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ANGER IN THE PHILOKALIAAuthor(s): Daniel A. DombrowskiSource: Mystics Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 101-118Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717344 .Accessed: 30/08/2014 06:27
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ANGER IN THE PHILOKALIA
Introduction
What is themoral status of anger? Is it virtue or a vice? Is there a place for it inthe life f a serious
religiousseeker
and,if there
is,under what conditions can it
be seen asmorally permissible? When in contrast is it impermissible? Two recent
developments, one in philosophy and the other inmystical theology, have
brought these questions to the forefront f scholarly debate.
The development in philosophy is the renewal in the last generation of virtueethics (i.e., the traditional view of ethics in the ancient and medieval thinkers).This renewal has not only forced philosophers to look again at the hegemonythat the deontology-utilitarianism debate has had on philosophical ethics (thatis, the debate between absolute rights theorists and those who base ethicaldecisions
strictlyn
consequences),but ithas also
encouraged philosophersto
look at specific virtues and vices and at the roles these virtues and vices play inthe lives of persons interested in pursuing their teloi, their ultimate purposes(Pence 1984;Trianosky 1990;Maclntyre 1981).
The second development, that inmystical theology, is the first ranslation into
English of The Philokalia (literally, ove of thebeautiful). These Greek texts, ritten
by spiritual masters in the Orthodox Christian tradition between the fourth ndthe fifteenth enturies, were compiled in the eighteenth century. Their greatestimpact todate has been on Russian Orthodox spirituality. But between 1979 and1995, four of five projected volumes of The Philokalia
appearedin
Englishtranslation for the first ime1. he present article isnot intended tobe a summaryofwhat I take tobe themost important contributions tobe found inThe Philokalia,
which are the subtle treatments f certain crucial elements in rthodox Christian
mystical theology, like the state ofwatchfulness and the tranquillity and silencecharacteristic of a state of hesychia (Dombrowski 1992).Rather, Iwould like toconcentrate on the various treatments f anger found in theseOrthodox Christian
masters.
The fact that omany authors inThePhilokaliawere concerned for ver a thousandyears with the concept of anger indicates its
importancein this tradition.
Mythesis is that our contemporary concern for virtues and vices can be greatlyenhanced by coming to terms ith the treatments f anger found inThePhilokalia,
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which are themost insightful nd detailed in the history ofmystical theology ofwhich I am aware.
A secondary aim of this article is to argue against the view, held by Gibbon,Nietzsche, Nygren, and others, that there is a radical discontinuity between theview of virtue and vice found among the ancient Greeks and that found in
Christianity. That is, Iwill show in detail how the view of anger found in the
spiritual masters anthologized inThe Philokalia is continuous with that found inPlato and Aristotle, even if t s also true that in certain respects they (especiallySt.Gregory of Sinai, St.Maximos the Confessor, St. Diodochos of Photiki, andSt. John Cassian) improve on it.
A Negative View of Anger
Itwould be amistake to claim that there is no evidence whatsoever for the
discontinuity thesis, the stance that the view of virtue and vice found amongthe ancient Greeks is radically different from that found inChristian thinkers.
Certainpassages
taken in isolation caneasily
beinterpreted
aspointing
to aview of anger that seems tobe much more negative than that found inPlato andAristotle. Eventually we will see that this is not the case, however.
It is common to find the authors in The Philokalia claiming that one's affairs inlife can be organized so as to avoid anger and that we should do all we can to
avoid it. Inmany ways this negative view of anger is consistent with Christianasceticism in that it rests on the view that desire not only disrupts prayer, it lso
provides fuel for anger, which, in turn, disturbs spiritual vision. In this regardthere s something senseless about anger in that it ravages, darkens, and confusesthe soul; indeed, itmakes the soul bestial.
Angerblossoms on the tree f bitterness
when its roots are kept moist by the foulwater of pride; the fruit produced hereisquite rotten. Given this view of anger, it eems the best advice is todry up the
passion of anger and to cast it nto the fire. here are other options, however. Byrecalling the humiliation of Christ, the whole perverse edifice of anger andresentment automatically collapses (1,59?Evagrios the Solitary; 1,154,156-157?St.Mark the Ascetic; also seeMatthew 3:10).
If ach passion holds imagination in chains, the angry person who fights gainstthe one who has offended him or her is not really conscious of anything external,but is rather fettered by the internal power of imagination. Hence freedom fromanger in some sense involves not losing one's own temper, a goal that is especially
important if t s true that anger is the cause of all evils. Even if this hypothesis is
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hyperbolic, it nonetheless indicates the serious nature of anger from the
perspective of the authors inThe Philokalia,who, despite their idiosyncrasies inother respects, generally offer a unified account of anger (1,249?St. Neilos theAscetic; I, 252?St. Diadochos of Photiki; I, 331?attributed to St.Anthony the
Great). One significant difference, however, will be treated later in relation to St.John Cassian.
