1

Aishwarya Nair

I t is no surprise that the Canadian oil sands excite both political and industry antennae, given that it is the world’s third largest deposit of hydrocar-

bons, and the largest open to private investment. For oil investors, Canada’s far north is crucial for their long-term financial future. For politicos on both sides of the 49th parallel, it represents a source of employ-ment, revenue, and energy security. But not only are the oil sands the world’s most expensive source of ma-jor oil, the environmental liabilities associated with their development (and subsequent reclamation) are extensive, expensive, underestimated and often un-disclosed.

Canada remains in a unique position to contribute towards meeting the demand in growth of energy from the U.S. and Asia. Already the preferred trading partner of the U.S., the oil sands production provides a “secure and reliable supply” (CAPP report, June 2011) which would reduce reliance on foreign im-ports, while providing economic growth in both Cana-da and the U.S. But with each barrel of oil from the oil sands creating three times as much carbon dioxide than a barrel from Saudi Arabia, and pipelines trav-ersing across the continent over ecologically critical areas, criticism of these projects is growing louder. There is much concern that the oil sands are counter-productive to moving towards a green future.

This paper will start with a brief overview of the eco-nomics associated with oil sands projects in Canada. The second section will explore the relationship be-tween the oil sands and the environment, as well as the relationship with the socio-economic impacts of the projects. Two case studies showcasing these will be presented in the third section: the Keystone XL pipeline debate, which analyses the Canadian connec-tion with the U.S. market, and the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline that aims to create links with Asia. The final section will provide a conclusion and recom-mendations.

Production Economics

The real determinant of oil sands development is the price of oil. The current consensus is that production from existing oil sands projects will continue to be

economically viable at world oil prices exceeding $35-$40 a barrel. Newer projects, on the other hand, require the price of light sweet crude (WTI) to be sustained at significantly higher levels – $60-$70 per barrel – in order to be profitable1 (Levi, 2009).

It is for this reason that the last five years have seen oil sands projects treble throughout Alberta. But while significantly higher oil prices would off-set the vulnerability of oil sands economics and improve the financial attractiveness of these pro-jects, industry experts are agreed that there is a limit to how high the price of oil can go (CERA). Should oil prices rise above $120 - $150 per barrel, the world would be led into a demand-destroying recession. With the break-even point currently set at $95 per barrel (for in-situ projects), there is lit-tle flexibility in the economic viability of the oil sands industry. For Western Canadian producers, refining capacity and competition in the mid-continental U.S. and Canadian markets is also an additional factor.

Costs

Capital intensity is another major factor in the de-ciding the viability of an oil sands project. The costs of capital vary depending on the extraction method but generally range between 8 and 10 per-cent (RBC Capital Markets, 2010). The National Energy Board of Canada (NEB) estimates operat-ing costs per barrel of oil range from $4 to $14 for

*Author Aishwarya Nair is a graduate student in Univer-

sity of Pennsylvania’s Master of Environmental Sciences

program focusing on energy and business. Her contact is

nairaish@sas.upenn.edu.

**IGEL is a Wharton-led, Penn-wide initiative to facilitate

research, events and curriculum on business and the envi-

ronment. IGEL Research Briefs are written by students on

relevant issues in business and the environment and do

not represent the views of Penn, Wharton or IGEL. Learn

more at http://environment.wharton.upenn.edu

1 Oil sands producers receive a lower price for their heavier

products than those that prevail for more desirable crudes;

this is already reflected in this estimate.

2

bitumen, and $12 to $18 for synthetic crude oil. The supply cost, which includes the operating costs, cap-ital costs, taxes, royalties and the rate of return on investment, is double these figures. The supply cost of a barrel of oil from the oil sands is most sensitive to changes in the capital cost; it is worth noting, however, that prices of inputs such as steel and ce-ment are generally locked in through long-term con-tracts and are not affected as much by immediate market fluctuations.

Inputs such as natural gas and water present some additional non-market barriers to entry into oil sands development. Current methods of exploiting the oil sands require large amounts of natural gas.2 Projections from NEB see natural gas demand from the industry rising substantially by 2015, with roughly 40 to 45 million cubic metres (1.4-1.6 billion cubic feet) per day being used. The volatility of natu-ral gas markets therefore must also be factored into the costs of an oil sands project.3

It is worth noting that natural gas prices have been bottoming in recent years due to a continued over-supply in the North American market that is project-ed to last till 2015 (Nair, 2011). In addition, with most of Canada’s unconventional gas being situated in Alberta, like the oil sands, it is unlikely that the provincial government will artificially restrict gas availability to the oil sands.

