Analysis - ecdpm.org

European Centre for Development Policy ManagementCentre européen de gestion des politiques de développement

John SaxbyPretoria, South Africa

Capacity building for decentralisededucation service delivery inEthiopia and PakistanA comparative analysis

David Watson

A case study prepared for the project ‘Capacity, Change and Performance’

Discussion Paper No 57IJune 2005

Analysis

The lack of capacity in low-income countries is one of the mainconstraints to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.Even practitioners confess to having only a limitedunderstanding of how capacity actually develops. In 2002, thechair of Govnet, the Network on Governance and CapacityDevelopment of the OECD, asked the European Centre forDevelopment Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, theNetherlands to undertake a study of how organisations andsystems, mainly in developing countries, have succeeded inbuilding their capacity and improving performance. Theresulting study focuses on the endogenous process of capacitydevelopment - the process of change from the perspective ofthose undergoing the change. The study examines the factorsthat encourage it, how it differs from one context to another,and why efforts to develop capacity have been more successfulin some contexts than in others.

The study consists of about 20 field cases carried out accordingto a methodological framework with seven components, asfollows:• Capabilities: How do the capabilities of a group,

organisation or network feed into organisational capacity?• Endogenous change and adaptation: How do processes of

change take place within an organisation or system? • Performance: What has the organisation or system

accomplished or is it now able to deliver? The focus here ison assessing the effectiveness of the process of capacitydevelopment rather than on impact, which will beapparent only in the long term.

External context Stakeholders

Internal features andresources

External intervention

The simplified analytical framework

Co r e va r i a b l e s

Capabilities

EndogenousChange andadaptation

Performance

Study of Capacity, Change and PerformanceNotes on the methodology

• External context: How has the external context - thehistorical, cultural, political and institutional environment,and the constraints and opportunities they create - influenced the capacity and performance of theorganisation or system?

• Stakeholders: What has been the influence of stakeholderssuch as beneficiaries, suppliers and supporters, and theirdifferent interests, expectations, modes of behaviour,resources, interrelationships and intensity of involvement?

• External interventions: How have outsiders influenced theprocess of change?

• Internal features and key resources: What are the patternsof internal features such as formal and informal roles,structures, resources, culture, strategies and values, andwhat influence have they had at both the organisationaland multi-organisational levels?

The outputs of the study will include about 20 case studyreports, an annotated review of the literature, a set ofassessment tools, and various thematic papers to stimulatenew thinking and practices about capacity development. Thesynthesis report summarising the results of the case studies willbe published in 2005.

The results of the study, interim reports and an elaboratedmethodology can be consulted at www.capacity.org orwww.ecdpm.org. For further information, please contactMs Heather Baser ([email protected]).

Capacity building for decentralised education service delivery in Ethiopia and Pakistan

A comparative analysis

David WatsonAccredited Governance Consultant

Department for International Development (DfID)

In association with

Lissane Yohannes (Ethiopia) and Adnan Qader Khan (Pakistan)

A study prepared for the project Capacity, Change and Performance

June 2005

Capacity Study Analysis Discussion Paper No. 57I

iii

Contents

Acronyms iv

Introduction 1

Comparison of the case studies in Ethiopia and Pakistan 4

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) financed the field work for this paper

The European Centre forDevelopment Policy ManagementOnze Lieve Vrouweplein 21NL-6211 HE Maastricht, The Netherlands Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 [email protected] www.ecdpm.org

Discussion Paper No. 57I Capacity Study Analysis

iv

ADB Asian Development BankDAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)DfID Department for International Development (UK)ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy ManagementNGO non-governmental organisationOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentPMU project management unitPRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperSWAp sector-wide approachTA technical assistanceUSAID United States Agency for International Development

EthiopiaDfIDE Department for International Development EthiopiaEPRDF Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic FrontESDP Education Sector Development Programme MCB Ministry of Capacity BuildingMoE Ministry of EducationPSCAP Public Sector Capacity Building ProgrammePTA parent-teacher associationRCBB Regional Capacity Building BureauVSAT very small aperture terminal (satellite receiver)

PakistanCCB citizen community boardCIET Community Information Empowerment and TrainingDCO District Coordination OfficerDSP Decentralisation Support ProgrammeDfIDP Department for International Development PakistanDTCE Devolution Trust for Community EmpowermentMCB Ministry of Capacity BuildingMoE Ministry of EducationMPAs Members of the Provincial AssemblyNCHD National Commission for Human DevelopmentNRB National Reconstruction BureauNRSP National Rural Support ProgrammePESRP Punjab Education Sector Reform ProgrammePMIU Project Monitoring and Implementation Unit (of PESRP)WB World Bank

Acronyms

school completion rate of Pakistan. Ethiopia has madebetter progress in achieving equity of access for girls,and this is reflected in proportionately higher level ofliteracy among women than in Pakistan.

The private sector is a major player in the overall edu-cation system capacity in Pakistan, having boomed inresponse to demand (even from poorer households)for better quality education than the state sector pro-vides. The private sector is not currently significant inEthiopia, but it is growing player in secondary educa-tion, especially in urban areas. The key performancefactors cited as reasons for the popularity of privateschools in Pakistan is much lower teacher absen-teeism (even though the teachers are less well quali-fied, and worse paid than those employed in stateschools); better infrastructure standards, and a higherproportion of co-educational schools and womenteachers (explained by the fact that the lower payattracts fewer men).

Political background and patterns and extentof 'devolution'

The analysis of the respective histories and the emer-gence of political players and power blocs is revealing.These factors are significant determinants of capacitydevelopment potential, and the 'environment' inwhich capacity - of local government in general, andas a delivery vehicle for education in particular - canbe built. Coincidentally, both countries experienced a'shot-in-the-arm' regarding devolution at the sametime (2001), but for different reasons, and with differ-ing degrees of ownership at the crucialregional/provincial level. Up to then, neither countryhad empowered local governments.

After 2001, Ethiopian local governments were givenmuch more autonomy over (albeit inadequate) finan-cial resources and personnel. In comparison,Pakistan's devolution was, in the words of a majorstudy of the policy, 'incomplete'.

Accountability: the key to local service 'capacity'?

Both countries have put great store in enhancingcommunity accountability as a means of pressuringlocal governments to deliver better services. Contextsand strategies differ fundamentally.

