Anthony Price Birkbeck College London Contextualism in Practical Reason

8/14/2019 Anthony Price Birkbeck College London Contextualism in Practical Reason

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CONTENTS

Introductory Overview

Analytical Abstract

Chapter One : Practical Inferences

I : Introduction

II : Loic and Practical Inference

III : Satisfaction and Satisfactoriness

I! : The Teleoloy of Practical Thin"in

Chapter Two : Practical #ude$ents

I : Conte%tuality and Practical #ude$ents

II : &'ust() &Need() and &Ouht(

*a+ &'ust(

*b+ &Need(

*c+ &Ouht(s) all,in andpro tanto

*d+ &Ouht(s) situational and aential

*e+ &Ouht() &can() and &$ay(

Chapter Three : -easonin with Conditionals

I : .ypothetical I$peratives / the Proble$

II : 0roo$e on &Ouht(

III : 0roo$e(s &Nor$ative -e1uire$ents(

I! : 0roo$e / 2urther Clarification and Criticis$

! : Conditional &Ouht(s

!I : 3uasi,4etach$ent

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!II : A Test Case

!III : .ypothetical I$peratives / a Solution

Appendi% I : The Test Case and 4efeasible Inference

Appendi% II : 4etach$ent) Eli$ination) and E%clusion

Appendi% III : Nor$ative -e1uire$ents -evisited

Chapter 2our : -easons for Action

I : Introduction

II : Internal and E%ternal -easons

III : 4esires and -easons

I! : -easons and Particularities

! : !arieties of Pleasure

!I : Conclusion

-eferences

Inde%

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INT-O45CTO-6 O!E-!IE7

Precision $ust not be souht to the sa$e deree in all accounts of thins8 2ine

thins and 9ust thins involve reat variation and irreularity) so that they co$e

to see$ fine and 9ust by convention alone) and not by nature8 So$ethin li"e

this lac" of reularity is found also in ood thins) because of the fact that they

turn out to be sources of da$ae to $any people: so$e in fact have perished

because of wealth) others because of courae8 7e $ust be content) then) when

tal"in about thins of this sort and startin fro$ the$) to show what is true

about the$ rouhly and in outline *Aristotle)Nicomachean EthicsI )

;b;?,??) tr8 -owe) abbreviated+8

Aristotle(s s"etch of the &variation and irreularity( of the sub9ect,$atter of practical

thin"in is perennially felicitous and salutary8 And yet we appear to $anae 1uite

well enouh in applyin such abstract ter$s as &$ust() &ouht() &ood() and &bad() and

in assessin pieces of practical reasonin that $a"e use of such ter$s) or carry an

aent fro$ one intention to another8 .ow do we achieve the re1uisite fle%ibility@ 'y

proposal is that it is by e%ploitin relativities to contextin our practical reasonins) in

our practical 9ude$ents) in our ascriptions of reasons to aents) and in our

evaluations of actions8 Thus a sinle thread runs throuh the whole boo") thouh it is

by $any $eans) and not 9ust one) that we have devised ways of thin"in and spea"in

that are ade1uate to our purposes8

Aristotle hi$self was te$pted to try to round the rationality of practical

inferences upon a loic that is partly distinctive8 6et he never tried to elaborate this

for$ally *there is no &Practical Analytics(+) and atte$pts in our ti$e have not

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succeeded8 I have co$e to be persuaded of two theses *neither oriinal to $e+8 2irst)

e%pressions of intention) such as *in 0ritish Enlish+ &I will () are assertions) thouh

of a special "ind) and hence sub9ect to standard truth,oriented loic8 Secondly)

practical inferences are inferences of a "ind themselves to advance the aent towards

his oal8 .ence &I will and () as a prediction) unproble$atically entails &I will 8(

.owever) it is a different and practical 1uestion whether to for$ a si$ple intention to

for the sa"e of fulfillin the co$pound intention to and 8 7hat if ,in without

,in is a verybad idea *far worse than ,in without ,in+) and ,in will $a"e it

less certain that one (s and (s *it $iht use up too $uch ti$e and enery+@ 'ore

enerally pointless is an inference fro$ &I will ( to &I will or () for an arbitrary

&(: how could for$in the dis9unctive intention be an intelliible way of $ovin

closer to ,in fro$ intendin to @ 4ecidin whether a piece of inference serves the

teleoloy of practical reasonin re1uires attendin to its practical point) and hence)

very often) to the continencies of the reasoner(s situation8

To illu$ine the content of practical 9ude$ents) I ta"e the followin case8 7e are

standin toether on the underround platfor$) you idly put your one re$ainin ?


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shallow necessities arise fro$ relations of $eans to ends) and not fro$ whatever

round *if any+ there $ay be to achieve the end8 In such conte%ts) &$ust( *or &ouht(+

is relative to so$e oal) evident fro$ the conte%t or discoverable by en1uiry) and

whatever factors) end,li"e or circu$stantial) as are accepted or selected as placin

li$its upon the $eans8 This co$$on way of spea"in is overloo"ed by the followin

would,be truis$: &IfA wantsX) and if it is true that if he wantsX he $ust do Y) it does

not follow that he $ust do Y that will follow only if) further)X is the thin that he

$ust pursue8( Our uses of &$ust( often contradict that principle they ta"e shorter

views8

I would be happy if $y understandin of such uses of sentences li"e &I $ust put in

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see the .i$alayas8 6et) consciously ta"inA(s re$ar" less idly than it was intended)

Bchanes the conte%t so that it ta"es in his own constraints8 This shows how we can

defend the traditional i$plication by &ouht( of &can(: &6ou ouht to ( is out of place

if it is $eant relatively to a set of circu$stances that $a"es it i$possible for you to 8

'eant relatively to a s$aller) or otherwise different) set of circu$stances that leaves it

open whether you can ) it can stand8

Ac"nowledin the relativity of &ouht(s to sets of circu$stances can also

reconcile us to what otherwise see$ unintuitive cases even of detachin &6ou ouht to

( fro$ &Ifp) you ouht to () iven thatp. Such a case is this: I $ay acceptably say

to so$eone who is about to attac" his neihbour) &Diven that you are oin to stab

hi$ with a "nife) you ouht to stab hi$ with a short "nife( *which would cause less

da$ae+ but do we want to license an inference) supposin that you dowant to stab

hi$) to &6ou ouht to stab hi$ with a short "nife( *which sounds li"e diabolic

advice+@ 'y solution is to distinuish: &6ou ouht to stab hi$ with a short "nife( is

false relatively to aspects of the situation that leave it open whether you will stab hi$

at all) but true relatively to aspects that already deter$ine that you are oin to stab

hi$8 And of course) since truth is not itself relative) that $eans that the sentence

bears different senses in the two conte%ts8 A refusal to per$it reasonin here by

modus ponens *that is) reasonin of the for$ &Ifpthen q) andp thereforeq+, loo"s a

