Anti-Japanese Sentiment and the Responses of Two Meiji

Intellectuals* Masako Gavin

After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), overpopulation and unemploy- ment became pressing issues in Japan. Many intellectuals were concerned about the social and economic hardships caused by these "new" problems, and endeavoured to remedy them through emigration. Hawai'i and California became popular destinations for Japanese emigrants, both being on the Pa- cific Rim, with their warm climates and good job opportunities.

However, when anti-Japanese sentiment arose in both Hawai'i and Califor- nia in the 1910s, intellectuals such as Abe Is6 (1865-1949) and Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927) became deeply concerned about the rejection of Japanese living overseas. It is interesting to note that Abe's article, "Hainichi mondai to r6d6 mondai" (Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Labour Issues), and Shiga's article, "Igi aru hainichi mondai kanwah6" (Effective Ways to Pacify Anti-Japanese Sentiment), were published at the same time in RikugO zasshi (Universe). 1 This essay examines Abe's response to anti-Japanese sentiment and directly compares it with that of Shiga.

In his article, "Abe Is6 to imin jink6 mondai" (Abe Is6's View on Emigra- tion and the Population Crisis) (1993), Mamiya Kunio maintains that Abe advocated emigration as a solution to the population crisis at the turn of the twentieth century (from about 1897 to 1905). When anti-Japanese sentiment intensified in the 1920s, however, he began to advocate birth control as the answer to the problem} Mamiya also claims that Abe argued that the anti- Japanese backlash in Hawai'i and California was caused by cultural, religious and racial differences rather than the more "practical reasons" offered by the U.S. government. These differences were too sensitive a topic to be openly discussed by U.S. officials, hence they cited the labour issue and the immi- grants' high birth rate as more acceptable reasons for the "antagonism". 3

Although Mamiya examines Abe's views on both the problem of cheap labour and the high birthrate, he does not dwell on Abe's thoughts regarding the education of the immigrants, which Abe regarded as another key cause for the rejection of the overseas Japanese. In redressing this oversight, this essay

EASTASIA, Fall 2004, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 23-36.

24 East Asia / Fall 2004

aims to present another of the complex factors that culminated in the antago- nism.

After its victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo- Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan expanded its terr i torial control over neighbouring countries. Japan acquired Taiwan as a colony, obtained an ex- tensive leasehold and economic privileges in southern Manchuria, and an- nexed Korea in 1910. 4 It is also important to note Japanese emigration to the Pacific region grew along with revisions of the unequal treaties with the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. In parallel with the emigration of unemployed Japanese to the Pacif ic region, many Chinese and Korean labourers were sent to Japan and, as Bonnie Oh claims, "added some 15 mil- lion to a Japanese population which was already growing rapidly. ''5 Michael Weiner points out that this coincided with the growth of urban problems and social unrest in Japan.

Poverty, the increased frequency and scale of industrial disputes, and the emergence of socialist, communist and anarchist movements alarmed many in Japan who often asso- ciated these consequences of indusWialisation with the immigrant. 6

Overpopulation and unemployment in the urban centres of Japan came to be associated with the "new" Japanese workforce from Japan's neighbouring countries.

The Japanese government, though, took a f inn stance against people emi- grating to Japan's western neighbours at that time. Okamoto Shumpei claims that Foreign Minister Komura Jutar6 (1855-1911) of the second Katsura (Katsura Tar6 1847-1913) cabinet recommended that Japan direct its emigra- tion to Manchuria and Korea, not to Canada and the United States. The so- called "Komura (anti-emigration) doctrine" (1909) asserts that as a result of the war, it became imperative for Japan to concentrate Japanese nationals in the conquered areas, instead of having them scattered in distant foreign lands. 7 Komura envisaged that an influx of unskilled, lower-class Japanese labourers would cause an inevitable clash with their American counterparts, hence he continued the policy of restricting Japanese emigration to the United States and Canada in order to avoid arousing anti-Japanese sentiment in these coun- tries. 8 In accordance with this policy, the government prioritised its economic expansion in Asia rather than towards its Pacific neighbours.

Educational strategies played a vital role in the "Japanisation" of Japan's new colonial subjects, the Taiwanese and Koreans in particular. From the out- set, the Japanese government provided its "new" territories with a signifi- cantly modified educational system to that given to Japanese in the homeland in order to transform the indigenes into loyal "imperial peoples" (krmin) . 9 Mark Peattie maintains:

the government concentrated on "shaping the loyalties and outlook of indigenous peoples toward Japan through moral education and Japanese language training and to limit their educational advancement to the acquisition of vocational and practical skills.,,10

G a v i n 25

Although the colonial subjects were provided with a limited education, it was imbued with the same values and bore the same responsibilities as those imparted by the education system for imperial subjects (shinmin). As we will see, this educational principle became a source of antagonism against Japa- nese emigrants in Hawai'i and the U.S. mainland. It produced loyal subjects but did not teach them how to assimilate to a new land and community.

