An Aspiring Buffer State Anglo-Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 1804-1807

8/12/2019 An Aspiring Buffer State Anglo-Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 1804-1807

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An Aspiring Buffer State: Anglo-Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 1804-1807Author(s): Edward IngramSource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1973), pp. 509-533Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638202.

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The Historical Joti7-nal, XVI, 3 (I973), PP- 509-533. 509Printedin GreatBritain

AN ASPIRING BUFFER STATE:ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS IN THE THIRDCOALITION, 1804-1807

By EDWARD INGRAMSimon Fraser University

There was never such a drastic misadventure n moderndiplomacy as these minor alliances of Dulles'. Machiavelliwarned weak princes against joining with a strong one.In my forthcoming revision of his work, I will warnall strong states against weak ones. Since weak statesare weak, the strong state gets no added strength out ofits alliance. But the weak state can use its stronger allyfor its own purposes.

John Kenneth GalbraithI

WE AK states can control strongstates,provided the weak can persuadethe strongto admit, that they are vitally interestedin their integrity and independence. Inthe late nineteenth century everybody understood the influence of the OttomanEmpire upon British policy, and the influenceof Austria-Hungaryupon ImperialGerman policy in the near east. In the heyday of the Great Powers of Europeit was not expected that orientalsshould aspire to similar influence: their futureswould be decided by Europeans. Until the work of Robinson and Gallagherrevealed the extent to which the khedive of Egypt controlled Lord Cromer,2thehistory of late nineteenth centuryimperialismwas written from this assumption.Regardless of the merits of their work, Robinson and Gallagherwrote a tractfortheir times. The behaviour of John Foster Dulles towards the emancipatedEuropean colonies had revealed that these states, too, are able to impose upontheir ally. In the nineteenth century, contrary to the beliefs of Europeans, thispossibility was not unrealized by oriental states. The first such state was QajarPersia.

IThe foreign policy of Persia in the early nineteenth century, particularlyherpolicy towardsRussia, is usually characterizedas inept; her attemptto reconquerGeorgia as a grandiose dream impossible to fulfil.3 That the Persian army was

1 Galbraith to John F. Kennedy, 7 May I962, Bombay, Ambassador's Journal: A PersonialAccount of the Kennedy Years (New York: New American Library, I970), pp. 33I-2.

2 R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa anid the Victorians (London, I96I).3 For a recent example, see R. K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Irat, I500-I9I4 (Charlottes-

ville, I966), pp. 44-7.

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510 EDWARD INGRAMconsistently defeated, whenever it did battle with the Russians, is indisputable:equally, the outcome of the Russo-Persian wars, the treaties of Gulistan andTurkmanchai, was a disaster for Persia, and undermined her claim to be anindependent state.4Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Persians realized whatwould happen to them if they fought Russia unassisted; that they did all theycould by diplomatic means to avoid doing so; and that their foreign policy wasmore astute than is usually supposed.Fath Ali Qajar and his ministers were notin fact attempting to reconquer Georgia: their aim was both more limited andmore sophisticated.Situated- as they saw themselves- between the Russian andthe Britishempires in Asia, the one powerful and neighbouring the other distantbut wealthy, the Persians were actually trying to turn themselves into a satis-factory buffer state. The Persian aim was impeccable: what they lacked was themeans. They failed, as the British ruefully admitted laterin the century, preciselybecause the British would not acknowledge soon enough that they needed Persiaas a buffer.

One of the prerequisites of the successful buffer state is precisely drawnfrontiers. Without them, neither of the more powerful states on either side canbe made to defend it against the aggression of the other. Between the treaty ofWestphalia and the congress of Vienna, aggression to Europeansmeant invasion.The problem for the Persians was to delimit their territoryin the Caucasus byobtaining a satisfactory rontier with Russia. They consideredthat there was noprospect of obtaining such a frontier - at least not one that would be politicallyand strategically acceptable- without the intervention of Great Britain. Onlythe mutual suspicionof Britain and Russia would preservethe independenceandintegrity of Persia. The Persian attempt failed, and they were left to fight theRussians by tlhemselves,because the British, who appearedto hold out hopes thatthey might, refusedto intervene. ' Since Sir John Malcolm first landed at Bushirein i8oo', complained Lord Curzon towards the end of the nineteenth century' Persia has alternately advanced and receded in the estimation of British states-men, occupying now a position of extravagant prominence, anon one of un-merited obscurity.'5 It was not, however, the fact that British policy fluctuatedwhich most confused the Persians,but that her differentrepresentativesappearedto carry out these fluctuating policies simultaneously. This tendency beganbetween I804 and I807, when the question of the Russo-Persian frontier in theCaucasus became entangled with the fate of the Third Coalition.

In the early spring of I807, for the first time since the reign of Charles I, theBritish Government decided to send an ambassador o Persia.To representthemthey chose Sir Harford Jones, who between I798 and i8o6 had been the residentof the East India Company at Baghdad. This British decision was a striking

4 These treatiesare printed in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacyin the Near and MiddleEast (Princeton,1956), i, 84, 96.

5 G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, I892), iI, 605.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 5IIreversal of their previous disinterest in Persia, and exposed the disagreementbetween the British Government and their officials in India and the near eastabout the nature of Britain's interests in the area and how far Persia could con-tribute to them. The British purpose was specific and peculiar. They did notwant to strengthen Persia because she was a buffer: for years they had ignoredthe argument that the strength of Persia contributed to the security of BritishIndia. And they did not want to revive the failing British trade with Persia. Theywanted solely to end the war between Persia and Russia, as a means ofstrengthening the Russianarmiesfighting France in Europe. This policy reflectedtheir policy towards the Turks, for the British were equally anxious first toprevent and then to end the war between Turkey and Russia. In i8o6, followingthe peaceof Pressburg, the increasing French influence in the neareast distractedfirst the Russians and in turn the Austrians from the decisive battleground incentral Europe. Removing one of these distractions, by delimiting the Russo-Persian frontier in the Caucasus, might contribute to the survival of the ThirdCoalition.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century delimiting her frontier withRussia had becomes Persia's most vital interest. The Qajars dreamed of recon-quering Bahrein, Basra, and Herat, but they could attempt none of these untilthey had partitionedthe Caucasus.Persia had been fighting Russiaover Georgiaintermittently for thirty years.The Georgians had once been vassals of the Safa-vids, but assertedtheir independence during the civil wars in Persia in the middleof the eighteenth century. When the Qajars,the final victors in these wars, triedto reassertthe Persian claim to suzerainty, in I783 the Georgians asked for theprotection of the Russians. While Catherine II agreed to protect them, she didnot in fact do so. By I799 George XII, the last king of Georgia, had decided thatbetween family feuds, and invasions from Persia and the surrounding Maho-metan Khanates, it was impossible any longer to maintain his independence.Therefore, although surroundedby Mahometans, being himself a Christian, andpreferring a Christian to a Mahometan suzerain, George asked Catherine'ssuccessor Paul to incorporateGeorgia into Russia. George hoped, however, topreserve his autonomy. Georgia had had a similar status under the Safavids:George would be simultaneously the viceroy and the king. The tsar would notagree to this divided sovereignty. In December i8oo he unilaterally annexedGeorgia. Ten days afterwardsGeorge XII died: the Russianswould not acknow-ledge his successor.6

The Russians immediately discovered, as had George XII, that it was im-possibleto administerGeorgia without controlling the surrounding MahometanKhanates, partlyto safeguardGeorgia from the Persians. In consequence, in theautumn of I802, Alexander I sent Prince Zizianov to impose Russian rule upon

6 For the historyof the Caucasusduring the eighteenth century, see L. Lockhart, The Fall of theSafavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupationof Persia (Cambridge, I958); and D. M. Lang, TheLast Yearsof the GeorgianMonarchy(New York, I957).



