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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCYSTRENGTHENING INITIATIVEASSESSMENT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION, SRI LANKA, 2016.
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Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) is an independent, non-governmental, non-profit and non-partisan organization with a vision of Sri Lanka in which government, politics, business, civil society and the everyday lives of citizens are free from corruption. As the fully accredited national chapter in Sri Lanka of the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), TISL partners and cooperates with TI and its chapters world-wide.
Published in October 2017
www.tisrilanka.org
Author: Jani de Silva, MA, Phd (Lond)
Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of December 2016. Nevertheless, TISL cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. TISL would like to thank the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), Colombo, for their cooperation in conducting this assessment. This publication reflects the views of the author only, and CIABOC, Colombo cannot be held responsible for the views expressed, or for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
ISBN: 978-955-1281-81-6
Transparency International Sri Lanka. All rights reserved.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 01ABBREVIATIONS 02PREFACE 03 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 04INTRODUCTION 11 ABOUT THE ASSESSMENT 11
1. SRI LANKA’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 13 ECONOMY 13 POLITICS 14 SOCIETY 17 LEVELS OF CORRUPTION 18
2. INSITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF CIABOC 20 FINANCIAL RESOURCES 21 HUMAN RESOURCES 22 STRUCTURE 23 PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH 24
3. KEY FINDINGS 25 LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND STATUS 26 FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 28 DETECTION AND INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS 30 PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH FUNCTIONS 32 COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 33 ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 34 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CIABOC’S EFFECTIVENESS 35
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 58 RECOMMENDATIONS 59
ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT 61 ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES 62ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED 63ANNEX 4: REFERENCES 64
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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ABBRIEVIATIONSACA Anti-Corruption AgencyAG Attorney GeneralBASL Bar Association of Sri LankaCC Constitutional CouncilCIABOC Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption CPI Corruption Perceptions IndexCSO Civil Society OrganizationDG Director GeneralFCID Financial Crimes Investigations DepartmentGCB Global Corruption BarometerGDP Gross Domestic ProductJVP JanathaVimukthi PeramunaMP Member of ParliamentNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationPA People’s AlliancePRECIFAC Presidential Commission to Investigate & Inquire into Serious Acts Of Fraud, Corruption & Abuse of Power, State Resources & PrivilegesSLFP Sri Lanka Freedom PartyTISL Transparency International Sri LankaTU Trade UnionUNCAC United Nation’s Convention Against CorruptionUNODC UN Office on Drugs and CrimeUNP United National PartyUPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance
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PREFACEA key aspect of the mission of Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) is to catalyse an effective and sustained movement against corruption in Sri Lanka. As part of this, TISL has been conducting research and undertaking advocacy initiatives on select sectors and institutions with the objective of improving governance and anti-corruption capacity. The reestablishment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption (CIABOC) as an independent Commission, following the enactment of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, has created an environment more conducive to CIABOC - Civil Society collaboration. It is in this environment that TISL has been able to conduct this unprecedented assessment of CIABOC.
Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) such as CIABOC are specialized institutions within their respective national integrity systems, given their mandate to control and prevent corruption. It is imperative that ACAs operate independently, transparently, accessibly, accountably and effectively. In doing so they should enjoy public trust. They must have the legal mandate and institutional strength to operate with a reputation of efficiency, impartiality, objectivity and professionalism.
Transparency International undertook an initiative to engage with anti-corruption agencies in a process of conducting evidence-based research to examine their performance and identify challenges in selected jurisdictions. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. The tool took into consideration such dimensions of assessment as the legal independence of the ACA concerned, its financial and human resources, investigative capacity, prevention, education and outreach functions, cooperation with related organizations, its accountability and oversight functions and finally, the level of public trust it enjoys.
Using this tool, TISL carried out an assessment of CIABOC, through a process of engagement with all stakeholders concerned. This was a comprehensive study of its performance, using as many as 50 indicators with the above-mentioned dimensions. The assessment was aimed at providing an objective analysis of CIABOC’s potential and performance as well as opportunities for improvement. Under each dimension, it also provides a set of recommendations consistent with the analysis. We believe that the study will be helpful in strengthening CIABOC’s effectiveness. We also trust the study will be useful for other stakeholders interested in understanding the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the challenges and opportunities faced by Sri Lanka’s apex anti-corruption body.
In conclusion we would like to recognise the tireless efforts of independent researcher Dr. Jani de Silva in conducting the study. We would also like to express our gratitude for the technical assistance provided by TI’s Asia Pacific Department and the invaluable peer review provided by TI-Bangladesh. Finally, we are grateful to those who held the office of Director General CIABOC during the assessment period and the staff of CIABOC, as well as a large number of key informants whose insights contributed substantially to the study.
S.C. Asoka ObeyesekereExecutive DirectorTransparency International Sri Lanka
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) suggests that the best way for nations to combat corruption is by enacting legislation for the creation of an independent body dedicated to such a task. Such bodies could enforce and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. A well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is seen as absolutely critical for good governance in any national context. In 2012, Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world, came together in Jakarta to develop a persuasive set of rules and standards for ACAs. These subsequently became known as the Jakarta Principles.
Informed by these principles, Transparency International (TI) has developed an initiative which aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia Pacific region. The ‘Anti-Corruption Strengthening Agency Initiative’ combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy, at both national and regional levels. Under this initiative, TI has developed a practical and comprehensive benchmarking tool aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 though a collaborative and comprehensive dialogue between TI, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International.
Employing this tool, Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) implemented an assessment of Sri Lanka’s Anti-Corruption Agency, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC). The objectives of this assessment were:
1. To provide CIABOC with up-to-date information regarding its performance and opportunities for improvement; and
2. To provide all stakeholders committed to tackling corruption in the island with a better understanding of the enabling and disabling factors which affect the ACA’s effectiveness.
METHODOLOGYDuring the period under review,1 the membership of the Commission as well as the position of the Director-General underwent changes. In line with the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, a new Commission was appointed in October 2015. A new DG had already been appointed in February 2015. Upon her resignation, another DG was appointed in December 2016.
The methodology used in this assessment incorporated all these shifts and comprised of the following steps:
1. A literature survey–this involved a review of legislation, White Papers, studies on relevant issues, journal articles, tabloid and electronic media, including websites and collecting statistical data from state departments and non-state groups.
2. Key informant interviews – these involved discussions with Heads of government departments, Members of Parliament, political party leaders, CSO leaders, journalists and academics active in the anti-corruption field
3. Interviews with the key stakeholder – this involved two extended interviews with the former Director General (DG) of CIABOC (Feb 2015 – October 2016), and two senior members of staff.
4. Discussion and justification of assessment scores with the key stakeholder – this took place at a meeting with former DG on 10.11.2016 and with the new DG (appointed 01/12/2016) on 15.12.2016.
5. External peer-group review (TI Secretariat/TIB).
1. November 2013 – November 2016
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The reference period for the assessment on the Anti-Corruption Agency was three years (November 2013-November 2016). Data collection took place between 1st September and 30th November 2016.
Table 1: Dimensions of Assessment
DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT NUMBER OF INDICATORS
1. ACA’s Legal independence and Status 72. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 93. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 94.ACA’s Prevention, Education & Outreach Functions 95. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 56. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 47.Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7
Total 50
METHOD OF SCORINGThe main findings of the assessment were based on a set of 50 indicators, divided into seven categories (see table 1 above). These indicators are fashioned to capture the capacity and effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Agency, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the level of standards set for each of the indicators. In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the scores were converted from the 1 - 3 scale to a 0 – 2 scale. Thus all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). For a clear understanding of the categories as well as the overall score, it has been classified into three groups – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% - 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% - 66%, and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0 – 33%.
KEY FINDINGSAccording to this assessment, the overall score for Sri Lanka’s ACA or CIABOC is 56.67%, which falls into the ‘moderate’ category. It is just 9 points below the borderline of the ‘high’ score. It suggests that CIABOC only needs to improve its performance on a few indicators to reach a high score. While 19 indicators out of 50 scored ‘high’, 22 fell into the ‘moderate’ category and only 9 scored low. Thus 38% of all indicators are high-performing.
It can be seen that the strongest showing was made by the dimension assessing CIABOC’s Legal Independence and Status (92.8%). Six indicators scored high and one moderate. This indicates that its ability to emerge as an independent and autonomous body is high. The score is marred only by the fact that the procedure followed in appointing Commissioners is not mandated, but depends on any steps the Constitutional Council (CC) may choose to take. The dimension to score the lowest involved CIABOC’s Accountability & Oversight functions (25%). This suggests that while CIABOC in fact enjoys a substantial extent of legal independence, its accountability mechanisms are weak. As a public body funded by the taxpayer, CIABOC needs to exhibit a greater degree of transparency in its internal workings.
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93%
72.22%
50.00%
66.66%
40.00%
25.00%
50.00%
56.67%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
ACA's Legal Independence &Status
ACA's Financial and HumanResources
ACA's Detection &Investigation Functions
ACA's Prevention, Education& Outreach Functions
ACA's Cooperation withOther Organizations
ACA's Accountability &Oversight Functions
Public Perceptions of theACA's Performance
Overall Score
Figure 1: CIABOC’s Score by Dimension
The next highest dimension deals with CIABOC’s Financial & Human Resources (72.22%) in which five indicators scored high, three moderate and one low. Here the most under-performing indicator did so because of larger macroeconomic and structural factors, such as the proportion of CIABOC’s budget to the national budget. The indicators on the security and stability of CIABOC’s budget and the salary and benefits enjoyed by its personnel also scored moderate. Still, both these indicators are also not directly under CIABOC’s control at the moment. The indicator addressing the level of expertise among investigators scored moderate as well, and this needs to be addressed.
CIABOC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach functions performed better than the overall score (66.66%). Two other dimensions, i.e. its Detection and Investigative functions (50%) and Public Perceptions of CIABOC’s performance (50%) performed more or less comparably to the overall score. Two dimensions scored much less than the overall score, i.e. its Cooperation with Other Organizations (40%) and its Accountability and Oversight function. Since these functions are so critical to CIABOC’s overall performance, this emerges an area of some concern.
In sum then, CIABOC‘s strengths included its legal independence and status, in terms of adequate mandate and legal powers, and the fact that – at this point - the government refrains from interfering in its routine work. In the new political climate which prevails, its investigators have been steadily building up their detection skills. Innovative prevention and outreach programmes are in place. Responsiveness to corruption complaints have improved significantly over the past two years. Most significantly, CIABOC shows a readiness to investigate influential persons without fear or favour. They have also succeeded in persuading women to come forward and complain about offenses committed against them.
The summary of dimension-wise findings is given below.
CIABOC’S LEGAL INDEPENDENCE & STATUSIn this dimension, six out of seven indicators have scored high. The only area of ambiguity is the procedure for appointing Commissioners, who are appointed by the President on the advice of the Constitutional Council (CC). In practice, the CC called for nominations from the public for the post of Commissioners, and subjected nominees to an interview.
But this process is not mandated. Thus the transparency and fairness of the selection process depends on the efforts of the members who comprise the CC at any given point. This is a area of potential weakness. CIABOC’s legal powers which are wide, rests on three legislative acts: (a) the Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994 which enables the setting up of CIABOC as an independent commission to deal with bribery in the public sector (b) The Bribery (Amendment) Act No.20 of 1994 which introduces a new offense of
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‘corruption’ and (c) the Assets and Liabilities Law No.1 of 1975. Its mandate is comprehensive and its legal powers are wide-ranging. However, the extent of CIABOC’s operational autonomy is questioned by those civil society groups and trade unions active in the anti-corruption field. The issue of whether the regime is using CIABOC as a weapon against its opponents also remains a charged one, with political figures outside the present coalition-in-power claiming that this is so. But their arguments are diverse and at times contradictory, and in the end, work towards substantiating CIABOC’s categorical claim that they have faced no political interference in their work.
CIABOC’s FINANCIAL & HUMAN RESOURCESThis dimension has also performed well (72.22%). The only indicator scoring low refers to the average proportion of CIABOC’s budget to the total budget, which while it indicates the priorities of the present government, is outside CIABOC’s control. The security and stability of CIABOC’s budget is also under dispute. Still, CIABOC feels its budgetary allocation is entirely sufficient for its needs.2 Another area of moderate performance involves the salary and benefits of CIABOC personnel, which, though accepted as adequate by serving personnel, at the same time prevents CIABOC from attracting the kind of talent which can make a difference in terms of raising conviction rates. Other public bodies and CSOs engaged in the anti-corruption front remain dissatisfied with the levels of expertise of investigation personnel. Though staff selection criteria scored high, the large number of vacancies for investigators at CIABOC testifies to the inadequacy of this method of selection for the quality of staff needed by the Commission. But the focus on training investigators has intensified over the past two years. Prevention and outreach activities have also picked up remarkably.
CIABOC’s DETECTION & INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONSThis dimension recorded three areas of low performance. The most significant of these referred to average rates of convictions. While CIABOC feels its legal officers are competent in drafting charges, it admits that they lack the advocacy skills to conduct their prosecutions in court effectively. Thus out of 413 charges brought to court, only 54 convictions were secured.3 CIABOC’s indicator on asset recovery is affected by the low rate of convictions. Another important indicator which scored low involved the failure to separate out the gender profile of complainants. The final indicator to score low involved the willingness to initiate inquiries on its own. This power of initiation, however, was only granted to CIABOC by the 19th Amendment in May 2015.
While CIABOC’s accessibility to complainants and informants, including whistleblowers over the past three years has been creditable, their responsiveness to the complaints received is seen as problematic. Anonymous complaints remain a persistent factor. But up to a third of all complaints have been submitted by groups such as political parties, trade unions and concerned CSOs engaged in anti-corruption activity who represent large constituencies and tend to compile complaints in large numbers.4 Many of them reiterate that their complaints have not been addressed.
Further, unlike before, the present Commission has proceeded to interrogate many influential political figures - including a serving cabinet minister, defence secretary, three former heads of the Sri Lanka Navy – and they should be given credit for this. Against this, critics point out that no convictions have been secured to date.5
CIABOC’S PREVENTION, EDUCATION & OUTREACH FUNCTIONS This dimension scored somewhat above the overall score (66.66%). An important indicator to score low involved research and exploration of corruption risks, contexts and conditions. This indicator is significant. Research into the context of corruption will equip CIABOC staff to target its prevention activities with more precision.
Another indicator which remained moderate involved the proportion of the budget allocated to prevention and outreach activities over the past three years, which did not reach the prescribed target of 1% of the total budget. Still, CIABOC has succeeded in initiating many activities with these funds. A final area of weakness involves the information on its website and the quality of the Annual Report, which does not measure up to standard report-writing criteria.
2. Interview with CIABOC’s ex-DG on 10.11.2016.3. However, CIABOC works with a group of 10 legal consultants who are members of the AG’s dept, and who are seen as very able (interview with ex-DG, CIABOC on 2.11.2016). 4. The JVP’s Dushanna Virodhi Handa says they have submitted around 150 complaints, the Dushana Virodhi Sanvidanaya which is a coalition of many groups, more than 500. The UNP MP Ranjan Ramanayaka also states that he has handed in over 150 complaints. Finally, the Dushana Virodhi Peramuna says they have given in 225 complaints (Ada of 24/10/2016)5. CIABOC maintains that the complexity to such cases demands extensive investigations and extended court hearings, which is why convictions have not been made.
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CIABOC’S COOPERATION WTH OTHER ORGANIZATIONSThis is somewhat troubling terrain. While at one level CIABOC would appear to receive the support of the AG’s department in handling prosecutions – even to the extent of hiring staff from the Department on a consultancy basis – in the end, rates of conviction remain low.
The level of cooperation between CIABOC and the other two other integrity agencies, the Financial Crimes Investigations Department (FCID) and the Presidential Commission to Investigate & Inquire intoSerious Acts Of Fraud, Corruption & Abuse of Power, State Resources & Privileges (PRECIFAC) is low. While they communicate in order to avoid duplicating work, there does not seem to be a coordinated strategy for approaching complex cases or complaints against influential figures. Cooperation between CIABOC and NGOs, including CSOs is somewhat problematic. Some trade unions and CSOS, especially those linked to leftwing political parties complain that CIABOC’s attitude towards the public is adversarial rather than supportive. A few CSOs however, say they were treated with civility, but agree that their complaints have not met with the response they anticipated after the electoral change of Jan 2015.
CIABOC’S ACCOUNTABILTY & OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONSHere the record is dismal. According to its enabling legislation (1994) CIABOC is required to produce an Annual Report detailing its activities, which is to be sent to the President. He then makes it available to Parliament. In practice, CIABOC’s Annual Report was uploaded onto its website for the first time in 2015. While the website is freely accessible, the information provided is somewhat limited. While CIABOC is answerable to the CC, in practice there is no external oversight mechanism in place. Internal procedures seem equally weak. This is a serious structural weakness in an integrity agency.
The procedure for dealing with complaints against CIABOC personnel is also inadequate. Internal mechanisms for investigating complaints against its own personnel seem very weak. Since CIABOC’s investigators are drawn from the police department, they fall under the disciplinary code of the Police Ordinance. They can only be disciplined by the HR Dept of the Police. But there does not seem to be a clear procedure for investigation even by the Police Dept, which often simply transfers officers out rather than take appropriate legal measures against them. Thus the outcome of complaints against CIABOC or its personnel in the past three years is that no punitive action is actually taken. In one instance there has been mention of a ‘probe’, the outcome of which remains shrouded in secrecy. This remains a major area of weakness.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CIABOC’S PERFORMANCEAccording to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2016) 43.9% of respondents felt that CIABOC was performing its role well or very well. Against this 26.1% were dissatisfied with its performance. Public confidence in CIABOC’s adherence to due process, impartiality and fairness in using its powers was also mixed. On the one hand, some influential figures who are outraged at being interrogated tend to publicly express consternation at their treatment. On the other, lower-status persons as well as members of critical CSOs feel that CIABOC is attempting to intimidate them. They point out that their complaints – though carefully crafted – have met with no response from the Commission. A significant proportion of those who have had direct contact with CIABOC interviewed by the research team are members of CSOs and political activists who represent organizations. They belong to the category of persons who have filed complaints on massive fraud of gigantic dimensions which the CIABOC, understandably enough in the present political climate, has been somewhat hesitant in investigating. This in turn makes them critical of CIABOC.
The other category of persons who have had direct contact with CIABOC are ordinary citizens. They tend to be intimidated by the somewhat adversarial approach assumed by CIABOC’s Receiving Officers, who, they complain, interrogate them as if they were offenders themselves. While both categories of complainants agree that many anonymous complaints may be motivated by petty revenge, they point out that CIABOC’s receiving officers cannot always assume this, and need to treat every complainant with greater respect and assume a more professional stance.
Among those who had had direct contact with CIABOC accessed by the research team, once again the response was mixed. A UNP MP who is a deputy minister in the government expressed satisfaction with the performance of CIABOC. However, it is not possible to say that those members of CSOs, NGOs and political parties interviewed expressed similar satisfaction.
Finally, the research team was not able to access any female complainants. Still, among raids into complaints of bribery and corruption cited on CIABOC’s website between 2012-16, there are five instances of female plaintiffs who cite demands for sexual gratification in lieu of money, for political favours or administrative services. Of these, two such charges have resulted in convictions, with sentences including two years rigorous imprisonment suspended for ten years. This is an impressive achievement in a conservative Asian society.
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RECOMMENDATIONSLegal independence and status
1. The procedure assumed by the Constitutional Council for the appointment of Commissioners – i.e. calling for nominations from the public and subjecting nominees to an interview process – should be mandated in order to ensure greater transparency.
Human and financial resources
2. CIABOC should proceed to recruit a special unit of approx 8 to10 staff who are equipped to deal with white collar crime – inclusive of chartered accountants, criminal justice professionals and qualitative social science researchers – at suitable rates of remuneration. They should be provided with recurrent training which would help them stay abreast of best practices in investigation and research.6
3. To deal with complicated cases or cases relating to grand corruption –CIABOC should initially recruit a 3 to 4 member experienced legal team led by a leading national-level prosecutor from the AG’s Department to prosecute charges in court. It should also set in place a system of rewards if convictions are secured.
4. Establish a new high court complex, preferably sited in Colombo, which is dedicated to hearing bribery and corruption cases under a trial-at-bar.
Detection and Investigation Function
5. Create an official forum for the exchange of ideas with FCID and PRECIFAC, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank, the Auditor General, Heads of the Customs/Excise departments, and if relevant, the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) in order to forge a coordinated and productive approach to complex and large-scale corruption and money laundering cases or suspects who may have influential support in government or through private investors/entrepreneurs, or underworld connections.
6. Should retain a separate register to identify the gender of complainants
Prevention, education and outreach functions
7. Should seek donor assistance to engage in qualitative research into corruption risks, contexts and conditions in Sri Lankan society.
Accountability and oversight functions
8. Produce a high quality Annual Report according to standard report-writing criteria
9. Provide Parliament with progress reports every two months.
10. A preliminary inquiry procedure should be devised by the Commissioners/DG to be deployed In the event of complaints against CIABOC staff. The procedure should ascertain the accuracy of the sequence of events cited in the complaint, and then expeditiously arrange a disciplinary hearing with the Police HR Department, at which either a Commissioner or DG also participates.
11. In the event of evidence of wrong-doing by CIABOC staff, disciplinary action must be taken and publicized on CIABOC’s website.
12. CIABOC’s confidentiality clause should be re-defined to cover only information pertaining to on-going investigations and court cases. There should be provision for senior CIABOC investigative staff to profitably share ideas on how to approach politically-sensitive or complicated cases strategically through a forum with the auditor general and other integrity bodies.
6. A cabinet draft has already been submitted for this cadre, but its composition should include higher quality staff.
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Table 2 - Assessment Summary: Indicators by dimension
DimensionACA’s legalindependence & status92.85%
ACA’sFinancial& HumanResources72.22%
ACA’sDetection & investigation function50%
Prevention, Education & OutreachFunctions66.66%
ACA’s cooperationwith otherorganizations40%
ACA’sAccountability & Oversight25%
Publicperceptions of the ACA’s performance50%
Legal indepen-dence
Average ratio of ACA’s budget to total national budget
Accessibility to corruption complainants /informants, including the public & whistleblowers
Average ratio of operating expenditure allocated to public out-reach and prevention
Govt support to ACA for prosecution of corruption cases
Information provided in and accessi-bility of ACA’s Annual Report & website
Public confidence that govt has given ACA required powers & resources to curb corruption
Mandate Sufficiency of budget
Responsive-ness to corruption complaints
Corruption prevention initiatives
Cooperation between ACA and other integrity agencies
Oversight mechanisms
Public trust in ACA’s adherence to due process & impartiality
Legal powers Security & stability of budget
Willingness to initiate corruption investigations.
No of reviews of organizational procedures, systems & capabilities
Cooperation between ACA and NGOs
Procedure for dealing with complaints against ACA personnel
Trust in ACA’s dignified and respectful treatment of persons under investigation
Appointment of Commission-ers
ACA personnel’s salary & benefits
Average no of cases investigated per year
Frequency of including corruption prevention recommenda-tions in investigation reports
Participation in international Networks
Outcome of complaints against ACA or its personnel
Public perception of ACA’s effectiveness in corruption control
Term of office & removal of Commission-ers
Selection criteria for ACC personnel
Efficiency & professionalism of corruption investigations
Plan for prevention, education & outreach & implementation
Cooperation with ACA’s in other countries
Views of ACA’s effectiveness in corruption- control among persons with contact with it
Operational Autonomy & impartiality
Expertise of personnel in corruption investigation
Average conviction rate of corruption cases
Collaboration with other stakeholders in prevention, education & outreach
Views on ACA’s effectiveness in dealing with complaints in women who had contact with it.
Govt’s reliance on ACA as a weapon against politi-cal opponents
Expertise of ACA’s staff in prevention & education
Willingness to investigate influential persons for corruption
Research and exploration of corruption risks, context & conditions
Training of personnel
Role in restitution, asset recovery, freezing and confiscation
Diffusion of cor-ruption preven-tion information/ campaigns
Stability of personnel
Identifying gender in compiling complaints
Use of social media & website for diffusion of information on corruption prevention
High Moderate Low
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The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) proposes that national legal systems should take steps to create independent bodies to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies. This proposal is based on the conviction that a well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is absolutely vital for good governance in any national context. Subsequently, in 2012, the Jakarta Principles - which were developed in consultation with a selected number of Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world - emerged as a widely-endorsed standard of accountability for an effective anti-corruption agency.7
In practice, assessment against these standards is somewhat sporadic. This is partly due to a lack of political will by governments to scrutinize their own oversight mechanisms. Another reason is the lack of an appropriate and viable tool with which to measure performance. Transparency International (TI) has responded to this opportunity by developing an initiative aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia and Pacific region. The proposed ‘Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative’ combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels.
Under this initiative, TI has developed a practical and comprehensive benchmarking tool aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 through a collaborative dialogue between Transparency International, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International.
Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) carried out an assessment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) of Sri Lanka. The assessment was aimed at providing CIABOC with up-to-date information regarding its current performances and opportunities for improvement in the future. It is also intended to provide a better understanding of the enabling and disabling factors which affect the ACA’s efficacy to all stakeholders committed to tackling corruption in the country.
Consequently, this report comprises the findings of this independent assessment of CIABOC conducted by TISL. In addition to a comprehensive evaluation of CIABOC’s performance in relation to a set of relevant indicators, the report provides some suggested approaches to address the key challenges. This report therefore serves as a guide for both CIABOC as well other interested stakeholders to strengthen and expand the impact of anti-corruption efforts in Sri Lanka.
ABOUT THE ASSESSMENTTISL carried out an assessment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) between 15 August 2016 and 30 November 2016. The research was led by an independent consultant, Ms. Jani de Silva, Phd (LSE), TISL’s research team and TI Secretariat’s Asia Pacific team.
During the period under review however, CAIBOC’s leadership underwent many shifts. In line with the requirements of the 19th Amendment (May 2015), a new Commission was appointed. A new Director General had already been appointed in February 2015. Upon her resignation in Nov 2016, another appointment to the post was made in December 2016.
The assessment process attempted to incorporate all these developments, and involved five key elements.This included White Papers, analyses of the legislation, legal reviews and discussions in the tabloid and electronic media, including newspapers, journals, official and unofficial statistics, websites etc.
INTRODUCTION
7. The principles can be found in UN office on Drug and Crime, Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies, 26-27 November 2012, available at https://www.uodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_6_Preventive_anti-corruption_bodies/JAKAR-TA_STATEMENT_en.pdf.
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Secondly, between 01.09.2016 - 30.11.2016, the research team conducted extensive interviews with key informants, ranging from government departments such as the Attorney General’s Department, the Auditor General, MPs, Members of Parliamentary Committees, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, academics and anti-corruption groups in civil society (see list of interviewees in Annex 2).
Interviews with the stakeholders were delayed due to overseas travel by the Commissioners and DG. The DG resigned unexpectedly at this point. However, since she had been in place through much of the research period (Feb 2015-Oct 2016), the research team met with her and two members of staff on two subsequent occasions on 2.11.2016 and 10.11.2016. At the second meeting the key findings and assessment scores were presented and discussed.
On the completion of this meeting, an internal peer review was conducted by TISL. Subsequently, a draft report of the key findings and adjusted scores was sent to the new DG, (appointed on 01.12.2016), and the Commissioners on 06.12.2016. The findings and scores were discussed in detail with the new DG on 15.12.2016.
Finally, an external peer review by the Transparency International Secretariat/Transparency International Bangladesh completed the assessment.
The assessment tool is designed to capture internal and external factors impacting on the ACA as well as getting a sense of its reputation and actual performance. Consequently, a comprehensive indicator framework made up of 50 different Indicators has been developed in consultation with experts (see Annex 1). These indicators are developed with the intention of providing a platform to assess the capacity and effectiveness of CIABOC and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity.
The indicators inquire into seven different dimensions (see table 1 below). Each indicator has three possible scores - high, moderate and low – and three defined levels of value for each indicator, depending on the condition assessed. To score each indicator, the research team identified the specific details where necessary, from CIABOC themselves, their website, reports by NGOs and international organizations. Each score was further substantiated by in-depth interviews with other stakeholders in the anti-corruption struggle, concerned government agencies, government departments and civil society organizations.
This report is divided into four sections. Section 1 describes Sri Lanka’s basic economic, political, and social characteristics and the perceived level of corruption. Section 2 explores the legal and constitutional backdrop within which the Bribery Commission operates.
Section 3 presents the key findings and a detailed assessment of each indicator, with comments on key issues and specific gaps have also been identified. Section 4 presents a brief set of conclusions and Transparency International’s recommendations for strengthening CIABOC.
Table 2: Dimensions of Assessment
DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT NUMBER OF INDICATORS
1. ACA’s Legal independence and Status 72. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 93. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 94.ACA’s Prevention, Education & Outreach Functions 95. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 56. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 47.Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7
Total 50
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ECONOMYInto the second decade of the new millennium, Sri Lanka remains a lower middle-income state. The island struggles to overcome economic issues faced by many small, multi-ethnic states. The island is situated at a strategic point on the main East-West Indian Ocean shipping routes. In the early-19th century, the British saw this location as an ideal site from which to position themselves in their attempts to wrest military control of the Indian subcontinent. But the age of globalization brings new options. The present government aims to exploit its location to develop the island into a financial and trading hub in South Asia.8
Such optimism about the possibilities of the Sri Lankan economy could only blossom after the ending of the debilitating 26-year-old civil war. In 2009, the United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA) scored a resounding military victory over separatist Tamil rebels. The victors seized the moment to call presidential elections, which they won by a decisive margin. But celebrations were short-lived. International condemnation of the human rights abuses said to have occurred during the final, bloodiest stages of the war grew more unremitting over the months. In the triumphalism of victory though, the UFPA would brook no criticism. Consequently, in 2010, the European Union withdrew Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status.9 This was a serious blow to the economy.