When antagonism towards the Japanese immigrants was surfacing, both Abe and Shiga were professors at the Tokyo Senmon Gakk6 (presently Waseda University) and had opportunities to visit Hawai'i and the U.S. mainland. While Abe was a pioneer of Japanese socialism, he is perhaps better re- membered as the father of university baseball in Japan. Shiga is known among scholars of Japanese intellectual history as the pioneering advocate of kokusui shugi, a theory that, in the late 1880s, called for the maintenance of Japan's cultural identity in the face of increasing pressure for modernisation from the West.

During the Russo-Japanese War, Abe gathered together a group of students to practice baseball at Waseda University and then took them to the United States to play against American students. It was after that trip that he became, although only for a short while, an advocate of Japanese emigration to the United States. In Hokubei no shin Nihon (A New Japan in the USA) (1905), which Mamiya argues best represents Abe's enthusiasm for emigration, Abe goes so far as to assert that a "new Japan" could be established there. II

Abe's contemporary, Shiga, was one of few Japanese intellectuals who vis- ited the South Seas as early as 1886. His first-hand account of the voyage to Australia, New Zealand, Hawai'i and various South Seas islands, Nan'y6 jiji (Current Affairs in the South Seas) (1887), 12 was an immediate best-seller. He was particularly impressed with the swift transformation of Australia and New Zealand into modern nations since the arrival of British settlers, which he described as an "Anglo-Saxon miracle". ~3 Henry Frei points out that Shiga was an enthusiastic believer in social Darwinism, which he thought would inevitably lead to Australian independence. Shiga wrote, "the Australian states will unite and become independent of Britain--such is the intention of the gods and nothing can stop it. The god of evolution will protect you, my south- erly neighbours, my good brothers". ~4 It was this trip that convinced him that emigration was a viable solution to Japan's population crisis; a policy he ad- vocated for the remainder of his life.

However, when anti-Japanese sentiment intensified overseas, Abe and Shiga responded differently. Abe reached the conclusion that domestic problems such as the overpopulation and unemployment had to be tackled at home, at a government level, and not via emigration. In contrast, Shiga responded to the backlash by encouraging further emigration to other destinations.

This essay outlines the views of Abe and Shiga regarding emigration and the social and historical background of emigration and anti-Japanese senti- ment at the turn of the twentieth century. It then focuses on Abe's thoughts on anti-Japanese sentiment and his recommendations for easing the antagonism and compares these with the views of Shiga.

26 East Asia / Fall 2004

Emigration to Hawai'i and California

A significant outcome of Japanese industrialisation was the overpopulation of the country's urban centres. During the feudal period, with abortion and infanticide being commonly practised, the population remained relatively low. However, it began to rapidly increase after the Sino-Japanese War, when the national economy became increasingly industrialised. A large population was considered an economic asset, particularly by those with a militaristic and imperialistic mindset. 15 But for others it was thought to be a social liability, a solution to which was sought through emigration.

As early as 1868, the Hawai'i government encouraged Japanese immigra- tion in order to provide labour for the country's sugar plantations. 16 In Nan'yO jiji (Current Affairs in the South Seas) (1887), Shiga maintained that Hawai'i was an ideal destination for lower-class Japanese emigrants, people who were unemployed and impoverished. From that point on, for the remainder of his life, he advocated emigration as a solution to the Japanese population crisis.

While the Japanese government was concerned about the "maltreatment" of the immigrants and thus reluctant to support calls for greater emigration, so-called Meiji shakaishugisha (socialists of the Meiji period), continued to advocate Japanese migration to the United States. iv Dekasegi (leaving home for a limited period of agricultural work) was one temporary solution to the social and economic problems that accompanied the rapid development of Japanese capitalism in the early 1900s. Organisations were established to as- sist people going abroad. ~8 Magazines such as Tobei zasshi (Going to the United States) and Tobei shimp6 (News from the United Sates) provided in- formation about transportation, employment and current affairs in the United StatesJ 9 It was in this climate that Abe also came to support emigration.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment

Japan's emergence on the international scene after its victories in the wars with China and Russia was perceived by many rival nations as a "threat". As Japan transformed itself into a militaristic nation, anti-Japanese sentiment in- creased overseas. At home, constant tax increases and worsening poverty cre- ated deep social tensions and fostered the rise of grass roots anti-government theories and radical social movements such as socialism and anarchism.

In order to pacify the political and social unrest, the government initiated kokumin d6toku undo (the National Morality Campaign) and in 1910 appointed Inoue Tetsujir6 (1855-1944), a professor of philosophy at the Imperial Uni- versity, as its leader. In Kokumin dOtoku gairon (Outline of the National Mo- rality) (1912), Inoue argued that Japan's unique kokutai (national essence), which derived from a continuous imperial lineage, was essential to its moral foundation. :~ In essence, the teachings of the twenty-year-old Imperial Re- script on Education were re-emphasised and remained the guiding principle of Japanese education until the end of World War II.

As more Japanese emigrants permanently settled overseas, education of their children became a serious and immediate concern. While earlier immi-

G a v i n 27

grants on temporary "contracts" often returned home once they had saved enough money, they now increasingly stayed on or moved to the U.S. main- land after Hawai'i was annexed by the United States in 1898. While issei (the first generation of the Japanese immigrants) remained Japanese citizens, nisei (the second generation), who were born in Hawai'i (or the U.S. mainland), became American citizens at birth. Their education, however, still followed the principle of imperial education set in Japan and Japanese teachers taught them using textbooks sent from Japan.

