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Crisis as Political Opportunity?
Partisan Politics, Housing Cycles, and the Credit Crisis
Ben W. Ansell
University of Minnesota
The global credit crisis of 2008 was followed by a wave of successive fiscal stimulusannouncements from almost every advanced industrial state. Although the choice toengage in fiscal stimulus in response to the crisis was near-universal, the size andcomposition of these stimuli, and the accompanying panoply of financial stabilizationmeasures, varied dramatically across the OECD. This paper examines the determinants offiscal responses to the credit crisis, focusing on the interplay between government
partisanship and the relative size of the housing boom experienced by countries in theyears before the crash. I argue that volatility in asset prices like housing affects
preferences over social spending, particularly in countries with high homeownership ratesand show strong empirical evidence for these patterns on data from eighteen countriesfrom 1980 to 2003. I then build on these findings to suggest that this interactive pattern of
partisanship and housing is also evident in the varied responses of countries to the creditcrisis. In particular I show that discretionary tax cuts were largest when right-wing partiesgoverned and housing booms had been especially large, whereas discretionary spendingwas largest where left-wing parties governed and housing booms had been largest.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis of Fall 2008, sparking fears of a repeat of the Great
Depression, produced a dramatic and choreographed set of government responses across
the advanced industrial world. Policymakers faced immediate threats requiring urgent
action, in particular the teetering financial sector, as well as the impending likelihood of a
prolonged slump in broader economic activity. Looking to the longer run, the crisis also
galvanized debate about the regulatory framework governing both global finance, and
domestic lending. While recent economic events suggest that the worst case scenarios
were held at bay, decisions made by governments in the year following the stock-marketdownturn of October 2008 will greatly impact the long-run fiscal health, monetary
stability, and regulatory frameworks of most countries. These choices, in fact, differed
quite sharply across states. Some like the USA and China, implemented large
discretionary fiscal stimuli; others like Germany and Sweden with automatic fiscal
stabilizers kicking in, were more hesitant to provide discretionary stimuli. Still other
countries, like Greece, Iceland, Ireland, and Hungary, were forced to adopt fiscal
austerity measures in response to market fears of their insolvency. In terms of financial
stabilization there was also broad variance. Central banks and finance ministries differed
in the kinds of assets they would accept as collateral, and while some states enacted
moved to nationalize banks and regulate traders, others took a more hands off approach
to financial stabilization and regulation.
Despite the importance, and sheer magnitude, of the policies implemented by
governments since the financial crisis began, at present scholars lack both a
comprehensive cross-national account of how countries differed in their policy responses
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and an understanding of why these different choices were made. Indeed, remarkably little
political science analysis has examined the role of governments in responding to housing
booms and busts (or, for that matter, equity market volatility). Yet, housing was the prime
cause of the credit crisis inflated house prices being the original sin of consumer over-
leverage. To properly understand how governments responded to this crisis we need to
move from the standard political economy focus on labor market income and class
differences to an analysis of how wealth and home ownership affect preferences and
policy. This paper builds on a theory of the political economy of ownership to address
two questions: (a) what explained variation in policy responses made by governments tothe credit crisis, and (b) to what degree are these responses part of a broader long-run
pattern of government responses to cycles in the housing market.
I begin in Section Two by outlining an important shift in the global economy from
a period of great price and wage volatility to one marked by a Great Moderation in the
goods and services market but with increasing volatility in the market for assets,
particularly housing and equities. Focusing on the role of housing, I theorize how
fluctuations in housing prices affect the preferences of both citizens and the political
parties that aggregate their interests and make policy. In particular, I identify a
conditional effect whereby right-wing parties are more likely to cut back taxes and
spending during periods of house price appreciation. I demonstrate the empirical strength
of this argument using cross-sectional time-series data for eighteen industrialized
countries from 1980 to 2003. I find strong and robust evidence that right-wing parties cut
social and pensions spending substantially during house price booms, even controlling for
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other aspects of the business cycle and that this pattern is most pronounced in countries
with high levels of homeownership.
Section Three extends this analysis to cross-national responses to the credit crisis.
Does the pattern of conditional partisanship hold up in terms of the fiscal packages put
together by governments in response to the economic collapse of 2008? I begin by setting
out new data on the size and composition of the fiscal packages before turning to
empirical analysis that confirms this hypothesis. I find no direct effect of partisanship on
the nature of the stimuli but a robust conditional effect whereby countries that had
housing booms see a very strong effect of partisanship on the types of discretionary taxand spending policies they engaged in. Examining homeownership, either instead of
house price appreciation, or in combination with it, I find similar effects. Put simply,
partisan control of government mattered most in responding to the crisis where housing
formed a larger share of the economy Section Four briefly examines the financial
stabilization measures imposed by governments following the crisis, asking whether
partisanship had a direct or conditional effect on the types of regulations and support for
the financial sector adopted. Here I find only a direct effect. Section Five concludes,
discussing this distinction between fiscal and regulatory policy and offers suggestions for
our understanding of the political economy of the post-industrial but clearly not post-
financial world.
2. From Income to Assets: A Theoretical and Empirical Background
Political economists know a great deal about the political causes and
consequences of business cycles in the postwar era. Drawing first on Keynesian
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economics and the Philips curve, and later on various versions of rational expectations
business cycle theories, successive scholars were able to draw broad conclusions both
about the effects of partisanship and labor market institutions on price inflation and
unemployment (Hibbs, 1977; Calmfors and Driffell, 1988; Hall and Franzese 1998;
Iversen, 1999), and symmetrically about the impact of these macroeconomic forces on
political outcomes from public spending to voting (Franzese, 2002; Duch and Stevenson,
2007). One irony of this expansive and convincing literature is that just as a broad
consensus on the relationship between politics and macroeconomics had emerged,
contemporary trends in the business cycle and particularly in price inflation, suggestedthat the macroeconomic volatility that characterized the mid-twentieth century had been
tamed. A variety of scholars, most notably Ben Bernanke (2004), announced a Great
Moderation had taken place with massively reduced volatility in output, employment,
and price inflation. When we examine price inflation across the OECD, that assertion
seems to hold up. Between 1956 and 1985 the average level of price inflation in the
OECD was 6.9% with a within-country standard deviation of 4.9%. Between 1985 and
2006 the average level of price inflation more than halved to 3.3%, as did the standard
deviation - to 2.4%. Put simply, price inflation has been substantially lower and
considerably less volatile over the past few decades.
However, while price inflation of goods and services was dormant, another form
of volatility was waking. From the mid-1980s, asset markets in equities and housing
became substantially more volatile. While equity markets have been volatile historically,
the same has not been true of house prices. In particular, house prices across the
advanced industrial world accelerated in hitherto unseen rates between 2001 and 2007
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before plummeting in an unforeseen fashion between 2008 and 2010. The period between
1985 and 2006 had three times the average level of real house price inflation as that
between 1970 and 1985 and, even before 2006 and the downturn in housing prices, a
higher level of volatility. This final boom and bust period was unprecedented in modern
times. Surveying the broad sweep of American house price history, Robert Shiller (2007)
is able to locate no qualitatively comparable episodes since the surge in house prices at
the end of World War Two, which was not, in any case, accompanied by any similar
downturn.