$uch $ore e%pensive way of bloc"in an undesirable inference) and nelects the

conte%tuality of &ouht(8

'ore have doubted the validity of inferrin &6ou ouht to ( fro$p and &6ou

ouht to ifp( *where &ouht( has wider scope than &if(+8 Indeed) this has beco$e a

current orthodo%y8 'any who defend it per$it us to contrapose / which is evidently

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a $ista"e: even &6ou ouht to if you () whose contraposition is per$itted by

ra$$ar) does not entail &6ou ouht not to if you don(t 8( *It $ay be proper or

advisable for you to if you ) but not to refrain fro$ ,in if you o$it to 8+ 'ore

proble$atic is reasonin fro$ &6ou ouht to ifp( andp. .ere ,in ifp isan act

specified by a condition) say a possible circu$stance which could stand to your ,in

as a round to a conse1uent8 If it is iven that the circu$stance obtains) the aent will

be failin to act in accordance with &6ou ouht to ifp( unless he (s if he does )

becausep) he thereby s ifp8 I ta"e this to license a defeasible inference fro$ &6ou

ouht to ifp( andp to &6ou ouht to ( *defeasible in that it only holds in the case

that) if you ) you will do so becausep) in a wea" sense of &because( that suffices to

e%clude your ,in coincidentally whenp+8 6et such inferences are not by

detach$ent) if that $eans modus ponens I call the$ &1uasi,detach$ent(8

The relativity of &ouht( pro$ises to e%plain the sense in which I can say &If you

want to et drun" every evenin) you ouht to wor" in a pub( / and even) in $y view)

supposin that you do want to et drun" every niht) infer &6ou ouht to wor" in a

pub8( This last &ouht( is no loner conditional) but it lin"s you to wor"in in a pub

only relativelyto your oal of ettin drun" every evenin8 It is relevant to the truth

either of the hypothetical) or of the detached &ouht() to 1uery whether wor"in in a

pub is the $ost affordable and practicable $eans in your case) but not to 1uestion the

desirability of achievin the end *which) in this case) is neative+8

!ery different is the use of &ouht( within &If you want to et drun" every evenin)

you ouht not to wor" in a pub8( This&ouht( $ay well be drawin your attention to

what you hypothetically have areason to do8 If so) the thouht is li"ely to be that not

wor"in in a pub $ay be essential for preservin your health and sanity *which are

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desiderata for any hu$an bein+) supposin that you are an alcoholic8 Now it is 9ust

conceivable that &If you want to et drun" every evenin) you ouht to wor" in a pub(

could be intended with a si$ilar sense: if I ascribed tre$endous value to efficiency in

achievin one(s oals) whatever they $ay be) $y $eanin $iht be that wor"in in

pub $ay be essential for your achievin such efficiency *which I reatly priBe+)

supposin that you want to et drun" every evenin8 This) however) would be a

strane valuation: it is usually the case that one tries do whatever one is doin

efficiently) not that one does what one does for the sa"e of doin it efficiently and we

view efficiency as a value only when it is in the service of a worth,while oal8

A distinction of this "ind between hypothetical and cateorical &ouht(s does not

itself deter$ine any particular view of the nature and round of reasons for action8

.owever) I find $yself spea"in of these in two perhaps distinctive ways: first) I say

that havin a reason to is a $atter of there beinpoint) or value) in one(s ,in

secondly) I suppose that point or value is sensitive to conte%t8 In $y last chapter) I try

to say enouh not to co$pel such a view) but to co$$end it8

I discuss two $ain issues about reasons for action8 2irst) how does havin a

reason to relate to antingto @ It see$s riht to say that wantin to is not

auto$atically any reason to *thouh it $ay happento indicate that one is li"ely to

find,in worth,while+8 And yet I arue for a &enetic,psycholoical( connection

between desire and value) which is such that it is no continency that what we desire

is enerally ood) and thouht to be ood) in so$e way8 2urther) the point or value

that enerates a reason $ust e%ist relatively to the aent: if a $an has a reason to )

this $ust be a fact about him) and not 9ust a corollary of the desirability of ,in *fro$

another(s point of view+8 Now it $ay be that he presently has no $otivation that

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would be satisfied by ,in) and yet it is in his nature to co$e to find it rewardin to

once he has tried it out8 This could be enouh to round a clai$ that he alreadyhas

areason to *thouh it is another 1uestion how $uch bearin this has on how he had

best act+8

5ses of the sentence &A has a reason to ( *call this!+ appear co$$only to be

conte%tual: fro$ occasion to occasion) different types of deliberation *or other $ethod

of identifyin ains and losses+ deli$it the rane of considerations that are relevant to

deter$inin the truth of what is asserted) in conte%t) by utterin!8 4eliberation)

actual or possible) does not enerate reasons rather) inchoate or co$plete) it can fi%

what reasons are relevant to the truth of! as it is $eant in conte%t8

Secondly) how variably between conte%ts do reasons for action arise fro$ relevant

facts@ It is plausibly true of $any facts that their valence *whether they tell for or

aainst ,in+ varies between conte%ts8 This is even true of its bein en9oyable to :

where ,in is bad) en9oyin ,in is orse*at least when what one en9oys is

precisely what $a"es ,in bad+8 It $ay not be true of its bein in so$e specific way

virtuous to / brave) say: this $ay always count in favour of ,in8 .owever) what

concrete $ode of action counts as brave does vary between conte%ts and the aent(s

pri$ary reason for so actin $ust derive fro$ the concrete situation8 Even when the

lanuae of the virtues is applicable) it co$$only fails fully to encapsulate what its

spea"ers can ac"nowlede as reasons for or aainst acts8 It then leaves roo$ for

further reasons to co$e into play) and these $ay be iven by facts whose valence is

conte%tually variable8

Throuhout this boo") $y concern is rather withpro tanto than all,in &ouht(s) and

with havin areason than havin mostor *which is different+ sufficient reason8 About

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&deliberation() in its ety$oloical sense of weihin thins up) co$$only in order to

$a"e a practical decision) I say nothin8 Not) of course) that this doesn(t de$and

attention / but it is a different issue8 So different) indeed) that I doubt whether I do

$uch here to prepare for its proper e%a$ination8

A final note on sy$bolis$8 I follow the convention of e%ploitin part of the

Dree" alphabet for sche$atic sy$bols standin in for verbs or verbal phrases

sinifyin acts: thus I write of intendin to *phi+) or to *"hi+) or to *psi+) or to

*"si+8 7hen I need to use 9ust one of these) I prefer as the $ost fa$iliar8 7hen I

a$ considerin a $eans to an end) I use for the end and for the $eans8 7hen I

need a plurality) I pair with ) and with 8

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ANAL6TICAL A0ST-ACT

C.APTE- ONE : P-ACTICAL IN2E-ENCES

I : #ogic and !easoning

%%%,%%% 7e $ay e%plain an action as a $eans to an end of the aent(s8 The

aent hi$self $ay start fro$ intendin an end and reason to intendin a $eans within

apractical syllogism8 The contents of his intentions and beliefs stand in relations of

loical entail$ent8 So Aristotle suests8

%%%,%%% .ar$an has noted that one and the sa$e entail$ent can be played in

different ways *as with modus ponens and modus tollens+8 4eliberative rationality

