Analises and Theory of Emotions - G. Ramsay

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ANALYSIS AND THEORYOF THE EMOTIONS.


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ANALYSIS AND THEORYOF THE EMOTIONS

WITH DISSERTATIONSON BEAUTY SUBLIMITY AND THE

LUDICROUS

BY GEORGE RAMSAY B.M.Author of An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth. Principles of Human Happiness and Duty.A Classification of the Scibncbs, &c.

V OF THfUNIVERSITY }.

EDINBURGH: ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK.LONDONLONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.MDCCCXLVIII.


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ADVERTISEMENT

In a work published by the Author a few yearsago, entitled An Enquiry into the Principles ofHuman Happiness and Human Duty, a detailedaccount was given of some of the principal desires,chiefly with a view to their influence upon humanhappiness ; but no attempt was made at a generalclassification and theory of the Emotions, such asis contained in the present volume. Those desireswhich were treated of at large in the previous workare here but briefly noticed, the reader beingreferred to the Enquiry for a fuller investigation.

The present work may be considered as oneof a series which the Author began to publishnearly twelve years ago, commencing with PoliticalEconomy, continued through Political and MoralPhilosophy, and ending with pure Mental Philoso-phy, to which this volume belongs.


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CONTENTS.

Analysis and Theory of the Emotions.PAGE.

Part I. Analysis and Classification 1Part II. Theory 35

Dissertation on Beauty and Sublimity.part i.ON beauty.

Chap. 1. Introduction 63Chap. 2. On the Nature of Beauty 65Chap. 3. On the Sources op Beauty.

Sec. 1 . Does Beauty depend entirely on Association ? 75Sec. 2. On the real Sources of Beauty 100

part II.on sublimity.Chap 1. Wherein Sublimity differs from Beauty 129Chap. 2. On the Sources of Sublimity 137

Dissertation on the Ludicrous Emotion.Chap. 1. On the Nature of the Ludicrous Emotion 149Chap. 2. On the Sources of the Ludicrous Emotion 154


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ANALYSIS AND THEORYOF THE EMOTIONS.

Part I.Analysis and Classification.

The object of the present work is to analyse andclassify the Emotions, and by means of this analy-sis to trace their origin. And in order not tointerrupt the general view of the Emotions, such ofthem as claim a lengthened inquiry will be treatedof afterwards in separate Dissertations.

The emotions may be classified in various waysfirst as simple and compound, the former classcomprising but few, the latter very many emotions.The simple emotions are these, Joy, Grief, Wonder,Desire, Fear, and possibly one or two more, such asWeariness of mind from repetition, and Ennui fromvacancy, which however may be classed under thegeneral head of grief. All the other emotions areeither modifications or compounds of these elements.

B


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Z ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.Another classification may be derived from the

circumstance whether the emotions do or do notnecessarily involve the notion of Time. Emotionsnot necessarily involving the notion of time, are theelementary emotions of Joy, Grief, and Wonder, aswell as Cheerfulness, Melancholy, Beauty, Sub-limity, the Ludicrous emotion, etc.

Emotions necessarily involving the notion oftime are of two sorts, as they look to the past, or asthey look to the future, and therefore they may besubdivided into the Retrospective and the Pro-spective. Of the former kind are Regret andRemorse ; of the latter. Desire and Fear, and everycompound emotion embracing desire as one of itselements.

Though each of these classifications has itsadvantages, yet is there another which I wouldpropose as preferable to either, for it is equallytrue to nature, and probably of more practical use.

< Some emotions are not immediately connected with^outward action, while others are. Of the first sortare simple Joy and Grief, Cheerfulness, Melan-choly, Beauty, Sublimity, etc. These like everyfeeling, nay like every thought, may lead to out-ward action, but they may not, and they neverimmediately precede it ; whereas. Desire and Fear,in some form or other, directly urge to action, andwhen this takes place, they are always the


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PRIMARY DIVISION. 3immediate antecedents. This distinction seemssufficiently well defined, and sufficiently important,for the purposes of classification.

Agreeably to this view, our primary divisionwill be into the PASSIVE and the ACTIVEemotions.

CLASS FIRST.Passive Emotions.These the mind suffers^ but they are not the agentsin motion.

This class may be divided into two orders, intoemotions which have not, and those which have anecessary reference to other individuals, or to ourown past conduct. Under the first order we mayenumerate the following.y^' I. II. Joy and Grief, emotions of an opposite

^ character but of a simple nature, and as such,c unsusceptible of analysis and definition.

Under these may be classed, either as species orvarieties, the following emotions. Under Joy,

1. Cheerfulness^ which is permanent but gentleJoy.

2. Mirth : a lively joy, the result of ludicrousemotions.

Under Grief,1. Melancholy^ w^hich is Grief permanent, but

not intense.2. Weariness of Mind, arising from sameness

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PASSIVE EMOTIONS. O

that the frame of mind indicated, is very different.The man who suffers habitually from Ennui, islikely never to do much good, for in him the activeprinciples are deficient, but the Melancholy wightgives a better promise. The frame of mind whichtends to melancholy seems to consist of sensibility 'more than ordinary, and of eager wishes andaspirations after great things, united with littlehopefulness, but with much tenacity. Desio senzaspeme would be a suitable motto. This constitutionof mind is however far from unpromising; fordelicate sensibility, which implies delicacy of con-science, is highly moral ; and eager desire, withconstancy, will force its way almost without hope.

Tenacity ofthought and feeling supposes frequentrecurrence of the same ideas ; and sameness has atendency to lower the tone of spirits. It is thusthat tenacity favours melancholy.

Though Ennui and Melancholy differ so widelyin themselves, as well as in their causes, yet theremedy for both, as indeed for every ill, but forthem especially, is occupation.

CLASS FIRST.Passive Emotions.Order Second: Emotions having a necessary

reference to others, or to our own past conduct, eithertowards ourselves or others, and therefore bearing


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b ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.upon morality and remotely influencing practice.

Though the emotions already considered mayhave an influence upon practice, yet the influence isneither so near nor so general as in the case of thesecond order, which in the usual course of thingsleads on to the active emotions. It may be dividedinto the Immediate and the Retrospective Emo-tions, according as they look to the present orto the past.

The Immediate Emotions are,I. Sympathy and Antipathy.Sympathy is an emotion of pleasure arising from

the contemplation of some pleasure in another, or ofpain on the contemplation of pain.

Antipathy is exactly the reverse of sympathy, andis quite an exception to the general law, for sympathyis the rule of human nature.

II. Pride and Humility.Pride, a pleasing emotion, arising from the

consciousness of some real or supposed excellence inourselves, or connected with ourselves, as comparedwith others.

Humility is a painful emotion, arising from theconsciousness of some real or supposed defect inourselves, or connected with ourselves, as comparedwith others.

Retrospective Emotions.I. Remorse is a compound state of mind, com-


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BEMORSE, SHAME. 7prising : (1) a judgment of condemnation on ourown past conduct; (2) an emotion immediatelyconsequent thereon. The precise nature of thisemotion may be a matter of some doubt ; it is evidentthat it cannot be quite the same as that which belongsto Moral Disapprobation when felt towards others,for though in common language we are said almostto hate ourselves, sometimes to be angry with our-selves, by reason of a base action, yet we cannotseriously desire our own injury. The emotion ofRemorse, then, is not Hatred, but Grief; griefmodified by the reflection that we have done wrong,and accompanied with the resolution of acting betterin future. I repent, or think again, I am sorry formy sin, is the language of Remorse, and welldescribes it. First comes the thought or reflectionthat we have done wrong, then the sorrow, lastlythe resolution consequent on that sorrow.

The grief of Remorse partakes of the nature ofHumility, but not to the same extent as the nextand kindred emotion. Shame.

II. Shame and Remorse are the two grandbulwarks of morality, and though allied and oftenmixed one with another, yet they are by no meansidentical. The nature of the actions which givesrise to each differs considerably. Remorse neverarises but from some action which in the retrospectappears to ourselves morally wrong ; whereas shame


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8 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.is often roused by acts really indifferent as concernsmorality, and sometimes,as in the case of false shame,by deeds positively praiseworthy. Even when theconduct which rouses Shame is of an immoralnature or tendency, the shame is often out of allproportion to the degree of guilt. A woman is moreashamed of a slight act of immodesty than of acrime. Chastity is a virtue particularly guarded byShame ; for in women especially, a breach ofChastity gives far more shame than remorse.These and similar considerations prove to usthat shame peculiarly depends upon opinionand as the opinion changes, so will the shame.Adam Smith informs us, in his Theory ofMoral Sentiments, that the native Americans wouldbe greatly ashamed of living together openly like us,as man and wife; and we know that a Turkish womanis ashamed of showing her face. What would shethink of our ladies who uncover themselves downto the breast ^ In England many men are ashamedof being poor, others are ashamed of their poorrelations, or of being seen in unfashionable company,or in unfashionable places ; but will any one say thatmere poverty or vulgarity is vice *? or is it despisedwhere equality prevails*? In the English greatpublic schools, where the sons of gentry aloneresort, a boy is ashamed of being ill-drest; in thegreat day-schools in Scotland, frequented by all


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KEMORSE, SHAME. 9classes, a boy is rather ashamed of being well drest.I have known schools where a boy would have beenashamed to be found reading his Bible. Shame,then, is an emotion much more subject to the capriceof opinion than Remorse. Shame originates in theconsciousness, not that we have done wrong, but thatwe have done something that lays us open to Ridiculeor Contempt. Now, as Ridicule and Contempt, theformer especially, are often awarded where there isno moral delinquency, so Shame is frequently feltwhere there is little to blame. Shame, then, isvariable, because it depends chiefly on the sentimentsof others, and upon sentiments of Ridicule and Con-tempt, which themselves are liable to change.

