Trends in Southeast Asia Series: 15(2005)

Anti-Terrorism, Maritime Security,and ASEAN-China Cooperation:

A Chinese Perspective

Guo Xinning

This paper was written under the ASEAN-China Study Programme of ISEAS. TheASEAN-China Study Programme is funded by Professor Saw Swee Hock

ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. This version was obtained electronically direct from thepublisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may bereproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng MuiKeng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. <http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>

Published byInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies

30 Heng Mui Keng TerracePasir Panjang

Singapore 119614

E-mail: publish@iseas.edu.sgWorld Wide Web: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,

electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without theprior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 2005 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publicationrests exclusively with the author, and his/her interpretations do not

necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or itssupporters.

ISSN 0219-3213December 2005

About the Writer

Guo Xinning was visiting researcher at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore. He is research fellow in the Institute for Strategic Studies, National

Defence University. He is also senior colonial in the People’s Liberation Army,

People’s Republic of China.

Executive Summary

1. ASEAN-China relations are generally healthy. The strategic partnershipbetween ASEAN and China will be further enhanced if coordinated efforts aretaken to address terrorism and maritime security. Terrorism has affected Chinaand some ASEAN countries for years, while maritime security is becoming asecurity issue of greater significance for both ASEAN countries and China. Ifhandled improperly, the challenges of terrorism and maritime security mayundermine economic and social development, and to a greater extent, nationalsecurity.

2. So far, the primary source of terrorist threat to China is the so-called “East Turkistan” separatist movement that has attempted to establish a grand “East Turkistan” stretching across Central Asia. Xinjian Uygur Autonomous Region, a western province of China, is assumed to be a part of it. This “East Turkistan” is to be established by violent means.

3. In recent years Southeast Asia has risen to the fore in the internationalcampaign against terrorism. As with in China, terrorist groups in SoutheastAsia are, almost without exception, connected to religious extremism andseparatism. The most notorious terrorist organisations active in Southeast Asiainclude Jemaah Islamiyah, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and AbuSayyaff Group.

4. With regards to maritime security, the sea plays a hugely important economicrole for both Southeast Asia and China. The sea carries the vast bulk of tradeand communication, provides food supplies, and supplies substantial energyresources. As such, maritime security will be of increasing concern toSoutheast Asia and China.

5. Piracy is perhaps the most serious maritime security problem in the region. Inrecent years, piracy in Southeast Asia has been more and more rampant.According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the reportednumber of acts of piracy and armed robbery in 2004 was 330. Among allregions in the world, the Far East (including the Malacca Straits and SouthChina Sea) was the most affected area.

6. Relating to issues of piracy and maritime security is the security of sea lanesof communication. For China, the security of sea lanes is vital to ensure thecontinued import of oil, energy and raw materials, all of which are crucial forits economic growth. Meanwhile, most ASEAN economies are export-oriented, heavily dependent on foreign trade, thus making sea lane securityvital for the sustained economic development of countries in the region.

7. Successful response to terrorism and maritime security threats requiresinternational cooperation. The normalisation of relations with China in 1990

by Indonesia, and then Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, set the path forChina’s admission into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and, eventually, ASEAN dialogue partnership status in 1996. Since then, thepartnership has resulted in the deepening of cooperation in economic, politicaland security areas. The signing of the Joint Declaration on the StrategicPartnership for Peace and Prosperity in Bali in October 2003 was a veryimportant milestone in ASEAN-China relations. This formal documentelevated ASEAN-China relations to a new height.

8. Besides conventional forms of cooperation, much progress has also been madeon non-traditional security issues. In 2002, the 6th ASEAN-China summit sawthe issuance of a joint declaration on cooperation in non-traditional securityissues. These issues include drug trafficking, people-smuggling, includingthat of women and children, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, and cybercrime. These issues have affected regional and international security and areposing new challenges to regional stability.

9. Although ASEAN-China cooperation is healthy, there are several obstaclesthat may hinder this relationship. Firstly, the issue of political trust - What arethe implications of the ever-increasing power of China for ASEAN countries?Secondly, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are potential flashpoints.How these disputes are handled will reflect the quality of ASEAN-Chinarelations. Thirdly, different ASEAN countries have different attitudes towardscooperation with China. This will make it hard for ASEAN countries to comeup with a coordinated position on different issues. Fourthly, closer ASEAN-China cooperation may be read by the US and Japan as attempts by China toexpand its influence and weaken their position in the Southeast Asia. It may bedifficult for ASEAN to balance its relations with the US, Japan and China.

10. In conclusion, ASEAN and China have established a Strategic Partnership forPeace and Prosperity. More needs to be done to enhance the quality of thispartnership, while many new challenges and problems will emerge to test theresolve of this partnership. Among others, joint efforts in anti-terrorism andmaritime security will give new momentum to further enhancement ofASEAN-China relationship.

ANTI-TERRORISM, MARITIME SECURITY,AND ASEAN-CHINA COOPERATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

After the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed fundamental changes in

international security. We are now troubled not only by traditional security issues

such as armed conflicts, territorial disputes and other military related ones, but also by

non-traditional ones like international terrorism, transnational crimes, the spread of

deadly epidemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMDs). Among others, terrorism and maritime security are two major issues of

mutual concern for ASEAN and China. Terrorism and religious extremism have

disturbed China and some ASEAN countries for years, while maritime security is

becoming a security issue of greater significance for both ASEAN countries and

China. If handled improperly, the challenges from terrorism and maritime security

may undermine the process of economic and social development, and to a greater

extent, national security. Common interests will be a driving force for closer

cooperation in areas of anti-terrorism and maritime security between ASEAN

countries and China.

Terrorist Threats to China

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. And though this phenomenon may have come

into being hundreds of years ago, it was not paid much attention before the end of the

Cold War. The September 11th terrorist attacks in New York, however showed that no

country, no matter how powerful, was immune to terrorism. Four years have passed

since a global war against terror was launched, and international cooperation against

terrorism has been greatly enhanced. Yet the shadow of terrorist threats still looms. So

far as ASEAN countries and China are concerned, the fight against terrorism has been

ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. This version was obtained electronically direct from thepublisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may bereproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng MuiKeng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. <http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>

© 2005 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

2

and will continue to be one of the most difficult tasks in preserving their respective

national security strategy.

Separatism and religious extremism are usually seen as the breeding ground of

terrorism. This is the case with terrorism in ASEAN countries and China. So far, the

primary source of terrorist threats to China comes from the so-called “East Turkistan”

separatism that has been attempting to establish a grand “East Turkistan” stretching

across Central Asia. Xinjian Uygur Autonomous Region, a western province of

China, is assumed to be a part of it.

The separatist movement in Xinjiang can be traced back to the great uprising

of the Hui people in the mid-19th century. Nevertheless, it was in the 1930s and

1940s that a so-called “East Turkistan” state was actually established. Uygur

separatists established the “Islamic Republic of East Turkistan” in November 1933,

but the regime was short-lived, lasting less than five months. In November 1945,

another so-called “Eastern Turkistan Republic” appeared in Yining, but survived for

only half a year. In the four decades from the founding of the People’s Republic of

China in 1949 to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, “East

Turkistan” separatists had little chance to undertake activities within Chinese borders.

However, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the emerging Islamic

fundamentalism in Central Asia in the early 1990s stimulated “East Turkistan”

separatists to resume their separatist activities including deliberate act of violence in

Xinjiang. The disturbance in Baren in Akto county of Xinjiang in April 1990

represented the beginning of the terrorism conducted by the “East Turkistan” groups.