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5I2 EDWARD INGRAMthe whole of the south easternCaucasus.This forward policy did not affect Persiauntil two years later, when Zizianov laid siege to Erivan. For both political andstrategic reasons it was essential for the Persians to prevent Erivan's being cap-tured. The political supremacyof the Qajars depended upon the supportof tribeswho lived around the Caspian and in Azerbaijan: the capture of Erivan wouldthreaten not only the Persian state but the Qajar dynasty. Equally importantstrategically, should the Russians capture both Erivan and Nakhitchevan, theywould control all the passes from the Caucasus into Azerbaijan, which woulddecisively weaken Persia'snorth west frontier. In I804, accordingly, the Persiansbecame increasingly anxious to delimit their frontier with Russia in the Cauca-sus: to improve their chancesof doing so satisfactorily,they becameincreasinglyanxious for foreign help. Conveniently, at the very moment when the Persiansneeded it, theywere apparentlyofferedthe help of Britain.

ITThe British had first taken notice of the Russian expansion in the Caucasusduring the War of the Second Coalition. In 1799 the governor-generalof India,Lord Wellesley, sent John Malcolm to Persia, not as is usually claimed becausehe feared a French invasion overland from Egypt,7 but rather to negotiate analliance against Afghanistan. This would prevent the amir of Afghanistan frominvading India while Wellesley partitionedOudh. In return for this, and to freethe Persians from their embarrassments n the Caucasus,Wellesley was preparedif necessaryto recommend the British Government to mediate between Persiaand Russia.8Wellesley's superior,Henry Dundas, the secretary or war and presi-dent of the board of control for India, had doubts about this recommendation.Her relations with Russiaand Turkey involved Persiain the politics of Europe:any interest shown in Persia was bound to complicate Britain's relations withher necessary allies against France. Dundas, unlike Wellesley, was afraid thatIndia could be invaded overland. He was suspiciousof the Russian expansion inthe Caucasus, because the Russians might one day be in a better position toinvade than were the French in Egypt. Nevertheless, Dundas assumed that theRussians would resent British interferencein their quarrelswith Persia; and thatBritain should not provokebecausePersia could not withstand their resentment.Britain could not afford to fight simultaneously in Europe and in Asia: whileshe needed the alliance of Russia against France, she must disregard the affairsof Persia.9

7 A recent example is A. B. Rodger, The War of the Second Coalition (Oxford, I964), p. I28;who is relying upon J. Holland Rose, ' The Political Reactionsof Bonaparte'sEastern Expedition ',English HistoricalReview, XLIV (I929), 56.

8 The Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondenceof the Marquis Wellesley, K.G., During hisAdministrationin India, M. Martin (ed.) (London, I836-7), i, 286, v, 82; also Wellesley MSS,B.M. Add. MSS 13792, fo. I05.9 Dundas to chairman of East India Company, 3 Mar. I796, I.O. G/29/2I; see also ambassadorin Constantinople o Dundas, private, 2 Feb. I8oo, W.O. I/344, p. I55.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 5I3This was the attitude taken by Addington's Government when the European

war was renewed in i804. The British were kept well enough informed ofZizianov's campaigns in the Caucasus, but their agents disagreedsharply aboutthe likely effects of his success. Neither the ambassador in St Petersburg, SirCharles Warren, nor the minister in Constantinople, Alexander Straton, con-sidered that Zizianov was threatening any interest of Great Britain.10Warrenconsidered it more important that the Russians were continuing to resist theFrench attempts to break up Turkey, and appeared ncreasingly likely to re-enterthe war.1' The British would be foolish to jeopardize the chance of supportagainst France in Europe by undue suspicion of Russian activities in Asia. Theagents of the East India Company disagreed with this; implying that Britainshould be careful not to sacrificeher permanent Asiatic interest to her temporaryEuropean need. In Baghdad Harford Jones assumed it to be 'a position thatcannot be denied that it is our interest to stop the Russian encroachment in thenorthern part of Persia'. The interest was partly Indian: Jones, like Dundas,thought that Russia could invade India much more easily from the Caucasusthan France could from Egypt. But the interest was also European, because,unless they were restrained,the Russianswould always be able to' answer a fleetsent into the Baltic by the march of an army from Astrabad'. 2 Without asatisfactoryPersian frontier as its outermost defence, British India might notstrengthen but weaken Britain's claim to be a Great European Power. The mostimmediate connexion between Britain's interests in Europe and Asia, however,had been perceived by Straton's predecessor n Constantinople, the earl of Elgin.If Britain continued to ignore the Russo-Persian war, and refused to help theshah, then he would seek the help of France.13 Elgin was not afraid that theFrench, in alliance with Persia, might threaten British India. The danger wasEuropean. If the French could persuadeTurkey and Persia to attack Russia inthe east, they would divert her attention from Italy and Germany. Campaigns inMoldavia and the Caucasus might hazard the success of any coalition.

It was an assessment of the danger to British interestsin India, rather than inEurope, however, that led in the summer of I804 to an unofficial and most mis-leading initiative by the resident at Basra, SamuelManesty. Manesty was visitingTeheran on what was supposed to be merely a complimentary mission fromWellesley, to explain away the death of a Persian ambassador n a brawl in Bom-bay. Instead, he chose to interfere in the Russo-Persian War. Manesty workedfrom the same premise as Harford Jones, that 'it must certainly be the interestof Great Britain to prevent, if possible, Russian encroachmenton Persian terri-tory '.14 Accordingly he offered to arrangean armistice.Here appearedto be the

10 Warren to Hawkesbury, 30 July, 30 Aug. I804, F.O. 65/55; Straton to Hawkesbury, i JulyI804, F.O. 78/47.

11 Warrento Hawkesbury, i6 Dec. I803, F.O. 65/53; same to same, 2I Jan. I804, F.O. 65/54.12 Jonesto Willis, 2 Apr. I804, India OfficeLibrary,MicrofilmMSS 742.13 Elgin to Jones, i8 Dec. I802, National Libraryof Wales, KentchurchCourtMSS 79I8.14 Manesty o Wellesley, 2 Feb., 26 Feb. I804, I.O. G/29/24, nos. 2, 3.

H.J*-3



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514 EDWARD INGRAMoffer of assistance that the Persians needed. The shah refused Manesty's specificoffer. He claimed that the Persian army were capable unassisted of raising thesiege of Erivan; and Persia could not expect to obtain a satisfactoryfrontier inthe Caucasusunless they managed to. Instead the shah persuaded Manesty to goto London, to urge the British Government to intervene on behalf of Persia atSt Petersburg.15Manesty was willing enough to go, because he shared the shah'sassumption that only a settlement negotiated by Britain would be final: onlyBritain would be strong enough to make the Russians abide by it. At the sametime the shah decided to send another ambassador o India. If Persia was to be abuffer between the British and Russian empires in Asia, she needed a firm con-nexion with the government of India, and Manesty's behaviour could mean onlythat the fate of Persia was already of concern to them. Unfortunately, just asManesty was leaving Persia, he learned that his proceedings had been disavowedby Wellesley, who would not yet admit that the fate of Persia was of any con-cern.16Manesty could not go on to London. His individual attempt to resolvethe question of the Russo-Persianfrontier in the Caucasus had failed.