Since Shame arises from Ridicule or Contempt,it contains, as might be supposed, a strong mixtureof Humility ; but Humility is not the whole, as isproved by that outward sign which distinguishesShame from all other emotions, the Blush.

Anger generally reddens, but sometimes, like fear,renders pale the face ; Love and Jealousy are saidto give a tinge of green or yellow ; Pride andHumility are known by the expression of thecountenance, and almost by every act; Grief bytears, Wonder by silence ; but Shame communicatesthat beautiful crimson which comes and goes likesunshine in a chequered sky, overspreading in amoment face, neck, arms, and bosom. This sign of

c


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10 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.an inward emotion is one of the most charming thingsin nature, and a peculiar effect must have a peculiarcause, in the emotion of Shame, which, therefore,besides Humility, comprises a feeling which is

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properly its own, and of the painful sort.CLASS SECOND.Active Emotions.

This very important class of emotions may bedivided into two orders ; for some of them look onlyto the good of self; some to the good of others, eitherin whole or in part. The former may be called thesolitary or self-regarding, the latter the social activeemotions.

Every one of the active emotions contains Desireor Fear in some form or other, as one of its elementsand Desire and Fear simply as such, admit not ofanalysis or definition. To these alone, and onlywhen intense or permanent, the term Passion isproperly applied.*

Before entering upon the different kinds of Desire,we must observe that this emotion, in all its speciesand varieties, is often combined with Belief, andaccording to the degree of probability, that is ofapparent probability,the compound becomes modifiedin character, and assumes different names, suchas Wish, Hope, Expectation, Confidence. In all

* For a more detailed account of the principal desires, see theAuthor's Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness andHuman Duty. Book First, Part 1 1.


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ACTIVE EMOTIONS. 11

these the essential elements are the same, and varyonly in degree, for in all, desire is combined withBelief, an emotion with a relation, and in all, thedegree of probability modifies the intensity of Desire.Certainty of not succeeding, and certainty of suc-ceeding, in other words Despair and Security, bothdestroy desire, which depends upon Uncertainty, andtherefore, as we approach the opposite limits, the desirewill begin to decline ; so that the degree of proba-bility most favourable to ardour will be between thetwo extremes, and at some distance from either.

Order First : Solitary or Self-regarding ActiveEmotions,

1. Ambition in its proper signification is desireof power, though it be often used in a more vaguesense for desire of superiority of any kind ; in otherwords of eminence,

Jtiev apiareveiv koI v7reLpo')(pv e/nfievai, aXkcov.Power is valued on three accounts ; first for itself,

for there is a peculiar gratification attached to theexercise of power in any line, quite independent ofconsequences, and this gratification is original andelementary.Secondly, power is valued, as many other thingsare valued, because they argue Superiority, and feedPride.

Thirdly, power is valued from its consequences,which are apparent to all.

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12 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.2, Desire of Wealth :

Covetousness, Avarice.Covetousness is an eager desire for getting riches,

and, as commonly used, the word expresses Blamefor some supposed moral turpitude in the desire.

Avarice is an eager desire for saving riches, and italso expresses that the desire is blameable.

Stinginess, narrowness, parsimony, are lowerdegrees of avarice, and these words consequentlyexpress a lower degree of blame.

Frugality, Economy, are also a desire for saving,but these words convey praise.

Riches are valued first for their uses in spendingand consuming, but sometimes also, as it wouldseem, for their own sake. When riches seem to bevalued for themselves, as by the confirmed miser,what are the essential circumstances connected withthem for which really they are prized ? Thesecircumstances will be found to be two which arevery nearly allied, namely, the feeling of power, andthat of security, inseparably attached to riches, andthe latter is the principal cause. Great desire ofpower, or ambition, overcomes Avarice, for moneymust be spent in order really to create power, asCaesar began by ruining himself in order to acquirepopularity ; but in the eyes of the timid, security isimpaired by every expense which promises no imme-diate return. Fear, therefore, is the grand promoter


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14 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.Reputation, as we have seen, is valued partly

because it fortifies our good opinion of ourselves.But this opinion may refer either to moral worth, orto talents and other accomplishments, and, in thelatter case especially, Reputation ministers to ourPride, and feeds the universal passion for Superiority.Here then the humble desire begins to swell into thepassion, the passion for Fame or Glory, which fillsthe whole man.

The passion for Fame is chiefly a desire ofAdmiration, for it may exist with little or no carefor Esteem ; and herein lies the danger. So long asmen shall admire superior talents, or accomplish-ments, even when abused, for that they do so iscertain, so long will a thirst for glory be the charmand terror of mankind.

But other principles unite to heighten this in-toxicating passion. We all wish to extend as wellas to perpetuate our being, and fame through theaid of Fancy, conduces to these wished-for ends.An extension of Fame seems to us an extension ofself, as common language proves, for we are said tolive in the breath of our admirers, and these may beinnumerable : and a perpetuity of Fame seems animmortality, for we call illustrious authors, as Baconand Newton, immortal. The passion for Glory is,then, the child of Imagination, and it partakes of thatunspeakable charm which surrounds its magical pa


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CURIOSITY. 15

rent.* One verycommon form of this desire is Vanity^a term which always conveys disapprobation.-]-

4. Curiosity^ or Desire of Knowledge for its ownsake, without reference to the use or applicationthereof. The great spur of Curiosity is Novelty,and on that account it is apt to decline with years,unlike Ambition, Desire of Wealth or of Fame,which rather increase with age. Curiosity is theproper passion of Philosophers, for this alonelooks to the end which they propose to themselves,whereas other passions, such as Desire of Fame,though they may rouse the intellect, frequentlylead us aside from the path of truth. ThoughCuriosity is not without its dangers, yet on thewhole it is the safest of all the Self-regardingActive Emotions, because it is the most solitary,and the most independent of other men. Henceit is free, in a great degree, from those anxietieswhich wait upon the rest of the passions. It isgenerally an agreeable stimulus, seldom a ranklinggoad.

5. Desire of Life^ or of Continued Existence,here and hereafter. Though without some pleasure

* For a more particular account of this passion see '* AnEnquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and HumanDuty. Book First, Part II. Chap. ii. Sec. v.

f For a more particular account of Vanity, which is the wishfor display^ see Note at the end of this Analysis.


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16 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.we could hardly desire life, yet this feeling seemsdistinct from desire of pleasure.As it is with Riches so with Life. Had Riches

been of no use to us they would certainly neverhave been valued ; but, after a time, from longassociation, they come to be prized by some fortheir own sake. So, though Life without enjoy-ment could hardly have been an object of desire,yet since there can be no enjoyment without life,therefore, from constant association, life came to beprized for itself. Certainly the desire does not varydirectly as enjoyment; since the young, who enjoymost, are frequently most prodigal of their days,while the old, who enjoy least, are often the mosteager for life.

This desire, though in general exceedinglypermanent, is inferior in intensity to many; fornot only may it be overcome for a time by variousother passions, as by Love, Ambition, Covetousness,Desire of Glory, Curiosity, but it may be evenextinguished and give place to a contrary wish.=^Sudden and violent grief, or long-continued pain,* Bacon even says It is worthy the observing that there is no

passion in the mind of man so weak but it meets and masters thefear of death. Revenge triumphs over death ; Love slights itHonour aspireth to it; Grief flieth to it; Fear pre-occupates itnay, we read, after Otho the Emperor had slain himself. Pity, whichis the tenderest of affections, provoked many to die, out of merecompassion to the sovereign, and as the truest sort of followers.Bacon's Essays : of Death.


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LOVE. 17

mental or bodily, may give rise to desire of deathbut mental distress alone terminates in self-destruc-tion. As an element of religious feeling, Desire ofExistence becomes of first-rate importance ; but thereligious emotions will come under another head.