In one incident, a group of terrorists, supported by the “East Turkistan Islamic Party”,

took ten people hostage, demolished two cars at a traffic junction and killed six

policemen.

Since then, terrorist activities by the “East Turkistan” groups inside China

have greatly increased. Kindergartens, schools, and government agencies are often the

targets of their terrorist attacks. Over the past 10 years, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous

Region encountered more than 260 terrorist incidents, with more than 160 people

killed and 440 others wounded.1 In one of the most brutal terrorist attacks on March

27, 2003, the “East Turkistan Liberation Organisation” hijacked a passenger bus,

3

killed all the passengers and the driver, and set the bus on fire with the bodies inside.

Terrorist activities conducted by the “East Turkistan” groups seriously jeopardise the

lives, property and safety of the Chinese people of various ethnic groups, and

undermine political stability and economic development in the province.

It must be pointed out that there has been clear evidence showing that the

“East Turkistan” terrorist groups have become part of the international terrorist forces.

Osama bin Laden has schemed with the heads of the Central and West Asian terrorist

organisations many times to help the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces in Xinjiang

launch a “holy war”, with the aim of setting up a theocratic “Islam state” in Xinjiang.

The terrorist forces led by Osama have provided much financial and material aid to

the “East Turkistan” terrorists. In early 1999, Osama met with the ringleader of the

“East Turkistan Islamic Movement”, asking him to “coordinate every move with the

‘Uzbekistan Islamic Liberation Movement’ and the Taliban”. In February 2001,

Osama’s terrorists and Taliban leaders met at Kandahar to discuss the training of

“East Turkistan” terrorists. They allocated a sum of money for training the “East

Turkistan” terrorists and promised to cover the funds for their operations in 2001.

Moreover, Osama’s terrorists, the Taliban and the “Uzbekistan Islamic Liberation

Movement” have offered a great deal of arms and ammunition, means of

transportation, and telecommunication equipment to the “East Turkistan” terrorists.

Osama’s group has also directly trained personnel from the “East Turkistan” forces.

After the training, some of the key “East Turkistan” members were secretly sent back

to China to set up terrorist organisations in order to plan and carry out terrorist

activities. Some joined the Taliban armed forces in Afghanistan, some joined the

Chechen terrorists in Russia, and some took part in terrorist activities in Central Asia.

In August 2000, they took part in the invasion of Uzbekistan and the mountain area of

south Kyrgyzstan, attacking local government forces of the two countries.

The Chinese police have so far arrested over 100 terrorists who sneaked into

Xinjiang after being trained in terrorist bases in Afghanistan and other countries. The

police of other nations have also extradited to China a dozen or so “East Turkistan”

terrorists that they captured.2

4

The terrorist activities conducted by the East Turkistan forces have not only

undermined social order and normal life of China, especially in Xinjiang, but also

posed a threat to regional security and stability.

Terrorist Threats to Southeast Asia

In recent years Southeast Asia has risen to the fore in the international campaign

against terrorism. Similar to China, terrorist groups in Southeast Asia are, almost

without exception, connected to religious extremism and separatism. The most

notorious terrorist organisations active in Southeast Asia in recent years include

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaff

Group (ASG).

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was formed in Malaysia around 1993. Its political

objective is to create an Islamic state across Southeast Asia to include Singapore,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines. It has

established cells throughout Southeast Asia. It is believed that the group has become

part of the regional terrorist network controlled by al-Qaeda. JI is suspected of having

executed the Bali car bombing on October 12, 2002, in which suicide bombers killed

202 people and wounded many in a nightclub. JI is also suspected of carrying out the

2004 Jakarta embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali terrorist bombing.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is an Islamic separatist

movement based in Mindanao and its neighbouring islands in the Philippines.

Splitting from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1977, the MILF is

currently the largest Islamic separatist group in the Philippines. The MILF seeks to

establish an independent Islamic state comprising Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan, the

Sulu archipelago, and the neighbouring islands. In support of this aim, the

organisation has conducted many attacks against civilian and military targets

throughout the southern Philippines. In the early 1990s the MILF launched a wave of

attacks that forced former Philippines president Joseph Estrada to pursue an “all-out

war” against the organisation. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been trying to

find a peaceful solution to the problem since coming to office. However, peace efforts

have failed to put an end to terrorist activities by the MILF.3

5

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines is an extremist Islamic

militant group originated in 1990 as a splinter faction of the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF). It rose to notoriety because of its ruthless kidnapping and beheading of

hostages. Despite a large-scale government offensive backed by American forces,

Abu Sayyaf retains significant capability as demonstrated by its claims of

responsibility for the 26 February 2004 sinking of Superferry 14 near Manila in which

116 people were killed. Although Abu Sayyaf has been under heavy pressure, it has

not stopped its brutal terrorist activities.4

It is extremely worrisome that strong evidence shows the tendency of linkage

and collaboration among different terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. This will make

situation more serious and complicated.

Serious Maritime Situation

Ross Babbage and W.S.G. Bateman wrote, “The growing important of the sea is not

always fully appreciated. The sea holds a central place in nearly all economics

because it carries the vast bulk of trade and communication, it provides food supplies,

it supplies substantial energy resources and it promises even greater mineral wealth.

Moreover, the sea is an important focus for both security and insecurity”.5 Recent

development in East Asia, especially in Southeast Asia shows that maritime security

has become one of the major security concerns in the region. US navy lieutenant, John

F. Bradford opined that “The sea dominates Southeast Asia, covering roughly 80

percent of its area. The region’s islands and peninsulas, wedged between the Pacific

and Indian oceans, border major arteries of communication and commerce. Thus the

economic and political affairs of Southeast Asia have been dominated by the sea”.6

Although it is somewhat of an exaggeration to say that “the economic and political

affairs of Southeast Asia have been dominated by the sea”, Bradford is correct in

pointing out the importance of the sea to Southeast Asia. As a growing economy,

China is also attaching greater and greater attention to the maritime situation in the

Asia Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia where increasing Chinese interests

lie, both in terms of sustainable economic development and national security.

6

Just as in other parts of the world, the maritime situation in Southeast Asia is

uncertain, and faced with some serious challenges such as territorial disputes,

transnational crime, and environmental degradation etc. Because of its strategic

importance, maritime security in the region has aroused serious concerns not only

from countries in the region but also some external major powers.

Territorial Disputes

For historic, economic, political, security and other reasons, there exists a number of

territorial disputes among concerned countries in Southeast Asia. These territorial

disputes can be generally divided into two categories.

The first is the disputes among some ASEAN member countries over territory

and maritime rights. During the Cold War, such disputes were overwhelmed by the

predominant rivalry between the US and the former USSR. Beginning from late

1980s, disputes over maritime territories and rights became one of the most

intractable issues affecting relations among ASEAN countries, partly due to the end

of the US-USSR confrontation that had dominated international relations in Southeast

Asia for nearly 40 years, and partly because of increasing demand for resources with

rapid economic development in the region. Main disputes include overlapping

territorial claims between Singapore and Malaysia over Batu Puteh, between Malaysia

and Indonesia over Ligitanden Sipadan northeast of Kalimantan (Borneo), between

Thailand and Vietnam over the continental shelf, and some other issues relating to

maritime rights.7

The second is the complicated disputes and conflicts over territorial maritime

rights over the archipelagoes scattered in the South China Sea. These disputes have

occasionally strained ASEAN-China relations. Consisting of more than 200 small

islands and reefs, the South China Sea Islands have been part of China's territory since

ancient times. Given their increasing geographical, economic and strategic

significance, these small islands have become the target of a struggle between

surrounding countries. Besides China, Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, the

Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei have also claimed sovereignty over

some of the islands. Some have even taken military actions to reinforce their

7

positions. Their overlapping claims and some extremist activities make the region one

filled with flashpoints, undermining normal development of relationship among

concerned countries.