1 IntroductionThis report compares the findings of the case studiesof capacity building for decentralised education serv-ice delivery in Ethiopia and Pakistan (published asECDPM Discussion Papers 57H and 57G, respectively),in accordance with the Terms of Reference. The report• summarises the main features of the two cases in

terms of the national contexts, and features of thecapacity building experiences in the two countries;

• compares the main features of the contexts andcapacity building experiences with a view to draw-ing conclusions about the apparent significance ofvarious aspects of these experiences (Figure 1 com-pares the government structures in the two coun-tries); and

• distils conclusions about what factors appear tomatter most in the relationship between capacity,change and performance, and determine the feasi-bility of building effective capacity for devolvededucation service delivery over time.

The paper is not a substitute for reading the full textsof the two cases. It is written in note form, withoutmuch of the evidence used to back up statementsand conclusions in the case study papers themselves.

The largely tabular structure of the report comparesthe two countries against a variety of features. Theright-hand column draws conclusions, and assessesthe significance of the feature concerned in relationto capacity, change and performance.

The following paragraphs attempt to pull togetherthe main strands of the 'story' in order to highlightthe main similarities, contrasts and - to the extentpermitted by the data - factors that may explain thecapacity building experiences in the two countries.

National contexts: some performance parameters; investment in education

Both Ethiopia and Pakistan are poor, categorised aslow-income countries according to the World Bank,but Pakistan has four times the per capita GNP ofEthiopia (and twice the purchasing power parity). ButEthiopia gives significantly higher priority to educa-tion, especially if measured by the proportion of GDPso allocated. Ethiopia's absolute and relative povertyaccounts for it having less than half the primary


1


2

In Pakistan the President and the NationalReconstruction Bureau (NRB) aspire to use theDevolution Trust for Community Empowerment tohelp form and mobilise citizen community boards(CCBs), which, empowered by law and access to finan-cial resources (25% of local development budgets: bydecree), will put pressure on local governments forbetter services, and indeed launch service capacity-enhancing initiatives. The National Commission forHuman Development (NCHD) will gradually establishhuman development 'incubators' and establish part-nerships among actors in the public, private and civilsociety sectors.

This strategy is to be implemented top-down in spiteof the bureaucracy, rather than through or with it. TheNRB has been suspicious of the vested interests ofbureaucrats, particularly at the provincial level, andhas been openly critical of what it sees as attempts tosubvert devolution in general and these accountabili-ty-enhancing measures in particular. There are deepproblems with representative democratic institutionsin Pakistan. Service monitoring committees of districtcouncils are still largely dysfunctional, and are caughtup in issues of political patronage that permeate alllevels of Pakistan polity. Figure 1 depicts the 'shallow-er' quantitative permeation of representative demo-cracy in the two countries: while there are approxi-mately 1000 constituents for every elected unioncouncillor in Pakistan, there are only 200 in Ethiopia.

In Ethiopia, the governing political party is (now) unit-ed since a 'renewal' in 2001. It is dominant nation-wide. It (now) reflects a policy consensus, and itsinfluence permeates all levels of government. It hasspawned several parallel strategy initiatives: full fiscaldevolution (in the better-off and larger regionalstates); a capacity building plan and correspondingadministrative structure to implement it, which seeseducation as fundamental for nation-building (andwhich is to meet needs in private and civil society sectors as well as the state sector) and an educationpolicy and sector-wide approach (SWAp), backed by aconsortium of donors. The Education SectorDevelopment Programme (ESDP) provides for educa-tion 'watchdog' institutions at local (woreda) andeven kebele levels (average population 8000), estab-lished to monitor progress with state managementand investment in education. 'Ownership' from thecommunity level upwards is reflected in sometimesextraordinary levels of community contributions (incash and in kind) for education infrastructure and

materials. There is no better foundation for tight localaccountability: communities are poor and, these con-tributions are a heavy burden. This parental invest-ment gives rise to vocal and potentially critical localstakeholders.

Capacity building: definitions, history and experience

Histories of capacity building differ. In Pakistan, acolonially imposed formula for the bureaucracy per-sists, largely unreformed. Its elite, generalist, status-cadre- and grade-conscious culture (now much lesswell remunerated than in the past) has not takenkindly to changes in local government power struc-tures at district level. Chief administrators (DCOs) areaccountable for the first time to an (albeit indirectly)elected Nazim (mayor).

Capacity building in Pakistan has been traditionally'formal, career development promotion-orientedtraining'. The many donor-supported initiatives (sum-marised in Appendix 5 of the Pakistan report) havetended to support traditional formal approaches,using off-site training as the usual vehicle. The resultshave not been encouraging. This lack of success andpoor impact on performance is in part related to themethodologies used in these programmes. A morepowerful explanatory factor is the non-supportivecontext in which trainees work, and the lack of per-formance incentives.

In Ethiopia, chronic under-investment in education inthe past and - especially since abolition of feesexpanded enrolments - the overloaded teacher work-force have meant that the education system has risenfrom a low base. The high political priority accordedto education (and the fact that it seen as integral -subordinate even - to the national capacity buildingstrategy) has meant that the 'spotlight' has been onthe key players at the regional state and woredalevels. They are empowered in terms of autonomyover resource use (although they are very short ofresources) and have unambiguous responsibilities todeliver better education to a public that backs theeducation of their children with their own cash. Theseplayers 'have nowhere to hide' in accountabilityterms. They innovate and try to do their best as aresult. The indigenous gemgema system of individualperformance assessment and review - introduced byone of the main liberation groups during the civil war


3

against the Derg - is applied rigorously against thisbackground. It appears to be more pervasive, effectiveand potentially intimidating than formal civil serviceperformance appraisal systems.

Responses of local governments to the neweducation service delivery challenges

Comprehensive, convincing evidence is currently lack-ing in both countries. Neither country has objectivelyresearched information on how and why local govern-ment performance is responding to the pressures andchanges taking place. The indications are that more,favourable, and faster change is taking place inEthiopia. The Ministry of Capacity Building plans astudy of local realities and responses since 2001.Pakistan has undertaken an important baseline sur-vey of the opinions of all district populations aboutthe services they receive. The results will be invaluablefor tracking progress with both 'demand' and 'supply'sides of the strategy for delivering better servicesthrough devolution.