The things that provoke us to anger constitute a species of awider genus thatincludes things that distress us. That is, there are some things that distress us,like the death of a friend, that do not provoke us to anger. But the sources of
distress in general, and of anger in particular, should be treated the same way:
by eliminating the desire to change them, we can ameliorate their provocativestatus. The goal of the Orthodox Christian masters seems tobe release from theturbulence of anger and, through ascetic practice, to refrain from anger at anyone,however much we may suffer t the hands of others (II,84-85, 98, 291,293?St.Maximos the Confessor; III, 121,244?St. Peter of Damaskos).
Anger, on this interpretation, is contrary to the true nature of the soul, acontrariness that ismost likely to affect the spiritually immature or thosewhosecharacter is only recently or partially purified. Those most prone to anger arefettered by violent images and desires that make itmore likely that an explosionof anger will occur when emotion is triggered, however slightly. At the very
least, those prone to anger should censure themselves when they lose their
temper, specially if they re not yet capable of not losing it. nd the consequencesof losing it can sometimes be severe: murder often results from a blow, whichoften results from an insult, which, in turn, almost always results from anger
(IV,89,113,124,142?Nikitas Stithatos; IV,329?St.
Gregory Palamas).The Platonic Background
Beforemoving to the texts that illustrate why the view of anger inThe Philokaliaisnot as one-sidedly negative as the above would seem to indicate, it is crucialto consider the Platonic and Aristotelian background to Orthodox Christian
anthropology. The Orthodox Christian tradition, more so than theWesternChristian, relies heavily on the tripartite iew of the soul first developed inPlato's
Republic; laterwe will see that several of the authors in The Philokalia explicitlytreat this tripartite iew, and many others rely on it implicitly.
The Platonic view (Republic435-442) is that the soul, whereby it reasons andsearches for wisdom, is rational, whereas that by which it loves, hungers, thirsts,
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Mystics Quarterly
and feels is (irrational and) appetitive. The third part of the soul?thymos?is a
principle of "high spirit" by which we feel anger. That anger is different from
appetite can be shown in cases where anger fights against desire, aswhen (touse an example loosely based on Plato) we do not want to see something that is
ugly and unjust, but nonetheless feel compelled to see it, ue to our agitation atthewrong that has been done. In this light, pirit or anger is an ally of reason.
Plato seems to admit (ibid.) that the nobler individual is, inone sense, less capableof anger than a base individual, in that the former s less likely tobe offended bypetty wrongs. But if ne has been genuinely wronged in a non-trivial way, one's
high spirit or anger rightfully eethes, as in a guard dog under the tutelage of awise master. That is, the high spirited element is, or should be, much closer toreason than it is to appetite. But the high spirited element is not to be literallyidentified with reason, as can be seen in children who are chock-full of anger atsome wrong that has been done to them or to others, but who are not yet veryrational. Or again, the high spirited element can be seen innon-rational animals
(see, e.g.,Laws
963E).As iswell known, according to Plato the just individual is the one who canestablish a harmony among the rational, appetitive, and high spirited parts,especially when the latter exhibits courage in an intelligent way, that is, underthe sway of reason. One's high spirited part should persevere in the face of painor danger. We will see that theOrthodox Christian thinkers anthologized inThePhilokalia largely agree with Plato's account here, even if they re a little scepticalas towhether or not one's anger should be directed, as Plato thinks, toward the
maintenance of one's good repute (Republic580E-581B). Even Plato, however, isaware of the fact that
high spiritedconcern for
reputationcan
easily overstepits
bounds if one actually covets honor by becoming a haughty and contentioustimocrat, a ruler who covets rewards and praise (Republic548C, 550B).
Ideally one would like to have the gentleness of reason combined with the
legitimate harshness of high spirited anger, a balance that ismade more difficultto achieve if ne's education consists inunmitigated athletic activity, rather thana bodily discipline tempered by "music," broadly construed. Much is at stakehere. Plato's view that a certain fierceness is required in the just individual (or
just state) does not necessarily imply the (anti-Christian) view that we shouldlove our friends but hate our enemies. That is, ifwe are angry with others this
should be part of what St. Thomas Aquinas refers to as "benign severity"(Dombrowski 1991), or ofwhat we today might call "tough love." (SeeRepublic375C, 410D, 503B-C, 572A; Timaeus 18A; Laws 731B).