Map 1: South China Sea---- A Test for Relationship and Wisdom

Transnational Crimes

Piracy is perhaps the most serious transnational problem in terms of maritime security

in the region. Piracy in Southeast Asia has been increasingly rampant in recent years.

According to “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”, annual

report by International Maritime Organisation (IMO) issued on 5 May 2005, the

number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships that were reported to IMO

8

in 2004 was 330. Among all regions in the world, the Far East (including the Malacca

Straits and South China Sea) was the most affected area. The number of acts of piracy

and armed robbery against ships in the Malacca Straits and South China Sea was 174,

or nearly 56 per cent of the world total (see Charter 1 below).8

Chart 1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120East Afirca

Indian Ocean

Malacca Strait

South America (Atlantic)

South America (Caribbean)

South America (Pacific)

South China Sea

West Africa

The reasons for rampant piracy in Southeast Asia are complicated. Extreme

poverty is usually the economic reason for people to resort to piracy. Politically

speaking, piracy is one of the easiest ways to finance separatism and extremism while

the unstable political situation in some countries is a good condition for piracy.

Furthermore, the weak capability of most countries in countering piracy has led to

poor management of maritime order in the region.

Maritime terrorism may become an increasingly serious factor in the near

future. The 9/11 Commission of the US reported that, “while commercial aviation

remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their attention to other modes.

Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface

transportation.”9 Hitherto, there has been relatively little evidence of maritime

terrorism in the Southeast Asia. The February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry

Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed 40 people and wounded another 50 was clearly a

maritime terrorist act. The attack was blamed on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Some terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiyah have demonstrated their intent to

conduct large-scale maritime terrorism. Since 2000, regional security forces have

9

disrupted half a dozen plots to attack American warships transiting narrow waterways

or visiting ports in Southeast Asia.

Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong voiced his concern over

maritime security in Southeast Asia in a speech in June 2005:

One aspect of the terrorism issue is maritime security. Every year, 50,000

ships carrying 30 per cent of the world’s trade and 50 per cent of the world’s

oil pass through the Malacca Straits. At its narrowest, between Raffles

Lighthouse and Batu Berhanti in the Singapore Straits, this vital corridor is

only 1.2 km wide. With growing Asian demand for energy, this traffic will

only rise. Disruption of this vital artery would have immediate economic and

strategic repercussions far beyond Southeast Asia. The threat is real and

urgent. We know that terrorists have been studying maritime targets across the

region. The recent spate of violent pirate attacks in the Malacca Straits shows

up our vulnerabilities only too clearly, but a terrorist attack would be a threat

of an altogether different magnitude.10

Security of Sea Lane of Communication

Relating to issues of piracy and maritime terrorism is the security of sea lanes of

communication. The development of economy in ASEAN countries and China has

been and will continue to depend on the normal operation of sea transportation. In the

past twenty years, China has achieved unprecedented economic growth. One of the

most important driving forces behind this has been the rapid expansion of foreign

trade. The total value of imports and exports in 2004 reached US$1154.7 billion, up

35.7 per cent over the previous year.11 About 70 per cent of China’s foreign trade was

realised through sea and ocean transportation. With economic development, the

import of energy and raw materials has increased substantially. In 2004, China’s net

crude oil import reached 117 million tons.12 About 90 per cent of imported oil was

brought in by oil tankers going through sea lanes in Southeast Asia. From all these

figures, it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that the development of Chinese

economy has been and will continue to be heavily relied on the security of sea lanes

of communication.

10

Most of the ASEAN countries’ economy is also export-oriented, heavily

dependent on foreign trade. The security of sea lanes of communication is vital to

sustained economic development of countries in the region.

Need for Cooperation

All in all, ever increasing terrorist threats and the state of maritime security in

Southeast Asia is becoming more serious. Successful response to terrorism and

maritime security threats requires international cooperation, especially efficient

cooperation among countries in the region. As Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN Secretary-

General, put it, “As terrorism transcends national boundaries, no countryis insulated

from it. Worse, the maxim of chaos theory, which says that if a butterfly bats its

wings in one part of the world, its effects can be felt in the other side of the world,

appears to hold true. This is evident in the fact that criminal activities that occur in

countries other than your own may now have repercussions for you. Consequently, no

country can fight crime on its own.”13 Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

also expressed his strong desire for closer maritime cooperation with other countries

in a speech. He said, “Another problem we must worry about is the continuing threat

of extremist terrorism, and particularly the issue of maritime security. …… Although

the littoral states have primary responsibility for ensuring maritime security in the

Straits, we need the assistance of the US, Japan and China, and indeed of all major

interested parties”.14

Basis for Cooperation

The fruitful development of relations between ASEAN countries and China has paved

the way for closer bilateral cooperation in nearly all aspects.

It is true that the development of ASEAN-Sino relationship has not been

smooth, especially at the very beginning. When talking about ASEAN-China

relations, Ong Keng Yong once said, “ASEAN-China relations in the last decade have

not always been easy. In fact, the relationship has seen its ups and downs. Before ties

between ASEAN and China were formally established in 1991, they were marked by

mutual suspicion, mistrust and animosity largely”.15 The normalisation of relations

11

with China in 1990 by Indonesia and then Singapore and Brunei Darussalam acted as

a catalyst to set the path for China’s admission into the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF) in 1994 and eventually the granting of ASEAN dialogue partnership in 1996.

Since then the partnership grew from strength to strength, resulting in the expansion

and deepening of cooperation in the economic, political and security, social and

cultural and development cooperation areas.

Ever Deepening Tendency of Economic Interdependency

Both ASEAN and China agree that the strengthening of bilateral trade and economic

cooperation to be an important channel for maintaining lasting peace and security in

the region.

Regional Economic Cooperation

ASEAN and China have been actively pursuing all forms of regional economic

cooperation and striving to open new avenues and raise the profile of multi-channel,

multi-format and multi-faceted regional economic cooperation, working conjointly

with other East Asian countries. Following the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the

countries of the region realised the need for regional economic cooperation, and as a

result, a brand new form of regional economic cooperation - the 10+3 framework -

came into being. That started the process of East Asia economic cooperation.

Although there seems to be little substantial cooperation within the 10+3 framework

up to now, some effective cooperation has begun. For example, in the field of

monetary and financial cooperation, China and ASEAN have implemented a series of

concrete measures within the 10+3 framework aimed at fostering cooperation. China

has actively implemented the Chiang Mai Initiatives. China has concluded bilateral

money-swap agreements with both Thailand and Malaysia.

