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15 October 2011

To the PTW:

The paper that I circulate was originally written for a seminar in Heidelberg on

"Politische Kommunikation und ffentliche Meining in der Antike," which broughtancient historians working on a variety of ancient contexts together with sociologists andtheorists of communication from a variety of disciplines. Despite the space devoted byHabermas to charting changes in the meaning of public/publicness in the openingsections ofStrukturwandel der ffentlichkeit, few of the papers addressed or evenacknowledged that gap. For better or worse, my paper attempted to address and assessthat gap head-on.

With many thanks in advance for your readings,

yours, Cliff

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Empire, state and communicative action

Clifford AndoUniversity of Chicagoclifford.ando@uchicago.edu

The configuration and discursive limits of communication as a feature of government and

governmentality and as the structural underpinning of deliberation and deliberative

democracy have been central objects of study in historical and political theoretical

scholarship over the last quarter century or more.1 With a few notable exceptions,

however, inquiry in these fields has been conducted in isolation from each other. My

object in this essay to explore the nature not so much of public opinion but of publicness

itself in the ancient world, in light of these two bodies of contemporary scholarship,

namely, research into the political structure generally, and communicative structure more

particularly, of the Roman empire; and theories and histories of the public sphere.

In addition to offering some suggestions how to conceptualize the nature and

limits of ffentlichkeit in antiquity, I have another hope as well, which is to provoke

among theorists and historians of government sustained reflection on the periodizations

now commonly deployed in writing histories of the state, of civil society and the public

sphere, and of subjectivity itself. Nor is this solely a fancy of my own, a Quixotic

attempt to sustain a claim to relevance in modern thought on behalf of ancient history.

On the contrary, I take my cue directly from Habermas and Foucault themselves, for both

those theorists of modernity--like any number of others, less relevant to my concerns:

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Adorno, Arendt, Horkheimer, and Koselleck, to name a few--advanced their normative

projects on the basis of historical-empirical investigations of formidable sophistication.

As is well known, Foucault maintained a profound commitment to historicism and

nominalism throughout his life.2 In the Anglophone world, however, Habermas's

normative arguments in respect to discourse ethics had a wide reception nearly

autonomous from the empirical project that gave rise to their initial articulation: for

Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns was translated into English in 1984, while

Strukturwandel der ffentlichkeitwas published in English only in 1989, twenty-seven

years after its appearance in German.

3

(The English translation was made from the

eighteenth German edition.)

At the risk of gross oversimplification, I offer two reflections on their work, to

distill trends relevant to this essay and to the themes of this volume.4

First, both Habermas and Foucault differentiate the modern from what came

before along several axes, whose prominence in their respective arguments naturally

varies. These are, first, the emergence of the state, in Habermas's terms, of 'public

authority,' in the form of an apparatus of depersonalized institutions with legally defined

spheres of jurisdiction; second and concomitantly, the emergence of 'civil society,' a

domain of privatized economic relations, whose conduct was protected by the state but

which was understood as autonomous from it; third, the consolidation of the intimate

domain of the family and the correlative development of spaces--transcendental andphysical--conceived as public but non-statal: the meeting-houses, coffee-houses and

markets wherein members of civil society conducted both commerce and debate on

politics; and fourth and most crucially, the development of systems of knowledge-

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production and technologies for communication that made possible both the interpellation

of individuals as subjects of government and their mutual recognition and intercourse in

precisely that capacity, that is, as subjects of government.

The second reflection I offer on their work consists simply in the gesturing toward

the loose homology in their chronological schema: for both, it is an overlapping--and to a

point, interrelated--set of developments in the aftermath of the wars of religion that

brought into being on the one hand, an evanescent 'public sphere,' with its distinctive

discourse, and on the other enduring forms of power and knowledge and of persons as

subjects of power and knowing.