$ay yet involve an apt relation between a stretch of deliberation as a process) and

valid syllois$s constitutin its loical core8

%%%,%%% The validity of an ordinary syllois$ consists in a relation between the

truth,values of its pre$ises and conclusion8 Leavin open initially whether

e%pressions of intention have truth,values) we $ay spea" $ore enerally of what is

re1uired for consistency8

%%%,%%% A "ind of rationality$ay be co$$on to theoretical and practical

thin"in8 It is a failure in rationality to re9ect a conclusion entailed by pre$ises that

one accepts8 2urther) if the sub9ect "nows the truth,apt pre$ises to be true) he $ay be

said to have a reasonto accept the conclusion) and) in the practical case) to enact it8

%%%,%%% It $ay be that practical inference transmitsany reason there $ay be to

achieve an end to a $eans) but createsno reason to enact the $eans if there was no

reason to achieve the end8

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%%%,%%% So is there a for$ of rationality within practical thin"in that derives

fro$ the loical validity of practical entail$ents@ I shall arue that this for$ of

logicism is a $ista"e8

II : #ogic and $ractical %nference

%%%,%%% &I will () e%pressin an intention) and &I shall () $a"in a prediction)

differ in onus of $atch8 On a conative view) e%pressions of intention belon within

enny(s enus of fiats8

%%%,%%% 7e need a conative view of e%pressions of intention if there is to be

distinctively practical loic that leads deductively fro$ a $a9or pre$ise e%pressin an

intention to achieve an end) throuh a $inor pre$ise statin a $eans) to a conclusion

e%pressin an intention to realiBe the $eans8 A constative view of e%pressions of

intention that $ade the$ predictions) true or false) would enerate conclusions statin

necessary conditions that $iht be not $eans but conse1uences) or even

preconditions8

%%%,%%% Aristotle also offers so$e inferences to $eans that are not necessary but

sufficient8 7hich of these two "inds of reasonin) to necessary or to sufficient $eans)

$iht at once trans$it a reason for action) and constitute a loical inference@

III : &atisfaction and &atisfactoriness

%%%,%%% .are(s logic of satisfactionlicensed inference to a necessary condition

on the round that the pre$ises cannot be true or satisfied without the conclusion

bein true or satisfied8 enny(s logic of satisfactorinesslicensed inference to a

sufficient condition on the round that the conclusion and $inor pre$ise cannot be

true or satisfied without the $a9or pre$ise bein true or satisfied8 7ithin $i%ed

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inferences) we can co$pare the$ as proposin alternative $odels for inferrin one

fiat fro$ another given the state$ent of a $eans either necessary or sufficient for the

satisfaction of the initial fiat8

%%%,%%% If I have a reason to ) and ,in is a $eans sufficientfor ,in) I

enerally have the sa$e reasonto 8 And yet I $ay consistently intend to while

intendin not to ) 9ust so lon as I envisae ,in in so$e other way8 The loic of

satisfactoriness is defeasible: the e%tension of a wider oal,fiat $ay rule out $eans

sufficient and acceptable for a narrower oal8 Thus the trans$ission of a reason) and

the process of deduction) co$e apart8

%%%,%%% ,in $ay be a necessary$eans to ,in) which is a reat ood)

without one havin any reason to ) since ,in $ay be independently i$possible8

.owever) so lon as the startin,point is an e%pression of intention) the aent $ust

intend that any necessary $eans for$ part of so$e set of $eans which toether will

be sufficient8

%%%,%%% -easonin fro$ &I will and ( to &I will ( $ay see$ incontrovertible

as a loical inference yet it $ay not be advisable as a piece of practical reasoning8

7hat if ,in without ,in is a verybad idea) and ,in will $a"e it less certain that

the aent (s@ If so) he $ay $ore safely focus his $ind upon ,in after he has $ade

sure of ,in8

%%%,%%% The aent $ay intend to ) and envisae that) as a $eans to ,in) he

will have to 8 6et he $ay be unable now to for$ an intention to ) since he can

predict that that intention would o out of his $ind before it was ti$e to ) and one

cannot for$ an intention with the e%pectation that it will be idle8

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%%%,%%% If I loically infer qfro$p) I $ust be willin) by contraposition) to

infer pfro$ Fq8 6et this $a"es no sense when applied to reasonin fro$ an end to a

$eans either necessary or sufficient8

%%%,%%% .ence practical reasonin is not to be analysed in ter$s of a special

loic8

I! : 'he 'eleology of $ractical 'hin"ing

%%%,%%% 7e need to distinuish inference) a process of $ovin between

propositions) and deduction) which trac"s entail$ent,relations8 7hat i$poses a

discipline upon practical thin"in if it is not sub9ect to any loic of its own@

%%%,%%% !elle$an has distinuished the direction of fit) which intentions share

with e%pectations) and involves an ai$ of bein true) fro$ the direction of guidance)

which intentions share with desires) and depends on whether the attitude is such as to

cause) or be caused by) what it represents8 Intentions are e%pectations of a special

"ind whose function is to issue in their own fulfil$ent8

%%%,%%% It follows that loic cannot capture practicality *since it treats practical

and unpractical inferences ali"e+) but also that practical inferences $a"e use of

propositions that are sub9ect to standard loic8

%%%,%%% 'Gller has proposed that practical reasonin is inherently purposeful:

&To reason practically is to consider which actions can pro$ote one(s end) ith a vie

to realiBin this end by means of these actions8(

%%%,%%% Inference fro$ an end to a constituent) or to a necessary $eans) thouh

loically uni$punable) $ay on occasion fail to be practical8 -easonin fro$ &I will

( to &I will or () licensed within the loic of satisfaction) and fro$ &I will ( to &I

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will and () licensed within the loic of satisfactoriness) cannot be practical where

&or ( is an arbitrary dis9unct and &and ( an arbitrary con9unct8

%%%,%%% Practical inference is sub9ect to loical constraints as $uch as any

process of thin"in8 7e need a syncretistic account: what oes is deter$ined in part

by the laws of loic) but also by the nature of intention and the teleoloy of practical

thin"in) which dictate attention to conte%t8

%%%,%%% In av"a(s to%in puBBle) an aent is offered a reward for for$in an

intention today to drin" a to%in to$orrow8 .e see$s to have a reason to for$ the

intention today) thouh no reason to enact it to$orrow8 6et) even if the reward would

be worth the to%in) he cannot clear,headedly for$ an intention that he "nows will do

nothin to $a"e action li"ely8

%%%,%%% The antian principle &7hoever wills the end wills the $eans in so far

as he is rational( is either defeasible) or de$ands 1ualification8 7e have seen that the

aent $ay be unable to for$ an intention even to realiBe a $eans that he "nows to be

necessary and up to hi$8

%%%,%%% 7e use such ter$s as &intelliible() &sensible() and &consistent( in

assessin deliberation8 Practical thin"in invites situationally sensitive evaluations)

li"e action itself8 It is not overned by any special laws of practical reason8

C.APTE- T7O : P-ACTICAL #54DE'ENTS

I : (ontextuality and $ractical )udgements

%%%,%%% *ua9ude$ents) practical 9ude$ents *of the for$) &I $ust () &I ouht

to (+ are assessable as true or false qua practical) they connect with intentions8

%%%,%%% 7henA says &I $ust put in another ?


