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T h e In ten ti on a li ty of Sensat ion:A Gra~nrnatical eature

G. E. M . An sco mb c

Berl teley cal ls "colours with their variat iorls and different proport ions of l ight and

s h a d e " t h e " p r o p c r " a n d a l s o t i l e " i ~ n ~ ~ l e d i a t c "bjects of s ight . ' Thc f irst at any

ra te lo n g seemed o b v io u s t(o everyone, bo th before Berkcley and s ince h is t imc.But Berkeley 's whole v iew is n o w in so me d i s rep u te . S en se -d a ta , a th o so u g l i ly

Berkeleyan con ceptio n givcn tha t na m e by Russel l , 11ave hccoinc ol2jects of r i d i c ~ ~ lan d co n tem p t am o n g m an y 1 -i.e sent-day p h i lo so p h ers.

T h a t w or d "ob ject" wll ic ii comes in th e ph ra se "o bject of s ight" ha s sufferccl acertain reversal of rncaning ii i t11c Iiis tory of 12Iiilos0l~liy, ncl s o h as tlic con nec tcclwo rd " su b jec t , " th o u g h th e t \ v o reversals aren ' t h istorical ly connec ted. TIie subjectused to I>c \vh at t ile pr ol ~o si t io n, ay, is ; ~ \ x > L I ~ :lic tliing itsclf as it is in r c ; ~ l i t ~ , -unprocesseci by being conceived, as we might say( in case there is so me sor t o f pro-cessing there); objects 011 t llc o t l icr han d wcsc fo rmer ly a l w ~i ys b jec tsof -----.

Ob jec t s of desire, objects of rhought , aren o t objccts in o n e c o n i m o n m o d e r n s en yc,n o t ind iv t lual th ings, su ch a s [h e ol ~j cc ls birtld it2 11~cccrtsed rtlntt's pockcts.

I mi gh t illustrate the tloublc 1.eversa1by a t ru e scn tcn ceconstructed to a cc or d w i hth e old mean in g s : su b ject iv e ly th ere m u s t b e so m e d cf in it e ~ ~ l u m b c rf lcrtves on as p r a y t h a t I sce, b ut object i:~ely t licrc nec d n ot: th at is , tl ierc necd no t bc sol- i~cnumber. such t ha t I see t l ia t number o f leaves on the sp ray.

W h e n Descar-te s sa id th a t tile cau sc of a n idea m u s t h av e a t l eas t a s mu ch fo rn ~ a l

real i ty as the idea had objecrive real i ty, he meant that the causeI I I L I S ~havc a t Ic;lst, ,

as muc h to i t as wh at th e iclc:~w a s o f w o u l d h a v e , i f w h a t t h e id e a w a s of ac t i~a l ly jex is ted . The "~ en li in s hjeciii io" of a n idea thus mean t what wc s l iou lc l ca l l irs"content"-namely w h a t i t is o f , b u t co n s id e rcd as belonging purely to thc idca .

h f l b h h l

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ruoclel, w ha t the pic ture w as taken fronl-and w ha t is to be sec~xn thc pic ture i tse lf ,w h ich may no t even have had an o r ig ina l .

T h u s fo r m e rl y if s o ~ n c t h i i ~ gas cal led a n object tha t woulcl have ra ised thequest ion "objcct of what?" I t is harcl ly possible to usc the word "object" in th isw a y n o w a t l a y s ~ ~ i l l c s st ac tua l ly occurs in such a phrase as "ob jec t o f des i re" o r"objcct of t l i o ~ ~ g l i t . "~ ~ p p o s eomebocly says that the object of clesire, or clesirccl

objcct , nccd n o t exis t , ancl so there nccd no t bc a n y object which one desires . I-Ic

is obviously swi tch ing f r om o ne use of the w or d "ob jcc t" to ano t llc r. I f, I~ow ever ,w e speak of objects of s ight , or s e e ~ l bjects , i t wil l usually be assulned t hat "objects"has the mo1.c nloc1c1-n s c ~ ~ s c :hcsc will I J C ol~ jcc ts , l iings , entities, which one sccs .N o w to p~ . cvcn t o~ if l is io ii w ill i~ lt roc ll lc e he p h ra se " in t en t iona l ~ o l~ jcc t "o niean"objcct" in th e oldcr sense \vhicll s t i ll occ urs in "objcc tof clcsire."

"Intent ion al" in these conte xts is of te i i spel t with a ns. T h i s w a s a n i de a o f SirWill ianl I - lamilton's ; lie wante d t o turn the old logical w or d " in tent ion" into onethat lool tcd more l i l tc "extcnsion." I prefer to l teep thc older spel l ing with two ts .F o r the w ord is th c s ame a s the one in com m on use in con ~ lec t ionw i t h a c t i o n . T h econcep t ol in ten t ion which we use there o f cour se occurs a l so in connec tion wi ths a y i ~ g . h a t maltcs tl ic hr ic lgc to the logician 's use .

T l icre a r c th rcc sa l ien t th ings ah ou t in ten t ion which a re re levan t fo r my su l~ j ec t .Firs t , not an y t l-LIClesci-ipt ion of w h a t you d o clescr ibes i t as the act ion you intcndcd :on ly LIIICICScerta in of i ts c lescr ipt ions wil l i t be in tent ional . ("Do you mean to IJC

~ i s i n g ha t pen?"-"Why, w h a t a b o u t this pc~l?"-"It's Smith's pen."-"Oh L.orcl,no!") Scconcl, the dcscri l , tions und er w hich you intend wh at you d oc a n be vague,ind c tc r~ n in a tc . You m ean to pu t tl lc I,ool< clown o n the tahlc all right, anci ~ O L I oSO ,1)11tY O L I cIo not Incan t o put it do w n any wlicrc in par t icu lar o n thctable-thougliyou clo it clown som cw licrc in pa rti ci~ lar .) ' li ir tl , t lcscriptions und er wh ich youin tend to d o w h a t y o u d o in ay n o t c o m e t ru c , a s w l i c ~ i o ~ inaltc a s l ip o l ' th e tongue

o r pen. You ac t , bu t you r in t ended ac t does no t happen .Intentionality, whose n;lmc is taltcn from intention ancl cxprcsscs tl icsc charac-

teris tics of the con ccpt i i~rcll iiorz , s fount1 a lso in con nect ion with inany ot he r con -

cep ts . I sha ll a rgue tha t am ol ig thcsc a rc conccp ts o fsensation. I, i l tc many conccpts

marltecl by intention ality, t ho ug h unlilie inte ntio n itself, these a re express ed I>y verbs

com m onl y taking clircct ohjects . I shal l spe ak of in tent iona l verbs, taking intent ional

objects. I have mentior tcd t l ~ c i s to ry of thc w or d "ob jec t" to fo res tal l any impres-s io n tha t " an in ten t iona l ob jcct " ~ n ea l i s an in t e~ l t ion a l n ti ty."