Bilateral Economic Relations

At the end of 2001, China and ASEAN agreed to establish a free-trade area within a

decade. Then on November 4, 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Framework

Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation. This marked

12

the official launch of a process that will lead to the establishment of an ASEAN-China

free-trade area by 2010. In recent years, the scale of ASEAN-China trade and

economic cooperation has been growing, its level improving, thus ushering in a prime

era of development. From 2002 to 2004, the ASEAN-China bilateral trade increased

at an annual rate of 38.9 per cent. In 2004, bilateral trade registered at US$105.9

billion. Since the launching of the ASEAN-China FTA in 2002, bilateral trade

increased by US$50 billion within just two years. In the first half of 2005, the bilateral

trade reached US$59.76 billion, increasing by 25 per cent. ASEAN is now China’s

4th largest trading partner. During his visit to the Southeast Asia in April 2005,

Chinese President Hu Jintao pointed out that by 2010 trade between China and

ASEAN should reach US$200 billion.16 In the field of investment, ASEAN has been

an important source of FDI for China. In 2003, contractual FDI flows into China

amounted to US$6.5 billion and the actual paid-up capital was US$ 2.9 billion. By the

end of 2003, accumulated contractual FDI from ASEAN was US$64.3 billion and the

actual paid-up capital was US$32.3 billion.17 The amount of direct investment from

China to ASEAN has been low but is growing rapidly. The latest figures revealed that

Chinese investments to ASEAN grew by 20 per cent to US$226 million in 2004,

bringing China’s cumulative investment in ASEAN from 1995 to 2004 to about US$1

billion.18 These encouraging figures show the strong momentum of economic

interdependency between China and ASEAN countries.

ASEAN-China cooperation has also been expanded to other fields such as

agriculture, human resource development, science and technology, and transportation

etc. At the 10+1 summit meeting in 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and ASEAN

leaders together identified the key areas for bilateral cooperation for the early years of

new century. Cooperation in these fields has already been strengthened. In the field of

human resource development, China contributed financial support to the China-

ASEAN Cooperation Fund and proposed 14 cooperative projects. Most of these

projects have already been implemented and the results have been encouraging. In the

field of science and technology, an ASEAN-China Joint Committee on Science and

Technology was established. In the field of transportation, at the 5th in the series of

10+1 summit meetings in 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the

13

establishment of a mechanism for the meeting of transport ministers to further

strengthen communication and coordination. In September 2002 the first ASEAN-

China Transport Ministers’ Meeting was held in Jakarta. Agreement was reached to

strengthen all-round cooperation in issues relating to transport by land, water and air.

Political Cooperation

Political trust between China and its ASEAN partners has reached a new high in

recent years. China appreciates the positive role of ASEAN in the region while

ASEAN sees peaceful development of China as an opportunity. Both sides have made

efforts in enhancing cooperation in regional affairs. As a clear example of this, China

has been firmly supporting ASEAN’s vitalrole in the process of multilateral security

cooperation in the Asia Pacific, as seen in consistent Chinese support of ASEAN’s

leading role in ASEAN Regional Forum since its foundation.

ASEAN and China have concluded a number of agreements ensuring the

peace and security of the region, as well as creating a better international environment

favourable to economic development. On November 4, 2002 after three years of

consultation, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of

Parties in the South China Sea, which signalled the mutual desire to promote trust and

confidence to establish a regional code of conduct. The document was aimed at

reassuring the world that the South China Sea would become a sea of friendship and

harmony rather than a potential flashpoint for war, and that China and ASEAN would

be able to solve disputes peacefully through dialogue.

The signing of the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for Peace

and Prosperity in Bali in October 2003 was a very important milestone in ASEAN-

Sino relations. This formal document elevated the ASEAN-China relations to a new

height. The two sides had worked out a 5-year plan of action to implement the

Declaration. The significance of the document will be far-reaching. It symbolised a

new stage in ASEAN-China relations. Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN Secretary-General,

expressed his views on the importance of Sino-ASEAN partnership, at the ASEAN-

China Forum 2004, Singapore, 23 June 2004. He said:

14

Why does ASEAN and China need to develop a strategic partnership? I

cannot speak for China. For ASEAN, we see ASEAN and China as part of a

contiguous geographical landscape in East Asia. China shares common

borders with ASEAN and has historical and cultural linkages with many

ASEAN countries. Both face similar challenges and opportunities and share

aspirations, as developing countries, to achieve economic prosperity and

higher living standards for their people. At the same time, they want to tackle

the emerging transnational issues, which may have an adverse impact on their

economy and society. Putting it another way, ASEAN and China must co-

exist and share the responsibility of making our region a better place and be

better global citizens.19

In the same year, China became the first Dialogue Partner to accede to

ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. By acceding to

the TAC, China provided further reassurance to the peace and security of the region

and for the treaty to become eventually a code for inter-state relations in the region.

China has also shown its interest in signing the Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast

Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). It is another example of Chinese

commitment to the peace and stability of the Southeast Asia. These are reflection of

ever improving political relations between the two sides.

Cooperation in Non-traditional Security

It is widely accepted that the concept of security has, in its connotation, expanded

from its roots in military affairs and politics to embrace such diverse fields as

economics, science and technology, the environment and culture. Today many

countries face pressing problems relating to non-traditional security issues such as

terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, piracy and pandemic

diseases. These problems are often beyond both national and regional boundaries,

making it almost impossible for any single country to tackle them independently. The

US-led campaign against terror is a very good example. Multilateral cooperation is

the necessary way out.

15

Much progress has been made in areas of non-traditional security cooperation

between China and ASEAN. At “10+3” summit meeting in 2001, Chinese premier

Zhu Rongji proposed that, while maintaining economic cooperation as its core area,

10+3 cooperation should gradually expand to the fields of political and security

cooperation, taking non-traditional security issues as its starting point. In 2002, the

6th ASEAN-China summit saw the issuance of a joint declaration on cooperation in

non-traditional security issues. In the document, leaders of ASEAN countries and

China expressed their deep concerns “over the increasingly serious nature of non-

traditional security issues such as trafficking in illegal drugs, people-smuggling

including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling,

money-laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime, which have

become important factors of uncertainty affecting regional and international security

and are posing new challenges to regional and international peace and stability”, and

vowed to further strengthen and deepen cooperation in the field of non-traditional

security issues.20 The document set out the priorities and identified areas for

cooperation.

Since then, annual activities have been implemented. So far, 16 workshops,

seminars and training courses related to combating crimes have been convened, and

some more are underway. ASEAN and China signed an MOU on Cooperation in the

Field of Non-traditional Security Issues in January 2004 in Bangkok to implement the

Joint Declaration in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues. Under the MOU, a

2004 Work Plan with many project activities was developed. These successfully

implemented and a new Annual Plan was made out for 2005.

It is worthwhile to note that substantial maritime cooperation is now on the

agenda. On 11 November 2004, ASEAN, in cooperation with the Plus Three countries

(China, Japan and ROK) and Indian Ocean countries (India, Sri Lanka and

Bangladesh) adopted the Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships in Asia. Under this agreement, an Information Sharing Centre

would be set up in Singapore. And as a follow-up to the Declaration on the Conduct

(DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea, ASEAN and China convened a senior

officials’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 2004. During the meeting, all parties

16

agreed that confidence-building activities in the South China Sea would “create a

conducive environment for peaceful settlement of the overlapping sovereignty claims

over disputed areas in the South China Sea among Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Vietnam on the ASEAN side, and China”.21 It may be seen as a start

in maritime cooperation.

ASEAN countries and China all wish to create an increasingly peaceful and

favourable international environment in which to pursue their economic development.

Because of that, they have made joint efforts in cooperation in nearly all aspects of

their relationship. This will serve as the basis for further development in the future.

