MANAGEMENT

An essay in futurology: groups, networksand complexity in the open society

A.C. Robb, M.Eng.# Ph.D., C.Eng., F.I.E.E.

Indexing term: Engineering administration and management

Abstract: This paper uses several familiar expectations to create a larger scenario for postindustrial society. Thetransition is regarded as a major sociological event, of Renaissance proportions, in which the complexities ofour circumstances will elevate the importance of multidisciplined teams. It is suggested that Britain, whosesuccess with technologically innovative teams was brief, but memorable, before, during and after the SecondWorld War, may play a leading part in the transition. It is probable that, just as the Renaissance transformedman's vision of the world and of his own capabilities, so the great transition, which this essay anticipates, willtransform the structure of society, at the same time enriching and extend ng our humanity.

1 Introduction

'The great objective, in trying to understand history,political, religious, literary or scientific, is to getbehind men and grasp ideas. Ideas have a radiationand development, an ancestry and posterity of theirown, in which men play the part of godfathers andgodmothers more than of legitimate parents.'Letter to Mary Gladstone, 15th March 1880, fromLord Acton

In 1968 I wrote an article in Electronics & Power identify-ing what I considered to be important trends in futurechange processes [1]. I anticipated greater individual stressdue to accelerating change, and a transition from what stillseemed progress within secure circumstances, to a whollydynamic condition lacking this assurance.

Since then futurologists have attracted more attention.Toffler warned of danger round the year 2000 caused bysustained compounding of human experience, the positivefeedback accelerating change and establishing exponentialtrends [2], Forrester and Meadows of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology then produced global models sug-gesting that the 21st century would be critical for mankind,if we did not take important decisions at a global level tolimit population growth, the invasion of arable land,environmental pollution, and the waste of limitedresources [3, 4]. Conservation soon became an issue on itsown, widely associated in public opinion with ecology,although it understood little of this complex science.

The global models warned of a Malthusian crisis, withrunaway population growth, a declining standard of livingand the prospect of increasing famine. Critical responses tothese expectations were of two main kinds: first, areminder that population projections are known to be veryunreliable and new crop developments may offset some ofthe anxiety; and, more subtly, that these were aggregatedglobal models, it being suggested that regional differencesand trade between areas exploiting different local strengthswould improve the situation. A more recent and neglectedreview of such models, prepared for President Carter,argues that the aggregated models are probably the moreoptimistic—also suggesting, incidentally, that the mostserious resource shortage for a rapidly expanding worldpopulation may well be water [5].

Recently, discussion has shifted forward, to the next

Paper 3536A (M2), first received 29th February and m extended form 27th June1984

The author is a consultant with Multiprobe Ltd., Bollington, Cheshire, England

stage in our development; to a postindustrial society,which we expect will be mainly concerned with informa-tion and communications, and the prospects of more opensocial conduct [6]. These topics are to some extent com-plementary, although they have not yet been assembledinto a coherent scenario. My early ideas provide a basis forsuch a synthesis, and this seems an appropriate time torelate them to more recent debate.

2 The crisis in change

The nub of my earlier suggestions appears in the two orig-inal diagrams, reproduced here in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1

transitionperiod

,'•. ' - ' ' ' ' / ' ' • ' " " ; ' ' , s

corporateability

/

individualadaptability

past -future

Fig. 1 Dynamics of change: civilisation may appear stable before thetransition period, but must appear explosively unstable after it

500 1000 1500 2000BC- -AD time

Fig. 2 Changes in history; the historical development of civilisation hasbeen steeply regenerative, overlaid by a relaxation oscillation

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1985 67

suggests that present social tensions result from concentra-tions of collective skills, the corporate ability of manyhighly specialised groups making rapid, simultaneousprogress in widely different technological fields. Individualsnow find it increasingly difficult to keep abreast of inten-sive and proliferating specialisation, although special-isation provides the main thrust to human progress.

Fig. 2 suggests that the stimulus has not been contin-uous; that periods of radical change have alternated withperiods of consolidation, and that each successive periodhas been shortened to half the comparable period preced-ing it. Conflict between the cyclical and exponential viewsof history is therefore resolved.