Manesty remained convinced that Britain would eventually be obliged to puta stop to the Russo-Persianwar. This he assured the British Government wouldprobablynot be difficult. Manesty had correctlysurmised that the Persians wouldacknowledge the Russian annexation of Georgia, provided that the Russianswould evacuate the Khanates. 7At best Georgia would be a troublesome vassalstate; but if Persia was to have a delineated frontier, Erivan and Nakhitchevanwould be vital for its defence. Even if a satisfactory frontier should prove moredifficult itofind than he anticipated, however, Manesty insisted that the BritishGovernment should make the attempt, because, ' if the tzar entertains serioushostile designsagainst Persia, the conquest of thatcountry byhim is irresistible ..and India will be exposed to a degree of ... risk, which Great Britainmay here-after eriouslyament .18

IIIIn the autumn of I804 the shah grew slightly anxious. The Russians had raisedthe siege of Erivan, not because they feared the approach of a Persian army,but neverthelessgiving Persia the opportunity for a reasonablesettlement, pro-vided that the shah could obtain the support of Britain. These unwarrantedexpectations of British support were not solely the responsibility of Manesty.Britain'srelationswith Persia were governed by the treaty negotiated in i8oo by

15 Manesty to Wellesley, 5 July I804, ibid. no. II; the shah's letters travelled backwards andforwardswith Manestyanddid not reachLondon until Jan. i8o8.16 Secretary to supreme government to secretary to East India Company, 9 July I804, I.O.G/29/24, no. I3; Wellesleyo governor f Bombay,private, i JulyI804, WellesleyMSS, Add.MSS I3693, fo. I28.

17 Manestyto Wellesley, 6 July, i8 July I804, I.O. G/29/24, nos. I2, I4.18 Manesty to Castlereagh, 23 Sept. I804, The Memoranda and Correspondence of Robert

Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh,third marquis of Londonderry (ed.) (London, I848-54), V, 342.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-1807 5I5John Malcolm, which had not yet been ratified. This specifically required thePersians to assist the British in preventing the French and Afghans frominvading British India. The loosely worded preamble, however, implied thateach state was required to help the other against all her enemies. It now suitedthe shah to interpretthis to mean that Britainwas requiredto supporthim againstRussia. The interpretation was not entirely unreasonable. Malcolm's extrava-gance was a legend in Persia. His treatyimplied that the British were anxious toprevent the Persians from allying with France, and Malcolm had also inquiredwhether the shah would be willing to cede to the Britishan island in the PersianGulf.20The shah's recollection of Malcolm's attitude, combined with the offermade by Manesty,seemed to show that the Britishwere concernedat the prospectof any great power infringing the integrity of Persia. As the most likely powerwas Russia, the Persiansconcluded that they should now be able to persuadetheBritish to interveneon their behalf at St Petersburg,in acknowledgement that anindependent Persia was a necessarybuffer between the British and the Russianempires in Asia. This was a false conclusion. The Persianshad yet to realize thatBritishenvoys in the easthabituallyexceededtheir instructions.

During the winter of i804-5 the shah made an attempt through Manesty tospuron the British, first by suggesting that Britainand Persiashould plan a jointattackon Russia for the following year, and then by hinting that he had receivedtempting offers of assistancefrom the French.2 These offers were only vagueinquiries from the French consul at Aleppo; but in December the shah, himself,sent through the French embassy in Constantinople a much more specificofferof co-operation.22The shah's priorities should not be misunderstood: it wasBritish support he wanted, not the support of France. The French were not agreat power in the near east. Their interestin Persia would be transitory,becausethe integrity of Persia was not of vital interest to them. And the French couldhelp Persia only to go on fighting in the Caucasus, whereas the British mightnegotiate a settlement. The Persians also had objections to their other possibleally, the Turks. Turkey and Persia were more easily defeated in the Caucasusbecause they were more suspicious of one another than of Russia. The Turksclaimed that in the western Caucasus Zizianov had annexed only territoryoverwhich they had already renounced their suzerainty. They were, if anything,pleased to see the attention of Persia diverted from Kurdistan and Baghdad.2'Even had the two states co-operated,however, they would not have been strongenough to obtain a final settlement.There was no possibilityof theiroverwhelm-

19 This treatyis printedin Hurewitz, i, 68.20 Malcolm to Jones, 28 Oct. I8oo, Kentchurch Court MSS 6421; also resident at Bushire togovernor of Bombay, Io Apr. I802, I.O. BombaySPP/38i/34, p. 3968.21 Manesty to Castlereagh, with enclosures, 15 Jan. I805, Castlereagh, v, 345, 348, 352.22 This proposal is printed in E. Driault, La Politique Orientale de Napole'on: S'bastiani et

Gardane Paris, I904), p. I72.23 See Castlereagh,v, I62; Melville MSS, Add. MSS 4I767, fo. 3II; and Manestyto Addington,i8 Apr. I804, I.O. G/29/24.



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5I6 EDWARD INGRAMing the Russians in the field. It was because the shah was aware of his militaryincapacity that he was seeking the help of Britain.

To the Persians, the British had a decisive advantage over both the Frenchand the Turks: they were nearer than the French, stronger and richer than theTurks. If the shah could persuade the British that the expansion of Russia didthreaten British India, their interest in Persia would be permanent. They mightalso be able to make the Russians abide by a negotiated settlement. The shah'sflirtation with the French was designed in the first instancesolely to draw out theBritish. The shah calculated that, should the British retaliate at this breach ofMalcolm's treaty, he could easily disavow the French. France was too far away tothreaten Persia. However, should the British take alarm, as Malcolm's treatyimplied, at the prospect of French influence in Persia, and should they sendanother embassy to Teheran to counter it, the British alliance would do what theshah wished of it. With the British trying to outbid the French for his alliance,by negotiating on his behalf with Russia, the whole of Georgia or at least Erivanand Nakhitchevan might be saved.

In January I805, the Persians tried once again to open a negotiation with theBritish Government in London, this time through the residentat Baghdad, Har-ford Jones.24The response to these manoeuvres was not what the shah intended.Manesty, fettered by his instructions from Wellesley, had returned not to Londonbut to Basra. While he repeated his assurances that Persia could rely upon thefriendship of Great Britain, he no longer offered any actualhelp.25Jonesdid notreply at all until August, and then only to say that he had sent the Persian pro-posalson to London, but had receivedno reply. Jones, foolishly, did not challengethe Persian interpretation of Malcolm's treaty, that each state was obliged toassist the other against all her enemies, but he did challenge the right of Persiato negotiate with France, warning the shah not to receivea French ambassador.26These replies provoked an immediate reaction from the shah. At the end ofSeptember he repeated his demand for British mediation in the Russo-Persianwar and, if the mediation failed, for armed intervention against Russia. Tostrengthen his demand, the shah now added the threat that although he couldInever consent to the French alliance ... until the most complete infringementof the treaty... if neither of these two proposals are adopted', he would beobliged to.27

The Persianswere trying to increase their pressureon the British. If the Britishchose to disregard the potential danger from the increasing Russian influence,the prospect of increasing French influence in the near east might cause themmore immediate concern for the security of India. The reason for this pressurewas the increasing anxiety of the shah. In the middle of September, before the

24 Jonesto Castlereagh, 2 Jan. I805, BoultibrookeMSS,National Libraryof Wales, MS 4905.E.25 Manestyto Wellesley, I3 Dec. I804, Castlereagh,v, 345.26 Jonesto Mirza Bozurg, Io Aug. I805, F.O. 6o/I.27 MirzaBozurg to Jones,received I2 Oct. I805, F.O. 6o/i.



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5I8 EDWARD INGRAMpromised not to reply to the French until they had heard from the British.31Jones sent these communications on to London, and told the British Govern-ment that he, too, would do nothing until he had heard from them. But hewarned them that the Persianswere expecting anotherambassador rom France,and that unless they received a quick reply, they would agree to a Frenchalliance.32 I have done what I could ', Jones told a friend in the East India Com-pany ' and I wrote long, long ago what ought to have been done.' 33

This Persian manoeuvre almost succeeded, but its failure left the shah ingreater difficulties. Jones had misled the British Government. Because he over-estimated the interest of the Persians in an alliance with France, Jones was pre-pared on his own initiative to go to Teheran, to urge the Persians to reconsiderit. He was forcibly preventedby the pasha of Baghdad, with whom he had beenquarrelling, who had persuaded the Porte to ask for his recall.34Jones, in con-sequence, could not even await in Baghdad the replies from London. This had aseriouseffect upon the situation of the shah. If he could entice a Britishenvoy toTeheran at the same time as a French one, as he did four years later, the Britishmight finally feel obliged to intervene on his behalf with the Russians, and atleast - if only to protect the life of their ambassador they might pay him largesums to send the French away. As it was, Manesty had left Basraearlier in theyear to explain his conduct in Persia to the governor-general,and now Jones wasleaving Baghdad. The government of India had recently recalled their residentsat Muscat and Bushire: there was no British political agent between Constanti-nople and Bombay. The shah was forced to wonder whether Britain, despite thebehaviourof Manesty and Malcolm, ' if not hostile, was at least indifferent to the1 35interestsof Persia .