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O bv io us exa ~ n p le s f i n t ei lt io nal ve rb s a r e " to th in k o f ," " to w o rsh ip ," " to shoo tat." ( T h e ve rb "t o intetlcl" com es by nl et ap ho r fro in th e last-"ilztclzdere arcill12in ," leading t o " i lz te l~dere t ii~ l iut?zlz.") W he re w e hav e such a verb tal ti ilg a n ob jcc t,

f e a ture s ana logous to the thl -ee f ea tu re s of i n t e~ l t io ~ l a l~ le s sn ac t ion rc la te to som edescr ip t ions occur r ing as o l~ jec t -p hrase s f te r the verb .

T h e p os si bl e n o n - e x i s t e ~ ~ c ef the object, which is thc analogue of tl ie possiblcnon-o ccurren ce of t lie ilz te l~tfzd c t ion, is w ha t ha s cxcitccl mos t a t te nt io n ab ou t th is

sor t of verb. "Thii ll ting of" is a verb fo r wh ich th e topic of the non-exis ten t objectis ful l of t raps and temptations; "wors hipping " is less dangerous an d inay hel l> us

to l tecp ou r heads. Co nsidcr the cxprcssio n "object of though t ." I f I a n th ink ingof Winston Churchil l then he is tlie object of illy thought. Tliis is lilte "What is theobject of these people 's woi-ship?" Answ er: "T he m oon." But no w suppo sc thcob ject o f m y though t is Mr Pickwicl

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difference to the analys is of a sen tence l ike"X t h o u g h t o f-

" S o i f the ideais to be bro tig ii t in wh en the objec t doesn ' t ex is t , the n equal ly i t sho uld be broug ht

in when t l ic ohjec t ciocs ex is t . Yet on e is th inking , sure ly, of Wi nsto n C h ~ ~ r c h i l l ,o t

of the idea of I i in ~, ncl jus t th a t fa c t s ta r ted us off . W hen on e reads Locke , on ewa nts to pro tes t : "Th e n iinc l is no t emplo yed ab ou t ideas , bu t ab ou t th ings-unless

ideas a rc wha t we happ en to be th ink i ng abou t . " Wha teve r pu rpo se is se rved byin troc luc ing ideas , by saying , "Well , t iley hac l a n idea of Zeus ," w e can no t say tha tthe idea is tl ie objec t of tho ugh t , o r wors hip . It wi ll no t be r ight t o sayX w o r -sh ippecl an idca . i t i s ra ther tha t the subjec t ' s having an idca is what is neec led togive t i le proposit ion n chance of be ing t rue . This l imy seen1 he lpfu llor " w o r s h ip -ping," I~lr tnot lor "tliinlting oT"; "thinlcing of" ancl "having ari ideaof" a r c t o osinlil :~r; if the on e is j>roble matic , th en s o is th e oth er,

I.et us co nc en tra teo n tlie f a ct t h a t Il la ny ~ x o lx ~ s i t i o n sonta in in g in tcn t io i la l vcrbsarc true, ancl Ict LI S not be hypnotizccl by the possible non-existence of t l ie ol , jcct .Th er e a rc o th er Ccatt~rcs oo: 11on-sul?sti tutaI ,i l i ty of clifferent de sc rip tio ~isof theobjcc t , whc re i t does ex is t; a r id poss ib le ind et er ~n in ac y f tl ie objcc t .In fact all threef e a t~ i r e s r e c o nn c ct et l. I cal l th ink of a I i ian with out th in l

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somewha t a s fo l lows : the t eache r t akes a sen rcnce , say " John scn t Marya boolt"and says : "W ha t d id Jo111l senel M a ry ? " Ge t t ing the ans we r"A b o o k " h e says:"Tha t' s the d i rect ob ject . " N o w the ques t ion does no t r eal ly suppose , and t li e 12~~pi f he goes a long with th e teachel; does n ot ta l tc i t , th a t an y par t icu lar pcoplc ,o f

who111 the sentence is t rue ; a re in ques t ion , a nd so we Inay say rh a t wh en the tc : ic l~ing is S L I C C ~ S S ~ L I ~he qllestioil is unclcrstood as equivalent to "What clocs the sen-t en ce ' J o h n s e n t M a r y a b o o k ' say Joh n scn t M ar y? " Th e g ramrna tic: il concep tol'

a clircct objcct is acquired by o n e w h o c a n a n s w e r a n y s u ch q u e s ti o n . Th e c o ~ .i .c cta n s w e r t o s u c h n q ~ ~ c s t - i o rives ( in o lc lc r ~ ~ s ; l g c )r itself is ( i t1 11io1.c~.cc.ctlt ~s,l!:c)

the d i rec t ob ject . N o w sup pose t l i a t some one wcre to a sk : " Wh a t is co~nn lun ic; i tccto us by the phra se t l ia t \vc ge t ina correc t ans wc r? Is the p h r~ is c c ing 11sc ii o r

mentioned?" It is clear t l i :? t nothing is sett led aboutthis quest ion by n clioiccwh eth er to say, lo llow ing cilclcr usage, t l ia t the plirascg i l ~ e s he d ircc t o b jcc t or, i'ol-

lo wi ng m or e mocIcr11 usage, th at "clil-cct objcc t" isa n a m e t o r a scntcl1cc-l>nst.I propose-for a purpo sc wh ich wi l l appea r- to adop t the o lde r ~ l s ng c . hc i i the

ques t ion " W ha t i s the d i rec t ob jec t o f the ve rbin this sentence?" is the sal-nc as" W h a t d o e s t h e se n t e n ce:.ay Jo h n sent M ar y? " ;111cl th e qu es t ion "W h at c locs thcp hr as e w h i c h is t h e a risw er t o th a t q u e s t i o t ~ o m ~ i ~ u ~ ~ i c a t eo us, i .c . is i t being i ~sct lor ~i ie n t io ne d? " an bc as lced in thc forru "Is th e d irec t ob jcc t a h i t o f Iangu usc o r

r a th e r w h a t t h e b i t o f l a ~ i j i i~ a g etatlds for?"--and this i s now not a mere ques t ionof te rminology, but a s l i b s t a ~ l t i v e - s e e t i ~ i ~ i guestion of curious perplexity. Forsom eone ponder ing i t may a rgue a s fo l lows : I t won ' t d o to say tha t in th i s cxamplc

a boolc is tlic clircct ol)jcct. I:or i f we say that we can bc asltccl: "Wllich bool

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a n s w e r t o " W h a t d o th e y w o r s h i p ? " c a n n o t b e t h a t t h ey w o r s h i pa p h r a s e a n y m o r e

than t l i a t they worsh ip a n idea . A s imi la r po in t ho lds , o f cou rsc , fo r d i rec t ( an d

indire c t) ob jec ts in gen era l .I t m a y b e a rg u e d t h a t t hi s is n o a rg u ~ ~ l e n t . 2e r h ap s w e c a n n o t s ay " W h a t J o h n

is sa id to h ave sc nt is 2 p h r a s c ." B u t t h e n n o i n o r e c a n w e s a y " W h a t J o l in is s a id

to h a v e s e n t isa direct object"--for t l ic sen ten ce did no t say J o h n se nt M a r y a ciircctobjec t .