Finally, let me acknowledge the existence of substantial obstacles to establishing

any sort of dialectic between these theories of the modern, on the one hand, and the

ancient world on the other. One might identify several; I name two. The first concerns

evidence: the overwhelming majority of evidence for 'communication' in the ancient

world concerns individuals speaking from politically authorized positions or textualizes

interaction between some private party and the imperial state or between private parties

before the imperial state.5 The only exception in type that survive in significant numbers

are private commemorations. These can, I have argued, be made to speak to the history

of subjectivity, but are, I fear, problematic in the perspective of this volume: evidence for

public opinion, as formed in the public sphere, is extraordinarily difficult of access.6

The second obstacle to dialogue between ancient history and modern theory onthe topic of ffentlichkeit concerns the languages of scholarship. These are often

difficult to map onto each other, and in some cases downright misleading. In the context

of this volume, it merits consideration that classical historians and archaeologists

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4

speaking of "public spaces" mean just about the opposite of what Habermas meant by

"ffentliche Rume." Ancient historians use the term to refer to an agora orforum:

places supervised by statal authorities, in which the business of government was

conducted, among other things.7 Ancient historians thus reveal themselves not

surprisingly to employ categories derivative from precisely the public/private distinction

that Habermas attributes to the ancient world in the first chapter ofStrukturwandel der

ffentlichkeit, nor is their doing so methodologically problematic in itself. It only

becomes so when we attempt to correlate some understanding of ancient politics so

derived with a modern one.

-----

When turning to the ancient world, it is important always to keep in mind the

extraordinary difficulties imposed by the technology regime under which communities

and individuals operated. Extra-communal communication required the movement of

persons, which was expensive, dangerous and uncertain. Where public opinion and

public debate were concerned, we must therefore never underestimate the degree of the

monopoly enjoyed by the central government in the distribution of information, nor the

extent to which it exploited this monopoly. For example, after the death of the emperor

Julian on campaign in Parthia in 363 C.E., the new emperor Jovian dispatched agentsaround the empire, to confirm the loyalty of local army commanders and on occasion to

replace those of questionable allegiance. According to Ammianus Marcellinus,

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iussum est autem ad implenda haec perrecturis extollere seriem gestorum

in melius, et rumores quaqua irent verbis diffundere concinentibus,

procinctum Parthicum exitu prospero terminatum...

Moreover, the men commissioned to carry out these plans were ordered to

set the course of events in a favorable light, and to sow rumors wherever

they went, in terms that agreed with one another, to the effect that the

Parthian campaign had been brought to a successful end.... (Ammianus

25.8.12, trans. Rolfe, with minor changes)

One can track the efforts made by the central government to harness this power in a

number of ways: perhaps the simplest is to document awareness on the part of provincial

communities of imperial victories, flagged in the emperor's titulature.8 Nor were the

emperor's motives in spontaneous communication always Orwellian rather than merely

venal: communities were expected to send gifts of congratulations in response to victory

announcements, and there is abundant evidence that they did just that. That said, the fact

that emperors could and did lie in the broadcasting of news so as to shape the political

climate, was thematized by Dio in his account of the monarchy's foundation:

But after this time more and more business was hidden and began to betransacted in secret, and even if something was made public

(dhmosieuyeh), it was distrusted as being unprovable (nejlegkta).

For everything is suspected of having been said or done in accordance

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with the plans of those perpetually in power and those who have influence

with them. And therefore, many things are trumpeted about that never

happened; and many things that certainly happened are unknown; and

everything, so to speak, is publicized in some way different than it

happened. The sheer size of the empire, and the number of things going

on, render accuracy concerning them extremely difficult. There are so

many events in Rome and in her territory--including the continuous and

almost daily fights against her enemies--that no one other than those

involved easily acquires clear knowledge concerning them.... Therefore I

will describe all events that must be mentioned, as they were publicized,

whether it was really so or in some way different. (Dio 53.19.3-6)

Three things about the pragmatics and sociology of communication as depicted in these

passages require emphasis here. First, the mode of communication is imagined as

unilateral: the central government simply delivers information to passive recipients in the

provinces. Second, reasoned public debate on matters of policy and public welfare was

understood to be severely constrained by the difficulty of access to information, and that

difficulty was intentionally heightened by those in power under the monarchy, even as it

was understood to be surmountable through reasoned debate in more democratic regimes.

Third, differential access to means of communication created for political actors underthe empire discrepant experiential fields of political interaction, both spatially and

temporally--the very opposite, one might say, of the so-called network society -- or the

public sphere, for that matter.9 This is a point to which I shall return.