The original concept was not precise, because historycannot be neatly rationalised. It may be altered in variousways to illuminate the complex interactions involved. Forexample, Fig. 3 is a recent and more extended version of

2000-«-BC

1000 1000 2000

Fig. 3 The process of western history

'//// stable periods' innovative transition

is unlikely to provide a clear pointer to the future expecta-tions of industrial society. Other influences, and more par-ticularly economic rather than market variations, are likelyto decide its future.

3 Economic long waves

The existence of long-period economic variations was firstpostulated by the Russian, Nicholai Kondratieff, thendeveloped by Schumpeter and others [9, 10]. These 50-55year cycles are alleged to explain recessions in the 1820s,the 1870s, the 1930s and at the present time. The mostgenerally accepted mechanism, advocated by Mensch andothers, suggests that the recessions are economic adjust-ments to new technologies, and the International Institutefor Advanced Systems Analysis has recently extended thishypothesis [11, 12]. No really satisfactory explanation hasyet been provided, but the phenomenon is difficult torefute and may directly influence the transition from indus-trial to post industrial society.

If this proposition is tenable, we may expect the peaksof stable historical periods to correspond with crests ofeconomic long waves. The high point of industrial societywas probably at the end of the 19th century: the fin desiecle, AD 1900. This is precisely halfway between therecessions of the 1870s and the 1930s. It is also probable,from Fig. 3 and the general indications of global models,such as those shown in Fig. 4, that industrial decline will

1900 2000 2030 2100

Fig. 4 MIT global model forecast

a Quality of life [3]b Industrial output per capita [4]

the original diagram adjusted in this way. Key attributes ofeach period are identified to suit the present discussion.Like the original diagram it is specifically an account ofthe development of European civilisation. Egyptian civi-lisation was in a prolonged consolidation period duringthe turbulent city state expansion in the first millenia BC,while Islam was in a similar condition during the periodbetween the fall of Rome and the Renaissance. Evenduring the centuries of European revolution, liberal Euro-pean values were being consolidated in America. Therewas still separation between European civilisation and therest of the world, but we have now moved nearer to asingle closed system, with all the complex cultural and eco-nomic consequences this will entail.

In this paper we are interested in the most recent, rela-tively brief period of consolidation, the fossil-fuel epochwhich primed and now sustains industrial society. There isno reason to believe that energy will ever be cheap again,because all the known high-technology sources of thefuture require large capital investments. Nor can we besure how long the present epoch will last. Price mecha-nisms may reduce consumption, and new resource dis-coveries may prolong its span. Hubbert, who saw fossilfuels separating the labour-intensive past from a pros-perous nuclear future, initially estimated the epoch atabout six centuries, but halved it a few years later [7, 8]. It

continue into the early part of the 21st century. If the nextmajor recession occurs round 2030, which the 50-55 yearcycle suggests, we may expect the transition into postin-dustrial society to begin during the subsequent recovery.Many convergent arguments favour this timing, but thereare practical pointers to an earlier date. It is probable thatthe electronics industry, which is surviving the presentrecession well and is crucial for an information basedsociety, may soon expand rapidly. A powerful indicatorwith an earlier parallel points to such a change.

The machine-tool industry has often been used toanticipate recovery in heavy industry. Manufacturing com-panies purchase new plant in preparation for increasedproduction. Machine-tool purchases should therefore bewatched. The machine-tool industry is not, however, auseful indicator for electronics growth, which depends ondifferent production methods. All quantity produced elec-tronics units are now built on printed-circuit boards, andthe indicator for the electronics industry is the automatictest equipment increasingly used to establish their accept-ability.

4 Ambiguous indication

The use of automatic test equipment has expanded rapidlybecause it is labour saving, it is reliable, and there is less

68 IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1985

chance of damaging high-value boards, in handling or intest. These may be more important considerations atpresent than the need to increase production rapidly, butthis will be possible when economic recovery begins.

Investment in equipment may also be a complex eco-nomic stimulant, encouraging higher production toincrease equipment utilisation, and generally favouringlower cost, high-volume marketing strategies. Automatic-testing technology is particularly interesting because of therates of change involved. At a time when growth in allBritish manufacturing industry is around 1%, and whenthe overall growth in the electronics industry is about10%, the automatic-testing industry is roughly doublingannually.

