understand the motivations behind

rhetorical selection and why the President’s crisis rhetoric has evolved into a more

intimate and dramatic resource, this study conducts a linguistic analysis of three

different Presidents’ crisis rhetoric. Linguistic analysis identifies and describes each

speech’s semantic, phonological and grammatical structures, linking them to the

period’s contemporary context. This partially entails the political agendas of each

President, which have affected the form and content of their communicative

strategies’.

Studying Presidential rhetoric during periods of threat to national safety reveals

the ideologies the President and American citizens regard highest once their sense of

security has been compromised. This project correlates these ideologies with

Franklin D. Roosevelt; Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush’s use of rhetorical

strategies in public speech, 3 examining how enduring ideologies are represented

differently, through rhetoric, over time. Roosevelt’s response to the Great

Depression and attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Johnson’s intervention in the

domestic campaign for civil rights in the 1960s and Bush’s reaction to the terrorist

attacks of September 11 2001 reveal the evolution of the President’s crisis rhetoric

between 1933 and 2001. This window of time encapsulates three distinct periods of

threat to national security.

This project’s focus on the Presidency disregards the need to analyse party

2 Jeremiah Olson, Yu Ouyang, John Poe, Austin Trantham and Richard W. Waterman, “The Teleprompter Presidency: Comparing Obama's Campaign and Governing Rhetoric,” Social Science Quarterly, 93.5, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012): p.1406 3 For the purposes of this dissertation, the titles ‘President Bush’ and ‘Bush’ refer to George W. Bush,

the 43rd president of the United States of America.

3

affiliation in detail. The President communicates with a national audience, regardless

of which political party he comes from. Similarly, the role of the speechwriter will

not be scrutinised in this study either. Whilst professional writers help create public

speech, the President has the final verdict on its shape, content and use of rhetorical

devices.

Existing critical interpretations of U.S. presidential rhetoric provide two dominant

schools of thought on the consistency of the U.S. President’s rhetorical style in

public address over the twentieth-century.

Certain scholars argue there has been no significant change in the style of the

Presidents’ rhetoric or the values it perpetuates. Karen Hoffman stressed a

“significant continuity” amongst U.S. President’s public addresses, refusing to

acknowledge any discrepancy in presidential rhetoric.4 Craig and Kathy Smith

shared this opinion of “an unusually concordant value system”.5 Barbara Hinckley

suggested the ‘old’ formal and ‘new’ intimate rhetorical models of the U.S.

presidency bore a “striking similarity.”6 This study’s linguistic and contextual

analysis of Roosevelt, Johnson and Bush’s crisis rhetoric argues against this

collective opinion to suggest there was a development in rhetorical style.

In the second mindset, academics argue the President’s communicative strategies

have transformed over time. Scholars Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Edward Yager and

4 Karen S. Hoffman, “The rhetorical vs. the popular presidency: Thomas Jefferson as a popular president,” Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, (Chicago, IL, April 2001.) 5 Craig A. Smith and Kathy B. Smith. “Presidential values and public priorities: Recurrent patterns in addresses to the nation, 1963-1984,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, p.15, (Washington D.C.: Center for Study of the Presidency and Congress, 1985): p.749 6 Barbara Hinckley, The Symbolic Presidency: How presidents portray themselves, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990): p.133

4

Sandi Lahlou recognised this shift, citing colloquial terminology and abstract themes

in modern public address: “from themes concerned with (1) institutions, to…(2)

individuals, families, and children.”7 Olson suggested the modern President’s

rhetoric had become “anti-intellectual…more abstract, relying on religious and

idealistic references…more activist…inclusive and…conversational.”8 Tulis argued

“popular or mass rhetoric has become the principle tool of presidential governance,”9

suggesting each President adapted their rhetoric according to his political ideologies

and the national audience’s condition. Each claim partially contributes to my study’s

thesis, which hypothesises a transition from candid, formal registers of language to a

more intimate, emotive and dramatic lexicon in Presidential crisis rhetoric.

This study distinguishes itself from the second collective outlook, however, by

comparing close linguistic analysis of each President’s crisis rhetoric, whilst

identifying the prevalent social forces that prompted their respective oratory styles.

This provides further insight into the motivations behind each President’s selection

of rhetoric. Gallup polls and intellectual responses from the time provide further

indicators of synchronization or discord between the President and the national

population. Their incorporation into the project measures the contemporary response

to these different styles of rhetoric. The intellectuals referred to in this study are

figures who address U.S. politics and society on a theoretical level, for the educated

class of each period.

7 Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Edward Yager and Saadi Lahlou, ‘Yes, Ronald Reagan's Rhetoric Was Unique—But Statistically, How Unique?’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42.3, (Washington D.C.: Center for Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2012): p.484 8 Olson et al, “The Teleprompter Presidency,” Social Science Quarterly: p.1408 9 Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency: p.4

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I – Franklin D. Roosevelt: Economic depression, international

conflict and direct interaction.

Becoming U.S. President in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt was tasked with

restoring the United States following the nations’ descent into economic depression.

Roosevelt represented the early stages of a shift toward more dynamic

communicative strategies in crisis rhetoric. More reassuring, intimate rhetorical

features combined with the traditional and measured customs of predecessors

including Woodrow Wilson. Following the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the laissez-faire

political mentality of Herbert Hoover had struggled to help the nation recover

economically or emotionally.1 This prompted Roosevelt to combine his pioneering

rhetorical style with interventionist legislation that reflected his government

ideologies, collectively known as the ‘New Deal’ programs. Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’

cultivated a more direct and vicarious relationship with the national population, as

Federal government agencies including the Civilian Conservation Corps stimulated

employment as direct methods of government intervention.

Roosevelt established regular communication with the population through radio

broadcast “Fireside Chats.”2 Roosevelt’s actions developed familiarity and personal

intimacy with citizens in the domestic sphere, enforcing practical response in the

economic sphere at the same time. Roosevelt’s approach represented the modern

twentieth-century Presidency that Tulis cited in The Rhetorical Presidency, which

1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ‘Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton,’ Political Science Quarterly, 112.2 (New York, NY: Academy off Political Science, 1997): p.186 2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, FDR’s Fireside Chats, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992): pp.xiii-xviii Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1952): pp.5–6 Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, (New York: Viking Press, 1946): p.72

6

prioritised direct public appeal over Congressional deferment through

communicative strategies including ‘Fireside Chats’.3 This medium provided

assurance directly to the domestic sphere in a period of crisis. Through ‘Fireside

Chats,’ Roosevelt combined a stately, systematic register of language with reassuring

communication to the American family household. Following Japan’s 1941 attack of

Pearl Harbour, the U.S. navy base, this strategy became applicable to foreign policy.4

Roosevelt used the same rhetorical strategies to campaign for military mobilisation

in response to this threat from the Axis powers.

Roosevelt’s “Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War” and

“Fireside Chat 21: On Sacrifice,” challenged the prevalent national feeling of

isolationism that the attack on Pearl Harbor had crippled in 1941. Academic Dan

Scroop depicted isolationist sentiments in U.S. society prior to the Pearl Harbor

attacks as “the most popular and pervasive features of American society…US entry

into the First World War had been a disastrous mistake…to swell the profits of big

business and munitions manufacturers”.5 This depiction of isolationist sentiments in

U.S. society prior to the Pearl Harbor attack provided reasoning for the volatile

features of Roosevelt’s rhetoric in the attack’s aftermath. Roosevelt sought to resolve

national feelings of resentment and vulnerability by pushing the agenda for military

mobilisation.

Amongst Roosevelt’s rhetorical strategies, language from the semantic field of

hostility including dynamic verbs, “attacked,” “to deceive,” “torpedoed,” and 3 Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency: p.4 4 Lumeng Yu, ‘The Great Communicator: How FDR's Radio Speeches Shaped American History,’ The History Teacher, 39.1, (Long Beach, CA: Society for History Education, 2005): pp.89-106 5 Dan Scroop, ‘September 11th, Pearl Harbor and the Uses of Presidential Power’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15. 2 (Taylor and Francis Online, 2002): p.322

7

“whipped”, addressed the Axis powers that opposed the U.S.6 Conveying the

enemy’s hostile aggression, Roosevelt implied the U.S. should mobilize in its own

defence. Dynamic verbs’ form a part of Roosevelt’s largely accurate and informative

rhetorical account of the Pearl Harbor attack, without significantly embellishing the

truth.

Similarly, Roosevelt‘s reassuring, yet formal register of language includes

repetition, as a neutral rhetorical tactic, to convey urgency without resorting to

emotive language that could compromise speech’s serious tone:

“Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese

forces attacked Guam. Last night Japanese forces attacked the

Philippine Islands. Last night Japanese forces attacked Wake Island. And

this morning, the Japanese attacked Midway Island.”7

The juxtaposition of repetition in an asyndetic list form – without conjunction

words - against the single night of attacks reinforced the aggressive hostility of the

Japanese Empire. Combined with honesty, underlined by admissions of weakness,

these devices formed Roosevelt’s measured and informative rhetoric: “We have had

no illusions about the fact that this is a tough job – and a long one.”8 Roosevelt does

6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War with Japan,’ 8 December 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16053. (15 July 2012) Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Fireside Chat 21: On Sacrifice’, 28 April, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16252. (15 July 2012) 7 Roosevelt, ‘Requesting a Declaration,’ The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16053. (15 July 2012) 8 Roosevelt, ‘Fireside Chat 21’, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16252. (15 July 2012)

8

not betray his belief in the difficulties of the war effort, which translates to a respect

for the audience. This gesture is indicative of a candid and civil relationship between

the federal government and the national population that marked the early stages of a

transition towards more conversational rhetoric.