Environmental Externalities

In addition to the production costs associated with de-veloping an oil sands project, there are also significant costs to the environment. The majority of these exter-nalities are generally not monetised and internalised as financial obligations. Therefore, an accurate well-to-wheels cost of a project is often not presented to the public, government and investors, and they have little access to reliable data accurately reflecting reclamation costs. Despite the Alberta government requiring accu-rate reclamation costs to be submitted, the industry discloses only a minor portion of liability. The Pembina Institute estimated that the unaccounted liabilities in

2008 for oil sands mines alone amounted to $15 bil-lion, a figure that could rise up to $33 billion by 2035 (Lemphers et al., 2010).

The marginal economics of oil sands production means that these projects are uniquely vulnerable to anything that either increases the cost of production or decreas-es the price of oil. While companies do not stop pro-ducing even if prices do drop below threshold levels for several months due to the large restart costs of pro-jects, the fragility of oil sands economics was clearly illustrated by the recession; approximately 45 percent of “new build 2015 production being officially delayed or deferred” (RBC Capital Markets, 2010).

The Impacts of Oil Sands

Much concern has been raised about the scale and the pace of oil sands development, both domestically and internationally, and this has brought a mixed bag of after-effects.

Oil Sands and the Environment

With heavier forms of crude oil (as that contained in the oil sands) requiring more energy and resources to produce, there have been several well documented, and widely publicised, environmental effects associated with oil sands.

GHG Emissions

As the scale and intensity of oil sands production in-crease, so do the emissions. Environment Canada fore-casts that GHG emissions from the oil sands will triple

2 Natural gas supplies come from the Western Canadian Sedi-

mentary Basin which has between 376 and 947 trillion cubic feet

(Tcf) of gas that is recoverable from unconventional resources

(Nair, 2011).

3 It is worth noting that natural gas prices have been bottoming

in recent years due to a continued oversupply in the North

American market that is projected to last till 2015 (Nair, 2011).

In addition, with most of Canada’s unconventional gas being

situated in Alberta, like the oil sands, it is unlikely that the pro-

vincial government will artificially restrict gas availability to the

oil sands.

4 National Inventory Report & Statistics Canada, with data from 1990, 2000, 2004 and 2008. This figure includes only produc-tion data and total emissions data that occurs in Canada. No upstream gas production or downstream upgrading occurring in the U.S., refining, or combustion is included.

Canadian tar sands pictures. Photo Credit Flickr user Jungbim

3

to 92 million metric tonnes by 2020, from a base level of 30 million metric tonnes in 2005. While improve-ments in technology have helped curb emissions, per barrel emissions intensity for oil sands has improved only by just over 3 percent between 2004 and 2008.4

Although both in-situ and mining operations are on growth trajectories, in-situ operations are more GHG intensive due to their copious use of natural gas need-ed to heat the bitumen in place. Mining, extraction and upgrading projects use natural gas and other fuels to generate both heat and electricity to run operations. With in-situ operations set to overtake mining by 2017, industry wide GHG intensity can be expected to in-crease. Nor does the current administration have any plan to reduce emissions; if anything, their decision to exit the Kyoto Protocol suggests a contrary agenda.

Water

The removal of water from the watershed (surface and groundwater), the creation and expansion of large tailing ponds, and the risk of unplanned releas-es of contaminants through oil sands production all pose considerable threats to aquatic ecosystems. While effort is made to recycle5 the water used in the processes, a significant amount is suspended in tail-ing ponds which becomes a danger to both humans and wildlife in the area.6

The water used in oil sands mining operations comes primarily from the Athabasca River. All ex-isting and approved oil sands projects are required to obtain licenses allowing them a percentage of wa-ter withdrawal rights. But although the Alberta gov-ernment does have a framework in place for river water withdrawals (as high as 15 percent of river flow during most years), this is seldom monitored and in recent years, various watchdog organisations have questioned how much water is actually being taken from the river.