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operative end of his) and proposes what really is a necessary $eans to realiBin it in a

way open to hi$8 Call this a means+end necessity8 It is best interpreted conte%tually:

A(s utterance is to be interpreted as $a"in reference to an i$plicit end) to achieve

hich) in a way open to hi$) he $ay indeed have to act as he says8

%%%,%%% 6et B$ay reply) &6ou don(t haveto put in another ?


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instru$ental( needs are relative to ends whose ade1uacy in conte%t can be debatable8

&.e needs to ( $ay state a need of his) or of ours8

*c+ &Ouht(s) all,in andpro tanto

%%%,%%% Practical &ouht(s can be trivial) and need not connote obliations8

&Ouht& is $ore practical than &$ust( in that &$ust(s identify necessary conditions that

$ay or $ay not be ways or $eans8 So$e &ouht(s are all+in) or all+things+considered8

If I $ust in order to ) ,in is re1uired for ,in if there are any ways of ,in

without ,in) they are e%cluded8 If I ouht to) then there arealternative ways of

,in) but they are counter,indicated8 Even within a sinle situation) &$ust(s can be

sensitive to ends and circu$stances that attach different necessities to different acts

si$ilarly) &ouht(s $ay be sensitive to ends and circu$stances that attach different

pros and cons to different acts8 These &ouht(s $ay be calledpro tanto: they identify

what is fittin in some respect *which $ay need to be weihed aainst what is fittin

in other respects+8

*d+ &Ouht(s) situational and aential

%%%,%%% Theoretical &ouht(s operate upon sentences) as do 1uasi,practical

&ouht(s *which are situational+8 2ully practical &ouht(s operate upon predicates

*they are then agent+implicatingor agential) .u$berstone+8 3uasi,practical &ouht(s

are idle and indefinite unless they connect with practical &ouht(s8 'ore specifically)

there are three aru$ents8

%%%,%%% *;+ Thouh &o out with( is a sy$$etical relation) ifApro$ises to o

out with B) it $ay be thatAouht to o out with B) thouh it is not the case that B

ouht to o out with A8 These &ouht(s loo" aential8

%%%,%%% *?+ So does the &ouht( within &A ouht to beat B() in the sense of the

sentence in which it is not entailed by &It ouht to be thatA beats B8(

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%%%,%%% .owever) *;+ and *?+ can also be e%plained by relativiBin the &ouht(s

to different sets of circu$stancs8

%%%,%%% *+ The rule &Everyone ouht to be truthful( *aential+ is not e1uivalent

to the ideal &It ouht to be the case that everyone is truthful( *situational+8 0ein

untruthful once in order that others $ay be truthful twice is e%cluded by the rule) and

left open by the ideal8

*e+ &Ouht() &can() and &$ay(

%%%,%%% It cannot be relatively to the sa$e set of circu$stances that an act both

ouht to be done) and cannot be done8 If I ouht to ) relatively to C;) then C;$ust

leave $e free to ) and leave it open whether I but C?$ay si$ultaneously prevent

$e fro$ ,in) or e%clude $y ,in8 There $ust be a switch of perspective within &I

can(t do what I ouht to do8(

%%%,%%% If an aent can(t because of an earlier failin) or relatively to a

predictable failin) we re$ain free to say &.e ouht to () relatively to circu$stances

that do not e%clude his doin so8 Or we $ay offer advice about how he ouht to act

relatively to the circu$stances that do e%clude that8

%%%,%%% 0oth situational and theoretical &ouht(s behave si$ilarly8 &.e ouht to

have ot ho$e by now( can be true) relative to so$e body of infor$ation) even if it

turns out) because of further facts) that he couldn(t have done so8

C.APTE- T.-EE : -EASONIND 7IT. CON4ITIONALS

I : 0ypothetical %mperatives 1 the $roblem

%%%,%%% Co$pare *a+ &If you want to et drun" every evenin) you should wor"

in a bar( *a hypothetical i$perative+) with *b+ &If you want to et drun" every evenin)

you should not wor" in a bar( *which I count as cateorical+8 Diven *c+ &6ou do want

%viii


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to et drun" every evenin() should we infer *d+ &6ou should wor" in a bar() or *e+

&6ou should not wor" in a bar(@ Perhaps we can detach the conse1uent of *b+) but not

that of *a+ if so) *e+ follows and not *d+8

%%%,%%% .are supposed that *a+ e$beds and hypothesiBes an i$perative and not

an indicative sentence8 .ence the conse1uent can be detached) but only by &Det

drun" every evenin8( .owever) we $ay 1uestion whether the practical &ouht( is

i$perative) and whether i$peratives can intelliibly be hypothesiBed8

II : Broome on /ught

%%%,%%% 0roo$e interprets the aential &ouht( as in part sentential) connectin

an aent to a proposition8 So we $iht paraphrase &A ouht to ( by &It befitsA that

A 8( .owever) a better renderin is &It befitsA that he () which attaches to &A(a

predicate) &It befitsthat he () whose content $ay be wholly eneral8

%%%,%%% .ence we should not ad$it sentences of the for$ &It befitsA that B ()

ta"en as statin that it isA(s responsibility that B 8 The Enlish &ouht( does not

per$it such a possibility / nor do its e1uivalents) even when their synta% is different)

in other lanuaes8

%%%,%%% 0roo$e(s analysis of &A ouht *to ifp+( as &It befitsA that *A (s if

p+() or *with &O( and a subscript+ &OA*A (s ifp+() $ay per$it us to infer) by

contraposition) &OA*Fp ifA doesn(t +8( The ob9ection to that is not $erely that there

no Enlish e1uivalent) but that any e1uivalent there were would i$ply that the truth of

p is up toA) at least if he doesn(t ) which is not an i$plication of &A ouht *to if

p+8( .owever) 0roo$e can avoid the ob9ection by ta"in such sentences to specify an

%i%


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act or practice by a condition: within OA*A (s ifp+) as within &A ouht *to ifp+()

what is predicated as befittinA is the act of *,in ifp+8

%%%,%%% .ence it will not distort our discussion to allow 0roo$e to apply

&ouht( at once to propositions) and to aents8

III : Broomes Normative !equirements

%%%,%%% 0roo$e distinuishes &p ouhts q() as sharin the structure ofp Oq)

fro$ &p re1uires q() as sharin the structure of O*p q+8 .e calls the second a

&nor$ative re1uire$ent( *N-+) lossin it as follows: &6ou ouht to see to it that) ifp)

then q) and further$ore) it isp that re1uires you to q8( .e ta"es &p ouhts q() but not

