“ThePoliticsofProminenceintheGlobalizedNetworkofTradeAgreements”

SamuelBrazys W.KindredWinecoff UniversityCollegeDublin IndianaUniversityBloomingtonABSTRACT:AsWTOnegotiationssputtertoanunremarkabledeath,itlooksincreasinglylikelythatfutureliberalizationinglobaltradewilloccurthroughthedeepeningandexpansionofpreferentialtradeagreements(PTAs).Recognizingthisfact,webuildonanemergingliteraturethatconsidersthejumbleofsome250+PTAsasanevolvingnetwork,onethatisprovidingtheinstitutionalstructureforglobaltrade.Inthispaper,weconsiderwhatdriversaredeterminingthetiesofthisnetwork,particularlyaswemoveintothe“post-WTO”eraoftradenegotiations.DrawingondescriptivestatisticsofthisglobalizedPTAnetwork,wefindthatseveralcuriousactorshavehighdegreesofimportance.Inexplainingtheprominenceoftheseactors,wearguethatitisgeographicandpoliticalambiguitythatpositionsinkeypositionsintheglobaltradenetwork,andtestthesecontentionsusinginferentialnetworkanalysis(NA)tools.Wefindthatcountriesandinstitutionsthatcanbridgeideologicalandphysicalspacearethemostimportantforcreatingtheinstitutionallinkagesoftradeintheevolving21stcenturymulti-polarworld.Preparedforpresentationatthe2016annualmeetingoftheInternationalPoliticalEconomySociety,Durham,NC,November11,2016.NOTE:Thispaperisverymuchaworkinprogress.Inparticular,theempiricaloperationalizationsandfindingsoftheinferentialmodelareVERYpreliminaryandsubjecttochange.Pleasedonotcitewithouttheauthors’permission.

IntroductionMuchhasbeenmadeofthedeclineofthemultilateraltradeorderandtheriseofpreferentialtradeagreements(PTAs)acrosstheglobesincetheendoftheColdWar(HeydonandWoolcock2009).AsofApril2015,theWTOrecords449totalPTAnotificationswith262inforce.1Manyoftheserecentagreementsareconcentratedgeographically,constitutingwhathasbeencalledthe“new”regionalism(Ethier1998).Theproliferationofbilateralandregionalagreementshasledtoavastinterconnectionoftradeties,coinedbyBhagwatiasthe“SpaghettiBowl”(Bhagwati1995).WhileaconsiderableliteraturehasexaminedthedomesticanddyadicdriversofPTAformation(e.g.,Frankel,Steinetal.1997,Freund2000,ChenandJoshi2010),considerationofthenetworkdynamicsbehindPTAsisstillinitsinfancy(forexceptionssee(FurusawaandKonishi2007,Manger,Pickupetal.2012,LeeandBai2013,MangerandPickup2016)).AsWTOnegotiationslosesteam,itlooksincreasinglylikelythatthecontemporaryglobaltradeordercouldbedominatedbythenetworkofPTAs,including“mega-PTAs”suchastheTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership(TTIP)theTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP)ortheRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP),thatoftengobeyondWTOcommitmentsintermsofscopeanddepth(Hartman2013,Lamy2014),leavingtheWTOtoperhapsactasnomorethananadjudicatorinPTAdisputes(GaoandLim2008,MarceauandWyatt2010).However,formalworkbybothFurusawaandKonishi(FurusawaandKonishi2007)andLake(2015)suggeststhatitisunlikelythatastable,global,“PTAnetwork”willforminthepresenceofasymmetriccountries.ThisresultsuggeststhatthePTAnetworkwillbesub-optimalvis-à-visthemultilateralregimeforactorsthatarenotadequatelyconnected.IftheWTOistobesupplantedbyaPTAnetworkwithasymmetricwelfareconsequences,thenstudyingthestructureofthatnetworkiscrucialinunderstandingwhatactorsareandarenotimportantinthecurrentglobaltraderegime.Inthispaper,weaddtotheemergingliteratureonPTAnetworksbybringingbothnewtechniquesandinsightstotheunderstandingofPTAnetworkformation.Crucially,weareconcernedwithidentifyingandexplainingthoseactorsthatarefundamentaltothePTAnetworkand,byextension,thosewhoaremarginalizedbyit.Ourargumentistwofold.First,geographicallyandpoliticallyambiguousstatesareimportant,butoftenover-looked,inaglobaltraderegimecharacterizedbyincreasedinterdependence,contestationofideas,andaproliferationofactors.Insuchasystempoweriswieldedbythoseabletotraversebothphysicalandnormativeboundaries.Thus,someofthecrucialactorsinthePTAnetworkarenotthepolesofamulti-polarworld,butinstead,thestatesthatcanbridgethegeographicandideationalspacebetweenthosecenters.Second,thatthePTAnetworkdoesnotdevelop

1 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm Accessed 14-04-2015. We use “PTA” as a catch-all term for trade agreements that also include the so-called “Free Trade Agreements” (FTAs) or “Regional Trade Agreements” (RTAs).

accordingtoinstrumentallogicsalone,butalsocontainspowerfulendogenousprocessesthatrewardthosewhooccupykeypositionswithinthebroaderstructure.Accordingly,thefirsttaskinthepaperistomodeltheexistingPTAnetwork,usingdiagnostictoolstoidentifykeymeasuresofnetworkprominence.Thesediagnosticsidentifyseveralnon-intuitiveimportantactorsinthenetwork,presentingapuzzlethatpromptsustodevelopexpectationsaboutthetypesofstatecharacteristicsthatleadtoprominence.Weconsidertwostrandsofdeterminantsfornetworkprominence:institutionalandeconomic-geographic.Wethenuseinferentialnetworktechniquestoevaluatethesehypotheses,findingXXXbeforeconcludingwiththoughtsontheimplicationsofprominenceanddirectionsforfurtherresearch.WhatweknowaboutPTAFormation,Proliferation,andNetworksThereisasubstantialliteratureexaminingtheformationandproliferationofPTAs.Economistshavelongfocusedon“gravity”explanationsofgeographicproximityandonissuesoftradeopennessrelatedtoViner’s(Viner2014)classicanalysisoftrade“diversion”andtrade“creation”(forexamplessee:(Frankel,Steinetal.1995,Bhagwati,Krishnaetal.1999,Krueger1999,Magee2003).Concurrently,politicalscientistsbroughtattentiontotheformationofPTAsinconsiderationofhegemonicdeclineandgeostrategicinterests(Mansfield1998,Powers2004)or“political”tradedependence(MangerandShadlen2014),inthecontextofintra-democratictradepromotion(Mansfield,Milneretal.2002),orasaprocessdriveninconjunctionwithsuccessandfailureinthemultilateralorder(MansfieldandReinhardt2003).ThesepapershavebroughtvaluableinsightsintothedeterminantsofPTAs,butmosthavefocusedondyadicrelationshipsbetweenpairsofactors,ratherthanonthestructureanddynamicsofthePTAnetwork.Whilethereisalonghistoryofbothformalandinformalanalysisofnetworksinglobaltrade(DeBenedictisandTajoli2011)attentionhasonlyrecentlyturnedtonetworkanalysis(NA)ofPTAsdespitethefactthatsomecountries,suchasChina,explicitlyviewtheirPTAagreementsasaholisticnetwork.2RecentworkbyPiccardiandTajoli(2015)usesNAtoolstoconductacommunityanalysisoftradediversion,basedonbothdejureanddefactoidentificationsofpreferentialgroupings.Theauthorsfindnosignificanttradediversionasaresultofthesegroupings.WithrespecttoPTAformation,BaldwinandJaimovich(BaldwinandJaimovich2012)examinethe“spread”ofPTAsfindingsupportforcontagionwhere“political”PTAsinstigatearesponseof“defensive”thirdpartyPTAs.However,whilethisworkexaminesthespreadofPTAs,itdoessousingspatialeconometricswithapanelofdata,ratherthanexplicitlyfocusingonthenetworkfeaturesusingNA.LongitudinalnetworkanalysisisalsobroughttobearonthequestionofPTAformationbyMangeretal(Manger,Pickupetal.2012)whofocusontheformationofthePTAnetworkfrom1994to2004.SimilartoBaldwinandJaimovich’sdefensive

2 For example, China’s Ministry of Commerce refers to the “China FTA Network” when listing agreements in force, under negotiation, and under consideration: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml, accessed November 6, 2016.

