Antecedents of two-way symmetry in classicalGreek rhetoric: the rhetoric of Isocrates
Charles Marsh∗
William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Kansas,1435 Jayhawk Boulevaed, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA
Received 30 August 2002; received in revised form 14 February 2003; accepted 1 March 2003
Abstract
As rhetorical approaches to studying public relations have gained stature, two incomplete visions ofrhetoric affect their progress. The first is the notion that rhetoric, particularly classical rhetoric, was es-sentially asymmetrical, thus offering little to the greater understanding and furtherance of two-way sym-metry. The second misconception adopts virtually the opposite point of view, maintaining that rhetorictraditionally has been a comprehensive dialectical process—a civic-minded dialogue—that nobly seeksthe best for society. Such an approach overlooks important early struggles between asymmetrical andsymmetrical rhetorics.
If all writing about the past is partly an effort to understand the present, a confusing andcontradictory present would seem to call more insistently for historical analysis and explanation.This is particularly true for the profession and academic discipline of public relations.1
352 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
[Some] theorists accept public relations as a legitimate profession but have maintained thatsymmetrical public relations is a utopian ideal that cannot be practiced in reality.2
–James Grunig
1. Introduction
To say that public relations has important antecedents in classical Greek rhetoric is bothroutine and ambiguous. Public relations historian Scott Cutlip asserts that “persuasive com-munication is as old as Plato’sRepublic.” 3 L. Grunig writes that Aristotle is “often consideredthe first public relations practitioner.”4 Collegiate public relations textbooks generally note therole of classical Greek rhetoric in the evolution of public relations.5
However, Toth, among others, calls attention to the obscurity of the posited link betweenclassical Greek rhetoric and modern public relations: If we maintain that such a link exists, howare we defining bothrhetoricandpublic relations?6 In short, whose—and which—rhetoric dowe mean? And what do we mean bypublic relations? Pearson urged us to clarify the “confusingand contradictory present” of public relations by analyzing and explaining the past. This articlewill analyze four separate strands of classical Greek rhetoric in hopes of discovering andexamining successful antecedents of two-way symmetrical public relations.
2. Definition of terms
Classical Greek rhetoric is a catch-all phrase for the burgeoning analysis of persuasion thatbegan with Corax of Syracuse in the fifth century B.C. and flourished in Athens a century later,particularly in the rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates. Because early Greek rhetoriciansquarreled, often bitterly, among themselves regarding the definition of their art or craft,7 thisarticle will define classical rhetoric broadly. In the words of Corbett, it is “the art or the disciplinethat deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade or motivatean audience, whether that audience is made up of one person or a group of persons.”8
As for defining public relations, professors and their students are familiar with Harlow’scompilation of almost 500 definitions of the profession.9 For the present purpose, this articlefocuses on two-way symmetrical public relations, as defined by J. Grunig and White:“Two-waysymmetricaldescribes a model of public relations that is based on research and that usescommunication to manage conflict and improve understanding with strategic publics. . . . Withthe symmetrical model, both the organization and publics can be persuaded; both also maychange their behavior.”10 Boundary spanning, implicit in two-way symmetry, is the functionof representing the values of an organization to a public, and conversely, representing thatpublic’s values to the organization.11
3. Statement of purpose
This article’s purpose, or central questions, can now be stated more clearly:
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 353
• Can we better understand and assess the viability of two-way symmetrical public relationsby finding theoretical foundations and successful antecedents for it among the diverserhetorics of classical Greece?
• If we find antecedents of two-way symmetrical public relations in classical Greek rhetoric,might those antecedents suggest additional areas for study?
4. Literature review
Three trends in rhetorical approaches to public relations seem relevant to this study: atendency to see rhetoric as a monolithic, homogeneous tradition; a focus more on modernthan ancient rhetoricians and rhetorical scholars; and an acknowledgment that much researchremains to be done in exploring productive connections between rhetoric and public relations.
Paradoxically, the monolithic theory encompasses two opposing views of rhetoric: Oneview contends that rhetoric is essentially asymmetrical; the other contends that rhetoric is es-sentially symmetrical. Asserting that classical rhetoric was asymmetrical, Cheney and Tomp-kins hold that the relatively modern contributions of Habermas and Burke “counterbalancethe sender orientation of traditional rhetoric.”12 In “Two-Way Symmetrical Public Relations:Past, Present, and Future,” J. Grunig lists scholars who view rhetoric as asymmetrical.13 Ch-eney and Christensen would even place Grunig himself on such a list: “J. Grunig’s essay[“Two-Way Symmetrical Public Relations: Past, Present, and Future,”], like several of the pre-vious writings of his colleagues, features a conception of rhetoric as being largely one-way,strategic, and noninteractive. Thus, Grunig uses rhetoric as a foil against which a more two-way,understanding-based, and dialogic model (the two-way symmetrical ideal) can be assessed.”14
However, Grunig himself writes, “Persuasion still is a relevant concept in the symmetricalmodel . . . . The public relations professional sometimes must persuade management and atother times must persuade a public.”15
Heath opposes an asymmetrical assessment of rhetoric, positing instead an altruisticallysymmetrical “rhetorical tradition.” He contends that rather than being a one-way process ofgaining compliance, rhetoric actually is a “rhetoricaldialogue” (emphasis added). Rhetoricis “a tradition devoted to understanding how society is helped through an open and vigorouscontest of ideas. . . . A rhetorical view presumes that, in terms of their right to speak, all partiesare symmetrical.”16