Class Second.Order Second : Social ActiveEmotions.This order of Emotions may be subdivided into

the Benevolent, and the Malevolent.Benevolent Emotions.

Most of the emotions comprehended under thishead are either different species, or merely varietiesof

I. Love. Love, in v^hatsoever form, comprisesat least two elements : first, a certain pleasure de-rived from beholding or reflecting on the belovedobject; secondly^ a desire of good to that object.These elements are essential, for they are sufficientto constitute Love, and without them there can beno such emotion.

Under this genus may be enumerated as speciesL General Benevolence, or Love to Mankind in

general, which is the simplest species of Love, andI may remark that the custom of self-sacrifice on the death of a

Chief, prevailed of old among the followers of princes both in Spainand in Gaul.See Plutarch in Sartorioy and Cesar de BelloGall. Lib. in.


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18 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.distinguished from other species by the circumstanceof its being indiscriminate.

2. Friendship^ and every private attachment,whether transient or permanent, slight or deep-seated, contains a third element in addition to thetwo above mentioned, namely, the desire of beingloved in return.

3. Love^ properly so called, Love between thesexes, comprises a fourth element besides thesethree, namely, the sensual desire, which is sopowerful, that the word desire^ when used by itself,often signifies this alone.

These three species are quite distinct ; but thefollowing are only modifications or varieties of thesame.

Thus, Patriotism is general Benevolence limitedto our own countrymen.

Party Spirit, Esprit de Corps, the Clannish Spirit,are also General Benevolence still further limited toour own party, sect, clan, or profession.

Family Affection, again, from the nearest anddearest that exists between parent and child, down toa slight regard for distant relations, is a modificationof Friendship, taken in its widest sense, for whateverpartiality we may entertain towards relatives, wecertainly wish that it should be reciprocal. No doubtthere are differences between Friendship in its strictsense, and family affection, depending in part upon


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GRATITUDE. 1^

this, that Friends, properly so called, are of our ownchoosing, while Relations come by nature; but thesedifferences are not sufficient to constitute a differenceof species ; they form therefore only varieties.

Gratitude is Love towards an individual onaccount of some benefit conferred intentionally.This last consideration somewhat modifies theemotion, for we feel that love is due, and thoughlove in every form desires the good of its object,Gratitude is not satisfied unless that good be ourown act. Such however is our natural dislike toanything like constraint in affection, that the verycircumstance which ought to command our love,sometimes prevents any real warmth of feeling.This is especially the case where the love ought tobe the strongest, namely, where the benefit con-ferred has been very great ; for then, not only isthe constraint most felt, but along with it is a senseof inferiority, and the greater the favour, thegreater the humiliation. Hence the more Prideprevails in the character, the less is it open togratitude.

When a return seems to be expected, then theirksomeness of constraint is felt in the highestdegree ; while the idea thus suggested that thebenefit was not gratuitous, serves as an excuse forIngratitude.

Religious Emotions are of a compound nature,D 2


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20 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS,embracing, firsts a feeling of Gratitude towardsGod for all his benefits conferred upon us ; andGratitude is a variety of Love, comprising a delightin contemplating God, and a wish to do all thingspleasing in His sight, as well as a desire of favourin His eyes.

Secondly^ the Religious Emotion comprehendsthe desire of continued existence, that longing afterimmortality which all men feel, but chiefly theintelligent and good. The dolt and the wickedman may be content with this life, but the enlight-ened and the virtuous never cease to pant for anhereafter.

Love, in some form or other, is the grand solaceof human kind ; Love, properly so called, is themost violent, the most complex, the most way-ward, the most imaginative, the most captivating ofthe passions, and for a time the most happy ; butthe Religious Emotions, though occasionally violent,are in general calming, and give a permanent andunspeakable satisfaction.^

Besides the above, there are other emotions andmixed states of mind, of which Love forms acomponent part ; for instance :

Admiration. This is a state of mind whichseems to occupy the interval between pure Love and

* This is the delectation interieure of the good, the spiritualMalebranche.


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PITY. 21

Esteem, comprising as it does some AflFection,as well as a favourable Judgment concerningits object. But it is essentially distinguishedfrom either by the presence of Wonder, which is anecessary element of Admiration ; and it is owing tothis element in particular, that the compound stateof mind is on the whole more allied to emotion, thanto cool intellectual decision.

Esteem. Here the emotion of Love is reduced tothe lowest degree compatible with any partiality,while on the other hand the judgment as to themerits of the object is serious and decided. Esteemis synonymous with Moral Approbation, or, if therebe a shade of difference, it is that the latter refersmore particularly to the outward expression, theformer to the inward sentiment.

Respect, Respect is a mixture of Love withHumility ; and Humility tempers Love with some-thing approaching to Fear. Moreover, Respectseems to comprise a certain exercise of the judg-ment.

In Veneration., the Humility is deeper, and con-sequently the love is more tempered with Fear;while in Awe., fear predominates.

IL Pity. Pity and Love are emotions so nearlyallied that it is not possible to conceive any personsusceptible of the one, and at the same time unsus-ceptible of the other ; meaning by Love no more than


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22 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.general Benevolence ; though Pity frequently givesrise to a warmer affection.

Pity, or Compassion, embraces two elements :first, a feeling of pain at the sufferings of another,secondly, a desire to relieve those sufferings ; andthough other feelings may follow, those two aloneseem to constitute the emotion. The desire, however,which forms a part of Pity, probably admits of afurther analysis, for it seems to be compounded of(1) a desire of relief to the sympathetic pain whichwe ourselves experience, instantly followed by (2),a desire of removing the occasion of that pain, viz.the sufferings of a fellow creature.

Thus it appears that the primary element in Pityis Painful Sympathy, which seems necessary toproduce the other, Desire of Relieving, and withoutthe first it does not appear that we should ever havefelt the second. Love, on the other hand, seems tobegin with pleasing Sympathy, a feeling for the joyof others, followed by the wish to promote that joy ;and when our fellow creatures have becomeassociated in our minds with pleasure, the firstelement of love exists. Sympathy, then, is thefoundation of both Pity and Love ; and we canhardly conceive the one without the other, (on theproper occasion), for how can we feel for Griefwithout feeling for J oy ^ how can we desire torelieve pain without desiring to confer pleasured


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HATE. 23

Conversely, if we love any one we must pity hismisfortunes, and the greater the love the deeper thepity. Indeed, it is well known from experience thata feeling which began in Pity frequently terminatesin ardent Love ; that the helplessness of women,their delicacy of constitution, nay, their very ail-ments and sufferings, often rouse the tender passion.

From the above it follows that Sympathy, afeeling for the weal and w^oe of others, is an ultimatefact in Human nature, and the origin of Love andPity.

CLASS SECOND.Order Second.Family Second: The Malevolent Emotions.

As almost all the Benevolent Emotions are speciesor varieties of Love, so nearly all the Malevolentare species or varieties of Hate.

L Hatred, in whatsoever form, contains at leasttwo elements ; first, a certain pain derived frombeholding or reflecting on the object hatedsecondly, a desire of evil to that object. Theseelements are essential, for they are sufficient toconstitute Hatred, and without them there can beno such emotion. Under the Genus Hate may beenumerated as species,

1. Anger. All the species or varieties of Hateagree in this, that they are limited to certain indi-


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24 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.viduals, or classes of individuals, and that there isalways some particular cause for the Hate. Thereis no such thing as general Hate, as there is generalLove or Benevolence ; for at the utmost, Hate extendsto certain nations, not to the whole family of man-kind ; and then there is always some particular causeof Hatred. If Misanthropy exist, it is a disease,not a regular phenomenon of human nature. Thus,Anger is a sudden and violent emotion of Hatredtowards an individual on account of some injury oraffront. Nor is it essential to Anger that the injuryor affront be intentional ; for though this may makea great difference in the intensity, and still more inthe duration of the emotion, yet the storm is raisedbefore there is time for reflection, and cannot beimmediately quelled. When pain is acutely felt, weinstantly hate the author, even though it shouldafterwards appear that he was perfectly innocent.But the absence of intention alone is not enough torender any one blameless, for Carelessness andIndifference to others may be highly culpable. Butwhether he be to blame or not in the eyes of animpartial spectator, the author or occasion of evil tous, becomes the object of Anger, which when con-firmed by reflection, terminates in Resentment orRevenge. There is then this difference betweenAnger and the converse emotion Gratitude, that theformer is roused by Injury or Affront simply as


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RESENTIVIENT, REVENGE. 25caused by a fellow-creature ; while the latter cannotexist unless the Benefit be supposed intentional.Gratitude and Anger however agree in this, thatthe desire which belongs to each respectively is notsatisfied with the good or evil of another howsoeverproduced, but it requires that the good or evil proceedfrom the party benefitted or injured, and on accountof such benefit or injury ; whereas Love or Hate,simply as such, is gratified by good or evil that maybefall its object, from whatever source.