PTAs,Mangeretalfocusonthemechanismof“triadicclosure”tounderstandtheproliferationofPTAs.Inaddition,theyalsofocusonhowrelativelevelsofeconomicendowmentdeterminePTAformation,findingahierarchicalnetworkwherehighincomecountriesarelikelytoformtieswitheachother,withmiddle-incomecountriesandthatmiddle-incomecountriesformtiesamongthemselves.Theyfindlittleevidenceoflow-incomecountriesformingPTAswiththemselvesorothers.Inarecentworkingpaper,PauwelynandAlschner(PauwelynandAlschner2014)presentatoolkitofNAdescriptivestatisticsregardingthePTAnetworkincludingmeasuresofprominence,clusteringanddepth.Theirfindingspromptmuchoftheinvestigationinthispaper,astheyidentifycountriessuchEgypt,Chile,Korea,IvoryCoast,Turkey,andtheSudanaskeyactorsinthePTAnetwork.Noneofthesecountriesarelikelytostrikethecasualobserverascrucialtotheglobaltradingsystemandnoneshareimmediatelyobviouscharacteristicsthatwouldexplaintheirpositionsofhighimportance.PauwelynandAlschnergofurtherinmappingthePTAnetworkwhenweightedby“depth”andthenetworkof“double”PTAs,whereinmultiplePTAsmaycoverthesamedyadpairofcountries(PauwelynandAlschner2014).WhilethesepapersprovideavaluablefoundationindescribingtheformationandshapeoftheglobalPTANetwork,theydonotfullydeveloporexhaustexplanationsofwhysomeactorsaremorecentraltothePTAnetworkthanothers.Mangeretal’s(Manger,Pickupetal.2012)principalfindingisthathigh-incomeandtrade-dependentactorsaremorelikelytoformtiesinthePTAnetwork.YettheseexplanationsaloneappeartobeinsufficienttoexplaintheheterogeneityofprominencesuggestedinPauwelynandAlschner(2014)whoidentifyanumberofprominentactorswhodonotappeartomeetthesecriteria,whilesimultaneouslynotingthelowdegreeofprominenceofseveralactorsthatfittheprofileofhigh-incomeandtradedependentactors.Importantly,wethinktheperiodunderstudyinMangeretal(2012),1994-2004,providesincompleteinsightsforthedeterminantsofthecurrentglobalPTAnetwork.WhiletheprospectofcontinuedWTOnegotiationwasstillverymuchaliveduringtheperiodintheirstudy,ithasbecomeincreasinglymoribundsince.Assuch,wethinkitplausibletoassumethatmorerecentdriverofPTAnetworkformationand,inparticular,theformationofinter-regionalties,maybemotivatedbyadditionallogicstothoseconsideredbyMangeretal(2012).Thus,InthesubsequentsectionswefirstreplicatePauwelynandAlschner’s(PauwelynandAlschner2014)findingsbeforedevelopingatheoreticalunderstandingforprominenceinaglobalizedPTAnetwork.DescribingtheNetworkFigure1showsthepreferentialtradenetworkin1990and2014.Itisimmediatelyevidentthatthissystembecamesubstantiallydenserinarelativelyshortperiodoftime.In1990therewererelativelyfewPTAsandnearlytiesareorganizedaroundregionalassociationssuchastheEuropeanFreeTradeArea,whichjoinedIceland,Lichtenstein,Norway,andSwitzerland.Intheensuingyearsotherregionalassociationscameintoforce–e.g.,NAFTAandASEAN–whichledmanytoconcludethattheworldeconomywasbecomingincreasinglyregionalized.Butby2014

thePTAsystemhadbecomeincreasinglyglobalized:thedensityofthenetworkincreasedsubstantially,andallregionalclusterswerelinkedbyatleastonepathway.3

FIGURE1a:Thepreferentialtradeagreement(PTA)networkin1990,plottedbytheauthorsusingtheFruchterman-ReingoldalgorithmincludedintheigraphpackageinthestatisticalsoftwareR.AttheendoftheColdWarthePTAsystemwasdominatedbyhighlyregionalandmostPTAsinvolvedregionalassociationssuchastheEFTA,CARICOM,andMERCOSUR.Note:

3 Figure 1b understates the amount of “globalization” of trade rules, since WTO membership also increased significantly during this period.

organizationswithexternallinks(e.g.,EFTA)areincludedasnodeslinkedtobytheirconstituentmembers;organizationswithoutexternallinksarenotincludedasnodes.Source:WorldTradeOrganizationRegionalTradeAgreementsdatabase.

FIGURE1b:Thepreferentialtradeagreement(PTA)networkin2000,plottedbytheauthorsusingtheFruchterman-ReingoldalgorithmincludedintheigraphpackageinthestatisticalsoftwareR.Note:organizationswithexternallinks(e.g.,EFTA)areincludedasnodeslinkedtobytheirconstituentmembers;organizationswithoutexternallinksarenotincludedasnodes.Source:WorldTradeOrganizationRegionalTradeAgreementsdatabase

FIGURE1c:Thepreferentialtradeagreement(PTA)networkin2014,plottedbytheauthorsusingtheFruchterman-ReingoldalgorithmincludedintheigraphpackageinthestatisticalsoftwareR.Overtime,thePTAsystembecamemuchdenserandmuchlessregionalized.Note:organizationswithexternallinks(e.g.,EFTA)areincludedasnodeslinkedtobytheirconstituentmembers;organizationswithoutexternallinksarenotincludedasnodes.Source:WorldTradeOrganizationRegionalTradeAgreementsdatabase.ItremainsasystemwiththeEuropeanUnionandEuropeanFreeTradeAssociation(Iceland,Liechtenstein,Norway,andSweden),butsignificantclustersofintegrationexistinallregions,andtheUnitedStateshasbecomemuchmorecentralwithinthePTAstructureovertime.Asthenetworkdevelopedsomepreviouspatternswerereinforced,butsomecountriesthatwere

notamajorpartofthissystemin1990becamemuchmoreprominentby2014.Manyofthesearesmall,openeconomiesthatarehighlyinvolvedintrade;othersaredependentupontheexportofprimarycommoditiesforgrowth.Figure2portraysthenetworkinaslightlydifferentwaybyplottingcountries’prominenceasmeasuredbydegree(x-axis)andcloseness(y-axis)prominenceforthemostrecentperiod.DegreeprominenceissimplyacountofthenumberofcountriestowhichoneistiedviaaPTA(Freeman1979;WassermanandFaust1994).Closenessprominenceisameasureoftheaverage“distance”–theaverageoftheshortestpathsbetweenonetradingentityiandallothernodesjinthenetwork–andiscalculatedby𝐶!(𝑖) =[ 𝑑 𝑖, 𝑗!