The education of immigrants and the nisei was considered one cause of the anti-Japanese sentiment. Other causes were the Japanese immigrants' willing- ness to work hard for low wages and their high birth rate, both of which were perceived as threats by the local community. As Japanese became increas- ingly conspicuous on the U.S. mainland, some U.S. citizens became con- cerned about their country's domestic defence. Thus, anti-Japanese sentiment became more a political issue, rather than one about labour. 2~ Both gov- ernments repeatedly held conferences and dispatched both private and of- ficial emissaries--scholars and diplomats. For instance, intellectuals such as Nitobe Inaz6 (1862-1933), Shimada Sabur6 (1852-1922) and Soeda Juichi (1864-1929) were sent to the United States to exchange views with their American counterparts. 22 Abe maintains, however, that all the U.S. repre- sentatives they met were already pro-Japanese and were opposed to the anti- Japanese sentiments being expressed by others, so little was gained by the exchange. 23

The U.S.-Japan Gentlemen's Agreement of November 1908 terminated the emigration of Japanese workers to the United States, except for those who were to become permanent farmers. The so-called Japanese Exclusion Clause in the 1924 Bill outlawed Japanese entry, and was the culmination of a pro- longed campaign against Japanese immigrants. 24 This was the first legal ex- pression of anti-Japanese sentiment since the revision of the 1914 Alien Land Law of California in 1920. 25

Shiga's View on Emigrants--"True Patriots"

In Nan'yO jiji (Current Affairs in the South Seas) (1887), Shiga maintained that one Japanese emigrant could provide economic relief for three people struggling to make ends meet. The first beneficiary was the emigrant. But then if that emigrant worked hard and sent some of his or her wages home and/or ordered everyday commodities from Japan, they would thereby create a new job in commerce and trade for a second person in Japan, as well as free up his or her old job for a third person in Japan. Thus, Shiga referred to emigrants as "true patriots who left for the benefit of the country". 26

When anti-Japanese sentiment surfaced in Hawai'i and on the U.S. main- land early in the twentieth century, Shiga became concerned about the rejec- tion of the emigrants. He identified the cause of this conflict as being the conduct of Japanese emigrants, which reflected the narrowly interpreted moral principle of the imperial education. This, he thought, isolated them from people in the local community. 27

28 East Asia ! Fall 2004

When the antagonism intensified, Shiga asserted that, having been taught to be unquestionably obedient to one 's family and the emperor, the immi- grants did not know how to adapt to the countries in which they had settled. 28 They did not consider themselves members of their adoptive community, and this too fostered anti-Japanese sentiment.

At a conference held in Honolulu by the Hawai kyOikukai (Education Com- mittee for Japanese in Hawai ' i ) in 1914, Shiga advised that the immigrants adopt education principles in accordance with those of the United States and to follow the maxim that "when in Rome do as the Romans do". He also suggested that they revise textbooks to reflect the current universal view on education, as articulated in the resolution of the first world conference held in London in 1913. Stressing the cultural coalescence required of people living in a culturally diverse society, he encouraged Japanese immigrants to assimi- late with the local community and to educate their children accordingly.

Despite the increase in anti-Japanese sentiment, Shiga continued to encour- age Japanese emigration, not to the United States, but to other destinations, such as Brazil and Cuba. 29 He bel ieved the population crisis in Japan de- manded it, regardless of the risk of inciting further antagonism. So determined was he to discover new locations for Japanese migration, Shiga even visited and wrote to General Jan Smuts (1870-1950), a statesman and army general, in South Africa in 1922. In correspondence with Smuts, he asked for the fair treatment of Japanese emigrants. He wrote:

I heartily beg you to forgive or excuse me, if I have said too much. We Japanese do not seek or want any extraordinary things, but quite plain and common, that is the exercise of decent commonsense and good feeling towards us had we acted in accord with the principles of civilisation, and not to elbow us aside as "Coloured" in the most common- place relations of social, commercial and industrial life of South Africa. 3~

He believed that apartheid, the "source of racial prejudice", had to be eradi- cated at its root, otherwise anti-coloured sentiment, and anti-Japanese senti- ment would never cease. 31

Abe's View on Emigrantsu"Imperial Coins"

Abe initially regarded emigration as a temporary solution to the problem of overpopulation, which he believed was the root cause of Japan's social and economic hardship. Given that only a small number of people (about 1,000) could go abroad at any one time, it in fact had a little effect on the total popu- lation. 32

However , as unemployment worsened, Abe gradually came to support emigra t ion as a more pe rmanen t so lu t ion and b e c a m e cr i t ical of the government 's failure to promote it. In "Seifu wa nazeni kaigai tok6sha o b r sh i sen to suru ka" (Why the Governmen t Discourages People Going Abroad?) (1904), he asserted that the government should provide passports and encourage overseas emigration, even if only for skilled workers such as

Gavin 29

carpenters, plasterers, masons and those that had completed high school, the so-called "gold and silver coins", who were able to earn a living anywhere in the w o r l d . 33

In "Hawai ni okeru Nihonjin" (Japanese in Hawai'i) (1910), Abe claimed that while people were struggling to earn a living in Japan, those in Hawai'i were able to think about how to augment their income. Jobs were plentiful, basic commodities were inexpensive, and the climate w a s g o o d . 34 Thus, it was much easier to survive there than it was in Japan.