At this point the economy - already reeling from the global escalation of oil prices in 2004 to 2007 – faced unprecedented pressure on its balance of payments. Over the next few years, the extreme volatility in global financial markets impacted on Sri Lanka’s exchange rates and interest rates. The economy also faced the adverse effects of climate change in the form of extremities of weather; droughts followed by floods.
Despite such ill omens, the UPFA coalition attempted to address the devastation caused by decades of war by embarking on a massive infrastructure-building strategy. This initiative was financed by commercial as well as concessional foreign funds. The sudden influx of millions of dollars into a dormant economy led to an unrestrained spending spree by UPFA political figures at the national, provincial and local levels. Tender procedures were often by-passed, regulations waived and accounting conventions flouted. But the economy grew at an astonishing average of 7.27% between 2011-14.10
Further, these developments were accompanied by a de facto concentration of powers in the hands of the Presidential family. The President’s brother was Defense Secretary. He wielded power over Sri Lanka’s numerically formidable armed forces, vast swathes of land still under occupation in the Tamil-speaking areas and prime real estate in the capital owned by the army. Another brother was Speaker of Parliament. A third held the powerful Economic Development portfolio which spearheaded the infrastructure building programme. His son, nephews and cousins occupying key political and diplomatic posts led to charges of nepotism and cronyism. This created an environment of mounting claims of corruption against the UFPA at all levels and much public outrage.
In January 2015 a new coalition swept into power, comprised of reformist factions within the UPFA itself and the opposition United National Party (UNP). The UNP-UPFA coalition campaigned on a specifically anti-corruption and ‘good governance’ (yahapalanaya) platform. In the months which followed, law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies began investigating officials and politicians connected to the previous government on charges of corruption. In January 2017, the coalition succeeded in its efforts to recover GSP+ privileges for Sri Lanka’s exports.
1. SRI LANKA’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
8. Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, USA. 2016 Investment Climate Statements Report 5 July 2016(www.state.gov/e/eb/ris/other/ics/2016/sea/254491.htm (accessed on 19.11.2016). 9. Generalized Scheme of Preferences. These were specially significant for the burgeoning ready-made apparel sector.10. Central Bank of Ceylon, Review of the Economy (2014)
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The economic outlook, however, is not too promising. Migrant remittances grew from US $ 4,116 million in 2010 to US $ 6,980 million in 2015 but the trend is already weakening.11 Exports have declined. The rupee depreciated approx 9% in March 2015.12 Growth has dropped to 4.8%.13 The budget deficit also rose from 5.4% of GDP in 2013 to 7.4% in 2016.14 And in March 2016, rating agencies revised Sri Lanka’s credit rating outlook from ‘stable’ to ‘negative.’15 The UNP-UPFA coalition’s efforts to boost the economy are constrained by this large fiscal deficit which is the product of structural factors such as the slowing global economy as well as reckless spending by previous regimes.16
Still, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew marginally to reach US $ 82 billion.17 Per capita income went up to US $3,925 in 2015, which is still one of the highest in South Asia.18 In the first quarter of 2016 the economy expanded by 5.5% and in the second by 2.6%, compared to the previous year. It is projected to grow approx. 5.3% in 2016.19
While the economy stumbles, the pressure for the UFPA-UNP coalition to take steps to recover the billions of dollars said to have been siphoned off by the ex-President, his family and immediate associates is growing. This poses an even greater burden on integrity agencies such as CIABOC.
POLITICS
Sri Lanka received universal franchise in 1933. When independence arrived in 1948, a parliamentary system was already in place. The island also had a booming plantation economy yielding substantial export surpluses.20 In the early-1950s, a key faction broke away from the pro-capital United National Party (UNP) in power. The new group became the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Over the next decade, a two-party electoral system complete with the requisite capital/welfarist ideological repertoire had evolved.21
This promising start, however was soon shattered by political violence. By the 1970s, Sinhala-speaking Maoist insurgents had launched their first armed uprising and subsequently Tamil separatist rebels unleashed up to four ‘Eelam’ wars.22 These developments have impacted negatively on civic rights over the decades, vitiated democratic institutions and created loopholes for massive corruption to rear its head.
Over the first few decades, successive governments exploited export surpluses to set in place a substantial welfare network, including free universal education, healthcare and a subsidized public transport network. But with the secular decline in the terms of trade for primary products in the 1950s and 1960s, export surpluses began to diminish. A foreign exchange crisis ensued. This led to a decision to close the economy, in a desperate bid to conserve external assets. It marked the beginning of a regulated economy which prevailed over the next two decades. The state began moving into key industries and starting state ventures in strategic industries such as basic metal, cement, timber, ceramics and salt. But the excessive regulation of the economy led to abuses, nepotism and cronyism, all of which resulted in the gradual de-professionalization of the Public Service. It created a situation where in order for the ordinary citizen to obtain any kind of service from the state, officials had to be bribed.
By the early-1970s, the stagnation of the economy, rise in landlessness among the agrarian poor and high levels of unemployment – especially educated unemployment – paved the way for the first armed uprising of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).23 The April Uprising was soon crushed. However, the
11. Department of Census & Statistics, Colombo (2016).12. Ibid.13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.15. US Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, Investment Climate Statements 2016: Sri Lanka.16. According to the US Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs’ 2016 Investment Climate Statements report on Sri Lanka, the government carries a large foreign debt burden and a persistent current account deficit. This Foreign debt comprises of both commercial and concessional debt (including debt owed to China for massive investments on infrastructure). Also, the Sri Lanka governments’ tax revenue to GDP ratio is one of the lowest in the world.17. Department of Census & Statistics, Colombo (2016).18. Ibid.19. Ibid.20. Between 90-95% of Sri Lanka’s external assets were built on the export of three primary crops tea, rubber and coconut. Wriggins, Howard, (1960), Ceylon: the dilemmas of a new nation. Princeton University Press, Princeton21. The UNP has always tended to be pro-capital, while the SLFP nurtured social democratic/welfarist tendencies which unfolded in its electoral alliances with the parliamentary Left. Over the decades though, the UNP has learnt the electoral value of welfarism and the SLFP the need for investment capital for economic development. 22. ‘Eelam’ is a version of the Tamil name for Sri Lanka.23. The JVP was then a Maoist-led New Left grouping which broke away from the Old Left parties such as the Communist Party (CP) and the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Pakshaya (LSSSP) who were at that point part of the ruling United Left Front (ULF) coalition. The SLFP remained the leading bloc in the ULF. The JVP’s support base is Sinhala-speaking, and in the coming decades it evolved into an extremist Sinhala nationalist grouping.
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United Left Front (ULF) coalition-in-power, convinced that land hunger was the main motivation for this uprising, embarked on a massive land reform programme. This not only fragmented the holdings of all large landowners, but also impacted on the viability of the plantation agricultural sector. It paved the way for a shift of resources into industry.
In 1977, a swing of political power brought in the pro-capitalist United National Party (UNP). The UNP initiated a new Presidential Constitution, which concentrated powers in the Executive, in particular the office of the President. It allowed the President to appoint persons to key posts in the Public Service, which up to this point had been the prerogative of career public servants. This process began the gradual politicization of the already innervated public sector. It was accompanied with moves to liberate the economy, de-regulate import-export controls and attract Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). Such moves involved establishing Export-Processing Zones(EPZs),which became economic enclaves within which trade union activity was banned.
There were other attacks on civic rights. In 1978, the civic rights of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - the largest group in the ULF coalition - were removed under very dubious pretexts.24 This created a groundswell of dissent which began in the vibrant public sector trade unions and spread to the rest of the economy. By 1981, a call for a General Strike had emerged.
The strike was crushed by locking out 80,000 workers. This development set the stage for an increasingly repressive climate which rolled-back decades of civic rights. The conduct of the Referendum in 1982, which aimed to extend the term of the UNP without elections furthered this dismal trend. Finally in July 1983, the infamous anti-Tamil riot was orchestrated in which up to 1000 Tamil civilians died.
In the wake of the events of ‘Black July’, thousands of young Tamil-speaking men and boys joined a range of militant movements. This created the backdrop for the 1st Eelam War (1983-7). It ended with the signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in 1987. The Accord was signed due to unrelenting pressure from India.25 It included the Provincial Councils Act of 1987, which became the 13th Amendment to the constitution. The Act allowed for a measure of political devolution to the provinces. This was especially significant for the Tamil-speaking areas, which could then administer themselves Tamil rather than Sinhala as was the case elsewhere in the island. However, this move was seen by the Sinhala-speaking electorate as a concession to federalist demands by separatist militants. Dissent against the ILPA created the backdrop of the 2nd Uprising of the JVP (1987-90).
Table 3 - Policy context of Sri Lanka
DIMENSION DATA DATA SOURCESLand area 65,610 sq km Dept of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2016Population 20,843,463 Dept of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2016GDP per capita US $3,925 Dept of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2016Type of Government Presidential Democracy 2nd Republican Constitution (1978)Voice & Accountability Index (2014)
-0.72 (-2.5 to +2.5 )26 www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_voice_accountabilty/
Political Stability Index (2014)
-0.25(-2.5 to +2.5 )27 www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_political_stability/
Government effectiveness index (2014)
0.09(-2.5 to +2.5 ) www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_government_effectiveness/
Regulatory Quality Index (2014)
-0.08(-2.5 to +2.5 ) www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_political_stability/
Rule of Law Index (2014) 0.15(-2.5 to +2.5 ) www.theglobaleconomy.com/sri_lanka/wb_rule_of_law/
24. The actual reason given was her role in extending the rule of the SLFP 1975-77 under Emergency Regulations.25. At this point, India was affected since thousands of Tamil-speaking refugees, including militant activists, were moving into her southern state of Tamil Nadu, which was destabilizing this Tamil-speaking state.26. Voice & Accountability Index captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media. Sri Lanka was ranked 138 out of 192 countries.27. The index is a composite measure as it is based on several other indexes from multiple sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum, and the Political Risk Services, among others. The underlying indexes reflect the likelihood of a disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, international tensions, terrorism, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts. The methodology of the overall index is kept consistent so the numbers are comparable over time. You may also want to have a look at the following indicators: Sri Lanka was ranked 122 out of 191 countries.
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The July Uprising unfolded with excessive violence. Insurgent activists embarked on an assassination campaign which targeted leading political figures in the UNP, and later the armed forces. The UNP responded with great ferociousness. Between July 1987-October 1990, up to 60,000 persons are thought to have been killed.28 The July Uprising was crushed by October 1990. But soon after, the LTTE launched its 2nd Eelam War(1990-95).29 This military initiative ended with the fall of Jaffna in 1995.30 By this time, the UNP had been electorally defeated and the SLFP, which was now the leading partner in the People’s Alliance (PA) was once again in power. The 3rd Eelam war started soon after, and continued until 2000.Throughout this period, leading political figures from both the UNP and the SLFP were subject to assassinations and assassination attempts by the LTTE, including an attempt on Chandrika Bandaranaike, President and leader of the PA, in December 1999. She survived.31
She also survived subsequent Presidential elections. In order to arrest the deterioration of the public sector, in October 2001, the PA brought in the 17th Amendment to the constitution. This amendment established the Constitutional Council (CC) and seven independent commissions. It aimed to reduce the politicization of the public sector and create a space for officials to display greater impartiality in serving the public.32
However, her government fell in 2001, creating a space for the leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickramasinghe, to come in as Prime Minister.33 The UNP negotiated a second Peace Fire Agreement in February 2002. They also presented their pro-capital ‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ initiative, which called for increased liberalizations to tap the opportunities offered by globalization. However, an electoral shift in 2005 brought in the UPFA once again. In response to consistent cease-fire violations by the LTTE - including targeted assassinations of key political/military figures and suicide bombs in heavily populated areas - the PA launched what unofficially became the 4th and final Eelam war in 2007. The war was won in 2009.
Still, after the initial euphoria, it became clear that the termination of the war did not spell the immediate return of civic freedoms. In 2010, the PA also brought in the 18th Amendment which removed the constitutional provision which disallowed the President from contesting elections for more than two terms. It also dissolved the CC and brought all independent commissions under the authority of the President. Even more menacing was the unprecedented step taken by the President to throw his key electoral rival, ex-army chief General Sarath Fonseka - who in fact spearheaded the victorious war – into jail on very flimsy charges.34 This move created a great wave of disaffection throughout the electorate. A new climate of intolerance emerged, in which public political dissent was depicted by the regime in the state-controlled media as akin to betrayal of the Sinhala nation. Private media networks critical of the government were bombed or vandalized by PA-linked goons, journalists and political opponents threatened or even assassinated.35
A year later the regime presented legislation to Parliament which sought to enlarge the powers of the already all-encompassing Ministry of Economic Development. The ministry was headed by the President’s brother. But the Supreme Court rebuffed them. Astonishingly, the regime proceeded to bring impeachment charges against the Chief Justice, and rush these through Parliament, over which the PA now held a two-thirds majority.36 Despite a tremendous public outcry, she was removed. All these developments fuelled renewed calls by international human rights and workers rights organizations to call for investigations into the conduct of the final phases of the 4th Eelam war and subsequent developments.
It was in this fraught climate that a decision to call Presidential elections was made, in order to buoy up the Presidents’ political position internally in the face of rising popular dissension. In view of the fate of his previous rival, he remained confident that his bid would go unchallenged. However, at this point, Maithripala Sirisena, a leading figure in his own cabinet broke away, and campaigned with the opposition UNP. He brought a significant segment of the SLFP vote base with him. After his electoral victory, Sirisena regained control of the SLFP.
28. Lankadeepa Editorial of 247.04.1994 and Mirror of 14.04.1996, among others. This figure is of course contested by the UNP but confirmed by Colombo-based Human rights groups including Amnesty International.29. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) the leading Tamil militant group which dominated the movement over the next two decades.30. Jaffna is the largest city in the Tamil-speaking areas and the heartland of Tamil nationalism.31. She suffered heavy head injuries and lost an eye.32. Sri Lanka Country Report (2003), National Integrity Systems, Transparency International, UK, p 833. Ms. Bandaranaike retained her position as President, as enabled by the 1978 constitution.34. This move echoed the decision of the UNP leader J R Jayawardene in 1978 to abolish his rival’s civic rights.35. During this period, the editor of the critical Sunday Leader was assassinated in broad daylight; a free-lance cartoonist picked up and subsequently killed. Tamil journalist Sivaram was also picked up in broad daylight and later killed. Poddala Jayantha, a veteran Sinhala trade unionist was picked up, beaten by assailants and had both his arms broken. Tamil MP and journalist Raviraj was killed by unknown assailants. The mainstream privately-owned Sirasa TV network was bombed, the Siyatha TV station also suffered a similar fate. Sundry student activists and trade union protesters were also killed during this period.36. This is due to a dubious provision in the 1978 Constitution which allows MPs elected by a given party to shift their affiliation once in Parliament. This has led to much corruption since MPs can be bought over.
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Consequently, for the first time in the history of Sri Lanka’s two-party system, a coalition of the two largest parties remains in place. This enabled the passing of the 19th Amendment, which brought back the CC with renewed powers. Thus while the economy continues to stumble in the context of structural drawbacks, the political outlook is still optimistic.
SOCIETYSri Lanka has a land area of 65,610 sq km. The mid-year population in 2015 was approx 20,966 million. Population density remains stable at 334 persons per sq km.37 A multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, the majority of the population are Sinhala (74.9%), of whom 70.1% are Buddhists.38 The largest minority are Tamils (15.3%) of whom 12.6% are Hindus.39 9.3% of the population are Sri Lankan Moors who are Muslims, and mostly speak Tamil.40 Many urban Muslims are bilingual in Sinhala and Tamil.
Sri Lanka’s socioeconomic indicators are progressive. Unlike elsewhere in South Asia, male and female literacy levels are mostly on par, with men having a very slight edge: 94.1% vs 92.1%.41 Average life expectancy was 74.9 in 2014.42 Infant and maternal mortality remains significantly lower than in the rest of South Asia. The poverty head count ratio based on PPP US $ 1.25 per day, fell from 28.8 in 1995/96 to 6.7 in 2012/13.43 Thus while economic inequalities persists, social trends are encouraging.
Sri Lanka presently tops the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) for South Asia, ranking 73rd out of 188 countries.44 The island’s HDI score rose from 0.679 in 2000 to 0.757 in 2015.45 The average score for South Asia remains 0.607.46
Women are active participants in the labour force. Large numbers of women continue to travel to West Asia and West European states such as Italy and Greece as unskilled labour. This remains a controversial topic in Sri Lanka, since it has enabled the rise of various kinds of manpower-recruitment agencies, many of which exploit rural and under-aged women by demanding heavy ‘fees’ in exchange for foreign employment. This situation creates a space for bribery and corruption since once they arrive, many women find that their passports are confiscated by their employers, who sometimes do not pay them for months on end. In the process, such women undergo gratuitous humiliation and suffering while engaging in domestic work in alien cultural milieus. The government is attempting to upgrade the skills of such migrant workers so as to enable them to obtain better levels of remuneration and work conditions.
Many other female workers are employed in the ready-made apparel-making factories in the Export-Processing zones. While in the early phases of the setting up of these zones, unionization was banned, over the years, the sector has become increasingly organized, and succeeded in winning many rights and benefits for their workers.
Form the 1930s onwards, the dominance of Left parties within the political culture has, in many ways, radicalized Sri Lankan society.47 In particular, the urban working class is militant and trade-union oriented, though the repressions of the 1980-90s has had its impact. New Left parties such as the JVP which enacted violent uprisings in the early-1970s and late-1980s, were completely decimated by the early-1990s.48 However, they have succeeded in regrouping in the late-1990s and entering into parliamentary politics, often elevating the level of debate. The New Left has picked up the ‘progressive’ mantle of the Old Left – now decrepit and discredited - and their contribution to the debate on the need to raise national integrity levels has been most welcome. It was the JVP which successfully brought in the 17th Amendment - espousing a CC and independent commissions - by using their strategic leverage within the (then) SLFP-led UFPA coalition. It is a sad comment on Sri Lankan politics that historically, neither of the mainstream parties – the UNP and the SLFP – have favoured independent commissions, since – when in power - the politicization of the public sector has worked to their advantage.
37. Sri Lanka socioeconomic data (2016), Central Bank of Sri Lanka.38.Ibid.39.Ibid.40.Economic & social statistics of Sri Lanka (2016), Central Bank of Sri Lanka.41.Ibid.42.Ibid.43.Ibid.44.Human Development Report, UNDP (2015).45.Ibid.46.The Hindu, 23/01/2016.47. Interview with Head/Department of History, Colombo University, on 14/10/2016.48. Interview with JVP provincial councilor on 14/10/2016.
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The most problematic aspect of Sri Lanka’s democratic composition remains the Intense culture of hostility between the two component political parties of Sri Lanka’s two-party system – the UNP and SLFP - with a long history of blood-letting on both sides.
LEVELS OF CORRUPTIONCorruption takes place at many level in Sri Lanka. The most common forms of corruption involves bribes paid to avoid bureaucratic red tape and solicitation of bribes by government officials. This situation has its roots in the highly regulated conditions of the economy between 1950-1977. In such a culture, social prestige hinges on not being seen to abide by the rules, such as queuing up for rationed goods or for a routine administrative service. To be seen queuing up implied a lack of ‘contacts’ within administration or access to influential persons. Consequently, nepotism and cronyism spread across the public sector and state corporations, where employment is linked to political affiliation. Further, corruption in the public sector is a consequence of low salaries, which is a phenomenon many South Asian states are facing. Sri Lanka still lacks transparency in selection procedures to posts in the public sector. This stands in the way of a greater level of professionalism.
Until 2001, cabinet ministers were vested with the authority to make all appointments to the public service. Such a system results in the politicization of the public service. In 2001 the 17th Amendment removed this power from the cabinet and vested it in the Constitutional Council. The 18th Amendment passed in 2010, vitiated the powers of the CC. The 19th Amendment once again restored the CC in 2015. Thus over the period 2010-15, a de-professionalization of the public sector has taken place.49 The present UPFA-UNP coalition is struggling to make selection processes more transparent, but is hampered by its own ministers who are under pressure to provide employment to electoral supporters.
Corruption in the public service also constitutes a formidable hurdle for private enterprise. Private companies state that they frequently have to make irregular payments or bribes in connection with access to public utilities and the awarding of licenses.50 According to the World Bank, up to 8% of enterprises that deal with government licensing agencies make such unofficial payments. These amount to 5-6% of the official fee.51
Public procurement is an area marked by a qualitatively higher level of corruption.52 Corruption in public procurements impacts greatly on investors in large projects, and those seeking government procurement contracts. In some instances, public funds are sometimes channeled into private companies, individuals or groups. Government procurements are required to be advertised publicly. Unsuccessful bidders have one week to complain to the Procurement Appeal Board, which may then launch an investigation. Over the last two years, the government has begun investigating such complaints.53
Police immunity is also remains a serious problem, particularly in a situation where high levels of bribery and corruption complaints against police personnel prevail.54 The police force is perceived as the most corrupt public institution in Sri Lanka.55
International corruption monitoring groups insist that Sri Lanka’s judiciary is subject to corruption and manipulation by the political elite.56 Businesses report the judiciary is not independent, public trust in politicians is low and the government is not transparent.57 The independence of the judiciary is undermined by the harassment, attacks and threats meted out to judges.58 Corruption remains common in the lower courts, and persons willing to pay bribes have better access to the legal system. A quarter of Sri Lankans consider the judiciary to be corrupt.59
49. See also Transparency International: National Integrity System Assessment: Sri Lanka 2014.50. Global Competitiveness Report (2014-15), World Economic Forum.51. Governance in Sri Lanka(2013), World Bank.52. Ibid.53. In particular, the previous UFPA-led government (2010-14) is criticised for not following procurement procedures. Consequently, anti-cor-ruption groups have brought in many complaints of such instances. It is not possible to assess to what extent proper procurement procedures are presently in place, but the issue is endlessly discussed on many civic forums as well as the tabloid and electronic media, which creates pressure of the present UPFA-UNP coalition to act in a more circumspect manner. The coalition has embarked on investigations of the trou-bled, million-dollar loss-making national carriers, Air Lanka & Mihin Lanka, the abrogation of key maritime security functions of the Sri Lanka Navy by the Defense Secretary, and the granting of these functions to a private security company (Avaunt Garde), among other things.54. Human Rights Report – Sri Lanka 2013. US Department of State.55. Global Corruption Barometer 2013. Transparency International.56. See Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index – Sri Lanka (2014). Alsowww.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sri-lanka. 57. Global Competitiveness Report (2014-15), World Economic Forum.58. Freedom in the World – Sri Lanka (2014), Freedom House.59. Global Corruption Barometer 2013. Transparency International.
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Table 4 - Global indicators on corruption in Sri Lanka
INDICATOR RANK SCORE AND RANGECorruption Perceptions Index60 83`/175 37 (1 – 100)Global Competitiveness Index61 73/144 4.2 (1 – 7 )Irregular Payments and Bribes62 91/144 3.5 (1 – 7 )Government Effectiveness Index63 0.09 (-2.5 to +2.5)Control of Corruption Index64 -0.25 (-2.5 to +2.5)
60. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, Transparency International (www.transparency.org/cpi201561. http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/economies/#economy=LKA. 62. http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/63. www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sri_Lanka/wb_government_effectiveness/64. www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sri_Lanka/wb_control _of_ corruption/
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In 1994, a spectacular electoral swing brought the People’s Alliance (PA) coalition into power. The SLFP – the driving force behind the PA coalition - was at this point preoccupied with the reckless disbursement of funds by the UNP in their donor-driven development drive over the previous decade. Bribery and corruption was felt to be rife in the securing of development contracts and the misuse of public funds endemic. Thus, together with human rights, corruption became the main plank on the PA’s platform.
In order to strengthen the hand of the Bribery Commissioner and equip him to deal with the new flows of irregular payments into the economy in the 1990s, it was decided to amend the Bribery Act of 1954. The Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1994 was mooted, which enabled the setting up of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) as a permanent body. Parliament subsequently also passed the Bribery (Amendment) Act No 20 of 1994, which introduced the new offense of ‘corruption’ into the Bribery Act of 1954. These legislative acts enable the Commission to prosecute persons for offences under the Bribery (Amendment) Act as well as the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No. 1 of 1975.
The key objective of the 1994 legislation was to create an independent and autonomous body which could investigate the insidious forms of bribery which had manifested itself across the public sector. It also aimed at addressing a new range of corrupt practice which had emerged with the opening up of the Sri Lankan economy and the inflow of developmental funds over the 1980s.65 Act No 19 of 1994 Section 5 (a – l) enable CIABOC to discharge a range of functions, such as:
1. To obtain or receive either written and oral evidence, and examine anyone the Commission thinks is necessary to interrogate;
2. To summon any person to be examined by the Commission and to require him/her to answer – either orally on oath or affirmation - any question which the Commission may feel is relevant to the matter under investigation. It may also require him to state any facts relevant to the matter under investigation in the form of an affidavit;
3. To summon any person and require him to produce any document or other piece of evidence he has or is under his control;
4. To give written direction to the manager of any bank to produce, within a specified time, any book, document or cheque issued by them which contains entries relating to the personal accounts of anyone under investigation by the Commission (or the spouse, son, daughter of such a person, or a company of which he is a director, etc), or to furnish certified copies of such documents;
5. To give the Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue written direction to furnish all information he may have about the affairs of the person under investigation (or the spouse, son or daughter of such a person) and to provide a certified copy of such documents.
6. To direct in writing any official in charge of a Government department, the Mayor, Chairman, Governor or Chief Executive of a local authority or Provincial Council to produce any document or certified copies of such documents the Commission may think necessary;
7. To direct any person to furnish a sworn statement in writing which sets out all his movable and immovable property, and those belonging to his spouse, son or daughter. It should also state the way in which such properties were acquired, i.e. purchase, inheritance, bequest, etc.
8. To prohibit any other person to hold in trust for the person under investigation, or a company in which he is a partner from transferring ownership during a specified time period.
9. To give written direction to the Controller of Immigration & Emigration to impound the passport and other travel documents of the person under investigation.
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION
65. Bribery & Corruption in Sri Lanka: strengthening the institutional framework. White Paper, USAID, Colombo, 2007)
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Despite these wide-ranging powers, however, in the first six years, CIABOC was unable to make an impact on the high incidence of bribery and corruption which was unfolding during this period. While some of this was due to the on-going military initiatives (Eelam wars II and III), the ruling PA coalition’s grip of political power during this period was also somewhat tenuous, and failure of the Rule of Law to prevail remained a serious constraint on Commission’s authority.66
In 2001, the PA brought in the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, which established a Constitutional Council (CC) and seven Independent commissions, one of which was the CIABOC. This removed the appointment of Commissioners from the control of the President and vested it in the CC. However, in 2010, the 18th Amendment revoked all these powers. It abolished the ten member constitutional council and set up a parliamentary council under the President. It was the 19th Amendment, brought in by a coalition of the PA-UNP which restored the powers of the CC and was able to strengthen the powers of the independent Commissions, including CIABOC.
FINANCIAL RESOURCESCIABOC’s annual budget is decided by the Treasury. Although funds for the Commission are in theory voted on by Parliament, in operational terms the Treasury determines the release of these funds. In the past, this has been a real constraint. However, the present Commission has been much more successful in accessing these funds, due to a greater measure of political will displayed by this government, at least in the initial period.
Table 5 - Average Proportion of CIABOC’s recurrent expenditure to total Government recurrent expenditure for past 3 years
YEAR TOTAL GOVERNMENT RECURRENT
EXPENDITURE [SL RS.]
ALLOCATIONTO CIABOC
[SL RS.]
CIABOC ALLOCATION AS A PROPORTION OF GOVT
BUDGET2014 1,429,179,090,000 180,058,000 0.0125%2015 1,666,785,000,000 245,500,000 0.0147%2016 1,867,399,062,000 231,800,000 0.0124%2017 1,850,368,313,000 236,950,000 67 0.0128%Total 6,813,731,465,000 894,268,000 0.0132%
Source: Ministry of Finance, NBD - Budget Estimates – 2016 – Eng.pdf.
Thus 2015 saw a spike in the recurrent expenditure allocation to CIABOC (see table 5 above), this receded over, the next year. The projection for 2017 appear to signify a very slight recovery. The trend in capital expenditure, (see Table 6 below) however, is clearly declining.
Table 6 - Average Capital Expenditure by CIABOC to total Govt capital expenditure for past 3 years
YEAR TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
[SL RS.]
ALLOCATIONTO CIABOC
[SL RS.]
CIABOC ALLOCATION AS A PROPORTION OF GOVT
BUDGET2014 595,710,647,000 16,069,000 0.00269%2015 831,215,000,000 46,059,000 0.00554%2016 1,182,750,098,000 8,200,000 0.00693%2017 559,218,295,000 8,650,000 0.00154%Total 3,168,894,040,000 78,197,000 0.00246%
Source: Ministry of Finance, NBD - Budget Estimates – 2016 – Eng.pdf.
66. During the conduct of the local elections in 1997, a PA MP, Nalanda Ellawala was assassinated in broad daylight by a UNP rival and the PA was unable to even take legal action against the suspect (Susantha Punchinilame) despite dozens of eye witnesses, due to the vicious intimidation campaign conducted by the UNP. Random suicide bombs and assassination attempts against senior political figures added to the instability. 67. Projection in 2016 Budget Estimates/Ministry of Finance.