IVJones made the same calculation as Elgin about what would happen as a result:the shah would be obliged to ally instead with France. Driving the Russians atleast from Erivan and Nakhitchevan was a prerequisiteof Persianindependence.When Jones left Baghdad, until the beginning of May i8o6 he camped at Kaze-meen, in the hope of receiving the British reply to the Persian proposalsof theprevious autumn. And he still assumed that the Persians would wait for thisreply before allying with France. But early in Februaryhe repeatedhis warningthat they would not wait long: ' if much further delay occurs in the Persiansreceiving the determination of our government ... I look on a definite alliancebetween Persia and France as certain to take place in three months more .3 He

31 Reza Kouli Khan to Jones, received 28 Oct. I8o5, and Record of a Conversation, 24 Nov.I805, F.O. 6o/i.32 Jonesto Castlereagh,24 Nov. i8o5, I.0. SecretLetters(Various)/6.33 Jonesto Willis, 3I Dec. I8o5, N.L.W. MS 49o5.E.34 Arbuthnotto Mulgrave, i8 Sept., i6 Nov. I8o5, F.0. 78/46.35 Malcolmto governor-general,8 June i8o8, I.0. Bengal SPP/2o6, i5 Aug. i8o8, no. lo.36 Jones to chairmanof East India Company, 2 Feb., 4 Feb. I8o6, I.0. SecretLetters(Various)/6.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 5I9added that either the British should send an ambassador o Persia from Englandto undermine the growing influence of France, or they should terminate theirconnexion with Persia altogether. They would have to do one or the other, forthe Persians 'avow that between France and England the one who promisesthem assistanceshall be their friend'. If the Persians could not obtain a per-manent commitment from Great Britain, they would have to manage as bestthey could with the temporaryhelp of France.

Despite these warnings, the British Government sent no reply to the successivePersian proposals. Throughout I804, as even Jones appreciated,38 he Britishhad to act towards Russia in the most friendly manner, to tempt her into analliance. Throughout the following year they had to try equally hard to turn thealliance into a coalition. When the British did turn their attention to the neareast they were in fear of France, and throughout the peace of Amiens and theThird Coalition the British were afraidof French influence in Egypt rather thanin Persia. 9While Turkey was an ally, unless the French first reoccupied Egypt,their influence in Persia and even an alliance with her could not endanger India.Russian influence in Persia the British must disregard. The British made theirpriorities perfectly clear: ' the great objectof the moment ', remarked the foreignsecretaryin the autumn of I805, 'is to set aside those ancient jealousies, and tooverlook those contingent dangers and distant apprehensions, for the annihila-tion of a present danger of greater magnitude and of more immediate effect'.40One of these contingent dangers was the Russian expansion in the near east: oneof the distant apprehensionsany threat to British India that might result. Butthe present danger was from France. For as long as possible the British wouldcontinue to disregardthe Russo-Persianwar. They would not admit to an interestin the integrity of Persia.

Throughout the eighteenth century the formulation of British strategy andforeign policy involved a constant argumentbetween the advocatesof continentaland colonial warfare; between defining Britain's vital interests as European orimperial. Pitt's first ministry had eventually broken up, after a disastrous recordin the War of the Second Coalition, because Pitt himself had proved unable todecide between the opposing policies of Dundas and Grenville. Throughout thenineteenth century the expansion of Russia in Asia would provoke a similarargument. During the Napoleonic wars both partiesneeded Russia's assistance.

37 Jonesto Willis, 6 Jan. i8o6, N.L.W. MS 4905.E.38 Jonesto Willis, 4 May I804, I.O.L. MicrofilmMSS 742.39 See Inglis to Jones, io Sept. I803, Castlereagh,v, I72; chairman of East India Company to

Pasha of Baghdad, 30 June I803, I.O. Board's Drafts/2; and Howick to Fox, 2i Nov. i8o6, W.O.6156, insisting that the British expedition to Egypt was being sent ' not for the conquest of Egypt,but merely for the capture of Alexandria, for the purposeof preventing the French from regaininga footing '.

40 Mulgrave to Harrowby, 27 Oct. I8o5, Select Despatches Relating to the Formation of theThird Coalition against France, 5804-5805, J. Holland Rose (ed.) (Camden Society: London,I904), p. 207.



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520 EDWARD INGRAMGrenville thought that Russia was indispensable to any successful coalition,Dundas that she was equally indispensable to any successful defence of Indiaagainst an overland invasion. Not until the Russians' interest in Asia distractedthem from their efforts in Europe would the British have to choose. Not untilthen would they debatethe natureof their interestin Persia.

Many years later the East India Company admitted, that although the Persianclaims on Britain were unfounded, ' more indifference was perhaps mani-fested ... than was consistent with sound policy '.41 For the predicamentof theshah was deepening: his military situation in the Caucasus might deteriorate.Throughout I805, although Zizianov had been fighting on the defensive, thePersians had barely held their ground in Azerbaijan, and the Russians hadevacuated only Erivan. The following year the Russians could be expected tofight with greater venom, because early in February, under a flag of truce, thekhan of Baku assassinatedZizianov. It was fortunatefor Persiathat his successor,Count Goudovitch, 'capricious, tyrannical, and vain to a degree', was alsoelderly.42At the same time the French, in contrast to the British, continued tooffer their help. In June i8o6 the second French envoy, Amedee Jaubert,reachedTeheran. He had been due to arrive earlier, but had been imprisoned for thewinter by the pasha of Bayazid. It seemed that the shalhwould hlave o agree toa French alliance, and to send an ambassador o France to negotiate the definitiveterms. When this became known at the French embassy in Constantinople,' everyone lauded the work of Jaubert.... His success spoke for itself '.4 ButJaubert'ssuccess was not yet certain. The shah still hoped that when it becameknown to the British they would finally react. Simultaneously, therefore, hemade a final appeal to the British through his ambassadorto India, Aga NebeeKhan. 4

The eagernessof the French had obliged the shah to treathis flirtationfarmoreseriously than he had intended. His original argument, that the British shouldappreciatetheir interest in preservingthe integrity of Persia from the continuousexpansionof Russia, had been gradually transformed,until the shah was suggest-ing that the British,rememberingthe French occupationof Egypt, should insteadassert themselves to forestall the threat to India from a Persian alliance withFrance. Not the RuLssian ar but the French alliance was to excite the British:the spur to action had been transformed into the cause for action. This trans-formation, partly the result of Jones'sover-anxiety,had unfortuntae effects. The

41 Secretcommitteeto chairmanof board, 27 Mar. 1823, 1.O. PS/Miscellanies/2, p. IIo.42 J.F. Baddeley, The RussianConquestof the Caucasus London, I908), pp. 68-71. For Russian

reactionsto the developmentsin the Caucasusin I8o5-6, see Arkhiv Vorontsova, XIV, 10, XXXIII,I7; Sbornik ImperatorskoeRusskoe IstorichzeskoeObschestvo(St Petersburg), LXXXII, 17, 45; andNicholas Mikhailovich, Le Comte Paul Stroganov (St Petersburg, I905), no. 176.

43 Puryear, p. I20; for an account of Jaubert'sembassy, see Comte P. A. E. P. Jaubert,Voyageen Armnlniet en Perse, Fait dansles Annees I805 et I8o6 (Paris, 182I).