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Anger can, in fact, be foolish in Plato as in the Orthodox Christian thinkers
(Timaeus69D, 90B; Laws 863B), and the high spirited part of the soul can easilydegenerate into unproductive contentiousness (philonikon?Republic 586D, 548C,581A). This is because anger itself like love) is amixture of pleasure and pain;foolish anger, it seems, arises when one receives too much pleasure at being
angry with another. That is, there should always be an element of reluctance
(pain)that attaches to one's
anger.
Aristotle and Moderation
Aristotle makes explicit what is implicit inPlato, that anger is a virtue when it s
present inmoderation. The continuity between the ancient view and theOrthodox Christian one is seen when Aristotle names the mean of this
phenomenon gentleness (praotes).The excess of anger he refers to as irascibility(orge?which is the equivalent of "anger" itself n ancient Greek) and the defectas spiritlessness (aorge).What may appear to be spiritlessness in the authors inThe Philokalia should, Iwill argue, more accurately be seen as an assiduous effort
to avoid themore likely vice: irascibility (NicomacheanEthics II,vii, 10).
Aristotle associates anger with a Platonic high spiritedness, and again he sees
courage (andreia) as themost admirable feature of this high spiritedness. Theline between legitimate and illegitimate anger (i.e., between "gentleness" and
irascibility) isoften hard to draw because the high spirited element isby naturelike awild beast when it iswounded and is likely tobe impetuous in the face of
danger. This impetuousness is apotheosized by Homer, but is only qualifiedlyadmired by Plato, Aristotle, and Orthodox Christian mystics, contraNietzsche's
interpretation of Christianity, according towhich there should be no place for
anger whatsoever. Aristotle, like Plato and the authors anthologized in ThePhilokalia, sees danger in unbridled, Homeric praise of anger, even if he cannot
?given his hylomorphism, his belief that human soul is always integrally
connected to some body? completely do without anger (i.e., "gentleness") as a
virtue2. Because our animal bodies make us the individuals we are, we cannot
lightly dismiss our animal-like courage in the face of danger. The trick s to see
legitimate anger as a virtue without giving in to the desire for revenge. In orderfor legitimate anger ("gentleness") tobe virtuous, itmust be guided by principle,rather than by a passionate desire to see the one with whom one is angryobliterated. A
sanguine temperamentmarked
bysturdiness isnot
necessarilya
bad thing (NicomacheanEthics III,viii, 10-14).
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As we have seen, "gentleness" is the observance of the mean in relation to anger,
"gentleness" being a deliberate designation on Aristotle's part that pushes thisvirtue more toward the defect than to the excess because the excess is the greatervice. Virtuous anger or "gentleness" occurs when one feels anger on the right
grounds, and against the right ersons, at the rightmoment, for the right mountof time, nd in the rightmanner. This is no easy task The gentle-tempered personis inclined to
forgive transgressions,but in some cases
righteous indignationis
the appropriate course. Just as anger can lead us to foolishness, so can a completelack of anger (aorgesia) (NicomacheanEthics IV,v, 1-6).
The problem isnot somuch with anger per se as it iswith irascible anger at the
wrong things, t thewrong time, and so on. The concept of irascibility, owever,contains different types: passionate anger that is expressed and is then over, on
the one hand, and bitterness, where there isno end to the anger, on the other.
(This latter sort of irascibility is especially the object of criticism for St. JohnCassian, as we will see.)Reiterating Plato's point about anger being amixture of
pleasureand
pain,the bitter
personis seen
byAristotle as the one who
replacesthe pain of temporary resentment with the perverse pleasure of a more permanentstate of implacability. Bitter anger isworse than passionate outbursts, accordingtoAristotle, because it tends to fester like a dirty wound, and hence is not as
easy to cure (NicomacheanEthics IV,v, 7-12)3.
There are no algorithms for determining how long one should remain angry,with whom, and so on. But slight transgressions are easy to distinguish from
major ones, even if exact calibrations cannot be made as a matter of principle:
But thismuch at all events is clear, that the middle disposition is
praiseworthy, which leads us to be angry with the right peoplefor the right things in the rightmanner and so on,while the variousforms of excess and defect are blameworthy
? when of slightextent, but little so, when greater, more, and when extreme, very
blameworthy indeed. It is clear therefore thatwe should strive toattain themiddle disposition (NicomacheanEthics IV,v, 13-14).