Most analysts agree that the huge housing booms and subsequent busts across theadvanced industrial world resulted from a set of policies that enabled cheap credit,
including mortgage market and broader financial deregulation, and extended periods of
low interest rates (Schwartz, 2009). In combination these policies have produced ever-
greater leakage from the housing sector into the health of overall economy. The IMF
(2008) estimate that in a number of countries, most pronouncedly in the USA, shocks to
house prices and their feedback into consumption and residential investment account for
north of twenty percent of variation in national economic output, even though changes in
house prices do not directly figure into national income accounts. Moreover, house prices
themselves have become ever more sensitive to policy changes. In many states - not only
the Anglo-American Liberal Market Economies but also Coordinated Market Economies
like Belgium, Norway, Denmark, and Japan - over fifty percent of house price variation
can be accounted for by monetary policy changes. This phenomenon is new. The interest
rate elasticity of house prices has increased massively since the 1970s. Whereas in most
OECD states between 1970 and 1982 a one percent point increase in interest rates was
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associated with less than a 1% decline in house prices, between 1983 and 2007 the same
interest rate change had substantially larger effects: producing a 2% decline in house
prices in Sweden, Finland and the UK, 3.5% in the USA and France, and 5% in Spain
and Holland (IMF, 2008). In short, housing was both more strongly affected by
macroeconomic policy and a greater cause of ensuing macroeconomic outcomes. The
Great Moderation was far from apparent in asset markets. It was likely this shift in
volatility from the product to the asset market that blinded policymakers to the
underlying weaknesses of the bubble economy of 2003-2008 that precipitated the credit
crisis. Hence, if we wish to understand comparative political responses to the credit crisis,it is crucial to understand conceptually how asset cycles, as opposed to regular business
cycles, affect citizens preferences and the behavior of politicians.
Elsewhere I have characterized the periods from 1945 to the early 1980s and from
the early 1980s to the present as representative of two ideal types: Employment
Dominance and Asset Dominance (Ansell, 2010b). In the former case, macroeconomic
policies have larger effects on the product market in terms of prices, wages and
employment than they do on the value of assets like equities and housing. Furthermore,
citizens in a world of Employment Dominance rely on wages for their income, and on
employer- or government-provided unemployment benefits or pensions for periods where
they are out of the labor force, either through involuntary unemployment or voluntary
retirement. Asset Dominance, by contrast, describes a world in which changes in
macroeconomic policies have a larger effect on the value of assets than on product prices,
wages, or employment. In this world, citizens depend increasingly on the value of their
assets both for day-to-day income (using the value of their asset as collateral) and for
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unemployment or retirement (a nest egg effect). These ideal types are just that
although the evidence above is suggestive of a Great Moderation in inflation and an
accompanying growing volatility in asset prices, clearly in reality both effects exist
contemporaneously. However, the past few decades have seen a greater proximity to a
world of Asset Dominance than the postwar era.
Theoretically, how would we expect political behavior to differ in these two
environments? Iversen (2005) argues that human capital is the single greatest investment
decision engaged in by individuals. One other type of investment might provide some
competition: home purchasing. Yet whereas political economists have devotedconsiderable attention to human capital investment over the past decade (Estevez-Abe,
Iversen, and Soskice, 2000; Iversen 2005; Busemeyer, 2008; Ansell, 2010a), there has
been little discussion of the potential impact of asset ownership on political preferences.
Here I briefly lay out some expectations over the impact of asset prices on the
preferences of asset owners.
As I argue formally elsewhere (Ansell, 2007), when asset prices like housing -
are rising, asset-owning citizens will respond by desiring both lower taxes and less
publicly provided social insurance. First, increased earnings from assets are likely to
make citizens more tax-sensitive, either because their assets are directly taxed (as in
property taxation) or because they adopt the anti-tax preferences of high-income
individuals. Second, since asset owners have privately insured against income loss in
unemployment or old age by being able to use their assets especially housing as a nest
egg they have less demand for public insurance as a hedge against such risks. Private
insurance substitutes for public insurance. These responses to rising asset prices should
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be mirrored by in the case of decreasing asset prices producing a reversal of
preferences. Arguably house price crashes should lead to increased demand for social
insurance against the vagaries of the market.
The discussion of changes in house prices begs the question of who the relevant
political actors are in this argument: after all, price changes themselves do not vote.
Homeowners are the obvious beneficiaries of house price appreciation and similarly,
renters and potential first-time buyers are the losers. These are essentially latent
political interests large groups of actors with common interests but unlikely to have
individual incentives to bear the costs of organizing for this interest. Thus, identifiableinterest groups with observable preferences over social policy are difficult to come by.
However, we might expect the aggregate national homeownership rate to affect the
balance of homeowner versus renter interests in terms of demands on politicians.
Specifically, in countries with higher homeownership rates, we would expect
homeowners to be more effective at expressing their preferences for reduced social
spending and taxation during periods of house price appreciation. Where homeowners are
a larger group they become a more attractive source of votes for politicians. Survey
analysis of the USA and the UK as opposed to Germany, finds a stronger effect of house
price appreciation on policy preferences in the former two high homeownership cases
compared to the latter country, well-known for its traditionally low homeownership rate
(Ansell, 2010b).
Who actually represents these homeowner preferences? In the empirical analysis
below I am not focusing on preferences but rather on policy outcomes, which raises the
question of how preferences are aggregated. Broadly, asset owners are represented by
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right-wing parties. This pattern fits the established findings that higher income and older
citizens tend to vote for, albeit not exclusively, right-wing parties. Indeed, the effects of
house price appreciation on individual preferences over social security are much stronger
for right-wing voters than for other citizens (Ansell 2010b). As such, we should expect to
see the preferences of homeowners channeled by right-wing parties during periods of
asset price change. Put simply, during house price booms I expect right-wing
governments to cut taxes and spending . In contrast, left-wing governments have fewer
asset owners among their constituents. We might expect such parties to try and increase
social insurance spending in order to target benefits to their constituents who lack the private insurance provided by asset ownership. In the empirical analysis below we find
that left-wing parties in countries with housing booms do appear to increase social
spending more than left-wing parties not experiencing housing booms.
I now turn to a brief empirical analysis of how national governments have
responded to changes in housing prices over the past few decades. 1 Even controlling for
changes in standard macroeconomic factors including national income, price inflation,
and interest rates we see powerful effects of house prices on patterns of government
spending. Not only is there a direct effect of house prices on spending but there also
appears to be a conditional effect that works through partisan control of the government.
In short, under right-wing government, the housing effect on spending is stronger. When
house prices are rising, right-wing governments appear to cut spending further and faster.
Furthermore, this pattern is most accentuated in countries with high levels of
1 A more detailed set of analyses are conducted in Ansell (2010a). The analyses below establish anempirical framework for comparison to Section Threes analysis of responses to the credit crisis.
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homeownership. Thus, where housing is most economically important, the politics of
ownership matter substantially in social policymaking.
I examine social spending in eighteen countries between 1980 and 2001. The total
social spending measure comes from the OECD (2008) and includes pensions,
unemployment benefits, survivors benefits, incapacity benefits, health spending, family
spending, active labor market programs, and public housing. 2 The key independent
variable is the five-year percentage change in real house prices (i.e. inflation-adjusted),
taken from the Bank of International Settlements. The mean of this variable is 12.8% (i.e.
a compounded annual rate of around 2.5%), its standard deviation is 25.6% and itsminimum and maximum values are, respectively, -45.8% and 118.3%. For government
partisanship I use Cusack and Engelhardt's cabinet `center of gravity' index which
produces a measure of cabinet ideology which is the summation of the ideology of parties
comprising the cabinet weighted by their relative size in the coalition (Cusack and
Engelhardt, 2002). I use their `composite ideology' index, which is based on 23 expert
ratings. This variable ranges (theoretically) between -100 (left) and 100 (right). I also
employ an interactive variable that is the product of cabinet ideology and the five year
percentage change in house prices. My expectation is that this interaction should be
negative that is, as house prices rise under right-wing government, social spending will
be cut. In two of the models I also use homeownership data drawn from Atterhog (2005)
for fifteen of the countries.