There are two ways of interpreting this firm pointer toearly expansion in the electronics industry, the more opti-mistic of which brings forward the transition to postindus-trial society, so that it follows directly upon the presentrecession, perhaps beginning in the 1990s. Some socialindicators seem to confirm this prospect. There is moretelevision networking; many programmes aim to stimulate,although cautiously, public participation; the use of homecomputers is increasing, and some of these are coupled tointeractive information systems. Are we, however, ready tobenefit from these developments?

This is a predominantly sociological question, and if weare not, we may perhaps expect a period of considerableconfusion between now and the recession around 2030,after which the critical transition may occur.

5 Post-industrial and open societies

When we consider our future in terms of postindustrialand open societies, we are using poorly defined conceptscombining a growing common understanding with strong-ly individual interpretations. The true character of bothchanges is illuminated by a familiar historical example: thetransition from medieval to Renaissance society. Thisinvolved a major attitudinal change brought about by newtechnologies.

We expect people's attitudes to be changed mainlythrough social interactions, by people striking sparks offeach other rather than through mechanical skills. Weunderestimate the way our skills affect our outlook, andthe extent to which we discover our latent talents throughthe tools we use. The Renaissance was primed in this way,by new communications technologies: printing, oil paint-ing, musical notation and even double-entry bookkeeping.The repercussions of the Renaissance rippled through theReformation, the Age of Reason and the Industrial Revol-ution. The attributes of new communications technologiesinvariably carry their own distinctive thrust, shaping futureeducational attitudes and methods. The information tech-nologies now evolving rapidly will certainly, in the nextfew decades, sweep us into a new transition, probably com-parable with, and perhaps more important than theRenaissance; in its time the greatest advance in civilisationsince the classical world.

Although, however, the Renaissance lit a short fuse forreligious, scientific and social revolution, it was not itselfrevolutionary. In a conventionally constrained religiousenvironment it extended horizons and critical perspectives,at the same time greatly widening the limits of acceptabledebate. Religious reformation, science and technology, andEuropean nationalism followed later.

The postindustrial and open societies of the future willbe the complementary agents of a future renaissance, theformer extending our horizons beyond a consumer view of

material wellbeing, and the second encouraging explora-tion, inquiry and bolder innovation through the new infor-mation technologies. We shall not so much reject the past(which is what some environmentalists and advocates ofzero growth seem to advocate) as grow out of it.Retrospectively, the transition will appear continuous:there will be no major discontinuity.

6 The challenge of complexity

Communications and information technologies offer greatopportunities, but also challenge our minds and our con-ceptual range. Our social and technological environmentshave ramified as rapidly as our perception of our situation,but we have no clear idea of how to deal with them. Ourcollective power is immense, but individually we have beenalienated by the complexity we have generated. We mustfirst of all discover how to accommodate it, and then,strange as it may seem, learn to enjoy it.

It will seem strange because our cultural and evolution-ary heritage has trained us to avoid complexity, to lookalways for a simple solution to our problems, thinking wecan isolate and then concentrate on central issues. Perhapswe often should, but the principle is wrong, and it is begin-ning to get us into trouble. Another principle, the principleof requisite variety, must be accepted instead: that youcannot understand or represent a complex situationthrough a simpler analogue [13]. On this basis we canonly resolve our problems by adopting systems whichaccommodate complexity in a more sympathetic manner.

Many people now recognise the ability of computers tohandle complexity in a balanced and objective way. Thosewho have worked with them interactively understand howskilfully they can be programmed to lead their users intodeeper and more specific concerns. The interaction isprivate, the user is helped in a friendly but neutral way,and he is spared the possible tensions of an interpersonalrelationship.

This friendly dialogue has been carefully fostered in selfteaching programmes for the retarded and educationallysubnormal. Here, however, the same support must begiven to the more able wishing to explore a large net-worked database in a more open society. We cannot yet becertain how such a society will evolve, but Popper, whofirst anticipated this kind of change, was well aware of thehostility of those in power to its development [14]. Never-theless, there are many other forces driving us toward it.Some are suggested in Table 1.