Prospect for Future Cooperation: Achievements

Both ASEAN and China have made some significant progress in the fight against

terrorism and preservation of maritime security, especially in recent years.

Fight Against Terrorism

ASEAN’s efforts in combating terrorism began long before 9/11. It was in 1997 when

the ASEAN Ministers of Interior and Home Affairs decided to meet for the first time.

The meeting issued the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime and created the

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), which has been

mandated to coordinate with other ASEAN bodies in the investigations, prosecution

and rehabilitation of perpetrators of transnational crimes, including international

terrorism. In November 2004, ASEAN countries concluded a Treaty on Mutual Legal

Assistance in Criminal Matters that would serve to enhance mutual legal and

administrative assistance among ASEAN member countries. ASEAN member

countries have established several regional centres dedicated to countering terrorism,

such as Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Indonesia,

Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia, and

International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Thailand. These centres have

conducted a number of activities relating to the transfer of technology and information

on counter-terrorism. Moreover, ASEAN has been expanding cooperation with non-

ASEAN countries. It has signed joint declarations in the fight against international

17

terrorism separately with New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Australia,

China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

China’s fight against terrorism has also produced some expected success. In

this regard, China has always attached great importance to international cooperation.

Under the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established in

2001, joint efforts have been made among China, Russia and some Central Asia

Countries. The SCO was among the first international organisations to advocate

explicitly the fight against the three evil forces (terrorism, separatism, and

extremism). On 15 June 2001, the day when the SCO was founded, the Shanghai

Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed, clearly

defining terrorism, separatism, and extremism for the first time in the international

arena. It outlined specific directions, modalities and principles of the concerted fight

against the three evil forces, thus helping to lay a solid legal foundation for SCO

security cooperation. At the June 2002 St. Petersburg Summit, the Agreement of the

SCO Member States on Counter-Terrorism Regional Structure was signed. China and

Kyrgystan conducted a bilateral joint anti-terrorism military exercise within the SCO

framework in October 2002, and the SCO member states held a successful

multilateral joint anti-terrorism military manoeuvre in August 2003. China also

joined hands with the US, EU, ASEAN and others to counter international terrorism.

Major forms of cooperation include information sharing, law enforcement support,

and joint exercises etc. With joint efforts, terrorist activities inside China have been

greatly reduced since 2001.

Maritime Security Cooperation

Maritime security has been high on the agenda for both ASEAN countries and China

in the past decade. Regional cooperation has been gradually enhanced.

Generally speaking, maritime security cooperation among ASEAN countries

is now developing at a faster pace in the new century than during the Cold War era.

Countries in Southeast Asia have demonstrated greater desire for and commitment to

expanding maritime confidence-building measures and operational cooperation. The

emphasis of cooperation has been on containing transnational threats such as

18

terrorism and piracy. As a suitable vehicle in promoting regional security cooperation,

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has made great efforts in the area of maritime

security cooperation. In June 2003, ARF issued “Statement on Cooperation against

Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security” and the “Work Program to

Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime”. The latter

was endorsed by the January 2004 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational

Crime.

Functional cooperation has also been under way. In September 2003 Thailand

and Malaysia concerned about insurgents and terrorists, announced that they had

invigorated cooperative maritime patrols in the northern Strait of Malacca. In June

2004, a meeting of FDPA defence ministers in Penang, Malaysia, decided to orient

their organisation for the first time toward non-traditional maritime security, focusing

on anti-terrorism, maritime interception, and anti-piracy. In July 2004, Singapore,

Indonesia, and Malaysia began a programme of trilateral coordinated patrols

throughout the Straits of Malacca. In November 2004, 16 countries (the ASEAN

members plus China, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka)

concluded the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships in Asia. The agreement will promote maritime cooperation on

a regional level. Its significance will be far-reaching.

China has shown more and more interest in maritime security cooperation

with other countries. It has maintained maritime security dialogue with the US since

late 1990s. Among others, ASEAN has been seen as one of the most important

maritime security cooperation partners by China. Aside from being involved in some

of the abovementioned cooperation, China has also made some progress with some

ASEAN countries. On December 26, 2000, the foreign ministers of Vietnam and

China signed in Beijing a boundary accord on the demarcation of the Beibu Gulf. The

accord went into force in June 2004. It means that China and Vietnam have finally

resolved a long-standing issue that had long plagued bilateral ties and had caused

tension. China has been discussing practical cooperation in the South China Sea with

ASEAN member countries in recent years and working to turn the South China Sea

into a friendly and cooperative bridge. On March 14, 2005, the national oil companies

19

of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a tripartite agreement for a joint marine

survey in certain areas of the South China Sea. This further indicates that China and

other Southeast Asian nations have been seeking practical ways in solving disputes

through consultation and dialogue. Cooperation in other field has also produced

substantial achievements. In October 2004, the Chinese maritime and other concerned

agencies and the Philippine Coast Guard held in Manila the first-ever joint search and

rescue (SAR) table exercise. The bilateral meet dubbed “China - Philippines

Cooperation 2004” table top exercises was aimed at further strengthening cooperation

between the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) of China and the Philippine

Coast Guard and fostering harmonious relationship between the two countries.

Obstacles

As all parties concerned may agree, it is necessary for ASEAN countries and China to

join hands in the fight against terrorism and the maintenance of maritime security.

However, the following obstacles may have negative impact on future cooperation.

Political Trust

Confidence-building among nations is always a long process that cannot be completed

overnight. Through joint efforts by both ASEAN countries and China, bilateral

partnership has been gradually strengthened and mutual trust greatly enhanced.

Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean the lasting problem of political trust has

been solved for good. Mr S Pushpanathan, Head of External relations and ASEAN

Plus Three Relations at the ASEAN Secretariat, noted:

ASEAN and China has turned the corner in the last decade to establish a more

fruitful partnership. However, new challenges and problems could emerge in

the region that will test the strength of the partnership. ASEAN and China will

have to take them in their stride as they forge a strategic partnership to benefit

the present and future generations in the region.22

There has always been one question in the minds of ASEAN leaders: What are

the implications of the ever-increasing power of China for ASEAN countries? It is

20

quite natural for ASEAN countries to contemplate this simply because the nature of

contemporary international relations has been characterised by power politics.

Chinese government seems to have fully understood the existence of distrust

or suspicion among ASEAN countries for various reasons. So efforts have been made

by China to alleviate such distrust and suspicion. To that end, China has taken some

concrete actions. To name some, annual dialogue between ASEAN and China was

established for the exchange of views over a wide range of issues concerning regional

security and bilateral relations. In 2003, China became the first Dialogue Partner to

accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia.

China has shown its willingness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast Asia

Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). These efforts are reflection of Chinese

sincerity in promoting political trust with ASEAN countries.

However, the apprehension of some ASEAN countries over China is deep-

rooted and will continue to exist. So, there is still a lot to be done for both ASEAN

and China in order to build a brand new relationship based on mutual trust and

confidence. As a Philippines scholar put it, “Both ASEAN and China must therefore

exert greater efforts to expand mutual trust, promote mutual understanding of their

convergent as well as divergent interests, and most importantly begin defining the

norms which will guide their political-security as well as economic relations in the

next century and in the next millennium, when China may have become the

comprehensive power that it seeks to be”.23

Territorial Disputes

As elaborated above, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are extremely

complicated. The issue involves not only geostrategic, economic and security

interests, but also national sentiments of relevant countries.