W ha t th i s shows i s tha t the re is a w ay o f t ak ing "Th e c iirect ob jec t is no t a d i rec tobjcc t" whic h i ilal tes th is t rue ; namely, by ass imila t i l lg th is sen te nce to "T he d ircc t

object is 11ot 11 g i rl ." (O n e co il ld imag ine cx p la i~ r ing oa cliiltl: "Tllc g i ~ - lisn't tlic

d i rc c t o b j ec t , b u t t h e b o o k t h a t J o l i n se n t . ")F r c g c ' s c o ~ ~ c l u s i o nT h c concept 1101-sc is no t a con ccj >t" w a s l>asccl o n tlic saliic

s o r t o f t r ou b l c a b o u t different u sc s of c x p r e s s i o ~ ~ s . h a t "cheval" stancls for is nconccpt, ancl wliar "cbcual" s t a n d s f o r is a I lorsc ; these prcmisses do not , however,

yield t l ic result that i f Buccph a lus is a I ~ o r s c c is a c o n c e p t . S in ~i l a r ly,w h a t J o h n iss a id t o h a v e s e n t Ma r y i s a b o o k , a n d w h a t J o h n i s saicl t o h a v e s c n tM a r y is a

t l irect object; these prcil l isses d o no t yield t l ie result t ha ti f J o h n g av e M a r y a b o o k ,he gave he r a t l irect object.

F r eg e c v c n tu a ll y p r o p o s e d t o d c a l w i th t h e t r o u b l e b y s t i p u l a ti n g t h a t s u c h ap l irase a s "W ha t ' cheva l ' s t an ds fo r" sho u ldoitly be used predicatively. i'i para l le l

s t i p u la t i o n i n o u r c a se : " W h a t J o h n is s a id t o h a v e s e n t M a r y is. . ." may ol l ly be

co iup le ted wi th such cxpressiovls a s co u ld f ill the b lank in " John sen t Mary .. . ."

T h e s ti p u la t io i l, w h i le h a r m l es s , w o u l rl b e b a s e d o n f a i l ~ ~ r ef ear for the clift 'cr-

,

e n t u s e o f t h c p h r a s e " W h a t J o h n is saicf t o h a v e s e n t M a r y " i n tli e e x p l a n a t i o r ~

"W ha t J o h n is saicl to hav e sen t M a r y i s the d i rec t ob jec t of the sen tence. " Bu ta nca r fo r a d i ff e rc l it u se c a n n o t b c d i s p c ~ i s e dwi th , a s the fu r the r cou rsc o f thc a rgu -m e n t s h o w s .

T h e a rgu lncn t bcgan w i th s ta t ing reasons w hy a c lircct ob jec t can ' t be somctl i ing

tha t the d irec t-objec t phrase s tancls for. Yet one can , one correc t ly docs , sap "A

boo k" in answe r to the qucs t io r i "Wlza t does the sen tence ' John sen t M ar y a boo li '

say JoI1i-r sen t- M ar y? " wh ich ask s the sa m e th ing as "W ha t is the d ircc t o l>jcc t in

t ha t s c ~ ~ t c n c c ? "cvc l- tl ic lc ss thc wa y the p 1 i 1 . a ~ ~'a 11ook" is being ~isetls such tha to n e c an 't s e ns ib ly a s k " W h ic h h o o k ? "

Wc n ius t cc t l l c l~~c lcf " o l~ j e c t s "(t l irect , il ic iivect a n d l ikewise inten tion al) t ha t t l ie

ob jec t is ne i the r the p l i ra se 11or w h a t th e ph rase s tanci s fo c W h a t then is i t ? The

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qucst io i l is based o na m is t a k e , ~ l a ll l e l y h a t a n c x p l a i l a to r y a n s w e r r u n n in g s a y")in

in ten t i onal (d ircc t , ind ire c t) ob jec t is such -and- such" is poss ib le and rcquis i tc . Rut

th i s need no t be so . Indeed rile o ~ i l y easonab le ca nd ida te s t o be answ crs a re t lico n e s w e h a v e f a il e d. R u t w h n t i s t h e a c tu a l u s e o f t h e t c r m ?Given n sentence i l lwhich a ve rb takes a n ob icc t, one p rocec lure fo r r ep lying to the ques t ion : "W ha t is

t h e o b j e c t in t h i s s e n t e ~ i c e ? "s to reci te the ob jcc t ph rase .

If pu tti ng th e ob jec t ph rase in quo te s inlplies t l ia t t l ie object-i.e. w ha t Joh11 issa id to have scn t Mary , w ha t th e Gree l t s worsh ipped- is a piece of language, tha t

is wrong ; i f i ts no t be ing in qu o tes i i ilpl ie s tha t som eth in g rcle r red to by the ob jcc tphrasc is the objcc t , t l ia t i s wrong too . To avoic l the In t tc r s t~ggcst iono n c n l i g l i ~

ins is t o n pu t t ing in quo tes ;tci

avo ic l the fo r lne r on c ln igh t wa n t to l eave them o i l t.O n e is inc l incd to invcnri spccia l so r t o f c l ~ ~ o t c s ;11t tlic clucstion is h o w thc plirnscwi th in such ne w quo tes w o~i lc l unc tion -anc l il w c ~ ~ n c l c r s t a ~ ~ dha t , w e do n ' t ncccla n e w s ig n . So e li d s t h e a rg u m e n t .

To r e p c a t , I a ln no t op pos in g the p rac t icc o f g ram ma r ians a ~ ic l ingu ist s fo r whnn ithe express ion "d irec t o b jec t" is def ined a s an express ion for a p l i rasc ; they usc t lint

a s I use th e express io n : 'di rc. i r-objec t p l i rase ." But , asI have arguecl, thc qucstioii" W h a r d o e s t h e s en te li ce s a y J ol il l g a v e ? " is f u n d a ln e n tn l f o r ~ ~ l ~ c l c r s t a n c l i l~ girlicr

"d i rec t ob jcct" o r "d i rec t -ob jec t ph rasc" a sI a m u s in g t h o s e c xp r cs sio ns ; a n d h e ~ i c cfo r ~ ~ ~ l d e r s t a n d i ~ i gc i i recr objec t" wl ie l~t is used f or a ph rase . A nd th ou gh th e clues-

t io n is answ ered ( l ike m an y q i ies t ions) by u t te r in g a phrase- in th is case "a boo kn -

th e p h r a s e h a s a special rise in answ er to th a t ques tiox i " W ha t does the scn tence sayJ o h n g a v e ?" I t can na me ne i the r a p iece o f l anguage , no r any th ing th a t thc p icccof

l an g~ lag e ame s o r o the rwise re la te s to , no r inctcecl any th ing e lse. T h e in te re s to lthe q ues t io i l an d an sw er is tl ic ra the r spec ia l in teres t of ge t t ing gra l l imat ica l unclcr-

s t a n d i ~ i g .G r a m m a t i c a l understanding a n d g r a r n ~ l ~ a t i c a lo n c e p t s , e v c n t h e m o s tf am i li ar o n e s l ik e s en te nc e , x r b , n o u n , a r e n o t s o s t r a i g h t fo r w a r d a i ~ clciown-to-

ear th a mat ter of p la in physica l rea l i t ies asI bel ieve pcop le som et imes sup pose . Th ec011cej1t of a nou n , fo r example , i s f a r le ss o f a physica l conccp t tha n th a tof a coin ;fo r som eo ne mig ht be t ra ineci to recognize co ins with fa i r success t l i ou gl ~ e Icncw

n o th in g o f m o n e y, b u t n o o n i t coulcl I)c tra in cd t o i.ccoj;nize Ilorlns \v it li o\ ~ti grc;\t

familiari ty \vitJi langungc; ancl yct t l lc conccptof n notti1 is not one wl~ ic l l ic \ \ ) i l la u t o ~ i ~ a t i c a l l yave througl i ( l i ; i t fa~ni l ia r i ty, s lie wil l havc tha t o la coil1 i f l ~ cj7cr.-a te s wi th co ined moncy. hdcc c l t li e exp lana t ion sof granl mat ic a l tc r lns 2rc only h in ts

a t w ha t is r ea lly g rasped f ro m exam ples .TIILIS o on e sho u ld th i~ i lc ha t by mere ly

