POPULATION DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONFLICT:

A CROSS NATIONAL STUDY OF POPULATION AND WAR

A Summary

Nazli Choucri Vassachusetts Institute of Technology

with the assistance of Lee Otterholt

(This paper, in revised form, will appear as Chapter 8 in Population

Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

June, 1974

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In t roduct ion:

There a r e many u n c e r t a i n t i e s concerning t h e imp l i ca t ions of popu-

l a t i o n dynamics f o r c o n f l i c t and v io l ence among na t ions . The record is

unclear . And d e s p i t e some pre l iminary evidence regarding t h e r o l e of

demographic f a c t o r s i n con t r ibu t ing t o v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t , cons iderable

I ambigui t ies remain. The purpose of t h i s paper is t o (1) s m a r i z e a

c ross -na t iona l s tudy of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between populat ion dynamics

and v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t i n developing a r e a s , (2) present a p r o f i l e of ba-

s i c p a t t e r n s and a s s o c i a t i o n s , and (3) provide some i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e

apparent l inkages between demographic f a c t o r s , on t h e one hand, and con-

f l i c t behavior , on t h e o the r . This s k e l e t a l review is abs t r ac t ed from

a d e t a i l e d comparative a n a l y s i s of t h e r o l e of demographic f a c t o r s i n

45 " t h i r d world" c o n f l i c t s s i n c e World War 11.~ L o g i s t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s

prevent a d i scuss ion of each case , and as comprehensive a review of me-

thods, procedure. r e s u l t s and po l i cy imp l i ca t ions a s would be des i r ab l e .

Only t h e broades t p a t t e r n s a r e de l inea t ed .

I n t h i s s tudy , popula t ion dynamics r e f e r s t o s i z e , composition, d i s -

t r i b u t i o n , and changes i n each, a s w e l l a s more s p e c i f i c populat ion va r i -

ab l e s which r ep resen t a d i s t i n c t man i f e s t a t ion of each of t h e s e f a c t o r s .

' ~ a z l i Choucri. Populat ion Dynamics - and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Violence: Propos i t ions , I n s i h t s , and Evidence (M.I.T.: Center f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S tudies , A u g u ~ ~ -

his study i s t h e outgrowth of t h e M.I.T. P r o j e c t on Populat ion Dynamics and Organized Violence supported by a g r a n t from t h e Population Council t o t h e Center f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S tud ie s , M.I.T. (Grant No. D71.109~).

For example, segmental differences ( racial , ethnic, religious or t r i -

bal divisions) represent d i s t i nc t character is t ics of population com-

position. Similarly, the location of population in relat ion t o na-

t ional boundaries, o r with respect t o some spa t i a l delineation, o r

i n terms of the concentration of available resources, a r e different

manifestations of population dis t r ibut ion.

Throughout t h i s study w e have adopted an all-inclusive defini-

t ion of confl ic t , ranging from overt p o l i t i c a l disputes with vtolent

overtones on the one hand, to the outbreak of violence and the genera-

t ion of casualt ies, on the other. Such s i tuat ions include wars of na-

t ional independence, confl ic t over national integration, international

confl ic ts , conflicts result ing from p o l i t i c a l i n s t ab i l i t y , and dis t inct-

l y po l i t i ca l o r diplomatic confl ic ts which may erupt in violence.

(1) Violent Conflict - in Developing Areas The extent and magnitude of vfolent confl ic t i n developing areas,

the levels of casualt ies generated, and the longstanding effects upon

the bel l igerents a r e often underestimated by scholars i n the West. I f

"war" is defined as.any armed confl ic t involving regular armed forces,

a cer ta in degree of organized fighting, and sustained violent encoun-

t e r and armed clashes, a recent study notes tha t there were 93 local

'bars" in Asia. Africa and Latin America between 1945 and 1969, none

formally declared, with a t o t a l duration in cumulative terms, of 225

years and seven months. Most wars las ted for more than one year. On

each day throughout the twenty-five years between 1945 and 1969 there

was an average of 10.22 wars being waged: Not a s ingle day passed

without witnessing a t l e a s t one war somewhere i n the developing world. 3

Although no precise estimate of t o t a l casualt ies i n these wars is

available, they a re measured i n the tens of millions.

In a recent study of l oca l confl ic t in the developing world,

Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss argue that such conflicts

have a common structure; tha t they can be separated i n t o several

phases ranging from a pre-host i l i t ies stage, t o open h o s t i l i t i e s , to

e i ther the potential settlement of the dispute o r the routinization

of the conf l ic t ; and that i n each phase there are ident i f iab le fac-

tors which generate pressures leading t o the transformation of the

confl ic t from one phase t o the other. The authors also argue that

the nature of the confl ic t can often be s ignif icant ly a l tered by use

of appropriate policy instruments, e i ther by the participants them-

selves, or by outside mediating forces. Their model allows the in-

vestigator t o ident i fy the s t ructure and components of a local con-

f l i c t and to subject i t t o concerted and systematic inquiry. 4

To enhance the i r theoret ical model, Bloomfield and L e i s s com-

3 Istvan Kende, ----* Local Wars i n Asia Africa and Latin America,

1945-1969 (Budapest: Center for Af ro-Asian Research of the Hunga- rian Academy of Sciences, 1972), p. 113. The average duration of these wars was 2 years and nine months. Most of these wars were being. fought in Asia (29 wars), followed by Latin America (23 wars) and Black Africa (16 wars).

The introduction of t he Middle East i n this calculus confounds these assessments somewhat, in that Kende assigns 25 wars to the Mid- d l e East region, including not only the numerous Arab-Israeli con- f l i c t s , but a lso confl ic ts involving the Berbers o r the Bedouins in North Africa, t he numerous disputes involving the Kurds i n Iran and Iraq, and other minor, although violent, h o s t i l i t i e s .

%his study i s the f i r s t large-scale and detailed analysis of

piled evidence on the s t ruc ture of fif ty-four post World War I1 local

conflicts. With Robert Beatt ie they have developed a logic system

f o r processing these data.5 Outside experts were called upon t o code

each confl ic t both i n terms of the presence o r absence of various cha-

r ac t e r i s t i c s of such confl ic ts , and in terms of measures of confl ic t

intensity.6 These data have been rendered computer-readable, and are

currently available on the time sharing computer system a t the Massa-

chusetts In s t i t u t e of Technology. Such codings allow simple and rapid

data re t r ieva l concerning the charac te r i s t ics of par t icular confl ic ts ,

I and also comparisons among them. The M.I.T. f i l e s , known as the

Computer Aided System for the Analysis of Local Conflict (CASCON),

provided the base for our investigations. However, a l l non-Third

World cases were excluded and some additional cases which seemed par-

t i cu la r ly revealing from a p o l i t i c a l perspective were incorporated

i n t o the data f i l e s . In sum, 45 cases were included on the basis of

importance, data ava i lab i l i ty , existence in the CASCON f i l e s , or the

confl ic t in developing areas. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. L e i s s . Controlling= Wars: - A Strategy -- for the 1970's (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969),p. 15-17.

5 ~ e e Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Robert Beatt ie, "Computers and Policymaking: The CASCON Experiment," Journal - of Conflict Resolution, "o'' ' " 9 (March 1971), pp. 33-46.

6 ~ i t h one or two exceptions, these 54 cases examined by Bloom- f i e ld and Leiss const i tute a subset of t he 93 confl ic ts in Asia, Af- r i ca and Latin America, 1945-1969.