This view of rhetoric seems closer to Platonic dialectic than any form of rhetoric envisioned infourth century B.C. Athens. Indeed, Heath quotes Burke’s definition that “rhetoric is. . . madefrom fragments of dialectic.”17 However, in the same essay, Heath asserts that the rhetoricalparts can be the same as the dialectical whole: “Rhetoric as a social force and process is adialectic.”18 Cheney and Christensen believe that Heath’s socially responsible rhetoric mayintrude too far into dialectic: “It might be that Heath leaves too little outside of the domain ofrhetoric (to invoke an image of Venn diagrams).”19 Toth sees Heath’s work as representative ofwhat she terms the “dialogical” perspective of rhetoric. She adds, however, that Heath “has beensensitive in his writings to the ‘sender-oriented’ notions which suggested that rhetoric was one-way and manipulative.”20 Heath himself notes that “manipulation and deception are two optionsof the use of rhetoric,” and he observes that the “rhetorical tradition” can be “perplexing.”21
354 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
This article contends that both monolithic views are incomplete, that the rhetoric of classicalGreece—the beginning of the so-called rhetorical tradition—was neither essentially symmet-rical nor asymmetrical. Rather, the modern struggle between symmetrical and asymmetricaltheories of communication began in earnest in the fourth century B.C. In her year 2000 assess-ment of rhetorical approaches to public relations, Toth invokes the arguments of Blair, whochallenges all monolithic theories that downplay the combative diversity of two millennia ofrhetorics: “Blair cautioned against the notion of historical ‘systems’ of rhetorical theory. . . . Iattempt to expose more than just the predominant rhetorical theories, but particular views ofrhetoric and public relations.”22 Even earlier, Miller had surveyed the multiplicity of classicalrhetorics and concluded, “We can start by admitting that the rhetorical tradition is a fiction,and a rather strained one at that.”23
A second trend in rhetorical approaches to public relations is the predominant focus on mod-ern theorists, primarily Kenneth Burke, rather than classical theorists such as Plato, Aristotle,and Isocrates. In the index of Toth and Heath’s 1992Rhetorical and Critical Approaches toPublic Relations, Aristotle and Isocrates together merit seven entries; Plato has none. Burkealone has 27. In Heath’s “A Rhetorical Enactment Rationale for Public Relations,” Burke ismentioned by name more than Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates combined. In Toth’s year 2000“analysis of fifteen years of research” of the relationship between rhetoric and public relations,she notes Burke’s influence on Heath, Tompkins, Cheney, and Peterson; she also presents other20th century rhetorical theorists, including Weick and Foucault, as influences on modern schol-ars. However, in modern scholarship she notes no traces of the influence of Plato, Aristotle, orIsocrates, other than Heath’s consideration of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric.24
Toth is also instrumental in voicing a third trend in rhetorical studies: a call for addi-tional research into the relationship between rhetoric and public relations. In 1992, she wrote,“Rhetorical and critical scholars must at least define what they mean by rhetoric and publicrelations; and, at best argue how their findings contribute to our theoretical understanding ofthe domain.” However, eight years later, she lamented, “Rhetorical studies of public relationsmay have reached their greatest concentration in the early 1990s.”25 Cheney and Christensenwrite, “We see public relations as a contested disciplinary and interdisciplinary terrain. . . . Avibrant discipline, we believe, needs to pursue a vision—or visions—of what it ought to be.”They list “rhetorical studies” as one vision that merits additional research.26
This article views two-way symmetry as an existing, normative model for public rela-tions. Since IABC’s Excellence study, J. Grunig has contended—not without challenges—thatthe two-way symmetrical model “provides the normative ideal for public relations in mostsituations.”27 The 1998 work of Deatherage and Hazleton presents additional evidence thatthe two-way symmetrical model does indeed exist and is “a significant predictor of perceivedpublic relations effectiveness.”28
5. Four strains of classical Greek rhetoric
As we seek successful antecedents of two-way symmetry in classical Greek rhetoric, oneof the first questions we must address is which strain of classical Greek rhetoric we mean.At least four distinct and definitely competing strains of Greek rhetoric existed in the fourth
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 355
century B.C.: the rhetoric of the sophists; the rhetoric of Plato; the rhetoric of Aristotle; andthe rhetoric of Isocrates.
5.1. The rhetoric of the sophists
This is easily the most nebulous and contested of the four categories. Sophistic rhetoricemphasized word-smithing—crafting aesthetically pleasing language—as much as it did per-suasion. Important rhetoricians classified as sophists include Protagoras, 486–410 B.C.; Gor-gias, 490–380 B.C.; Antiphon, 470–411 B.C.; and Lysias, 458–380 B.C.29—but even Socrates,who disparaged the sophists in hisGorgias, and Isocrates, who did the same inAgainst theSophists—are sometimes called sophists. J. Poulakos maintains that unifying elements of so-phistic rhetoric include, in addition to highly stylized language, a focus on being prepared tosay the right thing at the right time.30
However, the sophists differ on important points. For example, if we are to believe Plato/Socrates, Gorgias saw rhetoric as morally neutral while Protagoras saw it as a force that heldsociety together and created virtuous citizens.31 Schiappa concludes, “I strongly suspect thatthe label sophistic-anythingmay be more misleading than useful. The attributes one findscommon to all or most of the standard lists of sophists are also common to many other thinkersof the fifth century.”32
Even if we could identify a set of common elements in sophistic rhetoric, a stylish “thereadiness is all,” to borrow from Hamlet, hardly provides a successful theoretical antecedentfor two-way symmetry as opposed to other models of public relations. Sophistic rhetoric is nota direct antecedent of two-way symmetry.
5.2. The rhetoric of Plato
If we were to examine only theGorgias, Plato’s first major commentary on rhetoric, wewould be foolish to speak of a Platonic rhetoric because, in that dialogue, Socrates savages theso-called art of persuasion. Rhetoric is not an art at all, he says; rather, it is a mere technique,like cookery or, worse, just a form of flattery. It is, he says, “some device of persuasion whichwill make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who know.”33
Yet Plato (427–347 B.C.) later wrote thePhaedrus, in which Socrates grudgingly toleratesa limited form of rhetoric: In thePhaedrus—as well as in theRepublic, theStatesman, theLaws, and even, passingly, in theGorgias—Plato tells us that rhetoric is to be used only byphilosophers who have discovered ultimate truths, which predate the world’s creation, to leadthe uninformed toward those truths.34 Plato thus relegates the art of persuasion to those whoare certain they are right, who enter a relationship firmly believing that they must change othersand remain unchanged themselves.