Using large and particularly international databasescalls for special skills. Searchers fluent in several languageswill have a significant advantage when probing deeply intothe database; analysts handling the information theyobtain will need considerable insight to resolve anomalies;the modeller will have to anticipate increasingly sophisti-

Table 1 : Six pressures for an open society

Social pressures(i) disillusionment with simplistic political solutions to complexproblems(ii) increasing pressure for more open government(iii) demonstrable benefits from legislation giving public access toinformation sources

Business pressures(iv) current use of international satellite-linked data transfer by multi-national organisations(v) desire by networking industries to expand linkages as widely aspossible(vi) need to achieve maximum possible loading to the growingnetwork

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1985 69

cated adaptive responses (because most economists, inforecasting trends, underestimate public learning); whileforecasters will have to project their expectations into alarger dynamic environment. Nor will it be practicable toisolate these skills. Successful forecasting will depend onthe internal interactions and catalysis of a well integratedand multidisciplined team, recognised for its corporatestrength rather than the individual talents it contains. Itwill introduce a new level of radical competence as effec-tively as 'Renaissance man', the prosperous polymath sixhundred years ago.

Renaissance man is relevant to these remarks becausehe was more than a polymath, more even than a thrustingentrepreneur creating a vital new commercial system. Hewas independent of the main ruling groups and far widerin his social contacts. He understood the aristocrat and theartisan, the soldier and cleric, the artist and the scientist[15]. Multidisciplined teams will probably play a similarrole in the future.

7 A recent tragedy

A quarter of a century ago Britain had the opportunity tocreate a team-led, high-technology society, but it threwaway the chance. In the early days of the Industrial Revol-ution individual innovators played a decisive role, but theycontinued to do so for too long, failing to pass on theirexperience to well wrought creative groups. Indeed, if man-agement had delegated more power and sharedopportunity, we might have avoided the sterile social divi-sions which have bedevilled our industry for well over acentury. Because of them we have misread the causes ofour recent industrial decline, blaming lack of investmentand poor industrial relations when other explanations alsodeserve close consideration.

As technology became more complex the value ofgroups began to emerge. Before the Second World War ateam led by Isaac Shoenberg at EMI developed the firstwholly electronic television system, which proved to be adefinitive arrangement which has dominated televisiontechnology ever since. During the war other dedicatedteams developed radar, moved electronics some way fromanalogue toward digital techniques, established the prin-ciples of modern control theory, contributed to the devel-opment of nuclear fission, and produced early jet engines.At the end of the war, only 40 years ago, Britain was in aprivileged position technologically.

In the early years of peace the commitment of thewartime teams was transferred to newly formed industrialgroups, many of whose first successes were derived fromwartime achievements. These included commercial radar,early digital computers, new civil airliners such as theturbopropeller driven Vickers Viscount and the less suc-cessful jet-propelled de Havilland Comet. Nuclear powergeneration also began.

These were the familiar early successes. By the late1950s many of the more ambitious new projects wererunning into cash-flow problems and could not get intoproduction. A period of large-scale industrial restructuringbegan, a period of mergers and takeovers which seems tohave been a turning point. Rapid industrial decline fol-lowed, from which we have never recovered.

There were, of course, other contributory influences.Preferential terms of trade with the British Empire andCommonwealth had given us a false sense of commercialsecurity which is reflected in our very poor marketingskills. Our governments have also consistently failed, overthe last century, to influence our industrial organisation in

a creative way. My concern here is, however, with thespecialist groups who suffered from these serious short-comings.

Many industrial teams had settled down and reachedmaturity when the industrial restructuring began. Itdestroyed their cohesion and denied them success, justwhen they needed a reward. Creativity is a rich asset whichmust be carefully nourished and developed. We were wellendowed with talent at the time, but failed to appreciate it.Great opportunities were lost, but we seem to have learntlittle from our mistakes [16].

8 A second chance

If we have to accommodate both growing complexity anda forthcoming major transition, the kind of multidisci-plinary team already considered will become criticallyimportant. Large multinational organisations will trystrenuously to acquire a commanding grasp of their cir-cumstances, using these teams to chart their future. Theirsuccess will depend on the security of their privileged infor-mation, and on their ability, when appropriate, to respondquickly to team analyses and forecasts. For two reasonsthis relationship will probably be uneasy and short lived.Preserving information security will become more difficultas those supplying data become more sensitive about theway it is used, and recognise its wider value, while thosewho interpret it will increasingly prefer to work in placeswhere they have a greater influence on the consequences oftheir work.