Learning from capacity building experience

Neither country appears to be learning systematicallyfrom their experiences of capacity building. This issurprising, particularly in Ethiopia, where a dedicatedMinistry of Capacity Building has been established. Ithas more positive examples of progress in practicalcapacity building than does Pakistan, despite a short-er history and far fewer examples of capacity buildingactivities.

Ethiopia poses the more propitious environment forgradual build-up of local capacities - and the capaci-ties of capacity-providing institutions - than Pakistan.To some extent this depends on recognition at federallevel that innovation in capacity building approachesshould be encouraged. Paradoxically, the capacitychallenges appear most formidable (and under-recog-nised) at that level in Ethiopia.

In Pakistan, not only is the local environment for ser-vice delivery more fraught and complex in terms ofperverse incentives, but also capacity building institu-tions are caught up in the formal bureaucraticapproach to 'training as capacity building'. The mech-anisms by which they are financed in the public sec-

tor offer no incentives for innovation, responsivenessto local realities, or collaboration with private or civilsociety sectors. Pakistan therefore faces a real capaci-ty building dilemma. The needs are clearly huge, butthe socio-economic constraints on the establishmentof institutions in the vanguard of transformation ofservice delivery - citizen community boards (CCBs) -are ill-understood and apparently underestimated.Long experience of the National Rural SupportProgramme in trying to form and support communityorganisations is not encouraging. There are few agen-cies that are either equipped, or - with the style oftop-down strategy planned - empowered, to tacklethe demands for CCB mobilisation creatively.

Implications for donors

The implication of both cases is that donors can andshould do more to ensure that national capacitybuilding strategies evolve in the light of comparativeinternational experience. In Ethiopia, DfID sponsoreda comparative study of experiences in local govern-ment capacity building, which was bypassed due totime constraints. In Pakistan, even after so mucheffort and expenditure devoted to capacity building inthe past, the field is 'wide open' to discussion, demon-stration and analysis of constructive and positiveexamples from elsewhere. The present ECDPM studyand case studies will provide an important resource inthis regard.

Epilogue, April 2005

At the request of DfID Pakistan (DfIDP), betweenDecember 2004 and January 2005 the authors com-piled a supplementary policy paper based on thePakistan/Punjab report for consideration by Punjabprovincial government.1 The paper focused on twopositive case studies of capacity building in Punjab:the Project Monitoring and Implementation Unit(PMIU) of the Punjab Education Sector ReformProgramme (PESRP), and the Policy and Strategy Unitof the Strengthening Decentralised Local Governmentin Faisalabad project.

Notes1 David Watson and Adnan Khan (2005) Capacity and

Capacity Building in the Punjab for Devolved EducationService Delivery: Comparing current approaches withinternational experience; deriving possible pointers for policyand future action in the Punjab. Discussion Paper for DfIDPakistan (available on request from Nargis Sultana atDfIDP).


4

FEATURE COMPARED

Basic data &key education performanceindicators2

Political context and background(especially regarding devolution)

Comparison of the case studies in Ethiopia and PakistanETHIOPIAAMHARA REGIONAL STATE

Population:country 67 million, Amhara 17millionGNP per capita 2002: $100 / ppp$720Aid as % of central governmentexpenditure 2001: 39.3%% literacy 2001: aggregate 40%,f/m,3 67%% GDP on education 1998-2000:4.8%% budget on education 13.8%Primary school completion rate2001: 24%Primary school enrolment rate f/m2001: 77%3Public/private schools (Amhara)12,471/491

The country was not colonised fora significant period (except for fiveyears during the Italian invasionduring World War II). The currentgovernment is led by freedomfighters who displaced adictatorial military regime in 1992after a bloody civil war from 1975to 1991.

The 1995 Constitution provides fora federal structure: federal andregional state constitutions, andelected assemblies/councils. Inretrospect, 1995-2001 was a periodof deconcentration below regionallevel: the regions were dominantplayers.

After a crisis in the ruling partyEPRDF, 'renewal' in 2001 putgreater emphasis on political andfiscal devolution to the woreda andkebele levels4 to improve service

PAKISTANPUNJAB PROVINCE

Population:country 145 million, Punjab 70millionGNP per capita 2002: $410 / ppp$1940Aid as % of central governmentexpenditure 2001: 16.2%% literacy 2001: aggregate 44%;f/m, 49%% GDP on education 1998-2000:1.8%% budget on education: 7.8%Primary school completion rate2001: 59%Primary school enrolment rate, f/m2001: 74%3Public/private schools (Punjab):63,000/18,400 (under-counted:Management Association estimate= 55,000)

Colonial British administration upto partition from India in 1947. The1973 Constitution recognises onlyfederal and provincial levels. Afterindependence, successivegovernments never effectivelydevolved power or significantresources to local governments;any reforms were introduced intop-down fashion.

The military government that tookover in late 1999 introducedconstitutional amendments,including limitations on thepowers of provincial governmentsto amend local governmentordinances without presidentialapproval for a fixed period. Adevolution plan was introduced bythe President through the NRB inAugust 2001 for communityempowerment, bottom-upaccountability, and improved

ANALYSIS OR CONCLUSIONREGARDING SIGNIFICANCE

Both countries are 'low-incomecountries', with HumanDevelopment Index rankings:Ethiopia 169, Pakistan 144 (out of175 countries).

Pakistan is richer, more indebted,and less aid dependent, but spendssignificantly less of its GDP percapita and budget on education,and its literacy rate is only slightlyhigher than that in Ethiopia (andcomparatively worse for women;women in Pakistan are half aslikely as men to be literate). It has asignificantly better primaryeducation completion rate, butproportionately fewer girls areenrolled than boys.

History matters for capacitydevelopment, in terms of national'stock' and 'ownership',policytowards capacity building,andabilities to absorb change.While both countries experienced a'shot in the arm' with devolution andcapacity-building imperatives atabout the same time, the political'ownership' of the national goalstowards which policy was workingdiffered:Ethiopia's was more widelyshared (through the EPRDF's partydiscipline and communication chain)and apparently consensual than inPakistan. It has appreciably 'deeper'representative democracy structuresthan Pakistan: the ratio of thepopulation to each locally electedrepresentative is 1:200 in Ethiopia,compared with 1:1000 in Pakistan.

In the latter case,suspicions of therecentralising motives of the

Notes2 In order to ensure comparability, data taken from the World

Bank World Development Report 2004 (Tables 1-7) unlessotherwise stated.

