1
‘OurAchilles’Heel’–InteragencyIntelligenceduringtheMalayan
Emergency.
AthesissubmittedforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy
RogerChristopherArditti
BrunelCentreforIntelligenceandSecurityStudies
September2015
‘OurAchilles’Heel’–InteragencyintelligenceduringtheMalayanEmergency.1
Abstract
TheMalayanEmergency isoftenconsideredthedefiningparadigmforasuccessful
counter-insurgency campaign. The effective collection and management of
intelligence by Special Branch dominates this paradigm. However, the intelligence
architectureduringEmergencywasmuchmorecomplicatedthanthesimpleSpecial
Branch-Army nexus upon which existing studies focus. Other components of the
intelligenceincludedtheMalayanSecurityService(MSS),SecurityIntelligenceFarEast
(SIFE),theJointIntelligenceCommittee/FarEast(JIC/FE),theRoyalAirForce(RAF),
theArmy,andthemainstreampolice.Eachcomponentadaptedtothechallengeof
insurgencyindifferentways–thecivilianelementsfaringfarworsethanthemilitary.
Britainstruggledtoadapttothepost-warintelligencechallengesintheFarEast.Key
intelligencecomponentsandcapabilitieswereconstitutedinhastewithoverlapping
andambiguousremits.Consequently,therewasbitterinfightingatanumberoflevels,
particularlybetweenthevariouscivilianintelligenceagencies.Incontrast,theArmy
andRAFdemonstratedaninstinctiveabilitytoworkina‘joint’environmentfromthe
verybeginningoftheEmergency.Inparticular,theRAFtookaleadingroleincreating
a joint theatre-level intelligenceapparatuswhich includedestablishmentofa Joint
OperationsRoominKualaLumpurandtheJointIntelligencePhotographicIntelligence
Committee / Far East. However, the military were unable to provide the
comprehensive human intelligence or strategic leadership necessary to make the
broaderapparatuseffective.Thiscouldonlycomeoncetheapparatusledbythecivil
agencies–chieflytheuniformedpoliceaswellasSpecialBranch–hadlearnttoadapt
tothedemandsofwagingacounter-insurgencycampaign.
Given that the British intelligence organisations had learnt to function in a joint
mannerduring the SecondWorldWar, it is remarkablehowmuchhadapparently
been forgotten in the three years preceding the outbreak of the Communist
1AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalaya,fromApril1950toNovember1951,bySirHaroldBriggs.
3
insurgency in Malaya and how long it took to create an effective method of
coordinatingintelligenceduringsubsequentEmergency.
Contents
Abstract
p.2
Abbreviations
P.5
DramatisPersonae
p.9
Timeline
p.16
Chapter1–Introduction
p.19
Chapter2-StatusQuoAnte:DefenceandSecurityIntelligenceintheEmpirec.1945-47
p.57
Chapter3-TheFailureoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)
p.89
Chapter4-TheFailureoftheSecurityService
p.117
Chapter5–TheDemiseoftheMalayanSecurityService
p.147
Chapter6–TheDevelopmentofaLocalIntelligenceApparatus
p.179
Chapter7–NetworkingIntelligence–CreatingaTheatre-LevelIntelligenceApparatus
p.210
Chapter8–TheReconstructionoftheCivilianIntelligenceApparatus
p.235
Chapter9–Conclusion:EvolutionoftheIntelligenceApparatusduringtheMalayanEmergency
p.261
Bibliography p.300
5
Abbreviations.
ACFE AirCommandFarEast
ACP AssistantCommissionerofPolice
AHQ AirHeadquarters
ALFSEA AlliedLandForcesSouthEastAsia
AOC AirOfficerCommanding
APS AxisPlanningStaff
APIU AirPhotographicInterpretationUnit
ASP AssistantSuperintendentofPolice
BDCC(FE) BritishDefenceCoordinationCommittee(FarEast)
BMA BritishMilitaryAdministration
CCP ChineseCommunistParty
CEP CapturedEnemyPersonnel
CICB Counter-IntelligenceCombinedBoard
CICI CombinedIntelligenceCentreIraq
CIS CentralIntelligenceStaff
CLC CivilLiaisonCorps
CoS ChiefsofStaff
CID CommitteeofImperialDefence
CID CriminalInvestigationDepartment
CIGS ChiefoftheBritishImperialGeneralStaff
CIU CentralInterpretationUnit
CO CommandingOfficer
CP CommissionerofPolice
CPA ChiefPoliticalAdvisor
CPM CommunistPartyofMalaya
CPO ChiefPoliceOffice
CSDIC CombinedServicesDetailedInterrogationCentre
CT CommunistTerrorist
6
DALCO Dalley’sCompany
DCM DistrictCommitteeMemberCPM
DMI DirectorofMilitaryIntelligence
DMO&I DirectorofMilitaryOperationsandIntelligence
DoI DirectorofIntelligence
DSO DefenceSecurityOfficer
DWEC DistrictWarExecutiveCommittee
EIS EconomicIntelligenceSection
EIS EmergencyInformationService
FARELF FarEastLandForces
FEAF FarEastAirForces
FECB FarEastCombinedIntelligenceBureau
FELF FarEastLandForces
FIC FederalIntelligenceCommittee
FMS FederatedMalayStates
FOES FutureOperationsEnemySection
FSS FieldSecurityService/Section
FWEC FederalWarExecutiveCommittee
GLU GeneralLabourUnion
GOC GeneralOfficerCommanding
GOSII(Int) GeneralStaffOfficerII(Intelligence)
HD(S)E HomeDefence(Security)Executive
HUMINT HumanIntelligence
INA IndianNationalArmy
ISLD Inter-ServiceLiaisonDepartment
ISIC InterserviceIntelligenceCommittee
ISTD InterserviceTopographicalDepartment
JAPIB JointAirPhotographicIntelligenceBoard
JAPIC JointAirPhotographicIntelligenceCentre
JIB JointIntelligenceBureau
JIC JointIntelligenceCommittee
JID JointIntelligenceDivision
7
JIO JointIntelligenceOrganisation
JIS JointIntelligenceStaff
JOC JointOperationsRoom
JPS JointPlanningStaff
KMT Kuomintang
LDC LocalDefenceCommittee
LIC LocalIntelligenceCommittee
LSO LocalSecurityOfficer
MCA MalayanChineseAffairs
MCP MalayanCommunistParty
MEF MiddleEastForce
MEIC MiddleEastIntelligenceCentre
MELF MiddleEastLandForces
MI5 SecurityService
MI6 SecurityIntelligenceService(SIS)
MIO MilitaryIntelligenceOfficer
MDU MalayanDemocraticUnion
MNLA MalayanNationalLiberationArmy
MNP MalayNationalistParty
MPABA MalayanPeople’sAnti-BritishArmy
MPAJA MalayanPeople’sAnti-JapaneseArmy
MRLA MalayanRacesLiberationArmy
MSS MalayanSecurityService
NDYL NewDemocraticYouthLeague
OC OverseasControl
OCPD Officer-in-ChargePoliceDistrict
OPSUM OperationalSummary
OSPC OfficerSuperintendingPoliceCircle
OSS OfficeofStrategicServices
OWI OfficeofWarInformation
Photinit PhotographicIntelligence
PIAW PoliticalIntelligenceArabWorld
8
PIJ PoliticalIntelligenceJournal
PMFTU Pan-MalayanFederationofTradeUnions
PRC People’sRepublicofChina
PRO PublicRecordsOffice
PWE PoliticalWarfareExecutive
PWS PsychologicalWarfareSection
RAF RoyalAirForce
RAAF RoyalAustralianAirForce
RN RoyalNavy
SAS SpecialAirService
SB SpecialBranch
SAC SupremeAlliedCommander
SACSEA SupremeAlliedCommanderSouthEastAsia
SC SpecialConstable
SEAC SoutheastAsiaCommand
SEIO StateEmergencyInformationOfficer
SEP SurrenderedEnemyPersonnel
SFTU SingaporeFederationofTradeUnions
SIFE SecurityIntelligenceFarEast
SIME SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast
SIS SecurityIntelligenceService
SLO SecurityLiaisonOfficer
SOE SpecialOperationsExecutive
SOVF SpecialOperationsVolunteerForce
SRC SituationReportCentre
SWEC State/SettlementWarExecutiveCommittee
DramatisPersonae
Boucher,GeneralSirCharles(1898-1951)
Bornin1898andeducatedatWellingtonCollege.HewasappointedtotheIndiaArmy
in 1916, attached to the 2nd King Edwards VII’s OwnGurkha Rifles, and served in
Palestine and the North West Frontier. During the Second World War, Boucher
commanded the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade in North Africa and the 17th Indian
Infantry Brigade in Italy. He was appointed General Officer Commanding Malaya
District.In1948Heretiredin1951,dyingshortlyafter.
Bourne,GeneralGeoffrey(1902-1982)
CommissionedintheRoyalArtilleryin1923.BourneservedasamemberoftheJoint
Planning Staff between 1939-41. He was posted to the Joint Staff Mission in
Washingtonin1942.Hethencommandedthe152ndFieldRegimentinItalyandwasa
memberoftheGeneralStaffAirborneCorpsfightinginBelgium.Afteranumberof
staff appointments, Bourne was appointed General Officer Commanding Malaya
between1954-56.HeretiredfromtheArmyin1960.
Bower,GeneralSirRoger(1903-1990)
EducatedatSandhurst,BowerwascommissionedintotheKingsOwnYorkshireLight
Infantryin1923.HeservedinIndiaandHongKongintheinter-waryears.Duringthe
SecondWorldWarBowertookpartinOperationMarketGarden.Afterthewar,he
servedinPalestineandGermany.BowerservedasGeneralOfficerCommandingand
DirectorofOperations forMalayabetween1956-58.He retired fromthe Army in
1960.
Briggs,GeneralSirHaroldRawdon(1894-1952)
Born in Pipestone, Minnesota, USA in 1894. Briggs attended Sunburst and was
subsequentlyattachedtothe4thBnKingsRegiment,fightinginFrancein1915.Inthe
followingyearhetransferredtothe31stPunjabRegimentoftheIndianArmy,seeing
action inMesopotamiaandPalestine. Inthe inter-warperiodhesawactiononthe
10
North-WestFrontier.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,BriggssawactioninEritrea,North
AfricaandBurma, including thebattle forKohima. InApril1946hewasappointed
General Officer Commanding, Burma before retiring from the Army when Burma
obtained independence in 1948. He subsequently served in a civilian capacity as
DirectorofOperationsinMalayabetween1950-52.HediedinLimassolon27October
1952.
ChinPeng(1924-2013)
BorninSitiawan,Perak,Malaya.In1937hejoinedtheChineseAntiEnemyBackingUp
Societyandbyearly1939haddiscoveredCommunism.Wasanactivememberofthe
MalayanPeoplesAnti-JapaneseArmyduringtheSecondWorldWarandworkedwith
Force136.FollowingthedepartureofLoiTakin1947,ChinPengbecameSecretary
GeneraloftheMalayanCommunistParty(MCP).AftertheEmergency,hetookrefuge
inthejunglesofThailand,remaininginexileuntiltheMCPformallylaiddownitsarms
in1989.
Dalley,Lt.Col.John(datesunknown)
WasapoliceofficerintheFederatedMalayStatesPoliceForce.Followingtheinvasion
ofMalayabytheJapanese,DalleycreatedaguerrillanetworkcalledDalforce,which
numberedsome4,000fighters.Dalforcewasdisbandedin1942,followingtheBritish
surrender.Dalleywassubsequentlycapturedandspenttherestofthewaracaptive
oftheJapanese.Afterliberation,DalleyreturnedtoMalayaandwasappointedHead
oftheMalayanSecurityService(MSS).However,theMSSwasdisbandedin1948and
DalleyplayednofurtherpartintheMalayanEmergency.