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HUMAN RESOURCES Between 1994-2014 CIABOC had 183 investigators and investigative officers who were seconded from the Police Department, and 170 civil staff.68 This made up a total cadre of 353. In 2015, with a temporary increase in cadre-levels to clear up the backlog, these numbers went up to 431 investigative staff and 371 civilians, with a total of 802. At present, the number of investigators have gone down to 198, which leaves 233 vacancies. Of this 198, 15 are on opening inquiries duties, 81 officers are working on corruption cases, 28 on assets-linked cases, 28 in setting-up raids, and 46 in supervision and administrative activities.69
Over the past two years, CIABOC has developed a consistent focus on training, with weekly in-house training sessions of up to 2 – 3 hours. These are conducted by retired Interpol officers, staff from other internationally reputed investigative bureaus and senior police officers. Investigative staff at different levels are frequently sent overseas for training and re-training. CIABOC’s investigators are also presently undergoing intensive training in IT skills. At the same time, serious efforts are being taken to make them more conversant in English.70
CIABOC investigates incidents upon receiving a complaint.71 It prosecutes offenders against whom there is evidence of bribery or acts of corruption. It also prosecutes offenders against whom there are allegations of recent accumulation of wealth beyond his or her known means. Such complaints must contain basic details about offenders in order for an investigation to commence. The Commission also works on raising awareness of what constitutes incidents of bribery or a corrupt act and prevention activities.
When complaints are received by the CIABOC, they are sent on to the Commissioners. However, sometimes the complaint does not fall within CIABOC’s purview since many complainants tend to send their complaints to multiple agencies in order to seek relief. If the complaint does not come within CIABOC’s remit or lacks sufficient evidence, it is closed. If it does, sent on to the DG who sends it on to the investigations division which is headed by the Director/Investigations.
The Investigations department may pursue one of four options1. Investigate illegal accumulations of wealth2. Lay traps; make arrests as bribe solicitation is in progress3. Investigate allegations of corruption4. Inquire into bribery action after the gratification is awarded.
Once the case is completed, the Director Investigations will report to the DG on the investigation’s findings. The DG will then seek advice from the Legal Branch on initiation of action against these findings. The DG keeps commissioners informed of decisions.
Table 7 - CIABOC Profile
JURISDICTION PUBLIC SECTOR NON-GOVERNMENTFunctions/mandate/powers
legislators Judiciary Police,Military
etc
Other Public service
Govt-owned corps
Public Contrators
Charities/NGOs
All busi-ness/ Some
business
1.Research, intelligence, risk Assessment & detection
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2.Corruption investigation (in response to complaints)
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
3.Corruption investigation (own initiative)
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
4.Prosecution powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
5.Asset recovery/restitutionConfiscation powers
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6.Prevention powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
7.Education & outreachPowers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Y = Yes, N = No
68. CIABOC’s Annual Report 2015.69. CIABOC’s Annual Report 2015, and interview with CIABOC staff on 10/11/2016.70. Interview with asst. director, investigations, CIABOC on 10/11/2016.71. The 19th Amendment passed in May 2015, allows CIABOC to initiate its own inquiries. However, they have not yet begun to do so.
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All CIABOC employees have a statutory obligation to protect the identity of the complainants, witnesses and informants under Section 23 of the CIABOC Act and the Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses Act No. 4 of 2015.
Table 7 shows that according to law, CIABOC has jurisdiction over all the public (legislators, judiciary, law-enforcing agencies and other public services) and non-governmental (government-owned corporations, public contractors, charities and NGOs and business) sectors.
STRUCTUREThe Commission consist of three members, one of whom is the Chairman.72 Two of the Commissioners are required to be retired Judges of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeal; and one of whom is a person with wide experience relating to the investigation of crime and law enforcement. All Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council.73
They will hold office for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment.74 The procedure for the removal of Commissioners is similar to that applied to a judge of the Supreme Court.
Figure 2 - CIABOC’S STRUCTURE
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the Director-General (DG) who reports directly to the Commissioners. The DG also manages the investigations and prosecutions subject to the direction of the Commission. He is also the Chief Accounting Officer of the Commission as well as the Chief Administrator (see figure 2 above)
The Commission comprises of three divisions, which are Investigations, Legal and Administration. The investigative section is the largest branch, with positions for 802 investigators, of whom there are only 353 investigators in place at present.
COMMISSIONERS(3)
DIRECTOR GENERAL
SECRETARIAT
LEGAL BRANCHDIRECTOR INVESTIGATIONS
DTY DIRECTORINVESTIGATIONS
CORRUPTION ADMIN UNIT. INVESTIGATORS (4 units)
ASSETS INVESTIGATION UNIT
RAIDS INVESTIGATION UNIT (4 units)
INQUIRIES OPENING UNIT
COURT PROSECUTIONS UNIT
ADMIN UNIT.
ASST DIRECTOR INVESTIGATIONS
ASST DIRECTOR INVESTIGATIONS
ADMINISTRATION
72. Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 (1994) section 2 (2a) and section 3.73. Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 (1994) section2 (2b).74. The Commissioner’s tenure is secure and they can only be removed on grounds of incapacity or misconduct and then only by an order of Parliament, supported by a parliamentary majority. [Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1994, section2 (2a) and (2b)].
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PREVENTION, EDUCATION & OUTREACH FUNCTIONSIn 2015, SL Rs.1,451,000/- was spent on prevention work, which amounted to 0.56% of CIABOC’s total budget for the year. Though this was below the projected target of 1%, much has been done with these funds.
While awareness activities were conducted between 2013-2014, these were somewhat sporadic.75 In 2015, CIABOC stepped-up its activities. They conducted an extensive awareness programme for state sector employees at 14 different locations. These ranged from regional police academies, traffic police headquarters, Department of Prisons and District Secretariats.
In December 2015, CIABOC officially launched their Action Plan, titled ‘Seven Steps to Zero Tolerance.’ This is a comprehensive plan which envisages working with three key demographic groups, i.e. school-going children, school leavers and adults. CIABOC has already submitted a draft cabinet paper for the setting up of Prevention Units to implement their Action Plan and is awaiting approval.
Meanwhile, CIABOC has been working with the National Institute of Education (NIE) which drafts syllabi and teacher-training materials for the Department of Education. The goal is to incorporate prevention and awareness concepts into primary syllabi and text books. Such concepts aim to change collective attitudes to corruption through culturally-relevant graphics, images, metaphors and narratives. These are being taught in primary classrooms, from January 2017. Meanwhile, extensive campaigns in secondary schools have already begun.76
Engaging with school-leavers will be on a more conventional lecture and discussion format, through ‘Youth Mobilizing Against Corruption’ (YMAC) groups organized by CIABOC’s prevention staff. Work with adults will involve the starting of a public dialogue on corruption by using print media and social media. The envisaged Prevention Unit will encompass seven sectors, i.e. the Immigration department, the passport office, the excise department, police department, Identity card unit and local govt institutions and the education sector. While the Unit are not yet in place, pending cabinet approval, CIABOC staff are working with officials in these sectors to identify possible loopholes where corruption could take place. They then recommend how these loopholes should be tightened. This work is however, on-going and it is therefore too early to comment on how effective they may be.77 The Action Plan also aims to work towards revising the law in keeping with the provisions of the 19th Amendment.
74. Such activities involved working with provincial-level councillors and administrative staff. A workshop was conducted at the Galle 75. Kachcheri conducted by an Addl. Solicitor General of the AG’s Department in September 2013, for members of the Southern Provincial Council in September 2013. In May 2014, an awareness programme on bribery and corruption laws was held for the members and civil servants of the Central Provincial Council (www.ciaboc.gov.lk)76. Interview with CIABOC staff on 10/11/2016.77. CIABOC Annual Report, 2015 and interview with CIABOC staff, 10/11/2016.
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3. KEY FINDINGSThe main findings of the assessment are based on a set of 50 indicators, divided into seven dimensions (see Table 1 above). These indicators are designed to assess the capacity and efficacy of the ACA, while identifying gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the standards set for each indicator (see table 7 for details of the standards). For a clear understanding of the dimensions as well as the overall score, they have been classified into three categories – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% - 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% - 66% and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0% - 33%.
In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the score was first converted from the 1 – 3 scale to a 0 – 2 scale. Therefore all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). This is done because when aggregating the scores and converting them into percentages, the bottom of the scale must always be 0. If the 1 – 3 scale was to be used, then the lowest possible score of any dimension would be 33% (i.e. 1/3). Once the scores are converted from the 1 – 3 scale to the 0 – 2 scale, scores received by each of the indicators of a dimension were added up and then divided by the total of the maximum possible scores for all indicators within that dimension and then multiplied by 100.
For example, the sum of the indicators under the first dimension (Anti-Corruption Agency’s Legal Independence and Status) was 13 (6 indicators received the maximum score of 2 and one received a ‘moderate’ score of 1). The maximum total possible for this dimension is 14 (i.e. 7 indicators x the maximum possible score of 2 for each). Thus the final aggregate score (percentage) for this dimension would be 13/14 x 100 = 92.85%.
According to this assessment, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) has achieved a ‘moderate’ score. It has an overall score of 56.67%. The dimension on CIABOC’s Legal Independence and Status scored the highest mark (92.85%). Six out of seven indicators scored high. This indicates that its ability to emerge as an independent and autonomous body is high. The dimension on financial and human resources also rated an overall high score of 72.22%. Here five indicators scored high, while three were moderate and one low. The low score related to the proportion of CIABOC’s budget to the national budget, which is perhaps a structural feature outside the Commission’s control at this point.
The dimension dealing with CIABOC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach functions scored above the overall score (66.66%). Two other dimensions, i.e. its Detention and Investigation functions (50%) and Public Perceptions of CIABOC’s performance (50%), scored roughly similar to the overall score of 56.67%. This is due to mixed results in the individual indicators within this dimensions. Its cooperation with other agencies in the anti-corruption sector scored somewhat lower (40%). Finally, one dimension – which relates to the Commission’s Accountability and Oversight functions – scored very low, which is a serious problem in an anti-corruption agency.
This implies that CIABOC has the potential legal independence to play a powerful role in shaping the direction of Sri Lankan politics, economy and society. It needs to build up its human resources a little more. Prevention plans have got off the ground, despite delays in cabinet approval. Its investigative functions and legal role need to be enhanced and the rate of convictions must improve. It needs to innovate better forms of cooperation with other anti-corruption bodies such as the FCID and PRECIFAC. Finally, CIABOC needs to work with parliament on oversight procedures relating to how it goes about implementing its mandate. At the same time, public concerns about the conduct of CIABOC staff must also be addressed, and internal measures have to be devised for dealing with complaints against its own staff.
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93%
72.22%
50.00%
66.66%
40.00%
25.00%
50.00%
56.67%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
ACA's Legal Independence &Status
ACA's Financial and HumanResources
ACA's Detection &Investigation Functions
ACA's Prevention, Education& Outreach Functions
ACA's Cooperation withOther Organizations
ACA's Accountability &Oversight Functions
Public Perceptions of theACA's Performance
Overall Score
Figure 1 - CIABOC’S SCORE BY DIMENSION
LEGAL INDEPENDENCE & STATUSCIABOC’s legal independence remains its greatest institutional strength. This attribute is valued even by its critics. CIABOC has its own premises in an up-market location in Colombo. It is answerable only to Parliament. Its legal independence is built on three legislative Acts; the Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994 which enables the setting up of CIABOC as an independent commission to deal with bribery in the public sector, the Bribery (Amendment) Act No.20 of 1994 which introduces a new offense of ‘corruption’’ and the Assets and Liabilities Law No.1 of 1975, No 29 of 1985 and (Amendment) No. 74 of 1988.
The first two Acts allow Commissioners to interpret what constitutes an act of bribery or corruption within the parameters of the legislation. But they remain silent on money-laundering practices. Still, today Sri Lanka is struggling with a post-conflict economy in which the flow of illicit revenues have reached heights not envisaged in 1994 by those who drafted CIABOC’s enabling legislation. This has led concerned groups such as the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) to press for an extension of CIABOC’s legal powers to encompass specific types of money-laundering, i.e. the laundering of funds acquired through bribery or corrupt means. Acquiring such powers they argue, would substantially heighten the chances of securing convictions.78
The Assets & Liabilities Law of 1975 and related amendments require that politicians and public servants declare their earnings at regular intervals. But the receiving authorities for such declarations range from the Elections Commissioner and Heads of Departments to the Speaker of Parliament. This disperses its impact. Further, in recent times these requirements have rarely been complied with. CIABOC alone retains the power to initiate court proceedings into non-declaration of income, unexplained earnings and accumulation of wealth.79 The Act needs to be amended and a unified authority for receiving such declarations should be recognized by Parliament.
78. See Sunday Times, 04.07.2016. Also interview with Addl. Solicitor Gen. Y. Kodagoda, on 7.09.2016. 79. A petitioner can however, draw the attention of the AG, the Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue, the Head of the Department of Exchange Control and the Principal Collector of Customs to any recent acquisition of wealth by any person. (Act No 1 of 1975).
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CIABOC’s mandate is far-reaching and another source of strength. It encompasses the functions of investigation, prosecution, education and prevention. These are reinforced by wide-ranging legal powers, which include the power to obtain oral and written evidence and examine witnesses under oath. They allow authorized officers of the Commission to request relevant information from banks, the Department of Inland Revenue or any other institution.80 They also involve search and entry powers.81 CIABOC can even prohibit persons under investigation from leaving the country.
Still, if CIABOC’s legal independence, mandate and powers are so comprehensive, why hasn’t it performed better in the past? This brings us to the issue of operational autonomy. Its autonomy was directly affected by the 18th Amendment in 2010, which annihilated the powers of the Constitutional Council (CC). This impacted on the independence of Commissions such as CIABOC.82 In line with other pillars of the integrity system, CIABOC found that its powers and mandate had become reduced to a legal fiction. It found itself confined to pursuing low-level public sector employees.83 However, the 19th Amendment of 2015 restored the powers of the CC.
Despite this, critics argue that CIABOC’s operational autonomy is still in practice undermined by the fact that its investigators are paid by the Police Department, and its administrative staff by the Public Services Commission (PSC). This is seen to limit its ability to raise performance levels by shaping incentives-structures. It also affects CIABOC’s ability to discipline its investigative officers, since they fall under the penal code of the Police Ordinance. All these provisions are seen to bring in government regulation through the back door. CIABOC on its part insists that its operational autonomy is not affected by any of these arrangements.
Further, legal journalists, criminal justice professionals and some members of the BASL feel that CIABOC should develop a stronger legal division, which would reduce its dependence on the AG’s Department.84 While CIABOC is actively attempting to recruit legal staff, they are unable to attract applicants of appropriate quality. This then, remains the key problem.
Anti-corruption groups, trade unions and CSOs who were actively involved in efforts to bring down the previous regime, also question CIABOC’s impartiality. In this they are joined by politicians linked to the previous regime who now oppose the coalition-in-power. Such groups continue to wonder if the Commissioners and the DG are following a hidden political agenda of their own. Unfortunately, the unethical conduct of previous Commissioners have lent substance to such negative views.
In the end, such public distrust can only be healed with time and CIABOC’s continued good performance. While the former DG herself is well aware that she was perceived to be a political appointee, she categorically denies the charge.85 This claim is substantiated by the enormous amount of work the present Commission has been able to get through after her appointment in February 2015. This in itself is a firm validation of the political space allowed to CIABOC by the new government.
Procedures for the appointment of CIABOC’s Commissioners have become more transparent in the past two years. This is due to the active intervention of the CC. The Bribery (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 1994 states that the Commissioners will be appointed by the President on the advice of the CC and have a fixed term of five years.86 Commissioners have tenure and cannot be removed except on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity.87 In the event, the CC called for nominations from the general public. They proceeded to interview nominees in order to assess their perceived integrity, reputation and ability, submitting their chosen list of candidates to the President. Here the CC’s efforts can be seen as an attempt to restore the prestige of independent commissions, against a backdrop of the intense politicization of the public sector which has taken place over the past decade.88 Still, this process is not mandated. It relies on the desire for transparency among members of the CC. Finally, the Director General (DG) who is the chief executive officer, is appointed by the President, in consultation with the commission.89 This procedure again creates a loophole for criticisms of political links to the executive to emerge.
80. Bribery (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1994, Section 4 (2) (a) and (b).81. Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994, Section 5 (1) a – l and (6).82. The 18th Amendment dissolved the 10 member Constitutional Council and replaced it with a 5 member Parliamentary Council. Independent Commissions were brought under the direct authority of the President.83. See CIABOC website (www.ciaboc.gov.lk/investigations)84. CIABOC at present engages up to ten legal officers from the AG’s department on a consultancy basis to support its own staff.85. Upon her resignation on 18th October 2016, the ex-DG stated categorically in an in interview with the Sunday leader of 24.10.2016, that she had faced no political interference whatsoever during her time at CIABOC. See also Ceylon Today 23.10.2016 and Sunday Leader 24.10.201686. The Act stipulates that the Commission shall consist of three members, two of whom shall be retired judges of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal and the third, a person with wide experience in the investigation of crime and law enforcement.87. Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994,Section 2 (2) (a) & (b).88. While many trace this process of politicization of the bureaucracy to the 1978 constitution, the trend which began in the 1980s picked up renewed momentum over the past decade, with the massive influx of external funds which flooded in for reconstruction activity in the post-conflict phase.89. Bribery (Amendment) Act No.19 of 1994, Section 16 (1), (2) & (3).
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This brings us to the question of whether the regime uses CIABOC as a weapon against political opponents. Predictably, factions of the UPFA who are outside the ruling coalition continue to charge that it uses CIABOC as a weapon.90 Alternately, as observed above, critics from the left argue that the (perceived) weaknesses in CIABOC’s performance is due to a lack of training of its staff and lack of resources to meet challenges. Yet another line of criticism maintains that there is a measure of self-censorship on the part of either the Commissioners or the DG who may feel that those who appointed them expect them to toe a certain line.
In the end, the presence of so many divergent strands in the discursive field tend to counter the relative weight of each. They illuminate the fact that even what actually constitutes political bias is in dispute among CIABOC’s critics.91 Since all these arguments contradict each other, they work to neutralize each other. They in fact strengthen CIABOC’s position, expressed by former DG, Ms Wickramasinghe, that they faced no political interference, and have remained impartial in performing their duties.92
FINANCIAL & HUMAN RESOURCESThe dimension on CIABOC’s Financial and Human Resources scored 72.22%. While many indicators scored high, the one on CIABOC’s budgetary share received a low score. This is because allocations did not reach the prescribed target of 0.2% of the national budget over the past three years.93 Though there was a sharp improvement in 2015, the share fell back once again to 0.0124% in 2016 (see table 5 above). Therefore the average proportion of budget allocations over the past three years remains 0.032%.
Still, the indicator on the security and stability of this allocation fell into the moderate category. Since the UNP-UPFA coalition made corruption a key plank in its platform, budgetary allocations to CIABOC were expected to rise. In fact, while the allocation for 2015 did rise to 0.0147%, it fell the next year, only to rise very slightly in the projections for 2017 (see table 5 above), which perhaps justifies assigning it to the moderate category.
But is this allocation sufficient for CIABOC to perform its functions? This is a matter of some dispute. Many of the radical but numerically small political parties and CSOs who were involved in the effort to bring regime change feel that CIABOC’s budgetary allocation is insufficient in terms of the challenges it faces. CIABOC, on its part, says that the present budget is entirely adequate. Previous Commissioners have complained of the lack of vehicles for investigators and officers to conduct raids.94 But the present Commission is satisfied with the transport arrangements in place, in which the Police supply them with vehicles when required.95 Further, over the past two years, many other basic inadequacies such as the lack of computers and other electronic equipment have been overcome. And though CIABOC does have a serious problem in the lack of office space for investigators, they have been granted an adjoining allotment for building expansion. Thus the sufficiency of CIABOC’s budgetary allocation scores ‘high’.
Salary and benefits received by CIABOC personnel remains an area of relative weakness (‘moderate’). As mentioned above, CIABOC’s investigators and legal officers are paid by other public bodies. In addition, CIABOC pays officers investigating bribery cases a risk allowance of 25%. Investigators are also rewarded when convictions are secured. Legal officers receive a monthly allowance from CIABOC in addition to what they are paid by the PSC. Still, salaries are low, in keeping with salaries in the public sector. This structure has not enabled CIABOC to attract the kind of legal talent which could raise rates of convictions. This is therefore another slight bone of contention between CIABOC and other groups in the anti-corruption sector, who feel a higher level of remuneration is required to attract staff of appropriate quality.
Staff selection procedures are merit-based. But entry requirements into the Police Department from which investigators are seconded are low (O/Ls or less) compared to the rest of the public sector. CIABOC subjects them to an entrance test. The large number of vacancies for investigators speaks for the high standards imposed by CIABOC relative to the aptitude of applicants.
90. On 19th April 2015, some PA legislators opposed to the coalition protested against CIABOC’s anti-corruption investigations by sleeping on the well of Parliament. This caused a great public uproar and was seen as an effort by them to pervert the cause of justice.91. See Keerthi Tennekoon in Ceylon Today 14.10.2016; Island (Editorial) 15.09.2016; Sunday Times 26.04.2015.92. Interview with ex-DG (2/11/2016). See also Ceylon Today 23.10.2016 and Sunday Leader 24.10.2016. 93. This computation does not incorporate capital expenditure allocations, since these cannot be spent on activities and programmes.94. Prasanna Rodrigo in Sunday Times of 28.2.2010; Nirmala Kannangara in Sunday Leader of 22.2.201495. Interview with ex-DG on 2.11.2016.
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The issue of the level of expertise CIABOC staff should have, is also subject to a difference of opinion. On their part, the above-mentioned groups and other anti-corruption stakeholders in the public sector are dissatisfied with the ability of investigators who they feel lack the basic numerical skills to take down complaints accurately. Investigators are thought to lack basic IT skills, mathematical aptitude, accounting expertise or auditing ability. These skills are thought necessary in the pursuit of white collar crime such as money laundering where intricate paper trails have to be tracked down. This would require the help of international agencies such as Interpol, Scotland Yard and the FBI. They suggest, therefore, that CIABOC should engage more highly-skilled and qualified staff at higher rates of remuneration. Such staff, they feel, should include those with a background in criminal justice, criminal sociology, banking, computer-programming & systems analysis as well as forensic auditors and chartered accountants.96
CIABOC’s former DG responds to this criticism by saying that whenever a need arises for inputs by more highly-skilled personnel, it has the contacts and capacity to retain them on a consultancy basis. Still, she points out, the need for such highly - skilled staff does not occur everyday.97 She was convinced that - due to a decision made by CIABOC’s management in early 2015 to create a more enabling working environment - investigative staff are now mostly competent and improving all the time. As part of this move, the Commissioners and DG refrained from interfering with the work of investigators, so that they could build confidence. Once investigators realized that their independence would be respected and their work would not be interfered with, their ability to make impartial and independent decisions developed steadily over the past two years. This helped to improve their investigative skills.98 Such a claim is supported by the fact that 5,002 files were attended to by CIABOC over 2015, while 3,021 were closed after due consideration.99 Against this, in 2013, 1,797 files were closed but no investigations completed, and likewise in 2014, 937 were closed but no investigations done.100
Despite such achievements, it is clear that CIABOC’s management also appreciates the need for higher quality staff, at least in some areas. Thus in April 2015, it submitted a draft cabinet paper, to enable the recruitment of a special unit of approximately ten members, including accountants, custom’s officers and intelligence personnel. This has finally been approved by cabinet, but recruitment is still on-going.
Subsequently, in September 2016, CIABOC submitted another draft cabinet paper, which envisaged a new intake of 300 investigative officers, to be recruited on more elevated criteria - at the level of BA/BSc. It was also proposed that they should have a minimum of one years’ training in either the police department or any of the armed forces (including gun training). It is intended to provide them with legal training as well, by staff from the AG’s Department.
This however, is the crux of the issue. While CIABOC has certainly raised its level of performance, it’s own assessment of its staff needs do not match-up to the expectations of CSOs and NGOs in the larger anti-corruption effort in terms of the kinds of complex investigations (relating to billions of dollars rather than millions of rupees) they feel CIABOC should be undertaking. These reservations have confined the score of this indicator to ‘moderate’.
CIABOC’s expertise in prevention, education and outreach activities on the other hand, scored high. Staff training also scored high. In addition to on-going training activities, the new DG who took office on 1.12.2016 is also already focusing on intensifying training, including training workshops for legal personnel.101
Finally, CIABOC’s staff stability also rates a high score. Staff levels have remained very stable over the past ten years, with minimal staff turnover. This stability has also generated a high level of institutional loyalty. Nonetheless numbers remain very much below institutional requirements.
96. Interview with Chairman, COPE on 20th October 2016;, Auditor General on 21st September 2016; with Convenor, Voice against Corruption on 15th September 2016 and Gen. Secy. Ceylon Teachers Union on 14th September 2016.97. Interview with ex-DG CIABOC on 02.11.2016.98. Interview with ex-Dg CIABOC on 02/11/2016.99. See CIABOC Annual Report (2015) p 28, which states that 8,203 complaints were dealt with, of which 3,201 were closed down.100. See CIABOC Annual Report p 24.101. Interview with DG on 15/12/2016.
30
DETECTION & INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONThe dimension involving detection and investigation scored 50%. Its performance was mixed. Three indicators scored high, three were moderate and three were low. Low-performing indicators included the willingness to initiate corruption investigations, which was a new function only assigned to CIABOC under the 19th Amendment in May 2015. It has not been acted upon yet in view of the massive backlog of complaints. But it also included the indicator on the average rate of corruption convictions over the past three years. This emerges as an area of concern. Finally, the low score of the indicator on compiling complaints according to gender suggests that CIABOC remains insensitive to gender-linked problems faced by women.
CIABOC’s accessibility to complainants and informants, whistleblowers and members of the public is creditable. It received 9,382 complaints in the three years from 2013-2015.102 This makes for an average of 3,127.3 complaints per year, in a population of 20,966 million. This implies that approx. 0.0149% of the national population took steps to complain about corruption in their environment, and is an improvement on previous years.
This trend unfolds against a background of some ambiguity in projections by corruption indices on Sri Lanka. The 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Sri Lanka 83 out of 154 states, notching only 37 points out of a possible 100. This score has remained stable over the past 3 years.103 According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2016, 43.9% of respondents felt that Sri Lanka’s CIABOC was doing well or very well in fighting corruption, while 26.1% did not.104
Local surveys are more nuanced and indicate that public perceptions of corruption have actually decreased sharply over the past year. A community perceptions survey on policing conducted by the Asia Foundation, Colombo, in January 2016 shows that perceptions of corruption as a key factor affecting policing dropped from 24% in 2014 to 6% in 2015. Political interference as a factor affecting policing also dropped from 56% to 39% (see table 8 below). In such a context, the above complaints ratio assumes greater significance. It becomes higher relative to perceived levels of corruption.
Anonymous complaints, however, remain a persistent factor. The desire for anonymity is perhaps linked to a lack of confidence or feelings of insecurity among complainants. In the GCB data on Sri Lanka, 30% of respondents were not confident enough to venture an opinion on levels of corruption or CIABOC’s performance. This goes up to 33% among female respondents.105
Table 7 - Community Perception on key factors affecting policing in Sri Lanka (2015)
YEAR CORRUPTION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
TOTAL
2011 26% 57% 83%2012 17% 17% 34%2013 28% 54% 82%2014 24% 56% 80%2015 6% 39% 45%
Source: www.police.lk/images/other/community_police_perception_survey_2015.pdf(extracted from National Community Perception Survey – Sri Lanka 2015, Asia Foundation, Colombo, p 46)
CIABOC has a hotline on its website. Most complaints by individuals remain anonymous. However, approximately a third of complaints are made by political parties, trade unions and concerned CSOs who represent large constituencies and tend to be proportionately numerous in their complaints.106 Such complainants tend to call press conferences before and after filing their complaints, in order to pressurise the Commission. This signifies their greater confidence in the new political climate which has evolved over past two years, as well as their greater access to CIABOC.
102. CIABOC Annual Report (2015).103. Corruptions Perceptions Index 2015, Transparency International, Berlin.104. Global Corruption Barometer, 2016 Transparency International (forthcoming)105. Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (forthcoming) – Sri Lanka data. 106. The JVP’s Dushanna Virodhi Handa says they have submitted around 150 complaints, the Dushana Virodhi Sanvidanaya which is a coalition of many groups, more than 500. The UNP MP Ranjan Ramanayaka also states that he has handed in over 150 complaints. Finally, the Dushana Virodhi Peramuna says they have given in 225 complaints (Ada of24/10/2016)
31
With regard to whistleblowers, the initial phase of CIABOC’s ‘Seven Steps’ initiative involves selecting a group of ‘integrity officers’ in each government institution to act as whistleblowers. The new Right to Information (RTI) law contains relief for whistleblowers. This in itself assigns greater validity to the act of whistle-blowing, and may encourage more people to come forward, in a context where many fear losing their jobs if they do. In this new climate it was felt that CIABOC’s initiative merited a high score.
However, CIABOC’s response to such complaints over the past three years received a moderate score. Until end-2014, its receptiveness has been low. Nevertheless, the appointing of a new DG and a new Commission in 2015 created a more energetic climate. This made it possible for investigations to be expedited. Faced with the uphill task of investigating a backlog of 9,752 complaints along with those received during the year (altogether, 13,665 complaints) the new Commission experimented with different investigation methods. In the process, the ex-DG was able to innovate a new, hybrid approach by January 2016, which greatly increased output. A total of 8,203 files were attended to by the DG. 3,021 of these were closed after due consideration.107 However, it should be mentioned that many TUs and CSOs engaged in anti-corruption activity reiterate that their complaints have still elicited no response from CIABOC.108 This constitutes an important omission, which brings down the score of this indicator to moderate.
CIABOC’s willingness to initiate complaints scored low. However, the average number of cases investigated by CIABOC rated a high score. While the average for the period 2005-2014 is not impressive, as mentioned above, over the past two years, there has been a sharp increase in the rate.