Aristotle at least twice defines anger, once as a desire accompanied by pain caused
by a conspicuous slight at the hands of thosewho have no call to slight oneselfor one's friends, nd once as pain with a consciousness of being slighted (Rhetoric
1378a31;Topics 151 15).Although he also admits in theRhetoric that the retaliationthat one might bring about as a result of one's anger may cause pleasure rather
than pain, he is quite clear that anger is not to be confused with hatred, a
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distinction that once again helps to establish legitimacy for the continuity thesisin that hatred seems tobe antithetical toChristianity. Anger tends tobe directed
against individuals, hatred against awhole class (e.g. thieves); anger (in thesense of irascibility) can be cured, hatred cannot; anger is accompanied by pain,but hatred isnot necessarily connected to pain; and an angry person may cometo pity those who offend her, but not the one who hates (Rhetoric 382a2-18; cf.Politics
1312b28).In a third definition (On the oul 403a29-403b4), Aristotle distinguishes betweena scientist's view of anger (aboiling of blood or a warm substance around the
heart) and a dialectician's view (the appetite for returning pain for pain). Herethe material and formal conditions of anger, although joined in reality, are
theoretically distinguished. This concern for the pain associated with anger is
obviously connected toAristotle's belief that explanations for affections of thesoul, including anger, are "enmattered" accounts (in that the soul, for ristotle,is always the soul of some particular body), as in the swollen veins on the neck
and temples, and the (alleged) fact that angercauses
heat around the heart toboil (On the oul 403a30;OnMemory 453a27; Physiognomies 12a30; Problems 869a5,947b23). Plato also offered an enmattered account of anger (Timaeus 70A), andthis Platonic-Aristotelian account provides the basis for the Orthodox Christian
view in that at several points in The Philokalia anger is associated with the heart
and with heat in the chest (I,238; II, 294; IV,71, 261).
The key point to notice here is that Aristotle's view of legitimate anger(gentleness) as a mean between extremes (also see Magna Moralia 1186al2-24,
1191b25-38; Eudemian Ethics II, iii),his view that irascibility is like a servant whois too
eager (MagnaMoralia
1202bl-22),and his view that we should
onlybe
angry with evil-doers (Politics 1328al0) are the basis for the Orthodox Christianview of anger inThePhilokalia.And the problems with anger that ristotle noticesare not very different from those that are of concern to authors inThe Philokalia,save for the fact that neither Plato nor Aristotle were concerned tohave irascibilityeradicated through the help that could be provided by the theological virtues,especially agapic love. But the problems that Aristotle saw with anger are seen
by the authors in The Philokalia as well: there is a danger that the activity ofanger will reify nto a permanent state (NicomacheanEthics II, i);and despite thefact that acts of anger are voluntary, they are not necessarily done with malice
aforethought, and they re not necessarily uniquely human for having been donevoluntarily in that animals also get angry (NicomacheanEthics III, i-ii and V, viii;Eudemian Ethics II,vii, ix)4.
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The Incensive Power as Positive
The Orthodox Christian authors in The Philokalia almost unanimously implysome sort of attachment to the Platonic tripartite iew of the soul: the intelligentpower (to logistikon), he desiring power (to epithymitikon), nd the incensive
power (to thymikon r thymos)?this last being the force provoking vehement
feelings, including anger. Itwill be my purpose here to emphasize theways in
which this power can be used positively, as inefforts orepel temptations, ratherthan to stress itsnegative uses, as in self-indulgent and disruptive thought andaction. These negative uses are possible because the incensive power, along withthe desiring power, constitutes the soul's passible aspect (topathetikon) that isvulnerable to passion (I,358, 362).
Or more accurately, every deiform soul is tripartite in that unruly, irrationalsouls may be dominated entirely by the passible aspect. But under the tutelageof rationality a soul can exhibit discretion in the exercise of its incensive power,a discretion especially evident in the patient sort of courage needed to insurethat anger remains something positive. This patience is enhanced through love,even love for those with whom we are angry. This love is reflected back on
intellect so as to illumine it, s opposed to unbridled, dissolute, irascible angerthat darkens intellect (II, 18?St. Theodorus; II, 339?St. John of Damaskos).
Without anger one cannot obtain purity because in order to achieve spiritual
progress one must necessarily feel angry, so as to flare up and counteract the
evil inside each of us. An "anger of the intellect" isa good thing, that is, an angerin accordance with nature, whereby the incensive power isunder the sway ofreason, as when Job was angry with his enemies. This "natural" anger occurs
only when it s stripped altogether of self-aggrandizement and is informed witha desire for God (I,22, 27?St. Isaiah the Solitary). "Unnatural" anger, on thisview, ismost likely tobe that fueled by fantasies of gratuitous insults heaped onone or on one's friends and relatives. But "natural" anger can be directed against"unnatural" anger, as in the biblical injunction to "Be angry, but do not sin"(Psalm 4: 4) (I,39, 47?Evagrios the Solitary).