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-----

This is not to say that all communication in the Roman empire was unilateral, from center

to periphery, or even bilateral, between center and periphery. That said, the content of

communication within the empire through the middle of the second century C.E. reflects

in very large measure the success of Roman government in shaping the affective

aspirations and political self-understandings of communities throughout its territory.10

Roman efforts in this regard might be understood at a theoretical level as commonplace

to empires (in contradistinction to states): empires have traditionally governed through

the cultivation and management of difference.11 A very great deal of Roman governance

over conquered populations consisted in efforts to control geographic aspects of social

and economic conduct, most notably in forbidding forms of sociality (esp. marriage) and

rights of contract between individuals and groups across boundaries established by

Roman agents. At a minimal level, Rome's aim was no doubt to prevent the realization

of solidarity among conquered populations. But the effects of these efforts was more

complex and more interesting by far.

What is apparent in evidence already of the mid-first century B.C.E., if not earlier,

are two remarkable changes in politics, intimately connected to each other but susceptible

to disarticulation at the level of analysis. These were, first, the adoption by provincialpopulations of self-understandings informed by their positions within Roman

administrative systems of geographic, ethnic and political classification.12 Second, the

political energies of communities within the empire were rapidly redirected toward

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8

competition with each other--for Roman honors, within arenas established by Rome, in

which the currency was expressions of loyalty to emperor and empire.13

So, for example, in 15 C.E., Tacitus reports that, "Permission was granted to the

Spaniards, who were seeking to build a temple to Augustus in the colony of Tarraco; and

a precedent was set for all the provinces" (Ann 1.78.1). The communicative mechanism

by which this exchange might in fact become "a precedent for all the provinces" is not

clear from Tacitus's brief report. One possibility, familiar from diplomacy under the

Republic, is that permanent memorials were made of the exchange in Rome, which

would henceforth be visible to ambassadors from other cities. But another possibility is

that Tarraco could simply inform its rivals--rivals, that is, within the political economy

nurtured into being by Rome itself. Such action had already been taken by Mytilene at

some point between 27 and 11 B.C.E.: upon a vote there to establish a cult to Augustus

and games in his honor, the city decreed that heralds should announce the first

celebration of those games at, and deliver inscriptions advertising their foundation to,

Pergamum, Actium, Brundisium, Tarraco, Massilia and Antioch near Daphne--and

damage to the stone has eliminated the names of at least two further cities (OGIS456 =

IGRR 4.39).

The contests and conversations in which these communities were engaged was

thus intensively imperial, in at least three significant ways. In the first place, the

evidence urges that they understood or, at the very least, so conducted themselves as tosuggest that the aim of politics was not to contest the nature of the imperial system but to

find their place within it. Second, it is apparent from these documents, and much other

evidence besides, that Rome of this period might be understood as a particularly complex

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9

form of aristocratic empire14: it worked through the cooptation of local elites; it shaped

local institutions of government so as to conduce their formation and stability across

time; and it left the conduct of local politics, of jurisdiction, and indeed of tax collection

in their hands.

Third, what is patently not present in imperial politics so described is an impetus,

or even a practical or imaginative apparatus, for conceiving the institutions of the state or

its political culture as permeating uniformly and universally throughout its territory.15

But this is not the whole story, for I have set aside from consideration another

category of document, petitions for redress, which emanated from the disgruntled, the

put-upon, and mere losers at the local level, and which often worked by demanding that

the Romans redeem claims inherent in administrative ordinances. These may be read so

as to tell a very different story, in which the gradual rationalization of imperial rule

contributed significantly to the universalization of Roman legal culture, well prior to that

moment when the universal grant of citizenship to all free-born residents of the empire

formally effected just that end.

That said, the great bulk of such evidence may also be understood as testifying to

a quite different trend, that of the creation of subjects of law from subjects of empire. Let

me first outline its significance, before I knot these tales together and return, by and by,

to the public sphere.

-----

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10

In June, 1957, a large bronze tablet was discovered in excavations of the Roman colony

of Banasa, in modern-day Morocco. It testified to a grant of Roman citizenship to one

Aurelius Iulianus, prince of the Zagrenses, from Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. For

complex reasons, that grant was later confirmed, and the whole series of transactions

exactly described--and the record of it painstakingly transcribed--in a text of 6 July 177.