Roosevelt also asserted an authoritative tone highlighted by answering his own

rhetorical questions with declarative and imperative statements:

“Are you a business man, or do you own stock in a business corporation?

Well your profits are going to be cut…Are you a retailer or a wholesaler or

a manufacturer or a farmer or a landlord? Ceilings are being placed…Do

you work or wages? You will have to forego…”9

The question-answer format asserted Roosevelt’s reliability during a vulnerable

period in U.S. history. His detailing of the economic drawbacks of the nation’s entry

into World War II exhibited a candid honesty that contributed to Roosevelt’s

accurate and informative rhetorical style. Similarly, Roosevelt’s ‘seven point

program,’ a collection of economic principles designed to lower the cost of living,

exhibited organisation and preparation in response to the Pearl Harbor attack,

“First…Second…Third”.10 The list demonstrated informative rhetoric that contrasted

the emotive and figurative language George W. Bush employed in response to the

9/11 attacks.

9 Roosevelt, ‘Fireside Chat 21’, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16252. (15 July 2012) 10 Ibid.

9

Roosevelt also alluded to American Exceptionalism, one of the most rigid and

traditional ideologies in the national American identity; dating back to 1840.11 Terms

from the semantic fields of bravery and unity in ‘Fireside Chat 21’ conveyed this

ideology: “…The great war effort must be carried through to its victorious

conclusion by the indomitable will and determination of the people as one great

whole”.12 Roosevelt’s correlation of unity with strength is pertinent to the Pearl

Harbor attack’s threat against the nation.

The national population largely approved Roosevelt’s campaign for an

international war effort. The President’s approval rating rose from 73% to 84%

between 27 November 1941 and 25 January 1943 to reflect support following the

Pearl Harbor attack and Roosevelt’s reaction.13 The December 16, 1941 archived

copy of The Flat Hat also exhibited an acceptance of warfare and Roosevelt’s

interventionist ambitions in academic circles, documenting the opinions of faculty at

the College of William and Mary:

“‘A.G. Taylor, Professor of Political Economy …we must figure out what

each of our responsibilities is and go ahead and do our jobs until the time

when we find it necessary to change our course of action’…’The

importance of our participation in the war is that it assures finally our

11 Alexis De Toqueville, Democracy in America, (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) 12 Ibid. 13 ‘Job Performance Ratings for President Roosevelt,’ Online. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. URL: http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating_detail.cfm?allRate=True&presidentName=Roosevelt#.UVxEz6t34Tk (14 January 2013)

10

participation in the peace.’”14

“Carlton L. Wood, Assistant Professor of Economics and Government: “In

this present crisis we must always bear in mind the reconstruction of the

world that will be necessary both during and after the war, and we should

begin planning at once for such reconstruction.”15

“Harold Lees Fowler, Associate Professor of History: ‘…our immediate

duty is to do our own jobs to the best of our ability and to support the

national effort in every way possible.’”16

Calling for formal intervention into the Second World War, these responses affirm

an ideological departure from isolationism in the U.S. following Roosevelt’s appeal.

They are also evidence of a united outlook on foreign policy amongst educators, who

wielded significant social influence. Compliant attitudes are a testament to the

effectiveness of Roosevelt’s communicate strategies.

Domestically, Roosevelt’s informative, measured and reassuring rhetoric

contended with opposition in Louisiana Senator Huey Long and radio personality

Father Charles Coughlin. Long and Coughlin capitalised on widespread vulnerability

in the aftermath of the Great Depression, arguing that Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ did

not sufficiently address the imbalanced distribution in wealth in society. Long and

Coughlin’s dramatic communication of their radical social-economic ideologies

14 ‘Opinions On The War Crisis Given By Faculty Members’, The Flat Hat, December 14, 1941, 60.12, (Williamsburg, VA: The College of William & Mary, 1941): p.1 15 Opinions On The War Crisis’, The Flat Hat: p.1 16 Ibid.

11

accentuated Roosevelt’s formal rhetoric and central political ideals. American

historian Alan Brinkley affirmed Long and Coughlin’s reactionary exploitation to the

Great Depression:

“[Long and Coughlin] are manifestations of one of the most powerful

impulses of the Great Depression…the urge to defend the autonomy of

the individual and the independence of the community against

encroachments from the modern industrial state.”17

Huey Long’s ‘Share Our Wealth’ program promoted egalitarianism, as an

alternative to the existing distribution of wealth in the nation’s failing capitalist

economy, through rhetorical devices including hypothetical analogy and informal

modes of address. These devices dramatised and personalised the national economic

recession:

“Did that mean, my friends, that someone would come into this world

without having had an opportunity…to have hit one lick of work, should

be born with more than it...could ever dispose of, but that another one

would have to be born into a life of starvation?”18

Using these rhetorical devices, Long reinvented the recession as an injustice in

American society, to discredit Roosevelt. Long’s campaign received backing from a

diverse collection of the population including rural residents, the working class, 17 Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression, (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982): p.xi 18 Huey P. Long, ‘Every Man A King, (Radio Address, February 23, 1934),’ ed. By Wendy Wolff, Senate, 1789-1989, 3: Classic Speeches, 1830-1993, 3 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995): p.587

12

union members and professional, with more than seven million supporters joining

the national ‘Share Our Wealth Society’ by 1935.19

Coughlin exploited existing American ideologies, including anti-Communism and

the desire for independence, using dramatic metaphor and religious analogy to

discredit Roosevelt and the ‘New Deal’ reform programs:

“… everyone of you who is weary of drinking the bitter vinegar of sordid

capitalism and upon everyone who is fearsome of being nailed to the

cross of communism to join this Union which [must]…become a living,

vibrant, united, active organization, superior to politics and politicians.”20

Commanding in excess of ten million listeners,21 Coughlin used the population’s

sense of vulnerability during this period of economic decline to unsettle Roosevelt

through the guise of protecting the American population from political and economic

exploitation.

Coughlin and Long’s rigid, extreme government ideologies and exploitation of

national crisis manifested as dramatic rhetoric. As communicative strategies, their

speeches exhibited many qualities seen in the rhetoric of future President George W.

19 Snyder, Robert E., ‘Huey Long and the Presidential Election of 1936’, Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 16.2 (Lafayette, LA: Louisiana Historical Association, 1975): pp.121-122 William D. Pederson, The FDR Years, (New York, NY: Infobase Publishing, 2009): p.161 20 Father Charles Coughlin, ‘Address on the National Union for Social Justice (11 November 1934),’ Charles E. Coughlin, A Series of Lectures on Social Justice, (Royal Oak, MI: The Radio League of the Little Flower, 1935): p.9 21 Peter H. Amann, ‘A 'Dog in the Nighttime' Problem: American Fascism in the 1930s,’ The History Teacher, 19.4, (Notre Dame, IN: The Society for History Education, 1986): pp.572-573 Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression, (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982): 119

13

Bush. Whilst Bush used similar strategies to greater effect, the reassuring rhetoric of

Roosevelt and the dramatic language espoused by Coughlin and Long originally

permeated political conversation in the first half of the twentieth century. These

qualities developed into a common oratory style of U.S. Presidential rhetoric in

periods of threat to national security by 2001.

Roosevelt’s frank tone, blunt register of language and proactive legislative

changes satisfied the period’s demand for effective leadership. His peak approval

rating of 84% in January 1942 provided evidence of this.22 Roosevelt’s portrayal of

the United States as a victim of antagonism justified committing resources to a

foreign war effort, promoting interventionism to preserve national security. Whilst

Roosevelt’s reaction mirrored Bush’s response to 9/11, Roosevelt directly targeted

the forces that attacked Pearl Harbour using accurate information and a candid tone.

Bush dramatised the significance of 9/11 to justify invading countries that

accommodated the extremist Islamic movements responsible. The contrast of

Roosevelt’s measured, reactive approach with Bush’s proactive dramatic rhetoric

paralleled the different underlying agendas of each administration.

Following the economic depression and Pearl Harbor attacks, Franklin D.

Roosevelt’s novel communicative strategies in periods of threat to national security

marked the first shift towards more intimate crisis rhetoric and relations with the

national population. Pioneering concepts including Roosevelt’s ‘Fireside Chats’

transcended the domestic sphere whilst setting a precedent for national leaders

22 Jennifer Agiesta, ‘Presidential Approval Highs and Lows,’ The Washington Post, 2007. Online. URL: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2007/07/approval_highs_and_lows.html (16 August 2012)

14

succeeding him. Balancing the reassuring rhetorical qualities of his ‘Fireside Chats’

with formal elements of speech, Roosevelt maintained a public image as a

professional and attentive leader to motivate the national population, a notion

Richard Neustadt attested to: “FDR used fireside chats sparingly but with great effect

to build up a national audience.”23 Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush’s

communicative strategies conveyed the appeal of this emerging new intimate

approach to crisis rhetoric. Their willingness to adopt and develop these traits in their

own communicative strategies reflected this success.

23 Richard Neustadt, ‘The Weakening White House,’ British Journal of Political Science, 31.1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001): p.7

15

II – Lyndon B. Johnson: Civil rights, social reform and debate

rhetoric.

Lyndon B. Johnson expanded on the interventionist ideology and communicative

precedents set by Franklin D. Roosevelt. Social reform programs designed to

eliminate poverty and racial injustice, known as ‘The Great Society’ programs,

coupled more intimate and persuasive rhetoric to assert Johnson’s influence in a

period of domestic social upheaval. Johnson’s methods sought to pre-empt social

stagnancy arising out of civil tension, contrasting Roosevelt’s reactionary, reassuring

rhetoric. Although the Vietnam War represented an ideological conflict between

capitalism and communism that arguably threatened national security, Johnson’s

approach to resolving the civil rights campaign more prominently exhibited the shift

towards more intimate and emotive Presidential crisis rhetoric between 1933 and

2001.