In fact, t an be a sin to fail tobe angry, hich seems tobe theOrthodox Christian
way toput Aristotle's very point. It is theworldly-minded who remain unangrywhen justice is trampled under foot. (In our day we might think of those who
do not get angry atHeideggerians and other Nazi apologists when they ignorealtogether or de-emphasize the importance of theHolocaust.) It is the soulwhichloves God and which rises above the passions that, to quote St. Diodochos ofPhotiki:
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The soul has three powers: the intelligence, the incensive powerand desire. With our intelligence we direct our search; with ourdesire we long for that supernal goodness which is the object ofour search; and with our incensive power we fight to attain our
object.With these powers thosewho love God cleave to the divine
principle of virtue and spiritual knowledge. Searching with the, first
power, desiringwith the
second,and
fighting bymeans of
the third (II, 193).
The person who is not indifferent to fame and pleasure is likely to exhibit"unnatural" anger, a condition that can be partially ameliorated by almsgiving(II,61-62?St. Maximos the Confessor).
Like Plato and Aristotle, Orthodox Christian thinkers recognize many vices (orsins) that can develop if anger is licentious: heartlessness, hatred, lack of
compassion, rancor, envy, and murder. But these sins can, in fact, be avoided
through habituation with respect to a contrasting list f virtues: deep sympathyfor others, gentleness (again, a gentleness that is perfectly compatible with"natural" anger), brotherly affection, compassion, forbearance, kindness, and
spiritual love.As we have seen, it is not only true that the incensive power isenhanced by the rational power; the reverse isalso the case, aswhen the rational
power is enhanced when fiery anger is, in Orthodox Christian terms, inaccordance with nature. We should, in fact, be angry when human intelligence,
properly understood, is perverted or rendered unnatural through, say, academic
infighting or lying (II, 337?St. John of Damaskos; II, 215?St. Maximos theConfessor; II, 310, 320?St. Thallassios).
It is only anger without good cause that ismorally wrong, and not having agood cause to be angry is only likely when anger ismixed with, or is carried
away by, envy, contentiousness and guile. The harmony of the soul's three parts,however, isoften brought about when reason plays the other two parts againsteach other, saywhen tempestuous anger is assuaged with soft desire, or whendesire isparadoxically calmed by the severity of courage associated with anger.Anger, conceived as righteous indignation, can be directed against (unjust)external forces or against internal ones that prove to be spiritual obstacles. The
key is to link courageous anger to a ruling perspicacity and to avoid love of
praise (III, 21-23, 26?St. Philotheos of Sinai; III, 98, 100, 156?St. Peter ofDamaskos; IV, 82-83,104-105,147,170?Nikitas Stithatos).
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St.Gregory of Sinai isespecially helpful indetailing the positive role of anger ina deiform, tripartite oul. Because of the tight coexistence of body and soul?
whether in a Platonic, tripartite format or in an Aristotelian, hylomorphicformat?anger is referred to sometimes as a power pertaining to the body and
sometimes as pertaining to the soul. Gregory puts the issue in these terms:
At this point itmust be asked why the holy fathers sometimes
say that anger and desire are powers pertaining to the body andsometimes that they are powers pertaining to the soul....[B]othstatements are true, if correctly understood in context. For
indescribably body and soul are brought into being in such awaythat they coexist....The soul by virtue of its creation as a deiformand intellective entity possesses an intrinsic power of desire andan intrinsic incensive power, and these lead it tomanifest both
courage and divine love. For senseless anger and mindless desirewere not created along with the soul. Nor originally did they
pertainto the
body.On the
contrary,hen the
bodywas created
it as free from corruption and without the humours from whichsuch desire and uncontrollable rage arise. But after the fall angerand desire were necessarily generated within it, for then it ecame
subject to the corruption and gross materiality of the instinct
driven animals. That iswhy when the body has the upper hand it
opposes thewill of the soul through anger and desire. But whenwhat ismortal ismade subject to the intelligence it assists thesoul indoing what isgood ....WhenGod through His life-givingbreath created the soul deiform and intellective, He did not
implant in itanger and desire that re animal-like. ut He did endowit ith apower of longing and aspiration, aswell aswith a courageresponsive to divine love. Similarly when God formed the body
He did not originally implant in it instinctual anger and desire. Itwas only afterwards, through the fall, that itwas invested withthese characteristics that have rendered itmortal, corruptible andanimal-like (IV,227-228?emphasis added; also see 226, 229-231on Gregory's remarkably Aristotelian view).
It is passages like these which, read unsympathetically, curiously lead to a
Gibbonian or Nietzschean discontinuity thesis. But it should be noted thatGregory is here not so much condemning anger per se as condemning anger not
under the sway of reason (see the emphasized words in the above quotation).
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The most recent translators and editors of The Philokaliamake a crucial distinctionhere that isneeded in order tomake it less likely that one be persuaded by the
discontinuity thesis or by the view which claims that (Orthodox) Christianityhas a view of the human body that isnegative or life-negating. The distinctionconcerns three different meanings of the word "flesh" (sarx): (i)"Flesh" can referto the human in contrast to the divine, as in the phrase "The Logosbecame flesh."