I further include a set of macroeconomic controls including Gross Domestic
Product (measured in $100bn), the annual growth rate of GDP, the real interest rate, and
2 Ansell (2010a) examines disaggregated elements of social spending, finding that the effect of housing isstrongest on those aspects related most closely to social insurance: pensions and unemployment benefits.
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consumer price inflation taken from the World Development Indicators. I also add two
further important determinants of social spending: trade openness (Rodrik, 2000) and the
proportion of citizens over sixty-five years of age (Shelton, 2007). 3
Table One contains five models examining the hypothesis of an effect of
partisanship on social spending conditional on housing price appreciation. All the models
include the full array of control variables as well as year dummies (except Model A
which uses a linear time trend). Models A is a pooled analysis whereas Models B and C
include country dummies, thereby measuring only within country changes. Models A and
C both used lagged dependent variables, whereas Model B assumes an autoregressiveerror term of order one. The key finding is that the interactive variable of cabinet
partisanship and house prices is negative and robust across all three models. The
implication is that the impact of house prices, controlling for other aspects of the business
cycle and other determinants of government spending, is filtered through partisan control
of government.
To aid interpretation, Figure One shows estimates drawn from Model C of the
marginal effect on social spending of real house prices increasing by fifty percent over
five years. 4 It shows the estimated effect - with ninety-five percent confidence intervals -
of this increase in house prices for a given level of partisanship, where negative fifty
signals a government left of a countrys mean level of partisanship and positive fifty
signals a government to the right. There is a clearly negative slope: as government shifts
to the right the effect of house price appreciation on social spending moves from
3 These variables along with the dependent variables were drawn from the Quality of Governance SocialPolicy dataset compiled by Samanni et al (2008).4 Clearly using different models alters the slope and intercept of these predicted curves though broadly thesubstantive interpretation is the same.
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increased spending (at the extreme left) to decreased spending (for almost all
governments on the right). It is notable that this pattern is most robust for the right, with
significant decreases in spending occurring at for almost all right-wing governments.
Models D and E of Table One address the issue of homeownership. Arguably, the
impact of house price appreciation on social spending should be strongest in those
countries where homeownership is the norm, and where politicians can therefore find
more votes in addressing the policy preferences of homeowners. These models split the
sample according to whether countries have homeownership below the median (Model
D), or above it (Model E). As expected, while both sets of countries show a negativecoefficient on the interaction of partisanship and house price appreciation it is larger and
much more robust for countries with high levels of homeownership. Thus, where the
potential political coalition of homeowners is larger, fluctuations in housing prices have a
stronger effect on social policy outcomes.
Thus across the last few decades, OECD countries do appear to have experienced
important effects of housing on the behavior of governments. Does the story of the past
decades hold up today? Have right-wing parties responded similarly in the fiscal
environment following the credit crash of 2008 and have left-wing parties, for their part
moved in a countervailing direction to shore up spending?
4. Housing Booms, Partisanship, and the Stimulus
The collapse in global house prices that began in earnest in 2007 was the prelude
to a sustained decline in industrial output the following year, followed in October 2008
by a collapse in equity valuations and a near-collapse of the international financial
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system. Many commentators forecasted a second Great Depression. Almost
immediately, governments unveiled a set of policies to respond to these challenges. These
policies came in three forms: monetary policy easing; fiscal stimulus; and regulatory
policies. Monetary policymaking was rapid and uniform across the advanced industrial
world. By late October 2008, central banks had coordinated a massive slashing of interest
rates to near-zero levels. Policies regarding fiscal stimulus and financial regulation,
however, took longer to be enacted and varied considerably across industrial countries. In
this section and the next, I describe this variation and then examine its determinants. In
particular, I focus on the joint role of partisanship and the size of housing booms.I begin by examining the fiscal responses of advanced industrial nations to the
credit crisis. Though the crisis began in earnest in October 2008, most governments took
several months to respond fully. In particular, in February 2009 there was a rapid spurt of
announcements by governments of fiscal stimuli. The simultaneity of responses appears
related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of the Obama
administration, enacted on Febuary 17 th 2009, having been introduced three weeks
earlier. The $787 billion act was the single largest national fiscal stimulus in absolute
amount and appears to have set the cross-national fiscal agenda. Arguably, like monetary
policy, the pattern of engaging in fiscal stimuli across the OECD displayed a high deal of
interdependence, with even the most reluctant countries (like Germany) engaging in
fiscal policy announcements in short order after the American announcement.
Thus, if we are to look for substantive cross-national variation in fiscal responses
to the credit crisis, we will not find it terms of the choice to engage in stimulus, which
was effectively universal, nor the timing, which was near-simultaneous. Instead we must
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to turn to examine differences among stimulus policies in terms of their size and
composition. Here we do find substantial variation. It is helpful in terms of judging the
discretionary fiscal stimuli to measure them against cyclical changes in each countrys
fiscal position caused by the credit crisis and the general economic downturn and also
against existing levels of government debt. Table Three is taken from the OECDs
analysis of the relative fiscal positions of each state (OECD, 2009).
The first thing to note is that the massive fiscal deficits carried by most states over
2009-2010 have been produced by collapses in tax revenues and countercyclical
increases in spending to cover unemployment insurance and other stabilization expenses.While the average cyclical effect on government finances was just over five percent of
GDP, discretionary stimuli averaged at only one percent of national income. However,
the relatively small average discretionary stimulus is a product of several states
(Hungary, Iceland, and Ireland) having to engage in massive fiscal retrenchment
producing an anti-stimulus effect in these states. The standard deviation for stimuli is
twice the size of that for cyclical budget deficits. Put simply, discretionary government
policies reflect substantially greater variation than the degree to which states experienced
cyclical deficits. Many states also faced further deficits from other changes which
include the purchase / nationalization of private entities by the state for example, the
nationalization of Lloyds/TSB in the United Kingdom and the nationalization of AIG in
the USA. Finally, Table Three also displays data on the level of debt held by states at the
start of the crisis in 2008 and the net addition to the national debt of 2009 and 2010.
Broadly, we see that states with higher initial debt levels have also added greater levels of
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debt during the downturn than those with lower debt, though some low debtors like
Ireland have had very large increases in debt.
I now turn to the composition of the fiscal stimuli. In June 2009, the OECD
released its Economic Outlook report, which provides a broad variety of information on
these fiscal packages (OECD, 2009). Table Four, using this data, details the size and
composition of the fiscal packages. Before we analyze this data in greater detail, a few
salient points jump out. Firstly, almost all countries engaged in countercyclical fiscal
stimuli in that the net change in the budget deficit was negative everywhere but Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, and Ireland, all four of which had massive capital outflows and wereforced to engage in massive budgetary retrenchment (in Greeces case not until 2010).
Elsewhere the size of stimuli ranged between less than one percent of GDP (France,
Portugal, and Switzerland) and around six percent of GDP (Korea and the USA).
There was also a great deal of variation in how the stimuli were structured both in
terms of the relative share of taxation and spending and within these categories. Some
countries tilted their stimuli towards tax cuts, for example the Czech Republic and New
Zealand (which actually cut spending), whereas others focused on spending increases, for
example Australia, Denmark, Korea, and Spain. Some countries focused tax cuts on
individual income taxes, as in Australia and Spain. Others focused on cuts to social taxes,
as in Germany and the Netherlands, or consumption taxes as in Canada and the UK.