Johnson’s interventionist ‘Great Society’ programs served as an abstract

communicative strategy that imposed his political ideology on the national

population. This especially pertained to civil rights, where Johnson’s proactive

campaign for social reform paralleled the growth of the civil rights movement and

‘Black Power’ ideology. Through support measures including the Social Security

and Civil Rights Acts of 1965, Johnson met public demands and unified the

population under a national identity. His rhetoric also assumed a more persuasive

form, invoking reason over the imperative tone of Roosevelt, or emotive language of

Bush. Johnson’s civil rights agenda extended to opposing state authorities that

enforced racial oppression. Protecting protestors in the Selma to Montgomery Voting

16

Rights March, Johnson deployed federal forces including the U.S. Army, Alabama

National Guard, FBI and U.S. Marshall Service.1 Through verbal and physical means,

Johnson conveyed his political ideology using confident, persuasive rhetoric

alongside domestic policies.

“The American Promise,” Johnson’s televised message to the United States’

Congress and national population in 1965, exhibited linguistic and rhetorical devices

that reinforced Johnson’s progressive political ideology on racial parity.

The term “promise” is applied as a homonym – two identically spelled words

with distinct meanings - used repetitively to satisfy two separate definitions. In the

first instance, Johnson ascribed to a pledge made to the nation: “A century has

passed, more than a hundred years, since equality was promised. And yet the Negro

is not equal. A century has passed since the day of promise. And the promise is

unkept.”2 With a second meaning however, Johnson’s use of “promise” also alluded

to the potential benefits the United States can gain from revolutionary social reforms:

“[The American Negro] has called upon us to make good the promise of America.

And who among us can say that we would have made the same progress were it not

for his persistent bravery, and his faith in American democracy.”3 Both

interpretations are relevant to Johnson’s speech, whilst homonyms typically

1 Townsend Davis, Weary Feet, Rested Souls: A Guided History of the Civil Rights Movement, (London: W.W. Norton, 1998): p.38 2 Lyndon B. Johnson, ‘Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise,’ March 15, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26805. (21 July 2012) 3 Johnson, ‘The American Promise,’ The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26805. (21 July 2012)

17

highlight focal points of speech.4 ‘Promise’ also characterises the country,

empowering it with the ability to perform an action through reification, similar to

personification or anthropomorphism. Combined with the intimate connotations of a

promise, this tactic sustained the abstract notion that the U.S. is most secure when its

citizens are united. Persuasive rhetorical methods signified a closer and more affable

relationship with the national population than predecessors including Franklin D.

Roosevelt.

Other poetic devices including repetition also highlighted important elements in

Johnson’s speech. Repetition and pseudo-dynamic verbs asserted Johnson’s

proactive nature, correlating with the ‘Great Society’ programs’ attention to poverty

and intolerance:

“I want to be the President who educated young children…I want to be the

President who helped to feed the hungry…I want to be the President who

helped the poor…I want to be the President who helped to end hatred

among his fellow men…I want to be the President who helped to end war

among the brothers of this earth.”5

This strategy combined neutral, less emotive rhetorical methods applied by

Roosevelt with the motif of personal interaction that Bush embellished in his own

4 Susan A. Duffy, Gretchen Kambe, and Keith Rayner, ‘The Effect of Prior Disambiguating Context on the Comprehension of Ambiguous Word: Evidence From Eye Movements,’ On the Consequences of Meaning Selection: Perspectives on Resolving Lexical Ambiguity, ed. David S. Gorfein, (Washington D.C.: The American Psychological Association, 2002): pp.27-43 Morton A. Gernsbacher, Rachel R. Robertson and Necia K. Werner, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Meaning,’ On the Consequences of Meaning Selection: Perspectives on Resolving Lexical Ambiguity, ed. by David S. Gorfein, (Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2002): pp.119-137 5 Johnson, ‘The American Promise,’ The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26805. (21 July 2012)

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post-9/11 rhetoric, representing the gradual development of rhetorical style over the

twentieth-century.

Linguistic devices from the storytelling genre of literature presented information

clearly in “The American Promise,” whilst incorporating moral undertones.6

Historical, social and political analogies attempted to rationalise the passage of civil

rights legislation for all American citizens. Through this diverse collection of

American analogies, Johnson presented a speech resembling a debate argument to

persuade his audience to approve social progression. A transition away from the

candid, declarative tone of Roosevelt’s rhetoric, toward Johnson’s more personal and

persuasive rhetoric verified Presidential crisis rhetoric’s transition to a more intimate

and dramatic style.

Johnson’s pursuit of equal civil rights for all ethnicities, nationalities and genders

was presented using allusions towards historical moments of racial progress. This

included former President Abraham Lincoln’s declaration of slaves as free in the

Emancipation Proclamation: “It was more than a hundred years ago that Abraham

Lincoln, a great President of another party, signed the Emancipation Proclamation,

but emancipation is a proclamation and not a fact.”7

The reference to Lincoln reminded contemporary listeners that the 1960s civil

rights campaign was only the latest stage of a social endeavour that dated back to

slavery’s abolition in the early nineteenth-century. As a characteristic of Johnson’s

6 Paula Stoyle, ‘Storytelling - Benefits and Tips,’ Teaching English: British Council, (2003). URL: http://www.teachingenglish.org.uk/articles/storytelling-benefits-tips (7 October 2012) 7 Johnson, ‘The American Promise’, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26805. (21 July 2012)

19

rhetoric, this allusion affirmed the federal government’s capacity to address civil

unrest by empowering social progress.

Johnson also incorporated American Exceptionalism and patriotism into ‘The

American Promise’ through superlatives, declaring the United States: "the greatest

nation on Earth."8 This device appealed to the contemporary listener’s sense of

national pride to condemn racial repression. Johnsons exploitation of pre-existing

ideologies to assert his own agenda recycled Massachusetts’s Bay Colony founder

John Winthrop and former President John F. Kennedy’s use of a “City Upon a Hill”

metaphor to conceptualise American Exceptionalism:

“…wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eis of al people are upon

us…we shall be made a story and a a by-word through the world…”9

“…our governments, in every branch, at every level, national, state and

local, must be as a city upon a hill…aware of their great trust and their

great responsibilities.”10

This established ideology elevated the United States’ position in the world.

However, Johnson alluded to American Exceptionalism for a distinct purpose, to

challenge critical beliefs on racial discrimination in the United States. His

superlatives suggested that oppression based on criteria beyond the national identity

8 Ibid. 9 John Winthrop, ‘A Modell of Christian Charity,’ The American Intellectual Tradition: Volume I, 1630-1865, ed. David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): p.14 10 John F. Kennedy, ‘City Upon a Hill,’ January 9, 1961. Online. The Miller Center: University of Virginia URL: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3364

20

discredited the concept of American Exceptionalism. Johnson’s adaptation of

American Exceptionalism redefined this traditional concept for a new context in the

civil rights campaign. The reinterpretation of national ideology opposed Franklin D.

Roosevelt’s accurate and informative rhetoric. George W. Bush, however, developed

Johnson’s strategy in post-9/11 rhetoric, creating a new perception of reality through

wartime rhetoric to dramatise the scale of 9/11’s perpetrators. This comparison

exhibits Presidential crisis rhetoric’s evolution into to a more intimate and dramatic

style during periods of threat to national security between 1933 and 2001.

Popular idioms from the nation’s rhetorical history also strengthened Johnson’s

argument for civil rights and activist legislation in “The American Promise.”

Johnson interjected renowned phrases from U.S. history and reinterpreted these

quotations beyond their original context of addressing democracy: "All men are

created equal"; "Government by consent of the governed"; "Give me liberty or give

me death."11 . Instead, Johnson associated these terms with the plight of the African

American citizen. Another example of reapplying traditional ideologies to a new

situation, Johnson argued that racial discrimination disregarded the ideals of the

Founding Fathers who had pursued American liberty through democracy.

Citing idioms originally relating to the political system of democracy, Johnson

asserted that it was his obligation to continue enforcing this democratic system

through civil rights legislation: "the right to choose your own leaders" and “the

expansion of that right to all of our people."12 An imperative tone composed of

modal auxiliary verbs and short declarative statements also conveyed Johnson’s

11 Johnson, ‘The American Promise’, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26805. (21 July 2012) 12 Ibid.

21

conviction:

"Every American citizen must have an equal right to vote. There is no

reason which [sic] can excuse the denial of that right. There is no duty

that weighs more heavily on us than the duty we have to ensure that

right."13

Johnson campaigned for civil equality in American society using his critics’

national political history against them. Combined with “Great Society” social

reforms, Johnson’s more conversational, debate-like rhetoric, complemented the

President’s interventionist approach to enforcing progressive social and political

ideologies. By alluding the nation’s history and collective sense of identity, Johnson

constructed an argument so well-protected that disputing it entailed disputing the

same values the United States was founded on, encompassed by the phrase: "fail as a

people and as a nation."14

“The American Promise” also used religious expressions to appeal to another

facet of American identity that transcended ethnicity and gender, faith. Johnson

referenced Matthew 16:26, a passage from the Bible, to argue the nation would lose

its ‘soul’ if its population failed to uphold the democratic model of government and

ensure equality: “For with a country as with a person, ‘What is a man profited, if he

shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?’”15 Acknowledging Christianity

in his campaign, Johnson alluded to John Winthrop’s credit of North America as a

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

22

divine utopia free from religious persecution: "the first . . . in the history of the world

to be founded with a purpose."16 Religious citations added another staple of

American identity to Johnson’s speech, capturing the majority of citizens within its

scope, regardless of citizens’ physical differences. Associating his argument with

this concept of a higher authority, God, Johnson classified his progressive social

agendas under the United States’ divine purpose:

"Above the pyramid on the great seal of the United States it says…'God

has favored our undertaking.'…It is rather our duty to divine His will. But I

cannot help believing that He truly understands and that He really favors

the undertaking that we begin here tonight."17

Johnson’s implication that a higher power approved of the ideology behind civil

rights legislation exploited perceptions of the United States’ divine relationship with

God. Through terminology from the semantic field of religion, Johnson exploited

three existing civil notions: the country’s citizens perceive themselves as selected

people,18 the nation has an exceptional purpose,19 and the United States’ founding

was a blessed act that uniquely tied the population to God.20 Religion was significant

in the newer, more intimate rhetoric espoused by Johnson and Bush as they

campaigned to reform social relations and mobilise the nation’s military,

respectively. Johnson’s incorporation of religion into public address is

acknowledged by American sociologist Robert Neelly Bellah as a reference for the

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 James J. Hennessey, American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): p.4 19 Roderick P. Hart, The Political Pulpit, (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1977): p.12 20 Russell B. Nye, This Almost Chosen People: Essays in the History of American Ideas, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1966): p.165

23

national population, not an indicator of the President’s own religious beliefs.21

Compared to religion’s more understated presence in Roosevelt’s crisis rhetoric

following the Pearl Harbor attacks, religion is featured, in Johnson and Bush’s

rhetoric, as evidence of the U.S. President’s evolving rhetorical style between 1933

and 2001, representing intimate and abstract topics that Olson alluded to.22

Another characteristic of the storytelling genre that Johnson integrated into his

comprehensive campaign for civil rights legislation is figurative language.

Metaphors embellished aspects of Johnson’s speech: “…let each of us look within

our own hearts and our own communities, and let each of us put our shoulder to the

wheel to root out injustice wherever it exists.”23 Combining a unified first person

plural voice with the conceptual metaphor of ‘physical toil in the name of justice,’

Johnson conveys the need for national unity in his effort to pass civil rights

legislation and outlaw discrimination. Through the depiction of physical labour,

Johnson suggested that racial imbalance is detrimental to the nation’s well-being,

requiring physical and figurative effort that could be applied elsewhere. Johnson’s

manipulation of figurative language represented a middle ground between the formal,

forthright register of Roosevelt and the emotive language applied by Bush.

Dynamic verbs allowed Johnson to imply the positive impact racial legislation

would make: “This bill will strike down restrictions to voting in all elections… It

will eliminate tedious, unnecessary lawsuits… no force can hold it back.”24 This

21 Robert N. Bellah, “Religion in America,” Daedalus, 96.1(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967): pp.1-21 22 Olson et al, “The Teleprompter Presidency”: p.1406 23 Johnson, ‘The American Promise’, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26805. (21 July 2012) 24 Ibid.

24

rhetorical strategy combined with oxymoron to associate social progression and

government interventionism with justice. Oxymoron – the use of contradicting terms

in conjunction with one another - also communicated the importance of active

decision-making, weighing two opposite scenarios against one another. As rhetorical

devices, dynamic verbs and oxymoron linked social activism with benefits and social

stagnancy with hazards:

“Our mission is at once the oldest and the most basic of this country: to

right wrong, to do justice, to serve man. In our time we have come to live

with moments of great crisis. Our lives have been marked with debate

about great issues; issues of war and peace, issues of prosperity and

depression”.25

These techniques highlighted the traditional theme of morality in government that

Roosevelt, Johnson and Bush all subscribed to during periods of threat to the

nation’s domestic or international security. The dramatic, bombastic qualities of

these devices, however, are indicative of the transition to more a more emotive

Presidential crisis rhetoric across time.

Johnson used temporal phrases to pressure his audience into supporting civil

rights legislation. These idioms encouraged the rapid passage of civil rights laws by

making assertions of time sensitivity: "This time, on this issue, there must be no

delay, no hesitation and no compromise with our purpose," "the time for waiting has

25 Ibid.

25

gone.”26 Johnson also conveyed immediacy using devices including the temporal

adverb ‘now’ and repeated use of ‘no’ in the context of delaying legislation: the

"time of justice has now come," "This time, on this issue, there must be no delay or

no hesitation or no compromise with our purpose."27 This urgency attempted to

persuade the national population to adopt Johnson’s social ideology on civil rights

and accelerate the passage of any relevant legislation. As a communicative strategy,

Johnson’s persuasive ‘time rhetoric’ echoed Roosevelt’s more neutral language,

whilst still actively campaigning for legislation in an aggressive fashion similar to

Bush’s pursuit of military mobilisation post-9/11.

The combined effects of these rhetorical strategies cultivated the notion that

unequal civil status and segregation opposed the ideological consensus of American

identity. Using social, political and religious references, whist conveying urgency,

“The American Promise” addressed listeners through a comprehensive argument that

deviated from Roosevelt’s strict imperative tone. Johnson’s speech is evidence of a

transition towards more intimate rhetoric in communicative strategies.

In spite of the civil rights movement’s infamy amongst social groups including

white Southerners, Johnson’s 1965 appeal to Congress and the national population

was well-received by the majority of the national population. Johnson recorded an

approval rating of 69% following the address, suggesting the president and his

speech successfully resonated with a majority of the national population.28

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 ‘Presidential Approval Tracker’, USA Today, 2009. URL: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/presidential-approval-tracker.htm (22 November 2012)

26

Reasons for the success of Johnson’s rhetorical style in “The American Promise”

are found in contemporary social context. Johnson’s efforts to amend social

imbalance using reform measures converged with the emergence of a ‘New Class’ of

individuals, who were raised in the affluent period of economic prosperity following

World War II.29 Former US ambassador Jeane K. Kirkpatrick argued this New Class

sought “the progressive involvement of broader cultural forces in politics,”

advocating “relatively high levels of education and income…found in professions

requiring verbal and communication skills.”30 These professionals, from scientific,

medical, legal, academic and media vocations, supported Johnson’s ‘Great Society’

domestic social agenda, on its merit of assisting less fortunate citizens by

reciprocating their affluence in other areas of society. Support from liberals, the

middle class and black Americans represented the ideological convergence between

the President and national population on domestic social issues in the 1960s.31

American economist Henry J. Aaron also alluded to this common political ideology:

“…The faith in government action, long embraced by reformers and

spread to the mass of the population by depression and war, achieved

political expression in the 1960s. This faith was applied to social and

economic problems, the perceptions of which were determined by

simplistic and naive popular attitudes...”32

29 Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘The New Class and the Professoriate,’ Society, 16.2, (New York, NY: Springer, 1979): pp.31–38 30 Jeane K. Kirkpatrick, ‘Politics and the New Class,’ Society, 16.2, (New York, NY: Springer, 1979): p.42 31 Gary Gerstle, ‘Race and the Myth of the Liberal Consensus,’ The Journal of American History, 82.2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): p.579 32 Henry J. Aaron, Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1978): p.151

27

Johnson’s campaign against poverty and racial discrimination united with

aggressive Black Power ideology, exemplified by Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seale and

Malcolm X. Black Power groups sought to re-define and empower African

Americans in the United States. Factions including the Black Panther Party

conveyed their racial ideologies through revolutionary means as extreme as gun

crime,33 justifying this study’s perception of the civil rights campaign as a threat to

national security. Interactive violence between white and black Americans

threatened the well-being of domestic society, as African Americans sought to

destabilise public perceptions of white superiority. Despite extremist social

tendencies, Black Power members shared a proactive outlook on social progression

with Johnson and the civil rights campaign. This extended to social outreach

programs. Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ reforms, including the Economic Opportunity

Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, paralleled

the Black Panther Party’s voluntary outreach to black communities. As a

representative of Black Power ideology, the Black Panther Party offered provisions,

education and physical aid to less privileged members of their social group, and

activism against racial injustice.34

Johnson correlated his campaign for civil rights legislation with quintessential

American ideals and values. These encouraged civilians to fulfil the ‘duties’ of their

nation, forefathers and religious faith through this appeal for social reform. The

success of Johnson’s campaign was reflected in the passage of legislation that

33 Curtis J. Austin, Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making And Unmaking of the Black Panther Party, (Fayetteville, LA: University of Arkansas Press, 2006): p.xi 34 Ryan J. Kirkby “‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised’: Community Activism and the Black Panther

Party, 1966–1971,” Canadian Review of American Studies, 41.1, (Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 2011): pp.25-62

28

drastically altered the legal perception of African American civil rights, including the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, twenty-fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and

Voting Rights Act of 1965. Historical analogies, political allusions and figurative

language were means through which Johnson communicated with the national

audience and argued his case for civil rights legislation in a conversational format

akin to a debate. This balance of formal and dramatic speaking strategies elicited an

impassioned, and widely positive, reaction from listeners and strengthened the

notion of a transition towards more intimate, dramatic Presidential crisis rhetoric.

A potential reason for the evolution of Presidential crisis rhetoric, beyond

political ideology, was public scandals including ‘Watergate.’ The ‘Watergate’

scandal of 1972 tarnished the relationship between the United States’ national

population and the federal government, as senior politicians appeared to abuse their

influence to organise felonies for personal and professional gain.35 The lack of trust

resulting from this affair impacted the authority of Presidents who succeeded

Richard Nixon, which may have subsequently affected their rhetorical styles.