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a t l o l x i ~ ~ glic usag e o i inoclcrn gla mm ai.ialis , fo r who111 tile dir ect ollicct isa ivorclo r worcls, Iie lias avoideel lla iicllil~g lifficult co nc ep ts ai;tt reru;li~l cd in a p lai n iilaii'sworlcl of plaiil thillg.

" T l i e c l ~ t c i ~bject is wliar John sent ' ' (= "wirat the s ente nce i ay r jo1111 rc ~ it ") .

v F h e ~ ew o se i lt ences a rc paml le l . I t is fo r tl ie s rLe o f l~ ar a l l e l i s~ ~ iliat rve optciifor thc olci fashiollccl Llsagc of "cli~.ccto l ~ j c c t . "F o r cvc11 in th a t Ltsagc, n o olie willbe tenipteci to t11i11k that tliucct ohjects as such arc a special ty!>cclf ent i ty, Justthis t c i i ~ p t a t i c ) ~ ~xists very strongly for o b j c c t s o f t h o ~ ~ g l i ti i t i s c n s a t i u i ~ ; l l a ts,

f o r i n te n ti o na l ob je ct s, w h i c h a p p e ar a s e nt it ie s uncler t h e n a m e s " id ea " a ~ ~ dI'

,~ m p r c s s i o n . "

I t may I)e o l~jectec i: he c on t ex t "The sen tence says John sen t Ma ry

-, .1S

i tself i~ l r c n t io ~~ : l l .- Iow, then, can l i ly considerat ions about t l i recr objects throw l ighton in tcnt ional o hjects? 12\llly spcl lcd o ut they arc thcmselvcs merely exam ples of scn-tcnccs whose objects arc in tent ional objects . '

Th e answer is tll:it wh at is sa id i l l t he o l > j c c t i o ~ ~s trtle. 13~1th c sc c x a ~ n ~ , l e s ,\ ~ l l e ~ - cwc talk a bo u t t li rccc objects, a rc I~ar inl es s ncl profi table because certain s o1. t~ofsu g g e s t i o n : ~ l ) o t ~ tl ircct ol>jccts arc patc ut nons ense . For cxaml,lc no olle wou ldt l l i l ~ bh a t i f a se i lt coce says Jo l i i i sen t M ar ya book , w ha t i t immedia te lyand direct ly

says he scnt I lcr wa s a d ir ec t ob j c ct , a l ~ dnly in so m e i lldirect fashion , via this inlme-iliare object. cloes it say lie sent her a buol< . I want , that i s . to use s compar i so i iy i t h p a t e n t n o n se n se a b o ~ i t lircct o b je c ts in o rc le r t o e x ll ose a s l a t e ~ ~ tonsense ofjust the same I

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I t will help if w e conside r shoot ing at , aiming.A ma n aim s a t a stag ; but the tIii17j:he tool< for a stag was his fa! l ier, and he shoots l i is father.A w i t ~ i c s s e p or ts : "I-ica i ~ i ~ e c lt his fa th er." N o w t1-11:; s a ~ i i b i g ~ ~ o ~ ~ s .n t h e s c ~ i s cn wllicll give11 the situ,i-

tion as we have describeci it , this report is true, tllc pllrase "his father" cloes 11!1tgive al l intcntio nal objc ct . Let i is introduc e th e term " ma terial ol , jcctn: "li is fathci-"gives, w e sliall say, the inntci.iizl object of th e verb in t l ic sen tenc e "I-Ie aim ed a t hisfa ther" in t ile sense in which th is wa s tr rle. N o t because hc hi t I~ i sather-he mightafter all l uere ly have gon c w i c l e of t h e ~ l i a r l t .B u t \ xc aus e the th ing he too l

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, -Ihe)! wo~ .s l l ipr~cli-;inti-sucl~" will be tl.i~ e; 114 is1 chc cas e s r~ pp os ed om e silch

entence is true.

Q ~ ~ c s t i o ~ l sbo ut thc iden t ity of an in ten t iona l ob jec t , when th is ca nno t be reci~lce tlo the identity of n lllntcvinl object , arc obviously of sol i le in terest . How clo we

dcciclc that two peol>lc0 1 . ~> cop les o rshil7 o r clo no t w orsh ip t ile sa me g o~ 1?\gain,when a pro per na m e is ol>scure ancl rem ote in its historical ~.clcl-cncc,ike "Al-tll~lr,"

h e q lrcs tion may a r ise whet l ic r t wo people a rc t l l i l~ l t ingof: th e sa m e man-if tiley

have dif icrcnt , incompatihlc , p ic tures of h i ~ i i .But I perceive that my saying "when this cannot be reduced to t i le ident i ty ofa

u ~ o ~ c v i i l l l> jcctn n ay mislead: fclr by rr~nlerinl o[>jcctsI clo not n-rean what asc nowcalled "mate rial ol?jccts"-tables, planets, I~um ps f butte r ancl s o on .'To give a clearnstallce: a clcbt of five clollars is not a matcrial objc ct in t l~ is atter sense; hu t givcri

hat someone hacl contractecl such a debt , 111y th o u p l ~ t t l lat dc ht of five dollars"woultl linvc as its niatel-ial object something dcscrihecl and inclicatcd by the phrase

'

grv ing t lie in ten t iona l o l> jec t of my though t . W h e ~ it is I ~ ey on d luestion tha t t lie

p hr ns c iving a11 intent ional objcct do es descr ibea n d indicate a matcrial object i i i

his scnsc, t ile11 the q ocs tioil 21s to rile i dc ~ it it y f t lie iotcn tiona l o bjcct red oces totilequestion as to tlic iclentity o f the matcr ia l object . Arc we referr ing to the samedc k t? T h a t is , ~ ~ c r h a p s ,ot to o cliffic~llt o establish. But whe n either there is no realdebt or i t is very obsci~l.ewhether tl icre is, the case is altcrcti .