In-situ operations are not as water-intensive as min-ing operations due to their ability to recoup and re-use up to 90-95 percent of water once they are in full operation. These operations are also increasingly moving towards using saline/brackish groundwater sources to reduce their impact. However, the effects of groundwater withdrawals and the re-injection of process water from in-situ operations back into the ground are still being studied.

Land Use

Land use impacts differ between mining and in-situ production. Mining operations are the more land-intensive of the two. All vegetation and top soil must be removed – stored for later reclamation – for ac-cess to the oil sands, and result in large scale (temporary) removal of all wildlife and wildlife habi-tat from the area. In-situ extraction, though not as widely destructive, also cause habitat loss and forest fragmentation, and might influence more extensive-ly than just the area directly affected by the opera-tion (Jordaan et al., 2009). A point in favour for in-situ operations is that they do not require additional land for tailing ponds as do mining operations, and reclamation could be achieved quicker.7

Given the long time frames and massive scale of oil

Source: Government of Canada, Turning the Corner: Canada’s Ener-

gy and GHG Emissions Projections

5 In mining operations, 7.5-10 barrels of water is used for each barrel of SCO. With 40-70 percent recycling rates, this shrinks to 3.5-4 barrels. In-situ operations use about 2.5-4 barrels of water per barrel of SCO, or 0.5 barrels with recycling.

6 Tailing ponds are created at oil sands mining operations from leftover water, clay and sand of the bitumen separation process. Currently they cover over 65 square miles (or 223 bil-lion gallons of toxic water) of what was once Boreal forests and wetlands in Alberta and their reclamation are an average of 40 years. Leaks from these ponds (estimated at 11 to 12 million litres per day) end up in the environment, which have directly affected animals, aquatic life – there are multiple recorded instances of fish with tumours and deformities – as well as human health and activities.

In addition, the tailing ponds also pose significant danger to birds. In 2008, 1600 migratory waterfowl died when they land-ed in one of Syncrude’s toxic tailing ponds. Although Syncrude was fined CAD$3 million, the maximum penalty, its record has not improved; three days after the hearing, 230 ducks had to be euthanized after they landed in a toxic tailing pond also owned by Syncrude. This is not to say that reclamation efforts are wasted; Suncor Energy is working towards successfully reclaiming a 550-acre area in Wapisiw that was once a tailing pond.

7 As far as the author is aware, there have been no reports on in

-situ reclamation efforts to confirm this statement.

4

sands production (40-60+ years), reclamation does not happen quickly. Nor is the restored area ex-pected to be similar to its undisturbed state. Rather, it is expected that the reclaimed land will include forests, prairie, wetlands, and native vegetation to support forestry, wildlife, aboriginal land use and biodiversity (Alberta, 2006). The cost to companies to reclaim land is very high – for example, Syncrude paid $46,282 per acre to reclaim a 659 acre upland site – and so far, only a very small percentage of dis-turbed land has been certified reclaimed by the pro-vincial government.

Oil Sands and Socio-Economic Impacts

The socio-economic impacts associated with the oil sands only serve to underscore their complexity. Though most of the attention is focused on the eco-nomic and environmental effects, the social aspect must be included in any discussion of the oil sands.

Economic Development

Given Canada’s vast resources, it is no surprise that the energy sector is a major economic driver. In 2008, approximately 276,000 people – 1.9 percent of total employment in Canada – were directly em-ployed8 by the energy sector; 145,000 of these were in the mining, oil and gas extraction sector which includes the oil sands. Alberta especially benefits: the energy sector accounted for 30.8 percent of the province’s GDP in 2008, over $3 billion in royalties were collected in 2009/2010,9 and approximately $44 billion is forecasted to be invested into the sands by companies in 2011.10 The Canadian Energy Re-search Institute (CERI) expects the sands to contrib-ute over 11 million person-years of employment to Canada and $1.7 trillion to the economy over the next 2 years. For the U.S. as well, the oil sands bring promise, with 80,000 jobs supported in 2010, and a boost of $210 billion to GDP expected between 2010 and 2035.