I quote two extracts from the inscribed version of that text:

Copied from and checked against the record of those granted citizenship

by the divine Augustus and Tiberius Caesar Augustus and Gaius Caesar

and the divine Claudius and Nero and Galba and the divine Augusti

Vespasian and Titus and Domitian Caesar and the divine Augusti Nerva

and Trajan Parthicus and Trajan Hadrian and Hadrian Antoninus Pius and

Verus Germanicus Medicus Parthicus Maximus and Emperor Caesar

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus Germanicus Sarmaticus and

Emperor Caesar Lucius Aurelius Commodus Augustus Germanicus

Sarmaticus, which Asclepiodotus, freedman, brought forth, that which is

written below:

... At the request of Aurelius Iulianus,princeps of the Zagrenses, by

petition, with the support of Vallius Maximianus by letter, we grantRoman citizenship to them, salvo iure gentis, with local law preserved,

without harm to the taxes and duties of the People or the Imperial Purse.

(IAM94)

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Remarkable as is the survival of this text, its contents are wholly unexceptional. The first

clause testifies to no more--and no less--than the remarkable punctiliousness of Roman

record-keeping (on which more below). It witnesses, too, an important aspect of the

extraordinarily rationality of Roman government: its willingness itself to be held

accountable to, and likewise to enforce, the contents of its legal instruments.

On one level, the second clause attests no more than a grant of citizenship.16 This,

too, is unsurprising: if one feature of Roman history stands out in the history of empires

and likewise persists in common memory, it is the tendency of Rome to give away its

citizenship, even unto that still remarkable moment when it did so universally.

That said, the second clause also hints at a more complex problem, less often

remarked. The spread of a Roman law of persons--even the mere classification of the

conquered as alien--imposed upon local systems of identity formation a superordinate

one, common to the empire. More particularly, both ad hoc and systematic grants of

citizenshipper magistratuum interpellated individuals in ways that atomized them in

respect to their immediate social, political and economic contexts. It is recognition of

that fact, and its consequences for local economic and social orders, that provoked the

stipulation salvo iure gentis, whose import seems clear enough even if its practical

consequences remain obscure. Similar effects were no doubt worked by all manner of

administrative procedures that operated to create or even merely to classify the identitiesof individuals in respect to Rome, not least the census.

We know this not simply from a large sociological literature on the operation of

the census in modern democracies. It is clear, rather, from the enormous body of

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evidence suggesting that individuals retained and deployed both unofficial as well as

notarized administrative records attesting their status before the Roman state: from the

citation of earlier epikriseis in administrative hearings; to the submission of census

returns, tax receipts and death certificates in court; as well as the mere preservation of

such documents in family archives, for years and sometimes decades after their initial

production.17

The recourse of provincials, both citizen and alien, to Roman courts, over against

indigenous institutions of dispute resolution, required at the very least a notional

commitment to the legitimacy of both a peculiarly Roman order as well as the

(depersonalized) institutions that enforced it. But even if that commitment was motivated

in the first instance by a purely instrumental calculus, it is likely to have become more

than notional over time: on one level, iterated recourse to those institutions and

submission to their procedures involved de facto acceptance of the form of authority

embodied by them; while on another, the acquisition of fluency in their discursive regime

would have urged, if not demanded, an ontological commitment to their normative

validity. In other words, Romans believed that the maintenance of social order in the

provinces depended upon a communicative practice that had to satisfy certain conditions

of rationality. Although it was in the first instance Rome that defined those conditions,

the practice itself exposed the conditions to question: their validity thus came to rest not

on the power of Rome to assert them, but upon the integrative work of Roman andprovincial who together coordinated their social actions through criticizable validity

claims.

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What is more, I believe there to be very considerable empirical justification to

back just this argument. Perhaps the most significant evidence for this are petitions for

redress, consideration of which I earlier postponed. One remarkable and recently

published such text is a papyrus from the middle Euphrates, from 245 C.E., was addressed

from four Semitic villagers to Iulius Priscus, "prefect of Mesopotamia," seeking aid in a

dispute over land after having failed to receive appropriate redress from the local

procurator, one Claudius Ariston. I draw your attention particularly to lines 10-17 (P.

Euphrates 1):

Since, therefore, the case has not thus far obtained resolution, and our

fellow villagers are trying to expel us from the lands on which we reside

and to force the issue before judgment, and since the divine constitutions,

which you more than all others know and venerate (afl yeai diatjeiw, w

te pr pntvn gnvr!zvn proskunew), ordain that those finding

themselves in possession of goods should remain so until judgment, for

this reason we have fled to you and we ask you to command by your

subscription (di pografw sou) that Claudius Ariston, vir egregius,

procurator in the area of Appadana, who superintends the diocese, should

preserve everything unharmed and should forbid the use of force before

your blessed visit to the region when, obtaining our desire, we will be able

to render Your Fortune our eternal thanks.