3 From UNDP Human Development Report 2003.4 Government structures in the two countries are compared

in Figure 1.


5

Key institutions introduced as part of devolution policy and strategy

Main changes brought about bydevolution

delivery. The politburo 'purge' leftthe EPRDF united and stronger.This, and the placement of keyofficials at federal, regional andworeda levels (including theMinistry of Capacity Building andits bureaux) meant that policy andpriorities for capacity buildingcould be taken forwardconsistently at all four levels ofgovernment.

• Ministry of Capacity Building (and its regional state and woreda level offices);

• education and training boards (at woreda and kebele levels)

• Unconditional grants toworedas in four main regions(and Benishangul-Gumuz).

• Responsibilities for planningand managing basic servicesassigned to woredas.

• Formalisation of kebele level ofgovernment with electedbodies, and distinct role andinstitutions

• Reserved seats for women at

service delivery. The role of theprovince was imprecisely definedin this plan. Emphasis was insteadplaced on new bodies outsidegovernment, including citizencommunity boards, whose roleswere to apply pressure on (local)governments, and identify anddevelop projects and initiatives,which qualify for funding from the25% of local development budgetsreserved for that purpose.

• National Reconstruction Bureau (spearheading devolution)

• National Commission for Human Development(promoting human development incubators)

• Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (promoting citizen community boards)

• elected union councils• school councils

• Establishment of popularly elected union councils (6000+)

• Reserved seats for women and vulnerable groups (33%)

• indirectly elected heads of district councils (Nazims)

• Reduction in powers of districtcoordinating officer and subordination to Nazims.

bureaucracy persist.The approachadopted in Pakistan could becharacterised as introducingdevolution in spite of thebureaucracy,not through it.Therewas considerable opposition to thedevolution plan on the part of vestedinterests within the political andbureaucratic establishment,particularly at provincial level,whichmany thought stood to gain nothingin terms of power or resources fromthe plan.since 2001 more appears tohave changed operationally at locallevel in Ethiopia than in Pakistan.

Both countries embarked ondevolution at about the same time(2001) although for differentreasons. New institutions wereintroduced in both cases. Ethiopia'snew institutions were both withingovernment (at all levels), focusedon promoting accountability, andoutside government (educationand training boards).

Pakistan's institutionalinnovations were driven from thecentre, principally via the NRB,NCHD and DTCE, with the aim ofraising awareness, empowermentand mobilisation to enhanceaccountability of public bodies.Over 6000 elected union councilswere a crucial aspect of this localempowerment thrust.

Both countries' reforms recognisedthat government needed to bemore accountable to the public ifservices were to be moreresponsive. In both cases, womenwere to be actively supported. OnlyEthiopia's reforms provideddiscretionary financial resources tolocal government, and localauthority over staff. Pakistan'slocal governments remained


6

Notions of capacity and capacitybuilding

Capacity challenges and roles atvarious levels

regional and sub-regional levels(approximately 25%)

The current capacity buildingstrategy evolved after considerabledialogue with a variety of nationaland international stakeholders. Ithas three (ideally mutuallysupportive) elements: humancapacity, systems and procedures.

The new system of unconditionalblock grants has made animportant contribution todevelopment of capacities at locallevel. Ethiopia has an indigenoussystem of appraisal of anindividual's contribution to theorganisation's goals, and workingrelationships with colleagues(gemgema).

There are indications of capacityconstraints, functional overloadand detachment from localrealities at the federal level,particularly in the Ministry ofEducation (MoE). The Ministry ofCapacity Building (MCB)apparently exhibits these featuresto a lesser degree.

At the regional level, and recentlyat woreda level, although capacityconstraints are still real, pressuresof political accountability arekeenly felt, and appear to be actingas a spur to performance within(pressing) resource constraints. Thepolitical consensus (thatdevolution must be made to work,and local accountability structureshave an important role to play inthis) is a helpful feature of thiscontext.

Although we have witnesseddetermined attempts to make

No formal definition or apparentdiscussion of what capacity or'capacity building' is. The NRB chairsaw it as a process of popularempowerment to provide theability and confidence to holdgovernment to account.Otherwise, particularly in thepublic sector, it is seen as (oftenoff-the-job) 'training' to provideknowledge and skills to performjobs better.

There are some indications that areduced appetite for and cynicismare setting in regarding the over-supply of 'training'.

Education was organised atprovincial and local levels evenbefore devolution. But there is stilla (diminishing) tendency for'vertical programmes' to be runfrom federal and provincial levels,and a (continuing) tendency forprovincial interference inpersonnel and financialmanagement matters of districts,both of which undermine the spiritof devolution.

The role of the federal andprovincial levels have not beenofficially reappraised sincedevolution was introduced in 2001.District-level functions ineducation are poorly defined. TheECDPM case study proposed amore comprehensive set of districtfunctions for officialconsideration.

Although the capacity burdens areat district and union levels,

restricted in terms of authorityover staff, and discretionaryfinance.

Ethiopia focused explicitly on the'capacity' issue as an element of itsdevelopment strategy and, at itsown initiative, sought internationalassistance to support it.

In Pakistan, traditions of formaltraining within the civil service,and the history of many donor-supported interventions, has led tothe belief (verging on faith) that'training' is a good thing. This hascontributed to an almost ritualisticapproach to training.

Devolution has led to the biggestchanges at local government level.Local government reactions tothese challenges are notdocumented in Ethiopia, but betterstudied in Pakistan. In bothcountries, the implications forchange and performanceimprovement at the federal(ministry) level are not beingpursued with as much attention asthey merit. There is a need forlearning and sharing of experienceon capacity-related issues at locallevel in both countries.

The policy imperative in Pakistan isto establish and support bodiesoutside local governmentstructures (CCBs) to put pressureson it to perform, in a hithertoinauspicious environment for localaccountability and responsiveness.

In Ethiopia the major challenge isto relieve the chronic overload on


7

Examples and approaches tocapacity building adopted so far

devolution work, and heard avariety of descriptions of how thevarious actors at local level areresponding to the policy, there islittle objective, rigorouscomparative evidence of howlevels of local government areresponding (and performing)under devolution. The MCB planssuch a study. There is little detailedinformation available to analysts(government or donor) at thecentre of magnitudes of financialresource flows for educationservices to, and their use by, localgovernments.