Gent,Sir(Gerard)EdwardJames(1895-1948)
BorninKingston,Surrey.EnlistedwiththeDukeofCornwall’sLightInfantryinAugust
1914andservedinFlandersandItaly,winningtheMCandDSO.Gentthenentered
ColonialOfficeasanassistantprincipal.Hespentmuchofthe1930sintheFarEastern
departmentandwasitsheadfrom1939-42.In1945hewasappointedasGovernorof
theMalayaUnion,declaringastateofemergencyinJune1948.ShortlyafterGentwas
recalled to London for talks. The aircraft in which he was returning crashed with
11
anotheronapproachtoNortholtairporton4thJuly1948,killingGentandallother
passengersandcrew.
Gray,Col.Nicol(1908-1988)
WaseducatedatTrinityCollege,Glenalmondandqualifiedasacharteredsurveyorin
1939.Joined2ndBattalionoftheRoyalMarineBrigadeandservedinNorthAfricaand
the Middle East. Landed in Normandy on D-Day, as second-in-command of 45
Commando.FoughtthroughFranceandLowCountriestoGermany.Between1946-8
hewasInspector-GeneralofPalestinePolice.In1948hewasappointedCommissioner
theFederationofMalayaPoliceService.HeretiredandreturnedtoBritainin1952.
Gurney,SirHenryLovellGoldsworthy(1998-1951)
BorninBude,Cornwallin1898.HewascommissionedintheKing’sRoyalRifleCorps
in1917andwaswoundedshortlybeforetheendofFirstWorldWar.Afterattending
Oxford,GurneyjoinedtheColonialOffice,spendingmuchtimeinEastAfricainthe
1930sandearly1940s,beforebeing transferred toGoldCoast in1944asColonial
Secretary. In 1946 he transferred to Palestine, as Chief Secretary. In 1948 hewas
postedtothenewlycreatedFederationofMalaya,toreplaceSirEdwardGentasHigh
Commissioner.On6thOctober1951,whentravellingfromKualaLumpurtoFraser’s
Hill,heambushedandmurderedbyCommunistinsurgents.
Hayter,SirWilliamGoodenough(1906-1995)
Bornon1August1906inOxford,wherehewassubsequentlyeducated.In1930he
joined the Diplomatic Service and was posted to the League of Nations, Vienna,
Moscow,andShanghai.HewaspostedtoWashingtonasfirstsecretaryinDecember
1940.HereturnedtoLondon inMay1944,andwaspromotedtoAssistantUnder-
Secretary of State in February 1948. He was chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee between 1948-9. Hayter was then posted to Paris and served as
ambassador to Moscow between 1953-57. After his posting to Moscow, Hayter
acceptedthewardenshipofNewCollege,Oxford.HediedinOxfordshirein1995.
Jenkin,SirWilliam(datesunknown)
12
JenkinservedintheIndianPoliceSpecialBranchandtheIndianIntelligenceBureau
beforebeingappointedasAdvisoroftheSpecialBranch/CIDoftheMalayanPolice
inJune1950.ShortlyafterhewasappointedasMalaya’sfirstDirectorofIntelligence,
aposthehelduntilOctober1951.
Liddell,Guy(1892-1958)
BorninVictoriaon8November1892.JoinedtheRoyalHorseArtilleryduringtheFirst
WorldWarandwonaMC. JoinedSpecialBranch in1919. InOctober1931,Liddell
joinedtheSecurityServiceandwasappointedDeputyDirectorofCounter-Espionage.
HewaspromotedtoDirectorofBDivisioninJune1940.AfterthewarhecameDeputy
DirectorGeneral,workingtoSirPercySillitoe.Hewastarnishedbythedefectionof
hisfriendGuyBurgessandretiredfromtheSecurityServicein1953.
Lyttelton,SirOliver(ViscountChandos)(1893-1972)
Lyttelton was born on 15March 1893. He was educated at Eton and Cambridge,
leavinguniversityearlytoservewiththeGrenadierGuardsinFrancebetween1915
and1918.LytteltonhadasuccessfulcareerwiththeBritishMetalCorporationinthe
interwar years. In 1942 he replaced Beaverbrook as Minister of Production in
Churchill’swarcabinet.AftertheSecondWorldWar,Lytteltonreturnedtocommerce
but retained a parliamentary seat. Upon the formation of Churchill’s post-war
government,hewasinvitedtobecomeSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,aposthe
helduntil1954,whenhewaselevatedtotheHouseofLordsasViscountChandos.
Lytteltondiedin1972.
MacDonald,MalcolmJohn(1901-1981)
Born at Lossiemouth, Scotland, on 17 August 1901. In 1931 he was appointed
Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Dominion Office. Between 1935-40 he held
variouscabinetoffices,includingSecretaryofStatefortheColoniesandSecretaryof
State for theDominionAffairs.He served inChurchill’s government asMinisterof
Healthand then in1941hewasappointedHighCommissioner toCanada. In1946
MacDonaldwasappointedGovernorGeneral, FarEastAsia,atpostwhichbecame
knownastheCommissionerGeneral,FarEastAsiain1948.In1955hewasappointed
13
High Commissioner to India. In 1963 he became Britain’s last Governor and
Commander-in-ChiefinKenya.MacDonalddiedin1981.
MacGillivray,SirDonaldCharles(1906-1966)
Born in Edinburgh on 22 September 1906. He attended Oxford University before
entering the Colonial Service in 1928. His first postingwas as a District Officer in
Tanganyika.In1938hewenttoPalestine,servingasPrivateSecretarytoSirHarold
Macmillan, a District Officer, and Under-Secretary to the Palestine government.
Between1947and1952hewasColonialSecretaryinJamaica.In1952MacGillivray
wassenttoMalaya,servingasdeputyHighCommissionertoTempler.Hesucceeded
Templerin1954,andwastheFederation’slastHighCommissioner.Heretiredfrom
theColonialServicewhenMalayagainedindependencein1957.
Morton,Jack
Prior to his appointment as Director of Intelligence in 1952,Mortonwas a senior
officerinTheSecurityService,runningSecurityIntelligenceFarEast.
Mountbatten,Louis,firstEarlofMountbattenofBurma(1900-1979)
Born at FrogmoreHouse,Windsor on 25 June 1900. Educated at The RoyalNaval
Colleges,OsborneandDartmouth,MountbattenwasappointedmidshipmaninJuly
1916.TheinterwaryearswerespentbuildinghisNavalcareer.InJune1939hetook
commandofthedestroyer,Kelly.In1942,ChurchillappointedMountbattenasChief
ofCommandStaff, duringwhich timeheoversaw theDieppeoperationofAugust
1942. InAugust 1943hewas appointed SupremeCommander, SouthEastAsia. In
September1945hereceivedtheformalsurrenderoftheJapaneseatSingapore. In
December1946hewas invitedtobecomeIndia’s lastviceroy.After independence,
MountbattenreturnedtoNavy,becomingFirstSeaLordinOctober1954andChiefof
theDefenceStaffinJuly1959.MountbattenretiredfromtheNavyin1965.Hewas
murderedbytheIRAwhilstfishingoffthecoastofCountySligo,Eire.
Petrie,SirDavid(1879-1961)
14
Born on 9 September 1879 at Inveravon, Banffshire. Petrie studied at Aberdeen
UniversitybeforeenteringtheIndianPoliceServicein1900.HeservedintheNorth
WestFrontierandCriminalIntelligenceDepartment.Heinvestigatedthebombattack
ontheviceroy,LordHardinge,inDelhiinDecember1912andwaswoundedinagun
battle with Sikh revolutionaries in 1914. Petrie was instrumental in creating the
governmentofIndia’soverseasintelligencenetwork.HeretiredfromIndiain1936.
On the outbreak of the Second World War, Petrie was commissioned into the
Intelligence Corps and in November 1940 was recalled to London and asked to
becomeDirectorGeneralofMI5.Petrieretiredin1946.
Ritchie,GeneralSirNeilMethuen(1897-1983)
BorninEssequibo,BritishGuianaon29July1897.RitchieattendedSandhurstandin
1914 was commissioned into the Black Watch, and saw service in France and
MesopotamiaduringtheFirstWorldWar. In1938hetookcommandofthe1stBn
King’sOwnRoyalRegimentandservedinPalestine.In1939hewasappointedtothe
GeneralStaffof2ndCorps,commandedbyAlanBrooke.In1941Ritchiewassentto
NorthAfrica,takingcommandoftheEighthArmyuntildismissedbyAuchinleckthe
following year. He subsequently commanded 12th Corps through the campaign in
North West Europe. In 1947 he was promoted to General and took the post of
Commander-in-ChiefFarEastLandForces.Hisfinalpostwasin1950toheadofthe
BritishArmystaffinthejointservicemissiontotheUSA.HeretiredtoCanadain1951.
Scrivener,SirPatrick(1897-1966)
Bornin1897,Scrivenerbecameacareerdiplomat.Between1941-47hewasHeadof
EgyptianDepartmentoftheForeignOffice.SubsequentlyappointedMinistertoSyria
in1947.ServedasDeputyCommissioner-General,South-EastAsiabetween1948-9
andchairedtheJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast).Alsoservedasambassadorto
Switzerlandbetween1950-53.
Sillitoe,SirPercyJoseph(188-1962)
BorninTulseHill,Londonon22May1888.In1908hebecameatrooperintheBritish
SouthAfricapolice.HetransferredtotheNorthernRhodesiapolicein1911.Hetook
15
partinthecampaigninGermanEastAfricaandwasapoliticalofficerinTanganyika
from1916-22. HereturnedtotheUKandbecameChiefConstableofChesterfield,
EastRiding,andSheffieldsuccessively.In1931hewasappointedChiefConstableof
Glasgow, a post he held for twelve years. In 1943 Sillitoe was appointed Chief
ConstableofKent.HewasappointedDirectorGeneralofMI5inMay1946.Heretired
fromMI5in1953.
Templer,GeneralSirGerald(1898-1979)
BorninColchester,Essexon11Sept1898.CommissionedintotheRoyalIrishFusiliers
andsawserviceinFranceduringtheFirstWorldWar.Templersubsequentlyservedin
Persia, Iraq,Egypt,andPalestine. In1938,asabrevetLieutenantColonel,Templer
becameaGO2inintelligence.HesawactiveserviceinFrancein1940andItalyin1943
wherehewaswounded.In1945TemplerwasappointedDirectorofCivilAffairsand
Military Government in Germany. In March 1946 he was appointed Director of
MilitaryIntelligence(DMI)andthenin1948asViceChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff
(VCIGS).HeservedinMalayaasHighCommissionerbetween1952-4.AfterMalaya,
TemplerbecameChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff(CIGS)andwasappointedField
Marshalin1956.TemplerretiredfromtheArmyin1958.
Young,SirArthurEdwin(1907-1979)
Bornon15February1907inEastleigh,Hampshire.YoungjoinedPortsmouthpolicein
1923andby1938hewas theChiefConstableof LeamingtonSpa. In1941hewas
appointed as Senior Assistant Chief Constable for Birmingham; in 1943 he was
selectedtoestablishatrainingschoolforpoliceofficerswhowouldmaintainlawand
orderinliberatedaxisterritories;tenweekslaterhewasDirectorofPublicSafetyin
thealliedgovernmentinItaly.Afterthewar,YoungwaspostedasChiefConstableof
Hertfordshire;AssistantCommissioneroftheMetropolitanPolice;andCommissioner
oftheCityofLondonPolice.HewasappointedasCommissioneroftheFederationof
Malaya police service between 1952-4. He subsequently left Malaya to be
Commissionerof theKenyapoliceservice in1954.Hethenreturnedto theCityof
LondonpolicebutwenttoIrelandin1969toimplementtheHuntReport.Youngdied
on20January1979.