2. Resentment. Resentment is Anger permanentand confirmed by reflection on the conduct of theoffending party.

The observation just made upon Anger as apassion which desires the evil of another, throughthe agency of the injured individual, applies also toResentment, and with peculiar force, for Anger doesnot terminate in Resentment until we become con-vinced that the injury was intentional, or the resultof Negligence as concerns us ; and whereas uponbetter information Anger may altogether cease,Resentment, on the contrary, is confirmed andstrengthened by reflection, and is apt to pass intoRevenge.

3. Revenge, Here the desire of retaliating onthe offending party becomes intense, and whatevercalamities may befall him, retaliation alone fullygratifies, that is, the fact that we who received,


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26 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.also return, the injury. Where the opportunity ofRevenge is delayed, this may become a very perma-nent as well as a very violent passion, and theattainment of its object would seem to be attendedwith an intense pleasure, scarcely, if at all, inferior toany of which our nature is susceptible.

If I can catch him once upon the hip,I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him.He hates our sacred nation ; and he rails,E'en there where merchants most do congregate,On me, my bargains, and my well-won thrift.Which he calls interest. Cursed be my tribeIf I forgive him *

The scene in which Tubal announces to ShylockAntonio's losses is highly characteristic of Revenge.

Tubal. Yes, other men have ill luck too : Antonio, as I heardin Genoa,

Shy. What, what, what ? ill luck, ill luck ?Tubal. hath an argosy cast away coming from Tripolis.Shy. I thank God, I thank God ; is it true ? is it true ?Tubal. I spoke with some of the sailors that escaped the

wreck.Shy. I thank thee, good Tubal ;good news, good news, ha ha where ? in Genoa ?Tubal. There came divers of Antonio's creditors in my com-

pany to Venice, that swear he cannot choose but break.Shy. I am very glad of it ; I'll plague him ; I'll torture him ;

I am glad of it.Here, as in every variety of Hate, the disasters of

* Merchant of Venice, Act. I . Scene 3.


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INDIGNATION. 27

an enemy are a source of gratification ; but thegrand cause of Shylock's delight in these disastersis the prospect of Retaliation which they hold out.

I'll plague him ; I'll torture him ;1 will have the heart of him if he forfeit.*

Revenge is in a peculiar degree the passionof savage nations,^r5^, because Violence and Injuryare there of frequent occurrence, and secondly,because there is no Law to take the place of privateResentment. In proportion as the empire of lawbecomes more established, that of Resentment andRevenge declines.

4. Indignation. Resentment and Indignationare both species of Anger, and differ from oneanother in this respect, that the former dependsentirely upon private injury or affront, and may ariseeven when the offender is not morally to blame;whereas the latter may be roused by an injury toothers as well as to ourselves, and always supposessome moral guilt in the provoking party. As theinjuries which are the object of Resentment are feltby us directly, so those which are the object ofIndignation are in many cases felt by Sympathy,indirectly, and in these cases Indignation rarelybecomes excessive. It is then a moral emotion, andwhen united with a decision or judgment, constitutes

* Merchant of Venice, Act III, Scene 1.E 2


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28 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.the moral sentiment of Disapprobation. Resent-ment, on the contrary,beingroused by personal injury,is sometimes unjust, more frequently excessive,and at least it never fails to give additional energy toMoral Indignation.

5. Jealousy. Jealousy, whatever be its object,comprises two proximate elements, (1) a fear ofbeing deprived by another of something which weconsider our right; (2) a feeling of Hate towardsthe author of the injury. The emotion of Hate hasbeen already analysed. Thus, Fear and Hate are theessential elements of Jealousy, and the formerprecedes and gives birth to the latter. We hatebecause we fear to be deprived by another of some-thing which we prize, and which we have beenaccustomed to consider as of right our own ; so thatit is the self-regarding Passion which rouses theMalevolent ; and the two when united constituteJealousy.

6. Envy, The Passion of Envy comprehendsalso two elements; (1) Grief at the superiority ofanother; (2) a feeling of Hate towards the possessorof such superiority.Thus, a Passive emotion of Pain and an Activeemotion of Hate, are the constituent elements ofEnvy, and the former rouses the latter. Theenvious man hates because he painfully feels thesuperiority of another, which is equivalent to his


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JEALOUSY, ENVY. 29

own inferiority ; and he hates without the shadowof pretence that any mortification was intended. Itis enough that another, however innocently, hascaused him to feel humiliated. Envy, then, is anunjust passion, and the mark of a bad mind; whereasJealousy may be well-founded and blameless ; for noone is blamed for fearing to lose his due, and someill-will towards those who rob us of our rights seemsaltogether unavoidable.

Envy, moreover, is a confession of inferiority, forwere we not really inferior we should not feel so.But Jealousy denies superiority and asserts equalityat least. Envy, then, cannot be a passion of greatminds, though Jealousy may. Othello, as lagoallows, was of a noble nature ; nor does hisJealousy seem at variance with that character ; buthad he been represented as envious, he would haveforfeited all title to our respect. ^^^

Since Love of Superiority is the universal passion,and since every superiority in another lessens ourown,we may be sure that Envy is very general ; thoughit be the ugliest feature of human nature, the blaneof the mind, a sore which ever runs, for it is everirritated, and which, if stopped for a time, only breaksout again with greater malignity.

Where the little-minded feel Envy^ more gene-* *'La plus veritable marque d'etre n^ avec de gi'andes qualit^s,

c'est d'etre n^ sans envie. Rochefoucauld^ Max. 455.


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30 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.rous natures experience Emulation. Envy andEmulation agree so far that in each there is someuneasiness at another's superiority ; but whereas inEnvy this uneasiness gives rise to Hate, a wish todepreciate, and if possible to pull down our com-petitor to our own level ; in Emulation, on thecontrary, it awakens the desire of raising ourselves.In the one case, then, the primary Grief rouses aMalevolent, in the other a Self-regarding passion,and this difference of result will depend upon thetalents and moral disposition. Where any one isconscious that he cannot rise. Envy will be apt togrow up; where advancement seems attainable,Emulation will probably ensue.We may remark this difference between theMalevolent desire which belongs to Anger andResentment, and the one included under Envy, thatthe former is a Primary or Original desire, the latterSecondary or derived from another. When wereceive an injury, Anger immediately follows, andthe Anger vents itself without any notion that theinjury can thereby be repaired. If a man be struck,his anger rises, and he instantly returns the blow,though the fracture of an adversary's rib will notmend his own. The Malevolent feeling, in this case,therefore, is original, not dependent on calculation,nor subservient to any other design. But in Envy,the Grief experienced cannot be looked upon as an


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JEALOUSY, ENVY. 31injury for which any one is to blame, otherwiseResentment, not Envy, would be felt, and conse-quently Hatred here is not roused immediately. Apainful sense of Inferiority is felt, instantly followedby the desire of relieving this uneasiness ; the mindthen turns to the innocent cause of the same, wishesto pull it down as the means of raising self, and finallycomes to hate it as the obstacle to Self-Complacency.In this case, then, the Malevolent feeling is the con-sequence of a self-regarding desire. The same holdstrue of that passion which most nearly resemblesEnvy, namely, Jealousy, as hasbeen alreadyobservedunder that head.*

Since Envy and Jealousy both originate in desireof Superiority, or of Equality at least, it followsthat this desire, in a greater or less degree^ musttend to promote Malevolent passions. Envy, indeed,can never want for food, so long as high and low,rich and poor, exist in the world ; and only modestyor kindness on the part of the great seem capableof alleviating it; but peculiar circumstances maygreatly favour or repress Jealousy. Even Envy hasless for its object those who are very much aboveus, because we are not accustomed to compare our-

* The Angry Passions, including Simple Anger, Resentment,Revenge, Indignation, might be classed together as a sub-genus ofHate ; and the Jealous Passions, namely. Jealousy and Envy, asanother sub-genus.


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32 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.selves with them, from which comparison alone apainful sense of Inferiority is felt. But Jealousyexists only between competitors, between those whostand nearly on equal terms, and who, consequently,have similar pretensions. Jealousy fears to be sup-planted and outdone, rather than confesses inferiority,and is nourished by doubt, destroyed by certainty.Whatever, then, keeps up doubt, will tend to promoteJealousy. It may be said to spring from Pretensionmixed with Diffidence. Therefore, an uncertainposition, combined with an eager desire of rising,cannot fail to fan the passion. Now these are theessential elements of a democratical state of Society,which by breaking down every barrier between oneclass and another, by presenting honours and emolu-ments as the prize, not indeed of all, but of any,opens up a boundless field to the desires and energiesof man. These desires and these energies cannotfail to do great things, as they have in America ; butas they meetwith a thousand competitors, they willrouse a thousand Jealousies ; and though nationalprosperity will be advanced, and the nationalgrandeur promoted, Tranquillity of Mind will beunknown.