The 'capacity' for educationservices rests predominantly in thestate; the private sector iscomparatively a minor player.There have been a few major(bilaterally supported) capacitybuilding efforts. One imminentpublic sector capacity buildinginitiative is related directly andindirectly to devolved educationservices. Several analyses ofcapacities and performance in thesector have been undertaken, most(but not all) with donor support.

While there are no impact analysesof these programmes, thereappears to be appreciation of theway they have contributed tocapacities at regional and sub-regional levels, and some evidenceof positive outcomes onperformance (especially onfinancial management).

There was no evidence that theresults of, and lessons emergingfrom these initiatives are beingshared. A DfID-supportedinventory of capacity buildingchallenges, experiences andcapacities in Ethiopia and

learning from experience is takingplace slowly, against a backdrop offederal suspicion of bureaucraticobstruction of devolution andpopular empowerment.

An official response is awaited to amajor study of progress indevolution by the World Bank,Asian Development Bank and DfID.This study did not focus oncapacity issues per se, but soughtto analyse the institutional,resource management, politicaland bureaucratic factors that areimpeding performance in thedevolution policy context.

Pakistan has a long history, andmany examples, of capacitybuilding initiatives within the statesector, usually involving majortraining components, often withdonor support. The civil service hasa well-developed network offormal training establishments.

Needs analyses appeared toignore fundamental operational,management-ownership,systemic, regulatory, authority-over-resource, 'political' andincentive obstacles to applicationof knowledge and skills derivedfrom training.

Conclusions of impact analyses oftraining or capacity building havegenerally been negative. Severalprogramme evaluations identifiedobstacles to the effectivetranslation of trainingprogrammes into improved joband organisational performance,or indicated that there was noobservable evidence of behaviourchange.

One positive example (the trainingof enumerators for the service

the primary education systemcapacity through provision of morefinancial resources (to permitdeployment of more teachers). Inbetter-off regions, communitiesdemonstrate a sometimesremarkable willingness tocontribute to the educationinfrastructure and even materials.

The emphasis on building capacityof (education) service deliverysystems is a relatively recentphenomenon in both countries.Neither country has yet analysedits experience with capacitybuilding, or examined its apparentimpact on organisational orindividual performance.

The private sector in Pakistan is amajor component of aggregateeducation sector capacity. There islittle evidence of constructive stateregulation and support of thiscapacity.

Pakistan has more experience withtraining (labelled there usually ascapacity building) efforts thanEthiopia, and these initiatives arewell documented.

Pakistan has introduced the notionof service delivery surveys.Through the application ofsystematic training, capacity inPunjab and elsewhere has beenestablished to repeat thesesurveys. This offers the prospect ofregular monitoring of trends inpublic opinion, and more evidence-


8

Significance of factors affectingcapacity, change and performance

elsewhere was undertaken, but itwas not given the exposureplanned.

It appears that the 'learning fromexperience' function of theMinistry of Capacity Building is yetto be performed: there is noevidence yet that the agency isacting as a 'clearing house' forcapacity building experiences. Itsregional offices have supportedcapacity building of accountability-enhancing bodies.

Factors that have led to some'successes' and have beenappreciated, from the experiencesof several bilaterally supportedlocal government/ educationservice capacity building initiativesappear to have been:• consultant/trainers' long

experience and knowledge oflocal realities, and customisingnew or modified systems tothose realities;

• involvement of regional officesin programme preparation;

• follow-up of off-job training inthe workplace by trainers tofacilitate application of newsystems or skills, and'troubleshooting' problems;

• the timeliness of theseinitiatives, in relation to

delivery survey) was not itself aprimary capacity buildinginitiative, but is neverthelesssymbolic of what can be achievedwhen operational factors arefavourable, and implementers arenot constrained by prevailingconditions in the public services.

There was no evidence of theseevaluations being shared, or theirconclusions being discussed. Inonly one case was a decisivemanagement action taken as aresult of an evaluation (non-continuation of the in-serviceteacher training programme).While the Devolution SupportProgramme is attempting todevelop a 'demand-led market' fortraining, there are no indications ofhow applicants (including districtgovernments) will be informed ofthe negative results of earlierefforts.

Positive factors that led to theeffective preparation and buildingof capacities of CIET's surveyenumerators included:• clear specification of the tasks to

be undertaken based on pre-tested survey instruments;

• trainees qualified to undertakethe training and roles;

• only those who performed wellwere selected for field teams;

• practical, task-based simulationtraining sessions were heldunder supervision and withfeedback, in off- and on-siteconditions, until tasks weredemonstrably mastered;

• staff who did not meet definedperformance criteria in the fieldwere dismissed and replaced;

• close supervision.

based dialogue between (politicaland bureaucrat) policy makers,service providers and users.

User surveys are planned in Ethiopiaas part of the public sector capacitybuilding programme.

The WB/ADB/DfID devolutionstudy analysed factors that areimpeding the implementation ofthe policy, and cast light onnumerous systemic obstacles.

Only one distillation of previouscapacity building and/or trainingactivities has been attempted, inEthiopia. This also addressed howbest to address the capacityimplications of devolution. Eventhis was not shared adequately ordiscussed as widely as intended.

In both countries, there is potentialfor much more discussion of whatcapacity building is, and whatlessons can be drawn from earlierexperiences.

There are positive examples ofbuilding capacities in bothcountries, but in neither case havethe factors that led to success beeneffectively or explicitly distilledand 'publicised'. Nor have theimplications for future (larger-scale) efforts been discussed andinternalised by the key players.

The WB/ADB/DfID study inPakistan clarified the factors itidentified as fundamentalproblems. They help to explainwhy, without urgent and criticalconsideration, conventional'training' approaches to capacitybuilding will continue to producedisappointing results in terms oforganisational and individualperformance.


9

External context

pressures for accountabilityfrom the top as well as thebottom of the delivery system;

• approaches are practical andrelate directly to tasks andoutputs that participants haveto tackle at work;

• groups of colleagues are invitedto be trainees and then work asteams.

Several factors provide a generallysupportive context for capacitydevelopment at local and regionallevels in the medium term,including:• the clarity of regional states'

autonomous status provided bythe constitution;

• dominant party politicalconsensus on the importance ofeducation in nation anddemocracy building;

• long-standing education policy • unconditional fiscal devolution;

and• strong local accountability

HIV/AIDS is an increasinglysignificant negative influence oncapacity development andmaintenance at all levels.