Finally, some countries focused spending increases on government consumption
(Denmark and Sweden) others on government investment (Australia, Canada, Poland),
whereas other increased transfers to households, businesses, or subnational entities
(respectively, Luxembourg, Japan, and the United States). Clearly this is ample variation
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in both the size and targeting of fiscal stimuli. We now turn to how well the explanation
from the previous section related to house price booms and partisanship fits this data.
Since Cusack and Engelhardts data on cabinet partisanship does not extend until
2008, I rely instead on data drawn from Armingeon et al (2008) who code the proportion
of cabinet seats held by right-wing, center, or left-wing parties. The Armingeon data
corresponds to 2007. Thus, where control of government changed by the time of the
announced stimulus packages in OECD countries I recoded the cabinet composition
using data drawn from the collection of country profiles in Bale and Van Biezen (2009).
Below I use two different variables to reflect cabinet partisanship, along the linesdeveloped by Armingenon et al (2008). Firstly, I use right wing partisanship the
proportion of the cabinet held by right-wing politicians, following the Armingeon et al
coding of parties by country. Secondly, I use left-wing partisanship the proportion of
the cabinet held by left-wing politicians. These are not mirror images of one another
since a third category remains center-party politicians for example the Democratic
Party in the USA or the FDP in Germany. 5 I run two sets of cross-sectional regressions,
one for right-wing partisanship and one for left-wing partisanship. 6 Each time I interact
the relevant partisanship variable with a house price variable. This variable is the 2001-
2006 five-year increase in real house prices, taken from the BIS data used above. The
reason for using this span of years is that it best reflects the overall size of the housing
boom in most countries, since by 2007 prices had leveled and indeed begun declining in
5 Arguably the Democratic Party represents the left-wing in the United States. However, since the analysisin this section is cross-sectional we must be careful not to conflate the Democratic Party with socialistEuropean parties. Furthermore, the final stimulus bill in the USA reflected the necessity of overcomingsixty-vote cloture rules in the Senate, requiring two Republican votes, thereby making the bill moremoderate. Rerunning the regressions with Democrats coded as left-wing does not alter the resultssubstantially.6 Similar results are obtained by creating a partisanship index that measures right-wing cabinet proportionminus left-wing cabinet proportion.
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many countries. Each regression thus contains partisanship, house price appreciation,
their interaction, and finally a measure of the cyclical budget deficit in 2008, drawn from
Table Three above.
I conduct two sets of regressions, one for the right-wing partisanship measure and
one for the left-wing partisanship measure. In each I examine two broad indicators of
discretionary fiscal policy first aggregate tax changes and second aggregate spending
increases. Obviously, most tax changes were negative and spending was positive, since
all these states save Ireland engaged in countercyclical stimuli. Because of Irelands
unique status as a retrencher in this cross-section, I report results both with and withoutIreland. I also show for each tax and spending dependent variable, the effects of
examining the direct effect of partisanship in Model A and then the effect conditional on
house prices in Model B. As we shall see, in every case, partisanship only matters in
terms of its interaction with housing prices.
Table Four (a) uses the right-wing partisanship variable. Models A through C
examine the determinants of discretionary tax policy. While Model A shows no net direct
effect of partisanship on the size of tax cuts, Models B and C both display an interactive
effect of partisanship conditional on the size of the housing boom in each state, albeit not
robust in Model B. Specifically, where the boom was particularly large, right-wing
government led to larger tax cuts. Or put in reverse, under right-wing control of
government states with large housing booms had large tax cuts as part of their
discretionary stimuli. The elective affinity of right-wing government, housing boom,
and cuts in revenues holds in this cross-sectional analysis. The effect is also apparent in
terms of discretionary spending. Right-wing governments in countries with large house
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booms had much lower spending increases than either left or center governments or,
indeed, right-wing governments in countries without large house price booms.
Table Four (b) shows symmetric results when we turn to measuring cabinet
partisanship with the proportion of cabinet seats held by left-wing parties (again
following Armingeon et als party definitions). In terms of tax stimuli the results are
statistically insignificant but the interaction term does have its expected sign positive
and as we shall see presently, there is evidence of a borderline significant impact of
housing booms when left-wing parties are entirely absent from government in this case
producing a reduction in taxes. The analysis of spending does show the expected robustinteraction between left-wing cabinet seats and house prices. When left-wing parties held
no seats house booms were associated with spending cuts in stimuli but where they held
the entire cabinet, house booms were associated with spending increases.
Since interpreting interactive coefficients is difficult, as in the previous section I
graph the estimated effects of house price booms at varying levels of cabinet
partisanship. 7 Figures Two (a) and (b), drawn from Models C and F of Table Four (a),
use the right-wing seats measure and show the estimated interactive effect of house price
booms and partisanship on, respectively, discretionary taxes and discretionary spending.
The figures show strong conditional effects. At total right-wing control of government,
house price booms are robustly associated with a decline in discretionary taxes and with a
decline in discretionary spending. Interestingly the estimated size of tax cuts and
spending cuts as a percentage of national income is almost identical implying that right-
7 The marginal change being modeled here is a doubling of house prices between 2001 and 2006. Forcomparability to Figure One, a fifty percent increase in house prices would simply be this marginal effectdivided by two.
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wing governments in countries with house price booms did not engage in Keynesian
countercyclical policies but accompanied tax cuts with spending cuts. 8
Figures Three (a) and (b) show the effects of left-wing control of government.
Here we see that when left-wing governments controlled cabinets there was no robust
effect of the size of the house price boom on discretionary tax policy. However at full
left-wing control of government, house price booms were associated with an increase in
discretionary spending. Put together, unlike right-wing parties, left-wing parties in
countries with housing booms did engage in counter-cyclical policies with some gusto.
However, perhaps surprisingly, this result only holds up when one examines theconditional effect of partisanship and housing prices. There is no direct effect of left-
wing (or indeed right-wing) partisanship on either discretionary tax or spending policies.
The effect of partisanship was moderated by countries housing experience.
We can view countries housing experience through another lens, that of
homeownership. Homeownership and the size of the housing boom in the first decade of
the new millennium are quite closely related. Figure Four demonstrates this pattern using
the five-year house price appreciation variable and a measure of aggregate
homeownership drawn from Atterhog (2005). 9 Arguably, parties should respond to the
wishes of homeowners more in countries where homeownership is widespread and
reflects a larger potential vote pool. Moreover, this effect should be amplified under
conditions of rising house prices as in Table One. Tables Five (a) and Five (b) use two
8 Both graphical and statistical analysis of the net change in countries fiscal position regressed on partisanship and house prices confirm this hypothesis. Left wing governments with housing booms,conversely, do appear more likely to have increased budget deficits more when housing booms were larger.9 I use data from the year available for each country in the Atterhog dataset, which varies between 1999 and2003. Hence the levels of homeownership do not correspond perfectly with those at the height of thehousing bubble. With that caveat aside, the rank order of countries in homeownership has changed verylittle over the past four decades.
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homeownership variables in place of the house price appreciation variable and its
interactive term used in Tables Four (a) and Four (b). 10 The first measure is the aggregate
homeownership rate and the second is that rate multiplied by house price appreciation
this latter variable measures the aggregate increase in national housing wealth.