!!! ]!!.Inotherwords,degreeprominencecapturesallofthedirectconnectionsanodehastotherestofthenetworkwhileclosenessprominenceisonewayofmeasuringthepositionofanodewithinthenetworkbyreferencetotheothernodes.Countriesthatareprominentintermsofclosenessare“inthemiddleofthings”eveniftheyarenot,themselves,strongly-tied.Ifacountryishighlyprominentonbothmeasuresthenwecansaythatitpossessesbothdirect(degree)andindirect(closeness)influenceonthenetwork.FromFigure2itclearthattherelationshipbetweenthedegreeandclosenessprominenceislooselylinearinthePTAnetwork:ascountriesgainmoretiestheyalsobecomeclosertoallothernodes.Asexpected,theEUandEFTAareclearlythemostprominent,butthenexttierofinfluentialnodesismorediverse:alongwithlargeOECDeconomiessuchastheU.S.andCanadaareChile,Egypt,Jordan,Morocco,India,Peru,SouthKorea,Turkey,andUkraine.Itisalsoimportanttonotewhichcountriesarenotparticularlyprominent,chiefamongthemChina.Chinahasthe12thmostPTAsinthenetwork,butitsclosenessscoreisnotremarkable:itis“inthemiddleofthings”toroughlythesameextentasBosniaandCostaRica.Someotherinterestingpatternsemerge.Forexample,theU.S.hasroughlydoubletheoverallconnectionsasMalaysiabutitsaverageclosenessisnohigher,suggestingthatmanyoftheU.S.’sPTAsarewithcountriesthatarerelativelyisolatedinthenetwork,(includingsmallregionalneighborssuchasCostaRica).ThisalsoprovidesacontextforwhytheU.S.wouldseektobecomemoreattachedtotwoofthemostprominentclustersinthenetwork–Europe(viatheTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership)andEastAsia(viatheTrans-PacificPartnership).Whilemostpolicydiscussionhasfocusedonthedirecteconomicgainsthatwillcomefromthesedeals,thereisasecondaryconsideration:theU.S.willmoveintoamuchmoreprominentpositionwithinthestructureofglobaltradeinstitutionsifTTIPandTPParecompletedsuccessfully.Thus,evenifthefirst-ordereconomicimpactofthesedealsisrelativelysmallassomeeconomistsexpect(Petri&Plummer2016;Razaetal.2016),thesecond-orderconsequence–theU.S.willmoveintoamoreinfluentialpositionwithinthe“regimecomplex”(Keohane&Victor2011)ofglobaltradeagreements–maybemuchmoreimportant.

FIGURE2:DegreexClosenessfor2014.Othermeasuresofnetworkprominencerevealdifferentpatterns.Figure3plotseigenvectorprominence(x-axis)againstcountries’betweennessscores(y-axis).Anode’seigenvectorprominencescoresisthesumoftheprominenceoftheothernodesoneisconnectedto,normalizedtovaryinbetweenzeroandone;thatis,ahigheigenvectorvalueindicatesthataunitisnotonlystronglytiedbutisstronglytiedtootherwell-tiedunits.Anodeithatprovidesapathwayconnectingotherwiseun-tiedjandkisprominentintermsofitsbetweennessscore,

calculatedas𝐶! 𝑖 = 𝑔!"(𝑖)/𝑔!"!!! .4Nodeswithhighbetweennessprominencecanbethoughtofasimportantbrokers,orgatekeepers.InthePTAnetwork,theEuropeanUnionisconnectedtoeveryotherimportantunitandprovidesmorepathwaystoothercountriesinthesystemthananyoneelse.TheEFTAremainsinfluentialbythesemeasuresaswell.Butfollowingthosearesomecountrieswhoseprominencecouldbemoresurprising:Chile’seigenvectorprominenceisquitehigh,whileIndiaandUkraineserveasimportantbrokersdespitebeingonlymoderatelywell-tiedtootherimportantnodes.Perhapssurprisingly,byallofthesemetricsotherthansimpledegreeprominenceIndiaisthemostinfluentialoftheso-calledBRICS(Brazil,Russia,India,China,SouthAfrica)economies.SeveralOECDeconomiesoutsideofthetraditionalG10corearealsoquiteimportantwithintheglobalPTAstructure,includingChile,Egypt,Mexico,SouthKorea,andTurkey.TheorizingProminenceinthePTANetworkThedescriptiveportraitaboveoffersaninterestingpuzzle–whyaresomeactorsmorecentraltotheglobalPTAnetworkthanothers?Whyaresomecountriesimportantaccordingtosomemeasuresbutnotothers?Somepositionsarenotsurprising,includingtheoverwhelmingdominanceoftheEUinthenetwork.Evolvingfromaninstitutionfocusedontradeliberalization,theinstitutionnowhasnearly30internalmembersandover40externalagreements.Asaliberal“soft-power”actor,theEUhasbeenapopularchoicetoreplacetheUSasthespearheadoftheinternationaltradesystem,despitethefactthatinternalsquabbleshavecausedobserverslikeElgstrom(Elgström2007)tobrandthegroupa“restrictedleader”.Indeed,theEU’sriseandfallwithintheWTOmayhavebothbeenmanagedpriortothenewmillenniumthroughitsoverplayingofthe“SingaporeIssues”(Young2011)andrecentandongoingfinancialcumpoliticalcrisishavepresumablyonlyfurtherunderminedthisleadershippotential.However,despitethesechallenges,thegrouphasdonewellatpositioningitselfasthemajoractorwithinthePTAnetwork,afeatunmatchedbyitseconomiccounterweightstotheWestorEast.Indeed,aconsciouseffortof“competitiveinterdependence”(Sbragia2010)or“competitiveliberalization”(Aggarwal2009)hasbeenattributedwithpromotingtheEU’sPTAefforts.

4 Where gjk is the number of geodesics connecting jk and gjk(i) is the number of geodesics that include i.

FIGURE3:sdfsdjfsdfjlksdfsdLog-transformedbetweennesscentralityfor2014,withcountriesinrankorder.However,apartfromtheEU,itissomewhatsurprisingthattheusualsuspectpowerhousesarenotasprominentintheglobalPTAnetworkastheireconomicdominancewouldsuggest.Therelativenon-prominenceoftheUS,inparticular,standsout.PerhapsthisseemingunimportanceisunsurprisingasmuchhasbeenmadeofthechallengesfacingtheglobaltraderegimesincetheadventoftheWTOin1994.Asearlyas1992,Preeg(Preeg1992)notedthattheUS-ledsystemwouldfacechallengesfromregionalagreementsandachanginggeo-political