The efficiency and professionalism of CIABOC investigators over the past three years also scored moderate. On the one hand, the number of total complaints received in 2015 was 3,913, and the number of complaints closed was 3,021. This is a positive efficiency ratio. However, many plaintiffs are dissatisfied the level of professionalism shown by CIABOC. This is because they claim that its staff, as ex-police officers, tend to view complainants such as themselves as potential suspects. This was so especially for those who came in to complain about corruption in the educational sector, with special reference to Principals and other staff demanding bribes to admit children into schools. Also, there is a popular perception that anonymous complaints, despite being framed with detailed information, were not addressed by CIABOC.109 All these factors were seen as constituting a lack of professionalism. It was this perception which pushed the score down to moderate. CIABOC’s ex-DG on her part reiterates that investigators have shown marked improvement over the past two years and a high level of staff commitment has been achieved.110
Against this, the average rate of conviction for corruption cases investigated over the past three years scored low. While 413 cases were filed in the High Court and the Magistrate’s Courts over the past three years, only `54 resulted in convictions. This works out to an average rate of 13.07%, which is very low. It suggests a need for a higher level of professionalism in the filing of cases (see table 8 below). The rate of convictions actually dropped from 46.15% in 2014 to 12.6% in 2015. It has not picked up significantly over the first 10 months of 2016. The drop may have to do with the complexity of charges filed.
Table 8 - Average rate of convictions to charges filed by CIABOC (2014-2016*)
YEAR NO. OF CHARGES FILED
NO. OF CONVICTIONS AVERAGE CONVICTION RATE
2014 52 24 46.15%2015 119 15 12.60%2016* 91 15 16.48%Total for period 413 54 13.07%
Source: CIABOC (2016)*Up to October 2016.
107. CIABOC Annual Report (2015).108. Interview with convenor, Dushana Virodhi Handa (15/09/2016) and Gen.Secy, Ceylon Teachers’ Union (14/09/2016).109. Some of these complaints are based on whistleblower information and address corruption in the ministries and state corporations.110. Interviews with ex-DG, CIABOC on 2.11.2016 and 10.11.2016.
32
CIABOC’s former DG insists that legal officers are competent at drafting charges, but admits that they lack advocacy skills in terms of defending their suit in court. This is due to a lack of experience. It is expected that this situation will improve with increased exposure of legal staff to more complex cases.111 CIABOC‘s low rate of convictions also affects its role in asset recovery. When a conviction is reached, all monies and assets seized in the course of investigations are channelled into the Consolidated Fund, along with penalties and fines charged by court.
CIABOC’s willingness to investigate influential persons for corruption without fear or favour, however, scored high. Still, this remains a very complex and nuanced issue. Unlike in the past, the present Commission has taken steps to call many influential political figures of the previous government – including a serving cabinet minister, an ex-Defence Secretary, three former Heads of the Sri Lanka Navy - to make statements before it. But critics outside the present government continue to accuse CIABOC of being part of a government-sponsored witch hunt.
The evidence for such a claim, however, is weak. Further, CIABOC has had to face sharp challenges inpersuading such persons to come before it, including in some cases, resorting to legal action. But it should be mentioned that while charges have been filed, over the past two years, there have been no convictions of influential persons.
CIABOC’s present DG responds to this criticism by pointing out that the public’s sense that investigations are not yielding results does not mean that progress hasn’t been made. This is because - unlike the police - CIABOC does not require the court to direct the progress of the investigation at each step, i.e. by granting permission to detain suspects, search premises, check bank accounts etc, since all these powers are granted to CIABOC by its enabling legislation. Therefore the work takes place behind the scenes, as it were. The media does not have access to key moments in the investigation. Consequently the media is not in a position to inform the public that a ‘breakthrough’ has been made, which creates the impression that there has been no progress.112
Finally, CIABOCs role in identifying the gender of complainants also scores low. This is because CIABOC does not in practice retain information on gender, due to the large proportion of anonymous complaints. However, even though complaints maybe anonymous, it should be possible to identify the gender of the complainants themselves on a separate register. The failure to do this implies that CIABOC does not grasp the gendered nature of many crimes against women.
PREVENTION, EDUCATION & OUTREACH FUNCTIONSThe performance of this dimension is well above the overall score (66.66%). Three indicators scored high. These included corruption prevention initiatives, the implementation of CIABOC’s Plan for prevention, education and outreach, and collaboration with other stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector. The indicators scoring moderate included the average proportion of operating expenditure allocated for prevention and education work, the number of reviews of organizational procedures, systems and capabilities, the frequency of including corruption recommendations in investigation reports, the dissemination of corruption prevention information and the use of its website and social media for disseminating such information.
A low score was received by the indicator assessing research and exploration of corruption risks, context and conditions. This indicator is important since it can allow CIABOC to target its prevention activities more specifically, and therefore emerges as an important area of opportunity.
The indicator measuring the proportion of CIABOC’s operating expenditure devoted to public outreach and prevention during the past three years scored moderate. CIABOC’s total operating expenditure amounted to SL Rs. 247,500,000/- in 2015, which is the only year with publicly-accessible records for operating expenditure.113 The expenditure on bribery prevention (Rs. 1,451, 000) is however, taken from its budget for capital expenditure, which is something of a budgeting anomaly.114 This works out to 0.54%. It brings CIABOC uncomfortably close to the boundary between moderate and low scores. Still, much has been achieved with these funds and this should be appreciated.
111. Interview with ex-DG, DIABOC, on 10/11/2016.112. Interview with present DG on 15/12/2016.113. CIABOC’s operating expenditure was calculated by adding-up total re-current expenditure, training & capacity building, and bribery prevention. See CIABOC’s Annual Report (2015) p 36. 114. CIABOC’s Annual Report (2015), p 36.
33
Corruption prevention initiatives over the past three years rated a high score. Between 2013-14 awareness activities were conducted, but these were somewhat ad hoc. However, as mentioned above, in 2015, CIABOC stepped-up its activities.115
CIABOC celebrated ‘Anti-Corruption Day’ in December 2015 with the former DG launching the anti-corruption website I-paid-a-bribe, which aims at crowd-sourcing corruption complaints. An awareness campaign in the form of an anti-corruption walk was also organized for the first time. On Anti-Corruption Day, December 2016, CIABOC organized a workshop for approx 800 public servants expected to be involved in the conducting of provincial elections in early-2017, on what constitutes electoral corruption. Provincial level politicians also participated. CIABOC is presently organizing a legal workshop for its legal officers. All these initiatives together enabled a high score.
The number of reviews of organizational procedures, systems & capabilities conducted by CIABOC to prevent corruption during the past three years rated ‘moderate’. The frequency of including corruption prevention recommendations in investigation reports during the past three years also scored moderate. Though CIABOC staff state that recommendations are structured into the investigation reports, it was not possible for the lead researcher to corroborate this, by accessing a report format. This precluded a higher score.
CIABOC’s plan for prevention, education and outreach and its implementation received a high score. Collaboration with other stakeholders on prevention, education and outreach activities also rated a high score. CIABOC’s use of campaigns to disseminate prevention information also scored high in view of the level of organizational activity outlined above. However, use of website and social media for corruption dissemination information also scored moderate, for lack of activity. CIABOC does not use social media at present.
Finally, research and exploration of corruption risks, context and conditions rated a low score. CIABOC does not have a budget for research and exploration of corruption risks. Its website displays research done by other organizations engaged in anti-corruption work, but no independent research has been initiated.
COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONSPerformance in this dimension is slightly above the overall score (60%). One indicator scored high and the other four moderate.
The only indicator to score high referred to the extent to which CIABOC participates in international networks. The Commissioners, DG and senior staff all participate often in UNCAC, UNODC and SAARC-related events. They also take part in INGO-related andprograms organized by Transparency International Sri Lanka. Staff ranging from Directors of Investigation and Asst Directors are sent abroad frequently for training, to well-known institutions in India, the UK and the USA.
The government’s support to CIABOC for prosecution of corruption cases scores moderate. This is because despite a relative absence of interference from the AG’s Department in its work, and despite the fact that CIABOC in fact hires legal personnel from the AG’s Department on a consultancy basis, average prosecution rates remain low.
Cooperation with other integrity agencies also scored moderate. Two other integrity agencies exist. The Financial Crimes Investigation Department (FCID) which is a unit within the Police Dept, was gazetted in early-2015, after the electoral victory of the present coalition, to focus on large scale financial crime. The Presidential Commission to Investigate and Inquire into Serious Acts of Fraud, Corruption and Abuse of Power, State Resources and Privileges (PRECIFAC) on the other hand, has a slightly different focus. Also set up in the wake of the electoral victory, it deals with the massive abuses of state power and misuse of state property which (allegedly) transpired during the time of the previous government.
CIABOC points out that they share legal staff with PRECIFAC, which in practice ensures that cases handled by one agency are not duplicated in others. However, this is only an informal arrangement. PRECIFAC also constantly checks if CIABOC is following up on cases which PRECIFAC has received. This is due to the fact that complainants tend to seek relief by applying to multiple agencies at the same
115. See Section 2.
34
time. However, there does not seem to be any real collaboration in investigations; nor any fruitful exchange of information on high profile or complicated cases or a common strategy towards politically sensitive cases involving ‘influential’ suspects. Such cases may have underworld support, or contacts with high-level political figures, or even be high-level political figures themselves, or have contacts with both the underworld and politics. Dealing with this kind of suspect may require a unified approach by all integrity agencies if they are to prevail.
CIABOC’s failure to forge strategic alliances with other integrity bodies may have to do with the fact that it is tied by its confidentiality clause. Such confidentiality clauses sometimes tends to create a somewhat insular environment in which the organization concerned becomes very secretive and reluctant to share information.
Cooperation with non-governmental organizations, however, scored moderate, which is an area of some concern. This is due to complaints by some trade unions and CSOs mentioned above - especially those linked to leftwing political parties - that CIABOC’s attitude towards the public is somewhat adversarial rather than supportive. This is vehemently denied by CIABOC.116 But CIABOC front office staff may themselves be unaware of the extent to which the public finds their demeanour intimidating rather than encouraging. They may be preoccupied with trying to extract from the complainant what they feel is relevant information in order to put together a comprehensive complaint on paper. Further, they may feel that the complainant is motivated by petty revenge rather than pubic-mindedness when making an entry. This is supported by the large number of complaints which are made anonymously.
Still, as a public institution funded by the tax-payer, CIABOC staff cannot assume that complaints are motivated by self-interest alone. Even though their experience as investigators may lead them to think so, they need to remain professional and treat complainants as public-minded citizens until such time as they prove themselves not to be so. It should be mentioned that other CSOs say they were treated with civility, but go on to attribute this to the fact that they have an organization behind them.
ACCOUNTABILITY & OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONSThis dimension rated the lowest score (25%). This is a serious area of concern. Two indicators scored moderate and the other two low.
Information provided in and accessibility of the annual report and website scored moderate. According to its enabling legislation (1994) CIABOC is required to produce an Annual Report detailing its activities, which is to be sent to the President, who then makes it available to Parliament. In practice, CIABOC’s 2015 Annual Report has, for the first time, been uploaded onto its website. However, this does not compensate for lack of information on the history of its activities as a public-funded institution accountable to the public. Hard copies of previous reports are difficult to access.117
The 2015 Annual Report spelt out its mission and provided some information on its budget, number of investigations carried out over the past five years and staff vacancies. Its website is freely accessible, but the information provided is limited to a hotline and email access to the DG and the Commissioners, number of completed investigations and convictions. The website also lacks basic information on the activities of the institute, and as CIABOC staff admit, is not always updated.118
Oversight mechanisms also scored moderate. CIABOC is answerable to Parliament. It is expected to provide the relevant parliamentary committee with progress reports every two months. However, the 19th Amendment which contains these oversight provisions was only passed in May 2015. In practice, therefore, these procedures have only just begun to fall into place. This is an area of opportunity which CIABOC should pick up, since the very process of reporting on the progress of institutional activities in itself requires a self-assessment of them which would not otherwise happen.
117. The research team was not able to access even hard copies of previous reports, despite many efforts.118. Interview with CIABOC staff on 10.11.2016.
35
Procedure for dealing with complaints against ACA personnel scored low. Here the record is very problematic. There is no procedure for investigation by another public agency. In fact, a complaint of bribery against a previous CIABOC Chairman (2010-15) was investigated by the accused himself and dismissed. As evidenced by the number of articles in the electronic and tabloid media which are sharply critical of his conduct, this issue generated much public outrage.119 CIABOC is not able to discipline its investigators, who come under the Police Ordinance. Disciplinary hearings have to be initiated by the Police HR Division. This is a cumbersome procedure.
In May 2016 the Sunday Times stated that CIABOC was probing the conduct of an investigator (Inspector A.H.M. Gamini Abeysinghe) accused of leaking confidential information. The outcome of this probe remains shrouded in secrecy, and in general, CIABOC’s internal procedures lack transparency. Thus the indicator on the outcome of complaints against CIABOC or its personnel in past three years also scored low.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CIABOC’S PERFORMANCEThis dimension rated a moderate score (57.4%), which again is an area of some concern. The only indicator to score high, related to perceptions of CIABOC’s effectiveness in dealing with complaints among females citizens who had direct contact with it.
The research team was not able to access any female complainants. However, the Sri Lanka data on the 2016 GCB (forthcoming) reveals that 42.8% of female respondents thought that CIABOC was doing well or very well in fighting corruption, while 24.1 were dissatisfied. An equal number (24.8%) were unable to form an opinion. Thus a much greater percentage of female respondents were optimistic about CIABOC’s performance than not.
Further, it was noted that among the inquiries into complaints of bribery and corruption cited on CIABOC’s website between 2012-16, are five instances of female plaintiffs who cite demands for sexual gratification in lieu of money, for political or administrative services. Of these, two such charges have resulted in convictions, with sentences including two years rigorous imprisonment suspended for 10 years. The first was initiated in August 2012, but the indictment only took place in March 2016. The other was made in September 2013, and the perpetrator was sentenced in January 2016. This is a 40% conviction rate, which is much better than the overall convictions record. Clearly then, while women complainants have brought charges against demands for sexual gratification before, it is only in the past two years that these have borne fruit in the courts. This indicates that the present CIABOC staff takes complaints of demands for sexual gratification seriously enough to see plaintiffs through to court.
Indicators assessing a range of perceptions from the degree of public confidence that the government has given CIABOC the powers/resources it requires for curbing corruption, in the Commission’s adherence to due process and its impartiality, confidence in CIABOC’s respectful treatment of persons under investigation, its effectiveness in corruption control, all scored moderate. This was because they evoked a mixed response.
Public confidence that the government has given CIABOC sufficient powers elicited a range of responses. According to the GCB’s (2016) Sri Lanka data, 43.9% of respondents thought that CIABOC was doing well or even very well. 26.1% were dissatisfied and 30% did not want to venture an opinion. Against this, as mentioned above, a community perceptions survey on policing by the Asia Foundation, Colombo in Jan 2016 shows a sharp shift over the past year: public views on corruption as a key factor affecting policing dropped from 24% in 2014 to 6% in 2015. Political interference as a factor also dropped from 56% to 39% in the same period (see table 6). This implies that perceptions of corruption as well as political interference within public institutions such as the police has declined radically over 2015 (i.e. 100% -[6%+39%] = 55% of respondents have confidence in the political climate) This rates a ‘moderate’ score.
This note of optimism ran through all key informant interviews. Professional groups ranging from criminal justice practitioners, academics, trade unionists and journalists agree that CIABOC does have sufficient legal powers. At the same time, they qualify this assertion by pointing out that CIABOC lacks adequate resources – especially high-quality human resources. The fact that CIABOC is dependent on the Police Department to supply it with investigators is thought to be unsatisfactory. Its legal resources are also thought to be wanting, which increases its dependence on the AG’s dept. This is seen to impact negatively on conviction rates.119. This incident was quoted by many key informants to justify their reservations on CIABOC.
36
Public confidence in CIABOC’s adherence to due process, impartiality and fairness in using its powers also scored ‘moderate.’ This is again due to mixed responses to this question. As the Asia Foundation survey mentioned above indicates, perceptions of corruption as well as political interference within public institutions such as the police has declined radically over 2015. On the other hand, there is there is close media interest in CIABOC’s activities. Here the issue of its impartiality and adherence to due process and fairness remains problematic. In fact, a succession of senior political figures expressed such consternation about CIABOC’s (alleged) failure to adhere to due process or be impartial that the then-DG felt obliged to tender her resignation. The fact that she did, ironically, is testimony to the fact that she felt that she did adhere to due process and attempted to be impartial. At the same time, these incessant charges and counter-charges should be seen against a fraught political culture which has emerged in the post-conflict situation. A near breakdown of law and order and the abject politicization of public institutions prevails. This has created enormous public anger against politicians and public servants who are perceived to be culpable. In such a context, the public continues to make demands that corrupt politicians should be brought to justice which may be quite unrealistic in the short term.
CIABOC’s treatment of persons under investigation also scored moderate. The research team could not access such persons. But as mentioned above, many political figures investigated by CIABOC have complained of their treatment to the media. It was in fact the (allegedly) disrespectful and inappropriate conduct of the interrogation of a senior cabinet minister (for a relatively minor charge) which set into motion the train of events which led to the resignation of the then-DG Ms Wickramasinghe on 17.10.2016.
Finally, views of persons who have had direct contact with CIABOC also scored moderate. Persons who had contact with CIABOC fall into two main categories: (a) ordinary citizens and (b) members of CSOs and political activists who represent organizations. The second category in particular, have filed complaints on massive fraud of gigantic dimensions which the CIABOC, understandably enough in the present political climate, has been somewhat hesitant in investigating. This has lead to polarized responses, and those who had high expectations of massive fraud being investigated remain critical about CIABOC’s performance.
Ordinary citizens on their part tend to be intimidated by the somewhat adversarial approach assumed by CIABOC’s Receiving Officers, who, as mentioned above, they complain, interrogate them as if they were the offenders themselves. Many complainants construe such an adversarial response as a lack of impartiality in that CIABOC seems to respond better to higher status complainants or those with an organization backing them.
While both categories of complainants agree that many anonymous complaints may be motivated by petty revenge, they point out that CIABOC’s receiving officers cannot always assume this, and need to treat every complainant with greater respect and assume a more professional stance.
37
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te
and
soci
al
med
ia fo
r di
ssem
inat
ing
info
rmat
ion
on c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
AC
A’s
coop
erat
ion
with
oth
er
orga
niza
tions
(40%
)
Gov
t’s s
uppo
rt to
AC
A w
ith th
e pr
osec
utio
n of
co
rrupt
ion
case
s(m
oder
ate)
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACA
& ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
(low
)
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACA
and
civi
l soc
iety
gr
oups
(mod
erat
e)
Parti
cipa
tion
in in
tern
atio
nal
netw
orks
(hig
h)
Coo
pera
tion
with
AC
As in
oth
er
coun
tries
(low
)
AC
A’s
acco
unta
bilit
y an
d ov
ersi
ght
(25%
)
Info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
in a
nd
acce
ssib
ility
to
ACA’
s An
nual
R
epor
t and
w
ebsi
te
Ove
rsig
ht
mec
hani
sms
Proc
edur
es fo
r de
alin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CA
pers
onne
l
Out
com
e of
co
mpl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
A or
its
pers
onne
l
Publ
ic
perc
eptio
ns
of A
CA’
s pe
rfor
man
ce(5
0%)
Publ
ic c
onfid
ence
that
the
ACA
has
been
giv
en
suffi
cien
t pow
ers
and
reso
urce
s fo
r cur
bing
co
rrupt
ion
Publ
ic c
onfid
ence
in
the
ACA’
s ad
here
nce
to
due
proc
ess,
im
parti
ality
and
fa
irnes
s in
usi
ng
its p
ower
s
Con
fiden
ce in
its
adh
eren
ce
to d
ue p
roce
ss,
impa
rtial
ity a
nd
fairn
ess
amon
g th
ose
who
hav
e ha
d di
rect
con
-ta
ct w
ith th
e AC
A
Con
fiden
ce in
the
ACA’
s ab
ility
totre
at p
erso
ns
bein
g in
vest
igat
ed
with
dig
nity
and
re
spec
t
Publ
ic p
erce
ptio
n of
the
ACA’
s eff
ectiv
enes
s in
co
rrupt
ion
cont
rol
Perc
eptio
n of
AC
A’s
effec
tiven
ess
in
corru
ptio
n co
ntro
l am
ong
pers
ons
with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith th
e AC
C
Perc
eptio
n of
AC
A’s
effec
tiven
ess
in
deal
ing
with
co
mpl
aint
s am
ong
wom
en w
ho h
ad
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
it
38
Tabl
e 9
- DET
AIL
ED IN
DIC
ATO
R S
CO
RES
1. A
CA’
s Le
gal I
ndep
ende
nce
and
Stat
us (7
indi
cato
rs)
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
1. A
CA’
s Le
gal i
ndep
ende
nce
Inde
pend
ent
agen
cySe
para
te a
genc
y ou
t-sid
e m
inis
tryW
ithin
pol
ice
or
min
istry
CIA
BOC
is a
n in
depe
nden
t Com
mis
sion
ans
wer
able
onl
y to
Par
liam
ent (
Act 1
9 of
199
4 Se
ctio
n 26
). Its
lega
l ind
epen
denc
e is
sub
stan
tial,
and
rest
s on
3 le
gisl
ativ
e Ac
ts; (
a) A
ct N
o.19
of 1
994
whi
ch e
nabl
es th
e se
tting
up
of C
IABO
C a
s an
inde
pend
ent c
omm
issi
on to
dea
l with
brib
ery
in th
e pu
blic
sec
tor (
b) T
he B
riber
y Ac
t No.
11 o
f 195
4 (a
men
ded
in 1
994)
whi
ch in
trodu
ces
a ne
w o
ffens
e of
‘cor
rupt
ion’
and
(c) t
he A
sset
s an
d Li
abilit
ies
Law
No.
1 of
197
5. C
ritic
s po
int o
ut
that
the
fact
that
CIA
BOC
’s in
vest
igat
ors
are
seco
nded
from
the
Polic
e D
ept a
nd a
dmin
istra
tive
staff
from
the
Publ
ic S
ervi
ces
Com
mis
sion
is a
con
stra
int t
o its
aut
onom
y, a
nd b
rings
in
gove
rnm
enta
l reg
ulat
ion
thro
ugh
the
back
doo
r. C
IABO
C d
enie
s th
at th
is is
so
and
is w
ell
satis
fied
with
the
exte
nt o
f its
lega
l ind
epen
denc
e.12
0
Sour
ces:
Act
No
19 S
ectio
n 4
(2) (
a),(b
) and
(3) o
f 199
4; th
e As
sets
and
Lia
bilit
ies
Law
No.
1 of
19
75. A
lso
Inte
rvie
w w
ith fo
rmer
DG
(10/
11/2
016)
; int
ervi
ew w
ith A
udito
r Gen
eral
(21/
09/2
016)
, w
ith a
ttorn
eys
in th
e AG
’s D
epar
tmen
t, m
embe
rs o
f the
BAS
L an
d le
gal j
ourn
alis
ts.
2.AC
A’s
man
date
Focu
s on
in
vest
igat
ion,
pr
osec
utio
n,
educ
atio
n
&pre
vent
ion
Prim
ary
focu
s on
in
vest
igat
ion
Educ
atio
n &
prev
entio
n w
ithou
t in
vest
igat
ion
CIA
BOC
’s m
anda
te e
ncom
pass
es a
ll fo
ur fu
nctio
ns o
f inv
estig
atio
n, p
rose
cutio
n, e
duca
tion
and
prev
entio
n.
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
’s A
nnua
l Rev
iew
(201
5), p
34;
Brib
ery
(Am
endm
ent)
Act N
o.19
& A
ct N
o 20
of
199
4. A
lso
inte
rvie
ws
with
CSO
lead
ers.
3.AC
A’s
lega
l pow
ers
Exte
nsiv
e Po
wer
s (A
rrest
and
se
arch
, pro
bing
of
ban
k A/
Cs,
sa
fe-d
epos
it bo
xes,
inco
me
tax
reco
rds
, pr
oper
ty, s
earc
h an
d en
try o
f pr
emis
es, e
tc)
Som
e po
wer
sFe
w o
r non
eC
IABO
C’s
lega
l pow
ers
are
wid
e-ra
ngin
g, in
clud
ing
the
pow
er to
obt
ain
oral
and
writ
ten
evid
ence
, exa
min
e w
itnes
ses
unde
r oat
h, re
ques
t rel
evan
t inf
orm
atio
n fro
m b
anks
, Dep
t of
Inla
nd R
even
ue o
r any
oth
er in
stitu
tion,
pro
hibi
t sus
pect
s fro
m le
avin
g th
e co
untry
, ent
er a
nd
sear
ch p
rem
ises
, rig
ht to
issu
e su
mm
ons
and
sear
ch w
arra
nts
with
out a
cou
rt or
der,
etc.
The
BASL
is p
ress
ing
for a
n ex
tens
ion
of C
IABO
C’s
lega
l pow
ers
to e
ncom
pass
the
laun
derin
g of
fund
s ac
quire
d th
roug
h br
iber
y or
cor
rupt
mea
ns, i
n or
der t
o en
hanc
e ch
ance
s of
sec
urin
g co
nvic
tions
.121
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G (1
0/11
/201
6); a
lso
inte
rvie
ws
with
mem
bers
of t
he B
ASL
and
the
AG’s
Dep
t. C
IABO
C’s
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15);
The
Brib
ery
(Am
endm
ent)
Act N
o.19
of 1
994
Sect
ion
3, S
ectio
n 4
(10,
(2) &
(3) a
nd S
ectio
n 5.
120.
CIA
BOC
’s e
x-D
G p
oint
s ou
t the
re a
re d
iffer
ent m
etho
ds o
f rec
ruiti
ng s
taff
to C
IABO
C. A
t pre
sent
, the
lega
l offi
cers
bel
ong
to a
‘clo
sed’
ser
vice
and
inve
stig
ator
s be
long
to th
e Po
lice
Dep
t. Bu
t onc
e th
ey’re
rele
ased
to
CIA
BOC
th
ey b
ecom
e ‘a
utho
rized
offi
cers
’ and
ther
efor
e ca
nnot
be
rem
oved
by
the
IGP
with
out t
he c
onse
nt o
f the
Com
mis
sion
.12
1. S
ee a
lso
Sund
ay T
imes
(4.7
.201
6); C
eylo
n To
day
(29/
2/20
16).
39
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
4. A
ppoi
ntm
ent o
f AC
A’s
Com
mis
-si
oner
sIn
depe
nden
t co
mm
ittee
usi
ng
obje
ctiv
e cr
iteria
an
d tra
nspa
rent
pr
oced
ure
Min
iste
rial
com
mitt
ee u
sing
ob
ject
ive
crite
ria,
but p
roce
dure
not
tra
nspa
rent
PM/P
resi
dent
m
akes
dec
isio
n&
proc
edur
e is
not
tra
nspa
rent
The
Brib
ery
(Am
endm
ent)
Act (
1994
) sta
tes
that
Com
mis
sion
ers
will
be a
ppoi
nted
by
the
Pres
iden
t on
the
advi
ce o
f the
CC
and
hav
e a
fixed
term
of 5
yea
rs. I
t als
o st
ates
that
the
Com
mis
sion
sha
ll co
nsis
t of t
hree
mem
bers
, tw
o of
who
m s
hall
be re
tired
judg
es o
f the
Su
prem
e C
ourt/
Cou
rt of
App
eal a
nd th
e th
ird a
per
son
with
wid
e ex
perie
nce
rela
ting
to th
e in
vest
igat
ion
of c
rime/
law
enf
orce
men
t.
In p
ract
ice,
the
CC
follo
wed
the
proc
edur
e in
oth
er c
ount
ries
in th
is re
gard
and
cal
led
for
nom
inat
ions
from
the
gene
ral p
ublic
. The
y pr
ocee
d to
inte
rvie
w n
omin
ees
in o
rder
to a
sses
s th
eir p
erce
ived
inte
grity
, rep
utat
ion
and
abilit
y, s
ubm
ittin
g th
eir c
hose
n ca
ndid
ates
to th
e Pr
esid
ent.
How
ever
, thi
s pr
oced
ure
is n
ot m
anda
ted.
The
refo
re th
e le
vel o
f tra
nspa
renc
y re
mai
ns a
n op
tion
whi
ch is
dep
ende
nt o
n th
e in
itiat
ive
(and
libe
ral c
ompo
sitio
n) o
f the
CC
.
Sour
ces:
the
Brib
ery
(Am
endm
ent)
Act N
o.19
of 1
994,
Sec
tion
2 (2
a), (
2b) &
(3) i
nter
view
s w
ith m
embe
rs o
f the
BAS
L, A
G’s
Dep
artm
ent a
nd a
cade
mic
s. A
lso
inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G
(10.
11.2
016)
5. C
omm
issi
oner
’s te
rm o
f offi
ce &
re
mov
alFi
xed
term
with
te
nure
(diffi
cult
to
rem
ove
with
out
prop
er c
ause
Fixe
d te
rm w
ith
with
out t
enur
e,
but n
ot d
ifficu
lt to
rem
ove
Com
mis
sion
ers
No
fixed
te
rm a
nd
Com
mis
sion
ers
can
be e
asily
re
plac
ed
Com
mis
sion
ers
enjo
y a
fixed
5-y
ear t
erm
whi
ch is
tenu
red
and
cann
ot b
e re
mov
ed e
xcep
t on
grou
nds
of p
rove
n m
isco
nduc
t or i
ncap
acity
. The
y ar
e no
t elig
ible
for r
e-ap
poin
tmen
t.
Sour
ce: B
riber
y (A
men
dmen
t) Ac
t No.
19, S
ectio
n2 (5
) (a)
and
(b),
(6).