Abe was aware that many emigrants wished to return to Japan as soon as they had saved enough money to retire. He advised them, however, to stay on, writing:

It is rather unfortunate for the immigrants to think of returning home because they can end up worse than before, as illustrated in the fairy tale of Urashima Tar6 .... Longing for home is perhaps characteristic of Japanese but one must realise that it remains only as a source of inspiration. 35

The economic reality in Japan remained harsh and it would be even harder for them to start anew back home. The lesson learnt from the return of Urashima Tar6 might be that once one leaves home, one should stay away. Abe likened emigration to a daughter leaving home to marry the son of another family. Once she has left home, she has to follow the customs of her husband's family. 36

Like Shiga, though, Abe was concerned about the education of the Japa- nese Hawai'ians. He maintained that because Japanese children born in Hawai'i obtained American citizenship at birth, it was more beneficial for their parents to raise them as U.S. citizens. 37

They should sing the U.S. national anthem rather than Kimi ga yo, the Japanese one, and celebrate Independence Day on 4 July instead of Japan's Culture Day on 3 November. 38

Abe's view was clear, a child born in the United States to Japanese parents remained racially Japanese but was a U.S. citizen. The Japanese language might be taught in Romanised and/or syllabic scripts, but he stressed that it was "unnecessary to teach the kanji characters". 39 If students were interested in subjects such as Japanese history and geography, then they should study them using English-language textbooks.

Contrary to Shiga, Abe maintained that first generation immigrants, in con- trast to their children, should remain loyal subjects of Japan.

It is needless to remind one that any Japanese born in Japan remains a loyal subject of the Emperor. Therefore those living abroad should still sing Kimi ga yo and celebrate the Culture Day on 3 November. I hope my remarks are not misunderstood, n~

Abe believed that Japanese should be loyal to the emperor at home and abroad. Clearly, however, he made a distinction between nisei, who were U.S.

30 East Asia / Fall 2004

citizens, and issei, the original immigrants, who should retain their fidelity to Japan and remain imperial "coins".

Unlike Shiga, Abe did not attribute the cause of the rejection of Japanese immigrants to their retention of a Japan-centred morality. Rather, he thought the Japanese immigrants had assimilated with the local community quite well, especially in comparison with the Chinese immigrants who had maintained their own way of living. The Japanese adjusted to western customs, for in- stance, sleeping on beds instead of ta tami (straw mats) and wearing local clothes. They also participated in the playing of baseball and enjoyed enter- tainments, such as plays and music concerts. Abe remained unconvinced that cultural and racial differences were the direct causes of anti-Japanese senti- ment and believed it more important to focus on what he saw as the "practical causes" of the backlash, namely, cheap labour and high birth rates.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment: Conflict Over Labour and Population

Abe analysed the anti-Japanese sentiment in California and Hawai'i from two viewpoints--labour and population. In "Hainichi mondai to r6d6 mondai" (Anti-Japanese Backlash and Labour Issue) (1915), he maintained that the U.S. government limited the number of foreign workers entering the country, thereby maintaining high wages for existing employees. Similarly, local people, regardless of class, were anxious about the economic effects of an uncon- trolled increase in population and so practised birth control. 41 After all, it was accepted wisdom, not only in Japan but everywhere, that overpopulation begets poverty.

Abe claimed that the labour issue was at the core of anti-Japanese senti- ment on the U.S. mainland. When Hawai'ian Japanese moved to California, their cheap labour threatened the wages and conditions of local workers, which resulted in a general lowering of wages. By then, labour unions were already playing an important role in the national politics of the United States. For instance, the American Federation of Labour (AFL) had about one million members and their votes were vital to the election of President Woodrow Wil- son (1856-1924). Abe regretted that at that time there were no unions of any significance in Japan. He believed that unless Japan dispatched delegates equivalent to "workers' representatives" rather than diplomats to communi- cate with the executives of U.S. unions, the labour problem surrounding Japa- nese immigrants would not be so lved . 42 Mamiya maintains that from a socialist viewpoint, Abe believed the tension could be eased through an appeal to their common class interests; through the development of solidarity between inter- national workers. 43

Mamiya also claims that Abe's thinking on this point was influenced by Sidney Lewis Gulic (1860-1945), an American missionary and professor at Doshisha University, Kyoto. Gulic claimed that the U.S. government should not limit the number of Japanese immigrants, and that it should permit first- generation Japanese immigrants, issei, to become naturalised citizens of their adopted country. 44

Returning from a visit to the Unites States, Gulic announced that U.S. labour

Gavin 31

union officials hoped to start negotiating with the Japanese workers in the near future.