Energy Security

The prospect of sourcing oil from a nearby, friendly country is naturally appealing to U.S. policymakers. The non-nationalized nature of Canada’s energy sec-tor is seen as leverage against price manipulation by OPEC and other national governments, as well as protection from politically motivated supply disrup-tions. The oil sands are also an alternative to oil rev-enues going towards empowering nations whose in-terests often conflict with the U.S. Skeptics however play down the purported benefits of Canadian oil since the oil is still traded on global markets; im-

portance, they say, must be placed rather on expand-ing access to alternatives and cutting U.S. consump-tion.

Health

The possibilities of ecosystem disturbances and po-tential degradation of local fish and wildlife due to oil sands operations has raised many questions. Adding to this has been the increased rate of illness, especially the preponderance of some cancers amongst residents of the community of Fort Chipewyan.11 Due to the naturally occurring contact between the oil sands and the watershed, it has been difficult previously to determine if the toxins in the water had anthropogenic origins. A recent industry-government panel, however, did link thirteen toxic pollutants found in the Athabasca River directly to oil sands mining.12

Aboriginal Concerns

There are “seventeen First Nations, with a combined population of 16,000 people living on-reserve, and six Métis settlements with approximately 6,000 resi-dents” living within the oil sands area in Alberta(Alberta Factsheet, 2010). These communities rely on the land, water and wildlife for hunting, trapping and harvesting, recreational, ceremonial and naviga-tional activities. With illnesses increasing, their life-styles being disrupted, and the watershed being af-

8 Does not include downstream petroleum product retailing jobs

9 Government of Alberta, Energy Statistics. Last revised: 4th November 2011

10 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers report 2010 11 Fort Chipewyan is located on the western tip of Lake Atha-basca, adjacent to Wood Buffalo National Park, approximately 230 km north of Fort McMurray, the biggest strip mining oper-ation in the Athabasca oil sands.

12 Mercury, thallium and other heavy metals were found in higher concentrations in snow-packs and waterways near and downstream from oil sands development than in remote areas.

13 The Obama administration called for another review of the impacts of the proposed pipeline on November 10th, 2011. No decision is now expected till 2013. In the meantime, the GOP is trying to introduce legislation to force President Obama to pass the Keystone XL proposal within the next 60 days, or show that it is not in the country’s national interest.

14 TransCanada, the owner and operator of the pipeline, an-nounced on 14th November – after the decision by the govern-ment to review the pipeline – that it is willing to discuss an al-ternate route with environmental groups and the State of Ne-braska that will avoid the Sandhills area.

5

fected, these communities are questioning the pace and scale of oil sands development.

The Keystone XL Pipeline: Boon or Bane?

The proposed extension to the already controversial Keystone pipeline would bring up to 830,000 bar-rels of crude oil per day nonstop from Canada to market hubs in Oklahoma and Texas. The 1700 mile-long, $7 billion extension has faced strong opposi-tion from environmental groups, the public and from within both governments before being post-poned by the Obama Administration.13 In its original plan,14 the pipeline would have passed through over Nebraska’s ecologically sensitive Sandhills area and the Ogallala aquifer, which supplies drinking water for 82 percent of the region’s population and 30 per-cent of the nation’s irrigation. An oil spill in this re-gion, where water tables are particularly high in many places, could have a disastrous effect.

Proponents for the pipeline state that it would help create desperately needed jobs in the U.S. TransCan-ada pledges that the pipeline will put 140,000 Amer-icans back to work in construction, manufacturing and indirect jobs not including employment created in heavy and commercial industries through a se-cured oil supply. But amid allegations of ties be-tween lobbyists, TransCanada and the government,15 an independent study released by Cornell University claimed that nearly one-third of these supposed jobs would not exist, and many of the jobs that did would be temporary. Furthermore, 50 percent or more of the steel pipe, the main input to be used for Key-stone XL, is likely to be manufactured outside the U.S. The study concluded that one year of additional fuel costs in the Midwest, rising costs due to climate change, pollution, and possible spills as a result of the pipeline could in fact negate some or all of the jobs created by the project.

As well as escalating the aforementioned effects linked with oil sands production, Keystone XL will have a direct and negative impact on caribou herds. Already a threatened species in Alberta and Canada,

the relentless destruction of boreal for-est wilder-ness will de-prive caribou of their life requisites while expos-ing them to levels of pre-

dation they did not evolve with or are capable of adapting to. Consequently, caribou are on a slide to extinction16 and it is expected that they will disap-pear in 70 years and as soon as 30 years in areas open to rapacious oil sands development.

The Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline: The Other Frontier

Rather than leaving all its eggs in one basket, the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline is Canada’s bid to become a global player in the petroleum market. The 731 mile double-barrelled pipeline from Alberta to Kitimat, British Columbia would carry oil west and send condensate, a liquid used to dilute thick crude so it flows, to the east. Also proposed is an oil/LNG port in Kitimat that would open up Alberta’s oil sands to the Asian market,17 allowing super tankers with up to 2 million barrels of crude to navigate be-tween the jigsaw of islands to and from the port. Current federal regulations state that, should there be a tanker spill, Enbridge would not be responsible nor would they be legally obliged to pay damages or help with the cleanup effort.

No less critical is the impact of the pipeline on the Great Bear Rainforest, a 250 mile stretch of western red cedar, hemlock, and spruce forest along the BC coast, and the only home of the white spirit bear in the world. Earlier a battleground between environ-mentalists and timber companies, today the war is against tanker traffic. The smallest human error in these twisting channels could result in a devastating oil spill which would destroy economically important salmon habitat, as well as the habitat of whales, or-cas, marine life, bears and humans whose lives that depend on these coastal waters and forests.

15 The State Department allowed Cardno ENTRIX of Houston to conduct the Keystone XL economic impact study. The com-pany had done previous work for TransCanada and identified them as one of its major clients.

16 It was previously assumed that the drop in caribou popula-tion was due to wolves, which led to mass extermination of wolves in an effort to protect. A recent study found that the steep decline in caribou herds is directly linked to human activi-ties (timber, oil sands) in the area, rather than predator popula-tions. 10 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers report 2010

17 Sinopec, China’s state-owned oil company, is among the Asian and Canadian firms that have invested $105 million into moving the Northern Gateway through the planning and per-mitting stage.

18 Over 61 have signed the Save the Fraser Declaration which bans pipelines through the Fraser River watershed. It also pro-hibits crude oil tankers in the ocean migration routes of the Fraser River salmon. Canadian oil sands Photo Credit: Peter Rizov

6

The pipeline also traverses through traditional lands of First Nations tribes in BC, whose unceded territory encompasses the entire coastline. There are currently over 130 First Nations – from Haida Gwaii to the Northwest Territories – who are in opposition,18 with concerns about the impacts on the habitats of salmon, shellfish and the endangered Nechako white sturgeon in the Skeena and Fraser Rivers that sustain them. As the existing laws and jurisdictions of indigenous peo-ple in BC have never been extinguished, and are rec-ognized by Canadian and international courts, gov-ernments and companies alike must get consent from First Nations to have pipelines and tankers in their territories.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to outline some of the benefits and challenges surrounding the development of the oil sands in Canada. The scale of the resource, and the impacts associated with it, has put the oil sands firmly at the nexus of the debate around the desire for sus-tainable development and the current reliance on fos-sil fuels.

As the sole customer of the Canadian oil sands (99 percent), the U.S. has considerable ability to influence and improve environmental management north of the border. Should the Keystone XL pipeline be built, there will be nearly a 50 percent increase in oil sands production, and if allowed to develop without checks, this will come at considerable environmental and so-cial costs.

Similarly, resource-rich Canadians cannot be forever expected to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water. Instead, there must be more focus on how to develop these resources more holistically, addressing all three aspects of the triple bottom. It cannot be de-nied that the oil sands are crucial for Canada’s devel-opment but they must be only one piece of the puzzle. Obsession over the oil sands would be a dangerous distraction; instead they must be part of a much broader strategy and should not detract Canada from its much applauded commitments to a greener, more sustainable future.