6. A
CA’
s op
erat
iona
l aut
onom
y an
d im
parti
ality
Hig
h (n
o po
litic
al
inte
rfere
nce)
Lim
ited
(som
e po
litic
al
inte
rfere
nce)
Low
( hi
gh
leve
l of p
oliti
cal
inte
rfere
nce)
CIA
BOC
’s e
x-D
G d
enie
s th
at th
ere
was
pol
itica
l int
erfe
renc
e in
the
daily
ope
ratio
ns o
f the
C
omm
issi
on. S
he s
tate
s ca
tego
rical
ly th
at d
urin
g he
r ten
ure
of 1
9 m
onth
s sh
e fa
ced
no p
oliti
cal
inte
rfere
nce
wha
tsoe
ver.
How
ever
, she
resi
gned
her
pos
t on
17.1
0.20
16 in
resp
onse
to a
crit
ical
co
mm
ent b
y th
e Ex
ecut
ive.
122
CIA
BOC
’s im
parti
ality
, how
ever
. is
cont
este
d by
man
y C
SOs,
trad
e un
ions
and
pol
itici
ans
oppo
sed
to th
e go
vt. T
he u
nfor
tuna
te c
ondu
ct o
f pre
viou
s C
omm
issi
oner
s ha
ve a
lso
fuel
led
publ
ic p
erce
ptio
n th
at C
omm
issi
oner
s/D
G a
re p
oliti
cal a
ppoi
ntee
s. T
hey
furth
er c
ompl
aine
d th
at C
IABO
C w
as n
ot im
parti
al in
oth
er w
ays;
sin
ce it
s st
aff w
ere
draw
n fro
m th
e po
lice
dept
, fro
nt-o
ffice
sta
ff te
nded
to re
plic
ate
the
som
ewha
t adv
ersa
rial a
ttitu
de o
f the
Sri
Lank
an p
olic
e to
war
ds th
e pu
blic
. Ord
inar
y co
mpl
aina
nts
tend
to b
e in
terro
gate
d as
if th
ey w
ere
the
offen
ders
th
emse
lves
. Thi
s is
thou
ght t
o im
pact
on
CIA
BOC
’s im
parti
ality
. It w
as fe
lt th
at C
IABO
C
pers
onne
l dis
play
ed g
reat
er im
parti
ality
/pro
fess
iona
lism
tow
ards
soc
ially
-adv
anta
ged
grou
ps o
r th
ose
with
an
orga
niza
tion
supp
ortin
g th
em.
Sour
ces:
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5, in
terv
iew
with
Ex-
DG
(2/1
1/20
16);
Con
veno
r, C
eylo
n Te
ache
rs’
Uni
on (2
2/9/
2016
); G
ener
al S
ecy.
Pub
lic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4/19
/201
6) a
nd C
onve
nor,
Voic
e Ag
ains
t Cor
rupt
ion
(15/
09/2
016)
. See
als
o Su
nday
Lea
der (
23/1
0/20
16) a
nd L
anka
deep
a (2
0/10
/201
6).
122.
Thi
s w
as a
gen
eral
com
men
t mad
e by
the
Pres
iden
t to
all a
nti-c
orru
ptio
n ag
enci
es a
nd n
ot a
imed
at C
IABO
C in
par
ticul
ar.
40
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
7. G
over
nmen
t’s re
lianc
e on
AC
A to
us
e co
rrupt
ion
as a
wea
pon
agai
nst
polit
ical
opp
onen
ts
Gov
ernm
ent h
as
not u
sed
ACA
as a
wea
pon
agai
nst p
oliti
cal
oppo
nent
s
Evid
ence
of l
imite
d us
e of
AC
A as
a
wea
pon
agai
nst
polit
ical
opp
onen
ts
Evid
ence
of
wid
espr
ead
use
of A
CA
as a
w
eapo
n ag
ains
t op
pone
nts
This
is c
ompl
ex te
rrain
. In
the
pres
ent p
oliti
cal c
onte
xt, f
or th
e fir
st ti
me
in h
isto
ry, t
he tw
o m
ain
parti
es in
Sri
Lank
a’s
two-
party
sys
tem
hav
e fo
rmed
a c
oalit
ion,
blu
rring
line
s on
who
is ‘i
n’ th
e re
gim
e an
d w
ho b
ecom
es a
n ‘o
ppon
ent.’
CIA
BOC
, in
the
past
has
mos
tly te
nded
to fo
cus
on re
lativ
ely
min
or o
ffend
ers
rath
er th
an th
e ‘b
ig fi
sh.’
How
ever
, und
er th
e ne
w c
limat
e th
ey h
ave
begu
n to
inte
rroga
te in
fluen
tial fi
gure
s.
This
pro
voke
s th
ose
outs
ide
the
coal
ition
to c
ompl
ain
that
CIA
BOC
is b
eing
use
d as
a w
eapo
n ag
ains
t opp
onen
ts o
f the
regi
me.
At t
he s
ame
time,
oth
ers
argu
e th
at th
e pe
rcei
ved
wea
knes
ses
in C
IABO
C’s
per
form
ance
– fa
ilure
to s
win
g co
nvic
tions
in c
harg
es a
gain
st ‘b
ig fi
sh’ -
are
due
to
a la
ck o
f tra
inin
g of
its
staff
and
lack
of r
esou
rces
to m
eet t
oday
’s c
halle
nges
. Yet
ano
ther
lin
e of
crit
icis
m a
sser
ts th
at th
ere
is a
mea
sure
of s
elf-c
enso
rshi
p on
the
part
of e
ither
the
Com
mis
sion
ers
or th
e D
G w
ho m
ay im
agin
e th
at th
e Ex
ecut
ive
whi
ch a
ppoi
nted
them
exp
ects
th
em to
toe
a ce
rtain
line
.
The
pers
iste
nce
of s
o m
any
dive
rse
criti
cism
s w
hich
con
tradi
ct e
ach
othe
r in
fact
tend
s to
ne
utra
lize
the
forc
e of
eac
h an
d re
info
rces
the
notio
n th
at th
e in
stitu
tion
is re
lativ
ely
impa
rtial
. C
IABO
C re
spon
ds b
y po
intin
g ou
t tha
t the
y ar
e pr
esen
tly in
vest
igat
ing
high
ly-p
lace
d fig
ures
w
ithin
the
gove
rnm
ent,
as w
ell a
s ke
y m
embe
rs o
f the
pre
viou
s go
vern
men
t. At
leas
t one
suc
h fig
ure
has
publ
icly
adm
itted
that
he
was
, in
fact
inte
rroga
ted
over
a c
ompl
aint
.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G (2
.11.
2016
); al
so In
terv
iew
with
con
veno
r, Pu
blic
Sec
tor N
urse
s’
Uni
on (1
4/09
/201
6); C
hairm
an, C
OPE
(20/
10/2
016)
; Sun
day
Tim
es (2
6/04
/201
5);`I
slan
d (E
dito
rial)
(15/
09/2
016)
; Cey
lon
Toda
y,(2
4/10
/201
6).
41
2. A
CA’
s Fi
nanc
ial a
nd H
uman
Res
ourc
es (9
indi
cato
rs)
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
8. A
vera
ge ra
tio o
f AG
A’s
budg
et to
to
tal g
ovt b
udge
t for
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
Abov
e 0.
20%
Betw
een
0.10
%-
0.20
%Be
low
0.1
0%Th
e av
erag
e pr
opor
tion
of C
IABO
C’s
bud
get t
o to
tal g
over
nmen
tal b
udge
t ove
r the
pas
t 3 y
ears
is
0.0
132%
. Thi
s th
eref
ore
falls
into
the
low
cat
egor
y (S
ee ta
ble
3).
Sour
ces:
Min
istry
of F
inan
ce, B
udge
t Est
imat
es –
201
6 (w
ww.
treas
ury.
gov.
lk)
9. S
uffici
ency
of A
CA’
s bu
dget
in
term
s of
per
form
ing
its fu
nctio
ns
Mor
e th
an
adeq
uate
(8
0%-1
00%
of
budg
et re
ques
ts
appr
oved
Adeq
uate
(66%
-79
% o
f bud
get
requ
est i
s ap
prov
ed
Inad
equa
te (l
ess
than
66%
of
requ
est
Appr
oved
And
relie
s on
fu
ndin
g by
C
SOs
and
dono
rs
CIA
BOC
sta
tes
that
its
budg
etar
y po
sitio
n is
ver
y sa
tisfa
ctor
y an
d th
at th
ey h
ave
no c
ompl
aint
s.
Thou
gh a
t the
beg
inni
ng o
f 201
5, o
ffice
equ
ipm
ent s
uch
as c
ompu
ters
wer
e la
ckin
g, o
ver
the
past
two
year
s th
is s
ituat
ion
has
impr
oved
con
side
rabl
y. W
hile
the
Com
mis
sion
stil
l lac
ks
suffi
cien
t offi
ce s
pace
for i
nves
tigat
ors,
they
hav
e be
en g
rant
ed a
n ad
join
ing
bloc
k of
land
for
build
ing
expa
nsio
n.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G C
IABO
C (0
2/11
/201
6); C
IABO
C’s
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15);
inte
rvie
w w
ith A
udito
r-Gen
eral
(21/
09/2
016)
; als
o in
terv
iew
s w
ith c
once
rned
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
acad
emic
s.
10. S
ecur
ity &
sta
bilit
y of
AC
A’s
bud-
get d
urin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
sBu
dget
is
guar
ante
ed,
base
d o
n pr
evio
us y
ear’s
al
loca
tion
and
has
not b
een
redu
ced.
Budg
et h
as n
ot
been
redu
ced
in th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s
Budg
et h
as b
een
redu
ced
durin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s
Sinc
e th
e ne
w g
ovt w
hich
sw
ept i
nto
pow
er in
Jan
201
5 m
ade
corru
ptio
n a
key
plan
k in
its
plat
form
, the
allo
catio
ns to
CIA
BOC
impr
oved
in 2
015
over
pre
viou
s ye
ars
(0.0
147%
). H
owev
er,
this
leve
l fel
l to
0.01
24%
in 2
016,
but
impr
oves
slig
htly
to 0
.028
% in
pro
ject
ions
for 2
017
(see
Ta
ble
5).
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
’s A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
); M
inis
try o
f Fin
ance
, Bud
get E
stim
ates
201
6, (w
ww.
treas
ury.
gov.
lk);
inte
rvie
ws
with
aca
dem
ics
and
lega
l pro
fess
iona
ls.
11. A
CA
pers
onne
l’s s
alar
y an
d be
nefit
sC
ompe
titiv
e sa
lary
and
be
nefit
s
Adeq
uate
sal
ary
and
bene
fits
Low
sal
ary
and
limite
d be
nefit
sC
IABO
C’s
inve
stig
ator
s ar
e pa
id b
y th
e Po
lice
Dep
t and
its
adm
inis
trativ
e st
aff b
y th
e Pu
blic
Ser
vice
s C
omm
issi
on. S
alar
ies
rem
ain
low,
in k
eepi
ng w
ith s
alar
ies
in th
e pu
blic
se
ctor
. How
ever
, CIA
BOC
pay
s offi
cers
inve
stig
atin
g br
iber
y ca
ses
a ris
k al
low
ance
of 2
5%.
Inve
stig
ator
s ar
e al
so re
war
ded
whe
n co
nvic
tions
are
sec
ured
. Leg
al o
ffice
rs re
ceiv
e a
mon
thly
al
low
ance
from
CIA
BOC
in a
dditi
on to
wha
t the
y ar
e pa
id b
y th
e Pu
blic
Ser
vice
s C
omm
issi
on
(PSC
). C
IABO
C s
taff
expr
esse
d sa
tisfa
ctio
n w
ith p
ay c
ondi
tions
and
ben
efits
to th
e re
sear
ch
team
. Des
pite
this
, CIA
BOC
has
not
bee
n ab
le to
attr
act t
he k
ind
of le
gal t
alen
t whi
ch c
ould
ra
ise
rate
s of
con
vict
ion
in c
ourt.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
(2/1
1/20
16) a
nd C
IABO
C s
taff
(10.
11.2
016)
; als
o w
ith A
udito
r G
ener
al (2
1/09
/201
6), B
ASL
and
lega
l jou
rnal
ists
.
42
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
12. A
CA’
s se
lect
ion
crite
ria fo
r st
affM
erito
crat
ic
and
trans
pare
nt
proc
edur
es
Lim
ited
degr
ee
of m
erito
crat
ic
& tra
nspa
rent
pr
oced
ures
Patro
nage
and
no
n-tra
nspa
rent
pr
oced
ures
CIA
BOC
’s in
vest
igat
ors
are
seco
nded
from
the
Polic
e D
ept,
to w
hich
ent
ry re
quire
men
ts a
re
low
(O/L
s or
less
) rel
ativ
e to
the
rest
of t
he p
ublic
sec
tor.
CIA
BOC
sub
ject
s th
em to
an
entra
nce
test
. Th
e la
rge
num
ber o
f vac
anci
es fo
r inv
estig
ator
s sp
eaks
for t
he h
igh
cut o
ff po
int r
elat
ive
to
the
aptit
ude
of a
pplic
ants
.
CIA
BOC
poi
nts
out t
hat t
he d
iscr
etio
n al
low
ed th
em to
set
recr
uitm
ent s
tand
ards
has
incr
ease
d gr
eatly
in re
cent
yea
rs a
nd th
is s
houl
d be
app
reci
ated
. It h
as a
lread
y pr
esen
ted
a dr
aft c
abin
et
pape
r out
linin
g el
evat
ed s
elec
tion
crite
ria fo
r a n
ew in
take
of 3
00 in
vest
igat
ors
to m
eet s
taff
need
s, w
hich
set
s th
e ba
r at a
firs
t deg
ree,
and
at l
east
1 y
ear’s
trai
ning
in
any
of th
e ar
med
fo
rces
.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith E
x-D
G (1
0/11
/201
6); C
IABO
C A
nnua
l Rev
iew
(201
5) p
33.
13. L
evel
s of
exp
ertis
e of
AC
A’s
Cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
n pe
rson
nel
Hig
h le
vels
of
expe
rtise
Lack
s ex
perti
se in
so
me
area
sLa
cks
expe
rtise
in
man
y ar
eas
Ther
e is
muc
h di
ssat
isfa
ctio
n am
ong
CSO
gro
ups
and
prof
essi
onal
s w
ithin
gov
t dep
artm
ents
w
ith th
e ab
ility
of C
IABO
C’s
inve
stig
ator
s, w
hose
num
eric
al s
kills
see
m to
them
to b
e in
adeq
uate
to e
ven
take
dow
n co
mpl
aint
s co
mpe
tent
ly. In
vest
igat
ors
are
thou
ght t
o la
ck IT
sk
ills, n
umer
ical
ski
lls, a
nd a
udit/
acco
untin
g ab
ility.
CIA
BOC
acc
epts
that
this
may
hav
e be
en s
o in
the
past
, but
den
ies
that
suc
h a
situ
atio
n st
ill pe
rsis
ts. T
he e
x-D
G s
ays
that
the
skills
of i
nves
tigat
ors
have
impr
oved
ove
r the
pas
t with
co
nsis
tent
in-h
ouse
trai
ning
and
are
stil
l im
prov
ing.
Whi
le th
ey d
o la
ck h
ighl
y-qu
alifi
ed s
taff
for
com
plex
inve
stig
atio
ns, s
he in
sist
s th
at th
ese
case
s ar
e re
lativ
ely
few
at p
rese
nt, a
nd th
ey h
ave
the
mea
ns to
hire
hig
hly
-qua
lified
con
sulta
nts
for s
peci
fic ta
sks
as n
eede
d.
Still,
the
conc
erns
of o
ther
sta
keho
lder
s in
the
anti-
corru
ptio
n fro
nt c
anno
t be
dism
isse
d.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G, C
IABO
C (2
/11/
2016
); w
ith C
IABO
C s
taff
(10/
11/2
016)
; als
o in
terv
iew
with
Cha
irman
, CO
PE (2
0/10
/201
6); C
onve
nor,
Cey
lon
Teac
hers
’ Uni
on (2
2/09
/201
6)
Gen
. Sec
y. P
ublic
Sec
tor N
urse
s’ U
nion
(14/
19/2
016)
, Con
veno
r, Vo
ice
Agai
nst C
orru
ptio
n
(15/
09/2
016)
; Aud
itor-G
ener
al (2
1/09
/201
6). A
lso
inte
rvie
ws
with
crim
inal
just
ice
prof
essi
onal
s,
and
jour
nalis
ts.
14. E
xper
tise
of A
CA
Pers
onne
l in
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n an
d ed
ucat
ion
Hig
h le
vels
of
expe
rtise
Lack
s ex
perti
se in
so
me
area
sLa
cks
expe
rtise
in
man
y ar
eas
Falls
into
the
high
cat
egor
y si
nce
in te
rms
of e
duca
tiona
l qua
lifica
tions
, CIA
BOC
’s c
leric
al s
taff
who
are
recr
uite
d by
the
PSC
are
exp
ecte
d to
hav
e a
first
deg
ree.
Whi
le in
the
past
ther
e w
as
little
focu
s on
pre
vent
ion,
ove
r the
last
two
year
s, th
e ne
w C
omm
issi
on a
nd D
G p
lan
to s
et u
p a
Prev
entio
n U
nit,
with
a s
trate
gy ti
tled
‘Sev
en s
teps
to z
ero
tole
ranc
e’. A
dra
ft ca
bine
t pap
er
has
been
pre
pare
d to
set
up
such
uni
ts. T
houg
h ca
bine
t app
rova
l is
pend
ing,
wor
k is
on-
goin
g.
CIA
BOC
has
wor
ked
with
the
Nat
iona
l Ins
titut
e of
Edu
catio
n (N
IE) -
whi
ch fo
rmul
ates
syl
labi
an
d te
ache
r-tra
inin
g m
ater
ials
for t
he D
epar
tmen
t of E
duca
tion
– to
inco
rpor
ate
corru
ptio
n aw
aren
ess
conc
epts
into
prim
ary
scho
ol s
ylla
bi. T
hese
cam
e in
to e
ffect
in J
anua
ry 2
017.
Thi
s in
itiat
ive
has
been
wel
com
ed b
y C
SO a
nd tr
ade
unio
n le
ader
s.
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
’s A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
) and
inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G (2
/11/
2016
); in
terv
iew
with
G
ener
al S
ecy.
Pub
lic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4/19
/201
6) a
nd C
onve
nor,
CaF
FE (1
4/09
/201
6); K
Te
nnak
oon
in C
eylo
n To
day
(14/
10/2
016)
.
43
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
15. T
rain
ing
of A
CA
pers
onne
lW
ell-t
rain
ed
staff
with
m
any
train
ing
oppo
rtuni
ties
Som
e tra
ined
pe
rson
nel w
ith
limite
d tra
inin
g op
portu
nitie
s
Trai
ning
is s
een
as u
nim
porta
nt
and
negl
ecte
d
CIA
BOC
has
a c
onsi
sten
t foc
us o
n tra
inin
g. In
-hou
se tr
aini
ng s
essi
ons
take
pla
ce a
a w
eekl
y ba
sis.
Tra
inin
g is
con
duct
ed b
y re
tired
Inte
rpol
offi
cers
, sen
ior p
olic
e offi
cers
. Inv
estig
ativ
e st
aff
at d
iffer
ent l
evel
s ar
e al
so s
ent o
vers
eas
for t
rain
ing
and
re-tr
aini
ng. D
urin
g 20
15, R
s. 3
27,7
50
was
spe
nt o
n tra
inin
g an
d ca
paci
ty b
uild
ing.
Whi
le m
any
conc
erne
d gr
oups
act
ive
in th
e an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
field
com
men
t tha
t CIA
BOC
sta
ff w
ould
ben
efit b
y hi
gh-q
ualit
y IT
ski
lls, f
oren
sic
audi
t and
cha
rtere
d ac
coun
ting
expe
rtise
, C
IABO
C p
oint
s ou
t the
nee
d fo
r suc
h in
puts
is li
mite
d at
the
mom
ent (
see
indi
cato
r No.
13).
Furth
er, t
hey
poin
t out
that
CIA
BOC
’s s
taff
are
pres
ently
und
ergo
ing
inte
nsiv
e tra
inin
g in
IT
skills
and
muc
h eff
ort i
s be
ing
mad
e to
mak
e th
em m
ore
profi
cien
t in
Engl
ish.
CIA
BOC
’s le
gal
office
rs a
re a
lso
unde
rgoi
ng tr
aini
ng o
n a
wee
kly
basi
s, b
y st
aff fr
om th
e AG
’s D
epar
tmen
t.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G a
nd C
IABO
C s
taff
(10/
11/2
016)
; CIA
BOC
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15);
inte
rvie
w w
ith A
udito
r-Gen
eral
(21/
09/2
016)
and
ex-
secr
etar
y, P
REC
IFAC
(10/
09/2
016)
; als
o in
terv
iew
s w
ith le
gal p
rofe
ssio
nals
, aca
dem
ics,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd c
once
rned
pub
lic s
erva
nts.
16. S
tabi
lity
of A
CA’
s pe
rson
nel
Low
turn
over
an
d ra
tes
of
resi
gnat
ion
(0%
-5%
per
yea
r)
Mod
erat
e tu
rn-o
ver
and
resi
gnat
ion
rate
(b
etw
een
5%-1
0%)
Hig
h tu
rn-o
ver
and
resi
gnat
ion
rate
(ove
r 10%
)
CIA
BOC
’s s
taff
rem
aine
d ve
ry s
tabl
e ov
er th
e pa
st 1
0 ye
ars
and
ther
e ha
s be
en li
ttle
turn
over
. Th
is s
tabi
lity
has
also
gen
erat
ed a
hig
h le
vel o
f ins
titut
iona
l loy
alty
. Fur
ther
, CIA
BOC
can
not
sack
em
ploy
ees
– di
scip
linar
y he
arin
gs fo
r inv
estig
ator
s ha
ve to
be
cond
ucte
d by
the
Polic
e H
R
Div
isio
n an
d ad
min
istra
tive
staff
by
the
Publ
ic S
ervi
ces
Com
mis
sion
.
How
ever
, in
orde
r to
addr
ess
the
real
ities
of t
he 2
1st c
entu
ry, i
t has
bee
n de
cide
d to
rais
e th
e st
aff in
take
by
at le
ast 3
00 in
vest
igat
ors.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
(2/1
1/20
16) a
nd C
IABO
C A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
), p
33.
44
3. A
CA’
s de
tect
ion
and
inve
stig
atio
n fu
nctio
n (9
indi
cato
rs)
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
17. A
CA’
s ac
cess
ibilit
y to
co
mpl
aina
nts
& in
form
ants
, inc
ludi
ng
whi
stle
blow
ers
and
the
publ
ic o
ver
the
past
3 y
ears
ACA
is h
ighl
y ac
cess
ible
as
refle
cted
in th
e hi
gh p
ropo
rtion
of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
rece
ived
rela
tive
to p
opul
atio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of c
orru
ptio
n an
d pr
opor
tion
of c
ompl
aina
nts
confi
dent
eno
ugh
to id
entif
y th
emse
lves
ACA
is a
cces
sibl
e as
refle
cted
in
the
mod
erat
e le
vel o
f cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
rela
tive
to p
opul
atio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
ls
of c
orru
ptio
n, &
th
e pr
opor
tion
of c
ompl
aina
nts
confi
dent
enou
gh to
iden
tify
them
selv
es
ACA
is
inac
cess
ible
as
refle
cted
in lo
w
prop
ortio
n of
co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nts
rece
ived
, rel
ativ
e to
pop
ulat
ion
and
perc
eive
d le
vels
of
cor
rupt
ion
and
anon
ymou
s co
mpl
aint
s
CIA
BOC
rece
ived
9,3
82 c
ompl
aint
s in
the
thre
e ye
ars
from
201
3-20
15.
This
mak
es fo
r an
aver
age
of 3
,127
.3 c
ompl
aint
s pe
r yea
r, in
a p
opul
atio
n of
20,
966m
n. T
his
acco
unts
for a
ppro
x.
0.01
49%
of t
he p
opul
atio
n, w
hich
is a
rela
tivel
y hi
gh ra
tio.
Acco
rdin
g to
the
GC
B 20
16 d
ata,
43.
9% o
f res
pond
ents
felt
CIA
BOC
was
doi
ng w
ell o
r ver
y w
ell i
n fig
htin
g co
rrupt
ion.
26.
1% re
mai
n di
ssat
isfie
d.12
3 But
a c
omm
unity
per
cept
ions
sur
vey
on
polic
ing
con
duct
ed b
y th
e As
ia F
ound
atio
n, C
olom
bo i
n Ja
n 20
16 s
how
s th
at p
erce
ptio
ns o
f co
rrupt
ion
as a
key
fact
or a
ffect
ing
polic
ing
drop
ped
from
24%
in 2
014
to 6
% in
201
5. P
oliti
cal
inte
rfere
nce
as a
fact
or a
lso
drop
ped
from
56%
to 3
9% (s
ee ta
ble
4). I
n su
ch a
con
text
, the
ab
ove
com
plai
nts
ratio
ass
umes
gre
ater
sig
nific
ance
. It b
ecom
es h
ighe
r rel
ativ
e to
per
ceiv
ed
leve
ls o
f cor
rupt
ion.
Anon
ymou
s co
mpl
aint
s, h
owev
er, r
emai
n a
pers
iste
nt fa
ctor
.124 T
hese
con
cern
com
plai
nts
mad
e by
indi
vidu
als.
How
ever
, a s
igni
fican
t num
ber o
f com
plai
nts
– pe
rhap
s a
third
of a
ll co
mpl
aint
s - a
re b
roug
ht b
y po
litic
al p
artie
s, tr
ade
unio
ns a
nd c
once
rned
CSO
s w
ho re
pres
ent
larg
e co
nstit
uenc
ies.
125
Such
gro
ups
tend
to c
all p
ress
con
fere
nces
bef
ore
or a
fter fi
ling
thei
r co
mpl
aint
s, in
ord
er to
pre
ssur
ise
the
Com
mis
sion
. Thi
s im
plie
s th
eir g
reat
er c
onfid
ence
in
the
new
pol
itica
l clim
ate
whi
ch h
as e
volv
ed o
ver p
ast t
wo
year
s, a
s w
ell a
s th
e in
crea
sed
acce
ssib
ility
of C
IABO
C to
suc
h gr
oups
. Sin
ce s
uch
grou
ps fr
eque
ntly
brin
g in
wel
l-res
earc
hed
com
plai
nts
(con
tain
ing
whi
stle
-blo
wer
info
rmat
ion
in th
e ca
se o
f TU
s) re
leva
nt to
CIA
BOC
’s
man
date
, the
y w
ould
app
ear t
o co
mpr
ise
sig
nific
ant p
ropo
rtion
of r
elev
ant c
ompl
aint
s. .
With
rega
rd to
whi
stle
-blo
win
g, th
e in
itial
pha
se o
f CIA
BOC
’s ‘S
even
ste
ps’ i
nitia
tive
invo
lves
se
lect
ing
a gr
oup
of ‘i
nteg
rity
office
rs’ i
n ea
ch g
ovt i
nstit
utio
n to
act
as
whi
stle
blow
ers.
Thi
s ta
kes
plac
e ag
ains
t the
bac
kgro
und
of a
new
Rig
ht to
Info
rmat
ion
(RTI
) law
whi
ch o
ffers
som
e
relie
f to
whi
stle
blow
ers,
whi
ch w
ill gi
ve g
reat
er v
alid
ity to
the
act o
f whi
stle
-blo
win
g, a
nd m
ay
enco
urag
e m
ore
peop
le to
com
e fo
rwar
d, i
n a
cont
ext w
here
man
y fe
ar th
ey m
ay lo
se th
eir
jobs
if th
ey d
o.
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
‘s A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
), p
35; i
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
CIA
BOC
(2/1
1/20
16);
with
Gen
eral
Sec
y. P
ublic
Sec
tor N
urse
s’ U
nion
(14/
19/2
016)
; ED
, Dus
hana
Viri
dhi S
anga
may
a (1
4/9/
2016
) Con
veno
r, D
usha
na V
irodh
i Han
da (1
5/9/
2016
) C
onve
nor,
CaF
FE (1
4/09
/201
6);
Edito
r, R
avay
a (5
/10/
2016
); D
eput
y So
licito
r-Gen
eral
, AG
’s d
ept (
7/09
/201
6);
lega
l co
mm
enta
tors
, aca
dem
ics
& C
SO le
ader
s.
123.
Glo
bal C
orru
ptio
n Ba
rom
eter
201
6 (fo
rthec
omin
g) S
ri La
nkan
dat
a.12
4 It
was
not
pos
sibl
e fo
r the
rese
arch
team
to a
cces
s nu
mbe
rs o
f ind
ivid
ual c
ompl
aint
s, b
ut C
IABO
C a
gree
s th
at o
f the
se, a
nony
mou
s co
mpl
aint
s do
min
ate.
125.
At l
east
one
suc
h gr
oup,
Dus
hana
Viro
dhi S
anvi
dhan
aya
have
bro
ught
ove
r 500
com
plai
nts
to d
ate
and
the
Dus
hana
Viro
dhi H
anda
ove
r 150
cla
ims,
alm
ost e
ntire
ly o
n la
rge-
scal
e co
rrupt
ion.
The
UN
P M
P R
anja
n R
aman
ayak
a al
so s
tate
s th
at h
e ha
s ha
nded
in o
ver 1
50 c
ompl
aint
s. F
inal
ly, th
e D
usha
na V
irodh
i Per
amun
a sa
ys th
ey h
ave
give
n in
225
com
plai
nts.