16
Timeline
January1945 The Intelligence Machine, A report by Denis Capel-Dunn
released.
July1945 ClementAttleebecamePrimeMinister.
September1945 StartoftheBritishMilitaryAdministration(BMA)inMalaya.
March1946 GovernorSirEdwardGentarrivedinMalaya.
April1946 StartoftheMalayanUnion.
MalcolmMacDonaldappointedGovernorGeneral.
SirFranklinGimsonappointedGovernorofSingapore.
CreationoftheBritishDefenceCoordinatingCommittee/Far
East(BDCC/FE).
Col.JohnDalleyappointedheadofthereconstitutedMalayan
SecurityService(MSS).
C. Dixon appointed head of the newly constituted Security
IntelligenceFarEast(SIFE).
Sir Percy Sillitoe appointed Director General of the Security
Service(MI5).
June1946 FieldMarshallSirBernardMontgomeryappointedChiefofthe
ImperialGeneralStaff(CIGS).
October1946 Arthur Creech Jones appointed Secretary of State for the
Colonies.
November1946 MalcolmJohnstonreplacedDixonasHeadofSIFE.
1947 CreationoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee/FarEast(JIC/FE).
April1947 General Sir Neil Ritchie appointed Commander-in-Chief, Far
EastLandForces(FELF).
November1947 ReviewofIntelligenceOrganisations,1947,bySirACMDouglas
Evillreleased.
January1948 StartoftheFederationofMalaya.
February1948 William Hayter appointed chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee(London)(JIC(London)).
17
June1948 StateofEmergencyinLondondeclared.
MrLangworthy,CommissionerofPoliceinMalayaresigns.
General Ashton Wade, General Officer Commanding (GOC)
Malayaretires.
GeneralCharlesBoucherappointedGOCMalaya.
July1948 SirEdwardGentdiesinaircraftcrash.
August1948 ColW(Nicol)GrayarrivesinMalayaasCommissionerofPolice.
AlecKellarreplacedJohnston(diedinservice)asH/SIFE.
October1948 ColonialOfficejoinstheJIC(London).
SirHenryGurneyinstalledasHighCommissioner.
PatrickScrivener,chairmanoftheJIC(FE)visitsLondon.
November1948 FieldMarshallSirWilliamSlimappointedChiefoftheImperial
GeneralStaff(CIGS).
May1949 JackMortonreplacesKellarasH/SIFE.
July1949 GeneralSirJohnHardingappointedC-in-C.FarEastLandForces
(FELF).
1950 Patrick Reilly replacesWilliam Hayter as chairman of the JIC
(London).
February1950 Jim Griffiths appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies,
replacingArthurCreechJones.
March1950 Sir Harold Briggs is appointed as Director of Operations in
Malaya.
GeneralBoucherinvalidedhome.
GeneralRoyUrquhartappointedGOCMalaya.
June1950 SirWilliamJenkinarrivesinMalayaasintelligenceadvisor.
November1950 JenkinappointedDirectorofIntelligence.
September1951 Jenkinretires.
October1951 SirHenryGurneyismurderedbyCommunistinsurgents.
SirWinstonChurchillbecamePrimeMinister.
OliverLytteltonreplacesJimGriffithsasSecretaryofStatefor
theColonies.
18
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) issues the October
Directives.
November1951 Briggsretires,tobereplacedbyGeneralSirRobertLockhartas
appointedDirectorofOperations.
FieldMarshallSirJohnHardingappointedCIGS.
c.January1952 SirArthurYoungisappointedCommissionerofPolice,replacing
NicolGray.
January1952 GeneralSirGeraldTemplerisappointedHighCommissioner.
May1952 CourtneyYoungreplacedMortonasH/SIFE.
June1952 GeneralHughStockwellreplacesUrquhartasGOCMalaya.
November1952 SirFranklinGimsonretires.
1953 Sir John Sinclair replaces Sir StewartMenzies as Chief of the
SecurityService.
May1954 Sir DonaldMacGillivray succeeds Sir Gerald Templer as High
Commissioner.
General SirGeoffreyBournebecomesDirector ofOperations
andGOCMalaya.
July1954 Alan Lennox-Boyd appointed Secretary of State for the
Colonies.
July1955 ElectionsinMalayaheld.
TunkuAbdulRahmanappointedChiefMinister.
August1955 R.ThistlewaitereplacesYoungasH/SIFE.
December1955 BalingPeaceTalks.
1956 General Sir Roger Bower replaces Bourne as Director of
Operations.
August1957 Malayagrantedindependence.
July1960 StateofEmergencyinMalayarescinded.
December1989 A treaty is signed between the Communists, Thailand and
Malaya
19
Chapter1-Introduction
TheMalayanEmergencywas a strugglebetween two competing visions for the futureof
Malaya: the British aspiration for a managed transition to self-government and the
Communist’sdesiretocreateaneworderintheirownimage.ThestateofEmergencywas
declared in June 1948, following a rise of Communist-inspired violence against Malaya’s
economicallyvitalrubberandtinmines,whichtheMalayanauthoritiesbelievedwasthestart
ofanarmedinsurrection.TheBritishgovernment,theMalayanauthorities,theMalayrulers,
and various Commonwealth allies conducted the Emergency against the Communist
insurgent forces, which were drawn largely, but not exclusively, from Malaya’s Chinese
community.Manyoftheinsurgents,includingitsleaderChinPeng,wereformermembersof
Force136(theFarEastdivisionofBritain’sSpecialOperationalExecutive)andonlythreeyears
beforethedeclarationofEmergencyhadbeenfightingaguerrillawaragainsttheJapanese
alongsidetheirBritishallies.1
TheEmergencywasahighlyviolentaffair:1868securityforcepersonnel,2473civiliansand
6697 insurgentswerekilledbetween1948and1960.2 Attheheightofthecampaign,the
Malayangovernmenthadtwenty-threebattalionsoftroops,fiftythousandpoliceofficersand
six squadrons of strike or bomber aircraft pitched against some three and half thousand
insurgents.3 Yet, by its nature, theEmergencywasnot awar. Themilitarywere acting in
supportofthecivilianauthoritiesandthepoliceremainedtheleadagencyresponsiblefor
the restorationof internal security.Although the armedwingof theMalayanCommunist
Party(MCP)woreuniformsandwereorganisedalongmilitarylines,theirsupplywing(the
MinYuen)andsupporterswithintheChinesesquattercommunityandtownsdidnot.The
EmergencywasthusastrugglenotnecessarilyforterritorybuttheallegianceofMalayan’s
population.Ataminimum,theMCPneededtheactivesupportofonlyasmallproportionof
Malaya’scommunitiesandtheacquiescenceofthemajoritytounderminethegovernment.
Conversely,thegovernmentneededtocollectandassessasufficientamountofinformation,
1SeeC.BaylyandT.Harper,ForgottenWars–theendofBritain’sAsianEmpire(2008),p.31;A.Hoe&E.Morris,Re-entertheSAS(1994),p.14;B.Grob-Fitzgibbon,ImperialEndgame–Britain’sDirtyWarsandtheEndofEmpire(2011),p.105.SeealsoChinPeng,AliasChinPeng–MySideofHistory(Singapore2003).2A.Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya(London,1975),Appendix,pp.507-8.3WO208/5356,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1956bytheDirectorofOperations,Malaya;M.Postgate,OperationFiredog:AirSupportintheMalayanEmergency1948-1960(London1992),AnnexL–AirForcesOrderofBattle–SquadronsAvailable1948-60.
20
from aerial photographs or captured documents but, ideally, from informers, to identify,
arrestorkilltheinsurgents.IntelligencewasthuscentraltotheprosecutionoftheEmergency.
Theconventionalwisdom,aspositedbyLeonComberandAnthonyShort,isthatintelligence
during the Emergency revolved around the Special Branch of the Federation ofMalaya’s
police service.4 The prologue to the establishment the Special Branch in 1948 was the
abolitionoftheMalayanSecurityService(MSS)duetoitsfailuretoforecastthestartofthe
Communistinsurgency.Fromthisdifficultstart,itisheldthattheSpecialBranchgrewrapidly
into a model intelligence agency, and subsequently provided the basis for key post-war
counter-insurgencytheories.5Bytheearly1950sSpecialBranchwasabletomapmostofthe
Communist forces rangedagainst it.Under theauspicesof theBriggsPlan, it successfully
targeted theMinYuen, theCommunist supplynetwork,which forced theMCP to change
strategydramatically.Later,from1952,SpecialBranchswitcheditsattentiontotargetingkey
MCPleaders.Ateachstageitworkedinclosecooperationwiththemilitary,viaacommittee
structure implemented by General Sir Harold Briggs, the Federation’s first Director of
Operations. Prevailing understanding suggests the military played an important but
secondary role in relation to intelligence, predominantly relating to the exploitation of
intelligence provided by Special Branch, rather than collection or analysis. Thanks to the
effortsofSpecialBranch,supposedlythebackoftheinsurgencywasbrokenby1952.
However,themannerinwhichtheauthoritiescollected,assessedandorganisedintelligence
during the Emergency was broader, more complex and divided than the conventional
understandingwould suggest. For instance, the first key premise uponwhich all existing
accountsarebuiltisthatdeclarationofEmergencyreflectedthefailureoftheMSStoforecast
theCommunistinsurgency.However,theMSSdidprovideclearstrategicwarningofboththe
intention and capability of theMCP to threatenMalaya’s internal security. In fact, itwas
abolishednotbecauseofanintelligencefailurebutduetotheinteragency‘turf’warthatwas
4L.Comber,“TheMalayanSecurityService(1945-48)”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,18:3(2003),pp.128-153;Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60–TheRoleoftheSpecialBranchintheMalayanEmergency(2008);G.Sinclair,“‘TheSharpEndoftheIntelligenceMachine’:theriseoftheMalayanPoliceSpecialBranch1948-1955”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,26:4(2011),pp.465-67.5R.Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency–ExperiencefromMalayaandVietnam(1966);F.Kitson,BunchofFive(1977);Kitson,LowIntensityOperations–Subversion,InsurgencyandPeacekeeping(1971);T.Mockaitis,BritishCounterinsurgency,1919-60(London1990).
21
beingwagedbetweenCol.JohnDalley,headoftheMSS,andSirPercySillitoe,theDirector
GeneraloftheSecurityService(MI5).SpecialBranchdidplayacriticalroleintheEmergency
butitsimpacthasbeenoverstated.Indeed,itsfortunesweretiedtothewiderpoliceforce,
which,until1952,followedaparamilitarystrategyentirelyincompatiblewiththegeneration
ofintelligence.AlthoughthisstrategychangedunderGeneralSirGeraldTempler,thelegacy
remained.Indeed,thecivilianagenciesthatwereconcernedwithintelligenceinMalaya–the
police,theSecurityService,andtheJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)(JIC(FE))-were
rivenbyinterandintra-organisationalstrifeforlongandcriticalperiodsoftheEmergency.
Hence, as late as 1955, theArmy’s ownanalysis attributed the relative lackof success in
huntingdowntheinsurgentforcesinthejungletothelimitedoperationalhumanintelligence
beingprovidedbySpecialBranch.Thatsaid,themilitaryhadafarmoreprominentroleinthe
intelligencecampaigninMalayathanpreviouslythought,notleastthroughthephotographic
intelligence provided by the Royal Air Force (RAF), which was directed by the Joint Air
PhotographicIntelligenceCentre/FarEast(JAPIC/FE),andtheassessmentsprovidedbythe
JointOperationsCentre.Indeed,theRAFandtheArmyshowedfromtheverybeginningof
theEmergencyaninstinctiveabilitytoworktogether,forinstance,formingoperationsrooms
farearlierinthecampaignthanpreviousthought.
This amounts to a significant shift in the existing understanding of how the Malayan
authorities collected, assessed, used and organised intelligence during the Emergency.