44 Shahof Persiato Aga Nebee Khan [May-June i8o6], F.O. 6o/i.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-1807 52IRussian question was permanent, the French one temporary: the Persianswanted the British to intervene permanently to guarantee their frontier, nottemporarily to evict the French. At this time the British would not have inter-vened for either reason, but in the eyes of the British his manoeuvres discreditedthe shah. What was a serious question for the Persians, the security of theirfrontier, became concealed behind a trivial one for the British, the security ofIndia from a European invasion overland. The British Government did notbelieve that there was any danger of the French invading India overland. By hisappeal through Aga Nebee Khan, the shah was calculating that the governmentof India might. The terms of Malcolm's treaty should have meant that they atleast were sensitive to the danger.

In this, too, the shah miscalculated. Neither Wellesley nor the government ofBombay had ever feared a French invasion overland ; whereas Sir GeorgeBarlow, who had succeeded Wellesley in I805, was bound by stringent instruc-tions from London to a policy of restraint and economy. Barlow could not haveintervened had he wished to; but he did not. He considered that the shah wasmerely trying to get the British to bribe him out of a French alliance, and that theover-anxiety of Manesty and Jones had encouraged him to try to achieve this,by arguing that obligations imposed by Malcolm's treatyon Persia were obliga-tions imposed on Britain.46This was only partly true: had the British shownany interest in his predicament, the shah would have sacrificed the French.Nevertheless, partly it was true, because had the British shown too great aninterest, the sacrificewould have proved expensive.

The government of India did not take Persian envoys seriously. It was sup-posed, correctly, that they were principally interested in their own financial gain;as they had to be to recover the great outlay in presents necessary to obtain theirappointments. Any political issues raised by them were merely ' so many articlesof political merchandize which the king. put into... [their] hands to makethe most of '.47 On this occasion the British were mistaken. From the behaviourof Aga Nebee Khan there was no reason to suppose it, but the shah's interest inthe political issues was as great as his envoy's in the monetary ones. Barlow hadhoped to avoid meeting Aga Nebee, and had instructed the governor of Bombayto negotiate with him. This manoeuvre failed. When Aga Nebee insisted thatBritain was required by Malcolm's treatyto prevent Russia from invading Persia,if necessaryby going to war, the governor skirted the question of Britain'sobliga-tion, by replying that such decisionscould be taken only in London. This answerbeing unsatisfactory,becausethe Persianscould obtain no answersto theirappealsto London - and the governor's resistance to his monetary claims being equally

45 Wellesley to flag officer in command, East Indies, 29 Aug. I798, WVellesley, I, 248; flagofficer in command, East Indies, to secretaryto admiralty, 2 Dec. I798, Adm. I/I69, fo. 247.

46 Governor-generalin council to secret committee, 20 Aug. i8o6, I.O. Secret Letters fromBengal/I/g, p. 267; memorandumby Barlow, 9 Oct. I8o6, I.0. F/4/205, no. 4606, p. I87.

47 Duncan to Wellesley, 27 Feb. i8o6, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS I3702, fo. 32.



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522 EDWARD INGRAMso -, Aga Nebee insisted upon continuing to Fort William, to argue his casewith the governor-general.48

Unfortunately for the ambassador,he found Sir George Barlow to be evenmore uncompromising. Unlike the governor of Bombay, Barlow denied thatMalcolm's treaty did oblige the British to support Persia against Russia; butadded that it did precludePersiafrom negotiating with France. To reinforcethisinterpretationhe ratifiedthe treatyand referredto London the question of inter-vening in the Russo-Persianwar.49The shah had been misled. To negotiate withthe government of India was always difficult. At one moment they would beclaiming the powers of a sovereign state, at another denying that they had anydiscretion. On this occasion, in the reaction against the fidgeting of Wellesley,neither the argument of Jones and Manesty that Britain should intervene in theRusso-Persianwar to ward off the prospective danger from a Russian victory,nor the argument of the shah that she should intervene to ward off the immediatedanger from a Franco-Persianalliance, had any influence at Fort William. Thiswas because the government of India had no fear of an invasion overland: 'weconsider a project of that nature to be attended with such peculiar difficulties,and to be opposed by such extraordinaryobstacles,as to justify us in consideringit altogether impracticable'. 5 In keeping the French out of Persia, and indelimiting Persia'sfrontierwith Russiain the Caucasus,the government of Indiarefused to admit to an interest.The shah had no alternativeto the French.

VThe shah had not waited for these official replies from Barlow. After the firstreportsfrom Aga Nebee Khan of his unsatisfactoryreceptionby the governmentof Bombay, the shah had finally agreed to the negotiations with France, thatculminated in the treaty of Finkenstein. If the British would not mediate a finalsettlement, until they should change their minds with the support of FrancePersia would fight for the best settlement she could obtain. Persian policy, there-fore, did not change in i807: neither, despite its transformed appearance,didBritish policy change. In the spring of I807, for the first time, Russo-Persianrelationswere drawn, as the French had hoped, within the orbitof the Europeanwar. The proposed mission of Harford Jones to Persia was not the result of a

48 Recordof a conversationbetween Duncan and Aga Nebee Khan, 8 Feb. i8o6, I.O. F/4/f205,no. 4604, p. I07.

49 Secretaryto supreme government to Aga Nebee Khan, I0 Jan. I807, F.O. 6o/I; governor-general in council to court of directors, 14 Jan. I807, I.0. Political Letters from Bengal/2. It hasalways been assumedthat Malcolm's treaty was never ratified: see Sir J. W. Kaye, The Life andCorrespondence f Major-General ir JohnMalcolm (London, i856), I, I43-4; Sir H. C. Rawlinson,England and Russia in the East (London, I875), p. in; Curzon, p. 553; and P. E. Roberts, Indiaunder Wellesley London, I929), pp. 146-7.

50 Governor-general n council to court of directors, 31 July I807, I.O. Political Letters fromBengal/2.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-1807 523new appreciationof Britain's interests in the near east: nor was it the result ofany increasing alarm in India at the prospect of invasion. It was the result of thecourse of the war in Europe in I805 and i8o6, and in particularthe conduct ofTurkey. During i8o6 and I807 British policy in Persia was a reflexion of theirrelations with the Turks.

The Third Coalition, for which Hawkesbury and Pitt had worked so hard,had met disaster at Ulm and Austerlitz. In December I805 Austria made peaceat Pressburg. Both Britain and Russia spent the following summer negotiatingindividually with France: each was unsuccessful. Early in October the Britishambassador was recalled from Paris. The tsar had already refused to ratify thetreaty negotiated by his ambassador n July, but he did not intend to break off hisnegotiations. Two developments made him so do. Late in September, brieflyand disastrously,Prussia tried to defeat France unaided. Within a month Napo-leon shattered the Prussian army at Jena and occupied Berlin. Immediately healarmed the Russians by talking of recreating Poland. At the same time, thebehaviour of the sultan during the spring and summer persuaded both Britainand Russia, that he was likely to exchange their alliance for an alliance withFrance. The Turks had reacted to the peace of Pressburg as they always reactedto French victories: they became less frightened of Russia and tried to recoverthe friendship of France. Early in Januaryi8o6 the sultanrecognized Napoleon'simperial title. Napoleon responded in May by sending General Sebastiani toConstantinople to consolidate French influence both in Turkey and in Persia.Despite the desultory negotiations during the summer, the French were stillaiming, should the war be renewed, at defeating the Russians more easily inPoland by diverting their attention to the Principalities and the Caucasus. Thequestion of the Russo-Persianfrontier was being transformedinto a campaignon the fringe of the Napoleonic wars.