(Ada
of2
4/10
/201
6)
45
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
18. A
CA’
s re
spon
sive
ness
to
corru
ptio
n c
ompl
aint
s du
ring
the
past
3
year
s
ACA
is h
ighl
y re
spon
sive
as
refle
cted
in th
e hi
gh p
ropo
rtion
of
com
plai
nts
inve
stig
ated
or
case
s co
mpl
eted
du
ring
the
past
3
year
s
ACA
is re
spon
sive
as
refle
cted
in th
e m
oder
ate
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
inve
stig
ated
and
ca
ses
com
plet
ed
durin
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
ACA
is n
ot
resp
onsi
ve a
s re
veal
ed in
the
low
num
ber
of c
ompl
aint
s in
vest
igat
ed o
r co
mpl
eted
dur
ing
the
past
3 y
ears
Unt
il en
d-20
14, r
espo
nsiv
enes
s to
com
plai
nts
was
low.
126 T
he a
ppoi
ntm
ent o
f a n
ew D
G
and
late
r, C
omm
issi
on in
201
5 cr
eate
d a
mor
e en
ergi
zed
clim
ate.
Thi
s m
ade
it po
ssib
le fo
r in
vest
igat
ions
to b
e ex
pedi
ted.
In
2015
the
num
ber o
f tot
al c
ompl
aint
s re
ceiv
ed ro
se to
3,9
13,
and
the
num
ber o
f com
plai
nts
clos
ed w
as 3
, 021
. Thi
s is
a p
ositi
ve e
ffici
ency
ratio
.
The
new
Com
mis
sion
face
d an
uph
ill ta
sk o
f inv
estig
atin
g a
back
log
of 9
,752
com
plai
nts
alon
g w
ith th
ose
rece
ived
dur
ing
the
year
(all
toge
ther
, 13,
665
com
plai
nts)
. The
Com
mis
sion
ex
perim
ente
d w
ith d
iffer
ent i
nves
tigat
ion
met
hods
and
evo
lved
a n
ew, h
ybrid
met
hod
in J
anua
ry
2016
. Thi
s gr
eatly
incr
ease
d ou
tput
. 8,2
03 fi
les
wer
e at
tend
ed to
by
the
DG
and
3,0
21 c
lose
d.
How
ever
, it s
houl
d be
men
tione
d th
at m
any
TUs
and
CSO
s en
gage
d in
ant
i-cor
rupt
ion
activ
ity
reite
rate
that
thei
r com
plai
nts
have
stil
l elic
ited
no re
spon
se fr
om C
IABO
C. T
his
is s
igni
fican
t in
that
they
toge
ther
com
pris
e ar
ound
one
-third
of c
ompl
aint
s (s
ee fo
otno
te 5
).
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15) p
34;
Inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G (2
/11/
2016
); C
onve
nor,
Publ
ic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4/09
/201
6); C
hairm
an, C
OPE
(20/
10/2
016)
; Con
veno
r, D
usha
na
Viro
dhi H
anda
(15/
9/20
16) a
lso
inte
rvie
ws
with
CSO
lead
ers
and
trade
uni
on le
ader
s.
19. A
CA’
s w
illing
ness
to in
itiat
e co
rrupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns d
urin
g th
e pa
st 3
yea
rs
Hig
h nu
mbe
r of
cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
initi
ated
by
ACA
Mod
erat
e nu
mbe
r of
cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
initi
ated
by
ACA
Low
num
ber
of c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
in
itiat
ed b
y AC
A
Prio
r to
the
enac
ting
of th
e 19
th A
men
dmen
t in
201
5, C
IABO
C d
id n
ot e
njoy
pow
ers
to in
itiat
e in
vest
igat
ions
on
thei
r ow
n. F
urth
er, t
he C
omm
issi
on a
ppoi
nted
in O
ctob
er 2
015
face
d a
back
log
of 9
,752
file
s, w
hich
did
not
allo
w th
em to
giv
e pr
iorit
y to
initi
atin
g ne
w in
vest
igat
ions
.
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15);
19th
Am
endm
ent (
2015
).
20. A
vera
ge n
umbe
r of c
ases
in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e AC
A pe
r yea
r du
ring
the
past
3 y
ears
Mor
e th
an a
100
0 co
rrupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y AC
A pe
r yea
r in
the
past
3 y
ears
Betw
een
300-
999
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
inve
stig
a-te
d by
the
ACA
per y
ear i
n th
e pa
st 3
yea
rs
Less
than
300
co
rrupt
ion
case
s in
vest
iga-
ted
by th
e AC
A pe
r ye
ar in
the
past
3
year
s
Whi
le th
e av
erag
e fo
r the
per
iod
2005
-201
4 is
not
impr
essi
ve, o
ver t
he p
ast t
wo
year
s, 8
,023
fil
es w
ere
atte
nded
to b
y th
e D
G. O
f the
se 3
,021
wer
e cl
osed
afte
r due
con
side
ratio
n, w
hich
le
aves
5,0
02 fi
led
inve
stig
ated
. Thi
s w
orks
out
to a
n av
erag
e ra
te o
f 2,5
01 fi
les
inve
stig
ated
per
ye
ar o
ver t
he p
ast 3
yea
rs, w
hich
falls
into
the
high
cat
egor
y.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
) p. 2
4; 3
4.
126.
Man
y tra
de u
nion
s an
d an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
orga
niza
tions
cal
led
pres
s co
nfer
ence
s to
pub
liciz
e th
eir c
ompl
aint
s an
d la
ck o
f res
pons
e by
CIA
BOC
bet
wee
n N
ov –
Dec
201
4.
46
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
21. E
ffici
ency
& p
rofe
ssio
nalis
m o
f co
rrupt
ion
inve
stig
ated
by
ACA
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Hig
hly
effici
ent
and
prof
essi
onal
in
vest
igat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
Effici
ent a
nd
prof
essi
onal
in
vest
igat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
Ineffi
cien
t and
U
npro
fess
iona
l in
vest
igat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
In th
e pa
st m
any
com
men
tato
rs c
ompl
aine
d of
a la
ck o
f effi
cien
cy a
nd p
rofe
ssio
nalis
m a
mon
g C
IABO
C s
taff
in m
any
area
s. B
ut it
can
not b
e de
nied
that
afte
r a n
ew D
G w
as a
ppoi
nted
in F
eb
2015
, a m
assi
ve b
ackl
og w
as c
lear
ed in
a s
hort
spac
e of
tim
e, a
nd c
redi
t mus
t be
give
n fo
r thi
s eff
ort.
413
case
s w
ere
char
ged
in c
ourt
betw
een
2014
-16,
sec
urin
g 54
con
vict
ions
(12.
83%
). Th
is is
a d
ecis
ive
impr
ovem
ent o
n pr
evio
us le
vels
, but
stil
l low
.
In te
rms
of p
rofe
ssio
nalis
m, m
any
plai
ntiff
s st
ill cl
aim
that
CIA
BOC
sta
ff, a
s ex
-pol
ice
office
rs,
seem
to v
iew
com
plai
nant
s as
pot
entia
l sus
pect
s an
d th
is is
see
n as
unp
rofe
ssio
nal.
Thi
s is
so
espe
cial
ly fo
r tho
se w
ho c
ame
in to
com
plai
n ab
out c
orru
ptio
n in
the
educ
atio
nal s
ecto
r, w
here
th
e tro
uble
d is
sue
of s
choo
l adm
issi
ons
rem
ains
a p
eren
nial
site
of r
outin
e co
rrupt
ion.
Als
o,
ther
e is
a p
opul
ar p
erce
ptio
n th
at a
nony
mou
s co
mpl
aint
s, d
espi
te b
eing
cor
robo
rate
d w
ith m
any
supp
ortin
g do
cum
ents
, are
not
add
ress
ed b
y C
IABO
C.
CIA
BOC
is a
lso
perc
eive
d to
mov
e w
ith
extre
me
caut
ion
on c
ompl
aint
s in
volv
ing
sus
pect
s w
ith h
igh
polit
ical
clo
ut. S
till,
com
plai
nant
s in
terv
iew
ed b
y th
e re
sear
ch te
am a
gree
d th
at e
ven
such
sus
pect
s ar
e be
ing
– th
ough
slo
wly
- in
vest
igat
ed.
Sour
ces:
CIA
BOC
’s A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
); in
terv
iew
with
Con
veno
r, C
eylo
n Te
ache
rs’ U
nion
(1
2/09
/201
6); G
en. S
ecy.
Pub
lic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4/19
/201
6), C
onve
nor,
Voic
e Ag
ains
t C
orru
ptio
n (1
5/09
/201
6) a
nd H
ead,
His
tory
Dep
artm
ent,
Col
ombo
Uni
vers
ity (1
1/10
/201
6).
22.
Aver
age
conv
ictio
n ra
te o
f co
rrupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y AC
A in
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
Abov
e 75
%Be
twee
n 50
% -
75%
Belo
w 5
0%As
men
tione
d ab
ove,
whi
le 4
13 c
ases
wer
e fil
ed in
the
Hig
h C
ourts
and
the
Mag
istra
te’s
C
ourts
ove
r the
pas
t thr
ee y
ears
, onl
y `5
4 re
sulte
d in
con
vict
ions
(see
tabl
e 4)
.The
rate
of
conv
ictio
ns a
ctua
lly d
ropp
ed b
etw
een
2014
to 2
015
from
46.
15%
To
12.6
%.
This
rate
has
not
pi
cked
up
rem
arka
bly
over
the
first
10
mon
ths
of 2
016.
CIA
BOC
’s e
x-D
G fe
els
that
lega
l offi
cers
ar
e co
mpe
tent
in d
rafti
ng c
harg
es, b
ut a
dmits
that
they
may
lack
adv
ocac
y sk
ills in
term
s of
de
fend
ing
thei
r sui
t in
cour
t. W
hile
non
-lega
l fac
tors
may
of c
ours
e, im
pact
on
the
failu
re to
se
cure
con
vict
ions
, CIA
BOC
can
not h
ide
behi
nd th
ese
and
mus
t ens
ure
that
thei
r leg
al te
ams
– w
hich
now
face
num
eric
ally
mor
e ca
ses
and
mor
e co
mpl
ex c
ases
- ar
e up
to s
tand
ard.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C’s
web
site
(ww
w.ci
aboc
.gov
.lk)
and
Annu
al R
epor
t (20
15);
inte
rvie
w w
ith
CIA
BOC
sta
ff(10
/11/
2016
).
47
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
23. A
CA’
s w
illing
ness
to in
vest
igat
e in
fluen
tial p
erso
ns fo
r cor
rupt
ion
with
out f
ear o
r fav
our
Con
side
rabl
e
evid
ence
of
inve
stig
atio
n of
influ
entia
l pe
rson
s fo
r co
rrupt
ion
Som
e ev
iden
ce
of in
vest
igat
ion
of
influ
entia
l per
sons
fo
r cor
rupt
ion
No
evid
ence
of
inve
stig
atio
n of
influ
entia
l pe
r-son
s fo
r co
rrupt
ion
This
is a
ver
y co
mpl
ex a
nd n
uanc
ed is
sue.
Unl
ike
in th
e pa
st, u
nder
the
pres
ent C
omm
issi
on
CIA
BOC
has
take
n st
eps
to c
all m
any
influ
entia
l pol
itica
l figu
res
of th
e pr
evio
us g
ovt –
incl
udin
g a
cabi
net m
inis
ter,
defe
nce
secr
etar
y, 3
form
er h
eads
of t
he S
ri La
nka
Nav
y - t
o m
ake
stat
emen
ts b
efor
e it.
It h
as a
lso
inte
rroga
ted
a se
rvin
g m
inis
ter.
But c
ritic
s ou
tsid
e th
e pr
esen
t go
vt a
ccus
e C
IABO
C o
f bei
ng p
art o
f a g
ovt-s
pons
ored
witc
h hu
nt.
The
evid
ence
to s
uppo
rt su
ch a
cla
im, t
houg
h is
wea
k. F
urth
er, C
IABO
C h
as h
ad to
face
sha
rp
chal
leng
es in
per
suad
ing
such
per
sons
to c
ome
befo
re it
, inc
ludi
ng in
som
e ca
ses,
reso
rting
to
lega
l act
ion.
Whi
le c
harg
es h
ave
been
file
d, o
ver t
he p
ast t
wo
year
s, it
sho
uld
be m
entio
ned
that
th
ere
have
bee
n no
con
vict
ions
of i
nflue
ntia
l per
sons
as
yet.
But s
uch
case
s fre
quen
tly in
volv
e la
rge
sum
s of
mon
ey a
nd a
n in
trica
te p
aper
trai
l. Th
e ch
arge
s br
ough
t are
cor
resp
ondi
ngly
ar
duou
s to
pro
ve, n
eces
sita
ting
exte
nded
pro
secu
tion
proc
esse
s.
Sour
ces:
inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G (1
0/11
/201
6); a
lso
Con
veno
r, C
eylo
n Te
ache
rs’ U
nion
(1
2/9/
2016
) G
en. S
ecy.
Pub
lic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4/19
/201
6); C
onve
nor,
Voic
e Ag
ains
t C
orru
ptio
n (1
5/09
/201
6) a
nd H
ead,
His
tory
Dep
artm
ent,
Col
ombo
Uni
vers
ity (1
1/10
/201
6). A
lso
inte
rvie
ws
with
lega
l pro
fess
iona
ls a
ttach
ed to
the
AG’s
Dep
t and
BAS
L, o
ppos
ition
pol
itici
ans
and
jour
nalis
ts.
24.A
CA’
s ro
le in
rest
itutio
n, a
sset
re
cove
ry, f
reez
ing
and
confi
scat
ion
in
the
past
3 y
rs
Very
act
ive
role
by
the
ACA
ACA
play
s a
mod
erat
ely
activ
e ro
le
ACA
is in
activ
eC
IABO
C h
as s
ecur
ed a
ppro
x 54
con
vict
ions
ove
r the
pas
t 3 y
ears
and
all
mon
eys
and
asse
ts
seiz
ed in
thes
e in
stan
ce a
re c
hann
elle
d in
to th
e C
onso
lidat
ed F
und,
alo
ng w
ith p
enal
ties
and
fines
cha
rged
by
cour
t. T
he ro
le in
ass
et re
cove
ry, h
owev
er,
is a
ffect
ed b
y its
low
rate
of
conv
ictio
ns
Inte
rvie
w w
ith C
IABO
C s
taff
(10/
11/2
016)
.
25.
Doe
s th
e AC
A id
entif
y ge
nder
in
com
pilin
g co
mpl
aint
s an
d m
onito
ring
corru
ptio
n tre
nds
ACA
has
gend
er s
ensi
tive
dem
ogra
phic
in
form
atio
n th
at a
llow
s it
to m
onito
r how
co
rrupt
ion
and
its s
ervi
ces
affec
t w
omen
diff
eren
tly
ACA
has
gend
er s
ensi
tive
dem
ogra
phic
in
form
atio
n th
at
coul
d al
low
it to
mon
itor h
ow
corru
ptio
n &
its
serv
ices
affe
ct
wom
en d
iffer
ently
, bu
t doe
s no
t mon
itor
thes
e di
ffere
nces
ACA
does
not
co
llect
gen
der
sens
itive
de
mog
raph
icin
form
atio
n
Gen
der-i
dent
ifica
tion
in c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s is
not
mai
ntai
ned.
Thi
s co
uld
be d
ue to
the
larg
e pr
opor
tion
of a
nony
mou
s co
mpl
aint
s lo
dged
. St
ill, e
ven
if th
e co
mpl
aint
s th
emse
lves
are
mad
e an
onym
ousl
y, it
sho
uld
be p
ossi
ble
for t
he re
cept
ion
office
r to
com
pile
a re
cord
of t
he p
ropo
rtion
of
com
plai
nant
s w
ho a
re fe
mal
e.
Sour
ce: C
AIBO
C w
ebsi
te:w
ww.
ciab
oc.g
ov.lk
/inve
stig
atio
ns/c
onvi
ctio
ns.
48
4. A
CA’
s pr
even
tion,
edu
catio
n an
d ou
trea
ch fu
nctio
ns (9
indi
cato
rs) IN
DIC
ATO
R V
ALU
ESIN
DIC
ATO
RH
IGH
MO
DER
ATE
LOW
JUST
IFIC
ATIO
N O
F SC
OR
ES26
. Ave
rage
pro
porti
on o
f AC
A’s
oper
atin
g ex
pend
iture
allo
cate
d to
pu
blic
out
reac
h an
d pr
even
tion
durin
g th
e pa
st 3
yea
rs
Abov
e 1%
of
ACA’
s op
erat
ing
ex
pend
iture
Betw
een
0.5%
an
d 1%
of
ACA’
s op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re
Belo
w 0
.5%
of
ACA’
s op
era-
ting
expe
nditu
re
Acco
rdin
g to
CIA
BOC
’s A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
) its
tota
l rec
urre
nt e
xpen
ditu
re is
Rs
245
milli
on.
Its e
xpen
ditu
re o
n br
iber
y pr
even
tion
(Rs.
1,4
51, 0
00) i
s ho
wev
er, t
aken
from
its
budg
et fo
r ca
pita
l exp
endi
ture
, whi
ch is
som
ethi
ng o
f a b
udge
ting
anom
aly.
The
pro
porti
on o
f C
IABO
C’s
op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re a
lloca
ted
to p
ublic
out
reac
h in
201
5 is
ther
efor
e 0.
59%
, whi
ch fa
lls in
to
the
mod
erat
e ca
tego
ry.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C’s
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15),
p 36
.
27. A
CA’
s co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiat
ives
dur
ing
the
past
3 y
ears
Man
y c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
initi
ativ
es
Som
e co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiat
ives
(a
vera
ge o
f 1-2
per
ye
ar
Few
or n
o co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiat
ives
CIA
BOC
con
duct
ed a
n ex
tend
ed a
war
enes
s pr
ogra
mm
e at
14
diffe
rent
loca
tions
for s
tate
se
ctor
em
ploy
ees,
incl
udin
g re
gion
al p
olic
e ac
adem
ies,
traffi
c po
lice
head
quar
ters
, Dep
artm
ent
of P
rison
s an
d D
istri
ct S
ecre
taria
ts.
In D
ecem
ber 2
015
CIA
BOC
laun
ched
an
Actio
n Pl
an ti
tled
‘Sev
en S
teps
to Z
ero
Tole
ranc
e’ it
emiz
ing
seve
n pr
even
tive
mea
sure
s. O
ver t
he p
ast t
wo
year
s,
CIA
BOC
beg
an w
orki
ng w
ith s
taff
in 8
sec
tors
(Im
mig
ratio
n de
partm
ent,
the
pass
port
office
, th
e ex
cise
dep
artm
ent,
polic
e de
partm
ent,
Iden
tity
card
uni
t and
loca
l gov
t ins
titut
ions
and
the
educ
atio
n se
ctor
) pen
ding
cab
inet
app
rova
l of i
ts P
reve
ntio
n U
nits
. CIA
BOC
als
o ce
lebr
ated
‘A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n D
ay’ i
n D
ec 2
015
by o
rgan
izin
g an
aw
aren
ess
cam
paig
n. C
IABO
C’s
ex-
DG
la
unch
ed th
e an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
web
site
I-Pa
id-A
-Brib
e (IP
AB) (
whi
ch h
owev
er, h
as n
ot b
een
very
su
cces
sful
). It
is p
rese
ntly
pla
nnin
g to
com
mem
orat
e An
ti-C
orru
ptio
n da
y w
ith a
sem
inar
for
publ
ic s
ecto
r em
ploy
ees
on th
e pa
ram
eter
s of
ele
ctor
al c
orru
ptio
n, a
head
of p
lann
ed lo
cal
elec
tions
in 2
017.
Aro
und
800
invi
tees
at l
ocal
, pro
vinc
ial a
nd n
atio
nal l
evel
s ar
e ex
pect
ed to
at
tend
.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
, CIA
BOC
on
02.1
1.20
16;
ED, T
rans
pare
ncy
Inte
rnat
iona
l Sri
Lank
a (2
3/11
/201
6), C
IABO
C A
nnua
l Rep
ort (
2015
). Al
so in
terv
iew
with
pre
sent
DG
, 28/
11/1
6)
28. N
umbe
r of r
evie
ws
of
orga
niza
tiona
l pro
cedu
res,
sys
tem
s &
capa
bilit
ies
cond
ucte
d by
AC
A to
pr
even
t cor
rupt
ion
durin
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
Man
y re
view
s w
ere
con
duct
ed
(rela
tive
to
num
ber o
f or
gani
zatio
ns in
ju
risdi
ctio
n
A su
bsta
ntia
l nu
mbe
r of r
evie
ws
wer
e co
nduc
ted
(rela
tive
to n
umbe
r of
org
aniz
atio
ns in
ju
risdi
ctio
n
Few
or n
o re
view
s w
ere
cond
ucte
d (re
lativ
e to
nu
mbe
r of
orga
niza
tions
in
juris
dict
ion
CIA
BOC
‘ pro
pose
d Pr
even
tion
Uni
t to
over
see
the
abov
e-m
entio
ned
‘Sev
en s
teps
to Z
ero
Tole
ranc
e’ A
ctio
n Pl
an’ i
n se
ven
sect
ors
(Imm
igra
tion
depa
rtmen
t, th
e pa
sspo
rt offi
ce, t
he e
xcis
e de
partm
ent,
polic
e de
partm
ent,
Iden
tity
card
uni
t and
loca
l gov
t ins
titut
ions
and
the
educ
atio
n se
ctor
) are
task
ed w
ith id
entif
ying
pos
sibl
e lo
opho
les
whe
re c
orru
ptio
n co
uld
take
pla
ce. T
hey
then
reco
mm
end
how
thes
e lo
opho
les
shou
ld b
e tig
hten
ed. T
his
wor
k, h
owev
er, i
s on
-goi
ng.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
CIA
BOC
sta
ff on
10.
11.2
016;
CIA
BOC
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15),
p 34
.
29. F
requ
ency
of i
nclu
ding
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n re
com
men
datio
ns in
AC
A’s
inve
stig
atio
n re
ports
dur
ing
the
past
3 y
rs
frequ
ently
som
etim
esN
ot a
t all.
CIA
BOC
sta
tes
that
reco
mm
enda
tions
are
stru
ctur
ed in
to th
e in
vest
igat
ion
repo
rts.
This
in
form
atio
n is
not
acc
essi
ble
due
to C
IABO
C’s
con
fiden
tialit
y cl
ause
. It
was
not
pos
sibl
e fo
r the
le
ad re
sear
cher
to e
ven
acce
ss a
repo
rt fo
rmat
.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
(2/1
1/20
16) a
nd C
IABO
C s
taff
(10/
11/2
016)
.
49
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
30. A
CA’
s pl
an fo
r pre
vent
ion,
ed
ucat
ion
and
outre
ach
and
its
impl
emen
tatio
n
Com
preh
ensi
ve
and
clea
r pl
an w
hich
is
impl
emen
ted
and
acce
ssib
le
A pl
an d
oes
exis
t, bu
t is
not
impl
emen
ted
fully
Ther
e is
no
plan
or o
nly
a w
eak
one
for
prev
entio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
treac
h .
CIA
BOC
’s A
ctio
n Pl
an ‘S
even
Ste
ps to
Zer
o To
lera
nce’
incl
udes
cam
paig
ns in
sec
onda
ry
scho
ols
aim
ed a
t cha
ngin
g at
titud
es to
cor
rupt
ion,
incl
udin
g in
trodu
cing
cor
rupt
ion
awar
enes
s co
ncep
ts in
to p
rimar
y sc
hool
syl
labi
.
Muc
h w
ork
has
alre
ady
been
don
e in
sch
ools
acr
oss
the
isla
nd. T
he P
lan
in fa
ct e
nvis
ages
w
orki
ng w
ith th
ree
dem
ogra
phic
gro
ups:
sch
ool-g
oing
chi
ldre
n, s
choo
l-lea
vers
and
adu
lts
(prim
arily
pub
lic s
ecto
r em
ploy
ees)
. Whi
le w
orki
ng w
ith s
choo
l chi
ldre
n in
volv
es th
e ab
ove-
men
tione
d in
puts
into
prim
ary
sylla
bi, Y
MAC
or ‘
Yout
h M
obiliz
ing
Agai
nst C
orru
ptio
n” G
roup
s w
ill be
sta
rted
for s
choo
l lea
vers
, usi
ng a
lect
ure
and
disc
ussi
on fo
rmat
.
Wor
k w
ith a
dults
will
invo
lve
a p
ublic
dia
logu
e on
cor
rupt
ion
thro
ugh
the
prin
t, el
ectro
nic
and
soci
al m
edia
. Mos
t im
porta
ntly,
the
Actio
n Pl
an a
ims
to w
ork
tow
ards
revi
sing
the
law
in k
eepi
ng
with
the
prov
isio
ns o
f the
19t
h Am
endm
ent.
How
ever
, it i
s to
o so
on to
gau
ge th
e eff
ects
of i
ts
impl
emen
tatio
n
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
, CIA
BOC
; CIA
BOC
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15)
31. A
CA’
s co
llabo
ratio
n w
ith o
ther
st
akeh
olde
rs in
pre
vent
ion,
edu
catio
n an
d ou
treac
h ac
tiviti
es
Hig
h de
gree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
th
ree
or m
ore
join
t pro
ject
s
Som
e de
gree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
on
e or
two
join
t pr
ojec
ts
Littl
e or
no
colla
bora
tion
with
oth
er
stak
ehol
ders
CIA
BOC
col
labo
rate
s w
ith U
NC
AC/U
NO
DC
and
is w
orki
ng o
n a
self-
asse
ssm
ent w
ith U
NO
DC
. It
also
par
ticip
ated
in th
e op
enin
g of
the
Col
ombo
offi
ce o
f the
ipai
dabr
ibe.
lk w
ebsi
te a
nd
wor
ked
with
UN
DP
volu
ntee
rs a
nd m
embe
rs o
f CSO
s in
clud
ing
TISL
dur
ing
2015
-16,
incl
udin
g ce
lebr
atin
g An
ti-C
orru
ptio
n D
ay in
Dec
embe
r 201
5. C
IABO
C is
wor
king
with
the
Dep
artm
ent o
f Ed
ucat
ion
to in
corp
orat
e an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
awar
enes
s in
to s
choo
l syl
labu
ses
from
the
first
gra
de
upw
ards
.
CIA
BOC
is p
rese
ntly
wor
king
with
the
Pres
iden
tial s
ecre
taria
t and
Prim
e M
inis
ter’s
offi
ce
to o
rgan
ize
a se
min
ar fo
r pub
lic s
ecto
r em
ploy
ees
all l
evel
s (w
ho b
e in
volv
ed in
con
duct
ing
el
ectio
ns) o
n id
entif
ying
ele
ctor
al c
orru
ptio
n ah
ead
of k
ey lo
cal e
lect
ions
in 2
017,
to c
oinc
ide
with
Ant
i-Cor
rupt
ion
Day
on
9th
Dec
embe
r 201
6.
CIA
BOC
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15) P
34.
32. A
CA’
s re
sear
ch a
nd e
xplo
ratio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
risks
, con
text
and
co
nditi
ons
Exte
nsiv
e us
e of
rese
arch
to
deve
lop
risk
asse
ssm
ents
an
d se
ctor
al
corru
ptio
n pr
ofile
s
Som
e de
gree
of
rese
arch
to d
evel
op
risk
asse
ssm
ents
an
d se
ctor
al
corru
ptio
n pr
ofile
s
Littl
e or
no
disc
erni
ble
inde
pend
ent
rese
arch
car
ried
out b
y th
e AC
A
No
inde
pend
ent r
esea
rch
has
been
con
duct
ed b
y C
IABO
C. I
ts w
ebsi
te d
ispl
ays
rese
arch
don
e by
oth
er o
rgan
izat
ions
in
the
field
of a
nti-c
orru
ptio
n. B
ut C
IABO
C d
oes
not h
ave
a bu
dget
for
rese
arch
and
exp
lora
tion
of c
orru
ptio
n ris
ks, c
onte
xts
and
cond
ition
s.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C w
ebsi
te (w
ww.
ciab
oc.g
ov.lk
) and
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15).
50
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
33. A
CA’
s di
ssem
inat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
and
use
of
cam
paig
ns
Exte
nsiv
e di
ssem
inat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
and
relia
nce
on
cam
paig
ns
Lim
ited
diss
emin
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
-form
atio
n an
d re
lianc
e on
ca
mpa
igns
Doe
s no
t di
ssem
inat
eco
rrupt
ion
Prev
entio
nin
form
atio
n or
rely
on
cam
paig
ns
CIA
BOC
laun
ched
an
anti-
corru
ptio
n w
alk
on A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n D
ay o
n 9
Dec
201
5 in
whi
ch
arou
nd 2
,000
chi
ldre
n fro
m s
choo
ls in
Col
ombo
par
ticip
ated
, as
part
of a
n aw
aren
ess-
rais
ing
cam
paig
n. C
IABO
C c
ontin
ues
to w
ork
in s
choo
ls, d
isse
min
atin
g co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n. I
t als
o co
llabo
rate
s w
ith o
ther
gro
ups
wor
king
on
corru
ptio
n su
ch a
s th
e C
oalit
ion
Agai
nst C
orru
ptio
n, c
onve
ned
by T
ISL
on th
eir a
war
enes
s in
itiat
ives
suc
h as
wal
ks a
nd
exhi
bitio
ns.
As m
entio
ned
abov
e, it
has
set
up
YMAC
or y
outh
gro
ups
to s
pear
head
act
iviti
es a
mon
g sc
hool
leav
ers.
It is
als
o w
orki
ng w
ith th
e el
ectro
nic
med
ia a
s w
ell a
s th
e ta
bloi
d m
edia
to
conv
ey p
reve
ntio
n in
form
atio
n to
pub
lic s
ecto
r em
ploy
ees.
Thi
s in
clud
es a
sem
inar
/wor
ksho
p pr
ogra
mm
e fo
r pub
lic e
mpl
oyee
s.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
CIA
BOC
sta
ff on
10.