There will be two union conferences held in California this year. One by Californian members in October, the other by the Federation, in November. Japanese representatives can attend both... However, we have heard that the Japanese government has not allowed workers to form unions. 45

The difference in the working conditions in both countries was clearly one cause of the conflict, for which the Japanese government's attempts to ease the tension was inadequate.

Abe identif ied another cause of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States--the immigrants' high birth rate. Censuses in 1890, 1900, and 1910, revealed the number of Japanese residing on the Pacific coast to be 1,559; 18,269; and 57,628 respectively. Furthermore, the Japanese birth rate in Hawai ' i was twice as high as the overall rate in other modern industrialised countries. This rapid population growth was a concern to U.S. citizens. Given that there were already some 200,000 Japanese living in the United States, Abe considered it unwise to send more emigrants there and risk causing fur- ther conflict. 46

The Menace of Overpopulation: From Emigration to Birth Control

At the first Pan-Pacific Educational Conference, held in Honolulu from 11 to 24 August 1921, Abe asserted that overpopulation was a great menace to world peace and that each nation needed to take responsibility for its own population growth. 47 He said:

Unfortunately, an increased population has traditionally been considered an index of a nation's strength, which has led growing nations to consider the colonisation of other territories as a way of coping with the expansion. But as almost every acre of land on the earth is now mapped and claimed by one nation or another, no immigrants can enter a new dominion without encountering resistance. As long as the right of ownership is established, any nation can refuse immigrants entry ... no matter how much uninhabited land it may possess, just as a wealthy man in [a] large city may close the gates of his estate against the slum dwellers. 48

Thus, Abe was no longer convinced that emigration offered a solution to the problem posed by overpopulation in capitalist societies.

Abe criticised the Japanese government's emigration policy for having failed its intended purpose. Over a period of twenty-five years, only about 700,000 people had moved to live in Japanese colonies such as in Taiwan, Manchuria and Korea and a mere 100,000 had emigrated to the United States. 49 In Abe's view the benefits gained from relocating such a small proportion of the popu- lation were not great enough to warrant the amount of conflict and hostility it had caused. 5~ He concluded that Japanese should go abroad only for pur-

32 East Asia [ Fall 2004

poses of travel, study and/or business, but not for temporary or permanent w o r k ? t

Abe drew a parallel between a nation that cannot support itself sending its surplus population overseas as emigrants, and individuals who bear more chil- dren than they are capable of caring for and turning to relatives for assistance. "It is immoral and shameful", Abe stressed, "if a nation increases its popula- tion to the extent that it cannot feed them within its own land". 52 He thought, both the domestic and national situations, would be justly criticised. A nation needed to resolve the problem on its own, without relying on emigration.

Thus, Abe no longer supported emigration by the time the U.S. Immigra- tion Bill outlawed Japanese entry in 1924. In "Ijinshu no ky6d6 seikatsu wa kekkyoku son" (Disadvantages of Mixed Residence) (1924b), he reversed his previous advocacy.

In short, we should send Chinese back home and recall Japanese from the United States rather than receive more Chinese and send further Japanese to the States) 3

Abe came to believe that much of the tension between the United States and Japan was the result of political strategies.

While Abe didn' t think Japan would ever directly declare a war on the United States, he could envisage a clash of the two nations over Manchuria or China. In order to prepare for this contingency, Japan spent a disproportion- ate amount of its national budget on arms, thereby creating a considerable financial burden. 54 The build-up of arms, combined with Japan's rampant overpopulation, might have provoked U.S. suspicion regarding Japan's mili- tary aspirations and triggered a minor arms race. Echoing a sentiment ex- pressed at the first international conference on birth control, held in the United States, Abe argued that birth control would play an important role in maintain- ing world peace. He went so far as to declare that international conflict could only be avoided if all nations restricted the rate of their population growth.

Abe now believed in birth control. He claimed that the theory of a nation needing a large population in anticipation of the losses sustained in wars was both impracticable and unproven? 5 In this regard, he pointed to Sweden as a model society, one worthy of emulation. He claimed that the Swedish were a genuine and kind people and their caring nature was attributable to the country's socialist-type economic and social structures. These, Abe believed, were un- derpinned by the lowest birth rate in the world. 56 Everyone had once admired Switzerland as a utopia, but Abe argued that it was now Sweden that should be thought of as an ideal society. 57 Its population level was so restricted that citizens could live in comfort and peace and avoid the international tensions caused by emigration. In order to raise awareness of the Swedish example, in 1922--the same year that Shiga embarked on his global journey to scout out more emigration destinations and to meet General Jan Smuts - -Abe , along with other intellectuals, supported a visit in March to Japan by a birth control advocate, Margaret Sanger (1883-1966). Although the Japanese government

Gavin 33

resisted this initiative, the visit proceeded and (in May) he founded Nihon sanjii chOsetsu kenky(~kai (Japanese Association for Birth Control). 58

Conclusion

In "Abe Is6 to imin jink6 mondai" (Abe Is6: Emigration and Education) (1993), Mamiya maintains that Abe's support for emigration and birth control were state-oriented. 59 This essay affirms this nationalistic interpretation of Abe's position and elucidates his belief in the imperial education principle for all Japanese, both home and abroad. Contrary to Abe, Shiga did not advocate emigration for nationalistic reasons, nor did he necessarily affirm the imperial education principle. Hence, these were crucial differences in the attitudes of these two prominent Japanese intellectuals towards the issue of emigration.