Neustadt alluded to factor, claiming:

“the formal powers of the presidency…were attacked by a Democrat-led

Congress intent upon removing the president’s discretionary powers…The

emergency powers that FDR used to instigate and accelerate economic

mobilisation in anticipation of war…are not available to President

Bush…”36

35 Michael J. Robinson, ‘The Impact of the Televised Watergate Hearings,’ Journal of Communication, 24.2, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1974): p.18 36 Neustadt, ‘The Weakening White House,’ British Journal of Political Science: p.319

29

The Nixon administration’s betrayal of its authority diminished the national

population’s faith in the federal government, leaving future presidential

administrations without the same authority as Roosevelt and Johnson. Bush

attempted to compensate for this deficit using emotive language to unite the federal

government and the public as victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

30

III – George W. Bush: ‘The War on Terror,’ globalisation and

emotive speech.

George W. Bush’s tenure as President was defined by a radical shift towards

dramatic and intimate Presidential crisis rhetoric regarding the nation’s foreign

policy agenda. These changes were motivated by the 9/11 attacks, a series of

organised terrorist attacks against the United States launched by the Islamist outfit

al-Qaeda in 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush installed a new ‘rhetoric of fear’ to

impress neo-conservatism on the national population through communicative

strategies. Neo-conservatism, as an ideological movement, advocated the

international spread of democracy through economic and military influence. Bush’s

promotion of this foreign policy and its aggressive characteristics was more

emotionally manipulative than Roosevelt and Johnson’s rhetoric during periods of

threat to national security.

The evolution of technology since 1933 had precipitated a rise in mass media

outlets through mediums including television and the internet. Brigitte Lebens Nacos

alluded to the new scale of mass media toward the end of the twentieth-century,

which did not exist to the same extent under Roosevelt and Johnson:

“…the ‘CNN effect’ pointed to the ability of the first truly global

television network to inform the public instantly and continuously of news

from anywhere in the world and thereby force national decision makers to

31

deal with the reported problems and issues quickly.”1

In this period, where mainstream news overwhelmed the national audience with

information, Bush enhanced the influence of emotive language to assert himself as a

figure of strength in a period of American vulnerability following 9/11 whilst

promoting eo-conservatism.

Bush’s rhetoric played a fundamental part in endorsing international military

mobilisation to suppress terrorist organisations including al-Qaeda overseas. His

televised speech to the nation on 11 September and appeal to Congress on 20

September (televised via NBC News) informed the public audience of the terrorist

attacks and educated viewers on the perpetrators responsible. Televised speeches

were a primary communicative strategy through which Bush used emotive, dramatic

and intimate rhetorical methods to globalise the 9/11 attacks, exaggerate the

perpetrators and promote military mobilisation.

Linguistic analysis of Bush’s crisis rhetoric following 9/11 helps identify how he

communicated his ideological values effectively to a polarized and vulnerable

national audience post-9/11. Bush employed an aggressive, protective rhetoric

similar to the values in neo-conservatism. ‘The Bush Doctrine’ outlined the

President’s neo-conservative foreign policy ideology. Combining imperative modal

verbs and dynamic actions, the doctrine proposed military mobilisation in the

interest of long-term national defence: “We must deter and defend against the threat

1 Brigitte Lebens Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, Pierangelo Isernia, Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Lanham: MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): p.2

32

before it is unleashed . . . even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the

enemy's attack... The United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”2 This

language implied pacifist strategies were associated with weakness. American

political scientist Stephen Skowronek alluded to this comparison between neo-

conservative ideology, the Bush Doctrine and Bush’s distinct style of rhetoric:

“leadership by definition…the Bush Doctrine of preemption allowed the president to

define himself by being able to define his wars.”3

Bush incorporated terminology from the semantic field of war as he campaigned

for military mobilisation: "enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our

country".4 Classifying the 9/11 attacks as an ‘act of war’ instead of an extremist

ideological terrorist attack, Bush embellished the size and existence of the

perpetrators, formalising their presence as if it were a nation and implying war was

the only rational response. Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric, with terms from the semantic

field of military warfare, suggested that the decision to commit to full-scale conflict

had already been made, before Congress or the nation’s popular majority had

formally approved: “…in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our

moment. Freedom and fear are at war…we will not fail”.5 This tactic conveyed the

significance of nationalistic patriotism as an ideology pertinent to the public’s

American identity. Bush successfully manipulated the concept of unity based on

2 George W., Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 20 September 2002): p.14 3 Stephen Skowronek, “Leadership by Definition: First Term Reflections on George W. Bush’s Political Stance,” Perspectives on Politics, 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 817-831 4 George W. Bush: ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States’ Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,’ 20 September 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731. (30 July 2012) George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,’ 11 September 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057. (28 July 2012)

33

nationality to deliver a speech that foreshadowed the Bush administration’s ‘War on

Terror’.

By distorting the scale and influence of al-Qaeda, Bush implied the country must

unite under a single foreign policy ideology to suppress this threat to national

security. His response even extended to condemning nations independent of the 9/11

attacks as antagonists, using terms conventionally associated with moral taboos:

“States like these [Iran, Iraq and North Korea] constitute an axis of evil,

arming to threaten the peace of the world…Our enemies send other

people’s children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace

tyranny and death as a cause and as a creed.”6

Bush’s consideration of the nation in a global context was a facet of American

identity he used to direct popular opinion. His approach promoted unity to prevent

division between federal government and the national population.

Similar to Johnson’s use of religion to unite the population, Bush added morality

to his dramatic neoconservative rhetoric. Political commentator Justin Rex’s asserted

that “framing the case for war in terms of good and evil and using language that

conjured the devil were key ways in which this group and Bush understood the

world.”7 Rex’s comments revealed an incentive for using emotive figurative

6 George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 29

January 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29644 (12 August 2012) 7 Justin Rex, “The President's War Agenda: A Rhetorical View,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41.1, (Washington D.C.: Center for Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2011): pp.93–118

34

language linked to morality. By using imagery that “conjured the devil,” Bush’s

combination of abstract imagery with morality in his response to the 9/11 attacks

complemented the theory of increasingly intimate, accessible and dramatic approach

communicative strategies.

Religious allusions were also indicative of Olson’s suggestion that “anti-

intellectualism in modern presidential rhetoric is curiously…more abstract, relying

on religious and idealistic references” to become “more activist…inclusive

and…conversational.”8 The medium of religion applied by Bush had the dual benefit

of wide appeal, whilst empowering Bush’s neoconservative agenda through the

implication of religious connotations.

Bush also situated the scenario in a global context using parallelism: “America

and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the

world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.”9 This ‘good versus

evil’ dynamic associated the United States with positive qualities of ‘peace and

security,’ positioning the nation as a defender to al-Qaeda’s extremist aggression in

a context of formal warfare. This tactic justified future retaliation to appease

American opponents of foreign interventionism. Topic deviation towards Eastern

cultural customs unfamiliar in Western society dramatised the scale of Islamic

militant group al-Qaeda to validate military invasion. An asyndetic list format of

simple sentences conveyed Afghanistan repressive cultural values:

“Afghanistan's people have been brutalized. Many are starving and many

8 Olson et al, “The Teleprompter Presidency,” Social Science Quarterly: p.1409 9 George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,’ 11 September 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057. (28 July 2012)

35

have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for

owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate.

A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.”10

Bush juxtaposed these scenarios against the Western audience’s understanding of

conventional social norms. This highlighted the ideological division between the U.S.

and Eastern nations loosely associated with the Islamic Extremist outfit al-Qaeda.

Richard Dowis validated the benefits of analogy as a rhetorical device: “Analogies

are especially useful in explaining something that is difficult for an audience to grasp.

It is easier to understand a concept if it is explained in terms of something you’re

already familiar with.”11 By manipulating the audience’s perception of the Islamic

extremists using analogy to Afghanistan’s culture, Bush intensified the viewer’s

resentment towards these targets in spite of no formal association between the global

Islamist military organisation and Afghanistan. Collectively, these devices supported

military intervention, a component of neo-conservative foreign policy ideology. Dan

Scroop affirmed the deceitful qualities of Bush’s exaggeration of U.S. targets in his

public address:

“Bush’s State of the Union addresses…compounded those fears by

making what began as a manhunt to ‘those folks who committed this act’,

and became an attack, focused on Afghanistan, against the Taliban and

Al Qaeda, into a general campaign against an ‘axis of evil’ made up of

states (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) that…do not bear any responsibility 10 George W. Bush: " United States’ Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," 20 September 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731. (28 July 2012) 11 Richard Dowis, The Lost Art of the Great Speech: How to Write One, How to Deliver It, (New York, NY: AMACOM, 2000): p.127

36

for the attacks of September 11th…”12

Bush’s intimate style of rhetoric employed metaphor and figurative language in a

melodramatic account of the 9/11 attacks and their perpetrator, to intensify

sentiments of neo-conservatism amongst the national population. Whilst figurative

language was a component of all three Presidents’ rhetoric, Bush’s dramatic, poetic

metaphorical constructions were distinct from the pragmatic alternatives that

Roosevelt and Johnson employed. Bush projected his aggressive foreign policies on

the national population using figurative language that justified his neo-conservative

agenda. Amongst some of the conceptual metaphors that Bush incorporated into his

rhetoric were ‘terrorism is a natural disaster,’ and ‘justice is a limb’: “[Iraq is] at the

epicentre of terrorism,” “…there’s no cave deep enough for the long arm of

American justice.”13 Through metaphorical utterances, Bush exploited the

conventional understanding of existing terms in the national lexicon to rationalise his

campaign for military mobilisation. Personification in ‘the long arm of American

justice’ also offered Bush’s audience the control and authority it craved after being

rendered so vulnerable by terrorist attacks on domestic soil.