SpecialBranchwasbutonecomponentinawiderintelligencemachinewhichhadsignificant
internalfrictionsandstruggledtogaintractionfardeeperintotheEmergencythanpreviously
thought.Thisraisessomeintriguingquestions.WhereasothershaveaskedwhatroleSpecial
BranchplayedintheEmergency,themoreteasingquestionsarewhatroledidSpecialBranch
play within the broader intelligence apparatus and how did the authoritiesmanage that
apparatustomeetthedemandsofcounter-insurgency?Moreover,whywastheperformance
ofthatapparatussopolarisedbetweentheciviliancomponentswhichoftendescendedinto
bitter organisational in-fighting and the military elements which were able to work,
apparentlyseamlessly,inajointmanner?Whathappenedtocausethecivilianauthoritiesto
loseinthreeshortyearsthelegacyofeffectiveinteragencycooperationduringtheSecond
WorldWar?How,ifatall,didtheMalayangovernmentrecoverthesituation?
22
ThemythofintelligenceduringtheMalayanEmergency
PerhapsbecausetheMalayanauthoritieswerethefirsttoresistsuccessfullyaMaoistinspired
insurgency,thatitwasatruly‘all-of-government’effort,orthatintheBritishvictoryappears
pyrrhic because they had to accelerate significantly their plans for decolonisation, the
Emergencyhasattractedarichhistoriography.Thus,theEmergencyhasbeenviewedthrough
thelensesprovidedbyimperialhistorians,militaryhistorians,Malayannationalists,ColdWar
historians,counter-insurgencytheorists,anddecolonisationspecialists,includingnewasub-
setofrevisionistswhofocusontheuseofforce.However,asurveyofthismaterialshows
thatwhileintelligenceisacommonthemenoauthorhasprovidedadetailedandconsidered
assessmentofhowintelligencewascollected,assessed,usedororganised.Norhasanyone
definedorexploredfullythescopeoftheMalayanintelligenceapparatusorhowthevarious
agenciesevolvedandinteractedundertheintensepressureoftheCommunistinsurgency.
DespitethediverserangeofcommentatorsdrawntotheEmergency,mostaccountsbegin
withanacceptancethattheMalayanauthoritiesfailedtoforecasttheCommunistinsurgency
and, as a consequence, the Malayan Security Service was abolished shortly after the
declarationof Emergency.However, only LeonComber and, to a lesser degree,Georgina
Sinclair,haveprovideddetailedanalysisoftheactionsoftheMalayanSecurityServiceinthis
failure.6Bothauthorsprovideabriefintroductiontothepre-waroriginsoftheMSSandsome
of its operational difficulties. Comber discusses the events that led to the declaration of
EmergencyandarguesthattheMSSwasdisbandedbecauseofthe“dissatisfactionwiththe
performanceofMSSasthegovernment’smainintelligenceagencyanditsperceivedfailure
towarntheMalayangovernment ingoodtimeof theCPM’suprising.”7Comberand later
SinclairalsoechoSirPercySillitoe’sargumentthattheMSSwas“set-upunsound.”8However,
theirassessmentssufferfromsomesignificantomissions.Neitherconsiderstheprocessthat
led to re-constitution of theMSS in its post-war iteration; the organisational relationship
betweentheMSSandSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE),theSecurityService’sregionalhub,
isoverlooked;theroleofSillitoeintheabolitionofMSSisnotfullyexploredandthefactthat
6Comber,“TheMalayanSecurityService(1945-48)”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,18:3(2003),pp.128-153.7Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.43.8CO537/2647SillitoetoLloyd,17December1947.
23
theMSSwasprovidingclearstrategicwarningofthethreatposedbytheMCPisignored.A
reviewoftheevidencewillshowthattheMSSwasdisbandednotduetoanyperceivedfailure
butbecauseofanunequalinter-organisationalrivalrywiththeSecurityService.Thistherefore
challenges a fundamental premisewhich underpins the existing orthodoxy of intelligence
duringtheEmergency.
LeonComber’sMSSarticleprovidesthebasisoftheopeningchapterinhismonographonthe
historyoftheMalayanSpecialBranch.9Thisisfairlyconsideredtobeanimportantaddition
tothehistoriographyof theEmergency,not leastbecauseheprovides“themostdetailed
accountofhowSpecialBranchwasorganised,trained,operated,andinformedthecounter-
insurgency effort.”10 Indeed, as the only study dedicated to this dominant aspect of
intelligenceintheEmergency,Comberhaseffectively‘corneredthemarket.’Unfortunately,
however,therearesomelimitations.AnthonyStockwellsuggeststhatComberhasdanced
rather lightly across the issue of the use of violence to obtain intelligence.11 Kumar
Ramakrishnahasnotedsome“slightlyembarrassinggaffes”suchasstatingthatDatoAbdul
RazakwasMalayanprimeministerin1959.12Furthermore,Combermistakenlysuggeststhat
thesecretaryoftheJointIntelligenceCommitteehadtherightofdirectaccesstothePrime
Minister.13
However, there are some more significant methodological problems associated with
Malaya’s Secret Police. Perhaps understandably, given that Comberwas a Special Branch
officerduringtheEmergency,hepresentsafundamentallywhiggishassessmentofhowhis
formerorganisationmetthechallengesoftheinsurgency,inwhichclaimsofsuccessverge
onhyperbole.Forinstance,hesuggeststhatduetotheeffectivenessofSpecialBranch“itwas
possibletoeschewthe‘rifleandbayonet’approach–relyingontheuseofforcealonetofight
theCommunistterroristsandcontrolthelocalpopulation–anddefertotheSpecialBranch’s
9Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945.10R.Taylor,ReviewofMalaya’sSecretPolice1945-60:TheRoleofSpecialBranchintheMalayanEmergencybyLeonComber,AsianStudiesReview,35:1,p.117.11A.Stockwell,ReviewofMalaya’sSecretPolice1945-60:TheRoleofSpecialBranchintheMalayanEmergencybyLeonComber,AsianAffairs,40:3(2009),pp.478-9.12A.Stockwell,ReviewofMalaya’sSecretPolice1945-60:TheRoleofSpecialBranchintheMalayanEmergencybyLeonComber,AsianAffairs,40:3(2009),pp.478-9.13Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice,p.32.
24
moresubtlemethodsoffightingthewarbytheuseofhumanintelligence,whichrequired
time and patience, and empathising with the local population.”14 A reassessment of the
evidencewillshowthatsuchstatementsare,atbest,myopic.
Moreover, Comber’s thesis fails to locate Special Branch within the wider intelligence
apparatusengagedinthecounter-insurgencyeffort.Hence,thereisonlypassingmentionof
SIFE and the JIC (FE), and the manner in which Colonial Office gained a place on the
metropolitan JIC ismisrepresented.15Without providing the context inwhich the Special
Branch operated, Comber provides a sterile account of its organisational development, a
model suggesting operational autonomy rather than integration. This indicates that the
relationshipbetweenSpecialBranchandthewiderpoliceservicewaseithernon-existentor
unimportant. In reality, Special Branch was highly dependent upon the wider policing
organisationtoidentifypotentialsourcesofinformation.Afailuretoacknowledgethiscritical
dynamiccompromisesComber’sassessmentofSpecialBranchsignificantly.
GiventhemutualdependencybetweenSpecialBranchanditsuniformedcolleagues,thereis
surprisinglylittlewrittenaboutpolicingintheEmergency.Thekeyworkremainsachapter
written by Anthony Stockwell for David Anderson and David Killingray’s Policing and
Decolonisation.Stockwellarguesthat“duringtheMalayanEmergencythepoliceforcewas
largelyMalaywhilethepoliceproblemwasfundamentallyChinese.”16Hetracestheinitial
responseofthepolicetotheCommunistviolenceanditssubsequentlurchtowardsapara-
militarystyleunderCommissionerLt.Col.WilliamNicolGray.Hethendiscussestheswitch
backto‘normal’policeunderCol.SirArthurYoungwhoarrivedinMalaya,withareforming
agenda, twoweeks after SirGerald Templer in 1952. Finally Stockwell considers how the
Malayanpolicepreparedfordecolonisation. This importantworkprovidesausefulbroad
sweepofpolicingduringtheEmergencyandiscomplementedbySinclair’sstudyofcolonial
14Ibid.,pp.282-3.15R.Cormac,ConfrontingtheColonies–BritishIntelligenceandCounterinsurgency(London2013),p.29;R.Cormac,“AWhitehall‘Showdown’?:ColonialOffice–JointIntelligenceCommitteeRelationsintheMid-1950s”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,39:2(June2011),pp.249-267.16A.Stockwell,“PolicingduringtheMalayanEmergency,1948-60:communism,communalism,anddecolonisation”,inD.Anderson&D.Killingrayeds.,PolicingandDecolonisation:politics,nationalismandthepolice(Manchester1992),p.110.
25
policinginthepost-warera.17Nevertheless,policing,particularlyinrelationtointelligence,is
an understudied aspect of the historiography of the emergency. Many issues remain
unconsidered, suchas theuseof violence, the relativemeritsof consensual and coercive
policinginanintelligencecontext,theawarenessofpoliceofficersofintelligence–asboth
‘users’and‘producers’,theuseofhome-guardsandmilitias,andthechallengesofinterand
intra-communalpolicing.
The most comprehensive history of the Emergency is Anthony Short’s The Communist
Insurrection in Malaya.18 It was written at the behest of the Malayan government who
afforded Short full access to its archives but subsequentlywithdrew support for political
reasons.Short’saccountbeginswitheventsleadinguptothedeclarationofEmergencyand
theproblems thataffected thegovernment’sability to restore lawandorder in theearly
phasesof the campaign. Itportrays theEmergencyasa struggle foreffectivegovernance
wagedbetweentheMalayanauthoritiesandtheMCP.OneofShort’skeyargumentscentres
upontheimportanceofthemurderofSirHenryGurney,whichoccurredatatimewhenthe
government’scampaignwasstalling,andthesubsequentarrivalofSirGeraldTempler,who
energisedtheEmergencyeffort.ContemporaryreviewsindicatetheimpactofShort’swork.
For instance, Richard Clutterbuck suggests “it is undoubtedly the most comprehensive
accountthatwilleverbewrittenofaconflictofconsiderablesignificance.”19SimilarlyRichard
StubbsarguesthatShortprovides“ameticulouslydetailedyetlucidexpositionoftheBritish
colonialadministrationanditssecuritypoliciesduringtheperiodoftheEmergency.”20
TheCommunistInsurrectionisahistoryoftheEmergencyanddoesnotpurporttofocusin
uponintelligence.Inevitably,however,thetopicarisesduringthegeneralnarrative.Shortis
highlycriticaloftheMSSwhichhesuggestswasasmuch“clairvoyantorganisation”asan
17G.Sinclair,Attheendoftheline–Colonialpolicingandtheimperialendgame,1945-80.(Manchester2006),p.4.SeealsoSinclair,“‘TheSharpEndoftheIntelligenceMachine’:theriseoftheMalayanPoliceSpecialBranch1948-1955”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity26:4(2011),pp.460-477;S.Hurst,“ColonelGrayandthearmouredcars:TheMalayanpolice1948-1952”,MonashAsiaInstitute,WorkingPaper119,2003.18Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya.19R.Clutterbuck,“ReviewofTheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60”,ModernAsianStudies,11:1(1977),pp.149-152.20R.Stubbs,Reviewof“TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60”,PacificAffairs,49:4(Winter1976-77),pp.742-744.