landscape.Indeed,anincreasingdisconnectinthevisionsforthemultilateralorderhasrecentlybeencitedasalong-termforcedrivingdiscordinthemultilateralorder(MuzakaandBishop2015).NumerousauthorshaveattributedthisstagnationtodecliningUShegemonyandleadershipwhichareunabletosustainthemultilateraleffortinitiatedwiththeBrettonWoodsregime(GoldsteinandGowa2002,Ikenberry2003,Aggarwal2009),althoughothers,notablyKeohane(Keohane2012)arguethiscaseisoverstated.YetalthoughtheUShastakenawell-documentedbi-lateralandregionalturn(Bhagwati&Panagariya;Gathii2011),theydonotoccupythepositionofprominenceinthePTAnetwork.IftheUSisnotatthecenterofthePTAnetwork,andnotdrivingthemultilateralinitiative,thereislittleclarityastowhoorwhatreplacestheUSastheanchoroftheinternationaltradesystem,bothmateriallyandideationally(Ikenberry2011).Likewise,themajoremergingeconomiesarenotasuniformlyimportantasonemightsuspect.WhiletherehasbeenaflurryofspeculationthattheBASIC(Brazil,SouthAfrica,India,China)powerscouldtakethereinsoftheWTO(Narlikar2010),thereislittletosuggestthatthesestateshaveassumedthatmantle(Efstathopoulos2012),andthat,instead,theymightbeaddingtotheincreasedcontentionandgridlockoftheinstitution(HurrellandNarlikar2006,Wilkinson2015),albeittogreaterorlesserdegrees(Hopewell2015).Indiaand,toalesserextent,SouthAfrica,comeclosesttooccupyingpositionsinthePTAnetworkcommensuratewiththeireconomicandpoliticalimportance,buteventheyfallshortofbeingas“central”astheymightbe.Whilethereasonsforthiscomparativedisengagementnodoubtvarywiththeheterogeneityoftheseemergingstatesstates,eachfollowsdomesticandinternationaleconomicapproachesthatareatsomevariancewiththeexistingnormsofthetradeorder.Indeed,somegosofarastoclassifythesepowersas“illiberal”tradingstates(StephenandParízek).Insteadoftheseobviouscandidates,“second”oreven“third”economicandpoliticaltiercountriessuchasChile,Jordan,Egypt,TurkeyandtheUkrainepunchabovetheirweightintermsofnetworkprominence.Thispresentsthemostpuzzlingfindingofouranalysis.Whatcharacteristics,ifany,dothesecountriessharethatleadstotheirpositioningintheglobalPTAnetwork?Ourtheoreticalexplanationbuildsonthenotionintroducedby(FontaineandKliman2013)ofglobal“swingstates”,whose“mixedpoliticalorientationgivesthemgreaterimpactthantheirpopulationoreconomicimpactmightwarrant”(p.93).However,whereas(FontaineandKliman2013)usetheconcepttoidentifystateswithwhomtheUScanengagetoextendtheir(unipolar)globalorder,weinsteadtakethelogicinadirectiontotheorizeaboutstatesthatcanservetobridgethepolesinamulti-polarworld.Hereagain,the“mixed”orientationmatters.Whileperhapsnotasstarkasthethree“worlds”ofthecoldwar,thecomingglobalorderhasdistinctideationalpolesintermsofnormsandvalues.TheUS,EU,China,RussiaandtheirrespectivespheresofinfluencesinthecountriesofEurope,Africa,SouthAmerica,andtheMiddleEast,allhaveideationalvariantsoftheglobaleconomicorder(Nolke2011).Indeed,as(Hale,Heldetal.2013)argue,thismulti-polarityisoneofthedrivingfactorsbehindmultilateralgridlock.Asphysicalandideationalpolarityhasincreased,thestatesthatstraddlethesedivisionsshouldbecomekeytoanyglobalnetwork.Theambiguity,orcentrality,oftheseswing-statesallowsthemtoengagewiththedifferentiatedpoles,providinglinkageswhere

theymightnototherwiseexist.Thisturnsthesestatesintopowerfulactorsintheglobaltradenetwork–withoutsizedinfluenceduetonottheirmaterialcapacitybuttotheirgeo-economicandideationalpositioning.IntheorizingonthedeterminantsofprominenceintheglobalPTAnetworkweinvoketheprimarylogicoftrade-distance.Basedontheclassicalgravitymodel(Tinbergen1962),proximityasacausalmechanismhasdrivendecades’worthoftheoreticalandempiricaltraderesearch.Indeed,thisproximitylogicdrivestheexpectationsandfindingsofMangeretal.2012,whofindthatcountriesthatareneareachothereconomicallyorpoliticallyaremorelikelytoformtiesinthePTAnetwork.Thislogicwasusefulforthenetworkundertheirperiodofstudy,1994-2004,where,asshowninfigures1aand1b,mosttiesinthenetworkwereintra-regional,withfewlinkagesbetweentheclusters.However,asthenetworkbecomesglobalizedinfigure1c,thekeyactorsshifttothosethatprovidetheinter-regionallinkages.Usingaproximitylogic,theseactorsneedtobeproximatetobothregionswhicharebeinglinked.Whentheseregionsaregeographically,institutionallyeconomicallyorgeo-strategicallydisparate,thekeylinkagenodesarelikelytobethoseactorsthatfillthemiddlegroundalongoneormoreofthosedimensions.Thisiswhatwemeanbyambiguousactors,actorsthatbridgethegeographicboundaries,straddlelevelsofeconomicdevelopment,orspaninstitutionalorideationaldiversitybetweentwoormoredisparatenodes.Thus,ourfirsthypothesisfocusesondistance.H1:Distance:Actorsthatarenearerthemedianofgeographical,institutional,economicandgeo-strategicmeasureswillhavemorecentralityintheglobalizedPTAnetwork.Thishypothesishasseveralobservableimplicationsalongdifferentdimensions.Fromaneconomicgeographystandpoint,thegravitymodelhasconsistentlyinformedstudiesintotheformationofPTAs(Magee2003)andflowsoftrade(DisdierandHead2008),withWardetal.(2013)bringingNAtobearonthelatter.Basedonsimplelogicof“meltingiceberg”tradecoststhemodelpositsthatgeographicdistancewillbeinverselyrelatedtothevolumeorpresenceoftradeties.Thegravitylogichasmostoftenbeenemployedthroughtheexaminationofdyadiclinks,eitherthroughuseofasimpledistancemeasureoratrade-weightedmeasureofdistance.Thelatterisusefulwhenconsideringtheformationorexpansionoflinkagesbetweensystematicallyimportanttradeactors.WhileFagiolo(2010)usesatrade-weightedgravitylogicinanetworkanalysisoftradeflows,weareunawareofanyworkthathasusedatrade-weightedgravitylogictoinvestigateprominenceinthePTAnetwork.5Inparticularwewouldexpecttrade-weighteddistancetomatterparticularlyformeasuresofbetweennessandeigenvectorprominence.ActorsthataregeographicallycentraltothedensityofglobaltradeflowsarelikelytobehubsofPTAformation.Indeed,countrieslikeEgypt,TurkeyandtheUkrainearesituatedatthecrossroadsofcontinents.Theadvantagesoffavorablegeographictradearemostevidentinthecenturies-longimportanceofSouth-EastAsiastretchingfrom

5 While Manger et al. (2012) do include a measure of great-circle distance in their analysis of the PTA network formation they do not investigate the role of trade-weighted distance in explaining prominence.

earlyMalaysia(Jacq-Hergoualc'h2002)tomoderndaySingapore(Huff1997).Yetothercountriesthatserveasimportantinter-regionalorinter-continentalgeographicbridgesbetweenotherhubsofeconomicimportancemayalsobecentraltotheglobalPTAnetwork–linkingEasttoWest(Turkey,Ukraine),NorthtoSouth(Mexico)orboth(Israel).Hypothesis1a:Countrieswithlowertrade-weighteddistancesintheglobaltradenetworkwillhaveahigherdegreeofprominenceintheglobalizedPTAnetwork.However,thehubsatthecentreoftheglobalPTAnetworkdomorethanlinkgeographicallydisparateareasoftheglobe–theyalsomayservetobridgeculturallyorinstitutionallydiverseactors.WhilethereisstrongevidencethatdemocraciesaremorelikelytoformPTAs(Mansfield,Milneretal.2002),especiallywitheachother(Manger,Pickupetal.2012),andespeciallywhenthePTAis“deep”andthenumberofvetoplayersissmall(Mansfield,Milneretal.2008).Yet,therearenumeroussignificantnon-democraticactorsintheglobaltradesystem.Indeed,HanklaandKuthy(HanklaandKuthy2013)findthatinstitutionalized,party-basedandtemporallystable,authoritarianregimesoftenadoptopentradepolicies.However,despitethepresenceof“liberalautocracies”thereislittleevidencetosuggestthathighlydemocraticstatesformPTAswithhighlynon-democraticstates(Manger,Pickupetal.2012).GiventhislackofinteractionwewouldnotexpectdemocraticstatestobecentraltothePTAnetwork.Norwouldweexpectautocraciestofeatureprominentlyaskeyhubsinthesystem.Instead,weexpectthatpoliticallyambiguousactors–illiberal,semi,orquasi-democracies(Zakaria1997),“anocracies”(Gurr1974)or“hybridregimes”(Diamond2002)–tohavehighdegreesofbetweenessprominenceduetocompatibilitywitheitherdemocraticorauthoritarianalters.Indeed,Egypt,Jordan,TurkeyandtheUkraineallfulfillthePolityIVcriteriaof“closed”(inthecaseofEgyptandJordan)or“open”(forTurkeyandtheUkraine)anocracies.Democraticstatescanjustifyengagingwiththesestatesbasedonsupportinganemergingdemocracy,whilethequasi-democracieswillhavefewerqualmsengagingwithauthoritarianregimesastheyneedbelessresponsivetotheirowndomesticconstituencies.Hypothesis1b:ActorswithmoreambiguouspoliticalregimeswillhaveahigherdegreeofprominenceintheglobalizedPTAnetwork.Finally,thereisalongliteraturethatunderstandstheformationoftradeties(MansfieldandBronson1997;Powers2004).ThisliteraturehasrecentlybeenupdatedbyHaim(2016)whoconsiderstherelationshipbetweenalliancesandtradeflowsinthenetworkcontextofsharedalliancesandalliancecommunities.However,inaglobalizedPTAnetworkonceagainitisgoingtobetheactorsthatcrossgeo-strategiccommunitiesthatwilldisplayhighdegreesofcentrality.Actorsthathavehistoricallystraddleddifferentsecuritycommunities,likeEgypt,maybeabletoaccesstheeconomiccommunitiesofeachfaction(Barnett&Levy1991,Brownlee2012).Likewise,countries,likeMexicoortheUkraine,thatdoorhaverecentlypracticeddefactoordejureneutralitycanserveasbridgesbetweeneconomiccommunities(Friedman&Long2015,Yost2015).

