An overview of PDIA and its application to fragile states
Michael Woolcock World Bank & Harvard University
Summary • What is PDIA?
– How is it distinctive? • From ‘orthodoxy’? Predecessors? Neighbors?
– Why does it matter? • Regarding fragile states, how might PDIA…
– inform theory? – contribute to general allocation decisions? – guide country-specific policy/practice?
• Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste…
What is PDIA? (Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation)
• A framework for enhancing the state’s capability to implement its core tasks… – Delivering mail, immunizing babies, paving roads
(‘logistics’) to ensuring security, regulating firms, constraining itself (‘complex’)
– i.e., to actually be a state, not merely look like one
What is PDIA? (Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation) • A framework for enhancing the state’s capability to
implement its core tasks… – Delivering mail, immunizing babies, paving roads
(‘logistics’) to ensuring security, regulating firms, constraining itself (‘complex’)
– i.e., to actually be a state, not merely look like one • …given that
– empirically, performance trajectories in most countries are stagnant, even declining
– ‘next steps’ in development will be harder than the first – there is increasing recognition that BAU has at best
reached its limits; at worst is part of the problem • All on full display when BAU does FCS
Using the ‘Quality of Government’ rating there are few successes—most countries are going backwards
Classification by levels of Quality of Government in 2008
Classification by pace of change in (normed) Quality of Government, 1998-2008 Falling fast: (below -0.05 annual growth)
Stagnating (slow change, negative or positive)
Rising fast Above 0.05 annual growth Row
totals
(Falling) below 0 but above -0.05 annual growth
(Rising) at or above 0 but below 0.05 annual growth
High: (above 6.50)
Countries BRN, MLT SGP BHS, CHL, ISR, KOR
TWN
Number 2 1 4 1 8 Medium: (above 4.00 but below 6.50)
Countries ARG, BGR, BHR, BOL, CRI, GIN, GMB, GUY, HUN, IRN, JAM, LKA, MAR, MNG, MWI, NIC, PAN, PHL, POL, ROM, SUR, SYR, THA, TTO, TUN, ZAF
BGD, BRA, CUB, ECU, EGY, GHA, IND, JOR, MDG, MYS, OMN, PAK, PER, QAT, UGA, URY
AGO, ARE, BWA, CHN, CMR, DZA, ETH, KWT, LBN, MEX, SAU, VNM, ZMB
COL, IDN, TUR, TZA
Number 26 16 13 4 59 Low: (below 4.00)
Countries CIV, COG, DOM, GAB, GTM, HTI, KEN, LBY, PNG, PRK, PRY, SLE, SLV, SOM, VEN, ZWE
BFA, HND, MLI, MOZ, SEN, TGO, ZAR
ALB, IRQ, MMR, NGA, SDN
GNB, LBR, NER
Number 16 7 5 3 31 Totals 44 24 22 8 98
Or, ‘modernization’ of Administration as binding constraint on 21st C development
• ADMINISTRATION• Rational,
professional organizations
• SOCIETY• Equal social
rights, opportunities
• POLITY• Accurate
preference aggregation
• ECONOMY• Enhanced
productivity
Rules Systems
Figure 1: Development as a four-fold modernization process
One big question, four main points • How is it that countries manage to stay engaged
in development and yet fail to acquire capability?
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One big question, four main points • How is it that countries manage to stay engaged in
development and yet fail to acquire capability? 1. Conflate institutional form and function
• Change (and assess/measure) what institutions “look like”, not what they actually “do” (isomorphic mimicry)
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One big question, four main points • How is it that countries manage to stay engaged in
development and yet fail to acquire capability? 1. Conflate institutional form and function
• Change (and assess/measure) what institutions “look like”, not what they actually “do” (isomorphic mimicry)
2. Promote an inadequate theory of change • Accelerated modernization via transplanted best
practice
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One big question, four main points • How is it that countries manage to stay engaged in
development and yet fail to acquire capability? 1. Conflate institutional form and function
• Change (and assess/measure) what institutions “look like”, not what they actually “do” (isomorphic mimicry)
2. Promote an inadequate theory of change • Accelerated modernization via transplanted best
practice 3. Set (excessively) great expectations
• Time frames too short, bar too high, road not straight
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Haiti, even at huge accelerations of progress, still far from “developed” levels in 50 years
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One big question, four main points • How is it that countries manage to stay engaged in
development and yet fail to acquire capability? 1. Conflate institutional form and function
• Change (and assess/measure) what institutions “look like”, not what they actually “do” (isomorphic mimicry)
2. Promote an inadequate theory of change • Accelerated modernization via transplanted best practice
3. Set (excessively) great expectations • Time frames too short, bar too high, road not straight
4. Collude in premature load bearing • Too much asked of too little, too soon, too often • Failing in this way itself undermines progress; kills learning