7. Contempt is a mixture of Pride with Hatredor Dislike; and is directly opposed to Respect^which unites Humility with Love.

II. Malice. Malice seems to bear the same


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MALTCE. 33

relation to Hatred which Pity does to Love. As Pityis composed of two elements, a painful sympathywith the sufferings of another, who may be nofriend, and a desire to relieve those sufferings, soMalice is compounded of a pleasurable feeling,arising from the pains of another, who is no enemy,and of a desire to inflict such pains. The one unitesa painful Sympathy with desire of relief, the otherpleasurable Antipathy with desire of its continuance.This desire also, like that which belongs to Pity,probably admits of a further Analysis, for it seemsto be compounded of (I) A desire of the continuanceof that pleasure of Antipathy which we experience,and (2) A desire of the continuance of the occasionof that pleasure, viz. the pain of another. And asin Pity the primary element is a pain of Sympathy,so in Malice the original element is a pleasure ofAntipathy, which seems necessary to produce thedesire which follows.

Be it observed that Malice is quite an exceptionto the general law of human nature ; for wherethere is no particular reason to the contrary.Sympathy not Antipathy, Good-will, not Ill-will, isthe rule. But simple Malice supposes no cause ofHatred, and therefore it may be looked upon as avile excrescence rather than an ordinary part ofthe mental system. Malice also has in itnothing personal, that is peculiar to any one


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34 ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.more than another, but applies indifferently to all.

Malice, however, is not Misanthropy; for theprimary element in the one is Pleasure, in the otherPain. Besides, the latter, if it exist, is a permanentfeeling ; the former but an occasional emotion ; andwhereas Malice supposes no previous injustice.Misanthropy arises from some injury or series ofinjuries inflicted on an individual, who, by associa-tion, comes to hate not only those who injured him,but even the whole human race.


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36 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.of Cause and Effect amounts to little more thanthis, that the one invariably precedes and the otherinvariably follows ; wherever we find such a sequenceof phenomena, we may conclude that a relation ofcausation exists between them.

Passive feelings then, pleasurable or painful, mustbe considered as the cause of all our Benevolent andMalevolent desires ; and in general Pleasure is theSource of the Benevolent ; Pain of the Malevolent.We call those feelings Passive because they are notimmediately connected with outward Action, butinert they by no means are.

Here, however, a remarkable exception presentsitself. Though, in general, Pleasure is the source ofthe Benevolent, Pain of the Malevolent Emotions,as in all the varieties of Love and Hate, yet in thetwo emotions of Pity and Malice, which we haveseparated from Love and Hate, the contrary holdsgood ; for in Pity and Malice, Pain and Pleasurecreate good and ill will respectively. We feel thesufferings of our brother, and desire to relieve them ;we are gratified at another's vexation, and wish toplague him. How shall we account for thisanomaly^ Is the anomaly real or only apparent*?How comes it to pass that the pain which weexperience in Pity, instead of venting itself againstthe unhappy author of that pain, urges us to acts ofkindness *?


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PITY. 37

Let us observe in the first place, that we do notcompassionate all the sufferings of our fellows ; nay,that those sufferings often rouse a contrary feeling.A beggar with sores who forces himself on our notice,or a miserable object clad in rags and eaten up withvermin, rouses our anger or disgust, rather than ourpity, though, to outward appearances, he be in theextremity of woe. Again, whenever we have reasonto think that the sufferer has brought his calamitieson himself. Pity is replaced by Indignation ; and beit remarked, that people have a great tendency tosuppose that calamities are the result of ill-conduct,and seem to wish to persuade themselves to thiseffect. They thus obtain an excuse for not pitying,and not relieving.

Men in general, the proud especially, pity themisfortunes of their relations less than those ofstrangers, because they feel humiliated by them,and this painful feeling of humility creates dislikerather than compassion.

Some are so sensitive, so shocked by the ap-pearance of misery, that they fly from every sightof woe ; so that with these, dislike or horror,certainly not pity, is the consequence.Many men have but little tendency to compassion

at any time, and instead of pitying, are apt to despisethe poor and unfortunate. This is the case par-ticularly with Proud and Self-Confident characters.


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38 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.who think themselves too secure to be in danger offalling into the like calamities.

Lastly, Pity is but little felt towards beings unlikeourselves ; unlike either in species or in the order ofsociety. Persons otherwise of compassionate natures,even sensitive women, are often known to kill andtorture the lower kinds of animals ; and in thosestates of society where permanent Inequality reigns,the sufferings ofslaves and others are regarded by theirmasters and superiors with wonderful indifference.

In all the above cases there is no exception tothe rule that pain somehow proceeding from ano-ther is the cause of Malevolent feelings ; for in thefirst five cases, some modification of Hate, somedislike is roused ; in the last no pain is felt.

However, with these exceptions, the sufferingsof our fellow creatures do certainly rouse Compas-sion. But observe, that the feelings thus called upare by no means exclusively painful. The firstimpression undoubtedly is so, but consequent there-on is a feeling of Self-Complacency, proceedingfrom the consciousness of our being susceptible ofso amiable an emotion as Sympathy. Then comesan emotion of Pride, which arises from comparingthe miserable state of another with our own morefortunate condition. These two feelings, being bothof an agreeable nature, serve to neutralize, in part,if not entirely, the primary painful emotion, and


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PITY. 39

prevent any ill-will towards the unhappy occasionof that pain. And ill-will being repressed, anotherdesire naturally springs up, desire of relief to thatuneasiness which may remain, instantly followed bythe wish to remove the cause, the sufferings ofanother. But if the Pride which waits upon Pitybecome excessive, it will stifle Good-will instead ofpromoting it ; and then the painful feeling of Sym-pathy will create dislike, which when combined withPride, constitutes Contempt. Pity, then, andContempt, are often roused under similar circum-stances, according to the disposition of mind thatmay be exposed to the sight of woe.

If the above explanation be correct, it will followthat the instance of Pity is no real anomaly, that itforms no real exception to the rule, that Painsomehow proceeding from another is the cause ofMalevolent feelings ; for every cause may be over-come by an opposite cause sufficiently powerful ; andin this case the opponent Pleasure counteracts thetendency of Pain ; but not completely ; for on manyoccasions, and with some dispositions in particular,the tendency of Pain to produce ill-will becomeseven here apparent.

Upon the whole, when the sufferings of othersgive us unmixed pain, especially the pain ofHumility, they create simply dislike; when theymay be traced with some probability to the fault of


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40 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.the sufferer, they rouse Indignation ; when theypresent themselves to a very proud character,Contempt ; which results are all in agreement withthe general principle : but when those sufferings giveus a mingled feeling of Pain and Pleasure, par-ticularly a gentle emotion of Self-Complacency,then the Malevolent desire is replaced by theBenevolent ; and this, as we have seen, is no realexception to the general law.

The only question which now remains to beanswered is, why a large dose of Pride producesIndifference or Contempt, while a smaller quantityof the same is favourable to Compassion. As thefeeling is the same in kind, why is the effect sodifferent^ When Pride becomes prevalent andhabitual, it renders a man indifferent to the calamitiesof those beneath him, partly on the principle ofoccupation ; for when the mind is habitually filledwith Pride, there is no room for the softer emotions ;partly on the principle that we fully sympathizewith those only whom we consider similar to our-selves, and whose fate may become our own. Theproud man looks upon those below him as aninferior race of beings, and has little or no sympathywith joys or woes which he thinks can never behis. But should he at all sympathize with suchwoes, he could feel no perceptible increase of Prideby comparing his own prosperity with the misfor-


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MALICE. 41

tunes of those whom he considers so far beneathhim. Nay, such a comparison would wound ratherthan gratify his Pride, for comparison appears anapproach to equality. Therefore the sufferings ofhumanity cannot increase the self-satisfaction of theproud man ; but on the contrary, so far as felt, theymust rather diminish it, for they create a secretconsciousness that he is of the same clay. HenceContempt, rather than Pity, is the consequence.

But the man of humble mind, being not en-grossed by Pride, is more open to the tenderfeelings ; and though the woes of others give himpain, yet, on the other hand, they rouse some Self-complacency, because he has never been accustomedto consider himself above humanity. Homo sum,nihil humani a me alienum puto has been hismaxim ; and therefore he is content to occupy agood place in the scale. On this account, heneither dislikes nor despises, but on the con-trary, pities the wretched.