Hypothesis1c:Actorswithambiguousgeo-strategictieswillhaveahigherdegreeofprominenceintheglobalizedPTAnetwork. OursecondhypothesisregardingtheformationoftheglobalizedPTAnetworkrestsonnetworkcharacteristicsanddynamics.WILLEXPLAINHERE.(oristhisjustcontrollingforendogeneityinthenetwork)?H2:Networkdynamics:“Memory”,Hierarchicaldegreedistribution,sharedpartnersdistributionEmpiricalStrategyMostexistingpoliticaleconomyscholarshiphasexaminedthesystemofPTAsatthelevelofthedyad,oftenusinglogisticregressionorsomeotherbinaryresponsemodel.WhilethisgenerationofworkhasledtonumerousknowledgegainstherearereasonstothinkthatanewapproachcouldmoveourunderstandingofPTAformationforward.6WebelievethatanalyzingthesystemofofPTAsasanetworkhastwokeybenefits:first,governmentsappeartoviewtheirownPTAportfoliosholistically,atleastinsomecases;second,analyzingdyadicdataasanetworkallowsustoconsiderwhetherdyadsinthesystemareindependentorwhether,say,theprobabilitythattheUnitedStatespursuesaPTAwithJapanisinpartrelatedtoJapan’sexistingPTAportfolio(andviceversa).ThesestructuralconsiderationsmaybeespeciallyimportantincaseswherethedirecteconomicgainsfromPTAsarenotenormousbutthecosttopoliticalleadersisnon-trivial,asituationthatappearstoexistinmanyadvancedeconomiesatpresent.Toexaminethesehypotheseswepresentwhatwebelievetobethefirstexaminationofthenetworkofpreferentialtradeagreementsusingtemporalexponentialrandomgraphmodels(TERGM).UnlikethelinearandlogisticregressionmodelsthatarecommonlyusedtomodelthePTAsystem,TERGMsarehighlyflexiblemodelsthatallowforthetestingofhypotheseswithouttheassumption–requiredofregressionmodels–thatobservationsareidentically-distributedandindependentfromoneanother(Cranmer&Desmaris2016).Givenaspecifiedmodel,whichcanincludeexogenouscovariates(monadicordyadic)aswellasparametersthatcaptureendogenousstructuralprocesses,TERGMsestimatetheprobabilityofobservingthenetworkthatwehaveobservedoverallofthepossiblenetworkswecouldhaveobserved.Theseparametersareunbiasedlyestimatedviamaximumpseudolikelihood(MPLE),andpotentialinconsistencyinstandarderrorsiscorrectedviaanon-parametricbootstrappingre-samplingalgorithmdevelopedbyDesmaraisandCranmer(2012).7Thismethodismostappropriateforanalyzingtheglobalsystemofpreferentialtradeagreements,astheseagreements,takentogether,constituteadynamicnetworkthathas

6 See CRANMER + DESMARAIS ISQ for a more general discussion of the limits of dyadic research design 7 All models were estimate using the xergm package in statistical software R. Post-estimation procedures used the texreg package. The bootstrapped errors were replicated 5,000 times.

developedovertime.Itisevenmoreimportanttoemployamethodcapableofincorporateendogenousnetworkdynamicsgivenourtheoryabove,inwhichnewPTAsareformedpartiallyaccordingtotheirdirectinstrumentalvaluerelativetothecostofadjustment,butalsopartiallyaccordingtotheirindirectbenefit:theabilityofcountrieswithstructuralprominencetopossessinfluenceoverthebroaderinstitutionalstructuresthatgoverntrade.ArguablythislatterfactorhasbecomeevenmorerelevantovertimeasprogressintheDoharoundofWTOnegotiationshasstalledandmuchofthe“low-hanging”fruithasbeencollectedinprevioustradedeals.Itisthismotivethatislikelytoprovokewhatwecalledthe“struggleforposition”withinthePTAnetwork.TERGMsallowforexaminationof“complex”processesthatmaycontributetonetworkformation.Inthispaperwefocusontwo:endogenousprocessesthatinfluencetieformationatthelevelofthenode,andthosethatinfluencetieformationatthelevelofthek-ad.Inparticularweareinterestedinanswertwoquestions.First,arenewtiesdistributedrelativelyrandomly,ordonodeswithhighstructuralprominenceexantereinforcetheirpositionsexpost?Second,isthelikelihoodthattiesformbetweenanytwonodesdistributedrelativelyrandomly,orarenewtiesmorelikelytoformexpostbetweennodesthathavecommonpartnersexante.TheanswerstothesequestionsmayhelpusunderstandwhytheincreaseddensityinthePTAnetworkhasnoterodedthepositionofsomekeyentities–suchastheEuropeanUnion–withinthatstructure.Itcanalsohelpusunderstandsomewaysinwhichhigh-betweennessnodesmightinfluencefuturetieformationamongitspartners.Werestrictouranalysistotheperiodfrom1990-2012(4?)asthebulkofthePTAnetworkhasformedsincetheendoftheColdWar.ThisneverthelessrepresentsasubstantiallylongertimeframethanwhatwasanalyzedintheonlyotherinferentialnetworkanalysisofthePTAsystemofwhichweareaware,asMangeretal(2012)usedSIENAmodelstoexaminethe1994-2004period.Theadditionofyears2005-2012(4?)representsasignificantincreaseinthenumberofPTAsinthenetwork,whichprovidesagoodopportunitytore-evaluatetheseearlierfindings.Thedependentvariable–theentirenetworkofPTAsinagivenyear–wastakenfromtheWorldTradeOrganization’sDatabaseonRegionalTradeAgreements,whichcontainsinformationonallreciprocalPTAsagreedbetweenWTOmembers.IVs:(basicallyinspiredbyprevlit,Mangeretal(2012),plussometheoryabove)GWterms:Rephrasethis:“termisanalogoustomoretraditionalk-starstatistics(HunterandHandcock2006),butaremoreparsimonious.79Ratherthanspecifyingamodelwhichincludesaseparateparameterfor2-star,3-star,4-star,etc.,theGWIDandGWODtermscapturesthegeneraleffect,geometricallyweightedbyadecayparameter.Assuch,thesetermsreflect“anti-preferentialattachment"mechanismsthatoperatewithinthenetwork.80Apositivecoe_cientindicatesthattheprobabilitythatanadditionaltiewillattractfuturetiesdecreasesgeometricallywithnodedegree.Aswecansee,bothGWIDandGWODarenegativeandstatisticallysigni_cantatallthresholds,whichprovidesstrongevidencethatpreferentialattachmentisdrivingpartofboththein-degreeandout-degreedistributionswithinthenetwork:countriesthatarestrongly-tiedtotherestofthenetworkaremorelikelytoattract