To prevent conflict, the countries encompassing the South China Sea have

been looking for ways to solve this problem in the interest of all parties. For example,

they have hitherto convened several rounds of official or quasi-official multilateral

forums to exchange views on this issue. The greatest achievement ever made is the

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, issued in 2002. In the

21

declaration, the parties concerned “undertake to resolve their territorial and

jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of

force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly

concerned, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law,

including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”, and agreed “to intensify

efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and

confidence between and among them”. They agreed to take substantial measures such

as holding dialogues to exchange views between defence and military officials;

ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in

distress; notifying other parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military

exercise; and exchanging relevant information.24

Since then, the situation in the South China Sea has been basically stable.

However, some parties have not always followed the rules of game dictated in the

declaration and have sometimes tried to adopt unilateral actions. Indeed, there have

been some frictions. For example, in April 2004, Vietnam organised tourist activities

to the Nansha islands. Such activities inevitably aroused concern and dissatisfaction

from other parties. Although these minor frictions have not led to sharp confrontation

or conflict, nobody can be sure that future frictions will continue to be well controlled.

In a word, territorial disputes over the South China Sea will remain a

barometer of the quality of ASEAN-China partnership, and pose a major obstacle to

future cooperation, especially maritime cooperation. ASEAN and China have got to

find some way out.

Difficulties in Achieving a Coordinated ASEAN Position

China is a single nation where a political decision is relatively easier make while it is

quite a different story with ASEAN. ASEAN is a regional organisation composed of

ten very different nations. The solidarity among ASEAN countries has been greatly

consolidated through joint efforts and the process of ASEAN integration has produced

abundant and fruitful results. Nonetheless, differences still exist due to different or

sometimes conflicting national interests, just like any other regional organisation.

Among others, different perceptions of the role of China will be a significant factor

22

that may slow down the pace of bilateral cooperation. Although nearly all ASEAN

countries agree that enhanced cooperation with China in areas of anti-terrorism and

maritime security will be beneficiary and conducive to their respective national

interests, they do have different attitudes. Some countries harbour deeper suspicion

over China and are thus somewhat reluctant to move too fast while some others see

China as a reliable friend and are more active in further fostering relationship with

China. With such differences, it is natural to see different attitudes towards

cooperation with China. So, effective coordination among ASEAN countries will be

difficult but very critical to future cooperation with China.

External Factors

The relations between the US, Japan and China have always been an important factor

that, in turn, influences ASEAN-China relations. Closer ASEAN-China cooperation

may be read by the US and Japan as attempts by China to expand its influence and

weaken their position in the Southeast Asia. It may prove difficult for ASEAN to

balance its relations with the US, Japan and China.

Reflections

In fostering bilateral relations, ASEAN countries and China all advocate the

principles of mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and equality. These

principles must continue to be observed in future cooperation. In view of past

experiences of cooperation and existing obstacles between ASEAN and China, it is

also important to consider the following points in the course of anti-terrorism and

maritime security cooperation:

Confidence-Building

Successful confidence-building is crucial for the enhancement of security cooperation

between ASEAN countries and China. It is good to see that there are now various

bilateral or multilateral channels of dialogue and exchange, contributing a great deal

to the promotion of confidence between ASEAN countries and China. However, this

does not mean that the process of confidence-building has been completed. It is

23

desirable for the process of confidence-building to deepen. For example, as an

important part of dialogue, military-to-military relationship has yet to be strengthened.

Evolutionary and Realistic Approaches

The hitherto successful process of ASEAN integration may be good for ASEAN-

China cooperation. To a certain degree, the success of ASEAN integration may be

attributed to the evolutionary and realistic approaches adopted by ASEAN member

countries in the past. “Evolutionary” means the pace of cooperation or integration

should be properly tuned to the comfort of all member countries. Consensus is the

precondition for any step forward. “Realistic” means having a clear idea about what

can be done at the present stage of integration, what can be done in the near future or

in the long run, and what cannot be done under any circumstances. Evolutionary and

realistic approaches have helped ASEAN bypass various difficulties and make

gradual but concrete progress. In view of the aforementioned obstacles, ASEAN-Sino

cooperation in areas of anti-terrorism and maritime security will inevitably encounter

some difficulties. In order to prevent partial differences from obstructing overall

cooperation, future ASEAN-China cooperation may do well to adopt ‘evolutionary’

and ‘realistic’ approaches. It may start from relatively easy and less sensitive areas,

such as sharing of experiences of countering terrorism and maritime crimes,

establishment of coordination mechanism in areas of anti-terrorism and maritime

security, information and intelligence sharing in transnational crime, cooperation in

maritime search and rescue, maritime environment protection, law enforcement

cooperation against transnational crimes, cooperation among defence education

institutions, and joint efforts in peace-keeping in the region.

Openness Rather than Exclusiveness

The transnational or transregional nature of terrorism and maritime security dictates

that successful cooperation in these areas rely, to a fairly large extent, on whether it

can gather as much regional or global support as possible. Terrorism that undermines

social stability of both ASEAN countries and China is just a part of the global issue of

international terrorism. And in view of its close relations with international terrorist

24

organisations, terrorism will be better dealt with in an international context. By the

same token, maritime security in the Southeast Asia will be better viewed and

maintained in the broader context of maritime security in the Asia Pacific region or

even in the world. Joint efforts by ASEAN countries and China can be more

effectively carried out in close coordination with other parties. Therefore, future

cooperation between ASEAN and China should be open rather than exclusive so as to

invite active participation of other concerned parties.

Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

Hereby, “bilateral” refers to state-to-state cooperation between China and individual

ASEAN member countries while “multilateral” refers to cooperation between China

and ASEAN countries as a whole. For reasons mentioned above, it is sometimes

difficult for ASEAN to come out with a coordinated position on specific issues

including anti-terrorism and maritime security. Because of that, bilateral cooperation

is usually much easier to attain. It is very important to strike a proper balance between

bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Bilateral cooperation may serve as an interim

stage for, or be complementary to, multilateral cooperation rather than weaken or

undercut the latter. Also important, bilateral cooperation must take into account the

interests of other parties. Otherwise, it may give rise to suspicions and consequently

retard the process of multilateral cooperation. Moreover, ASEAN-China cooperation

can also parallel other ongoing frameworks, such as “Ten plus Three”, ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) and the UN.

Conclusion

ASEAN and China have established a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.

More needs to be done to enhance the quality of this partnership, and many new

challenges and problems will emerge to test the resolve of this partnership. Among

others, joint efforts in anti-terrorism and maritime security will further enhance the

ASEAN-China relationship.

25

NOTES

1 “‘East Turkistan’ Poses Major Threat”, Xinhua News Agency, September 6, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-09/05/content_3448750.htm.

2 Information Office of State Council, China, http://www.china.org.cn, January21, 2002.

3 http://www.saag.org/papers8/paper765.html.4 http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/abusayyaf.html.5 Ross Babbage and Sam.Bateman, Maritime Change: Issues for Asia, ©Royal

Australian Navy and Australian Defence Industries Ltd, 1993, pxix.6 John F. Bradford,“The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation

in Southeast Asia”,http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2005/summer/art3-su05.htm.

7 “Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation”, edited by China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Shishi Publishing House, January2005, p 265.

8 “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”, annual report by International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued on 5 May 2005.