With respect to Malice, which still remains tobe explained, we may repeat the observation, thatthe feeling which lies at the bottom of it, namely,a pleasure of Antipathy, is quite an exception tothe general law of human nature ; for where thereis no particular reason to the contrary. Sympathyis the rule. But supposing such a pleasure toexist, how comes it to pass that it does not, as in

G


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42 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.Other cases, rouse a Benevolent rather than aMalevolent feeling ? To this the simple answer is,because a Benevolent feeling is inconsistent withthe continuance of the pleasure. The pleasure ofthe malicious man is derived from the pain ofanother; and since he desires to continue thatpleasure, he naturally wishes to perpetuate the painfrom which it springs. The only thing unaccount-able is the original feeling of Antipathy, for thisbeing supposed to exist, the rest follows of course.Sympathy, as well as Antipathy, must be lookedupon as ultimate facts in human nature ; the onethe rule, the other the exception. And this originalfeeling of Antipathy is not only an exception, butit is so anomalous that it may almost be consideredas a disease. When Antipathy is connected withHatred the case is different for it is then no longeran original feeling, but the consequence of theprevious state of mind in reference to an individual.When one man hates another, he naturally receivespleasure from the pain and pain from the pleasureof the detested object.

But in Malice there is no previous hatred, andtherefore here the feeling of Antipathy is original andunaccountable. When we say that it is owing to apeculiar constitution of mind, we give no informa-tion ; we only state what has been already said, thatit is a peculiar fact, of which the cause is unknown*


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SYMPATHY. 43Hobbes denies that Sympathy is an ultimate

fact, in other words, that the pains of others, simplyand immediately, are a cause of pain to us ; for hesays that the effect is produced by the considerationthat we ourselves are exposed to similar evils. Weare witnesses of a calamity, we consider that thelike may befall us, and therefore we sympathizewith it. Now it must be allowed that the circum-stances of similarity and dissimilarity have a greatinfluence in increasing or diminishing the feelingof Sympathy ; that the nearer the sufferers come tous in species, station, age, character, even in spaceand time, the more are we prone to feel for them.We are certainly more afilicted by a small calamityin our own parish than by a great disaster inChina or Japan. The fall of a house in our ownstreet affects us more than that of the amphitheatreof Fidena, in the days of Tiberius, which buried inits ruins fifty thousand spectators. Above all, ifwe have actually experienced any calamity, we feelfor it the more readily in others. Le coeur, cherChactas, est comme ces sortes d'arbres, qui nedonnent leur baume pour les blessures des autres,que quand le fer les a blesses eux-memes.*

True and beautiful words This similarity,* The heart, dear Chactas, is like those trees which yield no

balm for the wounds of others until the iron has wounded themselves.Chateaubriand.G 2


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SYMPATHY. 45mediately on the view of their happiness or misery.Hobbes indeed, as we have just seen, says Grieffor the calamity of another is Pity, and arisethfrom the imagination that the like calamity maybefall himself. But were this theory true, (forthe first part only of the sentence expresses a fact,the second a theory^, still the fact is certain thatwe do sympathize with others, or, in other words,have a fellow-feeling for them, in numberless caseswhere our own interests are not immediately con-cerned. The Theory of Hobbes does not denySympathy, but only attempts to explain itsorigin by a distant reference to Self. Besides, wehave seen that the theory is not sufficiently sup-ported.

Again, it cannot be denied that we often desirethe good of others, and sometimes their evil, andthat too in cases where the good or evil of othersseems productive of no benefit to ourselves. Nodoubt, it has been maintained, that in desiring thewelfare of others we really look to our own gra-tification, and that the pleasure anticipated fromSympathy creates the motive to deeds of Charityand Love. Were this theory true, for this also is atheory, it would not disprove the reality of ourBenevolent desires ; it would only account fortheir origin, supposing them to exist. In everyview of the case, then, the pleasures and pains of


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46 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.Sympathy, which reach us by reflection, in otherwords, because pleasure or pain has first been feltby others, must be distinguished from the pleasuresand pains which affect us directly ; and the desireswhich look immediately to the welfare of our fellowcreatures, which becomes our own only by Sym-pathy, must be separated from the desires whichurge us to our own gratification without regard tothat of others.

But we may proceed further, and maintain thatall our Desires do not originate in the prospect ofsome good or evil to Self. To prove this, we needonly consider the phenomena of Anger, Love, andGratitude. Take the case of Anger. When aman, particularly one of a choleric temper, receivesa blow, does he take time to consider what benefitor injury may result to himself from returning it *?If he do, we may be sure that Anger is notuppermost in his mind, but Prudence, Fear, orsome other principle. He may certainly restrainhis anger from prudential considerations, from Fear,from Respect, but that is nothing to the presentpurpose, for it is by no means contended that Angercannot be mastered. But supposing it to be in-dulged in, what does it imply '^ When a blow orother injury is received, the first impulse is to returnit ; and if the impulse be not checked, the injury isreturned forthwith. To the feeling of injury, to the


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ANGER. 47perception of an individual as the cause of thatinjury, there succeeds immediately a violent emo-tion of Hatred towards that individual, comprisingpain at his presence, and desire of evil towardshim. Between the perception of the being whohas injured us, and the subsequent emotion ofHatred, it does not seem possible to detect anyintervening feeling, much less any calculation ofconsequences, or balancing of opposing advantages.The emotion and its consequences are too suddento admit of such an hypothesis. This is confirmedby the circumstance, that Anger and its results areoften in direct opposition to our interests; as weourselves acknowledge when we become cool. Itis a powerful object with the crafty and ambitiousman to keep down his temper, to subdue everyappearance of Resentment; for this, he knows, mightmar the success of his schemes. To feign Love, orat least Insensibility, where Hate is the naturalemotion, belongs to the deceitful man, because Hateis impolitic.

It seems then vain to deny that the Malevolentfeeling contained in Anger, looks really to the evilof another, not to the good of self. That desire isroused, as experience proves, not by the prospect ofsome personal pleasure to come, but by some painactually felt. There is surely no reason prior toexperience, why hurt to one who has injured us,


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48 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.may not be an ultimate object of desire. Pleasureto self may be a more general object, but must it bethe only one *? And where there is no convincing apriori argument, experience should decide.

Now wh^thas been said of Anger, applies equallyto Love and Gratitude. In many instances wherefavours have been received, Love towards our bene-factor rises instantly, far too suddenly to admit ofany calculation as to the advantages likely to resultto ourselves from returning his kindness, and eventoo quickly to allow of the pleasure of Sympathybeing presented to the mind in prospect as an objectof desirCc As far as our experience tells us, andwe can go no further, the Love, the Goodwill,immediately follows the feeling of a benefit, andthe perception of a benefactor ; nor are we sensibleof any intervening sequence of phenomena. Thatsequence must then be pronounced hypothetical,and the utmost that can be said is, that there is abare possibility that the mind, quick as lightning,sees the pleasure of sympathy before it, and desiresin consequence. But besides the high probabilityagainst this, derived from direct experience, we maydraw an argument from Analogy; for if it be provedin one case, as in the case of Anger, that we candesire something besides the good of self, namelythe evil of others, it will not appear improbable thatwe are capable of desiring their good as an ultimate


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SELF-REGARDING DESIRES. 49object. As, in the case of Anger, ill-will followsinstantly after the injury received, so, in the case ofGratitude, the good will immediately succeeds to thebenefit. Thus it is the pain or the pleasure alreadyexperienced, not a vague pleasure in prospect, whichin these instances rouses the emotion of desire.

The question with which we set out, whether allour desires originate in the prospect of some goodor evil to self, is thus determined in the negative.

The origin of the social desires being thusdiscussed, a second question remains, whether allthe other desires, whichwe have called self-regarding,may be reduced to desire of pleasure of somekind, in other words, desire of self-gratificationwhether, in short, they be all varieties of one princi-ple, Self-Love: or whether there be desires, suchas Ambition, Covetousness, Curiosity, which, thoughthey look to self in some measure, may still bedistinguished from Self-Love *? *

The truth probably is, that Pleasure, positive ornegative, is the original object of all our self-regarding desires, but it does not therefore followthat we can never desire anything but Pleasure

* This last opinion was broached by Bishop Butler in hisSermons at the Rolls, and has since been adopted by Dr. Brownin his Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. III.Lect. Ixv, Ixvi. What Butler calls Self Love, is a calm calcu-lating view of our interests ; a principle, according to him, es-sentially different from the Passions.