newconnectionsthanweakly-tiedcountriesevenafteraccountingforthestateoftherestofthenetwork.”ResultsTheresultsshowninfigure4providemixedsupportforourhypotheses.Fulfilledmostthoroughlyaretheexpectationsfromnetworktheoryregardingendogenousstructuralprocessesbeinganimportantfactorinthedevelopmentandpersistenceofnetworkofpreferentialtradeagreements,butseveraloftheproposeddyadiceffectsarealsopresent.InterpretationofestimatedcoefficientsonTERGMmodelsisnotasstraightforwardasthosefromregressionmodels.Thecoefficientsthemselvesrepresenttheconditionallogoddsoftieformationgiventherestofthenetwork.Therearetwotypesoftiesinthismodel:dyad-independentties,suchasthosecomparinghowthedifferenceinGDPpercapitabetweentwonodesimpactstieformation;anddyad-dependentties,suchasthosecapturingthedegreeandshared-partnersdistributions.Dyad-independentvariablesaveragestheimpactofavariabledyadsontheprobabilityoftieformationwithindyads,irrespectiveofalloftheotherdyadsinthenetwork.Dyad-dependentvariablescapturethedependenciesthatexistacrossdyads.Becausealloftheseareconditionalonrestofthenetworkthereisnosimpleanaloguetothekindsofpredictedprobabilitiesplotsthatarecommonlyfoundininterpretationsoflogisticregressionmodels.Micro-levelestimationispossible,butisbeyondthescopeofthisanalysis.Severaloftheestimatedcoefficientsassociatedwithdyad-independentvariablescontain95%confidenceintervalsthatdonotincludezero.DifferenceinGDPpercapitahasapositiveimpactontieformation,indicatingthatgreaterincomedisparitiesincreasetheprobabilityoftieformation.ThiscontradictsthefindingfromMangeretal(2012),perhapsbecauseagreaterproportionofPTAsenactedfrom2005-2012(and/orfrom1990-1993)werebetweenhigh-andlow-incomecountriesthanthoseenactedfrom1994-2004(theirsampleyears).Thereisnoimportantstatisticalrelationshipbetweenoveralleconomicsize,perhapsindicatingthatpossessionofdifferentcomparativeadvantagesaremoreimportantforPTAtieformationthansimpleeconomicmass.Thepositivecoefficientonlog-transformedtotaltradewithinadyadsuggeststhatpartnersengageinsubstantialtradeevenbeforeenteringintoaPTAarrangement.Variablescapturinginstitutional,geographic,andsecurityclosenesspresentasimilarlymixedpicture.Countriesthathavedissimilarlevelsofpoliticalfreedom,atleastascapturedbyFreedomHouse,aremorelikelytoformPTAs.Thismayalsocapturearecent-yearincreaseinPTAsamongNorth-Southdyads,andbetweendemocraciesandmixedregimessuchasSingapore.ThismodelsuggeststhatthePTAnetworkisnotbecomingincreasinglygeographicallyregionalized,however,asdistancebetweencapitalsisnotameaningfulpredictoroftieformation.Surprisingly,adefensepactbetweendyadsnegativelypredictstieformation,contrarytothefindingofMangeretal(2012)andourexpectation;onceagainthismayindicatethatthetypesofPTAsthatenteredintoforcesince2004arequalitativelydifferentfromthosecreatedintheimmediateaftermathoftheColdWar:asthesecurity

environmenthaschanged,theinstitutionalenvironmentgoverninginternationaleconomicexchangemayhaveevolvedwithit.Thedyad-dependentnetworktermshaveamajor–andmoreconsistent–impactontheprobabilityoftieformation.PreviousiterationsofthePTAnetworkstronglypredictfutureiterationsofthePTAnetwork,astheymust(sincePTAsalmostnevergooutofforce).Thistermfunctionssimilarlytoalaggeddependentvariableinregressionanalysesbutmaybeevenmorecriticalininferentialnetworkmodelsinwhichthedependentvariableisnotanindependentoutcomebutaninterdependentnetwork:justaspeopledonotchoosetheirfriendseverynewdaycountriesdonotchoosetheirpartnersforpreferentialtradeaccess.

FIGURE4:Resultsfromatemporalexponentialrandomgraphmodel(TERGM)ofthepreferentialtradeagreementnetworkfrom1990-2012estimatedusingthexergmpackageinthestatisticalsoftwareR.TheTERGMwasestimatedviamaximumpseudolikelihoodandstandarderrorswerecorrectedvia5,000iterationsofabootstrappingresamplingalgorithm.Theresultsstronglysuggestthatendogenousstructuralprocesseshaveapowerfulimpactonlinkformation.Somedyadicvariablesalsoinfluencelinkformation.Thegeometrically-weighted(GW)termsaresimilarlyimportantpredictorsoftieformation.ThetermcapturingtheGWdegreedistributionisnegativeandthe95%confidenceintervalisfarawayfromzero.Thisindicatesthatnewtiesarenotdistributedrandomly(takingintoconsiderationtheothercovariates),butasapartialfunctionofthepriordistributionofties:thenegativecoefficientindicatesthattheprobabilitythatanadditionaltiewillattractfuturetiesincreasesgeometricallywithnodedegree(Hunter2007).Thisprovidessomeindicationthatpreferentialattachmenteffectsexistwithinthisnetwork,allowingtie-wealthynodes(liketheEuropeanUnion)toattractnewtieswithmoreeasethanarandomly-selectednode.Thisshouldnotbesurprising;manyreal-worldnetworksdisplaypropertiessuchasthese,includingthosefoundinIPE,andmanyofthemost-prominentcountriesinthePTAnetworkarepresentlypursuingdeals.Indirectconnectionsconditiontheenvironmentwithinwhichstatespursuetradeagreements.Forexample,iftwostateshaveacommonPTApartnertheymaybemorelikelythanaveragetobecomepartnersthemselves.Similarly,iftwocountriesarelinkedtoeachthentheymayhavemanyotherlinksincommon,justasfriendstendtohavemanyfriendsincommon.TheGWESPandGWDSPtermscapturetheimpactofindirecttiesontheprobabilityoftieformationbetweentwonodes,andareamoreparsimoniousanaloguetothealternatingk-trianglesandalternating2-pathsstatistics,respectively.WhenestimatedtogetherinthesamemodelGWDSPrepresentstheeffectofhavingpartnersincommonwhentherearenodirecttiesbetweentwocountries,whileGWESPisolatestheeffectofsharedpartnersondyadsthataredirectlyconnected.Thegeometricallyweightededgewisesharedpartners(GWESP)statisticmeasureswhethertwoeconomiesthataretiedtogetherhavemoresharedpartnersthanwouldbeexpectedbychance.Forexample,iftheUnitedStatesandCanadaarelinkedtoeachother,GWESPcapturestheprobabilitythattheyarebothconnectedtotheUnitedKingdom,Australia,NewZealand,andsoon.Suchgroupingscouldoccuramongregionalpartners,forexample,oramongcommunitiesofnationswithsomeotheraffinity(suchascoloniallegacy,commonlanguage,orsharedculture).Thegeometricallyweighteddyadwisesharedpartners(GWDSP)statisticindicateswhethereconomiesthathavepartnersincommontendtoexistwithinthesamenetworkclusterirrespectiveofwhethertheythemselvesareconnected.Inotherwords,iftheUnitedStatesandCanadawerenotlinkedtoeachotherbutbothwereconnectedtotheUnitedKingdom,GWDSP