11.2
016.
34. A
CA’
s us
e of
its
web
site
and
so
cial
med
ia fo
r dis
sem
inat
ing
info
rmat
ion
on c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
Exte
nsiv
e us
e of
its
web
site
and
so
cial
med
ia to
sp
read
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n
Lim
ited
use
of
its w
ebsi
te a
nd
soci
al m
edia
to
spre
ad c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
ACA
does
not
ha
ve w
ebsi
te
and
does
not
re
ly o
n so
cial
m
edia
to s
prea
d pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
CIA
BOC
’s w
ebsi
te h
as a
hot
line.
Its
2015
Ann
ual R
epor
t als
o ha
s an
attr
activ
e pr
efac
e w
hich
us
es im
ages
and
nar
rativ
e st
rate
gies
to ra
ise
awar
enes
s. T
he w
ebsi
te o
ffers
link
s to
som
e re
leva
nt re
ports
on
corru
ptio
n co
nduc
ted
by a
ssoc
iate
d in
stitu
tions
, but
CIA
BOC
has
not
in
itiat
ed re
sear
ch o
r pub
lic p
erce
ptio
n su
rvey
s on
its
own
on is
sues
of c
orru
ptio
n an
d im
puni
ty.
They
do
not u
se s
ocia
l med
ia a
t pre
sent
.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C w
ebsi
te (w
ww
:cia
boc.
gov.
lk);
Annu
al R
epor
t 201
5.
51
5. A
CA’
s co
oper
atio
n w
ith o
ther
org
aniz
atio
ns (5
indi
cato
rs)
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
35. G
over
nmen
t sup
port
(eg.
AG
’s
Dep
t, D
irect
or o
f Pub
lic P
rose
cutio
ns)
to A
CA
in p
rose
cutio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
case
s
Hig
h le
vel o
f su
ppor
t as
refle
cted
in
abse
nce
of
inte
rfere
nce
and
aver
age
pros
ecut
ion
rate
of
abo
ve 7
5%
mod
erat
e le
vel
of s
uppo
rt as
re
flect
ed in
so
me
inte
rfere
nce
and
aver
age
pros
ecut
ion
rate
of 5
0% -
75%
Low
leve
l of
supp
ort a
s re
flect
ed in
su
bsta
ntia
l in
terfe
renc
e an
d av
erag
e pr
osec
utio
n ra
te
of b
elow
50%
CIA
BOC
rece
ives
sup
port
from
the
AG’s
Dep
t bot
h fo
rmal
ly a
nd in
form
ally.
The
y re
tain
s ar
ound
te
n la
wye
rs a
ttach
ed to
the
AG’s
Dep
t on
a co
nsul
tanc
y-ba
sis,
whe
n th
eir o
wn
lega
l per
sonn
el
cann
ot c
ope
with
the
wor
kloa
d. A
t pre
sent
CIA
BOC
has
26
lega
l offi
cers
.
Aver
age
pros
ecut
ion
rate
s ho
wev
er, a
re n
ot im
pres
sive
: 137
.3 p
er y
ear b
etw
een
2014
-201
6 w
hich
is a
sm
all p
ropo
rtion
of t
he in
vest
igat
ions
com
plet
ed.
Thou
gh a
t pre
sent
CIA
BOC
sta
tes
that
ther
e ha
s b
een
no in
terfe
renc
e fro
m th
e pr
esen
t gov
t, pr
osec
utio
ns o
f infl
uent
ial p
erso
ns re
mai
n lo
w -
due
in s
ome
mea
sure
- to
the
com
plex
ity
of a
rraig
nmen
ts s
ough
t. Fu
rther
, in
som
e in
stan
ces,
pol
itici
ans
out o
f pow
er m
ay s
till w
ield
si
gnifi
cant
pol
itica
l clo
ut in
a s
ituat
ion
in w
hich
the
coal
ition
-in-p
ower
rem
ains
a fr
agile
col
lect
ion
of d
iver
se g
roup
s. T
hus
even
if th
e go
vt d
oes
not i
nter
fere
, the
re m
ay b
e pr
essu
re fr
om o
ther
, illi
cit s
ourc
es, w
hich
impa
ct o
n pr
osec
utio
n ra
tes.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C A
nnua
l Rep
ort;
inte
rvie
w w
ith E
dito
r, R
avay
a (0
5/10
/201
6); w
ith e
x-D
G
CIA
BOC
(2/1
1/20
16);
Dep
uty
Solic
itor-G
ener
al, A
G’s
Dep
t (7/
9/20
16);
Audi
tor G
ener
al
(21/
09/2
016)
and
Cha
irman
, Pol
ice
Com
mis
sion
(28/
10/2
016)
.
36. C
oope
ratio
n be
twee
n AC
A an
d ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
(inc
ludi
ng
ACAs
if th
ere
are
mul
tiple
inst
itutio
ns)
Hig
h de
gree
of
coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACAs
or
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r int
egrit
y ag
enci
es
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r int
egrit
y ag
enci
es
Con
flict
&/o
r lac
k of
coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r int
egrit
y ag
enci
es
Ther
e ar
e tw
o ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
, i.e
. the
Fin
anci
al C
rimes
Inve
stig
atio
n D
epar
tmen
t (F
CID
) whi
ch is
a u
nit w
ithin
the
Polic
e D
ept,
and
the
Pres
iden
tial C
omm
issi
on t
o In
vest
igat
e an
d In
quire
into
Ser
ious
Act
s of
Fra
ud, C
orru
ptio
n an
d Ab
use
of P
ower
, Sta
te R
esou
rces
and
Pr
ivile
ges
(PR
ECIF
AC).
CIA
BOC
poi
nts
out t
hat t
hey
shar
e le
gal s
taff
with
PR
ECIF
AC, w
hich
in
pra
ctic
e en
sure
s th
at c
ases
han
dled
by
one
agen
cy a
re n
ot d
uplic
ated
in o
ther
s. F
urth
er
PREC
IFAC
con
stan
tly c
heck
s if
CIA
BOC
is fo
llow
ing
up o
n ca
ses
whi
ch P
REC
IFAC
is w
orki
ng
on. T
his
is d
ue to
the
fact
that
com
plai
nant
s te
nd to
see
k re
lief b
y ap
plyi
ng to
mul
tiple
age
ncie
s at
the
sam
e tim
e. T
he A
udito
r Gen
eral
als
o m
akes
inpu
ts w
hen
aske
d. W
hile
all
such
age
ncie
s ar
e ve
ry w
illing
, the
y al
so h
ave
thei
r ow
n st
aff s
horta
ge is
sues
.
How
ever
, the
re d
oes
not s
eem
to b
e an
y re
al c
olla
bora
tion
in in
vest
igat
ions
or a
ny a
ttem
pt to
fo
rge
a un
ified
stra
tegy
for d
ealin
g w
ith ‘d
ifficu
lt’ c
ases
– i.
e. h
igh
profi
le p
erso
ns o
r com
plic
ated
ca
ses,
in o
rder
to s
ecur
e a
high
er le
vel o
f con
vict
ions
. Som
e of
the
blam
e fo
r thi
s un
satis
fact
ory
situ
atio
n pe
rhap
s lie
s at
the
feet
of C
IABO
C’s
con
fiden
tialit
y cl
ause
.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
form
er S
ecre
tary
to P
REC
IFAC
(10/
09/ 2
016)
; Cha
irman
, Pol
ice
Com
mis
sion
(2/1
1/20
16) a
nd fo
rmer
DG
, CIA
BOC
(10/
11/2
016)
.
52
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
37. C
oope
ratio
n be
twee
n AC
A an
d no
n-go
vern
men
tal o
rgan
izat
ions
in
clud
ing
CSO
s an
d pr
ivat
e co
mpa
nies
Hig
h de
gree
of
coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r or
gani
zatio
ns
incl
udin
g C
SOs
and
priv
ate
com
pani
es
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
AC
A an
d ot
her o
rgan
izat
ions
Con
flict
and
/ or
lack
coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r or
gani
zatio
ns
Som
e tra
de u
nion
s an
d C
SOs,
esp
ecia
lly th
ose
linke
d to
leftw
ing
polit
ical
par
ties,
com
plai
n th
at
CIA
BOC
’s a
ttitu
de to
war
ds th
e pu
blic
is a
dver
saria
l rat
her t
han
supp
ortiv
e. T
hey
stat
e th
at th
eir
com
plai
nts
are
not a
ddre
ssed
. C
IABO
C d
oes
not s
eem
to h
ave
a po
licy
of c
onta
ctin
g co
mpl
ain-
ants
and
ask
ing
them
to p
rovi
de th
e ba
ckgr
ound
/con
text
to th
eir c
ompl
aint
s. H
owev
er, a
few
C
SOs
say
they
wer
e tre
ated
with
civ
ility,
and
kep
t inf
orm
ed a
bout
the
stat
us o
f the
inve
stig
atio
n of
thei
r com
plai
nts.
Sour
ce: i
nter
view
with
CSO
lead
ers
& tra
de u
nion
lead
ers.
38. A
CA’
s pa
rtici
patio
n in
inte
rnat
iona
l ne
twor
ks
Very
act
ive
with
AC
A pa
rtici
patin
g in
3 o
r mor
e ne
twor
ks
Activ
e w
ith A
CA
parti
cipa
ting
in 1
or
2 ne
twor
ks
ACA
does
not
pa
rtici
pate
in a
ny
netw
ork
The
Com
mis
sion
ers,
DG
and
sen
ior m
embe
rs o
f sta
ff pa
rtici
pate
ofte
n in
UN
, IN
GO
-rela
ted
an
d Tr
ansp
aren
cy In
tern
atio
nal-l
inke
d ev
ents
.
Sour
ce: T
rans
pare
ncy
Secr
etar
iat;
inte
rvie
w w
ith fo
rmer
DG
, CIA
BOC
.
39. A
CA’
s co
oper
atio
n w
ith A
CAs
in
othe
r cou
ntrie
s H
igh
degr
ee o
f co
oper
atio
n w
ith
join
t pro
ject
s an
d te
chni
cal
assi
stan
ce w
ith
seve
ral A
CAs
in
othe
r cou
ntrie
s
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
in s
ome
area
s w
ith
one
or tw
o AC
As in
ot
her c
ount
ries
ACA
does
not
pa
rtici
pate
in a
ny
netw
ork
CIA
BOC
has
mad
e co
ntac
t with
AC
As in
a w
ide
rang
e of
cou
ntrie
s, in
clud
ing
Asia
n co
untri
es
such
as
Chi
na, M
alay
sia,
Indi
a, P
akis
tan
and
Mon
golia
.
How
ever
, the
re d
oes
not s
eem
to b
e jo
int p
roje
cts.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
form
er D
G, C
IABO
C (2
/11/
2016
).
53
6. A
CA’
s ac
coun
tabi
lity
and
over
sigh
t (4
indi
cato
rs)
Som
e tra
de u
nion
s an
d C
SOs,
esp
ecia
lly th
ose
linke
d to
leftw
ing
polit
ical
par
ties,
com
plai
n th
at C
IABO
C’s
atti
tude
tow
ards
the
publ
ic is
adv
ersa
rial r
athe
r tha
n su
ppor
tive.
The
y st
ate
that
thei
r com
-pl
aint
s ar
e no
t add
ress
ed.
CIA
BOC
doe
s no
t see
m to
hav
e a
polic
y of
con
tact
ing
com
plai
n-an
ts a
nd a
skin
g th
em to
pro
vide
the
back
grou
nd/c
onte
xt to
thei
r com
plai
nts.
How
ever
, a fe
w C
SOs
say
they
wer
e tre
ated
with
civ
ility,
and
kep
t inf
orm
ed a
bout
the
stat
us o
f the
inve
stig
atio
n of
thei
r com
plai
nts.
Sour
ce: i
nter
view
with
CSO
lead
ers
& tra
de u
nion
lead
ers.
The
Com
mis
sion
ers,
DG
and
sen
ior m
embe
rs o
f sta
ff pa
rtici
pate
ofte
n in
UN
, IN
GO
-rela
ted
and
Tra
nspa
renc
y In
tern
atio
nal-l
inke
d ev
ents
.
Sour
ce: T
rans
pare
ncy
Secr
etar
iat;
inte
rvie
w w
ith e
x-D
G, C
IABO
C.
CIA
BOC
has
mad
e co
ntac
t with
AC
As in
a w
ide
rang
e of
cou
ntrie
s, in
clud
ing
Asia
n co
untri
es s
uch
as C
hina
, Mal
aysi
a, In
dia,
Pak
ista
n an
d M
ongo
lia.
How
ever
, the
re d
oes
not s
eem
to b
e jo
int p
roje
cts.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
, CIA
BOC
(2/1
1/20
16).
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
40. I
nfor
mat
ion
prov
ided
in a
nd
acce
ssib
ility
of A
CA’
s an
nual
repo
rt an
d w
ebsi
te
Com
preh
ensi
ve
info
rmat
ion
on
ACA
is p
rovi
ded
in a
nnua
l rep
ort
and
web
site
, su
bmitt
ed to
pa
rliam
ent a
nd
easi
ly a
cces
sibl
e to
the
publ
ic
Lim
ited
info
rmat
ion
on A
CA
is p
rovi
ded
in a
nnua
l rep
ort a
nd
web
site
; sub
mitt
ed
to p
arlia
men
t but
not
ea
sily
acc
essi
ble
to
the
publ
ic
Subm
its a
nnua
l re
port
to
gove
rnm
ent b
ut
is n
ot a
vaila
ble
to th
e pu
blic
Acco
rdin
g to
its
enab
ling
legi
slat
ion
(199
4) C
IABO
C is
requ
ired
to p
rodu
ce a
n An
nual
Rep
ort
deta
iling
its a
ctiv
ities
, whi
ch is
to b
e se
nt to
the
Pres
iden
t, w
ho th
en m
akes
it a
vaila
ble
to
Parli
amen
t. C
IABO
C d
ownl
oade
d its
Ann
ual R
epor
t for
the
first
tim
e on
to it
s w
ebsi
te in
201
5.
The
Annu
al R
epor
t spe
lt ou
t its
mis
sion
and
pro
vide
d so
me
basi
c in
form
atio
n on
its
budg
et,
num
ber o
f inv
estig
atio
ns c
arrie
d ou
t ove
r the
pas
t five
yea
rs a
nd s
taff
vaca
ncie
s. H
ard
copi
es
are
not e
asily
ava
ilabl
e. It
s w
ebsi
te is
free
ly a
cces
sibl
e, b
ut th
e in
form
atio
n pr
ovid
ed h
owev
er, i
s lim
ited
to a
hot
line
and
emai
l acc
ess
to th
e D
G, c
ompl
eted
inve
stig
atio
ns a
nd c
onvi
ctio
ns.
Des
pite
man
y eff
orts
, the
rese
arch
team
was
not
abl
e to
acc
ess
a ha
rd c
opy
of p
revi
ous
Annu
al
Rep
orts
.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
015;
web
site
(w
ww.
ciab
oc.g
ov.lk
)
41.A
CA’
s ov
ersi
ght m
echa
nism
sO
vers
ight
co
mm
ittee
s w
ith a
ctiv
e pa
rtici
patio
n by
MPs
sen
ior
civi
l ser
vant
s &
prom
inen
t ci
tizen
s
Ove
rsig
ht
com
mitt
ees
with
m
embe
rs o
f pa
rliam
ent a
nd /o
r se
nior
civ
il se
rvan
ts
as m
embe
rs
Acco
unta
ble
to E
xecu
tive
with
out a
ny
over
sigh
t co
mm
ittee
CIA
BOC
is a
nsw
erab
le to
Par
liam
ent.
The
y ar
e ex
pect
ed to
pro
vide
a P
arlia
men
tary
Com
mit-
tee
with
pro
gres
s re
ports
eve
ry tw
o m
onth
s. In
pra
ctic
e, th
ese
proc
edur
es h
ave
only
just
beg
un
to fa
ll in
to p
lace
, sin
ce th
e 19
th A
men
dmen
t to
the
Con
stitu
tion
whi
ch c
onta
ins
thes
e ov
ersi
ght
prov
isio
ns w
as o
nly
pass
ed in
May
201
5. T
he C
omm
ittee
has
jus
t rec
ently
com
e in
to p
lace
an
d ha
ve s
o fa
r req
uest
ed tw
o re
ports
from
CIA
BOC
. C
IABO
C is
beh
indh
and
on
the
first
but
ha
s co
mpi
led
the
seco
nd. T
hey
are
wor
king
on
this
.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
ex-
DG
CIA
BOC
(10/
11/2
016)
; Edi
tor,
Rav
aya
(5/1
0/20
16)s
ee a
lso
Chr
is
Kam
ales
an, S
unda
y Ti
mes
, (15
/5/2
016)
, Haf
sa S
abry
, Sun
day
Lead
er (6
.9.2
015
& 31
/07/
2016
).
54
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
42. A
CA’
s pr
oced
ure
for d
ealin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CA
pers
onne
lC
ompl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
A pe
rson
nel a
nd
inve
stig
ated
by
an-o
ther
pub
lic
agen
cy to
avo
id
confl
ict o
f int
eres
t an
d re
sults
of
inve
stig
atio
n an
d pu
nish
men
t im
pose
d ar
e pu
blic
ised
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst
ACA
pers
onne
l are
in
vest
igat
ed b
y its
inte
rnal
con
trol
unit
but r
esul
ts o
f in
vest
igat
ion
and
puni
shm
ent a
re n
ot
publ
icis
ed
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CA
pers
onne
l ar
e ig
nore
d or
not
in
vest
igat
ed
with
out a
ny
expl
anat
ion
Her
e th
e re
cord
is v
ery
prob
lem
atic
. Th
ere
is n
o pr
oced
ure
for i
nves
tigat
ion
by a
noth
er p
ublic
ag
ency
. In
fact
, a c
ompl
aint
of b
riber
y ag
ains
t the
pre
viou
s C
IABO
C C
hairm
an (2
010-
15) w
as
inve
stig
ated
by
the
accu
sed
him
self
and
dism
isse
d. A
s ev
iden
ced
by th
e nu
mbe
r of c
ompl
aint
s of
his
con
duct
car
ried
by th
e m
edia
, thi
s is
sue
gene
rate
d m
uch
publ
ic o
utra
ge. T
his
situ
atio
n ha
s ch
ange
d w
ith th
e im
plem
entin
g of
the
19th
Am
endm
ent,
whi
ch s
tipul
ates
a p
arlia
men
tary
co
mm
ittee
to o
vers
ee th
e fu
nctio
n of
inte
grity
bod
ies.
Sinc
e C
IABO
C’s
inve
stig
ator
s ar
e dr
awn
from
the
Polic
e D
epar
tmen
t, th
ey fa
ll un
der t
he
Polic
e O
rdin
ance
. Th
eref
ore
disc
iplin
ary
hear
ings
aga
inst
them
hav
e to
be
cond
ucte
d by
the
Polic
e H
uman
Res
ourc
es D
epar
tmen
t. T
his
is a
ver
y cu
mbe
rsom
e m
echa
nism
. In
any
cas
e,
the
puni
tive
stra
tegy
use
d in
the
Polic
e D
epar
tmen
t see
ms
to in
volv
e tra
nsfe
rring
offi
cers
out
ra
ther
than
inst
itutin
g ju
dici
al a
ctio
n ag
ains
t the
m, w
hate
ver t
he d
epth
of t
he o
ffens
e.
Thus
CIA
BOC
can
not i
nitia
te a
ctio
n ag
ains
t its
inve
stig
ator
s, o
nly
reco
mm
end
the
need
for i
t. Th
e in
tern
al w
ill an
d m
easu
res
for i
nves
tigat
ing
com
plai
nts
agai
nst i
ts o
wn
pers
onne
l are
wea
k.
In M
ay 2
016
the
Sund
ay T
imes
sta
ted
that
CIA
BOC
was
pro
bing
the
cond
uct o
f an
insp
ecto
r in
the
Inve
stig
atio
ns D
epar
tmen
t. A
CIA
BOC
spo
kesm
an w
as q
uote
d as
say
ing
that
an
inte
rnal
in
vest
igat
ion
was
taki
ng p
lace
. How
ever
, the
resu
lts o
f thi
s pr
oces
s w
as n
ot p
ublic
ised
, whi
ch is
un
satis
fact
ory
in a
n in
tegr
ity u
nit s
uch
as C
IABO
C.
Sour
ce: A
.C.V
isva
linga
m, I
slan
d, 3
0.07
.201
5;. N
irmal
a Ka
nnag
ara;
Sun
day
Lead
er 0
8.12
.201
3,
Chr
is K
amal
esan
, Sun
day
Tim
es, 1
5.05
.201
6, H
afsa
Sab
ry, S
unda
y Le
ader
, 06.
09.2
015
& 31
.08.
2016
.
43. O
utco
me
of c
ompl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
A or
its
pers
onne
l in
past
3 y
ears
All v
alid
com
-pl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
A pe
rson
nel
resu
lt in
pu
nish
men
t or
othe
r rem
edie
s,
and
outc
ome
is
publ
icis
ed
Som
e va
lid
com
plai
nts
agai
nst
ACA
pers
onne
l re
sult
in p
unis
hmen
t or
oth
er re
med
ies,
an
d ou
tcom
e is
pu
blic
ised
.
Com
plai
nts
invo
lvin
g AC
A pe
rson
nel a
re
igno
red
and
not
inve
stig
ated
.
Des
pite
a p
ublic
out
cry,
no
puni
tive
actio
n w
as a
ttem
pted
aga
inst
the
prev
ious
Cha
irman
(2
010-
15) a
ccus
ed o
f acc
eptin
g a
brib
e. T
he p
rese
nt C
omm
issi
oner
s, h
owev
er, e
njoy
a h
igh
repu
tatio
n fo
r int
egrit
y in
lega
l circ
les
and
this
con
tribu
tes
tow
ards
the
proc
ess
of c
onso
lida-
ting
the
pres
tige
of th
e in
stitu
tion.
As m
entio
ned
in th
e pr
evio
us in
dica
tor,
on 1
5th
May
201
6, a
new
spap
er s
tate
d th
at C
IABO
C
was
pro
bing
the
cond
uct o
f an
inve
stig
ator
(Ins
pect
or A
.H.M
. Gam
ini A
beys
ingh
e) a
ccus
ed o
f le
akin
g co
nfide
ntia
l inf
orm
atio
n. T
he o
utco
me
of th
is p
robe
rem
ains
shr
oude
d in
mys
tery
, and
in
gen
eral
, CIA
BOC
’s in
tern
al p
roce
dure
s la
ck tr
ansp
aren
cy. I
n O
ctob
er 2
016,
CIA
BOC
‘s e
x-D
G w
as a
ccus
ed o
f mis
usin
g he
r pow
ers
of d
iscr
etio
n, a
nd b
eing
sel
ectiv
e in
filin
g ch
arge
s. S
he
tend
ed h
er re
sign
atio
n on
17
Oct
201
6.
Sour
ce: C
hris
Kam
alen
dran
in S
unda
y Ti
mes
(15/
05/2
016)
, Col
ombo
Tel
egra
ph (2
7/9/
2016
); K
Tenn
akoo
n in
Cey
lon
Toda
y (1
4/10
/201
6); a
lso
disc
ussi
on w
ith k
ey in
form
ants
incl
udin
g ac
adem
ics
and
lega
l pro
fess
iona
ls.
55
7. P
ublic
per
cept
ions
of t
he A
CA’
s pe
rfor
man
ce (7
indi
cato
rs)
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
44. P
ublic
con
fiden
ce th
at
gove
rnm
ent h
as g
iven
the
ACA
the
requ
ired
pow
ers
and
reso
urce
s fo
r cu
rbin
g co
rrupt
ion
Hig
h le
vel o
f co
nfide
nce
as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs
(abo
ve 7
5%) a
nd
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l, C
SO le
ader
s an
d an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
s (5
0%-7
5%)
&vie
ws
of s
enio
r AC
A pe
rson
nel,
CSO
lead
ers,
an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
confi
denc
e as
re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ing
(bel
ow 5
0%)
and
view
s of
se
nior
AC
A pe
rson
nel,
CSO
le
ader
s,
anti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
and
jo
urna
lists
The
2015
CPI
rank
s Sr
i Lan
ka 8
3 ou
t of 1
54 s
tate
s, n
otch
ing
only
37
poin
ts. T
his
scor
e ha
s re
mai
ned
stab
le o
ver t
he p
ast 3
yea
rs. T
rans
pare
ncy
Inte
rnat
iona
l’s G
loba
l Cor
rupt
ion
Baro
met
er’s
(GC
B) 2
016
data
on
Sri L
anka
, 43
.9%
of r
espo
nden
ts th
ough
t tha
t CIA
BOC
was
do
ing
wel
l or e
ven
very
wel
l. 26
.1%
wer
e di
ssat
isfie
d. 3
0% w
ould
not
ven
ture
an
opin
ion.
Agai
nst t
his,
a c
omm
unity
per
cept
ions
sur
vey
on p
olic
ing
by
the
Asia
Fou
ndat
ion
in J
an 2
016
(see
tabl
e 6)
sho
ws
a sh
arp
shift
ove
r the
pas
t yea
r: p
ublic
vie
ws
on c
orru
ptio
n as
a k
ey fa
ctor
aff
ectin
g po
licin
g dr
oppe
d fro
m 2
4% in
201
4 to
6%
in 2
015.
Pol
itica
l int
erfe
renc
e as
a fa
ctor
al
so d
ropp
ed fr
om 5
6% to
39%
.Thi
s im
plie
s th
at p
erce
ptio
ns o
f cor
rupt
ion
as w
ell a
s po
litic
al
inte
rfere
nce
with
in p
ublic
inst
itutio
ns s
uch
as th
e po
lice
has
decl
ined
radi
cally
ove
r 201
5 (i.
e.
100%
-[6%
+39%
] = 5
5% o
f res
pond
ents
hav
e co
nfide
nce
in th
e po
litic
al c
limat
e) T
his
rate
s a
‘m
oder
ate’
sco
re.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C’s
Ann
ual R
epor
t (20
15);
Cor
rupt
ion
Perc
eptio
n In
dex
(201
5), T
rans
pare
ncy
Inte
rnat
iona
l, Be
rlin.
inte
rvie
w w
ith C
onve
nor,
Citi
zens
Mov
emen
t for
Goo
d G
over
nanc
e (7
/9/2
016)
; al
so A
udito
r Gen
eral
(21/
9/20
16),
Cha
irman
, CO
PE (2
8/10
/201
6); C
onve
nor,
Cey
lon
Teac
hers
’ Uni
on (2
2/9/
2016
); G
ener
al S
ecy.
Pub
lic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4/19
/201
6),
Con
veno
r, Vo
ice
Agai
nst C
orru
ptio
n (1
5/9/
2016
); al
so i
nter
view
s w
ith c
rimin
al ju
stic
e pr
ofes
sion
als
atta
ched
to th
e AG
’s D
ept a
nd C
SO le
ader
s.
45. P
ublic
con
fiden
ce in
AC
A’s
adhe
renc
e to
due
pro
cess
, im
parti
ality
and
fairn
ess
in u
sing
its
pow
ers
Hig
h le
vel o
f co
nfide
nce
as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
g (a
bove
75%
) and
vi
ews
of s
enio
r AC
A pe
rson
nel,
CSO
lead
ers,
an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs
(50%
- 7
5%) a
nd
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l, C
SO le
ader
s, a
nti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
an
d jo
urna
lists
Low
leve
l of
confi
denc
e as
re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ings
(b
elow
50%
) and
vi
ews
of s
enio
r AC
A pe
rson
nel,
CSO
lead
ers,
an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
The
issu
e of
CIA
BOC
’s im
parti
ality
and
adh
eren
ce to
due
pro
cess
and
fairn
ess
rem
ains
pr
oble
mat
ic.
On
the
one
hand
, the
re is
clo
se m
edia
inte
rest
in C
IABO
C’s
act
iviti
es. O
n th
e ot
her,
a su
cces
sion
of s
enio
r pol
itica
l figu
res
have
exp
ress
ed m
uch
cons
tern
atio
n ab
out
CIA
BOC
’s fa
ilure
to
adhe
re to
due
pro
cess
. In
resp
onse
to s
uch
a cr
itica
l com
men
t, in
Oct
20
16, t
he th
en-D
G fe
lt ob
liged
to te
nder
her
resi
gnat
ion.
The
fact
that
she
did
, iro
nica
lly, i
s te
stim
ony
to th
e fa
ct th
at s
he fe
lt th
at s
he d
id a
dher
e to
due
pro
cess
and
atte
mpt
ed to
be
impa
rtial
.
How
ever
, the
se in
cess
ant c
harg
es a
nd c
ount
er-c
harg
es s
houl
d be
see
n ag
ains
t a fr
augh
t po
litic
al c
ultu
re w
hich
has
em
erge
d in
the
post
-con
flict
situ
atio
n. A
nea
r bre
akdo
wn
of la
w a
nd
orde
r and
the
abje
ct p
oliti
ciza
tion
of p
ublic
inst
itutio
ns p
reva
ils. T
his
has
crea
ted
enor
mou
s pu
blic
ang
er a
gain
st p
oliti
cian
s a
nd p
ublic
ser
vant
s w
ho a
re p
erce
ived
to b
e cu
lpab
le. I
n su
ch
a co
ntex
t, th
e pu
blic
con
tinue
s to
mak
e de
man
ds th
at c
orru
pt p
oliti
cian
s sh
ould
be
brou
ght t
o ju
stic
e w
hich
may
be
unre
alis
tic i
n th
e sh
ort t
erm
.