26
intelligenceservice.21HeisparticularlydisparagingaboutthetheleadershipofLtColJohn
Dalley(H/MSS),whohesuggestswasfixatedonthethreatposedbyMalayandIndonesian
nationalismandwhoproducedverboseandambiguousintelligencereports.Despiteaccess
totheMalaysiangovernment’srecords,nomentionismadeofSIFE,JIC(FE)ortheBritish
Defence Coordination Committee (Far East) (BDCC (FE)). Short also offers only brief
assessmentsofthetwoDirectorsofIntelligenceandthemilitary’suseofintelligence.
Despite its undoubted excellence, questions have been raised about the perspective of
Short’s account. For instance, Roger Kershaw notes that it was largely a tale of British
achievement.22 Richard Stubbs posits that Short’s reliance on official sources may have
encouragedanarrownessofscopethat ledto‘fleeting’referencesto“considerationsthat
onemight reasonablyexpect in suchhistory.”Perhaps,however, thebiggest criticofThe
CommunistInsurrectionisKarlHackwhotakesissueswithtwokeyissues.First,hesuggests
that the “British narrative Short spins misreads Gurney’s policy, ignores the extremely
complexinterplayoftensionandcooperation(whichcontinuedunderTempler),andmisses
thewayAsiannationalism,BritishpolicyandtheEmergencywereinteracting.”Second,he
disputesthe‘stalematetheory’andTempler’s‘transmogrifying’abilities.23
However,RichardStubbshassupportedShort’sinterpretationofevents.InHeartsandMinds
inGuerrillaWarfare:TheMalayanEmergency,1948-60,Stubbssetsouttoplacetheshooting
warin“thebroadercontextofthesocial,political,andeconomicaspectsoflifeinMalaya.”24
AssuchheproposesthattwodistinctpolicieswereusedtotackletheCommunistforces.The
firstwasoneof‘coercionandenforcement’.Thiswasusedtomaintaingovernmentandallow
thesecurityforcestore-group.Thesecondwasoneof‘heartsandminds’.Thisreflected“the
socioeconomicnatureoftheconflictandtheconsequentlinkbetweentheguerrillasanda
sympathetic population.”25 These two phases are aligned with the administrations of Sir
21Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,pp.82–3.22R.Kershaw,ReviewofTheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya1948-1960byAnthonyShort,InternationalAffairs(RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs1944-),52:2(April1976),p.309.23K.Hack,“BritishandCommunistCrisesinMalaya:AResponsetoAnthonyShort”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,31:2(September2000),pp.392-395.SeealsoaletterfromAnthonyShortinthesamejournalpp.390-1.24R.Stubbs,HeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare:TheMalayanEmergency1948-60(Singapore1989),p.vii.25C.Lockard,“ReviewofHeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare:TheMalayanEmergency1948-60byRichardStubbs”,JournalofAsianStudies,49:3(August1990),pp.709-711.
27
HenryGurneyandSirGeraldTempler,respectively,althoughStubbsnuanceshisargument
bysuggestingthattheeconomicimpactoftheKoreanWarbegantotakeeffectin1951which
laidthefoundationforthesubsequent‘heartsandminds’strategy.26
TheargumentarticulatedbyStubbsisnotwithoutitsdetractors.Forinstance,bothGordon
MeansandCheahBoonKhenghavearguedthatStubbshasmisunderstoodthesocio-political
aspects of the hearts and minds phase. In particular, the former, who was conducting
researchwithinaNewVillageduringtheEmergency,arguesthatthe“nobookonthewarhas
beenableadequatelytoreplicatethecomplextangleofpersonalresponsemechanismsand
emotionaltraumaofthosecaughtinthemidstofaguerrillastruggle.”27Thelattersuggests
that the“majorpreoccupation in thisbook iswith the ‘heartsandmindsapproach in the
counter-insurgencymeasures adopted by the British government against the Communist
insurgents;apreoccupation thatat timesseemsratherexcessivebecause the ‘heartsand
mindsapproachwasnottheend-allorbe-alloftheEmergency.”Indeed,CheahBoonKheng
arguesthatrepressivemeasureswerestillusedbytheMalayanauthoritiesduringthe‘hearts
andminds’phaseoftheEmergency,andthusthatitmightbemoreappropriatetocallthis
the‘carrotandstick’approach.28Furthermore,perhapsunderstandably,intelligenceisnotat
theforefrontofStubbs’analysis.Stubbsprovidesusefulmaterialinrelationtointelligence-
gatheringopportunitiesaffordedbyresettlement,butHeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare
takes amuch broader sweep at understanding the Emergency. Nevertheless, it is a vital
adjunct to The Communist Insurrection in the historiography of the Emergency; together
ShortandStubbsprovidethebedrockofwhathasbecomeknownasthe‘stalemate’theory,
emphasisingthestaticnatureofthecampaignunderGurneyanditstransformationunder
Templer.
In 1999 Karl Hack released a series of articles that reassessed the ‘stalemate’ theory. Of
particularrelevanceishisdiscussionofintelligence.LikeComberandShort,Hackhighlights
thefailuresoftheMSSanditsSpecialBranchsuccessortogenerateintelligenceusefulforthe
26Stubbs,HeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare,p.vii.27G.Means,“ReviewofHeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare:TheMalayanEmergency1948-60byRichardStubbs”,CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience,23:4(December1990),pp.813-14.28CheahBoonKheng,“ReviewofHeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare:TheMalayanEmergency1948-60byRichardStubbs”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,22:2(September1991),pp.428.
28
Armyduringthe1948-49phase(whatHackcallsthe‘counter-terror’phase).Healsoexplores
theappointmentofSirWilliamJenkinasintelligenceadvisorinMay1950andrightlynotes
that Special Branch was beset with the operational difficulties, such as lack of Chinese
speakersinthepoliceandthestrainsthataffectedthecoreexecutiveinthisperiod.29While
acknowledging organisational improvements under Templer, Hack suggests “the
effectivenessofintelligenceatanyonetimecannotbegaugedbyitsorganisationalcondition
alone.” Instead,he suggests that the transformationof intelligenceduring theEmergency
occurred incrementally and concludes, “the insurgencywas successfully underminedby a
British campaign and intelligence apparatus working well below peak efficiency, and still
sufferingseriousleadershipproblems.”30
Hackuseshisassessmentofintelligencetoreflectuponwiderissuesofcausationandtiming.
He argues that theMCP’s ‘October 1951’ Directives prove that coercion and population
controlhadforcedtheMCPintoscalingdowntheirinsurgencypriortothearrivalofSirGerald
Templerin1952.31HesupportsthisviewbyarguingthattheMalayangovernment’scounter-
insurgency campaign “succeeded in ‘screwing down’ Communist supporters, rathermore
thanwooing‘heartsandminds.’”Thiswaspossiblebecauseoftheethnic,socialandpolitical
structure of post-war Malaya allowed the large-scale deportation and relocation of the
Chinese squatter community. As result, the pivotal point in the Emergency, according to
Hack’sthesis,wasnotthearrivalofTempler in1952but“theswitchfrompoorlydirected
counter-terrorandcoercionin1948-49,totightlyorganisedpopulationcontrolfrom1950.”
Herejects“thetraditionalviewthattheleadershipandpolicychangesofoneBritishgeneral
(Templer) were both necessary and sufficient to transform the campaign.” Instead, “the
criticalconditions[forcounter-insurgencysuccess]hadexistedbeforeTemplerand‘hearts
andminds’,andthatinthemostimportantpolicestherewas,andwasalwayslikelytobe,
continuitynotchangearound1952.”32
29K.Hack,“BritishIntelligenceandCounter-InsurgencyintheEraofDecolonisation:TheExampleofMalaya”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(Summer1999),pp.124-155.30Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4,pp.211-241.31Ibid,pp.124-155.32K.Hack,“‘IronClawsonMalaya’:TheHistoriographyoftheMalayaEmergency”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,30:1(March1999),pp.99-101.A.Short,“LetterfromShort”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,31:2(September2000)andK.Hack,“BritishandCommunistCrisesinMalaya:AResponsetoAnthonyShort”,31:2
29
Hack’swork formsan importantelementof thehistoriographyof theEmergencyandhas
been supported by a number of other commentators.33 Despite its initial allure, Hack’s
argumentwanesunderscrutinyinrelationtohisconsiderationof intelligence. Inthefirst
instance,thereisafundamentalflawinhisthesisinrelationtocauseandeffect.Hisprimary
argumentisthatpopulationcontrolledtoincreasedintelligence,andHackseekstousethe
publicationof theOctober1951Directivesandthesubsequentdecline in terrorist related
incidents,securityforceandciviliancasualties,andanincreaseofterroristsurrendersin1952,
asproofofeffect.However,thereareanumberofdifficultieswiththis,notleastthefactthat
twenty-two battalions of troops and heavy bombers still engaged in active counter-
insurgencydutiesintheyearafterTemplerleftMalaya.Moreover,whydidtheauthorities
repeatedly report to London between 1954-7 that the Emergency had either reached a
stalemateorthattheinsurgentscontinuedtoposeasignificantthreattothegovernmentof
Malaya?34 Indeed, if resettlement so greatly changed the battle space in favour of the
Malayan authorities,why did active counter-insurgency operations continued for at least
anothersixyearsandtheEmergencylastafurtherthreeyearsafterthat?
However,perhapsthekeyflawinthevariousiterationsofHack’sthesisisthatitneverdefines
its useof the term ‘intelligence’. The concepthasmanydifferent connotations: themost
obviousreferringto‘information’,‘process’,‘organisation’,or‘an-endproduct.’Thereisan
assumptionwithintheHackthesisthatintelligencewasproducedbycoercionandpopulation
control – it was thus ‘information.’ Hack largely ignores any other interpretation of
intelligence.Thereisanimplicitassumptionthattheintelligenceorganisationcouldgather
thisinformationandprocessitviaassessment,analysisanddisseminationintoanintelligence
(September2000).ForafurtherrestatementoftheHackthesis,seeHack,‘TheMalayanEmergencyasCounter-InsurgencyParadigm’,TheJournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.383-414;K.Hack,‘Everyonelivedinfear:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency’,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),pp.671-699.33H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3,pp.415-444;D.Mackay,TheDominothatStood–TheMalayanEmergency1948-60(London1997);R.Popplewell“LackingIntelligence:SomereflectionsonrecentapproachestoBritishcounter-insurgency,1900-1960,”IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,10:2(April1995),pp.336-52.34Forinstance,seeWO2083219,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,“ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1954”;WO216/885,BournetoHarding,3June1955;WO208/5356,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,“ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1956”.
30
‘product’ which would allow the security forces to prosecute the insurgents and, as a
consequencegatherinformationtore-startthecycle.Toborrowalegalconcept,Hackmakes
a ‘presumption of automation’within the broader intelligencemachine, that is, it simply
worked–asinformationwasfed-in,itwasassessedandintelligenceproductswerechurned
outthatledtoeffectiveoperationaloutcomesandthegenerationoffurtherintelligence.And
yethemakesnoattempttodescribethefullscopeoftheMalayaintelligencemachineand
appearscontenttoacceptabinaryArmy/policenexus.Thereisnoconsiderationofwhether
therewereanyothersupportingcomponents,orhowthesemayhaveinteracted.35
Togetherthe ‘stalemate’explanation(asespousedbyShortandStubbs)and‘incremental’
explanation (as championed by Hack) form the main trunk of the historiography of the
Emergency,butthereareanumberofspecialistbranches.Forinstance,asmallnumberof
scholars have focused upon the origins of the Emergency. Questions of whether the
insurgency was orchestrated with or without external assistance, if the colonial
administration’sactionagainstthetradeunionsprovokedtheMCPintoretaliatoryactionor
whetherthemurdersofthethreeplanterswhichpromotedthedeclarationofEmergency
werespontaneous, local,eventsremaincontentious. Initialassessmentsbycommentators
duringandimmediatelyaftertheEmergencysupportedthegovernment’sassertionthatthe
MCP’s actions were directed by the Soviet Union and communicated via the Calcutta
conferencesheldinFebruary1948.36However,AnthonyStockwell’sinfluential1993article
rebuttedthistheory.Hearguedthatthereisinsufficientprooftohold-upthecontentionthat
the Emergency was a “result of a widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow
government inMalaya.”Nor,however,canthecounterclaimofa ‘colonialconspiracy’be
substantiated.Instead,StockwellsuggeststhatministerstookthedecisiontobantheMCPin
July1948“notbecausetheyhadirrefutableproofofaCommunistplotnorbecausetheyhad
35SeealsoS.Smith,“GeneralTemplerandcounter-insurgencyinMalaya:heartsandminds,intelligenceandpropaganda”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,16:3(2001),pp.60-78;K.Ramakishna,“‘Transmogrifying’Malaya:theimpactofSirGeraldTempler(1952-54)”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,32:1(February2001),pp.79-92.36Hack,“OriginsoftheAsianColdWar:Malaya1948”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,40:3(October2009),p.473.Forauseful,ifdated,discussionaboutthedifferencesintheMCP’surbanandruralstrategiessee,R.Clutterbuck,RiotandRevolutioninSingaporeandMalaya,1945-1963(London1973).