Discovering the absolute, unchanging truth of any situation is a severe challenge to thePlatonic rhetorician—yet, according to Plato, this is the inviolate prerequisite of legitimatepersuasive discourse. Tellingly, Socrates, in consultation with Callicles in theGorgias, canname no rhetorician past or present capable of discovering such truths and then “speaking. . . with the single aim of making citizens as good as possible.”35 Jaeger declares that suchimpossible perfection in a rhetorician is “repulsive to ordinary common sense.”36
356 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
Even if such perfection in truth-seeking were possible, the breathtaking asymmetry ofPlatonic rhetoric has prompted ringing condemnations. Platonic rhetoric, writes Kennedy,is “responsible for much of the dogmatism, intolerance, and ideological oppression that hascharacterized Western history.”37 Platonic rhetoric is not altruistically dialogic: Yoos writesthat Platonic rhetoric “cannot function in negotiations and compromise.” Jaeger calls Platonicrhetoric “uncompromising.” Black notes that it deviates into “social control.” Kauffman findsPlatonic rhetoric “totalitarian and repressive.”38
Given the sweeping asymmetry of Platonic rhetoric—not to mention the admirable butseemingly impossible demand of determining the ultimate, pre-ordained truth of virtuallyevery topic we address—we cannot consider Platonic rhetoric to be an antecedent of moderntwo-way symmetrical public relations.
5.3. The rhetoric of Aristotle
Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) is probably the best-known of the classical Greek rhetoricians, due,in large part, to the survival of hisRhetoric, an analysis of the art of persuasion—a so-calledmetarhetoric. None of the other four schools of rhetoric examined in this article left such awork. The sophists, of course, did not collaborate upon a metarhetoric. No record exists ofPlato even contemplating such a work. Isocrates may have written one—historians of rhetoricdisagree—but if the work ever existed, it is lost, seemingly beyond recall.39
With his definition of rhetoric—“The faculty of observing in any given case the availablemeans of persuasion”40—Aristotle diverges from the rhetoric of Plato, his teacher: Rhetoricneed not flow from and lead others to a precise knowledge of ultimate truth; instead, it canbe applied to “any given case.” Repressive as Plato’s morality may be, it is a morality—afoundation lacking in Aristotelian rhetoric. “[Plato] did not reject the attempt to suffuse aninvestigation of rhetoric with a moral concern,” writes Black. “It is on this very point that hisgreat disciple departed from him.”41
Aristotle’s departure from his teacher does not, however, mean that he proposes an immoralrhetoric;amoralmight be a better description. Kennedy compares Aristotle’sRhetoricto thatphilosopher-scientist’s “dispassionate” analyses of plants and animals.42 Indeed, Black con-cludes that Aristotle “affirmed the moral neutrality of rhetoric.”43 Early in theRhetoric, Aristo-tle does assert “We must not make people believe what is wrong”—but he later discusses how togenerate a “misleading inference” and how to interpret an ambiguous law either for “justice orutility.” 44 Wardy compiles what he terms Aristotle’s “catalogue of fishy persuasive techniques”in theRhetoricand theTopicsand concludes that Aristotle “subordinates truth to victory.”45
One element of Aristotle’s moral neutrality is his treatment ofethos, a persuasive appealbased on the speaker’s character. Though noting thatethos“may almost be called the mosteffective means of persuasion,” Aristotle recommends only the appearance, not necessarily thereality, of a noble character: “It adds much to an orator’s influence that his own character shouldlook right and that heshould be thoughtto entertain the right feelings” (emphasis added).46
The true character of the speaker seems incidental; rather, in the words of Aristotle, “this kindof persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what peoplethink of his character before he begins to speak.”47 Appearances are indeed important, but intheRhetoric, Aristotle does not analyze the importance of the corresponding reality.
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 357
We should note again that Aristotle, in hisRhetoric, is not aggressively or even tacitlyimmoral; he is, instead, in the words of Corbett, “morally indifferent.”48 Yoos neatly sums upthe asymmetry inherent in such indifference:
In defining rhetoric as the art of finding all the available means of persuasion, Aristotle mustrecommend selecting, compiling, and arranging arguments to gain maximum persuasive ad-vantage. Such strategies to gain the prize need to hide the weakness of one’s own position.They need to divert an audience’s attention away from the strength of an opponent’s argument. . . . And finally they need to put the audience in a receptive form of mind that will lull their‘natural reason.’49
Aristotle’s focus on what will persuade, as opposed to what is in the best interests of boththe speaker and the listener, renders his rhetoric—and hisRhetoric—asymmetrical.
We can, for the most part, easily dispense with the sophists, but Plato and, to a larger degree,Aristotle have shaped our modern views of classical rhetoric.50 In these two wellsprings, how-ever, we find no basis for two-way symmetrical public relations; instead, we find only asymme-try of different natures. Is there not, we might ask, a midpoint between the moral tyranny of Platoand the moral neutrality of Aristotle? In doing so, we address the issue that, says Jaeger, con-fronted Isocrates, a contemporary of Plato and Aristotle: “The essential was to find a mean, as itwere, between the moral indifference which had previously characterized rhetorical education,and the Platonic resolution of all politics into morality.”51 This article contends that Isocratesdeveloped that mean, creating a powerful and successful antecedent of two-way symmetry.
6. The rhetoric of Isocrates: an overview
Isocrates was born in Athens in 436 B.C. His father was a financially successful flute-maker,but the family fortune suffered during the Peloponnesian War. To regroup financially, Isocratesbecame a logographer—a writer of judicial speeches for Athenian litigants—and then openeda school that became, in the words of Corbett, “the true fountainhead of humanistic rhetoric.”52
He was the contemporary of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, being born 37 years before Socrates’death, nine years before the birth of Plato and 52 years before the birth of Aristotle. He died in338 B.C. at the age of 98, shortly after writing a major discourse (Panathenaicus) and a letterto Philip of Macedonia. Some 30 of Isocrates’ discourses and letters survive.