The results are broadly similar to those found for house price appreciation, albeit
less robust with the homeownership variable and more robust with the homeownership X
house price appreciation variable. Putting these results together, it appears that aggregate
homeownership rates did indeed matter for fiscal stimulus responses but they did so
much more where house prices had also risen substantially. In terms of overalldiscretionary tax-cutting or spending increases, we find a consistent conditional effect of
partisanship, with housing shaping party responses most where ownership was broad and
price appreciation high.
Discretionary taxes and spending are still rather broad categories. It is instructive
to examine precisely what kinds of policies governments altered as part of their
discretionary stimulus policies. Tables Six (a) and (b) examine the determinants of
specific components of the stimuli. 11 Examining right-wing partisanship and taxes first
we across individual taxes, business taxes and social taxes that the general interactive
pattern we saw for taxes in general holds up it is, however, only robust in terms of
social taxation. Right wing governments in countries with house price booms appear to
have cut social insurance taxes sharply. In terms of spending we do not see any
significant effects on government consumption or investment but right-wing parties in
10 I do not split the sample as in Table One due to the very low number of cases under analysis. Thesetables should in any case be thought of as suggestive rather than inferentially rigorous.11 All the models exclude Ireland.
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housing boom countries appear much less likely to have engaged in transfers to
households, businesses, or subnational units.
Table Six (b) repeats the exercise for the left-wing partisanship variable. Here we
see a similar pattern except in reverse to that in Table Six (a). Left wing parties in
countries without housing booms reduced social insurance taxes whereas those in
countries with housing booms did not. In terms of spending there is some evidence for
increased government consumption in states with large housing booms and left-wing
control of government. But the much stronger effects appear in terms of transfers,
especially to businesses and localities, where fully left-wing governments with house booms greatly increased transfers. Overall it appears that the interactive effects of
partisanship and house price booms appear most strongly in terms of social insurance
taxation and transfers to households.
There are two important caveats to the analysis in this section. First, whereas the
analysis in the previous section incorporated twenty years of data over eighteen countries,
we are limited in this section to a cross-section of seventeen states for which we have
data for housing prices, government partisanship and cyclical and discretionary budgetary
changes. 12 This kind of cross-sectional data forces us to make rather heroic assumptions
that partisan changes across countries are similar to those within them. However, we
obviously lack the perfect counterfactual of two different political parties in the same
country being able to simultaneously respond to the credit crisis. Thus, although the data
analysis in this section is questionable, it is at least suggestive. In fact, the pattern seen in
cross-sectional responses to the credit crisis is remarkably similar to that uncovered more
12 The BIS housing data only covers eighteen countries. The OECD does not provide data on Norwayscyclical deficit reducing the sample to seventeen. Including Norway and removing the cyclical deficitvariable does not alter results substantially.
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broadly in the previous section. The effect of partisanship on fiscal responses is mediated
through the relative size of the housing boom (and indeed vice versa).
Second, was the interaction between political parties and house prices in the 2009
stimuli a function of the housing boom or the bust ? If the experience of the housing boom
is more important then right-wing parties will choose fiscal responses that cut taxes
whereas left-wing parties choose those that increase spending. But potentially the parties
could have responded to the decline in house prices that began in 2008, making policy in
the reverse manner. Why did parties respond to the boom not the bust? Most stimuli were
decided upon just as house prices began to decline rather than after several years ofdecline and the empirical results in this section used the five year change in house prices,
which even in 2009 reflected much more boom than bust. And as we saw, empirical
evidence suggests that there is a hangover of house price booms right-wing parties
continued to respond in the credit crisis in the same tax-cutting, spending-trimming
fashion as during the long preceding house boom. However, it is quite possible that over
the longer run if house price declines continue we could see a reversal of preferences for
the political parties.
One way to think about this issue is to examine the cases of Japan and Germany
where house prices had in fact declined between 2001 and 2006. These cases fit closely
within the patterns found above far from being outliers, despite having very different
(in fact negative) levels of house price appreciation to the rest of the sample, Japan and
Germany across the statistical models typically have some of the lowest residuals. Thus,
the findings above are not being driven purely by house price booms those countries
with stagnating and declining house prices fit the overall pattern rather well. This of
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course does not directly address the question of how long it takes preferences to reverse
what is the lag between anti-tax homeowners in good times and pro-social spending
homeowners in bad times? At root, this is an empirical question that simple cross-
sectional analyses cannot address. With that said, it appears that in Japans case house
price declines did eventually force a change in preferences in line with the theory
developed above.
5. Financial Policy and Partisan Politics
I now move from fiscal policy to a brief analysis of financial policymaking during2008/2009. Perhaps the most pressing issue that governments faced in late 2008 was the
threat of a severe banking crisis turning into a complete financial meltdown. Even before
fiscal stimuli were developed, many governments had already intervened into the
financial sector through regulation and financial support. In terms of regulations,
governments quickly moved to prohibit certain forms of trading or ring-fenced particular
assets. Financial support included government purchase of toxic assets, outright
nationalization of banks, and the provision of guarantees and liquidity.
Table Seven presents descriptive statistics on these financial policies. The first
four columns examine the size of governmental support for the financial sector as a
percentage of GDP. This data is drawn from the IMF (2009) and includes direct capital
injections, the purchase of assets by national treasuries, guarantees backing financial
firms provided by governments, and the provisioning of liquidity. In all of these four
cases, governments typically did not have to draw down on the full amount promised,
largely because the financial crisis did not prove quite as deep as initially feared. The
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fifth column reflects the actual size of upfront financing engaged in by governments.
Whereas governments guaranteed an average of almost a quarter of national income, the
actual amount of upfront financing provided averaged only around five percent of GDP,
albeit with substantial variation. For example, whereas the Australian government only
had to provide 0.7% of GDP in upfront financing, the British government, through its
purchases of financial institutions and liquidity provision spent one fifth of national
income on financial stabilization policies.
A second way of addressing governmental intervention in the financial sector is to
simply code in a binary fashion whether the government decided to intervene in particular areas. The OECD (2009) has created one such index of financial intervention,
with the following components: (a) whether deposit insurance was enhanced; (b) whether
the government bought debt from the financial sector; (c) whether the government
engaged in direct capital injection to shore up financial firms; (d) whether the
government nationalized any financial firms; (e) whether the government ring-fenced any
assets; (e) whether the government purchased any toxic assets; (f) whether the
government decided to fund commercial paper purchases; (g) whether the government
decided to fund the purchase of securities; and (h) whether the government decided to
restrict short-selling. Clearly some of these actions are attempts to shore up financial
firms, whereas others restrict the purchase or sale of various assets. Thus, ascertaining
exactly how friendly to the financial sector such policies are as difficult some financial
firms benefit from bans on short-selling, whereas others lose. Similarly some firms
benefit from capital injections, whereas others who do not receive them may consider
them to be unfair advantages. Generally, this index is thus best interpreted as measuring
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the level of aggregate government intervention in the financial sector for stabilization
purposes. Again there is substantial variation across the OECD in how interventionist
governments were. The United States engaged in all of these policies whereas the Czech
Republic only banned short-selling.
To what degree were variations in financial stabilization policies a function of
partisanship, both in terms of the IMF data on the size of intervention, and the OECD
data in terms of the range of policies used? In the previous section, I found that
partisanship only explained fiscal stimulus policy conditional on a countrys housing
profile. The logic behind this argument was that home ownership and house priceappreciation change the policy preferences of citizens and that political parties
aggregating these preferences will be responding partly to the shape of a countrys
housing market. As we move to financial stabilization policies, the question is whether
we expect this pattern to continue to hold.