Just as commercial entrepreneurs primed the Renaiss-ance, so we may expect that the forecasting entrepreneursof the next few decades will prime the transition into theinformation-based society we now anticipate, a societyquite different from anything we already know. Some ofthe uncertainties we have previously noted can be resolvedin a scenario suggesting what may possibly happen. I havesplit it into two complementary components.

9 Possible future developments

9.1 Scenario: part oneWe are already moving rapidly toward an information-based society, but we still have no clear idea how stable itwill be. The criteria for stability in a complex system aredifficult to establish for many reasons. There may be placeswhere the mesh is so complex that redundancy will protectthe overall system from local damage, while in other placesdamage to a critical link may spread catastrophically. Anecosystem in which individual systems are less efficientthan the total system may be more stable than aneconomy in which the parts are more efficient than thewhole. An information system which stimulates com-petition within a closed complex is also generating irrecon-cilable tensions which will make it a more generallydisturbing than stabilising influence.

We shall now only feel our future secure when we areconfident that any competitive stimulus will have a con-structive effect, and when we believe that the accelerateddynamics which are induced will also be inherently stable.Dynamic stability is a difficult concept at any time: in asociological context it is also susceptible to emotional dis-turbance. We are unlikely to understand much about ituntil we recognise and respect the way successful teamsoperate. It is possible that, after the tragic waste of Britishcreative talent following the Second World War, we maybecome more sympathetic to recent research into effective

70 1EE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1985

team building, more ready to use, and to learn, from it[17].

The development of well balanced teams will involveboth careful initial assembly and subsequent adaptivemobility. As society recognises the value of these groups,and as they acquire skill in self improvement, they will alsorecognise their social importance and increasingly assert it.This social impact is, nevertheless, difficult to imagine, norwill the teams gain independence easily. They will have tofight to distance themselves from organisations seeingthem only as a purchased resource with skills to beexploited at some appropriate price. They will also have toassuage individuals within their numbers anxious aboutcollective talent intruding upon private aspirations andchanging views.

Autonomous groups are not yet an important socialphenomenon, but in some areas, marketing and adver-tising, for example, their importance is beginning toemerge. The process will not, however, continue smoothlyor tidily. Existing social tensions are likely to be increased,further raising present levels of frustration and alienation.

The next apparent period of economic prosperity could,therefore, be particularly unproductive, as indeed the lasttwo have been. The First World War, before the 1930sdepression, led to about ten million deaths, and to inten-sive industrial production without accumulating value: theSecond World War caused roughly fifty-five milliondeaths, and continuing arms production which is stilldebilitating present world economics in precisely the sameway that cathedral building debilitated medieval society.Modern weapons also fail more seriously to accumulatevalue. Unfortunately, we still regard the 20th century as aperiod of splendid achievement: we rarely consider theglory which might have been ours but which we havefailed to earn.

These arguments suggest that we may not move intopostindustrial conditions until after the next major recess-ion. They also imply that the character of the new societyneeds closer scrutiny than we have yet attempted. Part twoof this scenario therefore adopts a different approach.

9.2 Scenario: part twoHere we will assume that a large, internationally net-worked databank has been created, that it is readily acces-sible, and that the problems of protecting personal datahave been successfully resolved. It is also assumed that theeconomics of such a network are favourable for all con-cerned, and that the advantages of an open social systemhave become so clear that most of the database is availableto everyone. This may seem an Utopian proposition, butthe ubiquitous presence of transistor radios and the inter-national televison network, involving satellite links andstandards conversion, illustrate how far along this road wehave already travelled.

Assumptions on this scale carry with them furthernecessary requirements. Guidance systems will have toallow users to probe databanks as deeply as they wish (orare able), but will also have to ensure that they can extracta 'complete' answer at any chosen depth of penetration.Because of the need to correlate varied data in differentways, data specification will help to eliminate subjectivedistortion. It should not, therefore, be difficult to ensurethat individuals get reliable information at whatever levelthey choose to penetrate.