This article contends that antecedents of two-way symmetry lie in Isocrates’ discourses andletters, primarily in his theories of invention—that is, his theories of discovering and framingthe arguments the rhetorician will make. As we shall see, those arguments are almost unfailinglysymmetrical. In thePanathenaicus, Isocrates praises Agamemnon’s ability to hold togethercompeting elements of the Greek army by “being better advised in the interest of others thanothers in their own interest.”53 And in thePanegyricus, Isocrates praises past leaders of Athensfor not abusing such extensive knowledge of others’ interests: “They exulted less in the exerciseof power than they gloried in living with self-control, thinking it their duty to feel toward theweaker as they expected the stronger to feel toward themselves.”54
Before examining this two-way symmetry in greater detail, this article will make one morepoint about Isocratean invention: It is the outcome of a rigorous system of explicitly moral
358 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
education designed for, as Isocrates says in thePanegyricus, students willing to train “their ownminds so as to be able to help also their fellow men.”55 Isocrates “preached that the whole manmust be brought to bear in the persuasive process,” says Corbett, “and so it behooved the aspiringorator to be broadly trained in the liberal arts and securely grounded in good moral habits.”56
Even from this brief overview of Isocratean rhetoric, we can anticipate substantial differencesfrom the Platonic and Aristotelian rhetorics. Unlike Plato, Isocrates did not believe that humanscould discover ultimate truths that preceded human existence. In theAntidosis, he declares, “Forsince it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can knowpositively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wisewho is able by his own powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course.”57 Benoitconcludes, “The contrast between Isocrates’ pragmatism and Plato’s idealism is quite sharp.”58
Isocrates’ rejection of Platonic searches for ultimate truth frees him to be more symmetricalin his rhetoric. Whereas Plato could brook no dissent because counter-arguments opposed abso-lute truth, Isocrates can, and consistently does, consider the differing needs and interests of hisaudiences. As he says in his letterTo the Children of Jason, “I myself should be ashamed if, whileoffering counsel to others, I should be negligent of their interests and look to my own advan-tage.”59 As we study more of Isocratean symmetry below, we also shall find evidence of hiswillingness to engage in boundary spanning and to change, qualities alien to Platonic rhetoric.
Significant moral differences also separate the rhetorics of Isocrates and Aristotle. Forexample, Aristotle discussesethosonly as it resides in the character projected by the speakerduring the speech. In Isocratean rhetoric, however,ethosis inseparable from the entire life ofthe speaker. In theAntidosis, Isocrates writes:
The man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no,on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honourable name among hisfellow citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by menof good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument whichis made by a man’s life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words? Therefore,the stronger a man’s desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to behonourable and to have the esteem of his fellow citizens.60
Near the end of his life, Isocrates wrote in thePanathenaicusthat, when considering hisstudents, he took more pleasure in those “who are distinguished for the character of their livesand deeds than in those who are reputed to be able speakers.”61 This is not the remark of anAristotelian rhetorician, who sees rhetoric as observing the means of persuasion inanygivencase and who considers stooping to chicanery to win a point.
Isocratean rhetoric clearly is not Platonic, nor is it Aristotelian. What, then, is it? The nextportion of this article will focus on four distinct elements of Isocratean rhetoric: its quest forsymmetry and the common good; its incorporation of boundary spanning; its moral foundation;and its ties to a comprehensive system of education.
6.1. The quest for symmetry and the common good
In the Athens of Isocrates, rhetoric was “largely concerned with the language of civil life, par-ticularly the law courts.”62 As a tool of litigation, rhetoric was, of course, asymmetrical, an art
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 359
used in the zero-sum game of judicial proceedings. Despite—or perhaps because of—his earlyyears as a logographer, Isocrates strove to move rhetoric from an adversarial to a relationship-building stance. T. Poulakos says, “He changed the art of rhetoric from the way it was whenhe inherited it. The version of rhetoric he left behind is, unequivocally, a rhetoric for the polis[community]. . . . He mobilized his version of rhetoric in order to advocate courses of action thatsafeguarded the interests of the citizens and promoted the general welfare of the city-state.”63
In Against the Sophists, Isocrates attacks teachers of judicial rhetoric, saying, “These mustnot be dismissed without rebuke, since they professed to teach how to conduct law-suits, pick-ing out the most discredited of terms which the enemies, not the champions, of [rhetoric] mighthave been expected to employ. . . . [They are] nothing more than professors of meddlesomenessand greed.”64
As T. Poulakos notes, Isocrates did more than attack asymmetrical judicial rhetoric. Inits place, he advocated a symmetrical, community-building rhetoric. InOn the Peace, forexample, he tells his audience, “You ought to be as much concerned about the business of thecommonwealth as about your own.”65 Isocrates worked to move rhetoric from asymmetry tosymmetry by, in the words of Heilbrunn, “jettisoning that part of the rhetorical cargo which ismost associated with improper use and most disreputable, the rhetoric of the lawcourts.”66
In moving the art of discourse from an adversarial to a community-building stance, Isocrateanrhetoric can be seen as an antecedent of the communitarian influence in modern public relations,which Culbertson and Chen link to two-way symmetry.67 In Public Relations and Community: AReconstructed Theory, Kruckeberg and Starck advocate a communitarian foundation for publicrelations but maintain that the profession currently lacks that basis: “Modern public relations—which often justifies its role and function, in part, because of the deficiencies of contemporarysociety—does not address itself specifically to the problem of restoration and maintenance ofcommunity.”68 In discussing the same lack in the rhetoric he inherited, Isocrates in theAntidosishighlights the irony of asymmetrical rhetoric, noting that rhetoric—the power of persuasivespeech, orlogos—originally allowed humans to come together to form communities: “Becausethere has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to eachother whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have cometogether and founded cities and made laws and invented arts.”69
Of Isocrates’ push of rhetoric toward symmetry and community building, Jaeger says, “Thusconceived, rhetoric is raised high above the level on which earlier experts treated it. . . . Isocrateshas deliberately shifted the emphasis from style and form to the content of the ‘advice’ whichthe orator imparts.”70
Like two-way symmetrical public relations, Isocratean rhetoric incorporates the rhetorician’swillingness to change. Anticipating what we now call boundary spanning (discussed in greaterdetail below), Isocrates inTo Nicoclestells the new ruler of Cyprus, “Regard as your mostfaithful friends, not those who praise everything you say or do, but those who criticize yourmistakes.”71
Throughout his works, Isocrates also stresses the disastrous consequences of asymmetry. InOn the Peace, he says, “Anyone can see that those who have been in the strongest positionsto do whatever they pleased have been involved in the greatest disasters, ourselves and theLacedaemonians first of all. . . . Arrogance and insolence have been the cause of our misfor-tunes while sobriety and self-control have been the source of our blessings.”72 As Machiavelli
360 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
did later, Isocrates notes that asymmetrical attempts at dominance can force individuals andorganizations to depend on unreliable allies: “Those who seek to rule their fellow citizens byforce are themselves the slaves of others, and. . . those who keep the lives of their fellowcitizens in peril themselves live in extreme fear.”73
In superseding the asymmetrical rhetoric of the judicial system, Isocratean rhetoric soughtto strengthen the relationships that build communities, even if that meant that Athens had toconsider changing its policies. Isocratean rhetoric is symmetrical rhetoric.