(ii)The term could also refer to fallen or sinful human nature in contrast to
human nature as it hould be, dwelling in communion with God, as St.Gregoryof Sinai argues above. And (iii) "flesh" can refer to the body in contrast to thesoul. That is, there is a basic difference between flesh (sarx)and body (soma) thatisusually ignored by discontinuity theorists. The contemporary editors of The
Philokalia perspicaciously note the following:
When St. Paul lists the "works of the flesh" in Galatians 5:19-21,he mentions such things as "seditions," "heresy/' and "envy,"which have no special connection with the body. In sense (ii)oftheword, "flesh" denotes the whole
soul-bodystructure in so far
as aman is fallen; likewise "spirit" denotes the whole soul-bodystructure in so far as a man is redeemed. The soul as well as the
body can become fleshly or "carnal," just as the body aswell asthe soul can become spiritual. Asceticism involves a war againstthe flesh?in sense (ii)of the word?but not against the body assuch (I, 361).
St.Gregory of Palamas (in addition toSt.Gregory of Sinai), for example, exhibitsthis positive view of the body when he contends that when, through self-controland cleansing prayer, we have purified the body and made our incensive poweran incentive for virtue, we will, as hylomorphs or as "soulbodies" (myword)experience the grace promised (Matthew 5: 8) to the pure inheart (IV,333).
The incensive power isby nature prone to be destructive in that it is supposedto break up the temporary hegemony of injustice. It is aweapon against evil,but, unfortunately, it can also be used against good, just as a spirited dog cansometimes attack wolves and sometimes the sheep themselves. Plato was rightto remind us in Book One of the Republic?a passage alluded toby Evagrios the
Solitary?that we should not hand a dangerous sword to those too readilyincensed to anger. Perhaps no one can do without anger altogether, but those
who have to some extent succeeded in ascetic discipline will surely have feweroccasions tobe tempted by anger than those who embrace possessions and glory.
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Biblical passages condemning anger (e.g.,Psalms 37: 8; 1Timothy 2: 8) shouldbe seen in this light.Anger that ispersonal (in the pejorative sense of the term)rather than principled, however, is rightly tobe condemned (1,40-41?Evagriosthe Solitary; I, 167, 185-186?St. Hesychios the Priest; I, 340?attributed to St.
Antony the Great).
One of the reasons why the vices associated with the incensive aspect of the soul
are often more difficult to combat than those associated with the desiring aspectis that the incensive aspect makes possible a listlessness that can arouse, not thisor that passion, but all of the passions together: the desires for riches, fame,pleasure, revenge, etc.Quite ironically, hen the incensive power is constantlystimulated in this way it can become cowardly in that it imagines somanyenemies that it can no longer act effectively. his ubiquitous stimulation, once
again, is to be brought under control by reason until the aeon; that is, until thesoul develops spiritually from the metaphorical "present age" to the "age tobe"
(II,59-62, 69, 77, 86,223?St. Maximos the Confessor).
Without subjection to intellect, incensiveness is difficult to distinguish fromfrenzy; in fact, this sort of incensiveness can be seen as frenzy premeditated,and frenzy as incensiveness brought to action. This should not take us awayfrom incensiveness altogether, however, when it is realized that properincensiveness or religious fervor is propaedeutic to the rapt ecstasy associated
with mystic contemplation. It should be noted that the major difference betweenthe ancient view of anger in Plato and Aristotle and the view found in the
Orthodox Christian thinkers is the dependence in the latter on the theologicalvirtues in addition to the cardinal ones, especially courage. But the fact thatChristian love isneeded along with intellect in the effort to
keepincensiveness
"natural" does not play into thehands of the (Nietzschean) discontinuity theorist.
Anger is still sometimes a virtue and sometimes a vice, as itwas inAristotle,and in order for it to be a virtue some sort ofmoderating "gentleness" (to use
Aristotle's term) isneeded. For the rthodox Christian thinkers this "gentleness"involves deifying love (II,74, 92,110,117, 224?St. Maximos the Confessor; II,38?St. Theodoras the Great Ascetic).
Once again, the problem isnot somuch with anger per se,aswith getting pleasurethrough one's anger, albeit the sort of pleasure awild beast exhibits when it
gnashes its teeth at a prey.Getting
angryreluctantly
isasign
that ne is removedfrom, or is in the process of moving away from, "unnatural," sinful anger (III,23?St. Philotheos of Sinai; III, 63?Ilias the Presbyter; III, 253?St. Peter ofDamaskos; IV, 165-166?Nikitas Stithatos)5.