For the British to recognize this transformation took almost a year. In thespring of i8o6, Charles James Fox, the Whig foreign secretaryin the ministryof 'All the Talents', in a statement unique in British foreign policy, stipulated,that should Turkey attack Russia in alliance with France, Britain and Russiamust ' act vigorously against the Porte as well as against France, and the furtherRussia can push her conquests the more this country will be satisfied'. TheBritish spent the remainder of the year recoiling from the implications of thisstatement, which provoked a chorus of protestfrom the British ambassadorsonthe continent, Lord Granville Leveson Gower in St Petersburg,Sir RobertAdairin Vienna, and the Honourable Charles Arbuthnot in Constantinople. All ofthem were agreed, that should the war be renewed, such a policy could have onlythe most baneful effects upon the military potential of the coalition. They hadthree objections. Firstly, Russia would attempt to conquer more of Turkey than

51 Fox to LevesonGower, 29 Apr. I8o6, F.O. 65/62.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 525Poland the French would advance: the farther the French advanced, the morethe Turks would disregard the Russians. Reversing the instructions of his pre-decessor, in the middle of January I807 Howick told Arbuthnot that, if warshould break out between Turkey and Russia, he should mediate. This media-tion, nevertheless,would be intended less to protect Turkey than to satisfy thetsar. Britain's most vital interest at this critical moment was in maintaining herRussian alliance.60The assistance of Russia remained more important than theintegrity of Turkey.

VIThis policy of persuading Turkey to settle her disputes with Russia, in order tostrengthen the coalition, guided British policy in Persia. In a similar manner theBritish were prepared to mediate between Persia and Russia, not to protectPersiabut to satisfy the tsar.During i8o6, therefore, the appearanceof the Britishinterest in Persia was transformed. The transformation can be best seen in thechanging reception given to the dispatchesof Harford Jones. In May i8o6 Jonesarrived in Constantinople from Baghdad. He was undecided whether to staythere, while the government decided whether or not to recall him as the Turkshad asked, or whether to return instead to London. When the news reachedConstantinople that the shah of Persia had finally agreed to send an embassy toFrance, Arbuthnot persuadedJones to stay. He also defended him in his disputewith the pasha of Baghdad, and asked the Porte to bring about a reconciliation.Finally, he sent to the Foreign Office Jones's latest analysis of the alternativeways in which Britain might defend her interests n the near east.6

Jones was continuing to argue that it was time the British tried to mediatebetween Persia and Russia, because the best guarantee of Britain's security inIndia would be an establishedPersian frontier in the Caucasus.Arbuthnot dis-agreed. ' Delicacy towards the Court of Petersburg', Jones told the agent of theEast India Company at Aleppo, 'has prevented our ministry interfering in thePersian business.' 62 Jones, however, once again reminded his government ofElgin's warning that, if they did not help the shah, Napoleon would. If theBritish would not resolve the question of the defence of India by resolving thequestion of the Persian frontier, they would have to find an alternative defenceagainst the effects of a Franco-Persian alliance. Jones suggested that once theyhad obtained paramount influence in Turkey, the French would be able tomarch an army overland to Persia either through Anatolia or Syria. Whicheverroute they took, they should be stopped at Baghdad, which ' is and ought to beconsidered as a barrierwe ought to defend to the very last '.63 Joneswas actually

60 Howick o Arbuthnot,3 Jan. 807, F.O. 78/55.61 Arbuthnot o Fox, 27 June i8o6, F.O.78/50.62 Jones to Barker,I July i8o6, N.L.W. MS 4905.E.63 Reflexions upon the state of affairs in Persia by Mr Jones, 26 June i8o6, F.O. 78/50; this is

the version revised and abbreviatedbv Arbuthnot.



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526 EDWARD INGRAMmaking a last appeal to keep his post: the resident at Baghdad should be giventhe responsibilityfor co-ordinating the defence of India. This argument reflectedJones's and Manesty's previous arguments; that Britain's principal interest inPersia was Asiatic. This was exactly why Arbuthnot would not support them.Arbuthnot would not recommend the British Government to intervene in theRusso-Persiandispute on behalf of the Persians, any more than the British wouldintervene in Russo-Turkishdisputes on behalf of the Turks. Nor was Arbuthnotconcerned about the defence of India. Britain's vital interest was European, heralliance with Russia, and' there is no subject', claimed Arbuthnot,' aboutwhichRussia would ... be so unwilling to permit any other power to interfere' as inher dispute with Persia.64

In the spring of i8o6 the British Government had not, as Jones had claimed,been restrained by delicacy towards Russia. Fox was equally prepared to dis-regard Russian attacks on Persia as he was her attacks on Turkey, and ignoredJones's analysis of the dangers that might be the result. ' I fear you do notadvance ', Jones was told by a friend with impeccable Whig connexions, ' in per-suading this government to interfere for the Persians... I cannot draw suffi-ciently the attention of anybody to Persia.' 65 The' Talents 'declined to interveneat St Petersburgon behalf of Persia. While Turkey remained technicallyan ally,and while the coalition was still both negotiating for peace and preparing toreopen the campaign in Germany, the situation in Persia remained of littleinterest and no significance. Even if the shah signed an alliance with France itwould have no effect. The key to the campaign, as both the French and theBritish appreciated,was the Turks.

The embassy in St Petersburg claimed that Arbuthnot had misjudged theRussians. They would not resent an offer of mediation. In April, immediatelyafter they learned of the assassinationof Zizianov, the Russians inquired, un-officially, whether the government of India might persuadethe shah to negotiatefor peace.66Later in the summer, at precisely the time Jones was writing hismemorandum for Arbuthnot, the minister in St Petersburg,Charles Stuart, waswriting a similar memorandum for Leveson Gower, who was going home onleave. Stuart, like Jones, wanted the British Government to mediate between theRussians and the Persians, to terminate their quarrel in the Caucasus. UnlikeJones, his principal interest in the quarrel was European. Stuart argued that ifthe Russo-Persianwar continued, Russia would advance until she controlled allthe territorybetween the Black Sea and the Caspian; when she would be in aposition to occupy Ghilan and Mazenderan, the most fertile provinces of Persia,whenever she wished. Persia as a result would no longer be an independent state.Stuart was as suspicious of Russian plans of expansion into Persia as he was oftheir expansion into Turkey, but he claimed that Britain had an opportunity to

64 Arbuthnot o Spencer,30 Oct. i8o6, F.O. 78/52.65 Vaughan to Jones,8 Sept. i8o6, KentchurchCourt MSS 84I4.66 LevesonGowerto Fox, I4 Apr. i8o6, F.O. 65/62.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 527forestallthem: their set-backs n the Caucasushad' induced the RussianGovern-ment to hope for the mediation of Great Britain '. They would not wait long,however, and if Britain did not agree to mediate they would have to send rein-forcements to the Caucasus.According to Stuarttherewere two reasons why thiswould threatenBritain. Eventually, by controlling Persia, Russiawould threatenBritain'sposition in India. And if Russiamade peace with France, Francewouldencourage Russia to expand in Asia. Britain, accordingly, had an importantAsiatic interest in ending the Russo-Persianwar. More immediately important,Russia's preoccupationwith Persia would threaten Britain's interests in Europeby tending to disrupt the coalition: 'it would be an advantage ... that a diver-sion of force for an object which can only occasionfuture disagreementbetweenthe allies, should not weaken efforts against the common enemy in Europe...The situation of the shah,' concluded Stuart, had become .... an object in thepolitics fEurope.'7

In November Stuart repeatedhis warning: 'nothing was more desiredbeforethe Russians marched into Germany than an accommodation with Persia'.68The Russian ambassadorin Constantinople had said the same to Jones.69As aresult, late in October, after the Persian embassy to France had left Turkey forPoland, Jones left Constantinopleto argue his case in London. He arrived earlyin the new year to find the government, in contrastto their attitude the previousyear, ' disposed to pay immediate attention to the British interest in Persia .70Jones, therefore, told his assistant,whom he had left behind in Baghdad, to re-establish contact with the shah. He was to claim, that Britainhad been unable toreply to the Persian request for intervention, until she had consulted Russia, butthat she would soon do so. At the same time, at their request, Jones sent a finalmemorandum on the subject of Persia to the foreign office. Jones badreturnedto London through Russia: this memorandum reflectedthe argumentsof Stuart. It stressedthe European reasonsfor intervening in the Russo-Persianwar. It also stressedthat intervening would be easy. Jonesargued, correctly,thatPersia had asked France to help only because Britain had refused, and that shewould repudiate France provided that Britain made ' a proper appeal to self-motives '. France could neither mediate on behalf of Persia nor reinforceher, atleast until the Turks broke with the Allies, whereas Britain could still mediate.And Britain should do so, to guard Russia 'from the chance of being seriouslyembarrassedwith the Persian war .171 A British envoy should be sent first to StPetersburg,to find out what terms the tsarwould accept,and should then go onto Persia, to persuadethe shah to agree to them. Joneswas at last admitting thatBritain should not bring pressureon the Russians, at the request of Persia, in