As we have seen, intellectuals such as Abe and Shiga, by means of emigra- tion, addressed new social problems of overpopulation and unemployment in Japan, which the government seemed reluctant to tackle in a more systematic way in the early twentieth century. When Japan's international status rose after its victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, and anti- Japanese sentiment grew overseas, both Abe and Shiga advocated greater assimilation to the emigrants' adopted societies.

Shiga continued to believe in emigration even after the rejection of Japa- nese immigrants intensified. His response to this conflict was to recommend alternative destinations for emigration. In contrast, Abe came to believe that emigration was an inadequate solution to the domestic problems of unem- ployment and overpopulation and effectively only reproduced and perpetu- ated these shortcomings elsewhere. With labour conditions in Japan practically unchanged, Abe became convinced that the only solution was birth control. Extrapolating from Japan's experience, he concluded that each country should regulate its population in accordance with its production capacity and that this should be achieved by educating people about the need for birth control. Unlike Shiga, who was primarily concerned about Japanese immigrants, Abe's focus was on the people back home. We have seen that, contrary to Shiga, Abe expected the first generation of immigrants to maintain their identity as "imperial coins", spiritually belonging to Japan both at home and abroad. As such, his main aim was to convince the Japanese government to deal with these problems on a national level.

While the Japanese government was preoccupied with the supervision of its newly acquired territories in the East, and with political complications with the United States, both intellectuals endeavoured to support these people who had been abandoned for the sake of the state's interests (kimin). Although ultimately via different paths, both Abe and Shiga represent those Japanese intellectuals who were concerned for their fellow countrymen and adrift by the rapidly changing world order. By examining Abe's response to anti-Japa- nese sentiment, in a comparison with that of Shiga, this paper has provided a more comprehensive view of the social problem which the Meiji intellectuals such as Abe and Shiga attempted to alleviate.

34 East Asia / Fall 2004

Notes

Unless otherwise noted, all Japanese references were printed in Tokyo and all Japanese names appear with the family name first. Throughout this paper, circumflexes are placed over long vowels of Japanese words, except for places and publishers, which are already known in their English spelling without them. For ease of reference, English translations are provided for the rifles of most works.

Shiga Shigetaka zensha (The Complete Collected Works of Shiga Shigetaka hereafter referred to as SSZ) in Japanese (8 vols.) were published by Shiga Shigetaka zenshfi kankrkai between 1927 and 1929. The reprint of SSZ was published by Nihon tosho center in 1995. Although the title suggests that the collection is complete, this is not the case as it is in fact a selection of his works. See Masako Gavin, Shiga Shigetaka (1863--1927): The Forgotten Enlightener (London: Curzon Press, 2001), 209-213.

Portions of this article concerning Shiga's views on emigration have appeared elsewhere in earlier versions (in English): Shiga Shigetaka (1863--1927): The Forgotten Enlightener (London: Curzon Press, 2001); "Educating for A New Japan: Shiga Shigetaka's Criticism of the Imperial Education System", Japanese Studies, Japanese Studies Association of Australia, 18: 3, December 1998.

1. Abe Is6, "Hainichi mondai to r6d6 mondai (Anti-Japanese Backlash and Labour Issues)," Rikug~ zasshi 411 (April 1915), 12-17.

2. Mamiya Kunio, "Abe Is6 to imin jink6 mondai (Abe Is6 and his View on Emigration and the Population Crisis)," Shakai kagaku trky~ (Social Sciences)(1993), 29-30.

3. Mamiya, 34. 4. Bonnie Oh, "Meiji Imperialism: Phenomenally Rapid," in Japan Examined: Perspectives on Mod-

em Japanese History, ed. Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 125.

5. Ibid. 6. Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London: Routledge, 1994), 214. 7. Okamoto Shumpei, 'Meiji Imperialism: Pacific Emigration or Continental Expansion?' in Japan

Examined: Perspectives on Modem Japanese History, edited by Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 142.

8. Ibid. 9. Mark Peattie refers to Patricia Tsurumi's explanation of "'dual purposes in a modem education

system: first, to provide basic schooling for the entire population, as well as large doses of social and political indoctrination to inculcate loyalty for the new state, and, second, to offer advanced education to those Japanese of superior ability to whom the future guidance of the nation would be entrusted. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 38-39.

10. Mark Peattie, 'Introduction,' in The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895-1945, edited by Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 40.