31
an interest in concocting one, but as an attempt to restore confidence in the colonial
regime.”37
UnderstandingoftheeventsleadingtothedeclarationofEmergencyweregivenafurther
dimensionfollowingtheemergencein1989ofChinPeng,theSecretaryGeneraloftheMCP,
from the jungles of southern Thailandwhere he had been in hiding since the end of the
Emergency.Hesubsequentlyengagedwithanumberofjournalistsandhistorians,publishing
hismemoirsandthetranscriptsandsupportingpaperswhichresultedfromaconferencewith
leadinghistoriansincludingAnthonyShort,RichardStubbs,KarlHackandLeonComberheld
inAustraliain2000.38Theresultofthisconferencewasabroadagreementthattherewasno
definitive, externally directed, strategy for theMCP to start an insurgent struggle in June
1948.However,accordingtoHack,“theMCPdiddevelopaplanofaction,thoughnotamap
oftheprecisemeanstocarryitout,forstagedpreparationsforrevolt.”39Instead,bothhe
and Stockwell suggest that the MCP was caught off-guard by government’s attempts to
dismantletheCommunist’sfrontorganisations,particularlythePan-MalayanFederationof
TradeUnionsandthenby thedeclarationofEmergency itself.40Moreover, theconsensus
amongthesecommentatorsisthatChinPeng’sexplanationthatthemurdersinSungeiSiput
that prompted the declaration of Emergency were spontaneous acts conducted by local
cadreswithoutCentralCommitteeauthorityiscredible.41Thisraisesfundamentalquestions
about the opprobrium heaped upon the MSS for failing to forecast the outbreak of
Communistviolencein1948.
TheroleofpsychologicalwarfareingeneratingintelligenceisanotherfacetoftheEmergency
whichhasyettobeexploredfully.SusanCarruthersprovidesauseful,ifbrief,chapteronthe
MalayanEmergency inhermonograph thatexplores the relationshipbetweenmediaand
37A.Stockwell,“‘Awidespreadandlong-concoctedplottooverthrowtheGovernmentinMalaya?’TheOriginsoftheMalayanEmergency”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,21,3(Sept.1993),pp.66-88.38C.C.Chin&K.Hack,DialogueswithChinPeng:NewLightontheMalayanCommunistParty(Singapore2004).39Hack,“TheOriginsoftheAsianColdWar:Malaya1948”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,40:3(2009),p,495.40A.Stockwell,“ChinPengandtheStruggleforMalaya”,JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,3:16(2006),p.286.SeealsoP.Deery,“Britain’sAsianColdWar?”,JournalofColdWarStudies,9:1(Winter2007),pp.29-54.41ChinPeng,AliasChinPeng–MySideofHistory(Singapore2003),pp.212-19;Chin&Hack,DialogueswithChinPeng:NewLightontheMalayanCommunistParty,pp.134-38.
32
Britain’s post-war counterinsurgency campaigns.42 Kumar Ramakrishna makes a more
substantialcontributiontotheunderstandingofpsychologicalwarfareintheEmergency.In
an article published in 1999 article he examined how the government’s surrender policy
developedand ledtothemasssurrenderofMCPpersonnel in1958.Hesuggeststhatthe
effectiveness of the policy depended upon three factors: “the content of the policy, the
credibility of the government in the eyes of the terrorists, and the strategic and political
context.”43Thiswasfollowed-upbyanarticlepublishedin2002whichwasintendedtofocus
on the closely related subject of the use of rewards for information. This aim, however,
appears to have been lost, and Ramakrishna was drawn back to explaining the 1958
surrenders.44 Nevertheless, through these articles and a subsequent monograph,
Ramakrishnaprovidesausefulbasisforunderstandingtheroleofpsychologicalwarfarein
theMalayanEmergency,albeitoneverymuchorientatedtowardsthe1958surrenders.45The
origins, development and integration of this component of the Malayan government’s
intelligencemachine,particularlyunderGurneyandBriggs,requiresfurtherexploration.
Given that the Emergency is perceived as one of Britain’s most significant wars of
decolonisation,inwhichsomeeleventhousandliveswerelost,thereisasurprisinglacunain
theliteratureconcerningtheroleofmilitaryintelligence.46Anearlyattempttoaddressthis
wasmadebytheRandInstituteonbehalfoftheUnitedStates’DepartmentofDefense.Thus,
intheautumnof1964,Randpublishedfive‘researchmemoranda’whichassesseddifferent
aspects of the British campaign in Malaya, including, organising counter-insurgency,
resettlement and food control, hearts and minds, Army operations and ‘anti-guerrilla’
intelligence.47RileySunderland,authorofallfivereports,notesthathewasgivenaccessto
42S.Carruthers,WinningHeartsandMinds:BritishGovernments,theMediaandColonialCounter-insurgency1944-1960(London1995).43K.Ramakrishna,“Content,credibilityandcontent:PropagandagovernmentsurrenderpolicyandtheMalayaCommunistterroristmasssurrendersof1958”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.242-266.44K.Ramakrishna,“‘BribingtheRedstoGiveUp’:RewardsPolicyintheMalayanEmergency”,WarinHistory,9:3,(2002),pp.332-353;Ramakrishna,EmergencyPropaganda:TheWinningofMalayanHeartsandMinds1948-58(2001).45SeealsoRamakrishna,EmergencyPropaganda:TheWinningofMalayanHeartsandMinds1948-58.46Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,Appendix,pp.507-8.47R.Sunderland,AntiguerrillaIntelligenceinMalaya,1948-1960(Rand1964).Seealsobythesameauthor;OrganisingCounterinsurgencyinMalaya(Rand1964);ArmyOperationsinMalaya,1947-60(Rand1964);ResettlementandFoodControlinMalaya(Rand1964);WinningtheHeartsandMindsofthePeopleinMalaya(Rand1964).SeealsoR.Komer,OrganisationofASuccessfulCounterinsurgency(Rand1972).
33
Britishclassifiedrecordsandwasabletointerviewkeyparticipants.Asaresult,Sunderland
producedsomeusefulinitialsurveysofkeyaspectsoftheEmergency.Moreover,theirutility
has somewhat faded over time. There are three reasons for this. First, it is clear that
Sunderlandhadlimitedaccesstoprimarysources.Forinstance,henotesthathedidnothave
accesstoSpecialBranchrecords.Second,Sunderlanddidnotattempttowriteahistoryof
theEmergency–hewasmoreinterestedinteasingoutthemes.Thus,thechronologywithin
his reports is confused.For instance, the sectiondealingwith the treatmentof Surrender
EnemyPersonnelsimplydoesnotsitethemethodologybeingdiscussedwithinaparticular
timescale.Thisimplies,erroneously,thatgovernmentpolicywasstaticanddidnotevolveor
changeduringthecourseoftheEmergency.Third,particularly inrelationtothepaperon
intelligence,Sunderland’sdiscussionislimitedtotheArmy–SpecialBranchnexus,without
considerationofanyotheraspectoftheMalayanintelligencemachine.
ThemainnarrativeworksprovidedbyShort,Stubbsetalfeaturesomediscussionofthekey
military developments in the campaign – the initial cordon and sweep operations, the
developmentofpopulationcontrolstrategiesandlong-rangejunglepatrols–buttheseare
dealtwithinbroadbrushstrokes.RichardClutterbuck’sTheLongLongWarprovidesalittle
moredetail.48Clutterbuck,aformerparticipantintheEmergency,“usesthebackdropofthe
historyoftheEmergencyperiodtodiscussthepracticalapplicationofsomeofthefinepoints
of counter-insurgency technique.”49 He pays particular concern to resettlement and
population control, not least in relation to the intelligenceopportunities such stratagems
afforded.TheLongLongWarisavehicleforClutterbucktoexplorecounter-insurgencytheory
as much as the military history of the Emergency. As such he analyses the modes and
techniquesofinsurgency,andtheappropriateantidotes.50Theresultisausefulintroduction
tothemore‘kinetic’aspectsofcounter-insurgencyinMalayabutwhichoverlooksinterand
intra-organisationaldevelopment.MoreusefularethetwochaptersonMalayainTimJones’
PostWarCounter-insurgencyandSAS.Thisisanexceptionallywell-researchedwork,which
illuminateshowtheArmydevelopeditscounter-insurgencyresponseinthefirstfouryears
48R.Clutterbuck,TheLongLongWar-TheEmergencyinMalaya,1948-60(Michigan1966).49M.Leifer,ReviewofTheLongLongWar:TheEmergencyinMalaya1948-1960byRichardClutterbuck,InternationalAffairs,43:4(October1967),pp.790-791.50C.Wolf,ReviewofTheLongLongWar:TheEmergencyinMalaya1948-1960byRichardClutterbuck,InternationalJournal,22:4,(Autumn1967),pp.683-685.
34
oftheEmergency.51AlsoofsignificantutilityisMalcolmPostgate’sOperationFiredog,which
providesanintroductiontotheroleofairpowerintheEmergency.52Drawnpredominantly
fromwhatwereatthetimeofwritingclassifiedfiles,Postgatesuppliesausefuloverviewof
theRAF’sroleinprovidingtransport,photographicintelligence,offensiveairsupport,andin
thegovernment’spsychologicalwarfareoperations.
Thereare a small numberofbiographies that adda further level ofdetail to themilitary
history of the Emergency. For instance, Arthur Campbell’s Jungle Green, Joseph Durkin’s
Malaya Scouts SAS, and John Chynoweth’sHunting Terrorists in the Jungle, provide vivid
accounts of infantry operations in Malaya.53 These are supplemented by J. Moran’s
fictionalisednarrativeofhistimeaspolicelieutenantduringtheEmergency.54Therearealso
useful biographies and autobiographies ranging from individuals such as Boris Hembry, a
planterandHomeGuardleaderandJohnDavies,thefoundingmemberofthe‘FerretForce’,
toSirGeraldTempler.55Theseworksprovidealevelofvisceraldetailwhichofficialdocuments
simplycannot.Inparticular,thethreeaccountsprovidedbytheinfantrysoldiersandMoran’s
account of policing during the Emergency convey the near impossibility of locating the
insurgentgangswithoutaccurateandtimelyintelligence.