I For related information on methods and procedures see CASCON

Factor CodingForms, Arms Control Project (M.I.T.: Center for Inter- national Studies, revised March 1971).

'For summaries of the p o l i t i c a l issues in each confl ic t see

poss ib i l i ty of ready i n c l u s ~ o n . ~ Forty of these cases a r e a subset of

the 93 wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America between 1945 and 1969. 10

CASCON was i n i t i a l l y designed as a computer-based system for the

cross-national comparisons of loca l confl ic t . But i t can also be em-

ployed as an ear ly warning system for detecting the development of con-

f l i c t s i tuat ions based upon pat tern recognition, tha t is , by matching

the character is t ics of new ongoing confl ic ts with those of previous

confl ic ts scored in the system, i n order t o assess potent ia l conse-

quences. Our objectives i n employing the CASCON f i l e s is t o ident i fy

the demographic character is t ics of violent confl ic ts i n developing

areas by comparing the ways i n which population factors a f fec t the in i -

t i a t i on and course of a conf l ic t i n d i f fe ren t s i tuat ions . According-

l y , we have drawn upon the CASCON data f i l e s in order t o inquire i n t o

the demographic roots of violent conf l ic t s in the developing world. 11

Toward this end, we have compiled a detailed h i s tor ica l narra-

t i v e of the development of each conf l ic t and developed a t t r i bu t e pro-

Irigangi C. Bloomfield, 52 Post-War Conflicts: Brief Summaries, Arms Control Project (M.I.T.: Center for International Studies, 1971).

'The confl ic t between India and Pakistan, fo r instance, are ex- ce l len t examples of s i tua t ions i n which demographic factors were im- portant i n shaping and conditioning the nature of t he dispute, but would have involved too much addit ional coding t o jus t i fy the i r inclu- sion i n our f i l e s . Table I presents the l i s t of cases included in our study .

''These are ident i f ied in Table I below.

l l~ l t ima te ly , i t would be desirable t o enhance the v e r s a t i l i t y of the CASCON f i l e s by formally incorporating the demographic a t t r ibu tes of the forty-five cases employed below i n t o the exis t ing computer- readable format. This technical refinement, however, is an unneces- sary elaboration for our purposes here.

f i l e s of the par t ies in question, including data on the dis t r ibut ion of

knowledge and skills, socio-econumic conditions, resources available,

and the levels of technology and mil i tary capabil i ty, as w e l l as demo-

graphic factors such as population s i z e , composition, dis t r ibut ion and

change, and the most detailed estimates possible on the movement of popu-

la t ion. The demographic data w e r e obtained from the United Nations - De- mographic Yearbook (annual s e r i e s ) , the publications of t h e Population

Council, and the annual yearbooks of the countries i n question (whenever

available) . l2 It was from these combined h i s to r i ca l , socio-economic and demographic prof i les of each confl ic t tha t the basic data for exam-

ining the ways i n which population variables a f f ec t t he nature, outbreak,

and course of l oca l conf l ic t s i n developing areas w e r e obtained. De-

ta i led case studies were thus developed which have allowed for a syste-

matic assessment of the ro le of individual population variables i n each

of the 45 confl ic ts , t he i r proximity t o the outbreak of violence, and

the i r impact upon subsequent A list of these confl ic ts

is presented i n Table I.

(2) The Role of Population i n Conflict Situations - A recent survey of the l i t e r a t u r e on population dynamics and vio-

l e n t confl ic ts c i ted above yielded few empirically ver i f iab le proposi-

t ions, and l i t t le clear evidence, concerning the spec i f ic linkages be-

12see also the References below.

1 3 ~ br ief note on methods and procedures i s presented in Section 3 below.

Table I * -- Local Conflicts in Developing Areas:

List of Cases

1. Aden (1963-67) : South Yemen's struggle for self- determination

2. Algeria (1954-62) : war for independence from the French

black African struggle to end white Portuguese domination

** 4. Arab-Israeli War (June 1967) : the "Six-Day War" 5. Arab-Israeli War (October 1973): the "Yom Kippur"War op~amaded'war

6. Bahrain (1970) : conflict over Persian claim to Bahrain

7. Bay of Pigs (1961) : attempted invasion of Cuba by U.S.-trained Cuban emigres

8. Bollvia (1967): Che Guevara's attempts to promote insurrection

*** 9. Ceylon (1971) : most violent outbreak of continuing

political unrest

10. Congo (Katanga, 1960-63): conflict among rival foreign-supported factions for control of central government

11. Cyprus (Enosis , 1954-59) : agitation for and resistance to political union with Greece

12. Cyprus (Communal, 1963- ) : continuinq hostility between Turkish- and Greek- Cy~riot communities

13. Dominican Republic (1965) : U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo

14. Dominican Republic-Haiti (1963): agitation over Dominican immigration policies

15. Ecuador-U.S.A. (1963- ) : dispute wer fishing rights

16. El Salvador-Honduras (1969): violent nationalistic rivalry precipated by a riot at a soccer match

17. Guatemala (1954): U.S. intervention to overthrow leftist government

18. Guyana-Venezuela (1962-70): attempt by Venezuela to take over vast area of Guyanan territory

Table I (Continued) --

Indonesia (West I r i a n , 1957-62): s t r u g g l e t o e l imina te l a s t pocket of Dutch con t ro l

I r a q (Kurds, 1958-63) : demand f o r p o l i t i c a l autonomy by Kurdish t r i b e s

Iraq-Kuwait (1961-63): d i spu te over I r a q i claim t o Kuwait

Kenya (1964- ):

Laos (1959-62) :

Lebanon (1957-58) :

t r i b a l warfare p ro tes t ing dominance of Kikuya t r i b e

s t r u g g l e t o check communist con t ro l of border a reas

U.S. in t e rven t ion i n i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l d i spu te

Malayan Emergency (1948-60): continuing communist g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s

Malaysia-Indonesia (1963-65): Indonesia support f o r g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y i n Malaysia

Morocco-Algeria (1962-63) : c o n f l i c t over Moroccan claim t o Algerian t e r r i t o r y

Morocco-Mauritania (1957-70): c o n f l i c t over Moroccan d e s i r e t o annex p a r t of Mauri tania

Morocco-Spain (1956- ): c o n f l i c t over Moroccan demand t h a t Spain r e l i n q u i s h he r African t e r r i t o r i e s

Muscat and Oman (1957- ) : p o l i t i c o - r e l i g i o u s c i v i l war

Nicaragua-Costa Rica (1955-56): c l a s s i c border c o n f l i c t

Nicaragua-Honduras (1957-60): c l a s s i c border c o n f l i c t

Nigeria-Biaf r a (1967-70) : war t o end Biafran succession

P a l e s t i n e (1947-49) : war between the Jewish and Arab over new Jewish s t a t e

Panama (1964) : r i o t s over U.S. con t ro l of Canal Zone

Rhodesia (1968-70) : s t r u g g l e by blacks t o end white dominance

Rwanda-Burundi (1959-72) : genocidal t r i b a l warfare

Sina i (1956) : I s r a e l i a t t a c k , coordinated wi th Br i t i sh - French a t t a c k on Suez

Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya (1960-64): Somali demand f o r Pan-Somali s t a t e

40. South Tyrol (1957-69): v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t between I t a l i a n and German e t h n i c groups

Table I (Continued) --

41. Suez (1956) :

42. Syria-Turkey (1956-57) :

43; Ulster (1969- ) :

44. Venezuela (1960-63):

45. Yemen (1962-69):

British-French a t t a c k t o re-es tabl i sh con t ro l over Suez 'Canal

border confrontat ion i n context of Cold War

t e r r o r i s t violence between Pro tes t an t s and Cathol ics

l e f t i s t - o r i e n t e d urban r i o t s

overthrow of monarchical government

* The Arab-Israel war ( ~ c t o b e r 1973), Ceylon (1971), and Kenya (1964- ) were

no t p a r t of t h e o r i g i n a l CASCON f i l e s , bu t were developed s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h i s study. With t h e exception of Bahrain (1970). Panama (1964), South Tyrol (1957-1969). Arab-Israel (1973) and U l s t e r (1969- ), t hese c o n f l i c t s a r e a l l included i n the 93 wars examined by Kende (1969) i n the s tudy noted above.