I _I l i e fac t t l~arw e c a n ~ ~ s che concep t of identity i l l c o ~ l n c c t i o nwith intent ionalubjccts slioulci no t lent1 11s to tilink th er e is ally se ns ein q r~ cs t io n s s t o the k ind ol.c s i s t c ~ ~ c c - t h cnro log ica l status-of i11tcntion;ll ob jcc ts a s such . /Ill s l ~ c h lucst iotis

a rc nonsensical. Once 111ol-cw e can clear o ~ ~ ric;tds I>y th in lti ng of direcr ol>jccrs.rlic answcr t o ' ' W h a t is the cl ircct objcct in ' J oh n scnt Mal-y a I ~ o o k '? "s "i\ b o o k . "T h is is t he r igh t an sw er a s r n ~ ~ c l ih e n th e s e ~ l t c ~ l c cs false as whcn it is true, ~inclalso whcn it is only nlaclc up, 3s it is i l l this c;ise, to illustrate a point. It is cviclent~ i o n s e n s co ask a l> out l ic no tic of ex is tence o r o ~ ~ to lo g i ca lta tu s of tlie clirect obj ec t

s such : o r t o aslz w h at lzincl of thiiig LI boo/< is , as it is thought of in answer to tl iecluest ion a l~outhe d i rec t o l~ jcc t .

In the ph i losophy of sense - j~crc cp t ion hcrc a re tw o oppos ing pos it ions . O ne saysth a t w h a t w e a r c immediately a w a r e of in sen satio n is sense -im prcs sio~ is, allecl"iclcas" by IScrlielcy ancl "scns c-clata" l ~ y

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" o r t l i n a r y l a n g ~ ~ a g e "hilo sop l~y , ays t lia t 011 th c co n tr ar y w c a t ally r : ~ ~ ccc ol>jccts(in the iciide n lo dc r~ i en se w h ic ll w o ~ l l d nclu tle , c .g , shado w s) w i tho u t any sucl lintermediaries. It is usually p ar t of th is posi t io i l to insis t tha t I can' t scc (or,feel , heal; tas te or smell) somct! i i ilg tha t is ~ i o tic rc , an y more t h a ~ i c an l iit somc-thing t ha t is not there: I ciln only t l~i lzk see (ctc.) so m eth ing il it isn' t there, or oillyi l l s o ~ n extcnclecl usage of "scc" do 1 scc wll;~t sn 't there. I s h a l l s a y m o s t a b o ~ i tseeing, as most people d o in tiiscussing this topic. T'lie other vcr11s arc for gooclreas ons (w hich ar en' t very relevilnt to 11ly topic ) often trea ted ra thc r tl iffercntly, espc-cial ly by orcl i~ lary ar ~g ua ge hilosophy.

I wish to say that b oth these posi t io~ ls rc wr ong ; t lia t both nlisunciers tancl ver l~ s

of sense-perception, bec ause th,:sc verbs a re int e~ ltio na l r essentially I ~ a v c n isiten-t iona l aspec t. Tile f ir st pos i t ion ~~ i i s co ns t r ue s~itent ional b jects as matcr ia l objccts

of sensat ion; ti le o ther a l lows on ly17zater.inl objec ts o f sensa t ion ; o r a t any ra tc docsnot a l low for a descr iption ofw h a t is seen which is c.g. ne utr al a s betwccsl i ts beinga real spo t (a s ta in ) or an af te l-- image, g iving only the c onte nt ofa n expc r i e~ icc f

see ing concern ing which o ne d ocs no t yct k n o w w h e t h e r o n e is seeing a rea l spo tor an af ter-image."

To see the in ten t iona l i ty o f se~rsa t io~ lt is only necessary to lo ok a t a few cxnm -

ples which bring it out.

( I ) " W h e~ i o11 screw L I ~our eyes Ioolzing at a l ight , you scc rays shooting outfrom i t ."

(2 ) "I scc the pr in t very 1)lurrcc.i: is it blurrccl, o r is it I I I ~ yes?"

(3 ) "M ove these handles unt i l yoti see the bird in t lie i~c st ." Squint- tes t ing ap pa -ratus; thc hiril ancl thc liest arc o n sc pa ra tc cnrcls.)

(4 ) " I scc six bu tto ns on tliat 1n21n's co at, I mercly see a lot of snow flakes framcclby this window-f rame-no def iiii te n ~ ~ ~ n h c r . "

(5) ". . . a mirage. An approac l i ing pedes t r ian may have n o fce t ( they a rc rep laced

by a bit of sky).'"(6 ) "W ith this hear ing aid, w1:cn y o ~ lalk I hea l som e sc reech ing no ises; n o lo wtol ies and the consona nts a rc ucsy indistinct."

(7) "I hear a r inging in my ears ."

(8 ) "I heard a t rc mcn dous roa l - ing no ise ou ts ii le , a nd w onder cd wi th a la rm for amo me nt w hat g re a t machine o r f loodwater cou ld be mal ting it. And thenI rcalizcclthat it was only my l it tle do g sr~ or iu g lose a t hai~cl.""

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( 9 ) "D o you I

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pher ma l te s an inco r rec t in fe rence f rom the t ru th o f the g ramm at ica l s ta tem en t tha tt lie in ten t ion al objec t , the imp~ :ess ion , he v isua l ob jec t , i s wh at y ou see . I-Ie takesthe express ion " wh a t yo11 sec" ma ter ia lly. "T hc v i s ~ ~ a l~ i ip ress ion s w ha t y o u sec,"wh ich i s a p~ .opos i t ionike " T l ~ e i l-cc t ob jec t is wh at hc sent ," is ~i i isconstruec loas to lead to "You sce a n i~ i ip re ss ion , "as the o ther ncvcr would be rn isconstr l~c t lso as to lead t o "I-Ie sen t her a d i rec t ob jec t . "

Th i s is a r l io re i n t er e st in g a n d p e r m a n e n tly t e m p t in g m i st a kc t l ~ a n h e o t i ~ c ~ .

who se appea l i s mere ly tha tof a com lnon-se nse revol t aga ins t a Bcr l telcyan typeof

view, B L I ~o th doc t r ines havc a g r e a t deal of p o i n t . To calic rh c "o rcIin;lsy l a ~ i g l ~ a g ~d o c t r i~ i e :

F i r si , w ha t I sha l l ca ll the ma te r ia l u se o l ve rbs of scnsc exi st s. Th e ma te r ia l ~ i s c

of "see" is a use whic h demai- ic is a ~rza ter ia l b jec t of th e verb . "You can ' t havc secna un ic or n, u ~ ~ i c o r n so n' t e xist ." L ' Y o ~ ~an ' t have seen a l ion , there wasn ' t an y l ion.there to see ." These uscsa r c q u i t e c o m m o n p la c e . I t is n o t ~ n e r c ly h a t t he o h jc c t-phr ase is ta ke n materially---IS w e hav e seen, th at m ay be the case wit h all intcn-

t ional verb wit ho ut re f lec t il l s on i ts in ten t ional i ty. He re the vcrh " to sec" is no ta llow ed t o t a l e a t ~ ~ ~ r e l j l~l tc i l t ion al b jec t ; non-exis tence of thc objec t (absolu te ly,

o r in the s i tua t ion ) is an ob jec tion to the t ru t l lof the sentence . We see t l ie doublcuse of the ve rb "see" hy co i~ tra s t in g t wit11 "worsh ip ."No one wo~ilc l vcr s ; ly :