TheEmergencyalsofeatureswithinanumberofbroaderstudiesofthesecurityservices.For
instance, RichardAldrich contributes useful, if brief, narratives about the key intelligence
developmentsduringtheEmergency–inGCHQfocusingonSIGINTandinTheHiddenHand
addinganextradimensionbyconsidering theEmergency in relation togrowingAmerican
51T.Jones,PostwarCounterinsurgencyandtheSAS,1945-1952–ASpecialTypeofWarfare(2007).SeealsoHoe&Morris,Re-entertheSAS(1994).52M.Postgate,OperationFiredog:AirSupportintheMalayanEmergency1948-1960(London1992).SeealsoS.Ritchie,TheRAF,SmallWarsandInsurgencies:LateColonialOperations,1945-1975(AirHistoricalBranch,undated),accessedviahttp://www.airpowerstudies.com/RAF%20and%20Small%20Wars%20Part%202.pdf(30September2013);J.CorumandW.Johnson,AirpowerinSmallWars–FightingInsurgentsandTerrorists(2003);A.MumfordandC.Kennedy-Pipe,“UnnecessaryorUnsung?TheStrategicRoleofAirPowerinBritain’sColonialCounter-Insurgencies”,J.Hayward(ed.),AirPower,InsurgencyandtheWaronTerror(2009),p.77.53A.Campbell,JungleGreen(1953);J.Chynoweth,HuntingTerroristsintheJungle(2007);J.Durkin,MalayanScoutsSAS–AmemoiroftheMalayanEmergency,1951(2011).SeealsoF.Kitson,BunchofFive(1977);M.Burton,“TheMalayanEmergency:ASubaltern’sView”,AsianAffairs,42:2(2011),pp.251-260.54J.Moran,SpearheadinMalaya(1959).55J.Cloake,Templer–TigerofMalaya(London1985);H.Hembry,MalayanSpymaster(2011);M.Shennan,OurManinMalaya(2007).SeealsoR.Thompson,MakefortheHills(1989).
35
concerns about Vietnam.56 Christopher Andrew also provides a brief overview of the
Emergency within his official history of MI5.57 Of particular interest is the short section
alludingtotensionbetweenSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE)andMalayanSecurityService
but,unfortunately,thisisnotdeveloped.58Indeed,anobviouslacunainthisbranchofthe
literatureistheabsenceofconsiderationoftherolesofSIFEandJIC(FE)inrelationtothe
Emergency.
CalderWalton’sEmpireofSecretsthreatenedtoaddresstheseissues.59Aformerresearch
assistanttoAndrew,WaltonsetouttoexaminetheroleofintelligenceattheendofBritain’s
empire,andheplacesmuchstoreontheuseofrecentlydeclassifiedfilestoaidthis task.
EmpireofSecretswaswellreceivedbybroadsheetreviewers,TheTelegraphnotingthat it
“fairlyripsalong,summoninginplacestheverveofagoodspynovel.”60Closerexamination
does,however,reveallimitations,particularlyinrelationtothethrustofWalton’sargument.
WhilstEmpireofSecretscoversabroadtimespanandnumerousinsurgencies,thereislittle
clearsenseofathesis.ThisisalsotrueinrelationtohischapteronMalaya,whichbeginswith
a rather conventional and derivative explanation of the ‘specular’ failure of the MSS to
forecasttheCommunistinsurrection.Thisisfollowedbyabriefandlargelyorthodoxre-telling
ofhowtheBriggsplanprovidedfreshtacticalintelligenceopportunities.GiventhatWalton’s
work appears to be concerned primarily with the role of the intelligence agencies, his
discussionofSIFEisdisappointing:thereisnoexplorationofitsoriginsorrelationshipwith
theothercomponentsofthelocalorregionalintelligenceapparatus;thereissomediscussion
oftheMI5runinterrogationcentrebutnothowtheSecurityServiceadaptedtothedemands
of the Emergency, nor how it operated in relation to other components of theMalayan
intelligenceapparatus.WaltondoesprovideausefuloutlineofMI5’sroleinpreparingMalaya
forindependencebutthisisoflessdirectrelevancetomanagementofintelligenceduringthe
campaignagainsttheMCP.
56R.Aldrich,GCHQ(London2011);Aldrich,TheHiddenHand:Britain,AmericaandColdWarSecretIntelligence(London2006).57C.Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorisedHistoryofMI5(London2010).58Ibid.,pp.448-50.59C.Walton,EmpireofSecrets(London2013).60D.Jones,“EmpireofSecretsbyCalderWatson”,TheTelegraph,30January2013.
36
Far more successful is Rory Cormac’s monograph that focuses upon the role of the
metropolitan Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the management of four colonial
insurgenciesbetween1948and1975.61HepositsapersuasiveargumentthattheJICwasable
toadaptovertimetothechangingnatureofthreatanddemand,whilstbalancingColdWar,
geo-strategic, concerns with the eruption of violence in the colonies and the blurring of
intelligenceassessmentandpolicy.Cormac’sdiscussionoftheMalayanEmergencyremains
focusedontheroleoftheJIC(London),whichhesuggestshadalimitedroleinthecounter-
insurgency campaign, because it “had little input in colonial affairs and held no formal
responsibility for overseas territories.”62 Yet, the JIC (London) did have an overarching
coordinationandadvisoryfunctionforthe‘satellite’JICsacrosstheglobe,includingthatin
theFarEast.CormacdoesnotsetouttoexploretheJIC(FE)butinthecourseofhisdiscussion
of its metropolitan facsimile does provide some particularly useful material. Ultimately,
however, the question of why the JIC (FE) so singly failed to perform in relation to the
Emergency rests on the twin premises that the MSS failed to supply intelligence to the
committeeandthatitlackedtheexplicitremittoprovideawarningfunction.
Thehistoriographyalsoencompassesarichcollectionofworkfocuseduponidentifyingwhat
lessonsmightbedrawnfromtheEmergency.OneofthefirstandmostinfluentialisSirRobert
Thompson’sDefeatingCommunistInsurgency.63Firstpublishedin1965,thisworkisbased
onhisexperiencesasamemberoftheDirectorofOperation’sstaffduringtheEmergency
andthenasHeadoftheBritishAdvisoryMissiontoSouthVietnam.Thompsonargues(like
BriggsandTempler)thatinsurgencyisfundamentallyapolitical,notmilitary,phenomenon.
Throughhisparticipationin,andreflectionon,theMalayanEmergencyandVietnamwar,he
formulated five principles which he considers vital for a state to confront successfully a
Communistinsurgentchallenge;specificallythestatemusthaveaclearpoliticalaim;itmust
function inaccordancewith the law; itmusthaveanoverallplan; itmustgivepriority to
61R.Cormac,FindingaRole:TheJointIntelligenceCommitteeandCounterinsurgencyattheendofEmpire,PhDThesis,King’sCollegeLondon,2011;Cormac,ConfrontingtheColonies–BritishIntelligenceandCounterinsurgency.MichaelGoodman’srecentlypublishedofficialhistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommitteeprovidesthedefinitiveanalysisofthiscommittee,butprovidessurprisinglylittleinformationaboutitsregionalcounter-parts.SeeM.Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume1(Oxford2014).62Cormac,ConfrontingtheColonies,p.30.63Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency–ExperiencefromMalayaandVietnam.
37
defeatingpoliticalsubversionanditmustsecureitsbaseareasfirst.Ofparticularrelevance
tothisthesisisThompson’salbeitbriefchapterdedicatedtointelligence.Hearguesthatthe
aimofanintelligenceorganisationisnotjustthepenetrationoftheinsurgencyorganisation
but‘”thetotaleradicationofthethreat.”ClearlydrawinguponhisexperiencesinMalaya,he
suggeststhatthereshouldbe“onesingleorganisationresponsibleforallsecurityintelligence
withinthecountry”andthattheorganisationbestsuitedforthis“isthespecialbranchofthe
policeforce.”Thompsonpositsthattheintelligenceorganisationshouldusemeasuressuch
as the movement of people and supplies to target “the contact points between the
Communistsubversiveorganisation,workinginthevillagesandtowns,andtheguerrillaunits
outsidethepopulation.”64
Thompson’s five principles of counter-insurgency have held sway among theorists since
publicationandremainsinfluential,forinstance,beingtaughttojuniorofficersattheRoyal
MilitaryCollege,Sandhurst.WhatcriticismthereisofDefeatingCommunistInsurgencytends
tosuggestthatThompson’stheoryofcounter-insurgencyisdrawntoodirectlyfromMalaya.65
MorerecentlyDouglasPorchandDavidFrenchhavearguedpersuasively that“Thompson
mustbe readasadidactic, aspirational treatise rather thana stateof fact.”66 Indeed,his
chapteronintelligenceis,ineffect,adescriptionofthe‘mature’Malayanintelligencemodel.
Unfortunately,Thompsondoesnotconsiderwhetherthismodelwasalwaysinexistence,if
andhowevolvedduringthecourseoftheEmergencyorifitisaretrospectiveconstruct.Thus,
thebaselinec.1948isignored,thekeycomponents,otherthanSpecialBranchnotmentioned
andthedeeplytroublesometaskofcreatingco-ordinationmachineryomitted.Whilsthighly
influential,Thompson’sworkisthereforeoflimitedutilityforthosewishingtounderstand
thegestationandmaturingoftheMalayanintelligencemachine.
64Ibid.,pp.84-90.65C.Woodhouse,“ReviewofDefeatingCommunistInsurgency–ExperiencefromMalayaandVietnam”,InternationalAffairs,43:1(1967),pp.183;J.McAlister,“ReviewofDefeatingCommunistInsurgency–ExperiencefromMalayaandVietnam”,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,61:3(September1967),pp.773-775.ForanassessmentofhowThompson’stheoryrelatestothecampaigninAfghanistansee,J.Pritchard&M.Smith,“ThompsoninHelmand:ComparingTheorytoPracticeinBritishCounter-insurgencyOperations”,CivilWars12:1-2(2010),pp.65-90.66D.Porch,Counterinsurgency–ExposingtheMythsoftheNewWayofWar(Cambridge2013),p.247.
38
Another key counter-insurgency theorist is General Sir Frank Kitson, who based his
observations upon his experiences inMalaya, Kenya, Oman andMuscat and Cyprus. His
thoughtson intelligenceduring thesecampaigns tend tomirror thoseofThompson,both
stressingtheimportanceofmaintainingeffectivegovernment,operatingwithinthelaw,of
developing intelligence,anddevelopingapoliticalprogrammetounderminethe insurgent
cause.67 However, Kitson outlines a potentially vital aspect in relation to intelligence by
arguingthat,“itisimportanttomakethedistinctionbetweenthesortofinformationwhich
theintelligenceorganisationisrequiredtoproduceinnormaltimes,andthatwhichitwill
havetogetaftersubversionhasstarted.”Hesuggests,“thefirstsortofinformationmightbe
describedaspoliticalintelligence,andsecondsortasoperationalintelligence.”68Asaresult,
Kitsonpositsthatintelligenceorganisations,whenconfrontinganemerginginsurgency,have
notonlytoexpandtomeetthethreatbutdevelopnewmethodstoembracebothtypesof
intelligence.69Thisisacriticalsuggestionbutonethat,unfortunately,Kitsondoesnotdevelop
inanyofhisworks.
ThehistoriographyoftheEmergencywasfairlystableuptothenewmillennium.However,
twoeventsupset thisequilibrium.The firstwas theattacksonAmericaon11September
2001,andthesubsequent‘waronterror’,whichinjectedanewdynamicandmomentuminto
thedebateaboutthenatureofinsurgency.LtColJohnNaglwaskeytothis.In2005hewrote
aninnovativeworkentitledLearningtoEatSoupwithaKnifeandForkwhichcomparedthe
experiencesof theBritishArmy inMalaya to thatof theUnitedStates inVietnam.70Nagl
focusesuponacomparisonoftheorganisationalculturesoftheBritishandUSarmies.He
suggeststhattheBritishArmydevelopedasuccessfulcounter-insurgencystrategyinMalaya
becauseofitssuccessasa‘learninginstitution.’Hethereforeoffersawhiggishassessmentof
67F.Kitson,BunchofFive(London1977).68Kitson,LowIntensityOperations–Subversion,InsurgencyandPeacekeeping(London1971),p.72.69SeealsoT.Mockaitis,BritishCounterinsurgency,1919-60(London1990).Mockaitisexaminedanumberofcampaigns,includingIreland,Palestine,Malaya,KenyaandCyprus.Hearguedthatthesecampaignswerebasednotonformaldoctrinebutthreebroadprinciples:minimumforce;closecivil-militarycooperation;andsmallunittactics.70J.Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife(Chicago2002).Thisisnot,ofcourse,thefirstUSbasedattemptedtounderstandtheimplicationsoftheEmergency.MostnotablewasaseriesofRandmonographsproducedinthe1960sfortheDepartmentofDefencse.Whilstnotbasedonprimarysourcedocuments,theydidbenefitfrominterviewsfromsomekeyparticipantsintheEmergency.SeeFN.32above.
