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Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.*

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.

G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.*

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLEs COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.

Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, a challenge on the validity of a Comelec Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion may be brought before the Supreme Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; No motion for reconsideration of a Comelec en banc resolution, order or decision is possible, the same being a prohibited pleading.The assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency.In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Same; Same; Same; Educative Function of the Supreme Court.Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.

Same; Same; Same; Procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent.Procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

Same; Party-List System; Under the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) 7941, political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties.We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Same; Same; The key words in the statutory policy set out in RA 7941 are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Proportional representation does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, but rather to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the lawnamely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of thelaw; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

Same; Same; The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5, and the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.It is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The partylist organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral groups, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government.Lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Noscitur A Sociis; It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

Same; Same; The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens.specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and partiesto be elected to the House of Representatives, and the assertion of the Office of the Solicitor General that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy.The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizensspecifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and partiesto be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.

Same; Same; Allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.

Same; Same; Same; The function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.

Same; Same; Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants,The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec fqr the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. Third, the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. Sixth, the party must not only comply with t)ie requirements of the law. Its nominees must likewise do so. Seventh, not only candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. So also must its nominees. Eighth, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

VITUG, J,, Separate (Dissenting) Opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; Neither Article 6, Section 5(2) of the Constitution, nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors.It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a sectoral party, the enumeration was intended to qualify only sectoral parties and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R,A, 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Political Party, Sectoral Party, Sectoral Organization, and Coalition, Defined; The party-list system is limited to four groups1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions.The party-list system is limited to four groups1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.

Same; Same; A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of candidates and their nominees relegated to mere agents.A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of candidates and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Judicial Legislation; Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages; The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment.The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remainseffect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails.

MENDOZA, J., Dissenting opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed; Textually, Art. VI, 5(1)(2) of the Constitution provides no basis for petitioners contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for marginalized sectors, by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The text of Art. VI, 5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations, not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, 5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for marginalized sectors, by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To the extent that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors to obtain seats in the House of Representatives.Under the partylist system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the winner-take-all single seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors referred to by petitioners, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide.The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, 5(1)(2) to say that Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the marginalized as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the underrepresented as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are always third or fourth place in each of the districts.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot hold that the partylist system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, 6 that A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.A problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing winner-take-all one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system, This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the Opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, 6 that A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article. Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Neri, Javier, Colmenares for petitioner Bayan Muna.

The Solicitor General for COMELEC.

Chan, Robles and Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.

Cruz, Cruz & Navarro III for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.

Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for The True Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.

Fracis A, Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.

Yap, Crisanto, Salvador & Calderon and Fornier & Fornier Law Office for Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association.

McAskell, Equilla, & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers.

Juan Carlos T. Cuna and Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.

Buhag, Kapunan, Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Demokratiko.

Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.

Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.

Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Afundo Law Office and Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Organization.

708

708

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rales of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, [verifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition [s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 151 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.

It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and

___

more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that said certified list be accordingly amended. It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be proclaimed.4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Thereafter, Comments14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.15

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:

1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the partylist elections.

3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. 16

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.

First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A18 dated November 9, 2000.19

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participatein the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioners action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedyand adequate remedy.23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency.24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.25

Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.26

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major political parties.28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao.32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:33

MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party-list system sa lahat ng mga partido.

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.34 He explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the partylist system.

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

x x x x x x x x x

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

x x x x x x x x x

Indubitably, therefore, political partieseven the major onesmay participate in the party-list elections.

Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political partyor any organization or group for that mattermay do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give genuine power to our people in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style partylist system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens.

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.

Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.

Finally, lack of well-defined constituency] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented.

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

SEC. 5. Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.38

The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 640 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarinas Village could participate in the party-list elections.41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizensspecifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and partiesto be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.

Indeed, the law grafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors.43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor un-

derrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of ones constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of ones bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enactedto give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the pastthe farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movementto come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of

Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within itthose who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the simplest scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within itthose privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory open house, which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the open house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the outsiders who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the

Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary48 that the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasijudicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political partiesRespondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMPon the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x. We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the partylist election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.

What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because it is a government entity using government resources and privileges. This Court, however, is not a trier of facts,51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track recordthat it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.52

Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction.54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS, he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

3. It is a foreign party or organization;

4. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

8. It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs, of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x.61

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last partylist elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Bellosillo, J., In the result.

Vitug, J., Please see dissenting opinion.

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VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001

733

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Mendoza, J., See dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., Join the dissenting opinion of Justice V. Mendoza.

Ynares-Santiago, J., Abroad on Official Business.

SEPARATE (DISSENTING) OPINION

VITUG, J.:

The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party in powera convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter

THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.

734

734

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2).First, the system should only apply to the election of 20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to be represented in voters registration boards, board of election inspectors, parties and organizations or similar entities.

On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System. In the May 1998 first party-list elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the first time, their political mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list system. While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multiparty list elections, however, were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied for registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN.

The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground that their participation does not level the playing field for less known and less organized sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other parties but only on the condition that the latter field sectoral candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the disqualification of the large major political parties and groups which do not represent any genuine sectoral interest.

735

VOL. 359, JUNE 26, 2001

735

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections

A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the qualifications of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system. Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the systems focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads

The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lacked well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positionsthe first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lions den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party

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representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromisethat the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.

The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the monopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats that may be gained by a party or organization.1 Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three seats.

There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that disallows major political parties from participating in the party-list system and, at the same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.

Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other,

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1 Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.

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presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list system is open only to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:

SEC. 5. Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, defining a sectoral party, the enumeration was intended to qualify only sectoral parties and not the other eligible groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions). Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected, was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.

The party-list system is limited to four groups1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of secur-

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ing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.

A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register with the COMELEC, together with a list of its five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged according to the groups order of preference. In every election for the House of Representatives, each voter casts two votesone for the district representative of his choice and another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the parties and organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other officials where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the number of votes received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis of the number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list system, should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.

At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties add an important element of stability to a political system and also help organize the government and electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation and providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. The idea could also be seen as a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the multi-party

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as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a complex society, including a range of ideological differences, conflicting political values and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicitA free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people.2 The multi-party system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-defined political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.

A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates,3 with the exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.4 A nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true representation.5 A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election.6 Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof.7 Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do district representatives, except that

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2 Bernas, pp. 355-358.

3 The Constitutional qualifications for legislative districts representatives apply to party-list nominees

Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.

4 Sections 8, R.A. 7941.

5 Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56 (1990).

6 Section 9, R.A. 7941.

7 Ibid.

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they are not entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund (CDF).8

A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of candidates and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term forfeits his seat.9 So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization.10

The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as they precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the members of the Constitutional Commission.

And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remainseffect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.11 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as com


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