6.2. Incorporation of boundary spanning
Two-way symmetrical public relations requires, of course, that practitioners engage inboundary spanning.74 The implication is that practitioners must communicate across the bound-aries separating their organization from publics important to that organization’s success. Per-haps the greatest challenge of boundary spanning is the practitioner’s duty to report unwelcomenews to the organization and to advocate change, to risk being seen as an outsider—yet Isocratesseemingly relished this challenge. Throughout his discourses, he rarely bypasses an opportu-nity to spotlight his self-appointed boundary status: To the children of Jason, a former ruler ofPherae, he writes, “I should be ashamed if I should be thought by any either to be neglectful ofyou on account of my city, or on your account to be indifferent to the interests of Athens.”75
Often, he advocates Greek unity—Panhellenism—to skeptical Athenian audiences who, ac-cording to Isocrates, are reluctant to adopt the symmetrical changes that unity would require.76
As Isocrates confessed to Philip, his pursuit of Greek unity often led him to criticize his owncity-state: “I have not been accustomed to flatter [Athens] in my discourses; on the contrary,more than anyone else I have censured her.”77 In On the Peace, Isocrates concisely describes hisboundary spanning as a composer of Panhellenic political discourses: “It is, therefore, my dutyand the duty of all who care about the welfare of the state to choose, not those discourses whichare agreeable to you, but those which are profitable for you to hear.”78 Recognizing Isocrates’boundary spanning, Heilbrunn declares, “Isocrates addresses Philip not as an Athenian, but asa non- or trans-political man.”79
Heilbrunn’s comment illustrates the familiar danger of boundary spanning: Did Isocratesprize Greek unity more than his loyalty to Athens? His answer in theAntidosisis a firm no:“I . . . endeavor to persuade the whole state to pursue a policy from which the Athenians willbecome prosperous themselves, and at the same time deliver the rest of the Hellenes fromtheir present ills.”80 Yet Isocrates understands of the dangers of boundary spanning: “I am wellaware, however, that it is instinctive with most persons when admonished not to look to thebenefits they receive but, on the contrary, to listen to what is said with the greater displeasurein proportion to the rigour with which their critic passes their faults in review.”81
Without using the precise termboundary spanning, scholars of Greek rhetoric have longrecognized Isocrates’ complex role in building better relationships among the Greek city-states.“He represented a higher interest than that of any separate state,” says Jaeger.82 More accurately,Norlin notes that Isocrates represented twined interests: “Love of Athens is the one passion ofhis dispassionate nature; and second only to this is his love of Hellas. Or rather, both of thesefeelings are blended into a single passion—a worship of Hellenism as a way of life, a savingreligion of which he conceives Athens to be the central shrine.”83
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 361
6.3. The moral foundation of Isocratean rhetoric
As noted earlier, Isocrates sought a midpoint between the moral tyranny of Platonic rhetoricand the moral neutrality of Aristotelian rhetoric. In creating symmetrical rhetoric, Isocratesachieved that midground. “What raises Isocrates above the crowd of unscrupulous teachers ofrhetoric,” writes Rummel, “is his willingness to assume moral responsibility and to considerthe ethics of persuasion.”84
Increasingly, public relations—particularly symmetrical public relations—has embracedmorality and idealism as foundations for ethics codes.85 In IABC’s Excellence study, the authorspresent “the idealistic social role” of public relations as the basis for two-way symmetry; infact, the normative theory of ethical public relations supported by the book explicitly invokesthe “moral imperatives” that Pearson derived from Habermas.86 Isocrates’ focus on “moralresponsibility and. . . the ethics of persuasion” is clearly consistent with two-way symmetricalpublic relations.
We have already seen something of Isocrates’ moral focus in his definition ofethos, partic-ularly when contrasted its Aristotelian counterpart. Just as significant, however, is his beliefthat moral rhetoric actually ennobles rhetoricians, improving their character. In theAntido-sis, for example, he writes, “But I believe that people can become better and worthier if theyconceive an ambition to speak well. . . . [The rhetorician] will select from all the actions ofmen which bear upon his subject those examples which are the most illustrious and the mostedifying; and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, he will feeltheir influence not only in the preparation of a given discourse but in all the actions of hislife.” 87
Kennedy writes that “peculiar to Isocrates, perhaps, is the insistence upon moral conscious-ness as actually growing out of the process of rhetorical composition.”88But for public relations,Corbett notes the most telling aspect of Isocrates’ moral focus: “[Isocrates’] position is a farcry from the suspicion harbored by many people down through the ages that rhetoric is apotentially corrupting influence because it can invest a speaker with insidious power over anaudience.”89 Rather, Isocrates intended rhetoric to work as powerfully and beneficially on therhetorician as it did on the audience.