** The f i v e wars between Arabs and I s r a e l i s -- i n 1968, 1956 (Suez and S i n a i ) ,

1967, and 1973 - though stemming from the same underlying d i spu te , a r e i n f a c t d i f f e r e n t i n many ways. For t h i s reason, w e treat them a s f i v e d i s t i n c t c o n f l i c t s .

*** Ceylon is now known a s S r i Lanka.

tween population and violence, although it is possible to ident i fy i n a

general manner some of the ways in which population variables affect po-

l i t i c a l outcomes. However, this much is clear: the ro l e which popula-

t ion factors play in a confl ic t s i t ua t ion is i n t r i c a t e and complex, and

is almost always subject to great variation. In some cases, population

variables provide the parameters of a s i tua t ion , and define the context

within which a conf l ic t unfolds, o r d i c t a t e the form tha t i t might take.

In such instances, population amounts t o a contextual factor which shapes

and constrains the interact ions of t he par t ies and d ic ta tes the bounds

of permissible behavior. In other cases, where t h i s context i s already

s e t , population factors provide a mul t ip l ie r e f fec t upon a confl ic t by

exacerbating the pre-existing form o r mode. In such cases, the major

ro l e of population is the in tens i f ica t ion of s e t patterns and the aggra-

vation of exist ing cleavages or disputes. In s t i l l other instances, po-

pulation may ac t as a variable. when i t might i t s e l f change in the course

of a conf l ic t or , a l ternat ively, cause a change i n the nature of the

conflict .

These dis t inct ions a r e f a r from precise, but they can be useful

conceptual guidelines fo r assessing the ro l e of population i n confl ic t

s i tuat ions and for providing some insights i n t o the nature of a con-

f l i c t and i ts development over time. It is important t o rea l ize t ha t ,

during the i n i t i a l stages of a conf l ic t s i tua t ion , population factors

might yield the basic parameters, but operate as a mult ipl ier as the

confl ic t progresses, and then perhaps even as a variable. For example,

the Arab-Israeli confl ic ts a r e a c l a s s i ca l i l l u s t r a t i o n of the ways in

which the ro l e of population variables can change as a confl ic t pro-

gresses and as the antagonists assume new a t t r ibu tes and characterist ics. 4

The large sca l e migration of Jews in to the Middle East during the f i r s t

par t of the twentieth century was a crucial variable in shaping the na-

t u re of the subsequent confrontation between the migrants and the native

population in 1948. Over the years, t h i s variable became a basic para-

m e t e r in the confl ic t , by consolidating the l ines of cleavage and pro-

viding the context w i t h i n which subsequent p o l i t i c a l disputes were un-

dertaken. The migration fac tor had effect ively transformed the demogra-

phic character is t ics of the region, and d i f fe ren t ia l s in population s i z e

provide a largely invariable context for the ensuing wars -- in 1956, 1966 and 1973. These changes also r e f l ec t the time perspective of the

conflict . often factors that in the short run may be regarded as fixed

parameters w i l l , in the long run, becme variables i n the si tuation.

The Arab-Israeli case is a dramatic example of such changing dynamics.

But i t i s not an isolated case. There are many confl ic t s i tuat ions i n

which demographic factors a re c r i t i c a l i n shaping the l ines of cleavage.

These different roles of population factors may thus be summarized:

Population is a parameter in a confl ic t s i tua t ion when i t provides

the context of the confl ic t and therefore dictates the form that the con-

f l i c t w i l l take. Thus, population s i z e might function as a parameter

when i t generates r ac i a l tensions, resul t ing in segmental confl ic t , as

was the case with the Nigerian c i v i l war (1967-1970), o r with the do-

mestic disturbances in Kenya (1964- ). And, populationdistribution

might be a parameter of a conf l ic t s i tua t ion when, fo r example, t r i b a l

allegiance crosses national boundaries, resul t ing possible in border

confl ic ts . as was the case in the Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya dispute (1960-1964).

Population provides a mul t ip l i e r e f f ec t in a conf l i c t s i t ua t i on

when i t exacerbates the form which is already set. For example, popu-

l a t i o n s i z e ac t s as a mul t ip l i e r by in tensi fying the e f f ec t s of migra-

tion. Composition becomes a mul t ip l i e r when i t exacerbates economic

o r other competitions in a society. And population d i s t r ibu t ion may

provide a mul t ip l i e r e f f e c t i f i t i n t ens i f i e s migration, contributes

to, o r i n t ens i f i e s , p o l i t i c a l h o s t i l i t i e s , as was t he case in the "soc- 1.

cer war" between E l Salvador and Honduras (July 1969).

Population is a var iab le in a con f l i c t i f it changes in the course

of a conf l i c t o r , a l t e rna t ive ly , i f it changes the na ture of a confl ict ,

For example, population s i z e might change through a t t r i t i o n o r migration.

Population composition may change through genocide o r assimilat ion, or

through the accomodation o r negation of segmental demands. The con-

f l i c t between t he Tuts i and Hutu i n Rwanda and Burundi (1959-1972) il-

l u s t r a t e s these complex dynamics. And d i s t r i bu t i on may be a var iable

in a conf l i c t s i t ua t i on i f i t changes through migration o r the discovery

of new resources. The con f l i c t between Morocco and Mauritania (1957-

1970) is an example of the c r i t i c a l i t y of resources in a seemingly minor

dispute.

Assessing the ro l e of population var iables in conf l i c t s i tua t ions

becomes increasingly complex, f i r s t when the e f f ec t s of individual popu-

l a t i o n var iables such as population s i z e , d i s t r ibu t ion , composition,

and change are taken i n t o account, and then as measures of in tens i ty

are added t o the analysis .

(3) Methodological - Note: - A Procedure for EvaluatFng the Role -- of Population Fn Conflict Situations - -

A four-stage coding procedure was employed to determine the role

of population variables in confl ic t s i tuat ions .

F i r s t : An i n i t i a l , but structured, probe i n t o the nature of

each conf l ic t and the ways in which population variables have affected

the i n i t i a t i o n and conduct of belligerency was undertaken, directed by

a series of queries. These queries were raised to a s s i s t i n identify-

ing the influence of the population variables, in terms of s i ze , change,

composition, and dis t r ibut ion, and were designed to provide a systematic

data base upon which fur ther investigations could be predicated as follows:

With respect t o population - s ize : (1) Does absolute population leve l , i n terms of the sheer weight

of numbers, contribute t o a group's violent behavior?

( 2 ) Does the pressure of numbers upon resources increase propen-

s i t i e s tovrard violence?

With respect t o population change:

(1) Does a high absolute r a t e of growth contribute t o internal

violence or external confl ic t?