One of the most pressing externalfactors affecting capacity andperformance in the educationsystem is the poverty of thecountry in terms of financialresources, in particular the dearthof resources for financingeducation services. Quantitativepressures on teachers, and thepoor state of infrastructure aresevere constraints.

As 'supplier' of future generations'core professional capacities, thehigher education system needs anoverhaul. The costs of highereducation are high; its efficiency,

The WB/ADB/DfID study ofdevolution cast light on how theinfluences on capacity, change andperformance have so far appearedto operate negatively in Pakistan.All of the factors in the ECDPMmodel appear to be significant.

The external environment forcapacity development to enhanceperformance at local level forservice delivery is in generaladverse in Pakistan. Thebureaucracy still exhibitscharacteristics forged duringcolonial times: it is an elite, with abias towards generalists, besetwith a cadre system that iscounter-productive; 'bottom-heavy' (excessive numbers ofunskilled officers), and (therefore)prone to 'political' pressure forpatronage-based employment,and to political interference instaff administration.

In the past low priority has beenaccorded to educationdevelopment at federal level(regardless of which political partywas dominant). The recentdemonstration of politicalpreferences at the local level is notfavourable to education: short-pay-off projects in water or electricalinfrastructure tend to be preferred.

Public awareness and expectationsof, and amount of informationabout, education service deliveryare modest. Socio-economic, socio-political, literacy and genderdisparities are pronounced. Recentexperience of the Rural SupportProgramme indicates that this hasaffected the capacity of localcommunities to forge social

Like Ethiopia, Pakistan has nohistory of effective devolution ofpolitical and fiscal powers toelected local governments.In both cases, therefore, thecapacity challenges of a devolvededucation service delivery aresignificant.

However, the balance of prevailingexternal contextual factors impliesthat Ethiopia is in a better positionthan Pakistan to make strides inbuilding capacities, and inimproving system performance atthe local level.

The factors that constrain progressin Pakistan are inherently political,bureaucratic and socio-cultural.This means that they are lessamenable to resources- ortechnically oriented inputs thanthose that constrain Ethiopia.

The strategy employed by thecurrent Pakistan government -community empowermentthrough the establishment of CCBs- has to be implemented in a socio-economic and local context wherepast experience indicates thatnewly forged social groupings arefragile and take time and effort tosustain.


10

External interventions

accountability and responsivenesspoor.

All major recent capacity buildinginitiatives, respective needsanalyses, and programme designexercises have been undertakenwith the help of donors.Notwithstanding a gradualtendency for donors to adoptbudget support modalities,'projects' survive in significantnumbers in the Ministry ofEducation.

The Public Sector Capacity BuildingProgramme (PSCAP) and EducationSector Development Programme(ESDP) are intended to address ahistory in the 1990s of ad hoc,poorly coordinated 'gap-filling'exercises in which donors pursuedtheir own priorities and fads, and ofthe passive, laissez-faire attitude ofthe government.

Donor preferences for SWAps(represented by the ESDP) carry risksof duplication of capacity buildingefforts in generic functions of localgovernments (e.g. financialmanagement).These risks appear tobe mitigated in Ethiopia by positivecapacity building progress in thisfinancial management functionthrough the DecentralisationSupport Activity,a USAID-supportedprogramme under the Civil ServiceReform Programme.

The ESDP is a joint donor-government programme with anelaborate design and joint reviewmission mechanisms.

'Tools' to support capacities forprogramme implementation arebeing developed with externalagency support (e.g. the ESDPproject implementation manual).

partnerships for a commonpurpose.

There have been many externallysupported initiatives, some ofthem very large (e.g. the SocialAction Programme), to supportinvestment in capacitydevelopment to improve servicedelivery systems.

(Capacity) needs analyses do notappear to take full cognisance ofthe factors that constrain publicsector capacities and performance.A dichotomy is becoming apparentbetween the government andexternally supported approachesto capacity development. Mostgovernment resources are directedto efforts to build communityorganisations (CCBs) or localpartnerships betweengovernment, civil society and theprivate sector (NationalCommission for HumanDevelopment incubators).

External agencies have supportedpublic sector administrationcapacity development in the main.

There is a growing awarenessamong donors of the apparentlylimited effectiveness of capacitydevelopment efforts in the past,and is leading to some innovativeapproaches. For example,• In the Decentralisation Support

Programme (DSP), the ADBemphasises stimulation ofdemand for support in buildingcapacities. It is using a capacity-oriented programme as a vehiclefor stimulating policy dialoguebetween stakeholders atdifferent levels of the statesystem.

• DfID is supporting a 'third-party'evaluation of the in-service

The governance-related influencesof historically and externallyinduced systems (particularly thebureaucracy) have been strong inPakistan, but relatively weak inEthiopia. This is despite the latter'srelatively higher currentdependency on donor support.Both countries illustrate some ofthe characteristics of donorprogrammes and their foibles,which are not conducive toeffective capacity development:• A drive for comprehensiveness

and complexity.• Pressure for measurable results

in a limited time frame.• Consequent succumbing to the

temptation to use 'PMU'approaches (projectmanagement units outside andin parallel to counterpart stateagencies). The results at leastfrom the Punjab case are not allnegative, however. But inEthiopia the project modalitystill aggravates severe capacityconstraints at the centre.

• The lack of appreciation of theextent to which 'external'political, historical, andsystemic/context factors mayconstrain the responsiveness ofindividual sectors ororganisations in a statebureaucracy, and theirwillingness to change andadapt.

• The inability or unwillingness toterminate or interrupt supportwhen significant mutuallyagreed terms are not met bygovernment.

• Past interruptions in donorsupport, for reasons other thanpoor progress or weakcompliance in joint development


11

Stakeholders

Even within elaborately constructed'SWAp' vehicles (such as PSCAP)donor coordination andharmonisation - especiallyregarding TA operations - is elusive.Bilateral agencies tend to retaincontrol over TA resources and areapparently reluctant to pool them.

The protracted preparation process(18 months) of the PSCAP artificiallyraised expectations of the RegionalCapacity Building Bureaux (RCBBs),but never engaged effectively withkey service sectors (education andhealth), nor did it take on board theimportant questions regardingcapacity development strategyposed by a DfID-sponsoredinternational comparative study oflocal government capacity building.