Appendix: Overview of the Oil Sands

The oil sands are a mixture of sand, clay, water and a tar-like substance known as bitumen, oil that is too heavy to flow or be pumped up without first being heated or diluted. Largely contained to the province of Alberta, there are three main deposits – the Athabas-ca, Peace River, and Cold Lake – totaling close to 2 trillion barrels of oil, 10 percent of which is currently

recoverable. Of Canada’s 175 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, 170 billion lies in the oil sands. The choice of extraction method is determined by the geology. Deposits that lie up to 100 meters of the sur-face are recovered through surface (open-pit) mining techniques and then processed in facilities where the bitumen is extracted. About four-fifths of Alberta’s deposits are buried much deeper and can only be pro-duced using in-situ methods. The most common of the-se are cy-clic

steam simulation (CSS) and Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD): in both processes, steam is injected into wells drilled down to the deposit to separate the bitumen from the sand, enabling it to be brought to the surface. It is worth mentioning that operating costs do also vary between different in-situ opera-tions. Plant gate supply costs for a barrel of CSS re-covered oil is about $42; SAGD oil comes in at about $38 per barrel. The bitumen recovered through either mining or in-situ processes is then “upgraded” at a separate facility to synthetic crude oil (SCO). Depend-ing on the degree of upgrading, SCO must be pro-cessed in refineries tailored to light crudes or heavy crudes.

Works Cited

CAPP. “Environmental Challenges and Progress in Cana-da’s Oil Sands”. April 2008. Print.

CAPP. “About Canada’s Oil Sands.” April 2009. Print.

CBC News. “Oil Sands Mining Linked to Athabasca River Toxins.” August 30th, 2010. http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2010/08/30/oil-sands-athabasca-river.html

CTV News. “Opposition Growing to Northern Gateway

Source: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2011

7

Pipeline.” November 30th, 2011. http://www.ctvbc.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20111130/bc_northern_gateway_pipeline_opposition_111130/20111130/?hub=BritishColumbiaHome

The Economist. “Canada’s Tar Sands: Muck and Brass”. Jan 20th 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/17959688

The Economist. “A Sticky Ending for the Tar Sands”. Janu-ary 15th, 2009. http://www.economist.com/node/12932252

The Economist. “The Other Keystone Debate”. October 1st, 2011. http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2011/10/canada%E2%80%99s-oil-industry

Financial Times. “North America: US has its eye on oil in-dependence,”. December 2nd, 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cf1f1eca-19b8-11e1-ba5d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1fWP7PFtR

Grant, Jennifer, Simon Dyer, Daniella Droitsch and Marc Hout. “Solving the Puzzle: Environmental Responsibility in oilsands development”. April 2011. http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/solving-puzzle-oilsands.pdf

IHS CERA. “Break Point Revisited: CERA’s $120-$150 Oil Scenario,” May 2008. http://www2.cera.com/news/de-tails/1,2318,9475,00.html

IHS CERA. “Ratcheting Down: Oil and the Global Credit Crisis (2008)”. http://www.ihs.com/products/cera/energy-report.aspx?ID=106591844&pu=1&rd=cera_com

Levi, Michael. “The Canadian Oil Sands: Energy Security

vs. Climate Change.” May 2009. Council on Foreign Rela-tions. Print.

Nair, Aishwarya. “Economic Possibilities for Canada’s Un-conventional Gas”. July 2011. The Pacific Gateway Series, Canada West Foundation. Print.

National Geographic. “The Canadian Oil Boom”. March 2009. http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/03/canadian-oil-sands/kunzig-text/1

The Pembina Institute. “Full Disclosures: Environmental Liabilities in Canada’s Oil Sands. http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/full-disclosure.pdf. June 2011.

The Pembina Institute. “Pipeline and Tanker Trouble: The Impact to British Columbia’s Communities, Rivers, and Pacific Coastlines from Tar Sands Oil Transport.” Novem-ber 2011. http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/nrdc-pipeline-and-tanker-trouble-for-web.pdf.

The Pembina Institute. “Keystone XL in context: oilsands and environmental management”. September 2011. http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/oilsands-enviro-mgmt-fs-201109.pdf

RBC Capital Markets. “Economics of Oil Sands” March 2010. http://w.nationalbuyersellerforum.ca/2010_presentations/March_25/Kent_Ferguson.pdf

Websites Accessed: TransCanada Corporation: www.transcanada.com Enbridge Northern Gateway: www.northerngateway.ca CERI: www.ceri.ca CAPP: www.capp.ca

Alberta Oil

Sands

Photo Credit:

Peter Rizov

The Initiative for Global The Initiative for Global

Environmental Leadership Environmental Leadership

Follow us on the web @WhartonIGEL)!

Facebook, Twitter, Wordpress, Youtube