(2) Do d i f f e r en t i a l ra tes of growth between competing population

groups aggravate p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y ?

With respect t o population composition:

(1) Does an imbalance between the numbers of males and females

aggravate a conf l ic t s i tua t ion?

(2) Does the age s t ruc ture of the bel l igerents influence the b

outbreak of the confl ic t or the conduct of the dispute?

(3) Do segmental differences play a r o l e in the i n i t i a t i o n and

development of the confl ic t s i tua t ion?

(4) Does the level , type, o r d i f f e ren t i a l in knowledge and skills

of various groups (that is, t h e i r technology) influence the in i t i a t ion ,

conduct o r outcome of t he conflict?

With respect t o population dis t r ibut ion:

(1) Does the concentration of population (in terms of absolute

and re la t ive leve ls of density) contribute t o tensions, and eventually

to confl ic t?

(2) Does the spa t i a l location of population i n re la t ion t o re-

sources amount t o a dominant determinant of confl ic t?

(3) Does the spa t i a l location of population in re la t ion t o na-

t ional borders amount t o an important factor in the i n i t i a t i o n of the

con£ l i c t ?

(4) Does the in t e rna l o r external migration of s ignif icant numbers

of population lead t o in s t ab i l i t y , tensi-ons, and eventually overt vio-

lence?

(5) Do rural/urban differences in the population structures of

the bel l igerents s ignif icant ly a f fec t t he i n i t i a t i o n , conduct or ter-

mination of a conflict?

Second: Each of these questions was then placed i n the context

of t he three possible (though not mutually exclusive) roles that popu-

l a t ion factors might assume i n confl ic t s i tua t ions , a l ternat ively as

a parameter, mulxiplier e f f ec t or variable. T h i s d i f ferent ia t ion thus

allowed for a more spec i f ic coding of the ro le of population.

Third: A measure of magnitude o r degree of intensi ty was intro-

duced i n t o each of t h e preceding assessments. Ind iv idua l population-

r e l a t e d f a c t o r s were coded i n terms of one of s i x o r d i n a l measures:

(0) apprec iab le i n f luence , (1) background s i g n i f i c a n c e , (2) - minor i r r i t a n t , (3) i r r i t a n t , ( 4 ) f c e n t r a l importance, o r (5) - s o l e determinant. These measures i n d i c a t e t h e e x t e n t t o which populat ion

f a c t o r s can expla in t h e de te rminants , course, conduct, and conclusion

of a c o n f l i c t . They a r e designed t o form an o r d i n a l s c a l e t he under-

l y ing dimension of which i s t h e propens i ty f o r violence. Theore t ica l

ambigui t ies involved i n measuring v io lence noted i n t h e survey c i t e d

i n t h e In t roduc t ion a r e f u r t h e r compounded by seeking t o i d e n t i f y pro-

p e n s i t i e s f o r v io lence , nonethe less t h i s o r d i n a l s c a l e appeared both

i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and r e l i a b l e a measure of t h e t h e o r e t i c a l dimen-

s i o n i n quest ion. An inqu i ry i n t o in te r -coder r e l i a b i l i t y f u r t h e r re-

in fo rced our confidence i n t h i s methodological approach: The coding r u l e s

were a s fol lows:

A populat ion f a c t o r was coded as a - s o l e determinant of t he c o n f l i c t i f an adequate explana t ion of h o s t i l i t i e s could b e obtained wi th r e f e r -

ence only t o demographic v a r i a b l e s . A popula t ion f a c t o r was coded a s

being of c e n t r a l Importance i f t h e c o n f l i c t would probably no t have

broken out had t h a t f a c t o r n o t been present . The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e

codings of - minor and i r r i t a n t was mainly one of degree: A demo- graphic f a c t o r was coded a s being a minor i r r i t a n t i f , though d e f i n i t e l y

present and s a l i e n t , i t appeared t o have only low-level impact on, o r

s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r , t h e c o n f l i c t . A major i r r i t a n t code was employed i f

t h e popula t ion- re la ted f a c t o r i n ques t ion was apprec iab ly g r e a t e r ,

although t h e c o n f l i c t would probably have broken out even wi thout

i t s in f luence . A demographic v a r i a b l e was coded a s being of back-

ground importance when major i n t e r v e n i n g processes appeared t o be

a t work, s epa ra t ing populat ion v a r i a b l e s and ove r t v io lence through

a series of mediat ing f a c t o r s .

Fourth: From these s p e c i f i c codings, we then attempted t o e s t i -

mate the importance and r o l e of t he fou r genera l populat ion f a c t o r s

( s i ze . change, composition, and d i s t r i b u t i o n ) and t h e o v e r a l l impor-

tance of demographic v a r i a b l e s in t h e c o n f l i c t . For example. i f t he

l o c a t i o n of populat ion i n r e l a t i o n t o resources was coded a s being of

c e n t r a l importance i n t h e c o n f l i c t , b u t , a t t h e same time, no o t h e r d i s -

t r i b u t i o n f a c t o r s were s a l i e n t , t h e importance of populat ion d i s t r i b u t i o n

a s a genera l populat ion f a c t o r would b e discounted and coded a s a major

i r r i t a n t . By t h e same token, i f popula t ion composition appeared t o be

t h e only popula t ion f a c t o r of any importance, t h e e s t ima te of the over-

a l l importance of populat ion f a c t o r s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n

would b e downgraded. I f , however, a l l t he major populat ion va r i ab l e s

were viewed as major i r r i t a n t s , t h e o v e r a l l r a t i n g s assigned t o each

v a r i a b l e would be regarded a s cumulative and i n t e r a c t i v e , and gene ra l

f a c t o r scores incremented accordingly. Thus, e s t ima t ing the importance

of t h e gene ra l populat ion v a r i a b l e s depended on the n m b e r of s p e c i f i c

populat ion-related f a c t o r s i n each case , and t h e r e l a t i v e importance of

each. On ba lance , we sys t ema t i ca l ly in t roduced a downward b i a s i n t o

t h e codings tending t o underest imate t o some e x t e n t t h e r o l e of demo-

graphic f a c t o r s a s a means of counter ing any underlying tendency

t o overemphasize t he r o l e of population var iables i n loca l conf l ic ts .

Overall, this four-stage procedure provided an ana ly t ica l screen

through which the demographic, h i s t o r i c a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l and so-

c iological da ta on each of the forty-five l oca l conf l i c t s i n developing

areas w e r e processed. It must be recognized t h a t this method of anal-

y s i s , though systematic, is based essen t ia l ly on the requirements and

l imi ta t ions of both conceptual framework and empirical data. Others

might prefer a l t e rna t i ve procedures. Nonetheless, any mode of inquiry

is equally dependent on both theory and data. The inferences w e draw

a r e s t r i c t l y confined t o t he da ta base and mode of analysis , and our

conclusions must be viewed accordingly. But, a high degree of in te rna l

consistency has been retained across cases, and t he analysis has been

grounded i n a sound theore t ica l ra t ionale . I n these two respects a t

l e a s t , what may appear as an a rb i t r a ry procedure is, i n f a c t , in accor-

dance with basic tenets of soc i a l sc ience inquiry.

(4) p r o f i l e of Population Factors i n Local Conflicts

An i n i t i a l mapping of the demographic p ro f i l e s of the forty-five

conf l i c t s l i s t e d i n Table I indicates t ha t population variables did

play some c r i t i c a l r o l e i n thir ty-eight. Of these, population variables

appear t o have been & determiaants of v iolent conf l i c t in four cases:

Ceylon's internal con f l i c t (1971), the Nigeria-Biafra c i v i l war (1967-70).

the Pales t ine war (1947-49), and the S ina iwar (1956).