Sour
ces:
Int
ervi
ews
with
lega
l pro
fess
iona
ls, N
irmal
a Ka
nnan
gara
in S
unda
y le
ader
(22/
02/2
014)
; Sun
day
Tim
es (1
6/04
/201
5); S
unda
y Le
ader
(31/
8/20
16),
Isla
nd
(31/
8/20
16);
Dai
ly M
irror
(23/
9/20
16);
Col
ombo
Tel
egra
ph (2
7/9/
2016
); Su
nday
Lea
der (
3/10
/201
6); E
cono
my
Nex
t (1
8/10
/201
6).
56
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
46. C
onfid
ence
in A
CA’
s ad
here
nce
to
due
proc
ess,
impa
rtial
ity a
nd fa
irnes
s in
usi
ng it
s po
wer
s, a
mon
g pe
rson
s w
ho h
ad d
irect
con
tact
with
th
e AC
A
Hig
h le
vel o
f co
nfide
nce
as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs
(abo
ve 7
5%) a
nd
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l, C
SO le
ader
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd, i
f po
ssib
le p
erso
ns
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
the
ACA
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
-din
gs (5
0%-7
5%)
and
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l, C
SO le
ader
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd ,
if po
ssib
le, p
erso
ns
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
the
ACA
Low
leve
l of
confi
denc
e as
re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ings
(b
elow
50%
) and
vi
ews
of s
enio
r AC
A p
erso
nnel
, C
SO le
ader
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd, i
f po
ssib
le p
erso
ns
with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith th
e AC
A
Pers
ons
who
hav
e ha
d di
rect
con
tact
with
CIA
BOC
fall
into
two
mai
n ca
tego
ries:
(a) o
rdin
ary
citiz
ens
and
(b) m
embe
rs o
f CSO
s, T
Us
and
polit
ical
act
ivis
ts w
ho re
pres
ent o
rgan
izat
ions
. Th
e se
cond
cat
egor
y in
par
ticul
ar, h
ave
filed
com
plai
nts
on m
assi
ve fr
aud
of g
igan
tic d
imen
sion
s w
hich
the
CIA
BOC
, und
erst
anda
bly
enou
gh in
the
pres
ent p
oliti
cal c
limat
e, h
as b
een
som
ewha
t he
sita
nt in
inve
stig
atin
g. T
his
has
lead
to p
olar
ized
resp
onse
s, a
nd t
hose
who
had
hig
h ex
pect
atio
ns o
f inv
estig
atio
ns in
to m
assi
ve fr
aud
bein
g fa
st-tr
acke
d ar
e cr
itica
l abo
ut C
IABO
C’s
pe
rform
ance
.
Ord
inar
y ci
tizen
s on
thei
r par
t ten
d to
be
intim
idat
ed b
y th
e so
mew
hat a
dver
saria
l app
roac
h as
sum
ed b
y C
IABO
C’s
Rec
eivi
ng O
ffice
rs. T
hey
com
plai
n th
at th
ese
office
rs in
terro
gate
them
as
if
they
wer
e th
e off
ende
rs.
It sh
ould
be
note
d th
at C
IABO
C’s
inve
stig
ator
s ar
e dr
awn
from
the
Polic
e D
ept,
whi
ch d
oes
not h
ave
reco
rd o
f bei
ng p
eopl
e-fri
endl
y. F
or m
any
com
plai
nant
s,
such
an
adve
rsar
ial r
espo
nse
is s
een
as a
lack
of i
mpa
rtial
ity in
that
CIA
BOC
’s s
taff
seem
to
resp
ond
bette
r to
high
er s
tatu
s co
mpl
aina
nts
or th
ose
with
an
orga
niza
tion
back
ing
them
, whi
ch
enha
nces
thei
r sta
tus.
Both
cat
egor
ies
of c
ompl
aina
nts
agre
e th
at m
any
anon
ymou
s co
mpl
aint
s m
ay b
e m
otiv
ated
by
petty
reve
nge.
How
ever
, the
y po
int o
ut th
at C
IABO
C’s
rece
ivin
g offi
cers
can
not a
lway
s as
sum
e th
is, a
nd n
eed
to tr
eat e
very
com
plai
nant
with
gre
ater
resp
ect a
nd a
ssum
e a
mor
e pr
ofes
sion
al
stan
ce.
Sour
ce: i
nter
view
with
Cha
irman
, CO
PE, (
20/1
0/20
16);
Con
veno
r, C
eylo
n Te
ache
rs’ U
nion
(2
2/09
/201
6); G
en. S
ecy.
Pub
lic S
ecto
r Nur
ses’
Uni
on (1
4./9
/201
6), C
onve
nor,
Voic
e Ag
ains
t C
orru
ptio
n (1
5/9/
2016
); C
onve
nor,
CaF
FE (1
3/9/
2016
) and
Hea
d, H
isto
ry D
ept,
Col
ombo
U
nive
rsity
(11/
10/2
016)
; int
ervi
ews
with
crim
inal
just
ice
prof
essi
onal
s a
ttach
ed to
the
AG
’s
office
and
BAS
L, o
ppos
ition
pol
itici
ans
and
jour
nalis
ts. S
ee a
lso
A.C
. Vis
valin
gam
in Is
land
(2
0/6/
2015
); K
Tenn
akoo
n in
Cey
lon
Toda
y (1
4/10
/201
6).
47. C
onfid
ence
in th
e AC
A’s
dign
ified
and
resp
ectfu
l tre
atm
ent o
f per
sons
und
er
inve
stig
atio
n
Hig
h le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
re
flect
ed in
the
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l, C
SO le
ader
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
pers
ons
subj
ect
to in
vest
igat
ion,
if
poss
ible
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in th
e vi
ews
of s
enio
r AC
A pe
rson
nel,
CSO
lead
ers,
jo
urna
lists
and
pe
rson
s s
ubje
ct
to in
vest
igat
ion,
if
poss
ible
Low
leve
l of
confi
denc
e as
re
flect
ed in
vi
ews
of s
enio
r AC
A pe
rson
nel,
CSO
lead
ers,
jo
urna
lists
and
pe
rson
s s
ubje
ct
to in
vest
igat
ion,
if
poss
ible
The
rese
arch
team
wer
e un
able
to a
cces
s su
ch p
erso
ns. A
t the
sam
e tim
e, if
com
plai
nant
s to
C
IABO
C a
re in
timid
ated
by
the
treat
men
t the
y re
ceiv
ed, i
t is
hard
to im
agin
e th
at s
uspe
cts
– at
le
ast t
hose
from
low
er s
ocio
econ
omic
bac
kgro
unds
– w
ould
fare
muc
h be
tter.
Som
e po
litic
al
figur
es in
vest
igat
ed h
ave
com
plai
ned
of th
eir t
reat
men
t to
the
med
ia.
But t
hese
are
influ
entia
l pe
rson
ages
who
may
ver
y qu
ick
to ta
ke o
ffens
e at
the
way
they
’re tr
eate
d w
hen
out o
f pow
er.
It w
as in
fact
the
alle
gedl
y di
sres
pect
ful c
ondu
ct o
f the
inte
rroga
tion
of a
sen
ior c
abin
et
min
iste
r (fo
r a re
lativ
ely
min
or c
harg
e) w
hich
set
into
mot
ion
the
train
of e
vent
s w
hich
led
to th
e re
sign
atio
n of
the
prev
ious
DG
on
17th
Oct
ober
201
6.
Whi
le C
IABO
C s
taff
agre
e th
at th
e Sr
i Lan
kan
Polic
e d
o no
t hav
e a
reco
rd o
f tre
atin
g su
spec
ts (w
ithou
t pol
itica
l con
tact
s) w
ith a
ny d
egre
e of
dig
nity
, the
y ve
hem
ently
den
y th
at
they
them
selv
es tr
eat s
uspe
cts
in a
ny w
ay th
at is
inap
prop
riate
. Thi
s an
xiet
y to
con
vinc
e th
e re
sear
ch te
am a
nd th
e p
ublic
at l
arge
, im
plie
s th
at th
e cr
itici
sm re
ceiv
ed o
ver t
he p
ast t
wo
year
s on
this
rega
rd h
as h
ad a
n im
pact
on
CIA
BOC
sta
ff ac
ross
the
boar
d.
Sour
ce: S
unda
y Ti
mes
(26/
4/20
15);
Isla
nd, e
dito
rial (
15/0
9/20
16);
Cey
lon
Toda
y (1
4/10
/201
6);
Keer
thiT
enne
koon
in C
olom
bo T
eleg
raph
(19/
10/2
016)
. Als
o in
terv
iew
s C
SO le
ader
s, jo
urna
lists
an
d ac
adem
ics.
57
IND
ICAT
OR
VA
LUES
IND
ICAT
OR
HIG
HM
OD
ERAT
ELO
WJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF
SCO
RES
48. P
ublic
per
cept
ion
of A
CA’
s eff
ectiv
enes
s in
cor
rupt
ion-
cont
rol
Hig
h le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs
(abo
ve 7
5%) a
nd
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l C
SO le
ader
s,
anti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
and
jo
urna
lists
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ngs
(50%
-75%
) an
d vi
ews
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
effec
tiven
ess
as re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ings
(b
elow
50%
) an
d vi
ews
of
CSO
lead
ers,
an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
As m
entio
ned
abov
e, in
the
GC
B (2
016)
dat
a, 4
3.9%
of r
espo
nden
ts th
ough
t tha
t CIA
BOC
w
as d
oing
wel
l or e
ven
very
wel
l. Th
e As
ia F
ound
atio
n, C
olom
bo’s
Com
mun
ity P
erce
ptio
ns
Surv
ey o
n po
licin
g c
ondu
cted
in J
anua
ry 2
016
was
eve
n m
ore
posi
tive.
It in
dica
ted
that
55%
of
resp
onde
nts
had
confi
denc
e in
the
new
pol
itica
l clim
ate
(see
tabl
e 6)
. Fur
ther
, all
key
info
rman
ts
inte
rvie
wed
for t
his
asse
ssm
ent –
with
out e
xcep
tion
– ag
reed
that
the
leve
l of a
ctiv
ity h
ad
defin
itely
rise
n w
ith th
e ne
w C
omm
issi
on a
nd s
peci
ally
ex-
DG
Ms
Wic
kram
asin
ghe.
Thi
s w
as
thou
ght t
o be
par
ticul
arly
so
in th
e re
alm
s of
pre
vent
ion
and
outre
ach
activ
ities
, with
the
‘Sev
en
step
s to
zer
o To
lera
nce’
stra
tegy
.
Sour
ce: S
ourc
e: in
terv
iew
s w
ith tr
ade
unio
nist
s, C
SO le
ader
s an
d jo
urna
lists
; A.C
. Vis
valin
gam
in
Isla
nd (2
0/6/
2015
); K
Tenn
akoo
n in
Cey
lon
Toda
y (1
4/10
/201
6); C
eylo
n To
day,
(22/
02/2
016)
.
49. P
erce
ptio
ns o
f AC
A’s
effec
tiven
ess
in c
orru
ptio
n –c
ontro
l am
ong
pers
ons
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
AC
A
Hig
h le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs
(abo
ve 7
5%) a
nd
view
s of
sen
ior
ACA
pers
onne
l C
SO le
ader
s,
anti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
and
jo
urna
lists
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ngs
(50%
-75%
) an
d vi
ews
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
effec
tiven
ess
as re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ings
(b
elow
50%
) an
d vi
ews
of
CSO
lead
ers,
an
ti-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
Amon
g th
ose
who
had
dire
ct c
onta
ct w
ith C
IABO
C, a
s m
entio
ned
abov
e, m
embe
rs o
f gr
oups
w
ho h
ad a
ctiv
ely
enga
ged
in o
vertu
rnin
g th
e pr
evio
us g
ovt e
xpre
ssed
dis
satis
fact
ion.
127 T
his
was
exp
ress
ed in
thei
r int
ervi
ews
with
the
rese
arch
team
, and
in th
e nu
mer
ous
lette
rs to
ne
wsp
aper
s an
d so
cial
med
ia. T
his
is p
erha
ps d
ue to
thei
r hi
gh –
and
per
haps
unr
ealis
tic -
expe
ctat
ions
of C
IABO
C.
How
ever
, eve
n am
ong
this
cat
egor
y of
per
sons
, the
re is
gen
eral
agr
eem
ent t
hat t
he le
vel o
f ac
tivity
has
rise
n en
orm
ousl
y in
com
paris
on to
pre
viou
s co
mm
issi
ons.
Sour
ce: S
ourc
e: in
terv
iew
s w
ith tr
ade
unio
nist
s, C
SO le
ader
s an
d jo
urna
lists
; A.C
. Vis
valin
gam
in
Isla
nd (2
0/06
/201
5); K
Ten
nako
on in
Cey
lon
Toda
y (1
4/10
/201
6).
50. P
erce
ptio
ns o
f AC
A’s
effec
tiven
ess
in d
ealin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
amon
g fe
mal
e ci
tizen
s w
ho h
ad d
irect
con
tact
with
AC
A
Hig
h le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs
(abo
ve 7
5%)
and
view
s of
C
SO le
ader
s,
anti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
, jo
urna
lists
and
, if
poss
ible
, wom
en
who
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith A
CA.
mod
erat
e le
vel o
f eff
ectiv
enes
s as
re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ngs
(50%
- 75
%) a
nd v
iew
s of
C
SO le
ader
s, a
nti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
, jo
urna
lists
and
, if
poss
ible
, wom
en
who
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith A
CA.
Low
leve
l of
effec
tiven
ess
as re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ings
(b
elow
50%
) &
view
s of
C
SO le
ader
s,
antic
orru
ptio
n ex
perts
, jo
urna
lists
and
, if
poss
ible
, wom
en
who
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith
ACA.
The
rese
arch
team
was
not
abl
e to
acc
ess
any
fem
ale
com
plai
nant
s. H
owev
er, t
he S
ri La
nkan
da
ta o
n th
e 20
16 G
CB
(forth
com
ing)
rev
eals
that
42.
8% o
f fem
ale
resp
onde
nts
thou
ght t
hat
CIA
BOC
was
doi
ng w
ell o
r ver
y w
ell i
n fig
htin
g co
rrupt
ion,
whi
le 2
4.1%
wer
e di
ssat
isfie
d.
Furth
er, a
s m
entio
ned
abov
e, a
mon
g ra
ids
into
com
plai
nts
of b
riber
y an
d co
rrupt
ion
cite
d on
CIA
BOC
’s w
ebsi
te b
etw
een
2012
-16,
the
re a
re fi
ve in
stan
ces
of f
emal
e pl
aint
iffs
who
ci
te d
eman
ds fo
r sex
ual g
ratifi
catio
n in
lieu
of m
oney
, for
pol
itica
l or a
dmin
istra
tive
favo
urs.
O
f the
se, t
wo
such
cha
rges
, hav
e re
sulte
d in
con
vict
ions
, with
sen
tenc
es in
clud
ing
2 yr
s rig
orou
s im
pris
onm
ent s
uspe
nded
for 1
0 ye
ars.
The
firs
t was
initi
ated
in A
ugus
t 201
2, b
ut th
e in
dict
men
t onl
y to
ok p
lace
in M
arch
201
6. T
he o
ther
was
mad
e in
Sep
tem
ber 2
013,
and
the
perp
etra
tor w
as s
ente
nced
in J
anua
ry 2
016.
Thi
s am
ount
s to
a 4
0% c
onvi
ctio
n ra
te, w
hich
is
sign
ifica
ntly
hig
her t
hat t
hat f
or o
ther
con
vict
ions
.
Cle
arly
then
, whi
le fe
mal
e co
mpl
aina
nts
have
bro
ught
cha
rges
aga
inst
dem
ands
for s
exua
l gr
atifi
catio
n, it
is o
nly
in th
e pa
st tw
o ye
ars
that
thes
e ha
ve b
orne
frui
t in
the
cour
ts. T
his
indi
cate
s th
at th
e pr
esen
t CIA
BOC
sta
ff ta
kes
com
plai
nts
of d
eman
ds fo
r sex
ual g
ratifi
catio
n se
rious
ly e
noug
h to
see
wom
en w
ho c
ome
forw
ards
with
com
plai
nts
all t
he w
ay th
roug
h to
co
urt.
This
is a
n im
pres
sive
ach
ieve
men
t in
a co
nser
vativ
e As
ian
soci
ety.
Sour
ce: C
IABO
C w
ebsi
te (w
ww.
ciab
oc.g
ov.lk
); G
loba
l Cor
rupt
ion
Baro
met
er 2
016
(forth
com
ing)
.
127.
90%
of k
ey in
form
ants
had
dire
ct e
xper
ienc
e of
dea
ling
with
CIA
BOC
.
58
93%
72.22%
50.00%
66.66%
40.00%
25.00%
50.00%
56.67%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
ACA's Legal Independence &Status
ACA's Financial and HumanResources
ACA's Detection &Investigation Functions
ACA's Prevention, Education& Outreach Functions
ACA's Cooperation withOther Organizations
ACA's Accountability &Oversight Functions
Public Perceptions of theACA's Performance
Overall Score
CIABOC strives to function in a post-conflict society in which public institutions are frail. Public administration has been subjected to intense politicization. A culture of irregular payments has evolved, in which the public remains ambiguous about what in fact constitutes the parameters of corruption. While large-scale corruption spawns much public outrage, paying bribes for minor public services does not bring moral censure upon the giver. Thus the offense is always committed by one’s opponents, and never by one’s self. The self remains in denial about its complicity in corruption. This creates a situation where the boundary between public service and administrative favour is blurred and unclear to both the public as well as the public servant. In the post-2015 political climate, public institutions are struggling to recover a measure of autonomy.
Figure 1 - CIABOC’S SCORE BY DIMENSION
The new government initially came to power on an anti-graft platform. But they now face rebellion by their own MPs and ministers, who wish to recompense their electoral supporters by gifting them with positions in the public sector. Here again, the culture intervenes. There is no real consensus that politicians giving jobs to their supporters is wrong; only that politicians you have no access to are somehow wrong to provide their supporters with employment in the state sector. This revives the politicization process. Further, politicians of all parties and at all levels national, provincial and local have been accused of receiving commissions from entrepreneurs and businessmen who obtain contracts for public infrastructure building projects.128 The cycle seems endemic.
In this climate, CIABOC’s efforts may seem like a drop in the ocean. Yet CIABOC’s staff are themselves encouraged by the extent to which their collective performance has improved over the past two years. Morale is up and a high level of staff commitment seems to prevail. This should be appreciated by critics rather than dismissed. At the same time this level of performance – while undoubtedly improved – still does not match the expectations of these same critics who invested so much effort in order to bring
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
128. This is due to many reasons.Though presently, a UNP-UPFA coalition governs at the national level, at the provincial and local levels, UPFA politicians linked to the previous regime remain in power, pending provincial and local elections delayed by delimitation issues. A number of such local politicians as well as national-level figures in the previous UPFA govt and leaders of minor parties within the UPFA have been accused of gross
59
about regime change. While they are firmly against ‘witch hunts’ taking place, they did expect that legal measures would be adopted against wrongdoers. CIABOC, on their part, appear to feel that such critiques do not appreciate the complexities of producing evidence against some kinds of white collar crime which could stand in court.
Against this, CIABOC themselves, the media and even some government ministers claim that files of completed investigations sent to the Attorney General are still stockpiled on his desk. The AG’s Department cites lack of court time. Either way, it cannot be denied that the rate of convictions is low. But CIABOC’s senior executives accept that its legal officers - used to dealing with routine misuse of bureaucratic privileges by low-level public employees such as grama sevakas, school teachers/principals and forestry officers - lack advocacy skills to defend more nuanced and intricate cases in court.
Thus though there is an indicator addressing the rate of convictions, the assessment tool itself lacks a dimension dedicated to the Anti-Corruption Agency’s legal competence. Since this is a key aspect of its ability to play its role in society successfully this is an important hiatus in the scheme.
While CIABOC’s code of confidentiality does protect the interests of suspects who are subsequently found to be innocent, it also contributes towards creating a culture of secrecy. A system of gate-keeping appears to have evolved where lower-level staff guard access to senior officials such as the Commissioners and Director-General, who - despite the avowals on CIABOC’s website - are not really accessible to the public. This could be for their own protection, in a situation where politically sensitive investigations are taking place. However, it also creates a situation where the Commissioners themselves seem reluctant to engage with potential critics, including other stakeholders on the anti-corruption front. Since their institutional position is tenured, this lack of openness in dealing with the public is indefensible.
This tendency extends to issues of institutional accountability. While it is valid that the position of the Commissioners should be tenured, this cannot extend to the rest of the staff, in the face of complaints of inappropriate conduct or misuse of funds. The drafting of internal inquiry procedures is required.
Finally, the failure to engage in qualitative research about and understand the context of corruption loopholes is a significant omission. Research into the context of corruption will equip CIABOC staff to grasp the context in which loophole for corruption tend to surface. It will help investigators to understand how a culture of impunity emerges in certain situation, which would help them deal with specific actors who are granted this kind of impunity.
RECOMMENDATIONSLegal independence and status 1. The procedure assumed by the Constitutional Council for the appointment of Commissioners – i.e. calling for nominations from the public and subjecting nominees to an interview process – should be mandated in order to retain transparency.
Human and financial resources2. CIABOC should proceed to recruit a special unit of approx 8 – 10 staff who are equipped to deal with white collar crime – including accounting and criminal justice professionals and qualitative social science researchers – and provide recurrent training which would help them stay abreast of best practices in investigation.129
3. CIABOC, as a public sector organization of extraordinary functions, should be freed from ties to the Police department and the Public Services Commission, and be allowed to recruit its own personnel and formulate its own salary structures.
129. A cabinet draft has already been submitted for this cadre, but its composition should include higher quality staff.
60
Detection and Investigation Function 4. Initially recruit a 3 – 4 member experienced legal team led by selected prosecutors with a proven record in the Attorney General’s Department, to prosecute charges in court relating to complicated cases or cases relating to grand corruption, until such time as CIABOC’s own team of legal officers are of such standard as to function independently of the AG’ Dept. CIABOC should also be able to and set in place a system of bonuses if convictions are secured.
5. Establish another high court complex preferably cited in Colombo, where bribery and corruption cases can be heard under a trial-at-bar.
6. Create an official forum for the exchange of ideas with FCID and PRECIFAC, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Central Bank, the Auditor General and if relevant, the CID for a coordinated and productive approach to complex and large-scale corruption and money laundering cases.
7. Should retain a separate register to identify the gender of complainants
Prevention, education and outreach functions8. Should seek donor assistance to engage in qualitative research into corruption risks, contexts and conditions in Sri Lankan society.
Accountability and oversight functions9. Produce a high-quality Annual Report according to standard report-writing criteria
10. Provide the CC with progress reports very two months.
11. A preliminary inquiry procedure should be devised by the Commissioners/DG to be deployed In the event of complaints against CIABOC staff. The procedure should ascertain the accuracy of the sequence of events cited in the complaint, and then expeditiously arrange a disciplinary hearing with the Police HR Department, at which either a Commissioner or DG also participates.
12. In the event of evidence of wrong-doing by CIABOC staff, disciplinary action must be taken and publicized on CIABOC’s website.
13. CIABOC’s confidentiality clause should be re-defined to cover only information pertaining to on-going investigations and court cases. There should be provision for senior CIABOC investigative staff to profitably share ideas on how to approach politically-sensitive or complicated cases strategically through a forum with the auditor general and other integrity bodies.
61
Transparency international believes that Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) as public institutions tasked with combating corruption, must be transparent, accessible and accountable to citizens. They must operate with the utmost integrity, maintain a reputation of objectivity and professionalism and demonstrate effectiveness in their duties. Transparency International has identified ACAs as key partners in the fight against corruption and plans to work in constructive collaboration with governments who are ready to invest in improving their anti-corruption effectiveness by building strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
Transparency International’s initiative aimed at strengthening anti-corruption agencies combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. In mid-2013, Transparency International convened an experts meeting in Kuala Lumpur to explore the possibility of developing an ACA assessment tool. After receiving encouraging feedback and useful input, Transparency International commissioned a background review and draft framework by anti-corruption specialist, Alan Doig. The concept received further interest and backing from ACAs in the Asia and Pacific region during the 18th and 19th Steering Group Meeting of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific in 2013 and 2014.
In 2014, Transparency International commissioned anti-corruption expert, Dr Jon Quah to further refine the framework, producing a set of indicators incorporating elements of TI’s National Integrity Systems assessment methodology and other relevant tools and principles. In April 2015, Transparency International organized a Focus Group Discussion in Bangkok, bringing together practitioners, researchers and ACAs to scrutinize the indicator framework and approach. Participants subsequently formed an Advisory Group to guide the finalization of the tool.
The tool was piloted in Bhutan in 2015 and lessons learnt around the research framework, process and approach were captured and used to finalize the methodology in consultation with the Advisory Group. At present the initiative is being implemented in a number of countries in the Asia Pacific region.
ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT
62
Persons interviewed during assessment of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), 15 August – 30 November 2016.
ORGANIZATION/DEPARTMENT/PARTY POSITION/DESIGNATION1. Anti-Corruption Front (Dushana Virodhi Peramuna
Executive Director
2. Attorney General’s Department Deputy Solicitor General3. Auditor General’s Department Auditor General4. Bar Association of Sri Lanka Member5. Bar Association of Sri Lanka Member6. Campaign for Free and Fair Elections Convener, (CAFFE) 7. Ceylon Teacher’s Union (Lanka Guru Sangamaya) General Secretary8. Citizen’s Movement for Good Governance(CIMOGG) President9. Committee on Parliamentary Enterprise (COPE) Chairman10. Police Commission Chairman11. PRECIFAC Ex-Secretary to Commission12. Presidential Secretariat Media Coordinator13. Public Sector Nurse’s Union (Rajaye Heda Sangamaya) General Secretary14. Ravaya Editor15. Voice Against Corruption (Dushana Virodhi Handa) Convener16. Voice Against Corruption (Dushana Virodhi Handa) Member17. United National Party Deputy Minister/Ministry of
Immigration & Emigration18. University of Colombo Head/Department of History19. United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) Resident Coordinator20. United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) Economic Adviser
ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES
63
Persons involved in consultations on assessment findings – Colombo, 10.11.2016
POSITION ORGANIZATIONDirector-General (15.2.2015 - 17.11.2016) CIABOCDirector-General (appointed 1.12.2016) CIABOCAssistant Director/Investigations CIABOCLegal Officer CIABOCLead Researcher Independent consultantResearch Assistant TISLProject Coordinator TISL
ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED
64
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs/USA (2016) Investment Climate Statements Report July5/2016
Central Bank (2015) Recent Economic Development. Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Colombo.
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2004) Sri Lanka 2003. Transparency International National Integrity systems Country Study Report. Transparency International Secretariat: Berlin.
Colombo Telegraph (2016) “Corruption Commission’s Director-General Dilrukshi Wickramasinghe Charged with Abuse of Office’ in Colombo Telegraph 27 September 2016.
Economy Next (2016) “Sri Lanka’s ex-Defence Secretary indicted over Rs. 11.4 billion arms scandal” (by police correspondent) in Econoomy next 31 August 2016 (www.economynext.lk)
Fernando, Anton and R.M.B. Senanayeke (2007) Synopsis of Anti-Corruption and Related Laws: laws In force and proposed new laws. USAID: Colombo
Fernando, Mark (2007) Defeating the Dragon (White Paper). USAID: Colombo. GAN Business Anti-corruption Portal (2016) Sri Lanka Corruption Report (2016)(www.business-anti-corrupton.com/country-profiles/sri-lanka - visited 2 November 2016)
Gomez, Mario, Neshan Gunasekera and Dinesha Samararatne(2007) Bribery and Corruption in Sri Lanka: Strengthening the Institutional Framework (White Paper) USAID: Colombo.
Jayasinghe, Amal (2015) “Sri Lanka’s Graft Busters question Rajapaksha brothers” in AFP News, 24April 2015.
Kamalendran, Chris (2016) “CIABOC investigator under investigation” in Sunday Times 15 May 2016.
Kannangara, Nirmala (2014) “Sri Lanka’s Bribery Cimmission in question!” In Sunday Leader, 22February 2014.
Ministry of Finance (2015) Annual Report. Minstry of Finance: Colombo.
Rodrigo, Prasanna (2010) “Sri Lanka’s Bribery Commission needs more fire-power” in Sunday Times, 28 February 2010.
Sabry, Hafsa (2016) “CIABOC to be revamped!” in Sunday Leader, 31 August 2016.
Sooriyagoda, Lakmal (2016) MR’s Ex-CO in Bribery Net! In Ceylon Daily News 19 August 2016.
Sugathapala, D.G. (2016) “Avant Garde: Court tells CID to submit final report on October 5th” in Daily Mirror, 16 August 2016.
Tranaparency International Secretariat (2014) National Integrity System Assessment – Sri Lanka 2014. Transparency International Sri Lanka: Colombo.
UN (2004) United Nations Convention Against Corruption. United Nation’s Office Against Drugs and Crime: Vienna & New York.
UNODC (2016) Country Review Report of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Review by China and Papua New Guinea of the implementation by Sri Lanka of articles 15 – 42 of Chapter III.“Criminalization and law enforcement” and articles 44 – 50 of Chapter IV. “International cooperation” of the United Nations Convention against Corruption for the review cycle2012 – 2013
Visvalingam, A.C (2011) Good Governance and the Rule of Law. Colombo: Citizens’ Movement forGood Governance.
(2015) “The Chairman of the Bribery Commission must go!” in Island, 20 June 2015.
World Justice Project (2016) Rule of Law index 2016 (www.worldjusticeproject.org)
Wriggins, Howard, (1960), Ceylon: the dilemmas of a new nation. Princeton University Press, Princeton
ANNEX 4: REFERENCES
65
66
Transparency International Sri Lanka5/1Elibank RoadColombo 05Sri Lanka
Phone: +94 0114369781 Fax: +94 011 2 501 707
facebook.com/tisrilankatwitter.com/tisrilanka