There are two reasons to believe that the pattern might differ. First, the fiscal
dilemmas faced by states in 2009 were closely connected to domestic housing markets
countries like Spain, the USA, and the UK that had experienced large housing booms
suddenly found a major source of employment, consumption financing, and tax revenues
drying up leading to the need for fiscal responses, whether through tax cuts (on the
right) or spending (on the left). However, the threat to financial stability from collapsing
banks affected all countries, regardless of their housing markets, since the stability of
banks largely depended on rapid flows of international capital. German banks were no
more immune from this dilemma than were British banks.
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Second, the preferences of political parties over financial stabilization policies are
more opaque than over taxing and spending. Financial stabilization can both harm or help
banks depending on whether they chafe at the new regulations or are bailed out by them.
Similarly, the fiscal impact of stabilization measures does not have clear consequences
for the voting public. Higher income individuals pay higher taxes and bear accordingly
greater shares of the bailout cost. However, since they are also hold a larger share of the
nations wealth in terms of savings and assets, they are also the chief beneficiaries of
explicit and implicit guarantees to the stability of the financial system. Since interest
group and voter preferences are unclear, partisan attitudes towards financial stabilizationmight instead simply reflect different party preferences over state intervention read
broadly, with left-wing parties more supportive of government regulation and ownership
of the financial market than right-wing parties. Thus our expectations for the effects of
partisanship on financial stabilization differ from those on fiscal policy. The conditional
effect of partisanship and housing markets should be considerably less important and the
direct effect of partisanship is likely to be determined not by voter preferences per se but
by party preferences over state intervention.
Accordingly, I run two sets of analyses both with and without the housing
interaction. Unlike the case of discretionary stimuli we find that the effects of
partisanship appear only to operate directly on financial stabilization without an effect
conditional on the size of the housing boom. Although some caution should be exercised
since the sample sizes across the simple bivariate and the conditional analyses are quite
distinct, it appears broadly that partisanship has a non-conditional effect on financial
stabilization policies. In particular right-wing control of the cabinet has a negative impact
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on the OECD composite financial regulation indicator and on both liquidity provisioning
and (less robustly) upfront government financing. Interestingly, these effects, except that
for liquidity provisioning do not hold up if we use the left-wing government partisanship
variable. In other words, right-wing governments behave differently than either left-wing
or centrist governments as regards financial stabilization but left-wing governments are
not appreciably different from centrist and right-wing governments. In fact, it is centrist
governments that are most favorable to financial regulation, although this result is mostly
driven by the USA and thus depends partly on coding the Democratic Party as centrist
rather than left-wing. Broadly, the bivariate analysis shows that right-wing governmentswere least likely to engage in either financial regulation or upfront government financing.
The multivariate analysis on the other hand displays no robust pattern of partisanship
interacted with the size of housing booms. 13 Thus, whereas the size of discretionary
stimuli appeared to depend on the combination of partisanship and housing boom size, as
regards financial stabilization partisanship simply has a direct effect. It appears that right-
wing parties unconditionally chose a less interventionist strategy than did left-wing
parties.
5. Conclusion
The credit crisis produced a flurry of activist fiscal policy across the advanced
industrial world, the likes of which had not been seen for several decades. Although, the
decision to use stimuli and their timing were near-uniform across the OECD, there was in
fact significant variation in the size and composition of fiscal stimuliIn this paper, I have
13 Very similar results are obtained using the homeownership variables in place of the house priceappreciation variables.
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argued that the interactive effect of government partisanship and the relative size of
housing booms experienced by these countries in the pre-crisis fat years explains a good
deal of this variation among countries. And indeed, this interactive pattern actually
explains broad patterns in social spending across the OECD over the past three decades.
Put simply, the housing market has an enormous impact of citizens wealth and on
macroeconomic outcomes more generally. It is not surprising that political parties should
internalize this effect in their policymaking. In this paper I have shown that housing
cycles, through the medium of political partisanship, appear to have strong effects on
government spending policies, particularly on social spending. The fiscal stimulus bills ofthe last few years were no exception to this general pattern.
However, in examining the determinants of financial stabilization policies I found
that the effects of partisanship were unmediated. Right-wing parties, regardless of the
size of the housing boom, were less favorable to financial regulation, and provided both
less liquidity and less upfront financing to the financial system. This might appear
surprising for two reasons. First, the stability of countries financial sectors was deeply
linked to the prevalence of cheap credit and housing booms, hence it is surprising that
house booms appear unrelated to financial stabilization measures. Second, many financial
stabilization policies could be construed as favorable to the financial sector, raising the
question of why left-wing parties engaged in policies that benefited a sector more
traditionally associated with the right. The first puzzle can be answered by reference to
the high levels of interconnectedness between the financial systems of OECD countries
when American mortgage-holders sneezed, German banks caught a cold, even though
there was no German housing boom. The second puzzle is rather more opaque since the
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distributive effects of financial stabilization are mixed. Perhaps left-wing parties are
increasingly supported by (or more cynically, captured by) financial sectors, as in the UK
and the USA. More likely, the greater degree of intervention by left-wing governments is
a function of broader left-wing preferences for a larger role for government, even though
the beneficiaries of financial stabilization were not typical left-wing constituents.
Bringing both fiscal and regulatory issues together, the varied responses to the
credit crisis of 2008 present an important challenge to political economists. To this point
very little theoretical or empirical work has been conducted examining the impact of
housing, or asset ownership more generally, on political behavior.14
Thus, we lack alanguage to help understand how individuals and political parties will respond to business
cycle volatility produced by the asset market, as opposed to our traditional focus, the
goods market. This paper provides a bridge linking a set of general theories about asset
markets and public spending to the specific case of the credit crisis, finding a good deal
of explanatory leverage. An equally intriguing question is how governments will react to
an era of stagnant house prices, or perhaps a long bear market, if these events come to
pass. Will the old partisan patterns of the 1960s and 1970s re-emerge, or will ownership
continue to play a key political role in the next decade?
14 For important exceptions see Schwartz (2009), Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009); Canes-Wrone and Park(2009).
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Table One: Social Spending and Housing Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)POOLED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED
ALL ALL ALL LOW H.O. HIGH H.O.