Additionally, population var iables appeared t o be of cen t ra l &-

portance in eleven conflicts: the Algerian war of independence (1954-621,

Angola's s t rugg le against Portuguese colonialism (1961) , t he Arab-Israeli

w a r of 1973, communal con f l i c t s in Cyprus (1963- ), t h e ~l Salvador-

Honduras "soccer war" (1969), the con f l i c t over ~ndones ia ' s claim t o

West I r i a n (1957-62) , domestic con f l i c t i n Kenya (1964- ) , the Malayan

Emergency concerning Communist insurgents (1948-60) , t h e Malaysian-

Indonesian confrontation (1963-65), the Rhodesian s i t ua t i on (1968-70).

and the border con f l i c t among Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya (1960-64).

I n t en cases population var iables appeared t o be amajor i r r i t a n t

i n t he con f l i c t s i tua t ion : t he 1967 Arab-Israeliwar, t he c r i s i s i n the

Foneo (1960-63). the s t rugg le over inde~endence in Cyprus (1954-59),

t he Kurdish ag i ta t ions i n I raq (1958-63). t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l prob-

lems i n Laos (1959-62), t h e Morocco-Algeria border con f l i c t (1962-63),

the Morocco-Mauritania d ispute (1957-70), t he con f l i c t s between Tuts i

and Hutu t r i b e s i n Rwanda and Burundi (1959-72), the conf l i c t between

Germans and I t a l i a n s i n South Tyrol (1957-69). and t he outbreak of vio-

14 lence between Protes tants and Catholics i n Ulster (1969- ).

Population var iables appeared t o be minor i r r i t a n t s in seven of

the thir ty-eight conf l i c t s : Aden's nat ional movement which resul ted

in the creat ion of t he Peoples' Republic of South Yemen (1963-67), the

Dominican Republic's con f l i c t with H a i t i (1963), the t e r r i t o r i a l con-

f l i c t between Guyana and Venezuela (1962-70), i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l con-

f l i c t in Lebanon (1957-58), t he clashes between Morocco and Spain over

Spanish-held t e r r i t o r i e s contiguous t o Morocco (1956- ), colonial con-

f l i c t s involving the in tegra t ion of Muscat and Oman (1957- ), and t he

14Although South 5 r o l and Ulster a r e not developing areas , these two conf l i c t s involved i s sues of na t iona l in tegra t ion and w e r e s tructu- r a l l y s imi la r enough t o con f l i c t s in developing areas to warrant inclu- s ion i n t h i s analys is .

c i v i war i n Yemen (1962-69). i In s i x of the th i r ty-e ight cases population fac to rs appeared t o

s ignif icance i n the development of the conf l i c t : the

(1961), Che Guevara's ag i t a t i on i n Bolivia (1967).

problems, culminating in U.S. intervention, i n

(19651, t h e Eduador-U.S.A. "tuna war" (1963- ),

over Suez (19561, and t h e Venezuelan revolu-

A mor de ta i l ed assessment of key cases i s presented in the l a rger study i

influence

over

(1954),

Kuwait

ragua

Honduras

Zone

War

t o

of w ch t h i s present paper is a summary, along w i t h a c loser look a t

t h e %graphic s t r uc tu r e of p o l i t i c a l con f l i c t s and the r o l e of a l t e r -

na t i v population variables. A t this point , however, i t must be empha-

In only seven cases did population var iables have no appreciable

on the development o r conduct of the conf l i c t : the dispute

'3ahrain1s independence (1970), the U.S. supported coup i n Guatemala

t h e conf l i c t between I r aq and Kuwait over the independence of

(1961-63), t h e con f l i c t between t h e p o l i t i c a l leaders of Nica-

and Costa Rica (1955-561, the border w a r between Nicaragua and

(1957-60), the r i o t s over t h e sovereignty of the Panama Canal

:1964), and the con f l i c t between Syria and Turkey involving Cold

r.-valries (1956-57).

Despite this cursory mapping, it is surpr i s ing t o note t h e extent

wk.ch demographic fac to rs were present in the Third World conf l ic ts .

t h a t ' t h e l inkages between population fac to rs on the one hand,

on t h e other a r e complex, i n t e r ac t i ve , and mutually rein-

Some additional ins ights into t he importance of population vari-

ables i n conf l ic t s i tua t ions can be obtained from a glance a t Table 11.

The number of cases in which demographic factors operate as parameters,

mult ipl iers and/or variables, sometimes simultaneously, in Third World

confl ic ts i s noted, as i s the extent t o which these assessments pertain

t o s i ze , change, dis t r ibut ion or composition. Table I1 reveals some

obvious, but important, facts:

F i r s t : It would appear t ha t the current popular emphasis on po-

pulation -* s i z e so f u l l y documented i n the survey c i ted e a r l i e r , i s large-

l y misplaced. This not to suggest tha t s i z e is not relevant i n conflict

s i tuat ions -- not a t all -- but t o s t r e s s again that s i z e i s largely invariant over the time perspective of a spec i f ic confl ic t , and tha t

population composition and dis t r ibut ion, which are generally ignored

i n popular, academic and o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s , a l so appear t o have been of

great importance i n many of the conf l ic t s examined. The importance of

population can be summarized as follows: Because the t o t a l number

of people does not change rapidly over t he short run, i t can contribute

t o the contextual arrangement of a conf l ic t by providing an important

parameter of t he s i tua t ion (and does so in seventeen cases). This si-

tuation can serve to generate i n t e rna l p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y which may

then be displaced externally, transforming an in te rna l confl ic t i n to an

expansionist one. Less of ten s i z e provides a mult ipl ier e f fec t upon

an ongoing confl ic t , exacerbating exis t ing s t r a in s and s t resses (in

eight cases).

Second: Population change tends to exacerbate t he e f fec t s of

size. In general, change in numbers was invariant in the cases exam-

-5~ 03 mns aou saop uunTo;, 1suy3 aq3 'snqr, :sxaqao uy auou sawyaamos pue 'ases auo uy a102 E padqd (uoy3ysoamos 'uoy3nqyxa

-syp 'a%ueq:, 'azys) zoj;,ea uoyae1ndod 1sxaua8 auo U8q3 axoln 'ua330y

ined. In only one case (Egypt before the October 1973 war) was a s t a t e

able t o alter i ts growth r a t e s ignif icant ly . Our cases of loca l con-

f l i c t s t r e t c h back t o 1948: It i s only recently tha t consciousness of

a population problem has increased and policy measures designed to

a f f ec t a society 's demographic character is t ics have become more sophis-

t icated. Kowever, strong sources of res is tance s t i l l remain. Popu-

l a t i on change appeared most often ( i n the th i r teen cases) as a multi-

p l i e r of the confl ic t , usually exacerbating the e f f ec t s of size. L e s s

often (in f ive cases), change alone was su f f i c i en t t o set the parameters

of the conflict .

Third: Population d is t r ibu t ion appears t o be most susceptible t o

var ia t ion over t he course of a conf l ic t (in nine cases). Populations

generally move in rela t ion t o resource ava i lab i l i ty , which tends to

vary with changes in demands, dhcover ies , new technologies o r with

t he movement of people as such. These variations can have important

impacts on the nature of a conflict . The d is t r ibu t ion of population

may also be an important mul t ip l ie r upon a conf l ic t (nineteen cases),

generally in the direct ion of reinforcing segmental differences. But

dis t r ibut ion only infrequently sets the s tage f o r a conf l ic t by emerg-

i n g as an important parameter of t h e s i t ua t ion (here, in only seven

cases).