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St. John Cassian's Casuistry
It should be emphasized that The Philokalia is not a collection of philosophical,or even theological, treatises. Rather, it primarily consists in spiritual advice.But it is advice that rests on certain philosophical and theological concepts, an
ignorance ofwhich makes the advice less efficacious. In this final section Iwouldlike to examine in detail the advice from the best casuist on the subject of angerinThe Philokalia: St. John assian (1,82-87).If t.Diodochos of Photiki, St.Maximosthe Confessor, and St. Gregory of Sinai are themost instructive authors in The
Philokalia regarding the positive and negative functions of anger, St. John assianis themost instructive author regarding what to do with anger when it arises.
John Cassian notices that when we are blinded by "unnatural" anger we can
neither discriminate concerning what is good nor fulfill our good intentions,nor even direct our intellect toward contemplation of the divine light (he citesPsalm 6:7; Ecclesiastes 7:9; Proverbs 15:1; James 1:20; Proverbs 11:24; Ephesians4:31; ITimothy 2:8). Even "natural" anger has itspitfalls, aswhen we are temptedby vainglory when correcting a brother who has done something unjust. In this
regard the biblical directives for the physician to heal himself (Luke 4: 23) andfor ll of us to ignore the speck in our brother's eye if theremay well be a rafterinour own (Matthew 7: 3) are quite appropriate.
In fact, John Cassian at times appears to abolish the very distinction betweenreasonable and unreasonable anger, as when he suggests that gold blinders
prevent us from seeing things ust aswell as lead ones. But quick on the heels ofsuch a comment is the advice to use our incensive power against self-indulgent
thoughts. At timeswe are even commanded tobe angry (Psalm 4:4), i.e.,against
our own malicious thoughts. If e do not get angry with our malicious thoughts,he thinks, Christ will get angry with us.
John assian isquite emphatic that hen anger ariseswe should not let itprolongand fester for days (asAristotle also argued), nor should we keep silent and letthe bottled up anger cause poisonous rancor that leads to our spiritualdestruction. He is so emphatic about this advice because he realizes that forsome itwill appear counterintuitive. Those who aspire to spiritual perfection
might assume thatwhen we are angry we should seek solitude on the groundsthat there, at least, no one will provoke us to anger, and that in solitude the
virtue of long-suffering can easily be acquired. To take this route, however, wouldbe to play into the hands of the Nietzschean caricature of Christianity to theeffect that Christianity calls for an attitude of retreat and disengagement
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simpliciter, ather than the more difficult nd defensible route that alls for isdom
regarding when to engage with, and when to disengage from, theworld thatsometimes gives us joyand that ometimes isan occasion for anger. (John assianhimself insists on the superiority of the cenobitic to the eremitic life.)Actually,thematter is even more complex than this, as is indicated in the cliche to theeffect that even when aChristian is in theworld (i.e.,engaged in it) she isnot ofit.
Our desire to leave the brethren with whom we are angry may actually be a
type of self-indulgent pride, rather than authentic solitude. Self-reform does notcome about through the patience others show to us, but rather through the
patience we show to others, especially those others with whom we are angry.Angry passions taken into solitude are not erased, but only temporarily hidden.In order to purge anger, whether reasonable or unreasonable, itmust first be
openly acknowledged. Premature solitude yields only the illusion of longsuffering and humility because no one is there to test us. However, as soon as
somethingoccurs that
temptsus to be
angry,our
previousand
temporarilyhidden angry passions may easily reassert themselves with a vengeance. JohnCassian compares this vengeance (inPlatonic fashion, see the Phaedrus 246,253)towild horses that have for too long been kept unexercised, but which will,
given the chance, pull the driver all the more violently to destruction.
Not only does the passion of anger not abate if left dle due to lack of contactwith other people, itmay very well get fiercer:
Poisonous creatures that live quietly in their lairs in the desert
display their fury nly when they detect someone approaching;and likewise passion-filled men, who live quietly not because oftheir virtuous disposition but because of their solitude, spit forththeir venom whenever someone approaches and provokes them.
This iswhy those seeking perfect gentleness must make everyeffort to avoid anger not only towards men, but also towardsanimals and even inanimate objects (I, 85).
That is, thosewho do not exhibit "natural" or "gentle" anger, if theAristotelianand Orthodox Christian oxymoron be permitted, can be sent into a rage even byinanimate objects, as in John assian's examples of pieces ofwood and tools.