Euphemisms also contributed to this reinvention of foreign policy in Bush’s

public addresses. American Professor David Bromwich cited euphemism’s ability to

“efface the memory of actual cruelties”14 surrounding 9/11. In “Euphemism and

American Violence,” Bromwich cited the “global war on terrorism” as an example

12 Scroop, ‘Uses of Presidential Power’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs: 320 13 George W. Bush, ‘Remarks on Proposed Citizen Service Legislation in Bridgeport, Connecticut (April 9, 2002),’ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States George W. Bush 2002 Book I: January 1 to June 30 2002, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005): p.584 14 David Browmich, “Euphemism and American Violence.” New York Review of Books, (2008) Online. URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/apr/03/euphemism-and-american-violence/?pagination=false (12 February 2013)

37

of “simple-sounding and elusive” euphemism in Bush’s rhetoric.15 This abstract

concept presented the nation’s response to the terrorist attacks in the deceptive light

of a formal war; drawing on the national sentiment of patriotism. Social

psychologists Yla Tausczik and James Pennebaker verified this association of

deception with a less complex, more accessible rhetoric:

“Complexity may be reduced in deceptive speech because of the

cognitive load required to maintain a story that is contrary to experience,

and the effort taken to try and to convince someone else that something

false is true.”16

Deceptive euphemisms complemented the shift of rhetoric towards a more

personal, intimate alternative theorised in this study. A marked feature of Bush’s

intimate and dramatic rhetorical strategies was the distortion of truth that may be

conceived as dishonesty in the interest of promoting neo-conservatism. This

rhetorical strategy is a more dramatic and radical variation of Lyndon B. Johnson’s

use of historical, political and religious allusions to unite the population by

nationality, over race. Johnson’s arguments were openly comparative and did not

entail the deceptive features of Bush’s rhetoric. Bush’s exaggeration of the nation’s

adversaries in 2001 also contrasted Franklin D. Roosevelt’s informative, accurate

and candid rhetoric following the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. This disparity exhibited

the evolution of rhetorical strategy in times of threat to national security between

1933 and 2001.

15 Bromwich, “Euphemism and American Violence,” New York Review of Books, Online. URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/apr/03/euphemism-and-american-violence/?pagination=false (12 February 2013) 16 Yla R. Tausczik and James W. Pennebaker, “The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods,” Journal of Language and Social Psychology, (New York, NY: Sage Publications, 2010): p.34

38

Cultural scientist Daniel J. Sherman and political scientist Terry Nardin asserted

that the Bush administration had constructed a new American ‘reality’ based on the

radical portrayal of foreign policy following the 9/11 attacks that had “changed

everything.”17 Terror, Culture, Politics highlighted the rapid movement of neo-

conservative interpretations of 9/11 from the fringe of American culture into the

artistic mainstream, pervading popular forms of artistic media including the comic

book18. Henry Jenkin’s contribution, “Captain America Sheds His Mighty Tears”,

interpreted this shift to the mainstream as the American imperial agenda coming to

fruition and empowering the typical American citizen:

“The long-term impact of September 11 could also be seen in the

emergence of new comic book series that celebrate the heroism of

average citizens…a multiracial, multinational organization of ordinary

people who contribute their services on an ad hoc basis.”19

Artistic media’s more temperate depiction of neo-conservative ideologies,

through the likes of animation, appealed to the United States’ social mainstream.

Mass media asserted the federal government’s hard-line conservative approach in a

manner less prone to significant backlash from the national population, as Bush’s

rhetoric redefined American society’s reality using intimate and dramatic devices.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bush engaged with the audience on a

17 Daniel J. Sherman and Terry Nardin, Terror, Culture, Politics: Re-thinking 9/11, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006): p.4 18 Sherman and Nardin, Terror, Culture, Politics. 19 Henry Jenkins, ‘Captain America Sheds His Mighty Tears: Comics and September 11,’ Terror, Culture, Politics: Re-thinking 9/11, ed. Daniel J.Sherman and Terry Nardin, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006): p.96

39

personal level to comfort the nation,20 foregrounding figurative language that

conveyed Bush’s emotive tone in his speech transcripts. Adjectives from the

semantic field of anger, “a series of deliberate and deadly attacks…lives were

suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terrors,”21 combined with abstract

characterising metaphors, “freedom itself is under attack,”22 to antagonise the

viewing audience. The concept of personal emotional engagement with the audience

is corroborated by Bush’s allusion to individual citizens. The rhetorical device of

first-person narrative allows Bush to personalise the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks:

“I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard,

who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to

me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my

reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end.”23

Framing his response to the 9/11 attacks around individual accounts accentuated

the intimacy of rhetoric in the modern presidency. Bush’s use of George Howard to

convey the national sense of loss arising out of the 9/11 attacks echoed Schonhardt-

Bailey’s claim that “All presidents from Reagan onward have spoken more about

individuals, families, and children…[than] institutions (e.g., relations between the

executive and Congress, federalism).”24 Whilst this claim does not account for the

gradual evolution of rhetorical style between Roosevelt and Bush hypothesised in

20 Michael Nelson and Russell Lynn Riley, The President' Words: Speeches and Speechwriting in the Modern White House, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010): p.237 21 Bush: "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057. (28 July 2012) 22 Bush: "Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11", The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731. (28 July 2012) 23 Ibid. 24 Schonhardt-Bailey et al., ‘Yes, Ronald Reagan's Rhetoric Was Unique’: p.484

40

this study, it is an observation pertinent to the rhetoric of Bush, whose individual

accounts differed from Roosevelt and Johnson’s express focus on the nation as a

whole.

Bush also established unity through anaphora, the repetition of words and

successive phrases, repeating the phrase ‘I ask you’.25 Bush implemented phrases

associated with personal interaction through a first-person narrative, to create the

illusion of a mutually dependant relationship with the national audience. This

perception of a weakened Presidency accounted for political and ideological

considerations that did not exist during Roosevelt’s time in office. American

political scientist Richard Neustadt proposed four factors that had weakened the

authority of the President:

“Congress and the courts had stripped away some of the president’s

formal powers...the absence of domestic emergency and the end of the

Cold War had enabled Congress to reassert itself [as]the dominant

branch of government...the communications revolution, and the

concomitant rise of multi-channel entertainment-oriented television, had

reduced presidents’ ability to make direct, unmediated appeals to the

public.”26

Bush circumvented these weaknesses using emotive, dramatic and personalised

language to assert his neo-conservative foreign policy through communicative

25 George W. Bush: "Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731. (28 July 2012) 26 Scroop, ‘Uses of Presidential Power’: p.317

41

strategies. These devices deviated from neutral, moderated language employed by

his presidential predecessors whilst eliciting a unified pro-active response from the

national population. Terminology from the semantic field of family and other

dramatic linguistic techniques contributed to an intimate rhetoric that represented the

final stages of the Presidency’s changing oratory style, in times of threat to national

security between 1933 and 2001.

As intellectual supporters of the Bush Doctrine, Robert G. Kaufman and Max

Boot’s remarks are a testament to the collective impact of 9/11 and Bush’s rhetorical

style on uniting Americans under a neo-conservative ideology:

“Americans wisely have repudiated [isolationist and political commentator

Patrick] Buchanan’s hostility to the notion of exporting the institutions of

freedom. From our founding, our great statesmen have always conceived

of the United States as an empire of liberty, a beacon for spreading

democracy elsewhere…”27

“[Bush is] right to say we can’t sit back and wait for the next terrorist

strike on Manhattan. We have to go out and stop the terrorists

overseas…play the role of the global policeman…shape the world much

more in our own image…be much more aggressive…”28

Contemporary Gallup Polls, which questioned sample audiences representing the

27 Robert Kaufman, In Defense of the Bush Doctrine, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007): p.17, p.99. 28 Max Boot, ‘The Bush Doctrine’, Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, broadcast 7/11/2002 on PBS, (Arlington, VA: Public Broadcasting Service, 2002).

42

national population, exhibited the public appeal of Bush’s rhetoric. “Terrorism

Reaction Poll#3 (2001)” asked a sample audience, “President Bush addressed…the

recent terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C.…[how] would you

rate George W. Bush's speech to Congress and the nation on Thursday…?” 87.04%

of the 1005 answers were positive.29

“Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the

events surrounding the terrorist attacks…?” 86.65% of the audience

approved of Bush’s conduct in the aftermath of 9/11.30

Bush’s efforts to dramatise and personalise the ‘War on Terror’ would continue to

be evident into 2003. “December Wave 1” asked a sample audience of 1004,

“George W. Bush flew on a military fighter jet to an aircraft carrier. On that ship,

Bush gave a nationally televised speech in which he announced an end to major

fighting in the war with Iraq…good idea or a bad idea?” 56.45% of the audience

responded affirmatively.31

Sample poll statistics collectively suggested that the national population’s

majority reacted positively to Bush’s rhetorical communicative strategies in the

aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. A significant proportion of the population subscribed

to Bush’s emotive ‘rhetoric of fear’ and embraced a proactive, neo-conservative

approach towards foreign policy. Bush’s rhetoric and conduct drastically contrasted

the measured and practical linguistic devices of Roosevelt and Johnson.

29 ‘Terrorism Reaction Poll #3’, Gallup, 22 September 2001. Online. URL: http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0109036&p=3 (15 October 2012) 30 ‘October Wave 1’, Gallup, 5 October 2001. Online. URL: http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0110037&p=3 (15 October 2012) 31 ‘December Wave 1’, Gallup, 7 December 2001. Online. URL: http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0312052&p=4 (15 October 2012)

43

In spite of Bush’s approval ratings, the President’s new ‘rhetoric of fear’

provoked a polarised response from the intellectual sphere as some critics

condemned Bush’s neo-conservative communicative strategies and foreign policy.