Fourth: Population camp6sition also frequently appears t o set

the parameters of confl ic t s i tuat ions . The importance of composition

a s a contextual factor (.in eighteen cases) can be a t t r ibu ted largely

t o the fac t that ethnic considerations often tend t o provide the para-

meters of a conf l ic t s i tuat ion. A t the same time, however, composLtion

also emerges as having a strong mult ipl ier e f fec t upon an ongoing con-

f l i c t (twelve cases). A s with population s ize , composition displays

considerable invar iab i l i ty -- i t has changed in only two cases once a confl ic t has already erupted. In other words, s i z e and composition do

not generally emerge as variables in a conf l ic t s i tuat ion: They s e t

the stage and possibly intensify the h o s t i l i t i e s , but they do not ge-

neral ly change the nature of the conf l ic t , nor a r e they appreciably

affected in the course of h o s t i l i t i e s .

Population s i ze , change, d i s t r ibu t ion and composition a re all

linked in complex ways. An e x p l i c i t consideration of these linkages

may lead to a more comprehensive perspective upon the development of

population pol ic ies , and possibly strengthen the case fo r population

control generally. But i t i s important t o r e c a l l t ha t control over

population s i z e has e f f ec t s in the long term, whereas confl ic t manage-

ment generally demands tha t greater a t tent ion be paid t o factors which

can be manipulated more immediately.

A more detailed assessment of the ro l e of the population factors

iden t i f ied in the queries for t he f i r s t s tage of this analysis i s pre-

sented in Table III, w h e r e the magnitude of the demographic influences

is takenin to account. Table 1x1 therefore not only indicates how often

spec i f ic population factors come i n t o play, but also provides an assess-

ment of the extent of impact in each case. This t ab le reinforces the

general inferences drawn from Table 11. Not only do population dis-

t r ibut ion and composition emerge more frequently as determinants of con-

f l i c t s in developing areas, but they are a lso of greater significance.

Table 111 - -- * The Importance of Demographic Fac tors i n Violent c o n f l i c t s

1 Back- 2 3 4 5 Weighted ground Minor Major Cent ra l So le Tota l Average ,* Factor I r r i t a n t I r r i t a n t Importance Determinant Cases Descriptor

POPULATION SIZE 3 ***

15 1 2 1 23 2.23

Absolute Populat ion Level 8 4 2 2 - 16 1.89 Populat ion Pressure on 1 8 7

Resources . POPULATION CHANGE 8 6 5 - - 19 1.84

Absolute Rate of Growth 1 0 10 3 2 - 25 1.88 Di f f e ren t Rates of Growth 3 5 1 - - 9 1.77

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 7 10 1 3 5 - 35 2.46 RuralIUrban D i s t r i b u t i o n 3 10 3 - - 16 2.00 Populat ion Density 2 3 2 - - 7 2.00 S p a t i a l Location i n Re- 3 4 8 3 - 18 2.61

l a t i o n t o Resources S p a t i a l Locat ion i n Re- 4 5 4 2 - 15 2.27

l a t i o n t o Borders popula t ion Movement 11 6 8 5 - 30 2.23

POPULATION COMPOSITION l' 6 11 1 3 . 1 32 3.22

Sex D i s t r i b u t i o n 2 2 - - - 4 1.50 Age S t r u c t u r e 3 3 4 - - 10 2.10 Segmental Divisions 2 1 10 12 6 31 3.61 Level of Knowledge and

S k i l l s (Technology) 4 9 10 3 - 26 2.46

Table I11 (Continued) --

*Entr ies a r e t h e number of cases i n which t h e f a c t o r l i s t e d on t h e l e f t played a r o l e of t h e magnitude l i s t e d above.

**These numbers a r e pure ly d e s c r i p t i v e s i n c e they t r e a t an o rd ina l s c a l e a s i f it were a r a t i o sca l e . They i n d i c a t e t h e average i n t e n s i t y of each f a c t o r ' s inf luence. The weighted average desc r ip to r (W.A.) is a funct ion of t h e frequency of cases times t h e i n t e n s i t y of inf luence of demographic f a c t o r s i n a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , divided by the number of cases i n quest ion. Thus W.A. = z(number of cases of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n s i t y * l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y ) / t o t a l number of cases. Thus W.A. range = 0.0 - 5.0. ***The number of cases l i s t e d f o r s p e c i f i c va r i ab le s wi th in each populat ion category does not sum t o t h e number of cases l i s t e d f o r each genera l f a c t o r (SIZE, CHANGE, DISTRIBUTION, COMPOSITION) because general f a c t o r s may be composed of s eve ra l s p e c i f i c va r i ab le s . The dec is ion r u l e was t o obta in a case- s p e c i f i c coding before undertaking a c ross na t iona l comparison. The a l t e r n a t i v e procedure, t o obta in a genera l f a c t o r coding from t h e sum of s p e c i f i c v a r i a b l e codes, would have produced an i n f l a t i o n a r y e f f e c t by overemphasizing t h e r o l e of demographic f a c t o r s i n c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s .

Looking more c l o s e l y a t t h e ind iv idua l populat ion-related v a r i a b l e s i n the

s i z e category, we f i n d t h a t absolu te populat ion level emerges a s a low l e v e l

inf luence upon c o n f l i c t behavior , opera t ing i n s ix t een cases with a weighted

average d e s c r i p t o r (wA)'~ of 1.89. But by f a r t h e more pronounced e f f e c t t h a t

s i z e appears t o have upon a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n is i n terms of pressure on resources.

The average magnitude of p re s su res of numbers resources (WA = 2.68) was

second only t o segmental d i f f e rences (WA = 3.61) , and only these two f a c t o r s

accounted f o r a t l e a s t one c o n f l i c t i n i t s e n t i r e t y .

I n terms of populat ion change, t h e absolu te r a t e of growth of a population

is usua l ly more important t o t h e development of a c o n f l i c t than any d i f f e r e n t i a l s

between populat ions. Absolute growth was an important v a r i a b l e i n twenty-five

c o n f l i c t s (WA = 1.88) i n comparison with n ine cases (WA = 1.77) f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l s

i n r a t e s of growth. . Comparing the r e s u l t s f o r populat ion l e v e l and r a t e of growth, we f ind t h a t

although both operate a t a low l e v e l of inf luence , r a t e of growth emerges as

a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n many more cases (twenty-five cases compared t o s i x t e e n ) .

This d i f f e rence is c e r t a i n l y cons i s t en t wi th t h e conventional wisdom: Often

i t is not s o much the l a r g e number of people t h a t produces t ens ions , a s a high

r a t e of i nc rease occasioning i m e d i a t e d i s l o c a t i o n s and i n s t a b i l i t i e s . Neither

s i z e nor change is , i n i t s e l f , a s u f f i c i e n t determinant of c o n f l i c t behavior;

t h e demands generated by each can be duly accommodated i f s u f f i c i e n t resources

a r e a v a i l a b l e t o be marshaled toward t h a t end. It i s only when both the

l e v e l and r a t e of growth p lace insurmountable pressures upon resources t h a t

1 5 ~ h e Weighted Average Descriptor (WA) i s a measure of t h e inf luence of -

demographic f a c t o r s i n a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n . For an explanat ion and desc r ip t ion see t h e notes t o Table 111.

t he g r e a t e s t d i s l o c a t i o n s a r e l i k e l y t o occur.