Of the moral focus of Isocratean rhetoric, Norlin writes, “Isocrates prides himself more uponthe sound moral influence of his work and teaching than upon any other thing.”90 Isocrateswould concur with the IABC Excellence study that “excellent public relations practice. . .
generally will be symmetrical and idealistic.”91
6.4. Isocratean rhetoric and education
Isocrates strove to develop moral, symmetrical rhetoric through a comprehensive systemof moral, liberal education. Summarizing Isocrates’ educational philosophy, Jaeger writes,“[Isocrates believed] it is possible for the whole nature to be changed and gradually and invol-untarily improved by concentration on an object worthy of study. And it is rhetorical educationwhich can bring that about.”92 Isocrates’ educational system is, in fact, his most enduringlegacy. “[Isocrates] helped make rhetoric a central subject of the educational system of theGreek and Roman world and thus of many later centuries as well,” says Kennedy.93 And
362 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
Jaeger is even more emphatic: “There is no doubt that since the Renaissance [Isocrates] hasexercised a far greater influence on the educational methods of humanism than any other Greekor Roman teacher.”94
Isocrates’ embrace of symmetrical rhetoric colors his theories of education. Johnson notesthat, unlike almost all other teachers of rhetoric, Isocrates encouraged two-way communicationwith students, encouraging them to criticize his own efforts, not just vice versa.95 Indeed, thegoal of his educational theories, as announced in thePanegyricus, is to produce individualswho have “toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able tohelp also their fellow-men.”96 Jaeger writes that Isocratean education strove to unite the var-ious elements of Greek society through conflict resolution: “Isocrates assumes that all highereducation of the intellect depends on cultivating our ability to understand one another. . . . Itis concerned with the forces which hold society together.”97
Isocrates’ symmetrical, moral, liberal approach to a rhetorical education triumphed overschools that, today, are better known—those of Plato and Aristotle in particular. AsJaeger notes, Isocrates has had greater impact on the centuries of higher education thaneither of those better-known Athenians. In the dramatic words of Cicero himself, “Then be-hold Isocrates arose, from whose school, as from the Trojan horse, none but real heroes pro-ceeded.”98
7. Conclusions
Isocratean rhetoric—with its quest for symmetry and the common good; its incorporationof boundary spanning; its moral foundation; and its ties to a moral, comprehensive system ofeducation—is a substantial antecedent of modern two-way symmetrical public relations. Ofequal significance is the fact that Isocrates proved the merits of symmetry in a contentious,litigious society similar to our own:
• To inculcate his unique vision of symmetrical rhetoric, Isocrates established a compre-hensive system of instruction that, because of its effectiveness, shaped higher educationfor thousands of years.
• Isocrates’ school—not Plato’s or Aristotle’s—produced the next generation’s leadingrhetoricians.99 “Isocrates was the most influential Greek rhetorician among his contem-poraries,” Corbett concludes.100
• As Jaeger says, Isocrates’ symmetrical efforts to unify the warring city-states of Greeceultimately prevailed: “The new era actually did fall into the forms which Isocrates hadthought out before its advent. Without [Isocrates’ ideas]. . . there would have been noMacedonian-Greek world empire, and the universal culture which we call Hellenisticwould never have existed.”101
To summarize, Isocrates’ life, works, and legacy powerfully argue for the success of sym-metry. An equally important conclusion for this article is to list areas for additional study thatmight, in the words of Toth, “contribute to our theoretical understanding of the domain.”102
Besides more comprehensive studies of Isocrates’ theory of symmetry, those additional areasmight include:
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 363
• A study of the use ofethosamong the students of Isocrates and Aristotle. Can the greatersuccess of Isocrates’ students be attributed, in part, to their broader understanding ofethos?
• A study of extending Isocrates’ theory of ennobling rhetoric to public relations. Doesethical behavior—and do models of ethical behavior—strengthen the ambition and abilityof practitioners to act ethically in the future?
• A study of Isocrates’ role in the union of the Greek city-states under Philip and thenAlexander. How—and how much—did Isocrates, with his boundary spanning, contributeto the fruition of Panhellenism?
• A study of Isocrates and communitarianism. Can Isocrates’ efforts to build a larger cultureout of disparate city-states contribute anything to the modern community-building theoriesof Kruckeberg and Starck, Culbertson and Chen, and others?
• Studies of what other Greek and Roman rhetoricians might add to our understanding ofthe two-way symmetrical model—or other models—of public relations.
Seemingly endowed with an ego that matched his abilities, Isocrates no doubt would approveof our mining his works to clarify our present. As he wrote to Nicocles, “If you are mindful ofthe past, you will plan better for the future.”103Indeed, he may well have anticipated our mining.In his explanation of theAntidosis, he professed that his aim was to create “a monument, aftermy death, more noble than statues of bronze.”104
References
[1] Ron Pearson, Perspectives on public relations history, in: Elizabeth L. Toth, Robert L. Heath (Eds.),Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992,pp. 111–130, p. 111.
[2] James E. Grunig, Two-way symmetrical public relations: past, present, and future, in: Robert L. Heath (Ed.),Handbook of Public Relations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001, pp. 11–30, p. 13.
[3] Scott Cutlip,The Unseen Power, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1994, p. xi.[4] Larissa A. Grunig, Toward the philosophy of public relations, in: Elizabeth L. Toth, Robert L. Heath (Eds.),
Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992,pp. 65–91, p. 68.
[5] David W. Guth, Charles Marsh,Public Relations: A Values-Driven Approach, 2nd ed., Allyn and Bacon,Boston, 2003, p. 57; Fraser P. Seitel,The Practice of Public Relations7th ed., Prentice Hall, Upper SaddleRiver, NJ, 1998, pp. 25–26.
[6] Elizabeth L. Toth, The case for pluralistic studies of public relations: rhetorical, critical, and systemsperspectives, in: Elizabeth L. Toth, Robert L. Heath (Eds.),Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to PublicRelations, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992, pp. 3–15, p. 12.
[7] Edward P.J. Corbett,Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, New York,1990, pp. 540–544.
[8] Edward P.J. Corbett, op. cit., p. 3.[9] Rex Harlow, Building a public relations definition,Public Relations Review2 (1976), pp. 34–37, p. 36.
[10] James E. Grunig, Communication, public relations, and effective organizations: an overview of the book, in:James E. Grunig (Ed.),Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management, Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992, pp. 1–28, p. 18; James E. Grunig, Jon White, The effect of worldviewson public relations theory and practice, in: James E. Grunig (Ed.),Excellence in Public Relations andCommunication Management, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992, pp. 31–64, p. 39.