&p re1uires q() to per$it the factual detach$ent byp of Oq8

%%%,%%% One N- $iht be that I ouht to intend to if I intend to and believe

that ,in is a necessary $eans to ,in8 It $ay be true that I a$ then bound to be

out of order if I don(t intend to 8 6et this does not entail that I ouht to : for I $ay

be out of order either in not intendin to ) or in not intendin to 8 Nothin follows

about what how I have a reasonto be8

%%%,%%% There can be doubts about 0roo$e(s e%a$ples of N- *they tend to be

variably i$plausible) uninfrineable) or artificial+) and about their role *unli"e

ordinary &ouht(s) they serve first,person uidance $ore proble$atically than other,

person advice or assess$ent+8

%%%,%%% It is open to 1uestion whether we should thin" of rationality as

i$posin requirements at all rather) intellient life is overned by &unreasonin

purposiveness( *'Gller+) and is a field of $ultifarious values sensitive to conte%t8

%%


21/36

%%%,%%% It re$ains an achieve$ent to avoid bootstrapping8 Even if &6ou ouht

to act as you yourself find reason to( is a plausible N-) there is no daner of havin to

infer that) iven that I find reason to *however perversely+) I indeed ouht to 8

I! : Broome 1 2urther (larification and (riticism

%%%,%%% There $ay be re1uired or banned combinations of beliefs and actions8

4ancy cites hypocrisy8 6et a rule aainst hypocrisy is asy$$etrical: &Say what you

really thin"() not &Thin" what you actually say8( Can 0roo$e round such

asy$$etries without per$ittin detach$ent@

%%%,%%% 4ancy re9ects detach$ent whenever the &if(,clause ascribes a

psycholoical state to the aent) and the conse1uent advises an act of his8 6et

suppose that $y conscience tells $e not to : it is not because of $y $oral

convictions that I a$ actin badly if I o aainst $y conscience yet it is because of

the$ that I a$ oin aainst $y conscience) and hence actin badly) if I 8 4ancy

$ust allow that psycholoical facts can constitute reasons for action8

%%%,%%% olodny distinuishes wide,scope fro$ narrow,scope uses of &ouht()

i8e8 *A+ &6ou ouht *if you ) to +( fro$ *0+ &If you ) you ouht to 8( Accordin

to hi$) *A+ e%cludes a certain co$bination of attitudes or acts) viB8 of ,in and not

,in hence it per$its contraposition) but not detach$ent8 *0+ ad$its detach$ent)

but not inference to &If you don(t ) you ouht not to 8 .e also distinuishes state

fro$ process re1uire$ents8

%%%,%%% 7e can still avoid undesirable bootstrappin by distinuishin what one

ought to do fro$ what one has a reason to do8 olodny $ay be riht about *0+) but

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22/36

wron about *A+) which *I shall arue+ resists contraposition) and ad$its what I call

&1uasi,detach$ent(8

! : (onditional /ughts

%%%,%%% &Ifp) you ouht to () where &if( has wider scope than &ouht() is areed

to per$it detach$ent of the conse1uent: iven thatp) one can infer &6ou ouht to 8(

'ore debatable is the loic of &6ou ouht *to ifp+() where &ouht( has wider scope

than &if(8

%%%,%%% Conditional intentions *e88) &I intend to ifp(+ often haveto be

interpreted as intentions with conditional contents8 .u$berstone(s analysis rihtly

yields an analoue of detach$ent) but nothin li"e contraposition8 6et this is better

achieved by interpretin ,in ifp as an act *or practice+ specified by a condition8

%%%,%%% 7e $ust treat &6ou ouht *to if you +( li"ewise8 Contraposition

clearly fails: one can(t infer) &6ou ouht *not to if you don(t +8(

%%%,%%% &If( is best interpreted not as e1uivalent to &() the sin of $aterial

i$plication) but as conveyin a ground+consequent relation *Strawson+) both between

propositions *as in &Ifp) q(+) and between a proposition and a predicate *as in &to if

p(+8 In the full sense) to intend to ifpis to intend whether one (s at least

so$eti$es to rest upon truth ofp8 Li"ewise) if oneouht to ifp) it is fittin for one

to act in a way that rests upon the truth ofp8

!I : *uasi+3etachment

%%%,%%% &I ouht to ifp( specifies an act by a condition8 If the condition

obtains as a condition of ,in) then to is to ifp) and I ifp inor by ,in8 If it

%%ii


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is fittin for $e that I ifp) then) in $y case) an act of ,in has a point it would

otherwise lac" if it is also an act of ,in ifp hence) supposin thatp) I ouht to /

so lon as it can correctly be presu$ed that) if I ) which is open) this will be because

p8 .ence) iven thatp) &I ouht to ( follows defeasibly8

%%%,%%% It is irrelevant to the loic of detach$ent or 1uasi,detach$ent whether

the hypothesis is in the aent(s control8 An apparent counter,e%a$ple of

.u$berstone(s nelects the conte%tuality of &ouht(8 &6ou ouht to ently( can be

true) thouh &6ou ouht to ( is false) so lon as the for$er ta"es your ,in as given8

%%%,%%% In other cases) the 1uestion is whether it is fittin to in the

circu$stance thatp8 A "ind person $a"es a practice of bein "ind) which involves

$any instantiations of ,in if *or when+p8 In so$e cases) this re1uires an inference)

ivenp) to &I ouht to 8(

%%%,%%% 3uasi,detach$ent $ay be re9ected either because it isn(t detach$ent) or

because a latent i$plausibility in an instantiation of &I ouht to ifp( only beco$es

blatant after 1uasi,detachin &I ouht to 8( Truly acceptable specifications of an act

by a condition should per$it inferences to &I ouht to ( that are not counter,intuitive8

!II : A 'est (ase

%%%,%%% Suppose *a+ &I ouht to phone $y $other today and visit her

to$orrow() and *b+ &I ouht not to phone her today if I($ not oin to visit her

to$orrow8( *a+ $ay see$ to entail *c+ &I ouht to phone her today() which plausibly

e%cludes *d+ &I ouht not to phone her today8( .ence) by modus tollens) *b+ and *c+

$ay see$ to entail the falsity of *e+ &I($ not oin to visit her to$orrow8( And yet

surely *a+ and *b+ do not entail *f+ &I($ oin to visit her to$orrow8(

%%iii


24/36

%%%,%%% 0roo$e treats *b+ as a N- which is not sub9ect to reasonin either by

modus ponens or by modus tollens.