Multidisciplined teams involved in the same way willuse their combined skills to achieve collective success, butthey will also demonstrate how small social groups canexplore wider aspects of our humanity. This is the critical

balance between convergence and conformity and diver-gence and adventure at the heart of Durkheim's sociology.He believed that people form groups of two kinds: 'mecha-nical', in which they sacrifice individuality for collectivestrength, often in repressive circumstances, as during therise of trades unionism; and 'organic', in which individualtalent is matched to group needs, in the trades and pro-fessions, for example, or sport or minority movements.Durkheim also considered the interaction between thesetwo kinds of cohesion, seeing mechanical solidarity as thecustodian of social values and mores, and organic soli-darity as the source of creative vitality. Without the moralcohesion of mechanical solidarity, vitality is diffused anddissipated, creating what Durkheim called anomie: 'thespectacle of an aggregate of disjointed parts which do notconcur' [18]. He believed that organic solidarity wouldbecome increasingly important (he was writing at the endof the 19th century boom), as suggested in Fig. 5. Much of

rinnovators, specialistssocial followers, supporters

repressionexploration

conformist core:conventionaldefensivesubmissive

artists,craftsmen,professionals,politicians,dissidents

Fig. 5 The Durkheim model of the social processSpecialisation leads to growth

the debate in the world today is about where this balance,now perceived as between collectivism and free enterprise,should be struck.

Durkheim illustrates this scenario because many of ourpresent difficulties have been caused by rapidly increasingspecialisation at a time of moral uncertainty and ideo-logical confrontation. Much of the cohesion now protect-ing the world against anomie has been provided indirectlyby the media, whose contributors generally offer neutralbut selective comment on the world about us. Rather likethe clergy in medieval society, they stabilise and to someextent regulate our social expectations. Because they mustbe reasonably detached from whatever they wish toobserve, and because they more often supply and interpretinformation than critically assess it, their own contributionto social change has been relatively small.

Widespread access to central data will radically changethis. Groups of all shapes and sizes, at all levels of society,will be able to relate objectively to a common pool ofknowledge and awareness. A very much more organic, butalso more coherent, society than ever before seems likelyto develop. We should have no reason to fear it: it willprobably resolve many, or all, of our present most serioustensions, at all levels in our society.

10 Da capo

I began by describing some early ideas about the historicalprocess, and from this developed a scenario for the futurein two parts. Its credibility depends on more than itslogical continuity, because there may be several acceptable

IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1985 71

projections into the future based on the present situation.We therefore need another criterion to enable us to selectthe preferred option.

I suggested earlier, when discussing complex situations,that the principle of requisite variety must be acceptedbefore they can be properly understood. The principle isimportant here because a complex proposition becomesmore credible when it confirms a large number of relatedbut contrasting influences. The scenario we have been dis-cussing is, I believe, generally compatible with the mainprocesses I have outlined. It is even possible that Britain,having enjoyed a brief period of successful creative team-work, will revive that skill, exploiting her innovative ratherthan developmental powers to lead the world into thegreat transition my scenario anticipates in the mid 21stcentury. It may involve more than a change of degree: it islikely to require a change of kind. That certainly was thethesis underlying my Electronics & Power article.

The developments we have been discussing so far haveonly involved changes of degree; a change of kind never-theless seems probable and follows naturally from my lineof argument. We have only to imagine that the networkeddatabase we have been considering records the frequencyof queries on different subjects directed to it, which anyregulatory system would require anyway. If we assumethat all users, from individuals to governments, have accessto this information about system use, we introduce anunprecedented level of general awareness into the system.'Mechanical' and 'organic' take on a new selfconscious sig-nificance, at once literal and transcendental. By developingsuch an awareness we create the basis for collective con-sciousness, perhaps even for a collective selfconsciousnesswhich is in no way a part of ourselves.