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What the petitioners in these lines reveal--Archodes son of Phallaios, Philotas son of

Nisraiabos, Vorodes son of Sumisbarachos, and Abezautas son of Abediardas--is

familiarity with the principles and substantive content of Roman law in two significant

respects. First, they would seem to know of the existence of possessory interdicts--at

least, that is the name a Roman lawyer would give to the action they seek. Second, and

more important, they clearly have come to appreciate the most characteristically Roman

feature of Roman administration, its rationality. As Priscus had power over Ariston, so

others had power over Priscus, and Archodes and his friends could now appeal to him,

citing his own behavior and several unnamed and unquoted imperial constitutions, on the

basis of their shared status as subjects of a higher power. (The claim that Priscus

performedproskynesis before imperial constitutions was no doubt based on autopsy.)

On my reading, it was therefore above all the communicative actions of Roman

government, along with administrative practices designed to produce from persons

objects of knowledge and of governance, that constituted formerly conquered provincials

as subjects. What is more, in so individually interpellating them, and in so

communicating, Roman government ultimately undermined its own various attempts to

rule through local aristocracies or, for that matter, to rule through the cultivation of

difference. One might even say that it ceased in any meaningful sense to be an empire. It

became, rather, something like a state--perhaps, to adopt the framework of Geoffrey

Hosking, a state that was, rather than a state that had, an empire--with a uniform law ofpersons and legal culture, both penetrating universally throughout its territory.18

-----

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What, finally, of publicness, of ffentlichkeit?

The question I wish specifically to address, invited but not strictly posed at the

start of my essay, is whether anything like a Habermasian public sphere came into

existence, however evanescently, in Rome or the empire at large between, say, 200 B.C.E.

and 400 C.E. In posing this question, I do not wish to imply that one cannot legitimately

study ffentliche Meinung in the absence of ffentlichkeit, as it were. Rather, I wish to

invite ancient historians to refine the analytic categories they bring to the study of ancient

politics, and likewise to urge modern historians and political theorists that the cluster of

phenomena they understand as characterizing modernity--embracing distinctive forms of

political discourse, publicness, subjectivity, governmentality, and forms of the state and

networks of states--are on the one hand capable of disarticulation in history, and on the

other stand perhaps in need of further definitional refinement in order to insure that they

are indeed distinctively modern, if this is, in fact, what one wishes to maintain.

I have already given two different reasons that urge against the discovery of a

Habermasian public sphere in Roman antiquity: the seeming non-existence, as it were, of

public spaces in the ancient world that robustly correspond to the ffentliche Rume of

eighteenth-century bourgeois England; and the discrepant temporal and spatial horizons

of participants in political communication. But this is naturally not all that one might

say. For it is quite clear that Roman elites of the late Republic were in fact highlyconcerned to restrict public speech to spaces under statal control or, perhaps, to

delegitimate as non-political such speech as took place elsewhere.19 At the same time, it

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is quite clear that they lacked a conceptual apparatus to describe their efforts in these

terms.

So, for example, in Livy's account of the Bacchanalian controversy, the consul

urged the Quirites in a contio that "your ancestors" had not wanted any assembly to be

held except under statal control--namely, when a standard was raised or at the summons

of a magistrate: in sum, the consul urged, maiores vestri had provided, censebant, that

"wheresoever the multitude was, there should be a legitimus rector multitudinis." The

challenge posed by a gathering of people outside such control was precisely that

contemporaneous political theory could not conceive of speech in such contexts except as

an alternative to contional rhetoric: the people gathered in a Bacchanal were, on this

understand, anotherpopulus, an alternative sovereign body (Livy 39.13, 15). Likewise,

when describing the upheaval in the early Republic caused by the dispersal of the plebs to

deliberate on the Esquiline and Aventine--precisely because it wished to escape

magisterial control over speech in the forum--Livy describes the Senate as denouncing

the consuls and the situation in the following terms: "If there truly were magistrates in

the state, there would have been no concilium in Rome exceptpublicum concilium. As

things stand, the res publica is dispersa et dissipata into a thousand curiae

contionesque."20 At stake, clearly, is a fundamental inability or unwillingness even to

conceive of non-private, non-statal public conversation on matters of policy or public

welfare.There is a great deal more one might say on this topic, of course. But I close with

the reflection that such evidence as exists--at Rome, at least--for elite anxiety over the

content of speech in tabernae or at cross-roads as the heart of neighborhoods, was

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addressed on the one hand by the assertion of imperial control over neighborhood

organizations, and on the other by the simple evacuation of meaning from Republican

politics altogether. In this respect, at least, the histories of publicness and subjectivity in

the ancient world are profoundly discontinuous and together pose a challenge to any

attempt conjunctively to write their histories in early modernity.