wouldestimatetheprobabilitythattheysharedotherpartnersaswell(e.g.,Australia,NewZealand,etc.).Bothofthesestatisticscontain95%confidenceintervalsthatexcludezero:GWDSPisnegativewhileGWESPispositive.Substantively,thismeansthattiedeconomieshavemoresharedpartnersthanarandomdistributionwouldsuggest,buteconomiesthatarenottiedhavefewer.Thissuggeststhatthereissubstantialclusteringinthenetwork,andobservationthatappearsreasonablegiventhegraphplottedinfigure1b.Themodel’sgoodness-of-fitdiagnosticreportshowninfigure5isveryencouraging.Despiteasomewhatcomplexnetworkstructure–indicatedbythemulti-peakeddegreedistribution–themodelpredictsthenetworkwell.Thereceiveroperatingcharacteristics(ROC)andprecision-recall(PR)curvesindicateexcellentmodelperformancerelativetoarandomgraphwiththesamedensityofties(i.e.agraphmodelcontainingonlyatermforedges,theanaloguetoaninterceptterminregression).Thecovariatesincludedinourmodelshowsubstantialimprovementinthepredictionofties;ourmodelperformsexcellentlybythiscriterion.Overall,theseresultspowerfullydemonstratethenecessityofusingamodelthatiscapableofcapturingpatternsofinterdependenceinthesystemofpreferentialtradeagreements.Non-networkmodels,ornetworkmodelsthatdonotincludestatisticscapturethepreviousstateofthenetwork,thedegreedistribution,andthesharedpartnersdistribution,areverylikelytobemisspecified.

FIGURE5:Goodness-of-fitdiagnosticsforthemodelreportedinfigure4,estimatedusingthe‘gof’functioninthexergmpackageinthestatisticalsoftwareR.Thediagnosticsshowverygoodmodelfit.SummaryandconclusionWehavepresentedthefirstanalysisoftheglobalpreferentialtradeagreement(PTA)networkusinganinferentialtemporalexponentialrandomgraphmodel(TERGM),andoursampleisthelargesteveranalyzedusinganyinferentialnetworkmodel.OurresultssuggestthatpreviousmodelsofPTAcreationmayhaveover-estimatedtheimportanceofsomemonadicanddyadicattributes,particularlycommoneconomicstatusandpoliticalinstitutions,whileunder-

estimatingtheimportanceofendogenousstructuralprocessesembeddedwithinthesystemofPTAs.Inparticular,therelationshipbetweenPTAformationandthedyadiclevelsofeconomicdevelopmentandliberalpoliticalregimes–well-establishedintheliteratureontradeinstitutions–isdifferentinaTERGMcontextthaninpriormodelsestimatedviaregression.TheyarealsodifferentfromthosereportedinMangeretal(2012)’sSIENAinferentialnetworkmodel.Ingeneral,thismodelsuggeststhatpoliticalandeconomicattributesareeitherlessimportantthanpreviousmodelshavesuggested.Whilethediagnosticreportsindicatethatthismodelfitsthedataquitewell,thisanalysisisnotconclusive.FutureworkshouldexaminetherelativeimportanceofothermonadicanddyadicattributesinthepredictionofPTAtieformation.Perhapsmoreimportantly,out-of-samplepredictionandmicro-levelestimationoftheprobabilityoftieformationcanhelpusunderstandthelikelihoodoffuturetiesthatcouldbeacriticalimportancetotheinternationalpoliticaleconomyoftrade.ReferencesAggarwal,V.(2009)."Reluctancetolead:UStradepolicyinflux."BusinessandPolitics11(3). Baldwin,R.andD.Jaimovich(2012)."Arefreetradeagreementscontagious?"JournalofInternationalEconomics88(1):1-16. Barnett,M.N.,&Levy,J.S.(1991).Domesticsourcesofalliancesandalignments:thecaseofEgypt,1962–73.InternationalOrganization,45(03),369-395.Bhagwati,J.(1995)."Preferentialtradeagreements:thewrongroad."Law&Pol'yInt'lBus.27:865.

Bhagwati,J.,&Panagariya,A.(1996).Thetheoryofpreferentialtradeagreements:historicalevolutionandcurrenttrends.TheAmericanEconomicReview,86(2),82-87. Bhagwati,J.N.,etal.(1999).Tradingblocs:Alternativeapproachestoanalyzingpreferentialtradeagreements,MitPress. Bliss,H.andB.Russett(1998)."Democratictradingpartners:theliberalconnection,1962–1989."thejournalofpolitics60(04):1126-1147. Brownlee,J.(2012).Democracyprevention:ThepoliticsoftheUS-Egyptianalliance.CambridgeUniversityPress.

Chen,M.X.andS.Joshi(2010)."Third-countryeffectsontheformationoffreetradeagreements."JournalofInternationalEconomics82(2):238-248. Cranmer, S. J., & Desmarais, B. A. (2016). A critique of dyadic design. International Studies Quarterly, sqw007.DeBenedictis,L.andL.Tajoli(2011)."Theworldtradenetwork."TheWorldEconomy34(8):1417-1454. Diamond,L.J.(2002)."Thinkingabouthybridregimes."Journalofdemocracy13(2):21-35. Disdier,A.-C.andK.Head(2008)."Thepuzzlingpersistenceofthedistanceeffectonbilateraltrade."TheReviewofEconomicsandstatistics90(1):37-48. Efstathopoulos,C.(2012)."LeadershipintheWTO:Brazil,IndiaandtheDohadevelopmentagenda."CambridgeReviewofInternationalAffairs25(2):269-293. Elgström,O.(2007)."TheEuropeanUnionasaleaderininternationalmultilateralnegotiations—aproblematicaspiration?"InternationalRelations21(4):445-458. Ethier,W.J.(1998)."Thenewregionalism."TheEconomicJournal108(449):1149-1161. Fagiolo,G.(2010)."Theinternational-tradenetwork:gravityequationsandtopologicalproperties."JournalofEconomicInteractionandCoordination5(1):1-25. Felbermayr,G.J.andB.Jung(2009)."Thepro-tradeeffectofthebraindrain:Sortingoutconfoundingfactors."EconomicsLetters104(2):72-75. Felbermayr,G.J.andF.Toubal(2010)."Culturalproximityandtrade."EuropeanEconomicReview54(2):279-293. Fontaine,R.andD.M.Kliman(2013)."Internationalorderandglobalswingstates."TheWashingtonQuarterly36(1):93-109. Frankel,J.,etal.(1995)."TradingblocsandtheAmericas:Thenatural,theunnatural,andthesuper-natural."Journalofdevelopmenteconomics47(1):61-95. Frankel,J.A.,etal.(1997).Regionaltradingblocsintheworldeconomicsystem,PetersonInstitute. Freund,C.(2000)."Multilateralismandtheendogenousformationofpreferentialtradeagreements."JournalofInternationalEconomics52(2):359-376.