"They c an no t have worsh ippec l un ico rns , because thc rc a re n o sucl i th ings ."Second , the wo rds g iving the ob jec t of a ve rb o f sense a rc ~~ ec cs sa r i lyos t of tc i l

intended as giving 17iaterial i) l ~j ec ts f sen se: for th is is their prirnn~.)l l l l? l ic;~ric~rlTo see th is , c o~ is id c r hc fo l lo \ \ i i~ lg . uppose11 I , r igll t red ~>l;~stico y clcl,li;irl~ lo ok sg rey ish -b rown to me in a ces t ; i i~light. On ly i f I clo no t l t now tl iut the j ;rcyish-bro\vn

co lou r i s merc appca raucc t lo I say wi t ho u t a l ly spec ia l con tex t ( c .g . tha tof cics-

cr ib i tlg impre ss ions) , o r apology, o r I iurnour :" I see a greyish-brown plastic toye lephan t . " Th is i s because:. we undcrstancl the c l e sc r i l> t ion -o l -a~~- ;~p l~ca r.nnc

"grey ish-brow n" by unde rs ta i ld ing the descr ip t ion "greyis l l-bro \vnn: th is dcscr i i~ cs\vhat the a1,pearance is of.To d o t h a t , it I I I L I S ~ n the f ir st i~ i s tanc e c a tlcscsiptionof such a th ing as i t woulc l bc t rue of ( for t l ~ cp p e a r a n c e is an a ppca rance of tha t ) -really, and n o t mere ly in ap lw ara ~ic c :h is wi ll he i ts pr imary appl ic a t ion . But , be ing

a descr ip t ion of a sens ib le proper ty, i t mu st a lsoi r i i ts p r imary app l ica t ion cn tc r in tothe objec t phrases fo r tl ie ap pro pr ia te verbs of scnsc , s ince w e ge t to k no w sensi1)Ic

proper t ies by the appropriate: senses.

F i~ r th e r,we ought to say, no t : "Being red is loo l t ing red in normal l igh t to t l te

n o rm a l -s ig l lt e d, " b ~ l ta th er . 'Looking scd is looki ng asa th ing tha t is red loolts inno rm al ligh t to the normal-s ighted ." Fori f we ought ra thcr to say the f i rs t , t l icn

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ho w d o we uncierstand "loolting red" ? N o t by unders ta~lcl i~igred" and "looking."I t would have to be explained as a simple idea; and so would looking any otherco lou c It may be repliecl: Tllcse all are simple ideas; "loolting yellow" an d " look ing

recl" are the right expressions for what you show someone when you sho\v hi111yellow and red, for he will only learn anci "~:cd" rom the examplesi f they1001< yellow ancl loo k rctl; so it is loo1:ing-jlcllo~u ant1 lool~itzg- rccl h a t he r eally getsh oltl of allcl h a s Occn i ~ ~ t r - o d ~ ~ c e ~ lo , eve11 t l lo ~ ~ g hO L I SCIY y o ~ l re explaining"yellow" ancl "recl." Th is woulcl co m e to saying tha tin s tr ic tllcss " l o o k i~ ~ g "houldbe part o f every co lour worcl i l l rcp orts of p erce ption : it will the11 cease to pcr formthe ac tual funct io~l f tlie worcl "loolting ." It w as plau sible to say: O11lyi f it looltsreti to hi111will he Icarn what is 11ica11t;but wr on g to infer: Wh at he then g rasps as

the correlate of tl ic word "red" isa rccl look. Even granted that hc Itnowsli e is tolearn the name of a coloul; still it invites ~i~ is~~t lc le r s ta l i c i i l lgo rely on sometliingthat only looks red to teach hini tlie word;i f lie notices that it only loolts recl, liowl i a t ~ ~ u a lor h im to suppose that "red" was the name of the colour that i t actual lyis. If you tell h im: " It's t lie c o l o ~ ~ rhat this ' loolts, '" this presupposes that "looksC" ancl "C" are originally, anci not just subsequently, distinct: that, in short, "beingred" is not after all to he explained as a certain Ioolti~lg-red.

Again , th ings d o no t always loolc the sam e shape, colour, size and so o n, hu t we

co m ~i ion ly ook a t an d tlcscribe thc m, saying, e.g. , "It 's rectangulal-, blacka n d a b o u tsix foo t in height," with ou t paying attention to ho w they look-indeed we migh tsay that often things look to us, strike us, not as they look but as they are! (Coti-viction th at 0111j1 so is "loolts" used riglitly wa s the ca us e of con fusio n to a n ovc r-confident ordinary -langt~ agc l~i lo so ph cr n an occasiorl famousi l l Oxforcl: I;. Cioflibrought in a glass vessel of water with a stick in i t . "Do ~ O L I ean t o say," he aslted,"tha t this stick docs not look b e ~ lr ? " N o," said the othe r bravely: "It loolts likeastraight stick in watcs." So Cioffi took it out and it ~uirsbent.)

So m ~ ~ c l lt least there is to bc saicl on the side of the "o rd ina ry -la rig u~ ~g e"hiloso-phc1: But, tn r~ l ing o the sen se- i ln j ~rc ss i o~ ~h ilo so ph y, h ow m uch it p o i~ it s ~ ~ tn dcan investigate which often gets querulously dis~liisseclby the other side! Tliere issuch a tliing as sim ply rlcscribing impressions , simp ly describing the sensil3leappear-ances th a t present thcnlsclves to one situa ted tlius ancl thus-or- to t~~ y s e lf .

Seconrl, t l ie sense-i~llprcssio~ll i i l o s o ~ ~ h yill be right in its way of taking tlieI'latonic d ic tl ~ m : I-Ie w h o sees mu st scc som ethin g." Plato co~-ripareclhis to "I fcwh o thinlts m ust tliinlt s o~ ne thi ng ," n d has sometimes been criticized on the ground

that "seeing" is a relation of a subject to an object in the nod ern sense of that last

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an d re la t ive posi t ions a nd s izc ; of I t inds of th ings a nd k inds of s tuff anc l tex ture a i ideven temp era ture ; of fac ia l es i ~i-e ss io nn d e m o t i o n a n d m o o d a n d t h o u g h t a n d c h a r-

acter; of ac tion an d movemc.i-i t ( in t llc stntiotinry imp ress ion ) an d l ife an d d eatl l .

Even with in the compass of rhe descr ip t ion "colours with the ir var ia t ions of l ig l i tasid sha de" the re are d iverse k inds of impress ion .

I t r e ~ n a i n s o s o r t o u t t li e ~ e i a t i o n s e tw e e n t h c i n te n ti o na lancl mater ia l ob jec ts ,of sensa t ion; as I have c lone most of the t ime,I wil l concentra te on see ing .