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(1984), 37-60. Reprinted in Millar 2002, 215-237.

Millar, F. (2002)Rome, the Greek World, and the East. Vol. 1: The Roman Republic

and the Augustan Revolution, edited by H. M. Cotton and G. M. Rogers, ChapelHill.

Millar, F. and E. Segal (Hg.) (1984) Caesar Augustus. Seven aspects, Oxford.

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Morstein-Marx, R. (2004)Mass oratory and political power in the late Roman Republic,

Cambridge.

O'Neill, P. (2003) Going round in circles: popular speech in ancient Rome, Classical

Antiquity 22, 135-166.

Rowe, G. (2002) Princes and political cultures, Ann Arbor.

Tully, J. (2008) Public philosophy in a new key. Volume 2:Imperialism and civic

freedom, Cambridge.

Withington, P. (2007) Public discourse, corporate citizenship, and state formation in early

modern England,American Historical Review 112, 1016-1038.

1 Notable recent work in ancient history includes Lendon 1997, Ando 2000, and Rowe

2002; see also Morstein-Marx 2004, focusing on the city of Rome.

2 Regarding Foucault's historical projects I have found Honneth 1991, 99-202, and

McCarthy 1981, 43-75, particularly helpful.

3 Full publication details are provided in the bibliography. Regarding the historical

grounding of Habermas's normative projects (a topic now rather neglected, or so it seems

to me) see Honneth 1991, 203-303; McCarthy 1981, passim but esp. 126-271. On the

reception of Habermas' work on the bourgeois public sphere among historians of early

modern politics see Withington 2007.

4

In what follows I refer principally to the historical arguments in Foucault 2004, whichpublishes his lectures from the Collge in 1977-1978. The content of these lectures was

long best known from the single lecture/essay "Governmentality," first published in

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Italian in 1978; in English in Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991, 87-104; and now easily

accessible in Foucault 2000, 201-222.

5 Millar 1977; see also Herrmann 1990 and Hauken 1998, who concentrate on petitions

from collectives (though the fact that their texts emanated from collectives was not a

criterion in their selection for study).

6 Ando, "Imperial identities" and Ando, "From Republic to Empire" attempt to

adumbrate, on both an empirical and theoretical level, a history of political subjectivity

under the empire, in east and west.7 Hlscher 1998 may here stand for an entire approach.

8 Ando 2000, 175-179; see also Millar 1984.

9 On these contrasting ways of modelling communication in contemporary

communications theory and their utility in studying imperial systems see Tully 2008,

166-194.

10 Ando 2000.

11 Barfield 2001, 29; Maier 2006, 5-7, 29-36.

12 Ando, "Imperial identities."

13 Ando 2000; Rowe 2002; Heller 2006.

14 Kautsky1982 (on whose much-remarked overcommitment to a social-materialist view

of class see, e.g., Eisenstadt 1985); Maier 2006, 33-36.15 That said, I have elsewhere argued that along a number of axes, on the basis of a

number of different bodies of evidence, Rome can usefully be studied in light of modern

theories of the state. See esp. Ando 2006, discussing pressures toward standardization in

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imperial administration; Ando 2008, on geographic consciousness as it emerges in

diplomatic practice and international law; and Ando, "Law and the landscape of empire,"

jurisdiction.

16 Ando, "Citizenship" provides an historical and historographic overview regarding

Roman citizenship.

17 Ando 2000, 336-362.

18 Maier 2006, 5, citing Geoffrey Hosking, "The Freudian Frontier," Times Literary

Supplementno. 4797 (1995), 27.19 For legal evidence regarding the assertion of statal control over fora for public speech

see, e.g., Tabula Heracleensis ll. 126-139.

20 On popular speech in Republican Rome see O'Neill 2003.