I n sum, s i z e and change f a c t o r s a r e seldom of more than background

s ign i f i cance , because t h e i r e f f e c t s a r e long term and i n d i r e c t ; any pressures

generated by these two demographic f a c t o r s a r e l i k e l y t o manifest them-

se lves through o the r populat ion va r i ab les . For example, s i z e f a c t o r s may be

the long-term parameters of a c o n f l i c t , and b a s i c h o s t i l i t i e s may be ex-

acerbated by populat ion change, bu t when t h e c o n f l i c t breaks out it is most

l i k e l y t o take t h e form of h o s t i l i t i e s between segmental groups o r a d i spu te

over t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries.

With r e spec t t o populat ion d i s t r i b u t i o n v a r i a b l e s , t he ru ra l lu rban

d i s t r i b u t i o n appeared t o be of only minor s ign i f i cance , funct ioning

i n s i x t e e n cases wi th an average importance (WA = 2.00). Population dens i ty

appeared t o be even l e s s r e l evan t , playing a r o l e i n only seven cases

(WA = 2.00). This con t rad ic t ion of t h e conventional wisdom re in fo rces

the conclusion presented above, t h a t d e n s i t y pe r s e is seldom of importance:

it i s the concentrat ion and loca t ion of populat ion r e l a t i o n resources

t h a t may be conducive t o v io lence , a s it was i n e ighteen of the cases

i n t h i s s tudy (Wa = 2.61). The l o c a t i o n o f ~ o p u l a t i o n r e l a t i o n

na t iona l borders a l s o appeared t o be of s l i g h t l y g r e a t e r than average

importance, being a f a c t o r i n f i f t e e n cases. Population movement, although

having a comparable importance (WA = 2.23) played a r o l e i n t h i r t y

cased (second i n number only t o e t h n i c d i f f e rences ) . This f inding i s

h ighly s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r migrat ion may o f t e n become a comer-stone of

d e l i b e r a t e publ ic pol icy . The frequency wi th which populat ion movements

have led t o , o r aggravated, c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s i n d i c a t e s the p o t e n t i a l pe-

rils of such pol ic ies .

With respect t o population composition, the numerical balance

between -- m a l e s and females had the smallest impact, playing a background r o l e i n two cases and acting a s a minor i r r i t a n t i n two more. The age

s t ruc tu re of the population appeared t o be of only s l i gh t ly greater im-

portance, emerging i n ten cases, but never c r i t i c a l l y . Segmental dif-

ferences i n a socie ty appeared t o be the most potent ia l ly explosive of

the population-related fac tors , emerging as an important determinant of

conf l ic t i n thirty-one cases. Further, when i t does become sa l i en t it

is usually a t l e a s t of major importance; six cases can be explained en-

t i r e l y in terms of such divisions. Finally, a generally l w -- l eve l of kndwledge - and skills, o r d i f f e r en t i a l s in the l eve l between competing par t ies , appeared t o have an important e f fec t on conf l ic t s i tuat ions ,

appearing t o be of aome importance in twenty-six cases. The specif ic

cases in each category of influence a s coded in Table 111 a r e l i s t e d

in the Appendix.

It s t i l l remains fo r us t o confront further evidence regarding

the relationship between r a t e of population change and i ts c r i t i c a l i t y

i n a conf l ic t s i tuat ion. We have found a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ignif icant ,

posi t ive correla t ion between r a t e of population increase and the mag-

nitude or in tens i ty of i ts influence upon a conf l ic t s i tuat ion: The

higher the r a t e of growth, the more s a l i e n t a fac tor population increase

appears t o be in the development of conf l ic t and violence. In view of

this largely unequivocal finding, TableIV presents the raw data on ra tes

of growth, on the one hand, and on magnitudes of influence upon a con-

f l i c t s i tua t ion , on the other, in addit ion t o the average r a t e of change

Table IV -- Rates of Population Change*

No Influence Background Factor Minor Irritant Major Irritant Central Sole

Importance Determinant

Rate 0.5 Cyprus of Change** 0.8 Ulster

1.6 Iraq

1.6 Iraq-Kuwait (5.5)

1.6 Yemen

2.1 Angola

2.1 Bay of Pigs

2.2 Congo

2.5 Lebanon

2.6 Bolivia

2.8 Guatemala

2.9 Laos

3.0 Syria-Turkey (3.0)

3.2 Aden

3.3 Bahrain

3.3 Panama

0.5 Cyprus

2.7 Israel-Arab (1973) (2.1)

2.7 Malaya

2.9 Somalia-Ethiopia- Kenya

3.0 Morocco-Alperia (2.5)

3.0 Morocco-Mauritania (2.2)

3.4 Ecuador

3.4 Nicaragua-Costa Rica (4.1)

3.4 Nicaragua-Honduras (2.5)

3.5 Venezuela-Guyana (3.1)

3.6 Dominican Republic

2.0 Haiti-Dominican Rep 3.0 Ceylon 2.4 Indonesia - (3.6)

3.3 Kenya 2.4 Indonesia- 2.5 Algeria (2.7) Malaysia

3.4 El Salvador- 2.5 Nigeria-Biafra Honduras

2.5 Suez (3.5)

3.0 Morocco-Spain (1.6)

3.5 Sinai

3.5 Rhodesia

3.6 Israel-Arab (1967) (2.8)

3.6 Venezuela

3.8 Rwanda-Burundi (2.3)

3.8 Palestine

Average 2.26 2.92

Range 0.5-3.3 0.5-3.6

* These figures r e fe r t o the r a t e of change a t the time of the conflict . No data are available for Muscat. Oman and South Tyrol. In a l l three cases, however, the populations appeared t o be s table and the r a t e of growth factor was coded as having no appreciable influence upon the confl ic ts in question.

** When two nations a re party to a conf l ic t , the r a t s of growth for the nation i n which the e f fec t of -population growth was the most s a l i en t i n the confl ic t s i tua t ion i s provided; and the rate for the other party is given i n parentheses. The values i n parentheses are not included i n computations of the average r a t e of growth for each category of influence, o r for the Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient.

Notes on the procedure for determining t& correlation between r a t e of change asmagni tude of influence in a - 4 - - - - conf l ic t s i tuat ion.

In view of the nature of these data, t ha t the ra tes of change a re interval measures and the category of influence a r e ordinal measures, i t has been necessary t o employ a non-parametric s t a t i s t i c , the Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient, adjusting for t i e s and transforming the resu l t s i n to a z-score for determining the s t a t i s t i c a l significance of the correlat ion coefficient. With the r a t e of change as the independent variable and the , influence upon a conf l ic t s i tua t ion as the dependent variable, the Kendal Rank Order Correlation Coefficient, r - 0.43 (with t i e s ) transformed t o a z score = 4.30, s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ignif icant a t the .001 level.

See: Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric S t a t i s t i c s for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 213-223 for specif icat ion of r and z and the underlying rationale.