%%,%%% I say) first) that *a+ does not on its own entail *c+ / thouh this isn(t

crucial) since *a+ already conflicts with *d+8

%%%,%%% Secondly) *a+ is relative to features of $y situation which $ust leave it

open whether I shall act as it says I ouht8 7e can then read *b+ as a warnin that

addin an e%tra feature) *e+) would tell aainst doin one of the two thins said to be

owin by *a+8 This is innocuous) since *e+ actually e%cludes *a+8

!III : 0ypothetical %mperatives 1 A &olution

%%%,%%% *;+ &The best $eans to ,in is ,in( see$s to entail *?+ &6ou ouht to

if you want to ( as a hypothetical i$perative8 Then *?+ and *+ &6ou want to (

see$ toether to entail *>+ &6ou ouht to 8( 0ut this can appear counter,intuitive

*see H I+8 'y solution is this: the truth of *;+ suffices for the truth of *?+ 9ust so lon

as *?+ si$ply $eans that ,in is for you the fittin $eans towards the hypothesiBed

oal of ,in8 This privilees ,in as fittin) by co$parison with other $eans to ,

in *by whatever criteria+) if ,in is your oal8 And when ,in actually is your

oal) then) by detach$ent or 1uasi,detach$ent) ,in is fittin / but relatively to that

goal of yours and the criteria of comparison8

%%%,%%% Co$pare these two &ouht(,9ude$ents *the first hypothetical) the

second cateorical+:

*I+ 6ou ouht to if you want to *the supposition of a oal+8

%%iv


25/36

*II+ 6ou ouht to if you want to *a supposition connectin with so$e

desideratu$+8

The &ouht( in *Ia+ is relative to the oal e%plicitly hypothesiBed: ,in is fittin as a

$eans to the hypothesiBed oal of ,in *and $aybe not otherwise+8 0y contrast) the

&ouht( in *IIa+ is relative to so$ethin i$plicit: ,in) when you want to ) fits so$e

unspecified non,hypothetical desideratu$8 *-utatis mutandis) the sa$e holds of

&$ust(,9ude$ents with the sa$e structures8+

%%%,%%% It follows that &ouht(s and reasons only partly coincide8

%%%,%%% *I+ and *II+ are very li"ely to be defeasible / but that isn(t the "ey to

$a"in sense of hypothetical i$peratives8 Even within *I+) the spea"er is allowed

so$e latitude in considerin the value of achievin the oal *so lon as its pursuit

isn(t 1uestioned+8

%%%,%%% If I ouht to ) relatively to a oal of $ine) then it $ay count as

efficient) or inenious) or consistent of $e to 8 .owever) such instru$ental

rationality is usually rather a 1uasi,end than an end: it doesn(t itself ive action value8

And bad or frivolous ends $ay cancel or curtail even the e%ecutive value of the

$eans8

Appendix % 4 'he 'est (ase and 3efeasible %nference

%%%,%%% Inferences and conditionals can be defeasible8 'iht trouble be

avoided if either *see above) H !II+ the inference fro$ *a+ to *c+) or that fro$ *b+ and

*e+ to *d+) is defeasible@

%%%,%%% 4efaults $ay be a priori) or a posteriori8

%%v


26/36

%%%,%%% Inference fro$ *a+ to *c+ is defeasible and a posteriori: &*a+ &I ouht to

phone $y $other today and visit her to$orrow( yields *c+ &I ouht to phone her

today( only if it can be presu$ed that) if I do that) I shall also visit her to$orrow8

%%%,%%% Inference fro$ *b;+ &If I a$ not oin to visit $y $other to$orrow) I

ouht not to phone her today( to &I ouht not to phone her today() via &I a$ not oin

to visit her to$orrow() is a priori but defeasible8 2or it $iht be defeated by a sudden

e$erency re1uirin $e to phone thouh I a$ not oin to visit8 0ut that doesn(t

arise here8 So we have to suppose) as I did) that *b;+ restricts the application of *a+8

%%%,%%% *b?+ &I ouht *not to phone $y $other today if I a$ not oin to visit

her to$orrow+( is aain defeasible8 It entails *d+) supposin that *e+) and that) if I

don(t phone her when I($ not oin to visit her) I shan(t phone her because I($ not

oin to visit her8 So *b?+ $ust also restrict the application of *a+8

%%%,%%% .ence appeal to defeasible inferences and conditionals does notshow

that *a+) *b+ and *e+ can be consistently asserted relatively to the sa$e set of

conditions8 6et it confir$s the i$portance of conte%t to note that *a+ yields *c+ only

iven an a posteriori default) and that *b+) in either for$) depends for its plausibility

upon a posteriori presu$ptions that $a"e it defeasible8

Appendix %% 4 3etachment, Elimination, and Exclusion

%%%,%%% &Ifp) I ouht to ( defeasibly or indefeasibly yields &I ouht to () iven

p) by detachment8 &I ouht *to ifp+( defeasibly yields &I ouht to () ivenp) by

quasi+detachment8 6et acceptance of 1uasi,detach$ent is liable to land us with

unpalatable inferences if we do not interpret &ouht( conte%tually8

%%%,%%% &*I shall I shall +( entails &*I shall not I shall not +( by

contraposition8 &I shall *if I +( does not entail &I shall *not if I don(t +8(

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27/36

%%%,%%% **p Oq+ p+ entails Oqby detachment8 *O*p q+ p+entails Oq by

normative elimination8

%%%,%%% 0ecause &ouht( entails &can() *O*p q+ p+entails Oqby factual

exclusion8 *O*p q+ *q p++ entails Oqby con5unction discharge8

%%%,%%% 4etach$ent is a process of accu$ulation) whereas eli$ination is a

process of salvae8 They should not be assi$ilated8

Appendix %%% 4 Normative !equirements !evisited

%%%,%%% O*q ifp+ suits 0roo$e(s conception of &p re1uires q( only if it sinifies

O*p q+)plus a relation of relevance for he needs the internal contraposition that the

latter per$its in order to deny detach$ent8 .owever) O*p q+ is sub9ect to nor$ative

eli$ination) which is i$plausible in the case of his N-(s8 So is its sy$$etry: it leads

via OFq to OFpas well as via Op to Oq.

%%%,%%% Ta"e the &test case( *H !II+8 %f&I ouht to phone $y $other today if I

a$ oin to visit her to$orrow( is a N- which entails &O*I visit $y $other to$orrow

I phone her today+() itself e1uivalent to &O*I don(t visit her to$orrow) or I phone

her today+() it invites nor$ative eli$ination8 0ut that is unwanted here8

%%%,%%% 2urther) O*p q+ per$its factual e%clusion) which is unco$fortably

close to detach$ent8

%%%,%%% I conclude that the loic of nor$ative re1uire$ents can be rescued by

three $oves: ta"in the$ to be re1uire$ents and not &ouht(s separatin O*q ifp+

fro$ O*p q+ and replacin O*q ifp+ by O*you ifp+) where &ifp( specifies an

act by a condition8

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C.APTE- 2O5- : -EASONS 2O- ACTION

I : %ntroduction

%%%,%%% 7hat an aent ought to do) or even mustdo) relatively to an end) $ay

not be anythin that he has any reasonto do for reasons can be trans$itted only fro$

ends that there is reason to achieve8 Instru$ental values *such as efficiency+ are

usually 1uasi,ends rather than ends8

%%%,%%% If the clai$ that a cateorical &ouht( has to be 9ustified relatively to a

real value or ood is inconsistent with an appeal to desires) it has still to be arued8