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Staying seriously stuck ‘Capability traps’ become entrenched when action across three levels – agents, organizations and systems – conspires to favor Mimicry over innovation Inputs over outcomes Compliance over experimentation Self-interest over collective value creation
What to do? Elements of alternatives… • Academic literature
– “Projects as policy experiments” (Rondinelli) – “Learning organizations” (Senge) – “Good-enough governance” (Grindle) – “Just-enough governance” (Fukuyama and Levy) – “Deliberation, not blueprints” (Evans, Roe)
• 21st C developmental state – “Best fit, not best practice” (Booth) – “Second-best institutions” (Rodrik) – “Positive deviance” (Pascale et al) – “Complex adaptive systems” (Ramalingam, Barder et al)
• Operational initiatives – Results Based Management – Cash on delivery aid (CODA, GPOBA), et al
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But need specific focus on… • Addressing ‘complex’ (and ‘chaotic’) problems
– Crafting locally legitimate, context-specific responses – Incorporating appropriate M&E strategies
• Navigating design space to find ‘best fit’ solution(s) • Building state capability for implementation
– To actually perform core responsibilities • Delivering mail, collecting taxes, immunizing babies,
educating kids, administering justice, regulating firms, etc – Success builds ‘good institutions’ (not vice versa)
• Esp. in persistently low capability countries, sectors – E.g., ‘Fragile’, conflict-affected countries (Haiti,
Somalia)
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Four Principles of PDIA (Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation)
1. Local Solutions for Local Problems
2. Pushing Problem Driven Positive Deviance
3. Try, Learn, Iterate, Adapt
4. Scale Learning through Diffusion (Communities of Practice)
Based on Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2013 ‘Breaking Capability Traps Through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)’ World Development
Local Solutions for Local Problems
Good problems This isn’t current practice… o Agenda for action focused on a
locally nominated (through some process) concrete problem
o Not “solution” driven that defines the problem as the lack of a particular input (e.g. “teacher qualifications”)
o Rigorous about measurable goals in the output/outcome space (e.g. cleaner streets, numbers of new exports, growth of exports)—can we know if the problem is being solved?
• The MDGs are an external agenda that may or may not correspond to locally perceived problems.
• The “Doing Business” indicators provide a checklist approach
• The “inputs” approach is still common (e.g. the goal is to “train more teachers”)
• “Reform” agendas in which the adoption of “best practice” is the goal
In summary: how PDIA differs
World Bank, Donors
NGOs
PDIA
What drives action?
Solutions (“institutional mono-cropping”, “best practice”, AMTTBP)
Solutions (variety of antidotes – e.g. “participation” “community driven”)
Problem Driven—looking to solve particular problems
Planning for action
Lots of advance planning (implementation of secondary importance)
Boutique, starting very small with no plans for scale
Authorization of positive deviation, purposive crawl of the design space
Feedback loops
Monitoring (short, on financing and inputs) and Evaluation (long feedback loop on outputs, maybe outcomes)
Casual, geared to advocacy not learning
MeE: integration of rigorous “experiential” learning into tight feedback loops
Scale Top-down—the head learns, implementation is just muscle (“political will”)
Small is beautiful… Or, just not logistically possible
Diffusion of feasible practice across organizations and communities of practitioners
Pushing Problem-Driven Positive Deviation o Authorize some agents (not all) to move from
process to flexible and autonomous control to seek better results
o An “autonomy” for “performance accountability” swap (versus “process accountability”)
o Only works if the authorization is problem driven, measured and measurable…
Regarding FCS, how might PDIA… • Inform theory
– Explain attraction, durability but limits of BAU – Distinguish different types of problems, contexts – Articulate alternative principles
• Contribute to general allocation decisions – Beyond CPIA < 3.2 – Toward types and trajectories of ‘fragility’
• On the basis of broad data + specific country cases • As a guide to country-specific policy/practice
– Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone – South Sudan – Afghanistan
Solomon Islands • RAMSI: $millions
spent on state-of-the-art courthouse, jail, training of judges, police…
• …vs ‘Justice Delivered Locally’, a decentralized system of island courts responding to everyday justice concerns of everyday people
Key readings • Andrews, Matt (2013) The Limits of Institutional
Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press) • Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock
(2013) ‘Escaping capability traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)’ World Development 51(11): 234-244
• Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock and Matt Andrews (2013) ‘Looking like a state: techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation’ Journal of Development Studies 49(3): 1-18
• Lant Pritchett, Salimah Samji and Jeffrey Hammer (2012) ‘It’s all about MeE: using structured experiential learning (‘e’) to crawl the design space’ Working Paper No. 104, WIDER (December 2012)