This prospect is not as strange as it may appear. Wehave, throughout our history, tried to project our ideasand our identity beyond ourselves, into books, artefacts,and finally, perhaps, into museums and galleries. Now weare beginning to understand more fully the totality of ourachievement, and I believe it is imperative that we shouldnever relax this concern. Everyone wishes, in a deeplycompulsive way, to contribute individually to our human-ity, to leave a positive mark, however small, in history.Humanity has always been a rich complex, immeasurablygreater than the sum of its individuals, but now a separa-tion is developing between an inordinately complex societyand the single individual who feels, however brilliant,rather overwhelmed by it. The alienation and existentialanguish being created are becoming unacceptable. Thekind of information artefact I have been describing couldperhaps, for the first time, effectively create a com-prehensive working interface between the individual andthe rich complex of which he is such a tiny part; in somesense, a true communion.

We have always in the past tried to forge a com-prehensive association of this kind, usually through somekind of anthropomorphic god or collection of gods. Onlywhen we constrain them to human proportions do ourdeities need propitiation, and display the rather tiresomecapriciousness of the gods of ancient Greece. Gradually wehave enlarged our vision of the links we need, HenriBergson regarding man as a machine for making gods, andEinstein and Eddington both discovering a divine mathe-matician controlling large-scale events.

This is neither extravagant speculation nor romanticfantasy on the threshold of science fiction: it is a coherentinterpretation of already evident trends, trends which willsoon directly involve the engineer in Bergson's god-makingprocess. I do not think he will have any great influence on

the way that process develops, because no one will, but Ithink he should understand his contribution to its evolu-tion. His perspectives, although not unique, are also preci-sely of the kind necessary to exploit the opportunities thesituation will create.

Expressing our collective identity through a mechanicalagency might be necessary for less heroic reasons. Faithsand ideologies, whether involving Christianity and Islamor private enterprise and collectivism, have consistently ledto confrontation. Science may have done much to revealour own complexity, and that of our environment, but ithas done nothing to reduce our aggressiveness, nor has itsignificantly altered our individuality. Civilisation, theglory of our aspirations, has always been expansionist,using its environment voraciously. How, however, expan-sion is limited and we are moving to a zero-sum situationwhere competition is becoming less of a race and confron-tation is again increasing. We see this to some extent in thefailure of the advanced world to help the developing world,although the action would be in everybody's interest.

These are critical areas in which we have overextendedour faith. The projections have failed through lack of com-mitment. The information networks we have been con-sidering should correct this failure, destroying parochialattitudes, increasing our understanding and extending andenriching our vision.

I want to end by returning to my original perspective,and by recalling some views of the philosopher Whitehead.He noted that the past is always interpreted with referenceto the value systems of the present, and that these imme-diate perspectives also affect our future expectations. Wetherefore need to get them right.

This study has been concerned primarily with thatobjective, and I have been anxious to make two mainpoints. First, if the progressions implicit in Figs. 2 and 3are in any way valid, the transition we face must be ofprofound significance, very much a change of kind perhapsanalogous to a phase change in a material. Fig. 1 can onlyhint at its character.

The Electronics & Power article was written before theinformation technologies were recognised as important. Ihave therefore tried, secondly, to suggest that they are themeans toward the kind of change I anticipate. The need fora change of the proportions these ideas indicate is alsoreinforced by the character of the present time. We havepassed through a century of horror unprecedented inhuman history and our vision of possible futures will notbe correct until we accept the proportions of this grimreality. We must climb out of this deep trench and back tothe sun. When we do so, we may recognise the extent ofthe opportunities opening before us. Whitehead succinctlycomplemented this logic.

'You cannot consider wisdom or folly, progress ordecadence, except in relation to some standards ofjudgement, some end in view. Such standards, suchends, when widely diffused, constitute the drivingforce of ideas in the history of mankind. They alsoguide the composition of the historical narrative.'[19]

11 References

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(Pergamon, 1979)

72 IEE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 132, Pt. A, No. 1, JANUARY 1985

6 BELL, D.: 'The coming of postindustrial society; a venture in socio-logical forecasting1 (Heinemann, 1974)

7 HUBBERT, M.K.: 'Energy resources'. Report to the Committee onNational Resources (National Academy of Sciences, USA, 1969)

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14 POPPER, K.R.: The open society and its enemies' (Routledge andKegan Paul, 1962)

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(Heinemann, 1981) .18 DURKHEIM, E.: 'The division of labour in society (1893)' (Free

Press, 1969)19 WHITEHEAD, A.N.: 'Adventures of ideas' (Free Press, 1967)

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