67 Memorandumby Stuart,23 JuneI8o6, GranvilleMSS, P.R.O. 30/29/I3(4), no. 68.68 Stuartto Howick, iI Nov. i8o6, F.O. 65/65.69 App. no. 6 to memorandumby Jones,7 Jan. I807, F.O. 6o/i.70 Jonesto Hine, 7 Jan. I807, KentchurchCourtMSS8408.71 Memorandumby Jones, 7 Jan. I807, F.O. 6o/i.



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528 EDWARD INGRAMorder to strengthen the defence of BritishIndia, but ratherthat she should bringpressure on the Persians, at the request of Russia, in order to strengthen thecoalition.For this reasonhe was at last attendedto.

Late in February, Jones was reinforced by Stuart, who reported that theRussianshad received overturesof peace from Persia, and were willing to nego-tiate, calculating that the Persians would abandon their claims in the Caucasusin return for compensation in Turkey.72Provided the Persianswere allowed toretain control of Erivan, this was not an unreasonablecalculation. Persia hadwanted to settle her dispute with Russia, and to obtain an agreed frontier in theCaucasus, precisely in order to expand into Afghanistan and Baghdad. At anyother time the prospectof a Persian attack on Turkey might have alarmed theBritish; but the Whigs had still not acknowledged that Britain had any vitalinterest in the integrity of Turkey. Upon these grounds, therefore, the Britishwere prepared to intervene. They would not intervene in the Russo-Persianwarto suit the Persians,and they would still not acknowledge that Britain was vitallyinterested that Persiashould continue to be an independent state. If the integrityof Turkey was not vital, neither was the integrity of Persia. The Whigs wouldintervene in the Russo-Persianwar to suit the Russians, if it seemed that bydoing so they could strengthen the coalition in Europe. The Britishknew by thistime that Russia and Turkey were technically at war; they did not know thattheir expedition to the sea of Marmora had failed. British policy still assumedthat a demonstrationof force would be sufficient to persuadethe Turks to breakwith France. On 20 February, the foreign secretary, Lord Howick, told theRussiansthat the British navy would give Russiaall the help possible in the warwith Turkey. Nine days later he told Leveson Gower's successor in St Peters-burg, the marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale, that it was equally important thatPersia, as well as Turkey, should not divert the attentionof Russiafrom Poland.' In proportion as the war with France pressesmore immediately on Russia, itbecomes important that the force of that power should be diverted as little aspossible from the first and most important object. A peace with Persia, there-fore', concluded Howick 'would .., be most desirable at this moment.' 7Howick was willing to mediateand wanted to know whether the Russianswouldagree. And he at lastagreed to appointHarford Jonesto be the mediator.

VIIBefore this decision could be carriedout, during March I807 ' All the Talents'resigned. They were succeeded by a Tory government headed by the duke ofPortland; a ministry' built not on sand, but dirt', Lord Minto called it.74GeorgeCanning became foreign secretary and Robert Saunders Dundas, the son of

72 Stuartto Howick, 14 Jan. I807, F.O. 65/67.73 Howick to Douglas, 20 Feb., 29 Feb. I807, F.O. I8I/6.74 Mintoto Grcnville, Io Oct. I8o7, National Libraryof Scotland, Minto MSSM.I59.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 529Henry Dundas, president of the board of control for India. Canning had neversupported Fox's attempt to negotiate peace, arguing that peace was impossibleas long as France was in control of Germany.75Therefore he was as anxious asHowick to revive the coalition. He was given a suitable opportunity to try. Bythe end of April Canning knew, both that the expedition to the sea of Marmorahad failed, and that the tsar now wished to negotiate peace with Turkey. Thethreatof coercion, and the attempt to coerce,had both proved unsuccessful.Andif they continued, the war against Turkey, as Fox had been warned, mightbecome more serious than Britain intended. Douglas and Adair both advisedCanning to support the Russian negotiations for peace.76So did Stuart, whoadded the reminder that if the war continued Russia might invade Erzerum andBaghdad in alliance with Persia.77Peace between Russia and Persia would bepointless without peace between Russia and Turkey, because a diversion inMoldavia would be more serious than a diversion in the Caucasus.Canning wasnot as willing as the Whigs to hazard the destruction of the Ottoman Empire,and the Turks would rejoin the coalition only if they were convinced, that it wasFrance and not the allies who was threatening their integrity. Canning, there-fore, instructed Leveson Gower, who was returning to St Petersburg,to tell theRussians that Britain would support them in their attempt to re-establishalliedinfluence in Turkey.78And he sent Sir Arthur Paget to Constantinopleto nego-tiate on behalf of Britain. Canning also hoped that this negotiation would be theprelude to a new coalition with Austria, which might remove the other adverseeffect of the Turkish war, Austria's increasingsuspicionof Russia.As Sir RobertAdair in Vienna had predicted,the more vigorously RussiaattackedTurkey, themore alarmedAustriabecame.79Canning was prepared o reassure he Austrians,by trying to limit the Russian demands on Turkey, but in return he wantedAustria to declarewar against the French. The purposeof ending the war in thePrincipalitieswas to renew the war in Poland.80

This prospect of reviving the Third Coalition had an immediate effect uponBritain's interest in Persia. Once the Allies were negotiating peacewith Turkey,the situation in the Caucasuslost its pertinence. Persia mattered only if Turkeywas co-operating with the French: only then would the French be able toreinforce Persia and extend the war in the Caucasus. If Britain could assume,from Russia's willingness to negotiate with Turkey, both that Turkey wouldco-operatewith the Allies, and that Russia would renew the war in Poland, thesituation in Persia was unlikely to have any influence in Europe. Canningeventually agreed to continue Jones's mission, but he moved slowly, and the

75 Canning to Rose, g Aug. i8o6, RoseMSS, Add. MSS 42773, fo. I I9.76 Douglas to Howick, I9 Mar. I8o7, F.O. 65/68; Sir RobertAdair, Mission to Vienna in I8o6

(London, I884), p. 2I3.77 Stuartto Howick, I7 Jan. I8o7, F.O. 65/67.78 Canning to LevesonGower, i6 May I807, F.O. 65/69.79 Adair, p. 2I2. 80 Canningto Pembroke,I5 May, i6 May I8o7, F.0. 7/83.