Appendix 5 of the Ethiopia reportsketches the problems, delays andfrustrations associated with theinterplay among donor regulationsand internal policy conflicts, limitedgovernment managementcapacities, and stilted coordinationbetween donors and 'their' projectsand consultants.

Roles of the two main protagonists:federal and regional stategovernments are constitutionallydefined. Lower-level governmentroles in education services aredefined clearly in MoE guidelines.

Changes in the role of federalgovernment agencies/ ministries,and restructuring due to devolution(and capacity implications) appearto have been little discussed (up tonow).The MoE appears to have majorcapacity problems, which may ormay not be addressed by current

teacher training programme inPunjab. It is also supporting anexperimental 'organisationaldevelopment' approach to LGdevelopment in Faisalabad,designed to avoid the usualproblems with TA, and toencourage facilitation ofindigenous capacities andknowledge, rather than itssubstitution by external'products'.

• The (World Bank-led) Devolutionin Pakistan study is unusual inthat it was spontaneouslyrequested by government, andwas rigorously conducted 'in-house' by the staff of threecooperation agencies (notconsultants). It was thereforemore thorough than thoseagencies would have permittedconsultants to be. The study isbeginning to have positive spin-offs in terms of raisingawareness of devolution policyand service delivery within thethree agencies.

• The President has justestablished a high-level group toreview progress in devolution.Ostensibly, the Devolution reportwill be considered by that group.

At the federal level, the NRB hasplayed a crucial role in designingthe devolution policy, puttingsystems in place, orienting keyplayers at all levels, driving forwardimplementation of the Presidentialvision of communityempowerment (through CCBs andservice delivery surveys), and theproduction of an impressive arrayof guidelines and trainingmanuals.

There is notable (mutual) distrustbetween the NRB, provincialgovernments, some politicians and

programmes, which havedisrupted ongoing capacitydevelopment programmes andaffected mutual trust betweendonors and governments.

• Apparent difficulties in pursuingpolicy dialogue on the basis ofcomparative internationalexperience (for reasons whichare unclear).

• The lack of consensus withindonor agencies about themerits, desirability andfeasibility of devolution as ameans towards the end ofimproved service delivery.

On the positive side, donors have acrucial role to play in supportingobjective evaluations and impactassessments of past capacitybuilding efforts. It is unfortunatethat this has not yet happened inEthiopia, and that in Pakistan, theresults - with one exception -appear to have been inadequatelydisseminated, discussed and actedupon.

The 'centre of gravity' of educationservice development appears to bethe woreda government inEthiopia, which is on the wholeconstructively supported byregional state governments.

In both countries, the role of thefederal Ministry of Educationappears overdue for review,restructuring and rationalisationof staffing.The private sector is important as aservice provider, but it is not apolitically influential player in theeducation sector in Pakistan. In


12

internally commissionedorganisational analysis activity.

Most MCB efforts appear to havebeen devoted to PSCAP formulation,and setting up regional bureauxand woreda offices.The MCBappears little engaged inmonitoring or learning fromongoing (donor-supported) localgovernment/education capacitydevelopment efforts.

For both ministries, keeping intouch with diverse regionaldevelopments will be a majorchallenge in the future.

The Amhara regional stategovernment - with its constitutionalempowered status - appears to be amajor source of innovation(including in performanceenhancement through incentives),and to have benefited from theaccountability pressure of an activeregional state council.

Woreda governments also haveactive accountability mechanismsand, at least in better-off regions,support from communities in theform of contributions for educationinfrastructure and even materials.Unmet or dissatisfied demand foreducation is not yet manifested inrural areas in private primaryschools, although private secondaryschools are increasingly in evidence:and not just in urban environments.

Education and training boards at theworeda and kebele levels,and parent-teacher associations are empoweredin relation to teachers and oversightof schools.The MCB and its regionalbureaux have been charged withtheir development andstrengthening.

key cadres of the bureaucracy. Thisis manifest in the NRB's reluctanceto countenance practicalobjections or suggestions and, incertain cases, even to engage indiscussion about theimplementation of aspects ofpolicy components.

The federal MoE has yet to addressthe need for it to change its roleand restructure accordingly.

The key stakeholders at provinciallevel appear to be politicians (ChiefMinister of Punjab and MPAs). Theprovincial education department(as is normal among provincialdepartments) routinely interfereswith district government becauseit still effectively controls theirsenior staff.

The chemistry of the interactionbetween the (new) political playerat district level (the Nazim) and the(newly constrained) districtcoordinating officer isfundamentally important as adeterminant of how services aredelivered.

The private sector is a major playerin education in the Punjab, but it isyet to be adequately andconstructively regulated andencouraged by the provincialgovernment.

Teachers are important politicallyinfluential actors at provincial anddistrict levels. They have tended inthe past to dominate proceedingsof (now defunct) schoolmanagement committees.

Ethiopia it is growing inquantitative importance only insecondary education.

Teachers in Ethiopia have so farbeen more amenable than theircounterparts in Pakistan inperforming their jobs, and incooperating with employers andlocal communities. The 'gemgema'system of organisational andindividual performanceassessments may have played arole in this. Since 1998 PTAs havebeen more empowered than theirequivalents in Pakistan.

In both countries, the importanceof the role of the head teacher as aleader, motivator, positiveexample, and quality controller isbecoming more apparent, andattention is at last being given tothem as a focus for assistance andadvice.


13

Internal management We concluded there are multipledimensions to the problem ofstructure and staffing of thefederal civil service including thelack of management and supportstaff of required competence tosupport technical professionals;and 'people management' factors(e.g. unwillingness to delegate orplan work).

Organisational developmentapproaches to capacity building(advocated by the DfIDE-sponsoredstudy of local government capacitybuilding) appear to be worth trying.

The MCB is clearly responsible forthe coordination of capacitybuilding strategies. Learning fromongoing (donor-supported)programmes should come withinthis brief, but they have attractedlittle attention so far.

A series of ongoing (and hithertounevaluated) approaches toimproving human resourcemanagement is being piloted atfederal level. Regional governments(with their own civil servicecommissions) are not bound bythese experiments and are pursuingtheir own.Emerging problems with themanagement of informationbetween levels of government maybe addressed by future activation ofVSAT satellite connectivity of alladministrative centres.This facilityoffers significant, but only partiallyexplored, potential for capacitydevelopment.