H


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50 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.for when an object has long been associatedwith pleasure, that object comes at last to bedesired for itself, without any actual thought of thepleasure that may attend it. Thus, Riches are atfirst sought as the means of enjoyment, afterwardsfor their own sake ; and the same may be said ofLife; but in both cases they are sought for our-selves, not for others, and therefore in both casesthe desire is Self-regarding. Whether it be Pleasure,or Power, or Riches, or Knowledge, or continuedExistence, it is still our Pleasure, our Power, ourRiches, our Life, which we seek to increase orprolong. What though the immediate object benot always Pleasure *? If the object be the good ofSelf in any form, surely the Principle is the same,and therefore the term should be the same, viz.Self-Love. Though the desire contained in Self-Love may be under the guidance of Reason andCalculation, that does not change the nature of thedesire, but only regulates its intensity, or ratherthe outward signs of intensity, restraining thesewhen necessary to the end in view. Here, Self-Love is a compound state of mind, but the desirewhich forms part of that compound is of no pe-culiar sort; it differs not from other desires andpassions. When we say that one man is governedby Reason, another by Impulse, we must not supposethat the moving principle is necessarily different, or


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SELF-REGARDING DESIRES. 51that Reason is at all a principle of Action ; we canmean only that the desire, whatever it be, is moreor less guided by Reflection.

But the assertion with which we set out, thatPleasure of some kind or other, Pleasure positiveor negative, is the original object of all our Self-regarding desires, deserves more particular proof.

It is allowed by the advocates of an oppositeopinion, that Pleasure always accompanies, or atleast follows, the desire, when the object is attainedand it is also allowed that such Pleasure may after-wards increase the desire, or rouse a similar one ona future occasion ; but it is denied that in the firstinstance Pleasure was necessarily the object in view,and the source of the desire. They do not disputethat Pleasure is one source of Self-regarding desire,but they deny that it is the only primary one, andaffirm that Power, Knowledge, etc. are originallycoveted for themselves.

Since Pleasure is admitted to be one immensesource of Desire, since the attainment of everyDesire is attended with Pleasure, and since thisPleasure certainly re-acts upon the Desire, enoughis allowed whereon to build a probability thatPleasure may be the source of all. But in order todecide this point, we must furtherconsult Experience.

It is notorious that men do not desire thingseagerly until they feel a want of them. But what

H 2


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52 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.is meant by a want, is a passive feeling of Pain,accompanied by the desire of relief to that pain.Thus, when we are hungry or thirsty, we are said tobe in want of food ; that is, we experience a certainsensation of a painful nature, attended by desire

.

of relief. Hunger, Thirst, etc. are properly calledAppetites^ because the pain is a sensation, orimmediately depends upon a change in the state ofthe body. In all cases, then, of bodily want, thereis first a pain, and then a desire to get rid of it,which is a desire of Negative Pleasure ; and thegreater the pain, the stronger the desire. But, wantsare mental as well as bodily ; and in the feeling ofwants there is an immense difference between men,and desires vary in proportion. Persons of littlesensibility, little alive to annoyance or pain of anykind, are apt to be indolent, while sensitive naturesare always full of wishes and activity. Those whofeel no uneasiness in the absence of comforts andluxuries, as savages, slaves, particularly negro slaves,never desire them eagerly ; and persons whofeel no shame, no distress at ignorance, neverseek knowledge with ardour. The pain of Ennuiis a great incentive to exertion, but whenthe habit is acquired (and acquired it maybe) of being idle without uneasiness, there isno hope of amendment, for desire is dead. What-ever renders Home agreeable and comfortable


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SELF-REGARDING DESIRES. 53deadens the longing for gay amusements, suchas Plays, Operas, Concerts, Balls, etc. whichare frequented by the single, or those lesshappy at home, who alone feel a want of them.The domestic may relish such amusements, perhaps,quite as much as others, but they must forcethemselves to go; while the others, urged byEnnui or Discomfort, cannot keep away. Hencethe connexion between these three things. Comfort,Domesticity, Morality.

These facts being granted, it seems to follow thatPain actually experienced, not a vague Pleasure inprospect, is the original source of Desire. Anuneasiness is felt ; the immediate consequence is adesire to get rid of the same, and hence all otherdesires. But desire of relief from pain is only oneform of Desire of Pleasure; and therefore, theresult upon the whole is, that Pain, actually felt, isthe source, the origin, the first exciting cause ofDesire, while Pleasure is its object. The firstdesire that arises in the mind of an infant is desireof relief to that uneasiness which he feels in theabsence of food ; but after he has tasted the food,he can desire the same, because it is positivelyagreeable. What is it that first induces us to useour limbs and move them from place to place ^Not the pleasure of Activity which is as yet un-known to us, but the uneasiness resulting from


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54 THEOBY OF THE EMOTIONS.inaction. Afterwards, indeed, that pleasure is aninducement, but not at first. The same holds goodof mental activity, the first spur to which is Ennui.So, what compels us to seek Change or Variety ^Not the charms peculiar to variety, which as yet weknow not, but the uneasy feelings resulting fromSameness or Repetition. Thus it probably is withall our Desires ; and had we not known the painsof Privation, of Insecurity, of Inferiority, and ofIgnorance, w^e should not have eagerly covetedRiches, Power, and Knowledge.

Search and you will find that every Desire has apain belonging to it ; and as no one pretends thatPain is the effect of Desire, what can it be but thecause*? And that Pain does really precede, notfollow Desire, we conceive to be proved byExperience.

Talking of Curiosity, Brown has said, and hisobservation applies to many other desires, Plea-sure, indeed, attends the discovery ; but it is surelyvery evident that there must have been Curiositybefore the Pleasure, or no pleasure could have beenfelt. Pain or Disquietude attends the ungratifiedCuriosity. But in like manner, there must havebeen a previous desire of Knowledge ; or if therewas no previous desire of knowing anything, therecould be no pain in the continued ignorance. *

* Lectures : Vol. III. Lect. Ixvi.


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SELF-REGARDING DESIRES. 55

Now, what is this but begging the question?and on what ground can it be said that there musthave been curiosity before the pleasure, or no plea-sure could have been felt ? or, '* that there musthave been a previous desire of Knowledge, or ifthere was no previous desire of knowing anything,there could be no pain in the continued ignorance?Do we see a priori^ any necessity in the case ?Might we not as well reverse the proposition, andsay : It is surely very evident that there must havebeen pleasure in prospect before the curiosity, or nocuriosity could be felt ; or that there must have beena previous pain in ignorance, or had there been noprevious pain in ignorance there could be no desireof knowledge.

Surely one of these propositions is as necessary inour eyes, is as self-evident as the other. But wedo not tread on the high priori road ; but on thehumble but safer way of Experience. To Ex-perience, then, we appeal, direct as well as indirect,the latter being called Analogy ; and we maintain thatnot only the innumerable cases in which pleasure iscertainly the object of desire, and the allowed in-separable connection between the two, render itprobable that pleasure in some form or other, positiveor negative, is the original object of all Self-regard-ing Desire; but also, the direct experience of allour wants, bodily and mental, seems to prove that


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56 THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.pain is originally the indispensable antecedent^ inother words, the actual cause of Desire ; while theabsence thereof, or negative Pleasure, is its firstobject.

Pain, therefore, as I have elsewhere said is thePrimum mobile of the human race/'* first in theorder of Time, as well as in importance.

The existence of evil has ever been, and willever be, the great stumbling-block of NaturalTheology ; for our faculties are too limited, as com-pared with the vastness and variety of the universe,to allow of the hope that we shall ever be able byunassisted reason, fully to vindicate the ways ofGod to man.

But, to the religious, every glimpse behind theveil which hides from their eyes the mysteries ofthe Holy of Holies is invaluable. When, then, wesee, that Pain, itself the grand cause of offence, hasyet a beneficial tendency, by rousing our faculties,we cannot but embrace with ardour a truth soconsoling, so favourable to the idea of Providenceand how small soever may be the portion of theheavenly veil which thus is drawn aside, we shallthere for ever gaze, in hopes that hereafter more maybe disclosed.

When treating of the Social Desires, we found* Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human

Duty, Book I. Part iii, chap. 2.


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CONCLUSION 57that those desires are real, and different from theself-regarding ; and that they take their origin inPassive Emotions of Pleasure and Pain, roused byanother ; and now we find that the self-regardingdesires originate in feelings of Pain. Therefore,the grand conclusion is, that desire universallysprings from the actual feeling of Pleasure or ofPain ; that the Self-regarding as well as the Male-volent affections, Malice excepted, take their originfrom Pain; the Benevolent from Pleasure alone,except Pity, which springs from a mixture of Painand Pleasure.

If, then, you wish for the love of others, try toconfer Pleasure ; and beware of giving Pain, if youwould not be an object of Hate.

From the above principles we may also draw thisinference : that Pain of every kind, bodily as wellas mental, tends to render men Selfish or Malevo-lent ; while Pleasure opens the heart, and disposesit to Love and Charity *

* Pity, indeed, as depending in part upon Pain, may be morelively in those who have suffered themselves; but much privatesuffering is unfavourable to this amiable emotion. The remark ofTacitus, in reference to a Military Tribune, et eo immilior quiatoleraveratj is one of general application.

I


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59

Note to Page 16.Vanity is the desire of the admiration of others; so called

chiefly when fixed upon small things, or when very prominent andexacting.