There is also $ore to be said in favour of relatin to concrete conte%ts8 Our topic

beco$es reasons for action8

II : %nternal and External !easons

%%%,%%% 7illia$s $a"es this distinction:A has an internalreason to if ,in

would serve a $otivation of hisA has an externalreason to if he has a reason to

of which that does not hold8 7e can derive fro$ 7illia$s a rouh $appin of the

derees of pro%i$ity in which reasons that can be ascribed to an aent $ay stand to

the reasons that he already ta"es into account8 .e holds that &a state$ent aboutA(s

reasons( $ust be &a distinctive "ind of state$ent about) distinctively)A(8 Tal" of

reasons for action is nor$ative as well as e%planatory) and so can o beyond what an

aent is already $otivated to do8

%%%,%%% *;+ A has a reason to if he is aware that ,in would serve so$e end

or value of his8

%%viii


29/36

%%%,%%% *?+ A has a reason to if he could discover that ,in would serve

so$e end or value of his by correctin error or rectifyin inorance throuh

infor$ation that is) to the appropriate deree) accessible to hi$8

%%%,%%% *?J+ A has a reason to if hecould discover that ,in would serve

so$e end or value of his by deliberatin soundly fro$ ele$ents within his &

*sub9ective $otivational set+8

%%%,%%% *+ A has a reason to if hecould discover that ,in would serve

so$e end or value of his if he trusted another(s sound deliberation on his behalf fro$

ele$ents within his &8

%%%,%%% *>+ A has a reason to if hecould discover that ,in would serve

so$e end or value of his throuh an e%ercise of his *or another(s+ i$aination about

what it will be li"e if he (s8

%%%,%%% *+ A has a reason to if hecould discover that ,in serves an end or

value that is new to hi$) but characteristic of the person he is) throuh e%perience of

,in8

%%%,%%% -easons can be personal without bein tied to the aent(s current

motivations: it is enouh if heis the sort of person to be able to co$e to appreciate the

value of ,in8

%%%,%%% 7illia$s places &dispositions of evaluation( within an aent(s &8 6et

one of 'ontaine(s cannibals $iht have no evaluative dispositions apt to dissuade

hi$8 A test that his conversion involved his &co$in to see thins ariht( would be

that he ca$e reflectively to prefer a different way of life throuh e%perience of it8

%%%,%%% There are different derees of pro%i$ity in which reasons that can be

ascribed to an aent $ay stand to the reasons that he already ta"es into account8 .ow

%%i%


30/36

could we select) so$ewhere alon the spectru$) a singletruth,condition for &A has a

reason to ( *call this!+@

%%%,%%% So$e reasons $ay be so re$ote fro$ the "ind of deliberation bein

pursued on that occasion byA) or by B onA(s behalf) that for either to assert!would

be out of place8 %nterpreted as intended to be apt ithin that context)!is then false8

Thus the $ode of deliberation deter$ines not what reasons there really are) but what

rane of reasons are relevant to the truth of!as then uttered8

III : 3esires and !easons

%%%,%%% Is desirin to eo ipso a reason to ) on an ade1uate conception of

desire@ Even if it is not) desirin to ) and havin a reason to ) $ay stand in a

relation that is internal) and not $erely continent8

%%%,%%% 7iser than either a purely &sub9ective( or &internalist( conception of

practical reasons) or a purely &ob9ective( or &e%ternalist( conception) is one that avoids

the dichoto$y8 So 7iins: &An ade1uate account of these $atters will have to treat

psycholoical states and their ob9ects as e1ual and reciprocal partners8(

%%%,%%% There is a use of &want( in which) whenever so$eone acts freely and

intentionally in order to achieve so$e oal) we $ay say that acts as he ants8 6et I

$ay also say idio$atically) &I don(t ant to ) thouh I must and shall() conveyin

that I view ,in with resolution but without pleasure8 7e $ay privilee as central

cases in which desirin involves viewin with pleasure8

%%%,%%% 7ollhei$(s &repsycholoiBation of desire( allows desire a prehistory8

There radually e$ere desires that tally with their ob9ects) in ways that invite

application of two closely related notions)pro5ection and correspondence8 7hat

%%%


31/36

results is a vast repertory of fine discri$inations and responses that) to a lare deree)

we share with others8

%%%,%%% &Dood( ta"es on attributive uses *e88) ood "nifeKhusband+8 Learnin to

apply the ter$ in new pairins oes with ac1uirin newly discri$inatin preferences8

%%%,%%% &7hat will turn out to satisfy) or frustrate) a desire can be an

e%peri$ental 1uestion( *7ollhei$+8 .ence arises the possibility of substitute

satisfactions) which play an i$portant role in personal and ethical develop$ent8 6et

the e%perience of felt satisfaction cannot beco$e an independent $otive8

%%%,%%% Schiffer distinishes &reason,followin( *r,f+ fro$ &reason,

providin( *r,p+ desires: an r,f desire to typically arises fro$ a reason to that is

also a reason for desirin to an r,p desire to ) as he conceives it) ma"es ,in

desirable8 .uner and thirst are r,p desires) if any are8 6et plausibly what ives one

reason to drin" when one is thirsty is thirst in the sense not of a desireto drin") but of

a needfor drin"8

%%%,%%% This e%tends $ore widely *Sta$pe+: desires are ideally sensitive to

needs whose presence they indicate) and to oods that satisfy needs8 4esirin is less a

for$ of believin than of perceivin or i$ainin8

%%%,%%% 6et we need to invo"e the intentionality of perception: to en9oy an

activity is to perceive and e%perience it in a certain positive way) but this way $ay fail

to capture any value that stands up to scrutiny8 Ob9ective reasons co$e onto the scene

with the en9oy$ent of activities that ecan view as en9oyable8

%%%,%%% 7antin to can be a reason to when it is a response to the perceived

value of ,in8 The aent(s wantin to $ay well *a+ enhance a value that

independently attaches to ,in or it $ay *b+ be a condition of hisrealiBin the full

value that ,in potentially possesses8

%%%i


32/36

%%%,%%% 4esire and oodness connect in that desirin to involves perceivin or

i$ainin ,in as ood in so$e way8 7e for$ new conceptions of oodness as we

revise and e%tend our repertory of desires8 It is not a continency that what we desire

is enerally ood) and thouht to be ood in so$e way8

I! : !easons and $articularities

%%%,%%% A perspicuous sche$a is this: &The fact thatp) ta"en in conte%t)ivesA

a reason to 8( This fact cannot be identical to the reason *there are not as $any

reasons as there are relevant facts+8 A reason is a reason for an aent8

%%%,%%% Particularists hold that a fact that ives one a reason to in one

situation$ay) in another situation) fail to ive one a reason to ) or even ive one a

reason notto *thus reversin its valence+8 4ancy distinuishes reasonsfro$

enablersor disablers) and also fro$ intensifiers orattenuators8

%%%,%%% A default reason needs no local help to count in favour of an act) but

can be hindered8 It stands in a relation of neative dependenceupon the absence of