Our goal should be not only the elimination of "unnatural" angry actions, butalso of angry thoughts in that e are supposed to eliminate not only the fruits four vices, but also their roots. Human beings only see the blood that is actually
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Mystics Quarterly
shed, whereas God sees the imagined murders committed by those under the
spell of "unnatural" anger (Romans 2:15-16;Matthew 5:22).As before, althoughSt. Gregory of Sinai, St.Maximos the Confessor, and St. Diodochos of Photikiare more instructive than St. John Cassian regarding how anger can be "natural"
or virtuous?when reading him one does sometimes get the impression that hefinds all anger inappropriate?John Cassian ismost instructive regarding howto confront and ameliorate
angerin the
pejorativesense of the
term,the
angerthat enslaves (1,82-87, cf. 78?St. John Cassian).
Maximos the Confessor mentions, where John Cassian emphasizes, that the"demons" who tempt us most?as Jesus learned in the desert?are far awayfrom human society. On both counts thewise person steers amoderate course:
when bothered by angry passions it s best tonot yet retreat to the "desert," andwhen tempted by garrulousness it is best to suspend commerce with society atleast temporarily. By considering the phenomenon of anger carefully, as Ihavetried to do in this article, we might come to appreciate the fact that it is not
silence perse that enables us to advance toward
mystic union,but rather
highquality silence, that apt silence found where anger has been, or is in the processof being, bridled (II, 58, 67?St. Maximos the Confessor; III, 40, 56?Ilias the
Presbyter).
Conclusion
I initiated this article by framing my contemporary treatment of anger in ThePhilokaliawithin the recent renaissance of virtue ethics, a rebirth that has led toseveral excellent treatments of anger (see, e.g.,Werpehowski 1996). Itmight beasked: how can a consideration of The Philokalia aid us in the contemporary effort
to understand anger? The authors inThe Philokalia have carefully treated angeras part of the religious life, ndeed as part of the monastic life, hile retaining
many of the key insights concerning anger developed in the ancient world. It isone thing to correctly notice, as does William Werpehowski, that all excessive
anger involves an offense against God fundamentally, and against ourselvesand others only derivatively. It is another to explore this insight within theconfines of a religious or monastic life, as have the authors examined in thisarticle. In a religious context, the goal of legitimate anger isa restoration ofmoralorder in God, a restoration that requires that our expression of anger leave openthe
possibilityfor (or better, be conducive to) reconciliation with the one who
has made us angry.
Daniel A. DombrowskiSeattle University
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NOTES1. See The Philokalia, trans, by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos
Ware (London: Faber and Faber). Roman numerals refer o the four volumes
published thus far: in 1979, II in 1981, III in 1984, and IV in 1995. Volume Vhas not yet appeared. Arabic numerals refer to page numbers in these
volumes. The author of each reference is also indicated.2. Homer's praise of anger can be overemphasized, however. For example,
Achilles' anger causes trouble for everyone in the Iliad and Odysseusstruggles to subdue his impetuous anger inOdyssey XX.
3. In theWestern Christian tradition, St. Thomas Aquinas develops a veryAristotelian view of anger; because ofAristotle's influence onWest and East,it s not surprising to find similarities between Aquinas and several authorsinThe Philokalia. See Summa Theologiae I-II46.6 andHI 47.2,4.
4. Itmust be admitted that the more immediate environment from whichmonastic writers absorbed their ideas concerning the passions, in general,and anger, inparticular, was provided by the Stoics, but a detailed treatmentof these authors would require another article. (See, for example, Nussbaum1994.) It is also beyond the scope of the present article to deal with all of thehistorical and conceptual differences among the authors in The Philokaliaitself, differences that are real enough, but so are the similarities amongthese authors on the topic of anger.
5. It should be noted in favor of the continuity thesis that in the Bible passionin
generalisnot
regarded negatively,nor is
apatheiaexalted. In fact, there
are parts of the Old Testament where wrath or zeal appears to be regardedas the cardinal divine attribute, and many of the Psalms forcefully xpressanger in cries for vengeance or retribution.
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Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
-. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle. 2 vols. Ed. J. Barnes. Princeton:Princeton University Press
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Dombrowski, D. 1991.Christian Pacifism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press
-. 1992. St. John f the ross. Albany: State University ofNew York Press
Maclntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN:University of Notre DamePress
Nussbaum, M. 1994.The Therapy of esire. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Nygren, A. 1969.Agape and Eros. New York: Harper and Row
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Plato. 1972. Platonis Opera. Ed. J.Burnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press
-. 1973. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns.Princeton: Princeton University Press
Thomas Aquinas. 1972. Summa Theologiae. Ed. Blackfriars. New York: McGraw
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Trianosky, G. 1990. "What Is Virtue Ethics All About?," American PhilosophicalQuarterly, 27,335-344
Werpehowski, W. 1996. "Do You DoWell toBeAngry?," The Annual of theSocietyofChristian Ethics, 59-78.
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