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530 EDWARD INGRAMimpetus came from the East India Company. The British were anyway too late.The moment for intervening in the Russo-Persian war had passed. Russia hadrecovered from her setbacks in the Caucasus: in order to maintain her positionthere she would not have to divert troops from Europe. In the middle of May,just as Canning was instructing his various ambassadors,he learned from Doug-las that the Russians, too, no longer attached any importance to the situation inthe Caucasus. They implied that the Franco-Persian alliance threatened onlyBritain by threatening British India.8 The foreign office had never admit-ted, and still did not, that French influence in Persia was a threatto BritishIndia:their intervention had been exclusively on European, not on Asiatic grounds.Canning asked Wellesley whether or not to proceed with Jones'smission. Welles-ley replied that although they would have been wiser to prevent the Frenchgaining an influence in Persia, they need not hurry to undermine it. It wouldhave no practical effect, and there was no need, concluded Wellesley, 'to hastenthe departure of Sir Any Body, because They have appointed him', as hedescribedthe East India Company and Jones.82

Early in April Jones had given Canning an outline of the instructionshe wouldneed. He suggested that he should travel first to St Petersburg to offer to mediatebetween Russia and Persia. Britain should not offer to guarantee the settlement,but should agree to allow the treaty to include articles stipulating that any sub-sequent disagreements should be submitted to her decision. Jones added that heshould proceed to Persia even if the Russians refused the offer of mediation, inorder to undermine the French, but not until he had been guaranteed a friendlyreception by the shah.83Nothing was done until the end of May. Even the boardof control appeared uninterested.84Eventually, however, they decided to con-tinue the mission; and Canning agreed to instruct Leveson Gower to co-operate.85The purpose of the mission was transformed. The president of theboard, Robert Dundas, told the governor-general that Jones was being sent tocounteract the projects of the French in Persia, and particularly their projectsagainst India. The mediation between Russia and Persia was only to be afavourable way of introducing Jones to the shah.86Dundas, too, was implyingthat Britain's interestsin Europe and Asia were intertwined, but his implicationwas the opposite, for example, to Stuart's. Stuarthad argued that the effects of anAsiatic crisiswould threatenBritain's interestsin Europe: Dundas was arguingthat the effects of a European crisiswere threatening her interestsin Asia. Joneswould strengthennot Russia but British India. ' I conceive it to be of the utmost

81 Douglas to Howick, 3 Apr. I807, F.O. 65/68.82 Wellesley to Canning, Io JuneI8o7, Leeds Public Library, Canning MSS34.83 Heads of instructionssuggested by Sir H. Jones for the Persian Mission, Apr. I807, CanningMSS 149.A.84 Inglis to Jones, May I807, KentchurchCourtMSS 5572-3.85 Canning to LevesonGower, June I807, F.O. 65/69 [not sent].86 Secret committeeto governor-general n council, I JuneI807, I.O. Board'sDrafts/3.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 531importancewith a view to counteract the designs of the French government, andto give additional security to our possessions in India,' Dundas told Canningearly in June, ' that we should endeavour to exclude the French from all suchconnexions and possessions in any part of Asia ... as might facilitate to themthe means ... of directing the efforts of any considerablebody of troops againstour Indian territories.' 7

For the first time a member of the British Government had acknowledgedthat Britain had a vital and permanentinterestin the independenceand integrityof Persia. Nevertheless, Dundas still did not acknowledge that the only satis-factoryguaranteeof this independencewas the settlementof the frontierquestionin the Caucasus. What concerned Dundas was not the expansion of Russia butthe Franco-Persianalliance. This reasoning provoked a decided reaction fromWellesley. While he had been governor-general,during the French occupationof Egypt, Wellesley had never been afraid of an overland invasion of India: hedid not fear one now. His influence was decisive. At the end of June Canningused the unsettled state of Britain's relations with Russia and Turkey as anexcuse for suspending the mission.88If the Allies re-established heir connexionwith Turkey the mission would be unnecessary: without the co-operation ofTurkey the French could not maintain themselves in Persia. If the Allies did notre-establish their connexion, it would be equally unnecessary: it could notsucceed. It was in the interest of strengthening the coalition, not underminingthe French, that the British had been preparedto intervene in the question ofthe Persianfrontierin the Caucasus.

ShortlyafterwardsCanning learnedof the treatyof Tilsit. There was no longera coalition to which Persia might contribute. Equally there was no longer anopportunity to intervene in the Russo-Persian war. Britain could no longeroutbid France for the alliance of Persia by offering to intervene on her behalfwith Russia, because there was no prospectthat Russia would agree. The shah'scalculation had finally proved mistaken. The treaty of Finkenstein was butsmall consolation. Should the French prove able to negotiate a settlement of thefrontier question, they would not remain sufficiently interested in the near eastto oblige the Russians to abideby it. And in returnfor trying, the French wouldrequire the shah to declare war on the British, the only power who could, ifthey would, oblige the Russians to abide by any settlement. For a moment, inthe spring, through no merit of his own, the shah had almost obtained a settle-ment negotiated by the British. As he had failed, the war with Russia must goon. The shah was still waiting for either the expansion of Russia or his alliancewith France to provoke the British to intervene. The moment they did, theywould acknowledge that they were vitally interested in the independence ofPersia. WVhenhat moment came, as Sir George Barlow had predicted, evictingthe French might proveto be expensive.

87 Dundasto Canning, 6 June I807, CanningMSS99.A.88 Dundas to chairmanof East India Company,30 June I807, I.0. Board'sDrafts/30, p. 219.



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532 EDWARD INGRAMVIII

The foreign policy of Persia was no more consistent than that of any other state.The Qajars had perceived - as Bokhara and Khiva never did - that it wasimpossible for a nomadic state, defined by its interconnected tribes, to existbeside a territorialstate. Unless the one delimited its boundaries, the other wouldcontinue to expand. The Qajars had perceived the problem: they could notsolve it, not anyway without the help of Britain. The Persians were anxious foran alliance with Britain because Britain was the only European state other thanRussia with vital interests in Asia. With the support of Britain, Persia mightbe able to persuade Russia to agree to, and to stay beyond, a satisfactory rontier.There was no hope of achieving this with the support of France. Negotiatingwith France was intended to affect the British, not the Russians. The treaty ofFinkenstein in fact principally affected the Persians: they lost their singlenessof purpose. The shah's great vice was avarice. For the remainder of the Napo-leonic wars the Persians tended to forget that they needed a British alliance towithstand the Russians, and behaved as if the British needed their alliance towithstand the French. Large subsidies were expected in return for Persia's con-tribution to the defence of India. Nevertheless, at Gulistan the Persians madegreat concessions. Their frontier was not what they had hoped for, but if, asthe British ambassador mplied, Britain would oblige Russia to stay beyond it, itwould suffice. But Britain would not: Castlereagh would not allow the needsof Persia to jeopardize the Congress System.89

To Gerald Graham 'it seems hardly credible that British statesmen ... shouldhave been so long to recognize Russia as the natural enemy . . .', becauseBritain and Russia ' alone confronted each other as acquisitive imperial states inareas outside Europe '.9 It seems easily credible to everyone else. For overtwenty years the British were fighting to curb the overweening power of Francein Europe. To succeed they needed the help of Russia.91While fighting Francethey had to decide whether their European or imperial interests were moreimportant, whether France could threateneither, and if necessaryto subordinatethe one to the other. During the I83os after the dramatic change in British atti-tudes towards France and Russia, the problemwas simplified. Fighting in Persialike fighting in the Crimea might help to protect both the balance of power inEurope and the British Empire from the overweening power of Russia. Dur-ing the Napoleonic wars the British had to choose. While they needed Russia inthe Third Coalition, they could not oppose Russian expansion in the Caucasus.

89 For Castlereagh's ear that the British connexion with Persiamight cause complicationsat thecongress of Aix-la-Chapelle, see Castlereaghto Bathurst, no. 47, 24 Nov. I8I8, F.O. I8I/I7, andCastlereagh o Cathcart,no. 3, secret, 2 Feb. I8I9, ibid.90 G. S. Graham, GreatBritain n the Indian Ocean(Oxford, I967), p. 3.91 ' To create and preservethe Russian alliance was for many years the principal object of ourmilitary policy and diplomacy . . . the most important single factor of British grand strategy':P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean, 803-I8I0 (London, I957), p. ix.



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ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, I804-I807 533They could not acknowledge that their vital interests were affected by anyinfringement of the integrity of Persia. While they were fighting France, whocould not invade British India, their vital interests were not affected. Until theBritish should divert their attention from France to Russia, Qajar Persia wouldnot be needed as a buffer. Unfortunately for them, by the time they did, Persiawas no longer capableof being one.

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An Aspiring Buffer State Anglo-Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 1804-1807

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