Whi le the re mu s t be an inceu tiona l ob jec t of see ing, these need no t ;~ l w a ) ~ s)c anla ter ia l ob jec t . That is to sa) ,"X a w A" where "saw" is used ruaterially, iniplics

s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n "X s a w ---" w h e r e " s a w " i s ~ ~ s e c ln ten t ional ly ; bu t thc con-verse docs not Iiojcl. Tliis Ici~cls o tllc Cocling chat rlic intentional use is so~iicllow

pr io r to the ma te r ia l use. Th c fee l ing sccnls to r u n con t r a ry t o the rccogn i tio t i, thefee ling , th a t fo r descrip t ionsof objec ts of s ig h t t h e m a ter ia l ; ~ p l~ l i c :~ t i o ns the pr iorone . B oth fee lingsare-legiti~ilatcly-satisfied by a l lowing t l i a ta n in ten t iona l ob jcctis necessarily involvecl in se ei i~ g,w h i le g r a n ti n g t h a t t h is d o c s n o t c o nf c r c l ~ i s t c n ~ o -

logical priority on pure ly in ten t ion al sen tences , wh ich inclcccl, in a h os t of th e m osto rd ina ry cases o f r epo r te t l scc ing , a re neve r fo rm ~~ la te c tr cotisiclcrcd.

J o h n A u s ti n , w h o o p p o s e d t h e v i ew t h a t t h er e a r e tw o s en s es of " se e" a c c o r d -

ing a s the see ing has to be ve r id ica l o r no t , r emark ed casua l ly tha t the re were

per hap s t w o senses of "o\, jeii- of sight." I t h in k i t w a si t 1

t h i s c o ~ l ~ l e c t i o nh a t h ec o ~ l t r a s t c d To d ay I s a w a m . ~ u o r n i n J e r u sa l e m " ancl " To d a yI saw a m an shavct lin Oxfo rd" -bo th sa id in O ~ l o r c l . t an y ra te, ou c says , you clidn't s ee h imborntoday; per l iaps you d id see someone 11cing shaved. So the one c lcscr ip t ion , wl~i lc

true of what you saw, in a sL:ilsed o c s n o t g iv c w h a t y o u s a w.A clescription cvhisliis true of a mate r ia l ob jec t L I ~h e v e r b " t o s e e, " b ~ l t h i c h s ta t es s o m e th in g t h nt

absolu te ly 01 - in tlie circumst-,111ces "y ou ca n' t liave scelz," ncc cssari ly gives olzly a

~l ia tcr ia l h icc t of scc ing .I11 spe aki ng of th e nlatcrial object of aim ing , I saicl t l ia t if a l l ian a imed a t tha t

d a r k p a t c h a g a i n s t t h e f o l i a ~ ~ c ,nd tha t pa tch was h is fa ther ' s ha t wi th h is fa the~. ' shea d in i t , thcn l i is fathcr w ; ~ s 111i1tcrialolljcct of liis ai111;)LI [if 'hc iiirtlctl ;i t S O I I I C

patch in a to ta l ly ha l luc ina tory sccnc , ancl h i t his fa ther, you coul ti no t s ; ~ yllat .N o w if we t ry t o a l-rply th i s exp lana t ion to tlie case of sce ing w e r u n in t o d i f i i -

cult ies which reflcct bacli011 ~ l ~ casc ol aiming. But in the casc consitlcrccl the n1;i-

t e r ia l oh jec t o f a iming wa s a~ .~ :uab lyn i rz~eii t io t ln l b jec t of see ing . Fo r w h a t c lsc-it might 11e asked-is a da rk pat ch ag ain st th e fol ia ge ?

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Th is ma y seem to p lur igc 11s in to confusio n. F or surely w ha t i s o i rly an in tent ionalob jec t of see ing can ' t be a ~n a t e r i a l b j ec t o f a iming? Th en w hen c loesa dcscril>tioilgivc a ntatcria l object of s igh t? O n e It ind of case w e have seen: wh en a t lescr ip t io~ i

is t rue o f wh a t is seen , hu t does u o t g ive an in ten t iona l ob jec t." I see a ma n \vhosegreat nnclc clicd in n l una t i c asy lum"- tl~e r el at ive c l a ~ i s c ives an a l~ so l~ r t c lyo n -in tcn t iona l desc rip t ion . " I see a g ir l wh o hasa ~ n o l e e tw e e n h e r sh o ul d e r- b la d e sn -in thc circum stntlccs i t givesn non -inte ntion al clcscriptiorl . Fo r she is facing mc, ctc."YOLI an ' t have seen that , " ~ I I C ays .

But w hy ? If I c a n 't s e e t h a t , w h y c a n I see Professor Price's to m at o? I t has a back-s i d e t h a t I d o n ' t s e e . M r TI~OII IPSOI~l a r k e d r a w s o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a ta vicw of a tom ato anc l a half - to i l la to rnay bc exact ly thc sa inc . T h a t i s so; but i t

is not l i l tc the fact that a vicw of soi l lcolle wi th an d w i th ou t a mole between hissho u ld e l blaclcs may be exac tly the sam e. If you look a t a to ma to a nd t ake on ly asi11g1c vicw , y ou trztrst s cc w h a t rltight be on ly a ha l f tomato : tha t i s wha t sec i~ iga tonla to i s . Whereas there i s a v icw of the mole; and110 fr on t view is a vicw of a

mole I~ et w ec n he s l ioulc ler b lacles . Suc11 a mole does n ot s ta m p thc f ron t v iew asma y a ppr oac hing cleat11 o r a loa d o f t roubles , an d s o there i s no i ~n pr cs si on f it-

jus t a s t li cr e is n o "born- in - Je rusa lem" look ab ou t a ma n .

I9it a ~ na tc r i a l b ject of seeing is not. ~ leccss ar i ly iven by a descr ip t ion of w ha tis before lily eyes when they a rc o pen ancl I arn seeing; if I a m to ta lly ha i luc ina ted ,the11 in n o scilse d o 1 see w ha t i s be fo re my eyes. Th us i t i s essent ia l to a mater ia lobject of seeing tha t i t i s give11 by a des cr ip t io~ lwhich is t rue o f what is srci t ; andwc havc to enquire in to the s igr t i f icance here of th is phrase "What i sseer^."

The jxoblcm is this: there is a material object of cp-ingi f there is a phrase g ivinga n i n t c nt i o n al ob j ec t of p i n g w h i c h i s a ls oa descr ip t ion of what exis ts in a sui t -ab le relat iol i to t lte cp-el: N o w this ca n' t be a descript ion of w h a t exists merely bydescr ib ing the in ten t iona l ob jcc t o f som e o the r ac t (he a ims a t tl ie da rk pa tch th a tltc sees); i f s imply desc r ib ing an i i~ tcn t ion a l l7 jcctof p i n g wi ll not-as of course itwi l l not-guarantee th at we have descr ibed a ~-natc~ . ia lbject of cp-ing, then howca n i t g ivc a m ater ia l o l~ jc ct f so m e oth cr vcrb , cp-ing?