364 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
[11] Jon White, David M. Dozier, Public relations and management decision making, in: James E. Grunig (Ed.),Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale,NJ, 1992, pp. 91–108, p. 93.
[12] James E. Grunig, Jon White, op. cit., p. 48.[13] James E. Grunig, op. cit., p. 16.[14] George Cheney, Lars T. Christensen, Public relations as contested terrain: a critical response, in: Robert L.
Heath (Ed.),Handbook of Public Relations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001, pp. 167–182,p. 173.
[15] James E. Grunig, op. cit., p. 13.[16] Robert L. Heath, A rhetorical enactment rationale for public relations, in: Robert L. Heath (Ed.),Handbook
of Public Relations, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2001, pp. 31–50, p. 31, 33, 35, 36, 39.[17] Ibid, p. 40.[18] Ibid, p. 49.[19] George Cheney, Lars T. Christensen, op. cit., p. 173.[20] Elizabeth L. Toth, Public relations and rhetoric: history, concepts, future, in: Danny Moss, Dejan Vercic,
Gary Warnaby (Eds.),Perspectives on Public Relations Research, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 121–144,p. 125, 127; See also Michael L. Kent, Maureen Taylor, Toward a dialogic theory of public relations,PublicRelations Review28 (2002), pp. 21–37.
[21] Robert L. Heath, A rhetorical perspective on the values of public relations: crossroads and pathways towardconcurrence,Journal of Public Relations Research12 (2000), pp. 69–91, p. 76, 74.
[22] Elizabeth L. Toth, op. cit., pp. 122–123.[23] Thomas P. Miller, Reinventing rhetorical traditions, in: Theresa Enos (Ed.),Learning from the Histories of
Rhetoric, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL, 1993, p. 27; See also Jacques Brunschwig,Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a ‘counterpart’ to dialectic, in: Amélie O. Rorty (Ed.),Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric,University of California Press Berkeley, CA, 1996, pp. 34–55, p. 51.
[24] Elizabeth L. Toth, op. cit.[25] Elizabeth L. Toth, op. cit., p. 12; Elizabeth L. Toth, op. cit., p. 141.[26] George Cheney, Lars T. Christensen, op. cit., p. 167, 172.[27] James E. Grunig, op. cit., p. 13; Greg Leichty, Jeff Springston, Reconsidering public relations models,Public
Relations Review19 (1993), pp. 327–339.[28] Christina Deatherage, Vincent Hazleton, Effects of organizational worldviews on public relations: a test
of the theory of public relations excellence,Journal of Public Relations Research10 (1998), pp. 57–71,p. 69.
[29] Richard A. Katula, James J. Murphy, The sophists and rhetorical consciousness, in: James J. Murphy, RichardA. Katula (Eds.),A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA, 1994, pp. 17–50;John Poulakos, Toward a sophistic definition of rhetoric, in: Edward Schiappa (Ed.),Landmark Essays onClassical Greek Rhetoric, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA, 1994, pp. 55–66;Philosophy and Rhetoric16(1983), pp. 35–48 (reprint).
[30] John Poulakos, op. cit., pp. 59–61.[31] Plato, Gorgias, in: W.R.M. Lamb (Trans.),Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1975. Original translation published 1925; Plato, Protagoras, in: W.R.M. Lamb (Trans.),Laches,Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977. Original translationpublished 1924.
[32] Edward Schiappa, Sophistic rhetoric: oasis or mirage? in: Edward Schiappa (Ed.),Landmark Essays onClassical Greek Rhetoric, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA, 1994, pp. 67–80, p. 73;Rhetoric Review10 (1991),pp. 5–81 (reprint).
[33] Plato, op. cit., 459C.[34] Charles Kauffman, The axiological foundations of plato’s theory of rhetoric, in: Edward Schiappa (Ed.),
Landmark Essays on Classical Greek Rhetoric, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA, 1994, pp. 101–116, 111–112;Central States Speech Journal33 (1982), pp. 353–366 (reprint).
[35] Plato, op. cit., 503B.
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 365
[36] Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the ideals of greek culture, in: Gilbert Highet (Trans.)The Conflict of Cultural Idealsin the Age of Plato, Vol. 3., Oxford University Press, New York, 1944, p. 57.
[37] George A. Kennedy,A New History of Classical Rhetoric, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994,p. 41.
[38] George E. Yoos, Rational appeal and the ethics of advocacy, in: Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, Andrea A.Lunsford (Eds.),Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse, Southern Illinois University Press,Carbondale, IL, 1984, pp. 82–97, p. 85; Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 70; Edwin Black, Plato’s view of rhetoric,in: Edward Schiappa (Ed.),Landmark Essays on Classical Greek Rhetoric, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA,1994, pp. 83–99, p. 98;The Quarterly Journal of Speech44 (1958), pp. 361–374 (reprint); Charles Kauffman,op. cit., p. 101.
[39] Yun L. Too,The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1995;George A. Kennedy, op. cit.
[40] Aristotle, Rhetoric, in: W. Rhys Roberts, Ingram Bywater (Trans.)The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle,The Modern Library, New York, 1954, 1355b.
[41] Edwin Black, op. cit., p. 99; InOf Oratory, Cicero has Crassus remark that some orators “in Aristotelianfashion. . . speak on both sides about every subject and by means of knowing Aristotle’s rules. . . reel offtwo speeches on opposite sides of every case” in: E.W. Sutton, H. Rackham (Trans.),Cicero, Of Oratory,in: Patricia Bizzell, Bruce Herzberg (Eds.),The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to thePresent, Bedford, Boston, 1990, pp. 200–250, p. iii, 21.
[42] George A. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 56.[43] Edwin Black, op. cit., p. 99.[44] Aristotle, op. cit., 1376b, 1375b.[45] Robert Wardy, Mighty is the truth and it shall prevail? in: Amélie O. Rorty (Ed.),Essays on Aristotle’s
Rhetoric, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1996, pp. 56–87, p. 74, 81.[46] Aristotle, op. cit., 1377b.[47] Aristotle, op. cit., 1356a; For an explanation of how a well-known orator could create a new ethos in a
speech, see Robert J. Connors, Greek rhetoric and the transition from orality, in: Edward P.J. Corbett,James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist (Eds.),Essays on the Rhetoric of the Western World, Kendall/HuntPublishing, Dubuque, IA, 1990, pp. 91–109.Philosophy and Rhetoric19 (1986), pp. 38–65 (reprint); EricA. Havelock,Preface to Plato, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1963, pp. 43–45.