These critics perceived his approach as one of self-serving interest.

Susan Sontag, political activist and critic of neo-conservatism, disregarded the

deceptive notion of warfare being a necessity. Instead, she suggested this style of

rhetoric contradicted the system of democracy that structured the country’s politics:

“We have a robotic President who assures us that America still stands tall.

A wide spectrum of public figures…strongly opposed to the policies being

pursued abroad by this Administration…The unanimity of the

sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials

and media commentators in recent days seems…unworthy of a mature

democracy”.32

Sontag argued that the Bush administration compromised a fundamental ideology

in U.S. society, the democratic representation of all national citizens to project their

ideals and grievances. Sontag represented intellectual and academic discontent with

Bush’s communicative strategies, including the mass media as an informal extension

of Bush’s authority that subscribed to his ‘rhetoric of fear.’ Professor Mark Danner

also referenced the manipulative qualities of Bush’s emotive crisis rhetoric,

substantiating intellectual discord with the Bush administration’s communicative

32 Susan Sontag, ‘The Talk of the Town,’ The New Yorker, September 24, 2001. Online. URL: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/09/24/010924ta_talk_wtc (13 October 2012)

44

strategies:

“A democratic empire is an odd beast. If one longs to invade Iraq to

restore the empire’s prestige, one must convince the democracy’s people

of the necessity of such a step. Herein lies the pathos of the famous

weapons-of-mass-destruction issue. Bush lied, and the war was born of

lies and deception…”33

Danner questioned the Bush administration’s respect for the traditional American

democratic system of politics. In particular, he critically cited the authenticity of

Bush’s communication with the national population; associating the President’s

rhetoric with ‘lies and deception’.

In her feminist commentary on the effects of 9/11, The Terror Dream, Susan

Faludi alluded to how well Bush’s emotive rhetoric was received by the mass media.

Faludi implemented a superhero motif to convey the mass media’s embracing of

Bush’s rhetoric:

“The media seemed eager to turn our designated guardians of national

security into action toys and superheroes…The president’s vows to get

the ‘evildoers’ won him media praise...UPI’s national political analyst,

Peter Roff, said ‘This is just the kind of hero America needs right

now,’...comic book language ‘rallies the nation to even greater

33 Danner, Mark, ‘Words in a Time of War: Taking the Measure of the First Rhetoric-Major President’. MarkDanner.com, May 10 2007. Online. URL: http://www.markdanner.com/articles/show/words_in_a_time_of_war (14 August 2012).

45

accomplishments and sacrifice…’”34

These comments suggested the president’s reassuring tone in his reaction to 9/11

was an attempt to assert himself as an inspiring and comforting leader, amidst the

new sense of vulnerability felt by the nation. Dan Scroop also suggested Bush

manipulated the public’s interpretation of the 9/11 attacks by asserting his own

emotions within a venue designed to inform:

“Bush’s early comments suggested a retributive notion of justice and the

implication that the US mission was primarily a personal war between

Bush, acting on the nation’s behalf, and the ‘faceless’ assailants. On

September 11th, and on several occasions since, Bush has framed the

American response as a manhunt…”35

Invoking the personal sentiment of retribution into his rhetoric, Bush reinvented

the 9/11 attacks as an individual attack on each American citizens. Using the fragile

emotional condition of American society, Bush justified a neo-conservative ideology

on foreign policy.

The Bush administration also cultivated national sentiments of American

patriotism through public address and mass media, to assert neo-conservatism and

earn public support. Olson’s study of Bush’s public speech verified this dominating

presence of foreign policy fear rhetoric’:

34 Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2007): p.47 35 Scroop, ‘Uses of Presidential Power,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs: p.324

46

“President George W. Bush spent almost 50 percent of his [State of the

Union Address] talking about terrorism and homeland security. The

speech had the effect of priming the public’s evaluation of his

presidency…[directing attention towards]…his handling of the war on

terrorism.”36

By cultivating public support through the proactive measure of establishing a

‘rhetoric of fear,’ Bush’s neoconservative agenda out-weighed the left-wing

intellectual opinions who critically opposed his ‘deceitful’ language. Critics of

Bush’s post-9/11 neo-conservative foreign policy were too disjointed to effectively

counter this rhetorical ideological output. Professor Thomas Palaima alluded to this

scenario: “American intellectuals were either inactive or ineffective in using public

intellectual discourse to influence the political process.”37 Palaima’s case also

includes Professor Robert Jenson’s division of the intellectual political spectrum into

five spheres. Jenson suggested only the far left and the far right proponents of

foreign policy actively spoke against Bush’s foreign policy. The far right defended

neo-conservatism as the far left rejected “the intellectually and morally bankrupt

claims of the far right.”38 From Jenson’s model, a stalemate between the two extreme

wings of U.S. foreign policy becomes apparent. In this deadlock, critics of the

President’s foreign policy failed to sway popular opinion as the federal government

continued its neo-conservative agenda. This intellectual disparity reflected the

evolution of U.S. society. Candid fringe groups created a diverse intellectual

36 Olson et al., ‘The Teleprompter Presidency': p.1410 37 Thomas G. Palaima, ‘The Texas Professoriate and Public Political Discourse Before and After 9/11,’ Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 1.1, (London: Routledge Publishing 2004 ): pp.89–99 38 Palaima, ‘The Texas Professoriate and Public Political Discourse Before and After 9/11’: p.90

47

spectrum, catalysed by the emergence of globalisation and denouncement of

isolationism.39 Bush’s more intimate communicative strategies suppressed these new

fringe groups using emotive language and dramatic literary devices with wide appeal.

Intellectual opposition struggled to present an effective counter-argument to the

social and political mainstream like Huey Long and Charles Coughlin had when

Franklin Roosevelt was in office. Bush capitalised on this polarity in the intellectual

sphere to assert his own radical foreign policy ideologies through intimate and

dramatic rhetoric that verified the notion of a transition away from the formal

register and candid tone employed in Roosevelt and Johnson’s public address.

The mass media supplemented the success of Bush’s intimate and dramatic

rhetoric in 2001, projecting the President’s dynamic, evocative response to the

events of 9/11. Contrary to Roosevelt, who had harnessed radio exposure through

‘Fireside Chats’ to directly address the national population, Bush adopted mass

media as an indirect extension of his neo-conservative communicative strategies.

Gallup polls exhibited Bush’s harnessing of public support in the aftermath of 9/11.

The President’s approval rating increased from 39% to a peak 90% between

September 7 and September 21, 2001.40

The projection of the 9/11 attacks on television screens nationwide through news

programming subjected the United States’ population to the figurative notion of

America’s newfound vulnerability. This notion is substantiated by academic Staci

Rhine’s research on the Bush administration’s influence on mass media: 39 Manuel Castells, “Globalization and changing cultural identities,” Journal of Contemporary Culture, (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2006): p.63 40 ‘Presidential Approval Ratings - George W. Bush’, Gallup, 2009. Online. URL: http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx. (8 August 2012)

48

“The Pew Research Center asked a random sample of American

adults…immediately after [9/11] which medium they turned to first for

news about the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 88 percent said

“television”…an instrument of simplicity in a world of complexity…the

stories are often framed around the [government’s] administration, its

goals and its statements.”41

Professor Daniel R. Labrecque also validated the media’s influence as an indirect

communicative strategy of federal government. Labrecque examined mass media’s

potential to dictate which topics dominated public attention, examining the media’s

coverage of Bush’s rhetoric between 2002 and 2006. He credited the President’s

‘rhetoric of fear’ as a propellant of widespread vulnerability in the aftermath of the

9/11 attacks, suggesting: “when the level of fear in the political climate is low, the

level of fear rhetoric in the president’s campaign speech is high.”42 This inverse

correlation saw Bush invoke dramatic, intimate language to sustain national fear and

increase his approval rating. This ‘rally effect’ united citizens against forces that

threatened the traditional model of the United States. The fear that Franklin D.

Roosevelt sought to eradicate from society using his rhetoric was the same emotion

Bush empowered though consistent attention on a public platform. This revelation

discredits scholarly claims of rhetorical consistency across the twentieth-century,

such as Barbara Hinckley’s assertion of similarity between different rhetorical

41 Staci Rhine, Stephen Bennett and Richard Flickinger, ‘After 9/11: Television Viewers, Newspaper Readers and Public Opinion,’ The Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, (Boston, MA: The American Political Science Association, 2002): p.4, p.12, p.13 David R. Gergen, ‘Diplomacy in a Television Age: The Dangers of Teledemocracy’, The Media and Foreign Policy, ed. Simon Serfaty, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): p.50 42 Daniel R. Labrecque, Fearing Terror: The Effects of the Political Climate on George W. Bush’s Use of Fear Rhetoric, (Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut, 2009).

49

models of the U.S. presidency across time.43

Bush’s declining approval rating correlated with the rising number of terms from

the semantic fields of violence and warfare in mainstream outlets New York Times,

USA Today, and The Washington Post. This relationship suggested Bush used

rhetoric and the mass media to manipulate the public’s perception of foreign policy.