All wou1tl I)e plain sailing if' w e cou l ii say : w c have a material object of s igh t o n l yi f soilrc i ~i lc nt io na l lcsci .ipt ion is al so tr ue of w h atrcally-physically-exists. A ndpcrl laps we can say that t l te clar lc patch agaiust the fol iage isn o t merely a n i'i1tc.n-t iona l ob jcc t of secing; there really is n tlarlc object or a region of cl a )Icncss tlicrc.

n l l t t h i s i s no t a lways the case when we scc . SupposeI havc clcfcctive sight: allI sce is a sh iny blur ov er t11c1.c. T h a t blur, w e say, is my wa tc h. We ther efore sayI

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see my watch, thong11 very indist inct ly; and I w a n t t o say t ha t m y ~ v a r c hs thet lla ter ia l object o f seciog. But I i l iay not be able to see i t as a watch;311 I scc is ashiny blur. B u t the desct -ip tion "a shiny blur" is not t rue of anyth ing t ha t physical ly

exis ts in the contcxt . S~ipj? osinghe f a ther had a d a r k h a t o n , i t w o u l d f ol lo w t h a t ,to ment ion the puzz le tha t pe rp lexed M oo re fo r so long , the ciarlc pa rch aga ins t t i ~ cfoliage w a s p n ~ if t he swtfclce o f a rnnlerinl ob ject (1nodert7 sei tse) ; b ~ i ter tainly "ablur" is no pa r t o f tl ie sucfnce of my w atc h. But i t ma y bcI l iavc n o o th cr clcscrip-t i o n of w h a t I see th an "a shiny blur ov er there ." So is there al ly in tent io nal descr ip-tion which, is also a clescriptioll of a material object of sight?

Yes; for even if lliy watch is nor a blur, it is a shiny thing ancl it is over tiicrc.

Suppose I had said: I scc a rou ghl y tr ia ng ul ar red blu r h erc , anel soui+ic c;tusalcon-

nect ion via t l ie v isual cent res in t he brain could havc been c li scovcrcti l~c tw cci l hntand thc p resence o f my \v : - i t c l t over thc r~ -wo~~l ( It lta vc I,cc~i ~.i t;ll tO sa y: '\Y/lintI a m seeing is n ly wi t tc l~ "? bclicvc not .

AII interest ing c ase is t h a t o f ntuscae riolitaiitcs, as thcy are callccl. You go to thedoc to r and you say : "I w o n d e r i f there is something wrong wi th n ly eycs o r myb r a i n ? I seen-or perh aps you say "I see171 to seen-"f loating spe cks bclo rc ntyeyes." T he d oc to r say's: "That's not vcry scr ious. Th ey ' r e there a l l s ight" (o r : "YOLIsee th em all right")--"the! , are j~i st he f loating deb ris in the fluidsof the eye. Yo11

are a bi t t i red ancl so your \>ra indoesn ' t kn ock th em o u t , t ha t' s a l l . " Th c th ings hesays you see a re n o t otit there w he rc you say you see thcm-ihnt pa r t of you r i ii tcn-t ional descr ip t ion is no t t sue of any thin g I-e levant ; but l ie does no t say th at ~ vl ta tyou are seeing is th at debr is on ly because th e dcbr is i s the cause . The re rcally arcf loat ing specks. If thcy caciscd you to scc a litrlc red clcvil or figlire o l eigh t, I

should not say you saw thei l l . I t may be possible to th in l\!rely as a n inte ntio nal on e; you wc rc giving the wortis

"floa ting speclcs" a scconc1;ii.y appl ic;ltio n, It c;imc as a S LI I.J >I .~S Co yoti t1i;it yo!^

would havc hacl the riglit to intcncl thc worcts materially.In t h c w e l l - k n o w n case of

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he w as ab le to desc r ibe w h a t he saw-a g rea t p il e o f leaves o n h is cou n te rp ane ,

which he kne w n o t t o be the re -we aga in liave a seco~ic ia ry pp l ica t ion : the wo rds

"a pile of Icavcs" were intcr~clctlo ~ l l y s a descr ip t ion of a n i~ i>prcs s ion .It is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t ic e t h a t v e ry o f t c ~ ih e r e is n o a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r

peoplc inte nd the worcl "see" in its~rzaterial se o r no t : tha t is, whe th er they a re sou si ng th e w o r d " se e" t h a t t he y w o ~ i i d a v e t o t a k e it b a c k s u p p o s i r ~ gh a t w h a t t h ey

saic l r liey s a w w as no t there . T f they we re mis -seeing some th ing tha t w as the re , they

would usually ' ivrin t to cor rect thernselvcs , f inding o u t "w l ia t they real ly saw." But

w h a t i f th e s e ei n g w e r e h a l l u c i n a t o r y ?

T h e q u e s t i o n w o u l d b e: s u p p o s i n g t h a t t u r n e d o u t t o b e t lie c a s e , w o u l d y o u c l ai n i

t h a t y o u m e a n " sc e " in s u c h a a w a y t h a t a ll y o u h a v e t c d o is a l t e r y o u r i n te n t i o n s

f o r t l i e t l e s c r i p t i o ~ ~f the object , f rom in te l ld ing i t in it s prittzary app l ica t ion as a

descr ip t ion of the tt~rrtcricllobjec t of s ight to i l l tending i t in a sccoitclnry app l ica t ionI as a descr ip t ion of ;I nlere i t i i /~ressio iz?Facecl with such a question, w e h a ve in general the r ight to re ject i t , saying l ike

Tom niy Traclc llc s: Bu t i t i sn 't so , y o i ~ now, so w e w on ' t supp osc iti f you don ' t

mind . And cvcn i f w e h a v e n o t this r igh t , we genera l ly en tc r r a i~ ino suci i suppos i-

t ion and ther r fore are unp l . cpared w i th a n answer. Wc neecl no t have de te rm ina te ly

n ican t the worcl " s ee" on c w ay o r thc o the r.We m a y m a k e a s i ~ n i l a r o i n t a b o u t " p l- la n to m limb." I take t i le part of t l ie body

where pain is fe l t to b e t h c o b j e c t of a transit.ive ver1,-like expression "to feel pain

i n --- " Th en wl icn the re i s, e.g. , n o foo t , bu tX, no t k now ing th i s , s ays he f ec lspa in in h i s foo t , he n lay s ay hc w as wr on g ("I did 1iot see a lion thcre, for t1ic1-ew as n o l ion" ) o r he m ay a l t e r li is under s rand ing o f tl ie ph rase" m y foot" so t l ln t i tbec om cs a j,ure ly in tent io nal o bje ct of the verb- l ike express ion . I3ut it need no t be

deter ln il lec l in adv an cc , in the n orm al case of fee l ing pain , whet tlc l- on e so in te nds

the cxpt-cssion "I fccl pa in in -----" as t o w i t h d r a w it, o r ~ n e r e l y lt e r s on e' s i n t en -tions for the c lescr iprion of the p lace of th e pain , if on e sh ou ld learn t ha t the ~71acc

w a s m i s s i~ i g .

Notes

1. Throughout this paper 1 use double quotes for ordinary quotations (and so singlesfo rquotes within q uotes) a n d s i ~ ~ g l e suse a s scare c111otes.

2. This was arguctl to me Ily M I. G. EIartiian, for which I am ol,liged to him.

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3. I am indebted for this objection and the discussion of it to Professors Bernard Williailisand Ar t h u r Prior and M r 1 T. Geach.

4. 1 a m obliged to Professor Frarik Ebersole for telling nie of a n cxpcricncc of his which s u p -plied this cxarnplc.

5 . Example from M . Lucliiesh.6 . Example t rom W. James.

7. Word L Z I T ~OOject (Carrtbridjie. Mass., 1 9 6 0 ) ,p. 7.