Lagged DV 0.950*** 0.826*** 0.734*** 0.827***(0.018) (0.040) (0.091) (0.066)
House Price Change -0.028 -0.417 -0.352 -0.582 -0.417(0.214) (0.455) (0.218) (0.470) (0.559)
Cabinet Partisanship -0.003** -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Partisan*House Price -0.016*** -0.026*** -0.018** -0.014 -0.027**(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
GDP per capita -0.063** -0.620*** 0.084 -0.279 0.286*(0.027) (0.189) (0.092) (0.208) (0.145)
GDP growth -0.244*** -0.051* -0.225*** -0.103* -0.282***(0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.059) (0.039)
Population (ln) 0.027 0.548 2.560 -13.198 -0.113(0.068) (1.998) (3.524) (11.327) (3.933)
Unemployment -0.039** 0.190*** 0.020 0.017 0.016(0.015) (0.065) (0.044) (0.083) (0.074)
Real Interest rate 0.058*** 0.059** 0.071*** 0.155** 0.083**(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.061) (0.038)
Inflation -0.024 -0.049 -0.004 0.014 -0.012(0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.081) (0.049)
Trade -0.002 -0.032** -0.022* -0.048* -0.013(0.002) (0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017)
Population>65 0.066* -0.239 -0.010 0.010 0.281(0.035) (0.290) (0.061) (0.198) (0.269)
Homeownership -0.093* -0.105(0.049) (0.071)
Constant 22.539 -4.059*** -40.063 237.965 5.423(38.094) (0.628) (58.631) (190.090) (67.180)
Observations 281 280 281 107 124R-squared 0.993 0.589 0.914 0.910 0.943
Number of countries 18 18 18 7 8
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Table Two: Cyclical versus Discretionary Fiscal Deficits and GovernmentDebt (all figures as % of GDP)
Cyclical
Deficit 09 Stimulus
Other
Changes
Total Deficit
Change 2008 Debt
Addition to
Debt 09-10
Australia -3.37 -3.29 -5.64 -12.30 14.24 9.99Austria -4.85 -1.21 -3.08 -9.14 65.72 10.06Belgium -7.65 -1.41 1.18 -7.88 93.18 10.38Canada -3.55 -2.61 -4.46 -10.63 68.45 10.38Czech Rep. -6.13 -2.79 2.15 -6.77 34.84 9.59Denmark -6.87 -3.28 -3.14 -13.29 40.06 6.45Finland -6.80 -3.15 -2.47 -12.42 40.61 4.15France -4.81 -0.73 -2.03 -7.56 76.05 14.36Germany -6.46 -3.19 0.48 -9.18 68.99 9.43
Hungary -7.68 7.69 -1.45 -1.45 76.47 8.17Iceland -6.40 7.27 9.39 10.26 93.21 18.32Ireland -6.27 6.48 -8.41 -8.20 47.46 22.47Italy -5.74 0.01 0.34 -5.38 114.45 10.80Japan -4.15 -4.50 -1.53 -10.18 172.09 15.52Luxembourg -7.50 -3.85 -0.81 -12.16 12.66 7.02
Netherlands -5.59 -2.54 -4.88 -13.00 64.58 11.02 New Zealand -3.91 -3.05 -6.45 -13.41 25.51 7.64Poland -4.37 -1.17 -1.20 -6.73 54.09 14.52Portugal -4.58 -0.80 -1.71 -7.09 75.26 12.46Spain -5.63 -1.34 -3.34 -10.32 46.75 17.96Sweden -8.67 -3.34 -0.58 -12.59 47.43 7.54Switzerland -3.66 -0.51 -1.72 -5.88 45.62 3.88UK -5.11 -1.26 -8.75 -15.13 57.02 26.14United States -3.07 -2.05 -4.45 -9.57 71.11 21.42
Average -5.53 -1.03 -2.19 -8.75 62.75 12.07Standard Dev 1.54 3.37 3.71 5.15 33.83 5.76
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Table Three: Size and Composition of Fiscal Stimuli across the OECD
Net Change TaxChanges
IndividualTax
BusinessTax
Consump.Tax
Social Tax SpendingChanges
Govt.Consump.
Govt.Investment
Transfers toHouseholds
Transfers toBusiness
Transfers toSubnational
Australia -5.4 -1.3 -1.1 -0.2 0 0 4.1 0 3 1.1 0 0Austria -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.1 0 0 0.4 0 0.1 0.2 0 0.1Belgium -1.4 -0.3 0 -0.1 -0.1 0 1.1 0 0.1 0.5 0.5 0Canada -4.1 -2.4 -0.8 -0.3 -1.1 -0.1 1.7 0.1 1.3 0.3 0.1 ..Czech Rep -2.8 -2.5 0 -0.7 -0.4 -1.4 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0 0.2 0Denmark -3.3 -0.7 0 0 0 0 2.6 0.9 0.8 0.1 0 0Finland -3.2 -2.7 -1.9 0 -0.3 -0.4 0.5 0 0.3 0.1 0 0France -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0 0 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 0 0Germany -3.2 -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 0 -0.7 1.6 0 0.8 0.3 0.3 0Greece 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 -0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0Hungary 7.7 0.2 -0.6 -0.1 2.3 -1.5 -7.5 -3.2 0 -3.4 -0.4 -0.5Iceland 7.3 5.7 1 .. .. .. -1.6 .. .. .. .. ..Ireland 8.3 6 4.5 -0.2 0.5 1.2 -2.2 -1.8 -0.2 -0.1 0 0Italy 0 0.3 0 0 0.1 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.1 0Japan -4.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 4.2 0.2 1.2 0.6 1.5 0.6Korea -6.1 -2.8 -1.4 -1.1 -0.2 0 3.2 0 1.2 0.7 1 0.3Luxembourg -3.9 -2.3 -1.5 -0.8 0 0 1.6 0 0.4 1 0.2 0Mexico -1.7 -0.4 0 0 -0.4 0 1.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0 0
Netherlands -2.5 -1.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.8 0.9 0 0.5 0.1 0 0 New Zealand -3.7 -4.1 -4 0 0 0 -0.3 0.1 0.6 -0.6 0 0 Norway -1.2 -0.3 0 -0.3 0 0 0.9 0 0.4 0 0 0.3Poland -1.2 -0.4 0 -0.1 -0.2 0 0.8 0 1.3 0.2 0.1 0Portugal -0.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0.4 0 0.4 0Slovak Rep -1.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0 -0.1 0.7 0 0 0.1 0.6 0Spain -3.9 -1.7 -1.6 0 0 0 2.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.7 0Sweden -3.3 -1.7 -1.3 -0.2 0 -0.2 1.7 1.1 0.3 0.1 0 0.2Switzerland -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0Turkey -4.4 -1.5 -0.2 -1.1 -0.2 0 2.9 0.6 1.2 0 0.3 0.6UK -1.9 -1.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 0 0.4 0 0.4 0.2 0 0United States -5.6 -3.2 -2.4 -0.8 0 0 2.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0 0.9
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Table Four (a): Percentage of Cabinet from Right and Stimulus Policies
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D MODEL E MODEL FTAX TAX TAX
EX IRE SPENDING SPENDING SPENDING
EX IRE
Right Gov 0.012 0.030** 0.021** -0.009 0.011 0.015(0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
House Price Ch 0.839 0.556 0.961 1.094(0.740) (0.585) (1.200) (1.215)
Right*House Pr -0.041 -0.040** -0.046** -0.047**(0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Cyclical -0.301 -0.335 -0.195 0.201 0.163 0.097(0.288) (0.301) (0.185) (0.220) (0.211) (0.186)
Constant -3.266** -3.798** -2.923** 2.828* 2.226 1.814(1.493) (1.725) (1.117) (1.362) (1.395) (1.301)
Observations 17 17 16 17 17 16R-squared 0.117 0.189 0.328 0.107 0.275 0.298
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p
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Table Five(a) Right Wing Partisanship and Homeownership Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)VARIABLES Tax Tax Spend Spend Tax Tax Spend Spend
Right -0.102 -0.020 0.112* 0.086 0.023* 0.016* 0.017 0.020*(0.097) (0.107) (0.058) (0.070) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Ownership -0.000 0.017 0.041 0.036(0.038) (0.035) (0.029) (0.027)
Right*Own 0.002 0.000 -0.002* -0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Own*%5Yr 0.007 -0.000 0.017 0.020(0.011) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015)