11. Mamiya, 31-33. Abe maintained that if a liberal education was established people would not long for a better place to live, their spirits would remain high and they would be satisfied with their surroundings. Abe also thought that people should be encouraged to settle land on the domestic frontier, places like Hokkaido that offered employment opportunities (Abe Isr, "Seikatsu shakai no risr," Doshisha bungakukai zasshi 18 (1888), 32-35. Abe became convinced of emigration as a solution to the population crisis when he visited California in 1905. In Hokubei no shin Nihon (A New Japan in the United States), he maintained that the Pacific coast of the U.S. mainland would be the best destination for Japanese emigrants because there were plenty of jobs there and the region had an abundance of natural resources such as rich soil, forests and fish. Abe Is6, Hokubei no shin Nihon (Hakubunkan, 1905), 37. During this period Shiga traveled extensively. From August 1904 to January 1905 (during the Russo-Japanese War), he accompanied the besieging army to Port Arthur as a war correspondent and observed the siege of the fortress from the headquarters of General Nogi Maresuke (1849-1912). In t909 he published an account of these experiences in Taieki shfshi (Observations of the Great War). Tokutomi Soh6 (1863-1957), his contemporary, is believed to have helped in financing its publication. Shiga also played an important role as a

Gavin 35

geographer for the subsequent demarcation of Japanese territory in Sakhalin in 1906 when in charge of land survey and preparation of the official map. Masako Gavin, Shiga Shigetaka (1863- 1927): The Forgotten Enlightener (London: Curzon Press, 2001), 118.

12, Shiga, Nan'yOjiji (1927), 21-22. 13. Ibid., 21-22. 14. Henry Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia: From the Seventeenth Century to World

War H (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 54. 15. Ishi Ry6ichi, Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan (London: ES. King & Son, 1937), 39. 16. Ozawa Gij6, Hawai Nihongo kyOiku (Honolulu: Hawai ky6ikukai, 1972), 3. The unofficial

emigrants of the first year in the Meiji era (1868-1912) are referred to as gan 'en mono (Ozawa, 3). The first settlers who arrived in January that year numbered 945, the second group of settlers arrived in June and numbered 989, and another 926 immigrants arrived in 1889 (Shiga, 97).

17. This was partly because the government was aware that Chinese "coolies" and earlier Japanese emigrants had been treated miserably overseas. Nagai Mansuke ed., Meiji Taisho shi: Gaik6 hen (Kuresu shuppan, 2000), 357. Other prominent socialists included Katayama Sen (1859-1933) and Kat6 Tokijir6 (1858-1930) Mamiya, 29.

18. For example, Shiga founded Kaigai tokO muhiyO hojokikan, a non-profit organisation, to assist people interested in going overseas, which provided them with basic information regarding travel- ing and living abroad.

19. Mamiya, 28. 20. Inoue Tetsujir6, Kokumin dOtoku gairon (Sanseido: 1912), 272-273. 21. Nagai, ed., 359. 22. Nitobe was an educator and a pioneer in advocating a liberal education in Japan. He dedicated his

life to introducing Japan to the West and to bridging the cultures of the United States and Japan. Soeda was a bureaucrat and scholar of finance and economics. Shimada was a politician and journalist.

23. Abe Is6, "Hainichi mondai to r6d6 mondai (Anti-Japanese Backlash and Labour Issues)," Rikug~ sazzhi 411 (1915), 13.

24. Mamiya, 28. 25. Ishii, 41. 26. Shiga, 432-433. 27. See M. Gavin, Shiga Shigetaka (2001). 28. See M. Gavin, Shiga Shigetaka (2001), and "Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Shiga Shigetaka's

Recommendations for Nikkeijin, Hawaiian Japanese", Crossroads Hawaii 2005(forthcoming), for more details about Shiga's recommendations for easing the antagonism towards the Japanese immigrants.

29. Shiga Shigetaka in Zoku sekai sansui zusetsu, SSZ 6 (1928), 432-433. 30. Shiga Shigetaka, Shirarezaru kuniguni (1928), 322-337. In Sirarezaru kuniguni, Shiga recorded

in detail his experience of the "Europeans only" policy in South Africa in September 1922. For example, he was thrown out of a restaurant at a hotel in Cape Town. He was requested to report to the immigration office to inspect his eligibility to travel in Transvaal. He showed his passport which was endorsed by the British counsel-general in Yokohama, but apparently this was not good enough for further traveling there. He then showed a letter of introduction written by the vice- president of the South African Railway Federation, addressed to staff at each station, ordering them to assist the holder of the letter who was a member of the Royal Geographical Society in London (The Society appointed Shiga as a correspondent in 1917).

31. Shiga, Shirarezaru kuniguni, 432-433. See, M. Gavin, Shiga Shigetaka (2001) and "Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Shiga Shigetaka's Recommendations for Nikkeifin, Hawai'ian Japanese", for more details about Shiga's demonstration on this issue.

32. Abe, "Seikatsu shakai no ris6," 32. 33. Abe Is6, "Seifu wa nazeni kaigai tok6sha o b6shisen to sum ka," RikugO zasshi 277 (1904), 3. 34. Abe Is6, "Hawai ni okem Nihonjin (Japanese in Hawai'i)," Rikuga zasshi 359 (1910), 281-284. 35. Abe, "Hawai ni okeru Nihonjiu," 288. In this popular Japanese fairy tale the protagonist finds

himself to be ancient and unwanted upon his return home from an underwater palace. 36. Abe Is6, "Imin to ky6iku," (Emigration and Education) Yuben (Oratory) 3:8 (1912), 46. Abe

asserted that women should also be encouraged to emigrate in order to raise the moral standard of Japanese men, both those in the lower classes and the young men of promise. About 95% of Japanese men were addicted to gambling. He believed women would help break this habit and encourage the men to save their wages for the home and/or business (Abe 1905, 59).