[48] Edward P.J. Corbett, op. cit., p. 544.[49] George E. Yoos, op. cit., p. 96.[50] John Poulakos, op. cit., p. 55.[51] Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 53.[52] Edward P.J. Corbett, Isocrates’ legacy: the humanistic strand in classical rhetoric, in: Robert J. Connors (Ed.),
Selected Essays of Edward P.J. Corbett, Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, TX, 1989, pp. 267–277,p. 275. Reprinted from paper presented to Pennsylvania State University conference on rhetoric, 1985.
[53] Isocrates, Panathenaicus, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.),Isocrates, Harvard University Press,Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 82. Original translation published 1928–1945.
[54] Isocrates, Panegyricus, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.),Isocrates, Harvard University Press,Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 81. Original translation published 1928–1945.
[55] Isocrates, op. cit., 1–2.[56] Edward P.J. Corbett, op. cit., p. 542.[57] Isocrates, Antidosis, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.)Isocrates, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 271. Original translation published 1928–1945.[58] William L. Benoit, Isocrates and Plato on rhetoric and rhetorical education,Rhetoric Society Quarterly21
(1991), pp. 60–71, p. 65.[59] Isocrates, To the Children of Jason, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.),Isocrates, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 14. Original translation published 1928–1945.[60] Isocrates, op. cit., 278.[61] Isocrates, op. cit., 87.
366 C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367
[62] Winifred B. Horner,Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988, p. ix.[63] Takis Poulakos,Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates’ Rhetorical Education, University of South Carolina Press,
Columbia, SC, 1997, pp. 3–4.[64] Isocrates, Against the Sophists, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.)Isocrates, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 19–20. Original translation published 1928–1945.[65] Isocrates, On the Peace, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.)Isocrates, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 13. Original translation published 1928–1945.[66] Gunther Heilbrunn, Isocrates on rhetoric and power,Hermes103 (1975), pp. 154–178, p. 166.[67] M. Hugh Culbertson, Ni Chen, Communitarianism: a foundation for communication symmetry,Public
Relations Quarterly42 (1997), pp. 36–41.[68] Dean Kruckeberg, Kenneth Starck,Public Relations and Community: A Reconstructed Theory, Praeger
Publishers, New York, 1988, p. 82.[69] Isocrates, op. cit., 254.[70] Werner Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 90–91.[71] Isocrates, To Nicocles, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.),Isocrates, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 28. Original translation published 1928–1945.[72] Isocrates, op. cit., 119.[73] Isocrates, Helen, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.),Isocrates, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 32–33. Original translation published 1928–1945.[74] Jon White, David M. Dozier, op. cit., p. 93.[75] Isocrates, op. cit., 3.[76] See, for example, Werner Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 80–81; Isocrates, op. cit., p. 64.[77] Isocrates, To Philip, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.),Isocrates, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 22. Original translation published 1928–1945.[78] Isocrates, op. cit., 39.[79] Gunther Heilbrunn, op. cit., 161.[80] Isocrates, op. cit., 85.[81] Isocrates, Busiris, in: George Norlin, LaRue Van Hook (Trans.)Isocrates, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1986–1992, 221–222. Original translation published 1928–1945.[82] Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 54.[83] George Norlin, Introduction, in: George Norlin (Trans.),Isocrates, Vol. 1, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1991, pp. ix–x. Original work published 1928.[84] Erika Rummel, Isocrates’ ideal of rhetoric: criteria of evaluation, in: Edward Schiappa (Ed.),Landmark
Essays on Classical Greek Rhetoric, Hermagoras Press, Davis, CA, 1994, pp. 143–154, p. 154;ClassicalJournal75 (1979), pp. 25–35 (reprint); Marrou concludes, “In the hands of Isocrates, rhetoric is graduallytransformed into ethics” in: Henri I. Marrou (Ed.), G. Lamb (Trans.),A History of Education in Antiquity,Sheed and Ward, New York, 1956, p. 89.
[85] Philip Seib, Kathy Fitzpatrick,Public Relations Ethics, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, New York, 1995,p. 29; Sherry Baker, Five baselines for justification in persuasion,Journal of Mass Media Ethics14 (1999),pp. 68–81; Charles Marsh, Public relations ethics: contrasting models from the rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle,and Isocrates,Journal of Mass Media Ethics16 (2001), pp. 78–98.
[86] James E. Grunig, Jon White, op. cit., p. 53, 60.[87] Isocrates, op. cit., 275, 277.[88] George A. Kennedy,The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963, p. 178.[89] Edward P.J. Corbett, op. cit., p. 275.[90] George Norlin, op. cit., p. xxv.[91] James E. Grunig, Jon White, op. cit., p. 53.[92] Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 150.[93] George A. Kennedy,Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition, 2nd ed., University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1999, p. 38.[94] Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 46.
C. Marsh / Public Relations Review 29 (2003) 351–367 367
[95] R. Johnson, Isocrates’ methods of teaching,American Journal of Philology80 (1952), pp. 25–36, p. 32.[96] Isocrates, op. cit., 1.[97] Werner Jaeger, op. cit., p. 143.[98] Cicero, J.S. Watson (Ed., Trans.)On Oratory and Orators, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale,
IL, 1970, ii, 22. Original translation published 1878.[99] See Marrou, op. cit.; Donald L. Clark,Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education, Columbia University Press,
Morningside Heights, NY, 1957; Kenneth J. Freeman,Schools of Hellas: An Essay on the Practice andTheory of Ancient Greek Education, Macmillan, London, 1907.
[100] Edward P.J. Corbett,Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, p. 541.[101] Werner Jaeger, op cit., pp. 80–81.[102] Elizabeth L. Toth, op. cit., p. 12.[103] Isocrates, op. cit., 35.[104] Isocrates, op. cit., 7.