9 The 9/11 commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York: W.W.Norton, 2004,p 391.

10 Keynote address by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 4th InternationalInstitute of Strategic Studies Asia Security Conference in Singapore, 3 June2005, Singapore Government Press Release, Media Relations Division,Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts.

11 “The development of China’s Foreign Economic Relations in 2004 and itsTendency for 2005”, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/2005swbg/961484.htm.

12 Speech by Zhang Guobao, Vice Chairman of the National Development andReform Commission, September 13, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/news050913.htm.

13 "Eight Steps in Securing Our Homelands", speech by Ong Keng Yong,Secretary-General, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at Third Asia-Pacific Homeland Security Summit and Exposition, Honolulu, USA, 21September 2005, http://www.aseansec.org/17765.htm.

14 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 11th InternationalConference on “The Future of Asia”, 25 May 2005, Tokyo, Japan, http://www.aseansec.org/17474.htm.

15 “Securing a Win-Win Partnership for ASEAN and China", speech by HE OngKeng Yong, Secretary General of ASEAN, at the ASEAN-China Forum 2004,Singapore, 23 June 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16255.htm.

16 Speech on the 2nd China-ASEAN Expo & China-ASEAN Business andInvestment Summit, Mr. Fu Ziying, Assistant Minister of Commerce of thePeople’s Republic of China, Sept.15, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/news050915-1.htm.

17 “Securing a Win-Win Partnership for ASEAN and China", Keynote Addressby Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General, Association of Southeast Asian

26

Nations, at the ASEAN-China Forum 2004, Singapore, 23 June 2004,http://www.aseansec.org/16255.htm.

18 “Welcome Remarks” by HE Ong Keng Yong, Secretary General of ASEAN, at the 2nd China-ASEAN Business and Investment, Nanning, China, 19October 2005, http://www.aseansec.org/17830.htm

19 “Securing a Win-Win Partnership for ASEAN and China", Keynote Addressby Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General, Association of Southeast AsianNations, at the ASEAN-China Forum 2004, Singapore, 23 June 2004,http://www.aseansec.org/16255.htm.

20 “Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues”, issued at the 6th ASEAN-China Summit, PhnomPenh, 4 November 2002, http://www.aseansec.org/13186.htm.

21 “Press Release”, ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting on theImplementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SouthChina Sea, held in Kuala Lumpur, 7 December 2004.http://www.aseansec.org/16888.htm.

22 “Building an ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership”, by S Pushpanathan, Head of External relations and ASEAN Plus Three Relations at the ASEANSecretariat. http://www.aseansec.org/16253.

23 Aileen S.P. Baviera, “China’s Relations with Southeast Asia: Political Security and Economic Interests”, PASCN Discussion Paper No. 99-17,Philippine APEC Study Center Network.

24 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, issued in November 2002, ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/13165.htm.

TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1(99): Marzuki Darusman, SH, Indonesia in Transition, April 1999.

2(99): Leo Suryadinata, The Ethnic Chinese Issue and National Integration inIndonesia, June 1999.

3(99): James Cotton, Peacekeeping in East Timor: an Australian perspective, July1999.

4(99): John Funston, Malaysia/Thailand, A Mid-Year Review: Contrasting PoliticalTrajectories, September 1999.

5(99): David K. Linnan, Indonesian Bankruptcy Policy & Reform: ReconcilingEfficiency and Economic Nationalism, September 1999.

6(99): Mahani Zainal Abidin and Zakaria Haji Ahmad, The Financial Crisis inMalaysia: The Economic and Political Consequences, October 1999.

7(99): Sheng Lijun, How China is Going to Respond to Lee Teng-Hui’s “Two States” Theory, December 1999.

1(2000): Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Khoo Kay Kim, K S Nathan, Hari Singh, MeredithWeiss and John Funston, Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment, January 2000.

2(2000): Michael Leifer, The Political and Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,January 2000.

3(2000): Agus Widjojo and Bambang Harymurti, Understanding Political Changeand the role of the military in Post Suharto Indonesia, February 2000.

4(2000): Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Thailand: Toward a Sustainable Recovery,February 2000.

5(2000): John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention–Practice andProspects, March 2000.

6(2000): C. P. F. Luhulima, Scope of ASEAN’s Security Framework for the 21st Century, April 2000.

7(2000): Ahn Choong Yong, Korea’s Economic Outlook in 2000: Recovery and Further Restructuring, April 2000.

8(2000): Mohamed Ariff and Azidin W. A. Kadir, The Near-Term Outlook for theMalaysian Economy, May 2000.

9(2000): John Funston, Election Fervour: Political Contest in Thailand andMalaysia, September 2000.

10(2000): Tin Maung Maung Than, Myanmar: The Dilemma of Stalled Reforms,September 2000.

11(2000): Sheng Lijun, Taiwan’s New President and Cross-Strait Relations,September 2000.

12(2000): Mohammad Sadli, Restoring Investor Confidence in Indonesia, October2000.

13(2000): Mochtar Buchori and Cornelis Lay, Assessing Current PoliticalDevelopments in Indonesia, October 2000.

1(2001): José Ramos-Horta, East Timor and the Region, January 2001.

2(2001): Ali Alatas, “ASEAN Plus Three” Equals Peace Plus Prosperity, January2001.

3(2001): Abdul Aziz and Michael Leifer, Political and Governance Challenges inSoutheast Asia: Outlook 2001, January 2001.

4(2001): Hadi Soesastro, Mahani Zainal Abidin and Chalongphob Sussangkarn, TheRegional Economic Outlook in 2001: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, January2001.

5(2001): M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Kitti Limskul, Thailand After TheElection: Politics and Economics, May 2001.

6(2001): Ade Komarudin, Ali Masykur Musa, Alvin Lie, Irwan Prayitno andPramono Anung,Trends in Indonesia: Visions for Indonesia’s Future, May 2001.

7(2001): Djoko Hartono and David Ehrmann, The Indonesian Economic Crisis andits Impact on Educational Enrolment and Quality, May 2001.

8(2001): Sheng Lijun, A New U.S. Asia Policy?: Air Collision, Arms Sales andChina-U.S. Relations, June 2001.

9(2001): Tan Sri Musa Hitam, Islam and State in Malaysia, September 2001.

10(2001): Surin Pitsuwan, Future Directions for ASEAN, September 2001.

11(2001): Thaksin Shinawatra, Rethinking Recovery, September 2001.

12(2001): K. S. Nathan, Economic Slowdown and Domestic Politics: MalaysiaBoleh?, October 2001.

13(2001): Derek da Cunha, Tan See Seng, K S Nathan and Farish A Noor, RegionalPolitical and Security Implications of the Terror Attacks in the United States, October2001.

14(2001): Anthony L. Smith, What the Recent Terror Attacks Mean for Indonesia,November 2001.

1(2002): Harold Crouch, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Carmen A. Abubakar andYang Razali Kassim, Islam in Southeast Asia: Analysing Recent Developments,January 2002.

2(2002): Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Hadi Soesastro, Outlook for Indonesia,January 2002.

3(2002): Supachai Panitchpakdi, Wang Gungwu, Paul M. Evans, Ernesto M. Pernia,Outlook for China and the Region, February 2002.

4(2002): Zainal Aznam Yusof and Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Regional EconomicOutlook 2002: Malaysia and Thailand, March 2002.

5(2002): Hadar N. Gumay, Shamsul A.B., Temario C. Rivera, Kullada KesboonchooMead, Assessing Democratic Evolution in Southeast Asia, April 2002.