36 East Asia / Fall 2004

37. Abe, "Hawai ni okeru Nihonjin," 291, Abe, "Imin to kyfiku," 43-45. 38. Abe, "Imin to kyfiku," 44-45. 39. Abe, "Hawai ni okeru Nihonjin," 291. 40. Abe, "Imin to ky6iku," 45. 41. Abe Isf, "Jink6 mondai to kokka no han'ei," (Population Crisis and State Prosperity) Kakusei

(Purity)19:9 (1929), 2. 42. Abe, "Hainichi mondai to rfd6 mondai," 14. 43. Mamiya, 34-35. 44. Mamiya, 34. 45. Abe, "Hainichi mondai to r6d6 mondai," 16. Abe was aware that these discussions were taking

place and that his colleagues were representing Japanese workers at union conferences in the United States. Upon their return they reported that the U.S. workers opposed the Japanese immi- grants for economic rather than racial reasons. If the Japanese worked hard for the same wages and lived as Americans did, they claimed they would not have rejected them. Abe isf, "Ikanishite dantai seikatsu o nasu beki ka," Chugaku sekai (Junior High School) (1916), 24-29.

Mamiya points out that Abe further claimed that a "labour" issue was a camouflage, because most Japanese were employed in work that the "white" locals did not want to perform (Mamiya, 32).

46. Abe Is6, "Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji ch6setsu (Birth Control as One Solution for Constraints of Everyday Life)," in Kindai fujin mondai meicho sensh~--shakai mondai hen (Nihon tosho center, 1931; reprint, 1983), 142-144. Abe's ideas concerning birth control were published in his earlier book, Sanji seigen ron (Birth Control), Jitsugyo no Nihon, 1922, p. 1. His book, Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chOsetsu, Tokyo do, 1931, is an update of the former and compiled in Kindai fujin mondai meicho sensh(t--Shakai mondai hen (Selected Works Concerning Women's Issues in Modern Japan: Social Problems), vol. 6, Niho tosho center, 1983.

47. Abe lsf, "The Fundamental Basis of International Peace Polity" (paper presented at the First Pan- Pacific Educational Conference: Programme and Proceedings, Honolulu, August 11-24 1921), 77.

48. Abe, "The Fundamental Basis of International Peace Polity," 77. This quote was rephrased for easier reading. The original is as follows: "Unfortunately, increase of population has been consid- ered as an index of the national strength, and consequently a colonial policy is looked upon as important for a growing nation. But as almost every acre of land on the earth is now mapped out for each nation, no immigrants can enter into dominion without much difficulty. As long as the right of ownership is established, any nation can refuse immigrants ... however large a stretch of uninhab- ited land she may possess, just as a wealthy man in large city may close the gates of his large estate against the slum people (Abe 1921, 77).

49. Abe, "Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chfsetsu," 4. 50. Abe Is6, "Sekai heiwa kitasu tame ni gaikoku bfeki o seigen seyo (A Curtail on Foreign Trade for

World Peace)," Kokusai chishiki (International Knowledge) 4:11 (1924), 7-9. Abe pointed out that Japan refused immigrants from not only China but also from Korea (Abe 1923, 58-60). Later, he claimed, "according to a bureau of statistics, unemployment in Japan numbered 480,000. ff 500,000 Koreans had not already come, there would be no unemployment problem today in Japan" (Abe 1934, 2).

51. Abe Is6, "Sekai heiwa no tame ni imin kinshi to b6eki kokuei (Emigration Ban and State Trade Policy for World Peace)," Bunka seikatsu (Modern Living) 2:9 (1924): 57.

52. Abe, "Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chfsetsu," 46. 53. Abe Is6, "Ijinshu no ky6d6 seikatsu wa kekkyoku son," ChYtOkdron (1924), 94. 54. Abe, "Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji chfsetsu," 161-163. 55. Mamiya maintains that Abe changed to the other extreme position of supporting a national policy of

free birth, umeyofuyaseyo (bear and have more babies) as Japan began its march towards the war in the 1930s. Mamiya, 28.

56. Abe, "Seikatsu mondai kara mita sanji ch6setsu,"155-156. 57. Abe Isf, Jidai no kakusei (Refinement of Our Society). Okakura shobo, 1945), 39. Later, Abe

noted that the United States had already solved the population problem and had established a fundamental policy regarding foreign trade.

58. Mamiya, 38. Abe introduced the Malthusian theory in his "Shin Marusasu shugi no shuch6 (The New Malthusian Theory)," Taikan (An Overall View), vol. 3: 10, 1920.

Abe K6kyu, "Abe Is6 to fujin mondai" (Abe Is6 and Women's Issues), Abe IsO no kenky~, Waseda daigaku shakai kagaktl kenkyajo, 1990, 15 l- 183.

59. Mamiya, 44.