Right*Own*5Yr -0.000 -0.001***
-0.001***
-0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cyclical -0.379 -0.320 0.192 0.174 -0.309 -0.105 0.177 0.094(0.441) (0.366) (0.244) (0.246) (0.364) (0.154) (0.246) (0.211)
Constant -3.161 -3.887 -0.132 0.094 -3.568 -2.374** 2.156 1.672(3.849) (3.280) (2.360) (2.188) (2.014) (1.029) (1.624) (1.486)
Observations 16 15 16 15 14 13 14 13R-squared 0.280 0.088 0.356 0.192 0.131 0.576 0.353 0.347
Table Five (b): Left Wing Partisanship and Homeownership Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Tax Tax Spend Spend Tax Tax Spend Spend
Left 0.152 0.017 -0.159* -0.115 -0.005 -0.007 -0.030 -0.029(0.147) (0.144) (0.088) (0.098) (0.015) (0.009) (0.021) (0.022)
Ownership 0.155 0.020 -0.131 -0.085(0.159) (0.160) (0.089) (0.103)
Left*Own -0.002 -0.000 0.002* 0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Own*%5Yr -0.021 -0.052*** -0.063*** -0.050**(0.043) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020)
Left*Own*5Yr 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Cyclical -0.563 -0.348 0.360 0.289 -0.317 -0.086 0.228 0.140
(0.464) (0.412) (0.303) (0.304) (0.355) (0.144) (0.262) (0.217)Constant -13.645 -4.660 11.256 8.262 -2.436 -1.290 4.057** 3.616**
(11.226) (11.263) (6.658) (7.426) (1.759) (0.836) (1.389) (1.263)
Observations 16 15 16 15 14 13 14 13R-squared 0.240 0.124 0.306 0.156 0.068 0.601 0.343 0.322
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Table Six (a): Composition of Stimuli and Right Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)IndivTax
BusTax
SocTax
ConsTax
GovCons
GovInv
TranHH
Tran Bus TranLoc
Right Gov 0.012 0.004** 0.006** -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.009* 0.002(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
House Price Ch -0.551 0.369 1.041*** -0.151 0.298 0.216 0.564 0.333 0.024(0.743) (0.241) (0.245) (0.259) (0.207) (0.694) (0.349) (0.561) (0.172)
Right*House -0.025 -0.005 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.015** -0.019* -0.006**(0.023) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003)
Cyclical -0.183 -0.039 0.039* -0.036 -0.067 0.164 0.019 -0.012 0.052(0.177) (0.040) (0.021) (0.054) (0.083) (0.132) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059)
Constant -1.780 -0.640** -0.409** -0.238 -0.311 1.575 0.338 -0.031 0.385(1.065) (0.290) (0.179) (0.293) (0.523) (0.948) (0.319) (0.346) (0.429)
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15R-squared 0.335 0.418 0.730 0.063 0.179 0.174 0.487 0.502 0.280
Table Six (b): Composition of Stimuli and Left Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)IndivTax
BusTax
SocTax
ConsTax
GovCons
GovInv
TranHH
Tran Bus TranLoc
Left Gov -0.005 -0.003 -0.007** 0.001 -0.009** 0.009 -0.003 -0.017** -0.009***(0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
House Price Ch -2.410 0.023 0.284** -0.094 -0.099 -0.089 -0.748 -1.522** -0.545***(1.555) (0.240) (0.112) (0.274) (0.281) (0.749) (0.427) (0.569) (0.115)
Left*House 0.020 0.006 0.012** -0.001 0.011* -0.004 0.015* 0.034** 0.013***(0.030) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.003)
Cyclical -0.184 -0.040 0.044* -0.037 -0.060 0.153 0.018 -0.010 0.065(0.173) (0.046) (0.023) (0.057) (0.073) (0.113) (0.054) (0.049) (0.053)
Constant -1.083 -0.386 0.025 -0.301 0.096 1.281 0.556* 0.780* 0.786*(0.820) (0.329) (0.135) (0.355) (0.390) (0.724) (0.266) (0.381) (0.361)
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15R-squared 0.305 0.170 0.596 0.051 0.298 0.286 0.390 0.605 0.511
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Table Seven: Financial Regulations and Government Support
CapitalInjection
TreasuryAsset Purchase
Guarantees Liquidity Upfront Govt.Financing
FinancialRegulation
Australia 0 0.7 8.8 . 0.7 3Austria 5.3 0 30.1 6.4 8.9 5Belgium 4.8 0 26.4 6.4 4.8 4Canada 0 10.9 13.5 1.5 10.9 4Czech Rep . . . . . 1Denmark . . . . 5Finland . . . . 5France 1.4 1.3 16.4 6.4 1.6 4Germany 3.8 0.4 18 6.4 3.7 5Greece 2.1 3.3 6.2 6.4 5.4 3Hungary 1.1 2.4 1.1 15.7 3.5 3Iceland . . . . . 4Ireland 5.9 0 198.1 6.4 5.9 5Italy 0.7 0 0 6.4 0.7 3Japan 2.4 21.2 7.3 2.9 0.8 5Korea 2.3 5.5 14.5 4.5 0.8 3Luxembourg . . . . . 3Mexico . . . . . 1
Netherlands 3.4 10.3 33.6 6.4 13.6 5 New Zealand . . . . . 2 Norway 2 15.8 0 14.7 15.8 3Poland 0 0 3.2 5.5 0 2Portugal 2.4 0 12 6.4 2.4 5Slovak Rep . . . . . 1Spain 0 3.9 18.3 6.4 3.9 4
Sweden 2.1 4.8 47.5 13.6 5.2 4Switzerland 1.1 0 0 25.5 1.1 5Turkey 0 0.3 0 3.1 0 0UK 3.9 13.8 49.7 14.4 20 8United States 5.2 1.3 10.9 8.4 6.7 9
Mean 2.27 4.36 23.44 8.28 5.29 3.80Standard Dev 1.90 6.12 41.62 5.56 5.47 1.92
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Table Eight: Partisanship and Financial Responses
Bivariate
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D MODEL E MODEL F
FinancialRegulation CapitalInjection TreasuryPurchase Guarantees Liquidity UpfrontFinancing
Right Shareof Cabinet
-0.018** -0.013 -0.001 0.090 -0.042** -0.052*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.031) (0.202) (0.019) (0.026)Constant 4.675*** 2.845*** 4.411** 19.408*** 10.264*** 7.637***
(0.568) (0.595) (1.836) (4.771) (1.488) (1.934)
Observations 30 22 22 22 21 22R-squared 0.156 0.090 0.000 0.009 0.114 0.180
Interactive
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D MODEL E MODEL FFinancial
RegulationCapital
InjectionTreasuryPurchase
Guarantees Liquidity UpfrontFinancing
Right Gov -0.003 -0.021** 0.091 0.005 -0.017 -0.084*(0.010) (0.009) (0.061) (0.200) (0.069) (0.046)
House Price Ch 0.245 -2.822 2.878 5.533 0.930 0.079(1.797) (2.026) (7.390) (17.673) (7.370) (9.538)
Right*House -0.026 0.036 -0.277* 0.777 -0.051 0.082(0.022) (0.033) (0.137) (0.757) (0.155) (0.130)Constant 5.165*** 3.773*** 4.742 17.229** 10.160** 8.627**
(0.658) (0.531) (3.653) (7.229) (3.282) (3.637)
Observations 18 15 15 15 14 15R-squared 0.185 0.104 0.272 0.117 0.064 0.199
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Figure One: Estimated Effects of House Price Changes on Total Social Spending
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Figure Two (a): The Marginal Effects of House Booms on Discretionary Taxes atVarying Levels of Right Wing Government
Figure Two (b): The Marginal Effects of House Booms on Discretionary Spending atVarying Levels of Right Wing Government
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Figure Three (a): The Marginal Effects of House Booms on Discretionary Taxes atVarying Levels of Left Wing Government
Figure Three (b): The Marginal Effects of House Booms on Discretionary Spendingat Varying Levels of Left Wing Government
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Figure Four: Homeownership Rates and House Price Booms