anythin that defeats it) unli"e a reason which stands in a relation of positive

dependenceupon the presence of so$ethin that empoers it8 4efaults can be a

priori or a posteriori8 A fact that is an a posteriorireason forA to 9ust gives A) or

provides A ith) a reason to ) whereas a fact that is an priorireason forA to further

constitutes a reason forA to 8

%%%ii


33/36

%%%,%%% Even default reasons depend upon basic enablers8 The line we draw

between a reason and the absence of a defeater) or the presence of an intensifier) can

depend upon the conte%t8

%%%,%%% The label &variabilis$( beco$es apter than &particularis$(: it is in part

because the fact providin a reason is left generalthat it can vary between favourin

or disfavourin the very sa$e action8

%%%,%%% The eneralist $ay try to distinuishprimary fro$ secondary reasons)

clai$in that the for$er rest on facts whose valence is invariant8 This $ay suest

the ideal of a complete reason) incorporatin reference to enablers and disablers8 0ut

that is unreal: a reason should be such as to be salient) and e%pressible by the aent

who respects it8 An aent(s reason is often the reason he gives) e88 &That would be a

lie8(

%%%,%%% 6et $iht the real reason aainst $ost lies be that they are contrary to

the point of veracity) and so untruthful@ The fact that so$e lie is untruthful $ay

indefeasibly constitute) a reason aainst it8

%%%,%%% *;+ Can an act be virtuous in so$e specified way without there bein a

reason in its favour@ 4o &Is this a brave thin to do@() &Is there any reason to do

this@() and &Is this the thin to do@( really constitute three separate 1uestions@

%%%,%%% Possibly a $an has no reason to do a "ind act not out of "indness8 6et

if the act is such as to serve the point of "indness) and the aent is aware of this value)

he $ay still be said to have a reason to do it8

%%%,%%% *?+ 4oes an act(s bein virtuous in so$e specific way then constitute

the pri$ary reason in its favour@ This could not be if to decide that an act is brave is

to decide that it is the riht thin to do8 Even if an act can be virtuous in so$e

specific way without thereby bein riht) it still holds ood that its bein brave cannot

%%%iii


34/36

be the pri$ary reason in its favour) which is rather so$e concrete feature of the

i$$ediate situation8 Courae *or "indness+ itself is an invariant summative value that

is co$$on to brave *or "ind+ actions otherwise very various8

%%%,%%% !ariabilis$ $ay still hold of the rounds for applyin virtue,concepts

this is the fa$iliar thesis of the uncodifiabilityof the virtues8

%%%,%%% 7e can say *after Lance and Little+ that) e88) the default is that it is

untruthful to tell a lie8 Conte%ts in which the defaultholds are privileed in bein

central to the concept8 6et an ele$ent of variabilis$ re$ains under the surface of the

ethical labels8

%%%,%%% 7hen the lanuae of virtues and vices isapplicable) it will often fail

fully to encapsulate what its spea"ers can ac"nowlede as reasons for or aainst acts8

Especially in the case of the virtues associated with &i$perfect( duties) such as

"indness) there are supple$entary reasons that favour certain options within a rane8

%%%,%%% There is thus plenty of roo$ for variabilis$ even if virtues and reasons

are $ore closely related than 4ancy supposes8 Let us not be party to a &narcissis$ of

s$all differences(8

! : 6arieties of $leasure

%%%,%%% 'ore interestin would be facts that constitute reasons necessarily) but

not analytically8 That I would en9oy ,in is plausibly a non,derivative reason for $e

to 8 And yet the valence of en9oy$ent see$s variable: &Pleasure at a wron action

co$pounds the wron( *4ancy+8

%%%,%%% As a pain that loses its disvalue in conte%t) 4ancy cites e%tractin a sea,

urchin fro$ one(s dauhter(s foot: if there is no alternative) the pain is noreason

aainst it8 This see$s heartless8

%%%iv


35/36

%%%,%%% &Cli$bin a $ountain $iht be $otivated by the e%tre$e li$its to

which one will be pushed) that is) by the pain and sufferin it will

involve( *'illra$+8 .ere the pain is intended) not 9ust accepted. 6et if pain and

sufferin cease here to be bad in any ay) how is it heroic to undero the$@ A

thin(s bein bad in a way can co$e) in certain conte%ts) to ive it point8

%%%,%%% Other e%a$ples illustrate that what $ay reverse valence is an aent(s

en9oyin not 9ust an act that is bad) but whatever ma"es it bad8 'any $aintain that

not only the pain of an inability to be actively bad) but even that of the loss of liberty

*which anyone would feel+) fail to tell at allaainst 9ust incarceration8 This is a hard

view8

%%%,%%% Aristotle says) &The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is ood and

that proper to an unworthy activity bad8( 6et perhaps the value or disvalue really

inheres in the deter$inate pleasure) so that no variable value attaches to pleasure as a

deter$inable8 .owever) this suits good+ma"ing better than being a reason for:

reasons are offered) by aents or advisors or assessors) before or after acts are

perfor$ed) and $ust have so$e deree of enerality8 And surely a thin(s bein fun

already does something) in innocuous cases) to $a"e it ood8

%%%,%%% The default could be *A+ that pleasure is ood: its bein en9oyable to

tells presu$ptively in favour of ,in) thouh the presu$ption $ay be cancelled *e88)

if ,in is vicious+8 En9oyin in actin well what $a"es it that enhances the value

naturally attachin to en9oy$ent8

%%%,%%% Or the default could be *0+ that hu$an activity is ood: it is ood unless

so$ethin corrupts it8 En9oyin in actin well what $a"es it that enhances the value

of actin well8

%%%v


36/36

%%%,%%% On either view) how we draw the distinction between reasons and

intensifiers in any particular case will be relative to conte%t8

%%%,%%% 7e need a particularis$ that rants defaults valences) and is sensitive to

conte%tual variations in reason attributions8 It should allow that) on occasion) a value

is rounded upon a disvalue) or one valence upon a contrasted valence8 !ariabilis$ is

only valid variably8

!I : (onclusion

%%%,%%% 7e have seen that there are different aspects to practical rationality: *A+

the rationality for$alised by loic) *0+ the rationality of practical inference) and *C+

reasons for action8 4esires help enerate the intentions that are sub9ect both to the

loic of *A+ and to the teleoloy of *0+ they are also perceptive of the values that

constitute *C+8 There is no real possibility of a eneral and syste$atic $is$atch

between desire and value: each is $ade for the other8 6et desires are not the$selves

specially constitutive of reasons8

%%%,%%% The co$$on thread to $y treat$ents of *A+) *0+) and *C+ is

contextualist8 Conte%t is crucial for the success of a piece of practical inference) the

truth of a practical 9ude$ent) the truth of a reason,ascription) and the presence of

reasons8 Practical rationality) in all its for$s) is a creature of continency8

%%%vi

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Anthony Price Birkbeck College London Contextualism in Practical Reason

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