“Terrorist,” “Terrorism,” “Al Qaeda,” and “Osama Bin Laden” were the most

prominent examples language pertaining to a ‘rhetoric of fear’ in these

publications.44 A 7.21% increase in the ratio of sentences containing fear rhetoric to

total sentences issued by the President between 2002 and 2006 verified Bush efforts

to use ‘rhetoric of fear’ and an intimate register of language to cultivate political

support. Similarly, Bush’s falling approval rating paralleled the drop in sample

audiences’ perceived likelihood of terrorism. In late 2001, 85% of a sample audience

declared a domestic terrorist attack ‘Very likely,’ compared to 35% in late 2005.45

Whereas Roosevelt and Johnson applied formal rhetoric to inform and persuade

the passage of legislation, Bush used rhetoric to deceptively assert a neo-

conservative national ideology. Roosevelt, especially, had used ‘Fireside Chats’ to

distinguish his voice from the media and directly address the national audience. Bush

used mass media to promote a neo-conservative foreign policy using an intentional,

intimate and dramatic ‘rhetoric of fear/war’. Formal support eventually allowed

43 Hinckley, The Symbolic Presidency: p.133 44 Labrecque, Fearing Terror: p.8 45 Lydia Saad, ‘Americans' Fear of Terrorism in U.S. Is Near Low Point,’ Gallup, 2011. Online. URL: http://www.gallup.com/poll/149315/americans-fear-terrorism-near-low-point.aspx (14 October 2012)

50

Bush to control an inflated military budget46 and pass the Patriot Act; indicators of

neo-conservatism’s prominence. These measures empowered Bush’s status as

President and Commander-in-Chief. Compared with the candid, almost understated

rhetoric of Roosevelt, or the confident debate of Lyndon Johnson’s “The American

Promise”, Bush’s emotive language exaggerated the truth to instil neo-conservative

values. Such a transition represented President’s evolving rhetoric of style between

1933 and 2001 in periods of threat to national security.

46 ‘Big boost for US military spending’, BBC News, 24 January 2002. Online. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1778681.stm. (10 October 2012)

51

Conclusion.

Analysing nuances of Roosevelt, Johnson and Bush’s crisis rhetoric, this study

reveals an evolutionary transition from a methodological and precise use of language

in communicative strategies to a more informal and emotive alternative. Figurative

language and personal sentiments became some of the more popular facets of the

U.S. President’s rhetoric as the twentieth century progressed. In contrast, U.S.

national leaders discarded systematic and impersonal tactics as antiquated forms of

communication that no longer engaged as effectively with the United States’ national

population in times of crisis or threat to national security.

Insight into the development of crisis rhetoric also allows one to hypothesise the

long-term direction of the President’s interaction with the national population. The

sustained empowerment of American institutions and emotive depiction of national

threats will continue to dictate interaction between the two parties. Evidence of

continued intimate and dramatic rhetoric already exists in today’s Presidential

television debates, political rallies and promotional campaign videos; ingrained into

social media services through Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. As an example,

President Barack Obama’s first campaign video of 2012 incorporated the same first-

person plural narrative voice that Bush applied in post-9/11 foreign policy rhetoric.1

The video promoted Obama’s leadership as a pseudo-collaborative effort with the

national population, similar to Bush’s personalised account of the 9/11 attacks.

In addition to political ideology or the influence of mass media, the diminished

1 ‘Obama Campaign Ad: Read My Plan,’ (27 September 2012) Online. YouTube.com URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZJ5K0zo7dc (15 February 2013)

52

role of the intellectual in federal government has also coincided with the President’s

direction towards more intimate and dramatic communicative strategies. Tevi Troy, a

senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, cited Roosevelt’s use of a ‘Brain Trust,’ elite

academic intellectuals who “helped…design the programmatic substance of the New

Deal and to shape the administration's early case for it.”2 Johnson’s, however,

deviated from the traditional norms of intellectual assistance. Tension between

Johnson and intellectuals on crisis issues including the civil rights campaign and the

Vietnam War converted leading academic intellectuals from affiliates of the federal

government to pioneers of liberalism.3 Bush formally discarded the notion of

external intellectual advisors, selecting advisors that shared his government ideology,

as Troy alluded to:

“Bush [drew] on the conservative intellectual community that had

developed as an alternative to the increasingly liberal world of the

academy…religiously inclined and culturally conservative writers and

scholars who embodied…"compassionate conservatism."4

Analysis of the polarised intellectual response to Bush’s extreme neoconservative

foreign policy ideology substantiates this claim. Professor Stephen Zunes

highlighted this disparity between the Bush administration and external intellectuals,

conveying the cost at which ideological opponents spoke out against neo-

conservative militarisation:

2 Tevi Troy, ‘Bush, Obama and the Intellectuals’, 3 (2010) Online. National Affairs. URL: http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_Troy.pdf (18 February 2013) 3 Donald R. Palm, ‘Intellectuals and the Presidency: Eric Goldman in the Lyndon B. Johnson White House,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26.3 (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing, 1996): pp.708-724 4 Tevi Troy, ‘Bush, Obama and the Intellectuals’, 3 (2010) Online. National Affairs. URL: http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_Troy.pdf

53

“[The federal government] portray our analysis as being the result of a

calculated ideological agenda or…a perverse subculture…caus[-ing]

political leaders, journalists and millions of ordinary citizens to not trust

some of the country's most critical intellectual resources in formulating

policies in the subsequent decade”.5

Zunes’ claim can be tied to the Presidency’s heightened exposure and interaction

with the national population, following mass media’s growth. In light of mass

media’s expansion, the government no longer relied on intellectuals to convey the

public’s interests. Professor Damon Linker alluded to Bush’s personalised rhetoric as

an alternative means of engaging with the national audience:

“…[Bush’s] economically libertarian and socially conservative policies to

his swaggering gait, mannered Southern drawl, and studied

inarticulateness — was intended to convey the message that he was "one

of us," an average American bringing his hard-won common sense to

bear on the most challenging problems of our time…”6

The decline of independent intellectuals communicating the nation’s needs to the

President between 1933 and 2001 coincided with an increasingly intimate and

dramatic rhetorical style in public speech. This suggests crisis rhetoric’s evolution is,

partially, a consolatory response the intellectual’s decreased role in federal 5 Stephen Zunes, ‘The Legacy of 9/11 and the War on Intellectuals,’ Truthout, 2011. URL: http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3247:the-legacy-of-911-and-the-war-on-intellectuals. (12 September 2012) 6 Damon Linker, ‘Against Common Sense,’ November 30 2009. Online. The New Republic. URL: http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/damon-linker/against-common-sense (19 February 2013)

54

government. The dichotomy between the President and national intellectual forces

between 1933 and 2001 would be grounds for further study beyond this project.

An increasingly intimate relationship between the federal leader and the public

validates the project’s thesis, exhibiting the gradual reformation of communicative

strategies in federal office. Economic depression, national warfare, the formalisation

of the civil rights campaign, terrorism and the development of mass media impacted

communication between the president and the national population. Although all three

Presidents demonstrated proactive political ideologies in response to threats to

national security, their rhetorical styles are shaped in reaction to a complex

combination of the period’s national context and each President’s political ideologies.

Changes to the nation’s economy, social landscape and foreign policy combined with

developing mass media to influence rhetorical strategy. This suggests that each

President’s choice of language and the ideologies they perpetuated were reactive

measures. Roosevelt’s formal, measured rhetoric candidly rationalised centralised

government and deconstructed isolationism as a foreign policy ideology in the

aftermath of a foreign attack on Pearl Harbor. Johnson’s more conversational debate

rhetoric paralleled his interventionist ‘Great Society’ domestic reforms. Bush’s

emotive rhetoric dramatised the scale and threat of international terrorist outfits to

justify his neoconservative approach to foreign policy. Beyond the basic intent to

protect the U.S., these former Presidents exhibited separate rhetorical styles and

political agendas in periods of threat to national security that contradicted Craig and

Kathy Smith’s assertion of “an unusually concordant value system”7 in Presidential

public speech.

7 Smith and Smith, “Presidential values and public priorities,” Presidential Studies Quarterly: p.749

55

Whilst certain parameters dictated that only three U.S. Presidents could be

examined in depth, brief allusions toward other Presidential figures also verify the

development of intimate and dramatic rhetorical strategies during periods of threat to

national security. Former president Ronald Reagan, the ‘Great Communicator’, was

another modern proponent of figurative language. Reagan harnessed abstract

concepts including religion in his Cold War rhetoric. Michael Weiler and W. Barnett

Pearce’s research supported this claim, revealing “over half (59%) of the discourse

in [Reagan’s] seminal speeches and 48% of the same in his State of the Union

speeches focus on themes of civil religion.”8 Current U.S. President Barack Obama

continued the transition towards intimate and dramatic rhetoric in his 2013

inauguration speech. Acknowledging the nation’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as

well as national economic recession, Obama applied rhetorical strategies including

individual analogy and the characterisation of the United States: ““a little girl born

into the bleakest poverty,” “America must choose between caring…and investing.”9

Obama’s figurative and emotive register of language reaffirms that intimate and

dramatic rhetorical strategies have become a central part of the U.S. President’s

crisis rhetoric, an evolution from the informative and literal language used by

Roosevelt in 1933.

8 Schonhardt-Bailey et al., ‘Yes, Ronald Reagan's Rhetoric Was Unique,’: p.484 Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce, “Ceremonial Discourse: The Rhetorical Ecology of the Reagan Administration.” In Reagan and Public Discourse in America, ed. M. Weiler and W. B. Pearce. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992): 29 9 Barack Obama, ‘Inaugural Address,’ January 21, 2013. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=102827 (February 18 2013)

56

As a contribution to the intellectual discussion on the content and format of crisis

rhetoric, this study suggests direct, personal and dramatic rhetorical strategies

suppressed intellectual criticism and impartial media coverage of economic, racial

and foreign policy crisis, allowing the President to assert his ideological political

agenda on the national population, independent of external outlets that may criticise

or restrict his message.

57

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