6(2002): Anthony L. Smith, Recent Political Developments in Southeast Asia, April2002.

7(2002): Harold Crouch, The Key Determinants of Indonesia’s Political Future,August 2002.

8(2002): Farish A. Noor, PAS post-Fadzil Noor: Future Directions and Prospects,August 2002.

9(2002): Daljit Singh, The Post-September 11 Geostrategic Landscape and SoutheastAsian Response to the Threat of Terrorism, September 2002.

1(2003): Richard H. Solomon and Yang Jiemian, Political and Security Outlook:Asian Geostrategic Trends, Feburary 2003.

2(2003): Hadi Soesastro, Mahani Zainal Abidin, Somchai Jitsuchon, RegionalEconomic Outlook 2003: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, March 2003.

3(2003): Rohan K. Gunaratna, Political and Security Outlook 2003: Terrorism inSoutheast Asia: What to Expect, April 2003.

4(2003): Zainah Anwar and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Political and Security Outlook2003: Islam: The Challenge from Extremist Interpretations, April 2003.

5(2003): Tommy Koh, Kristin Paulson, Jose Tongzon and Vikram Khanna, US-Singapore FTA: Implications and Prospects, June 2003.

6(2003): Kyaw Yin Hlaing and David Koh, Political Developments in Myanmar andVietnam, August 2003.

7(2003): Mohd Shafie Apdal and Carlyle A. Thayer, Security, Political Terrorismand Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, August 2003.

8(2003): Rehman Rashid and James Wong Wing-On, Malaysia in Transition: TheBattle for the Malay Mind, August 2003.

9(2003): Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Harold Crouch, Indonesia: Foreign Policy andDomestic Politics, August 2003.

10(2003): Michael Vatikiotis and Chin Kin Wah, The Geopolitical Situation in Eastand Southeast Asia, August 2003.

11(2003): Yaacob Ibrahim, Peter Riddell, Shad Saleem Faruqi and Sharon Siddique,Perspectives on Doctrinal and Strategic Implications of Global Islam, Part I, GlobalIslam: Doctrinal and Strategic Implications, August 2003.

12(2003): Surin Pitsuwan, Zainah Anwar, Hussin Mutalib, Bernard T. Adeney-Risakotta, Perspectives on Doctrinal and Strategic Implications of Global Islam, PartII, Southeast Asia Post-September 11: The Challenge of Political Islam, August2003.

13(2003): T. J. Pempel,The Changing Character of Japan’s Economic Linkages with Southeast Asia, October 2003.

14(2003): Cassey Lee, Implementing Competition Policy in Malaysia, October 2003.

15(2003): Chandra Muzaffar, Malaysian Politics: The Emerging Scenario UnderAbdullah Badawi, December 2003.

1(2004): Piamsak Milintachinda, Mario Artaza and David Parsons: APEC 2003Outcomes and Outlook for 2004—What it Means for the Region, January 2004.

2(2004): Rohan K. Gunaratna and Sidney Jones, Political and Security Outlook: TheThreat of Terrorism in 2004—What to Expect?, January 2004.

3(2004): Michael Richardson and P. Mukundan, Political and Security Outlook2004: Maritime Terrorism and Piracy, January 2004.

4(2004): Harry Harding, Yan Xuetong and G. Parthasarathy, Political and SecurityOutlook 2004: Asian Geostrategic Trends, January 2004.

5(2004): Hadi Soesastro and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, The Outlook for Indonesianand Malaysian Economies 2004, February 2004.

6(2004): Chan Heng Chee, US Policy in Asia, February 2004.

7(2004): Rizal Mallarangeng, Khoo Boo Teik, Ho Khai Leong, Kavi Chongkittavorn,Robert H. Taylor and Tim Huxley, Political and Security Outlook 2004: PoliticalChange in Southeast Asia, February 2004.

8(2004): Rodolfo C. Severino, Towards an ASEAN Security Community, February2004.

9(2004): Daljit Singh, Iraq War and Asia-Pacific Security, April 2004.

10(2004): Toshio Watanabe, K Kesavapany and J Soedradjad Djiwandono, FutureDevelopment of the East Asia Region: ASEAN-Japan Dialogue, May 2004.

11(2004): Haji Maarof bin Haji Salleh and Noorashikin Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s 2004 General Elections: An Assessment, July 2004.

12(2004): Seok-young Choi, Regionalism and Open Regionalism in the APECRegion, November 2004.

1(2005): Gareth Evans, Regional Outlook Forum 2005: Global and RegionalSecurity - Our Shared Responsibility, January 2005.

2(2005): Khairy Jamaluddin, Robert H Taylor and Carlyle A Thayer, RegionalOutlook Forum 2005: Political Outlook for Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam,January 2005.

3(2005): Bruce Hoffman, Rohan K Gunaratna and Sidney Jones, Regional OutlookForum 2005: Terrorism - International and Regional Dimensions, January 2005.

4(2005): Kurt M Campbell, Robyn Lim, Wang Jisi and K Shankar Bajpai, RegionalOutlook Forum 2005: Geostrategic Trends in Asia, February 2005.

5(2005): Sri Adiningsih, Indonesia’s Macroeconomy and the Tsunami Disaster,February 2005.

6(2005): Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Thai Politics After the 6 February 2005 GeneralElection, April 2005.

7(2005): Sree Kumar and Sharon Siddique, Research Note: Repositioning Perak–ACase Study, May 2005.

8(2005): Liu Zhi and Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN Cooperation Against DrugTrafficking: A Chinese View, June 2005.

9(2005): Ooi Kee Beng, Ghosts of Compromises Past –Malaysia and the Limits ofChange, September 2005.

10(2005): Conference on Strengthening the Korea-ASEAN Relationship, October2005, (Report written by Chang Chiou Yi and Ng Boon Yian).

11(2005): The ISEAS Forum on Water Issues in Southeast Asia, November 2005.

12(2005): Michael Richardson, Bird Flu & Bio-Security: Is the World A DeadDuck? (ISEAS Briefing Paper on the Threat of an Influenza Pandemic), November2005.

13(2005): Verghese Mathews, Cambodia –Wasted Time and Opportunities,December 2005.

14(2005): Jiang Shuxian and Sheng Lijun, The Communist Party of China andPolitical Parties in Southeast Asia, December 2005.

15(2005): Guo Xinning, Anti-Terrorism, Maritime Security, and ASEAN-ChinaCooperation: A Chinese Perspective, December 2005.

WTO Issues

1(2003): Barry Desker and Margaret Liang, Trade Facilitation: The Road Ahead,August 2003.

1(2004): Barry Desker, The WTO After Cancun: The Challenge to Multilateralism,November 2004.

2(2004): Margaret Liang, The Real Politik of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: FromUruguay to Cancun, November 2004.

Series EditorTerence Chong

Assistant EditorNg Boon Yian

Editorial CommitteeLee Hock Guan

Sakulrat MontreevatLee Poh Onn

Tin Maung Maung Than

Papers in this series are preliminary in nature and are intended tostimulate discussion and critical comment. The Series Editors and the Editorial Committee

accept no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed,which rests exclusively with the individual author. No part of this

publication may be produced in any form without permission.Comments are welcomed and may be sent to the author at the

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.http://www.iseas.edu.sg

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomousorganization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and otherspecialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and politicaland social change.

The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies(RSPS) and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS).

2

.