Procurement procedural problemswill emerge in poorer regions andworedas where there will have to bemore reliance on contractors forinfrastructure construction.

Staff 'pooling' systems for common

The WB/ADB/DfID Devolutionstudy devoted a lot of attention(50 pages) to the issue ofincentives, particularly perverse orabsent incentives to performanceat all levels of the delivery system,but particularly district level. Itconcluded that devolution hasmade little impression onprevailing patterns.

Morale amongst senioradministrative staff at district levelhas suffered.Their authority inrelation to elected Nazims has beenreduced. Education officers' loyaltiesare more to provincial educationoffices, rather than districtgovernments. There are few matterswhere district administrators havediscretion without referral upwardsto the province.

The budgeting system isdysfunctional,split into recurrentand development expenditures.Theformer is largely payroll and is thuscontrolled by the province; the latteris very limited and often allocatedwithout regard to the routinebudget,or development priorities,but instead divided equally amongcouncil members,who then allocateit to 'pet constituency schemes'.Absenteeism among teachers is amajor problem.The significantfactors that have affectedperformance, morale andprofessionalism are:• the perceived (low) status of

teaching as a career;• loose or non-existent supervision;• weak local accountability;• often very poor infrastructure;• absence of effective in-service

training and support;• political influence; and• weak voice mechanisms at the

level of monitoring committees atdistrict and union levels, and thenew formula for school councils in

The basic patterns ofaccountability at local governmentlevel - the key variable in 'internalmanagement' issues - are sound inEthiopia, but not in Pakistan. In thelatter case, this affects incentivesperversely, with disastrous results.

Unless the issues researched andanalysed at length in theDevolution in Pakistan study areaddressed, conventionalapproaches to capacity buildingwill (continue to) be futile.

In Ethiopia, the centre is in mosturgent need of analysis of thecausal factors behind its endemicweaknesses. Problems at regionaland woreda levels are moreamenable to conventionalinjections of resources, guidance,equipment and supervision fromthe regional level.


14

Core conclusions

services in the woredas appear to bea pragmatic approach to staffshortages, and the limited budgetsto employ them.

Staff turnover problems areunquantified at present. At woredalevel they could well emerge incadres provided with commerciallyvaluable training in future.

We conclude that:• No definitive causal

connections can be drawnabout improved performance,(past) capacity building inputs,or the changes brought about.Little learning (about whatworks, what doesn't and why)in capacity building is takingplace. Firm evidence related toservice delivery performanceand the underlying factors isalso scarce.

• The reform efforts beingundertaken are serious, andfully 'owned' throughoutgovernment structures.

• Since the late 1990s there hasbeen a marked change in theattitude of regions towards theworedas.

• The existence of a range ofpositive, mutually supportivefactors in favour oforganisational change andimproved performance,including:- unconditional block grants

for woredas- firm constitutional

underpinnings of regionalgovernment;

- (political) consensus oneducation and its priority atleast since the late 1990s;

- the possibility of incentivesfor, and priority attached to,capacity building;

- the low incidence of petty

the Punjab is largely untested.

Many members of the 'stock' ofeducation officers are unsuited fortheir managerial responsibilities:they are approaching retirement,have no management background,and are political pawns manipulatedby council members and under theinfluence of MPAs.

Our conclusions are that:• No definitive causal connections

can be drawn about improvedperformance, (past) capacitybuilding inputs, or the changesbrought about. Little learning(about what works, what doesn'tand why) in capacity building istaking place.

• Incentives facing principalstakeholders and players matter.The factors that limited theeffectiveness of a range of pastcapacity building efforts stillappear to be as real now as theywere then. Factors that have beenmentioned as important negativeinfluences on potential fordelivery performanceimprovements include the lack of:- provincial ownership of the

reforms;- regime stability;- political maturity;- links between plans and

budgets;- continuity of senior staff;- trust- integrity and objectivity; and- and management authority

over staff.• Given the magnitude of the

political imperative for communalempowerment andaccountability, time is of theessence, but social re-engineeringtakes time.

• Cynicism about 'training' is(justifiably) setting in; 'capacity

The cases do not reveal reliable dataor empirically backed insights intothe relationship between capacity(building) and the performance oforganisations or service deliverysystems.They do,however,cast lighton the conditions under whichcapacities can be said to exist or tothrive, if given certain types ofsupport.

All four factors hypothesised topay a significant role in affectingthe relationship between capacity,change and performance appearto be important. Their relativeimportance varies according to thehistorical, constitutional politicaland socio-economic context.

Political competition or rivalry canbe deeply problematic, particularlyif it extends to interference inadministrative or staffing matters.This is compounded if popularaccountability is weak, and ifresources are not 'cleanly' andunambiguously devolved to thelevel of government at which theyneed to be allocated, utilised andaccounted for.

Mechanisms exist, and arebeginning to be used in bothcountries for conditional grantswhich - for the first time in thecase of Pakistan - are ensuring thata core national priority isadequately resourced.


15

political interference;- public pressure and

accountability; and- the fact that major concerns

about 'capacity' are at thecentre rather than at locallevel.

building' is becoming a devaluedcurrency.The recent $60 millionfederal government programme(with minimal conditionality)sends the wrong signals.

There appears to be scope in bothcountries for internationallyreferenced high-level policydialogue on international capacitybuilding 'lessons of experience' towhich the present ECDPM studycould contribute. This dialoguewould provide the first-everopportunity for the stakeholdersto reflect on 'what works and why'in capacity building.

Figure 1. Comparison of government structures in Ethiopia and Pakistan.

ETHIOPIA

Federal Government

Regional State (11)Amhara (population 17.2 million)

Woreda (537)Amhara 105

Average population 164,000

Kebele (approx. 10,000)Amhara 2000?

Average population 7000-8000?Average 40 members,

26.7% women in Tigray (2002)Average voters per elected member <200

PAKISTAN

Federal Government

Province (4)Punjab (population 70 million)

District (97)Punjab 33

Average population 1.44 million

Union (6022)Punjab 3453

Average population approx. 20,00021 members, 27.6% women in Punjab

Average voters per elected member approx. 1000

Date post:	18-Dec-2021
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	2 times
Download:	0 times

Analysis - ecdpm.org

Documents