Friedman,M.P.,&Long,T.(2015).SoftBalancingintheAmericas:LatinAmericanOppositiontoUSIntervention,1898–1936.InternationalSecurity,40(1),120-156.Furusawa,T.andH.Konishi(2007)."Freetradenetworks."JournalofInternationalEconomics72(2):310-335. Gao,H.andC.L.Lim(2008)."SavingtheWTOfromtheriskofirrelevance:theWTOdisputesettlementmechanismasa‘commongood’forRTAdisputes."JournalofInternationalEconomicLaw11(4):899-925.Gathii,J.T.(2011).NeoliberalTurninRegionalTradeAgreements,The.Wash.L.Rev.,86,421. Goldstein,J.andJ.Gowa(2002)."USnationalpowerandthepost-wartradingregime."WorldTradeReview1(02):153-170. Gurr,T.R.(1974)."Persistenceandchangeinpoliticalsystems,1800–1971."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview68(04):1482-1504. Haim,D.A.(2016).AlliancenetworksandtradeTheeffectofindirectpoliticalalliancesonbilateraltradeflows.JournalofPeaceResearch,53(3),472-490Hale,T.,etal.(2013)."Gridlock:FromSelf-reinforcingInterdependencetoSecond-orderCooperationProblems."GlobalPolicy4(3):223-235. Hankla,C.R.andD.Kuthy(2013)."EconomicLiberalisminIlliberalRegimes:AuthoritarianVariationandthePoliticalEconomyofTrade1."InternationalStudiesQuarterly57(3):492-504. Hartman,S.W.(2013)."TheWTO,theDohaRoundImpasse,PTAs,andFTAs/RTAs."TheInternationalTradeJournal27(5):411-430. Heydon,K.andS.Woolcock(2009).TheRiseofBilateralism:ComparingAmerican,EuropeanandAsianapproachestopreferentialtradeagreements,UnitedNationsUniversityPress. Hopewell,K.(2015)."Differentpathstopower:TheriseofBrazil,IndiaandChinaattheWorldTradeOrganization."ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy22(2):311-338. Huff,W.G.(1997).TheeconomicgrowthofSingapore:Tradeanddevelopmentinthetwentiethcentury,CambridgeUniversityPress. Hurrell,A.andA.Narlikar(2006)."ANewPoliticsofConfrontation?BrazilandIndiainMultilateralTradeNegotiations∗."GlobalSociety20(4):415-433.

Ikenberry,G.J.(2003)."IsAmericanmultilateralismindecline?"PerspectivesonPolitics1(03):533-550. Ikenberry,G.J.(2011)."Thefutureoftheliberalworldorder."Foreignaffairs90(3):56-68. Jacq-Hergoualc'h,M.(2002).TheMalayPeninsula:CrossroadsoftheMaritimeSilk-Road(100Bc-1300Ad),Brill. Keohane,R.O.(2012)."Hegemonyandafter:knownsandunknownsinthedebateoverdecline."ForeignAff.91:114. Krueger,A.O.(1999)."Arepreferentialtradingarrangementstrade-liberalizingorprotectionist?"TheJournalofEconomicPerspectives:105-124. Lake,J.(2016).FreeTradeAgreementsasdynamicfarsightednetworks.EconomicInquiry.AdvancedOnlinePublication.DOI:10.1111/ecin.12360Lamy,P.(2014)."Istrademultilateralismbeingthreatenedbyregionalism?"AdelphiPapers54(450):61-78. Leblang,D.(2010)."Familiaritybreedsinvestment:Diasporanetworksandinternationalinvestment."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview104(03):584-600. Lee,T.andB.-I.Bai(2013)."NetworkAnalysisofFreeTradeAgreements."TheKoreanJournalofInternationalStudies11(2):263-293. Magee,C.S.(2003)."Endogenouspreferentialtradeagreements:Anempiricalanalysis."ContributionsinEconomicAnalysis&Policy2(1). Manger,M.S.andM.A.Pickup(2016)."TheCoevolutionofTradeAgreementNetworksandDemocracy."JournalofConflictResolution:60(1):164-191.. Manger,M.S.,etal.(2012)."AHierarchyofPreferencesALongitudinalNetworkAnalysisApproachtoPTAFormation."JournalofConflictResolution56(5):853-878. Manger,M.S.andK.C.Shadlen(2014)."PoliticalTradeDependenceandNorth–SouthTradeAgreements."InternationalStudiesQuarterly58(1):79-91. Mansfield,E.D.,&Bronson,R.(1997).Alliances,preferentialtradingarrangements,andinternationaltrade.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,91(01),94-107.Mansfield,E.D.(1998)."Theproliferationofpreferentialtradingarrangements."JournalofConflictResolution42(5):523-543.

Mansfield,E.D.,etal.(2008)."Democracy,vetoplayersandthedepthofregionalintegration."TheWorldEconomy31(1):67-96. Mansfield,E.D.,etal.(2002)."Whydemocraciescooperatemore:Electoralcontrolandinternationaltradeagreements."Internationalorganization56(03):477-513. Mansfield,E.D.andE.Reinhardt(2003)."Multilateraldeterminantsofregionalism:TheeffectsofGATT/WTOontheformationofpreferentialtradingarrangements."Internationalorganization57(04):829-862. Marceau,G.andJ.Wyatt(2010)."Disputesettlementregimesintermingled:regionaltradeagreementsandtheWTO."JournalofInternationalDisputeSettlement1(1):67-95. Muzaka,V.andM.L.Bishop(2015)."Dohastalemate:Theendoftrademultilateralism?"ReviewofInternationalStudies41(02):383-406. Narlikar,A.(2010)."Newpowersintheclub:thechallengesofglobaltradegovernance."InternationalAffairs86(3):717-728. Nölke,A.(2011).Transnationaleconomicorderandnationaleconomicinstitutions:comparativecapitalismmeetsinternationalpoliticaleconomy.Pauwelyn,J.andW.Alschner(2014)."ForgetAbouttheWTO:TheNetworkofRelationsbetweenPreferentialTradeAgreements(PTAs)and'DoublePTAs'."AvailableatSSRN2391124. Petri,P.A.,&Plummer,M.G.(2016).TheEconomicEffectsoftheTrans-PacificPartnership:NewEstimates.PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomicsWorkingPaper,(16-2).Piccardi,C.,&Tajoli,L.(2015).ArePreferentialAgreementsSignificantfortheWorldTradeStructure?ANetworkCommunityAnalysis.Kyklos,68(2),220-239.Powers,K.(2004)."Regionaltradeagreementsasmilitaryalliances."InternationalInteractions30(4):373-395. Preeg,E.H.(1992)."TheUSleadershiproleinworldtrade:Past,present,andfuture."WashingtonQuarterly15(2):79-91. Raza,W.,Taylor,L.,Tröster,B.,&vonArnim,R.(2016).Modellingtheimpactsoftradeonemploymentanddevelopment:AstructuralistCGE-modelfortheanalysisofTTIPandothertradeagreements(No.57).WorkingPaper,AustrianFoundationforDevelopmentResearch(ÖFSE).Ravenhill,J.andY.Jiang(2009)."China'smovetopreferentialtrading:anewdirectioninChina'sdiplomacy."JournalofContemporaryChina18(58):27-46.

Sbragia,A.(2010)."TheEU,theUS,andtradepolicy:competitiveinterdependenceinthemanagementofglobalization."JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy17(3):368-382. Stephen,M.andM.Parízek"NewPressuresontheWTO:TheRiseofIlliberalTradingStates." Viner,J.(2014).Thecustomsunionissue,OxfordUniversityPress.Ward,M.D.,Ahlquist,J.S.,&Rozenas,A.(2013).Gravity’srainbow:Adynamiclatentspacemodelfortheworldtradenetwork.NetworkScience,1(01),95-118. Wilkinson,R.(2015)."ChangingpowerrelationsintheWTO–WhytheIndia–UStradeagreementshouldmakeusworrymore,ratherthanless,aboutglobaltradegovernance."Geoforum61:13-16. Yost,D.S.(2015).TheBudapestMemorandumandRussia'sinterventioninUkraine.InternationalAffairs,91(3),505-538.Young,A.R.(2011)."Therise(andfall?)oftheEU’sperformanceinthemultilateraltradingsystem."JournalofEuropeanIntegration33(6):715-729. Zakaria,F.(1997)."Theriseofilliberaldemocracy."Foreignaffairs:22-43. Zhou,M.(2010)."Multidimensionalityandgravityinglobaltrade,1950–2000."SocialForces88(4):1619-1643. Zhou,M.(2011)."Intensificationofgeo-culturalhomophilyinglobaltrade:Evidencefromthegravitymodel."SocialScienceResearch40(1):193-209.