Pride is Self-admiration on account of some excellence, real orsupposed ; so called chiefly when in excess.

Self-Conceit is the Amour propre of the French; a compoundof Pride and Vanity ; not so self-dependent as simple Pride ; notso dependent upon others, as simple Vanity. This compound maybe considered the ordinary state of man, for few are so distrustful ofthemselves as to live entirely upon the praises of others ; few areso self-satisfied as utterly to neglect them.

Vanity tends to make a man ridiculous : Jlrst, because it isusually fixed on small things, is demonstrative and exacting.Secondly f because Vanity is often ill-founded.

Thirdlyf because in seeking applause, it argues some self-dis-trust. This incongruity between the palpable efforts at display andthe real want of capability, between the outward bearing and theinward man, is of the very essence of the ludicrous.

Pride, on the other hand, seldom causes Ridicule, oftenAversion, and, not unfrequently. Respect.

It causes Aversion, because, by assuming Self-Superiority, itcreates in others the pain of Inferiority.

It generates Respect, when it is supposed to arise from the con-sciousness of solid qualities, such as Independence of Character,Disdain of Servility, Firmness, Constancy, and Hatred of all baseactions. For a strong belief in the possession of such qualities is

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60 NOTE.generally more or less well-founded. The pleasure which accom-panies this Pride, and the pain which attends its loss, are strongpreservatives of Virtue.

Pride, which cares little for the suffrages of others, tends torender a man unsocial, and regardless of pleasing; while Vanity-leads a man into society, and urges him to make himself agreeable,for it is only by giving pleasure to others that he can hope to obtaintheir applause.

Affectation is the offspring of Vanity and Diffidence. Thebantling partakes of the character of its parents ; for as the issue ofVanity, it seeks applause ; as sprung from Diffidence, it is radicallyawkward. Affectation is laughed at ; for what is more ludicrousthan awkward attempts at display ? Vanity tends to make a manridiculous, but Affectation always does so. If there be more Vanityin France than in England, yet is there less Affectation; becausethere is less Diffidence.

The alliance of Pride with Diffidence seems less natural thanthat of Vanity and Diffidence ; but it is by no means uncommonfor a person may be proud of his solid qualities or other advantages,and yet diffident of pleasing. And as the effects of Pride and ofDiffidence upon the outward deportment are not unlike. Shynessor Reserve is attributed to the one or the other, according to thegood or ill-will of the by-standers, though it may really be owingto an union of the two.

Affectation is a sign of mediocrity. There is hope of a manwho is affected under twenty ; but after that age not much.

Since Admiration and Love are kindred emotions, it would seemthat Vanity, or Desire of being Admired, and the Desire of beingBeloved, should also be alUed. But as those who differ the leastare sometimes the bitterest enemies, and as neighbouring, not dis-tant states, are most apt to be foes, so Vanity and Desire of Affectionmost frequently come into collision. Between these the victory isoften in suspense ; and of all the triumphs of Love, the greatest isthat over Vanity.


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DISSERTATION FIRST.

ON BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY.


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64 DISSERTATIONbefore him. The writer, too, as well as the reader,becomes fatigued with an endless conflict ; and whenat last he brings forward his own views, he appearswith a bad grace, like an Eastern Monarch whorises to power by the slaughter of all his rivals.But in metaphysical inquiries, and indeed in allinquiries which admit not of demonstration, it oughtto be the writer's object to conciliate his readers,rather than arm them against himself by previoushabits of controversy. Moreover, nothing tends somuch to create general distaste for any subject, andeven a contempt for it, as perpetual wrangling ; forwhere there is so much variance, the indolent es-pecially are apt to persuade themselves that nothingis really ascertained. Thus, the never-ending dis-putes which at one time prevailed among PoliticalEconomists, threw discredit on the science ofNational Wealth, as if it dealt merely in barrensubtleties ; whereas some of its most importantprinciples were established beyond dispute. Forthese reasons, I shall proceed at once to the con-sideration of Beauty, without thinking it necessaryto discuss all the systems of my predecessors ; butwithout pretending to undervalue their efforts, or todeny how much I am indebted to some of them.


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ON BEAUTY. 65

Chapter II.On the Nature of Beauty.

In discussing Beauty, or any other emotion, theproper method appears to be to treat first of theNature of the emotion, next of its Causes, and lastly,if this be thought necessary, of its Effects. Weshall begin, then, with the Nature of Beauty.

In ordinary language, the word Beauty is takenin two different, senses ; for sometimes it means theinward feeling of the mind, sometimes the outwardcause of that feeling, whether this be a materialobject, or something moral or intellectual. Thisdouble sense has been one plentiful source of con-fusion and error in treatises of Beauty ; and a similarambiguity served for a long while to perplex thewritings of metaphysicians concerning the Qualitiesof Objects and the Nature of Sensation. But wemust remember that Beauty is not a Sensation, butan Emotion. In a former work, I pointed out thedistinction between our sensations and all othermental phenomena, and showed that it consists inthis, that the Cause, or, in the language of Brown,The Immediate Invariable Antecedent, of a Sensa-tion, is some change in the state of the body;

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66 DISSERTATION

whereas the cause of the other mental phenomena,whether Perceptions, Conceptions, or Emotions, isitself some state of mind, and not any bodilyaffection. When the emotion of Beauty arises frommaterial objects, the immediate antecedent is eithera Sensation or a Perception ; when it arises fromsomething moral or intellectual, then the immediateantecedent is a Conception ; but in all cases, thatwhich immediately precedes is a change in the stateof the mind. With Sensation it is otherwise : therethe immediate antecedent is some change in thestate of the nerves, whether of smell, sight, hearing,taste, or touch. But the Emotion of Beauty hasoften been confounded with Sensation, and for thisreason, that, as in the case of Sensation, so in thecase of Beauty, we mix up the Outward Cause withthe Inward Effect, and, by a singular mental process,incorporate the beauty, which we feel, with the sense-less object before us, just as we incorporate thecolours, as seen by us, with inanimate matter. Solong as the objects are before us this delusiveprocess goes on, whether we will or not; but itrequires, one would think, but a slight exercise ofreflection, to be aware that nothing but mind canfeel, and that the outward material cause must besomething totally different from the inward effect,whether Colour or Beauty, of which we are conscious.But obvious as this may appear to us now, it does


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ON BEAUTY. 67

not seem always to have been so ; for when Lockebrought forward the notion that the Secondaryqualities of matter, such as colour, sound, taste,etc. are not in the objects themselves, but in ourminds, he was thought, as Addison informs us, tohave made a great discovery ; but the discoveryconsisted only in separating the material cause fromthe inward and mental effect; for Locke neverthought of denying that there are certain realqualities in objects which give rise to our sensations,still less that there are any material objects at all.It appears then that some reflection is necessary todistinguish between our feelings and the outwardobjects with which we mentally incorporate themand as the mass of mankind are not much given toreflection, and as philosophers themselves are liableto popular error, we cannot greatly wonder that twosuch different things should have sometimes beenconfounded. And as we so readily incorporate thesensation of Colour as well as the emotion of Beautywith outward material objects. Beauty itself cameto be thought a sensation. Besides, the one fol-lows the other so closely that it was the more easyto confound the two.

How necessary it is to remember that Beauty istruly an Emotion, not a Sensation, we may learnfrom one of the best treatises in our language onthis subject, viz. that of Burke. This well known

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68 DISSERTATIONwork is divided into five parts. The first three arepleasing, interesting, and philosophical; but thelast two evince a woeful misapprehension of thesubject. Having previously endeavoured, and, as Iconceive, with very considerable success, to deter-mine some of the sources of Beauty and Sublimityin outward objects, the author, in the fourth part,aims at finding out what he calls the efficient cause,by which he means the immediate efiicient cause,or some link in the chain interposed between thequalities of outward objects, and the feeling ofBeauty in the Mind, which link, according to him,is a change in the state of the Body. Thus heis led to attribute the emotions of Sublimity andBeauty, the one to a contraction, the other to arelaxation of the muscular fibre This is nothingless than absurd. The cause, or immediate indispen-sable antecedent, of these emotions, is not a changein the state of the body, for then they would beSensations, not Emotions, but a change in the stateof the mind, a previous sensation or perception.Therefore, the attempt to discover the cause ofBeauty in a change in the state of the body, mustbe altogether vain and futile.*

Let us then always bear in mind these two* No less absurd is the attempt, in the Fifth Part, Of Words,

to prove that the effect of Poetry depends not at all upon the ideas itsuggests But I repeat that the first three parts of Burke's In-quiry are not only pleasing but truly philosophical.


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ON BEAUTY. 69things : firsts that the Beauty which we feel mustbe distinguished from the outward cause whichexcites it ; secondly^ that Beauty is an Emotion, nota Sensation

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Analises and Theory of Emotions - G. Ramsay

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