It must be noted tha t t h i s t e s t i s not as powerful as t e s t designed for determining the s t a t i s t i c a l significance re la t ing t o in te rva l data. The combination of ordinal and in t e rva l measures thus necessitates the use of the weaker s t a t i s t i c a l t es t . The resul t ing inferences must be appropriatelyguarded. Nonetheless, the level of s t a t i s t i c a l significance of the relationship between r a t e of change and influence i n a confl ic t s i tuat ion i s - such tha t association l a f a i r l y well established.

osp aheq an 'sauedysyl)xed aqa Kq pa~yaaxad aq Kem ay qayq~ uy Len ay2 pue uoy~

-mays e 30 axnaanzas aqa uaaruaq aauanx8uoauy Teyauaaod aqa $0 Maya UI

'aauaToyh pue aay~~uoa z03

sayqysuadoxd aqa xaleax8 aqa 'qanoa8 30 saaex aqa zaq%yq aqL :uoyae

-nays aay~juoa e uy saaex tpns 30 day~eayayla aqa pm 'pueq auo aq3 uo

qz1rno.18 uoyls~ndod 30 saws q%yq uaawaq uoyasyaosse %uoaas aqa saaeaau

Ken ou uy uoy~eayjypnb syq, 'lea6 xad auaaaad E-E se q8yq se pue s-0

se MOT se yamox8 30 saaex qaym sama papnpuy aay~3uoa aql uo aauanTjuy

a~qwyaaxdde ou peq 101)ae~ syqa axaqn suoyaenlys 103 qamx8 uoyae~ndod

30 alex aqq 30 a8uea aql 'AI a~qex paaou se apaapu~ 'aauaToya pue

lay~juoa 02 aanqyzauoa d~yxessaaau aou pyp qanox% 30 a381 q8yq e qa~qn

uy sasea axe aaaqL :suoy~eay~y-pnb pu~ saeane:, axe azaqx Jna

'a~qysnv~d K~%uyseaaaq sxoaae J

8uyleypam aaeyxdoadde qlp s~saqlodl(rl Tesnea aqa qem saop ay 'XJ~TJ

-- -uoa JuaToyh oa speaT aseaxauy uoylqndod ley~ K~amau euoyaepx Tesnea e saaoddns Ken ou uy aauapyna TeuoyaeTaxaoa syqq aTrw 'qXnoz8 uoy~epd

-od pydsz 30 aauanbasuoa aq3 sayjysuaauy 6~d1qs qayq~ $0 auawxauy pappe

Xu8 'aseq uoy~w~ndod aSze-[. e 30 aauasaad aq3 Kq paaeqxa:,exa xaqzanj

axe uoyasanb uy saymedp aql (aaueazoduq Tealuaa 30 %uyaq se papoa sy

qlnoa% $0 aaea aqa qayqn uy slayTjuoa ow aqa 103; K~qsaou asom) muaa

ahylexedmoa uy aaexapom saeadde aseazauy 30 a381 aqa aaaqn sass3 uy

uan3 'aauaToya pue lay~3uoa 03 qamx% uoyas~ndod pydea 30 dyqsuoy~e~

-ax (pazysaqXodKq) 8 %uypxe%ax mopsyn Teuoyluanuoa aq? azoddns sauypuyj

asaqL 'suoyleayjr~enb pus sqeanea ajeyadoadde qlym TF -- aaueay~yu -8ys Tesyasyaws 30 TaAaT sly pue aangeam uoylqaxxoa aqa %uylndmoa xo~

saanpaaoad aqX a3ou os~e aM 'aauanTJuy JO hro%aaea qasa lo3 a%uex pue

noted ln the course of our analysis the instances in which each popu-

l a t ion variable was expl ic i t ly and publicly perceived by government

o f f i c i a l s or opinion leaders as a c r i t i c a l factor in the conflict . A l -

though th i s investigation was not amenable to rigorous analysis be- . ... cause of its extremely subjective bas i s , cer ta in clues do emerge. In

order of importance the results a re as follows: I~I nineteen of the

thirty-one cases in which segmental differences were sa l i en t , i t was also

perceived by the bel l igerents themselves as a c r i t i c a l variable in the

confl ic t ; population pressure, level of technology, and migration w e r e

viewed as important in three cases each (of nineteen, twenty-six, and

th i r ty cases respectively); and the absolute l e v e l of population w a s

perceived as s ignif icant in two of sixteen cases. These patterns con-

t inue to suggest the tremendous discrepancies between t h e l a t e r consen-

sus of p o l i t i c a l analysts and the expressed perceptions of the partici-

pants. Clearly, confl ic ts which a re regarded i n primarily p o l i t i c a l

terms often have demographic roots: Recognition of these relationships

appears crucial t o any understanding o r prevention of such h o s t i l i t i e s .

T h i s i n i t i a l p ro f i l e indicates tha t population factors are indeed

c r i t i c a l in, and often determinants of , violent confl ic t in developing

areas. Segmental differences, migration, rapid population growth, dif-

fe ren t ia l levels of knowledge and skills, rurallurban differences, popu-

l a t ion pressure and the spa t i a l location of population i n re la t ion to

resources -- in t h i s rough order of importance - a l l appear t o be im- portant contributors t o conf l ic t and violence. The perception of the

par t ic ipants in these confl ic ts does not r e f l ec t these general patterns,

although the impact of segmental differences is often recognized as a

potent ia l source of tensions and s t ra ins . These broad resu l t s also

reinforce our e a r l i e r observation concerning the udsplaced emphasis

on population s i z e prevalent in both popular and academic c i r c l e s ; the

importance of s i z e in the development of a conf l ic t s i t ua t ion pales in

comparison with these other population variables.

These inferences and observations, though s t i l l largely ske le ta l ,

provide some i n i t i a l ins ight i n t o the importance of population variables

i n confl ic t s i tuat ions . Elsewhere we look more closely a t the demo-

graphic s t ruc ture of p o l i t i c a l conf l ic t s by focusing on a l te rna t ive

types of conf l ic t s and observing the spec i f ic ro le of population vari-

ables in each. In t he absence of detai led case s tudies , the general

patterns delineated in this paper remain in the nature of hypotheses.

Considerable evidence need ye t be put for th before the associations

noted above can be viewed as indication of causal linkages. 16

1 6 ~ h e detailed supporting analysis i s presented i n Part 11: "A Cross-National Study," i n the book version of Population D namics pJ International Violence: Insights - and Evidence Lexington, 'Mass.: Lexington Books, i n press

-7-

Appendix

This Appendix i d e n t i f i e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l cases coded i n Table 111

above no t ing t h e in f luence of s p e c i f i c popula t ion v a r i a b l e s i n t h e de-

velopment of l o c a l c o n f l i c t s . The format f o r t h i s Appendix i s iden t i -

c a l t o t h a t of Table 111. For each popula t ion f a c t o r -- s i z e , cmpo- s i t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n and change -- w e i d e n t i f y t h e s p e c i f i c cases with- i n each category of i n f luence -- ranging from no apprec iab le i n f luence on c o n f l i c t , on the one hand, t o s o l e determinant , on t h e o ther . The

o r d i n a l s c a l e ranges from (0) denoting no apprec i ab le i n f luence , to

(1) background importance, through (2) minor i r r i t a n t , (3) major i r r i t a n t ,

(4) c e n t r a l importance, and (5) s o l e determinant . This s c a l e must b e

viewed as an approximate measure of t h e in f luence of demographic f a c t o r s

in leading t o p ropens i t i e s f o r violence. I n t h i s regard, i t provides

some i m p o r t a n t = regard ing t h e r o l e of popula t ion v a r i a b l e s i n con-

f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s and t h e r e l a t i v e impact of each s p e c i f i c demographic

va r i ab l e . The caveats and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s noted i n t h e t e x t must be taken

i n t o account when viewing t h e r e s u l t s of our ana lys i s .

-27-

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