39
Britain’s counter-insurgency, which in many respects is in sympathy with Comber’s
assessmentofthecentralityofSpecialBranchand,potentially,Hack’sincrementalthesis.
YetNagl’scontributiontothehistoriographyofMalayaisbroaderthanLearningtoEatSoup
withaKnifeandForkbecausehewasakeyauthoroftheUSArmy’sCounterinsurgencyField
Manual,FM3-24.71Thisdocument,whichwaswrittenattheheightoftheIraqiinsurgency
against the US and coalition countries, refocuses upon the lessons of previous ‘classical’
counter-insurgencycampaigns.WhilstthewritingoftheFrenchcounter-insurgentGualuais
widely acknowledged to provide the main philosophical inspiration for FM 3-24, the
footprintsoftheMalayancampaignarediscerniblethroughoutthemanual.72
However,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnifeandForkandFM3-24haveattractedsignificant
criticism.Forinstance,commentatorshavesuggestedthatNaglplacesexcessiveemphasison
theperceivedlessonsfoundinthecomparingtwoverydifferentcampaigns,notleastbecause
theMCPwas not supported by an external forcewhile the Viet Congwere; the colonial
governmenthadtheadvantagesofexploitingtheracialdividedbetweennativeMalaysand
Chinese, andwasalsoable tousedecolonisation to reduce theappealof theCommunist
propaganda.Others, such as the influential David Kilcullen, have suggested that the ‘neo
classical’understandingofcounter-insurgencyhaslittlerelevancetothenewformof‘global
insurgency’beingwagedbyAl-Qaidaanditsaffiliates.73Intermsofthisthesis,theassessment
of intelligencewithinLearning toEat SoupwithaKnifeandFork isburiedwithinawider
discussionoftheEmergencyandislimitedtotwosubstantivepages.Assuch,neocounter-
insurgency theories,as representedbyNagl’swork,aremore important tounderstanding
71USArmy&MarineCorps,CounterinsurgencyFieldManual(Chicago2007).72D.Galula,Counterinsurgencywarfare–TheoryandPractice(2006).ThecampaignsintheIraqandAfghanistanhavepromptedasignificantincreaseinworksreviewingtheEmergencyandBritishcounter-insurgencyingeneral.Forinstance,seeD.Branch,“Footprintsinthesand:Britishcolonialcounter-insurgencyandthewarinIraq”,PoliticsandSociety,38:2(2010),pp.15-34;A.Mumford,“SirRobertThompson’slessonsforIraq:bringingthe‘basicprinciplesofcounterinsurgency’intothe21stcentury”,DefenceStudies,vol.10(2010),pp.177-94.W.Ladwig,“ManagingCounterinsurgency:LessonsfromMalaya”,MilitaryReview,MaytoJune2007,pp.56-66;D.Ucko,“TheMalayanEmergency:TheLegacyandRelevanceofaCounter-InsurgencySuccessStory”,DefenceStudies,10:01-02(2010),pp.13-39;J.Hamby,“Civil-MilitaryOperations:JointDoctrineandtheMalayanEmergenc”,JointForcesQuarterly,Autumn2002,pp.54-61.73See,forinstance,D.Kilcullen,“CounterinsurgencyRedux”,Survival,48:4(2006),pp.111-130;D.Jones&M.Smith,“WhoseHeartsandWhoseMinds?TheCuriousCaseofGlobalCounter-Insurgency”,JournalofStrategicStudies,33:1(2010),pp.81-121;F.Hoffmman,“Neo-ClassicalCounterinsurgency”,Parameters(Summer2007),pp.71-87.
40
contemporary security challenges and less the management of intelligence during the
Emergency.
ThesecondissuetodisturbthepreviouslysettledhistoriographyoftheEmergencyhas its
origins not inMalaya but Kenya. In 2005 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F&CO)
receivedaFreedomofInformation(FOI)requestfromlawyersactingonbehalfofanumber
ofexMauMauinsurgentswhowereattemptingtoclaimdamagesformistreatmentfromthe
Britishgovernment.Thisrequestpromptedthediscoveryofoverfifteenhundredfilesrelating
todecolonisation(theso-calledHanslopefiles),includingMalaya,thathadnotbeenreleased
toTheNationalArchive(TNA).74Thegovernment’sapologyandsettlementofdamages,plus
thereleaseofthepreviouslyhiddenfiles,ledhistorianstoquestionwhethertherealityofthe
Malayan Emergency reflected the paradigm of minimum force that the classical
counterinsurgency theorists (Thompson, Kitson and Mockaitis) and their neo-classical
successors(suchasNagl)havepreviouslymaintained.75
There followedanumberofarticlesexaminingBritain’suseof force inMalaya,andother
post-war counter-insurgency campaigns. For instance, Paul Dixon has argued “the phrase
‘heartsandminds’doesnotaccuratelydescribeBritain’shighlycoercivecampaigninMalaya.
TheBritishapproachinMalayadidinvolvehighlevelsofforce,wasnotfoughtwithinthelaw
and ledtoabusesofhumanrights.”76HuwBennetthas focuseduponthe ‘counter-terror’
phase in the initialeighteenmonthsafter thedeclarationofEmergency,positing that the
Armypursued“adeliberatelyformulatedcounter-terrorstrategyuntilcircaDecember1949,
aimedtointimidatethecivilianChinesecommunityintosupportingthegovernment.Mass
arrests, property destruction, and forced population movement, combined with loose
controls on lethal force, created a coercive effect.”77 In The British Way, David French
74C.Elkins,“AlchemyofEvidence:MauMau,theBritishEmpireandtheHighCourtofJustice”,TheJournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,39:5(2011),pp.731-748;M.Banton,“Destroy?‘Migrate’?Conceal?BritishStrategiesfortheDisposalofSensitiveRecordsofColonialAdministrationsatIndependence”,TheJournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,40:2(June2012),pp.321-335.75M.Hughes,“Introduction:Britishwaysofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),p.580;I.Beckett,“Britishcounter-insurgencyahistoriographicalreflection”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),p.788.76P.Dixon,“‘HeartsandMinds’?BritishCounter-InsurgencyfromMalayatoIraq”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),p.355.77Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),p.415.
41
considersMalaya alongside tenBritish counter-insurgency campaigns conductedbetween
1945-67withtheintentionofassessingwhethertherealityofthosecampaignsmatchedthe
perceived lessons as articulated by Thompson. He suggests “there were significant
divergencesbetweenthosetheoriesandBritishpractices.”Indeed,French’smaincontention
isthattheBritish“commonlyemployedawidevarietyofcoercivetechniquestointimidate
thecivilianpopulationintothrowingtheirsupportbehindthegovernmentratherthanthe
insurgents.”78
Theonlyrealattempttobalancethecurrenttrendintheliteraturethatfocusesuponviolence
and coercion inMalaya is provided by Anthony Short. He has examined the Batang Kali
‘incident’inwhichmembersoftheScotsGuardsshotsometwenty-fiveChinesesquatters.
Interpretationsofthiseventvary: theHighCourtruled inSeptember2012thattherewas
evidencetosupportthecontentionthattherewasadeliberateexecutionoftheciviliansat
BatangKali.Shortsuggeststhatthereislittleevidenceofadeliberatepolicyofcounter-terror.
Onthecontrary,therewasa‘non-policy’andthatsporadicactsofviolenceweretheproduct
of the police and Army simply not knowing “what to do or how to deal with enormous
numbersofruralChinese,manyofthemlivinginwhatwereregardedasenemyareasvirtually
underCommunistcontrol.”79
Arguablythemost interestingaspectof thisdebate is thatnoauthorhastackledfully the
relationship between violence, intelligence and the consequent effectiveness of counter-
insurgency.Waltonconsidersbrieflytheuseoftorturetoexactintelligencefromsuspects.
Heconcludes“therewereincidentswhenBritishinterrogatorstortureddetaineesinMalaya,
butthereisnoevidencethattorture…wasinstitutionalised.Itisnotpossibletocometoany
generalisedconclusionsabouthowandwhytortureoccurred.”80HuwBennettsuggeststhat
operationalandcognitive intelligence failures in theperiod1948-9 ledthegovernmentto
78D.French,TheBritishWayinCounter-insurgency1945-67(Oxford2011).Inanemotivelyentitledarticle,HackhasalsoconsiderstheroleofviolenceintheEmergency.HearguesthatitisartificialtocharacterizetheEmergencyasoneinwhich‘heartsandminds’andminimalforceorcounter-terrorandrepressiondominated.Instead,herestateshiscorethesisconcerningthecentralityofpopulationandspatialcontrolwhich,hesuggests,encompassesbothparadigms.SeeK.Hack,“Everyonelivedinfear:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),pp.671-699.79A.Short,“TheMalayanEmergencyandtheBatangKaliIncident”,AsianAffairs,41;3(2010),p352.80Walton,EmpireofSecrets,p.188.
42
deviseadeliberatecoercivestrategyaimedattheChinesepopulation.Unfortunately,hedoes
not examine what caused these failures.81 David French posits “an effective domestic
intelligenceservicewasimperativeifthesecurityforcesweretouseforcewithdiscrimination
against the ‘guilty’ few, while sparing the ‘innocent’ many. But at the outset of most
insurgenciescolonialgovernmentsfoundthemselvesdangerouslyhandicappedbyalackof
justsuchintelligence.”82InrelationtoMalaya,heargues,inlinewiththebroader‘stalemate’
thesis,thattheintelligencemachineremainedinthisparlousstateuntiltheappointmentby
TemplerofJackMortonasDirectorofIntelligenceandthecreationin1952ofjointoperations
rooms.83Despitetheseefforts,thelinkbetweenadearthofintelligenceandthesystemicuse
ofviolenceandabusehasbeenneitherconclusivelyprovednorrefuted.
Perhaps because of the fragmented nature of the coverage of intelligence within the
historiographyoftheMalayanEmergency,strongthemesarenoteasytoidentify.Thereis,
however,anearuniversalacceptancethattheconceptofintelligence,bothasanactivityand
organisation,waspivotaltotheprosecutionoftheEmergency.84Forinstance,Shorthassaid
that“itisobviousthatthatkeytocounter-insurgencyinMalayawasintelligence”85;Aldrich
believes that Malaya was “a war of intelligence”86; Kitson and Thompson stress the
importanceoftheintelligencemachine87;Millersaysthatthe“intelligencesystemwhichthe
SpecialBranchcreatedin1952basicallywonthewar”88;andStewartsaysthat“…theeventual
victoryovertheMalayanCommunistsowedmuchtointelligence.”89Moreover,thesub-set
of the historiography focused around Hack’s work does not refute the importance of
intelligencebutinsteadattemptstoredefinethenexusbetweenpopulationcontrol,hearts
andminds,andthegenerationofinformation.Eventherecentworksthathavefocusedupon
81Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444.82D.French,“Nastynotnice:Britishcounter-insurgencydoctrineandpractice,1945-67”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),p.746.83French,TheBritishWayinCounter-insurgency1945-67,pp.27-9.84ForabroaderconsiderationoftherelationshipbetweenintelligenceandBritishcounter-insurgencysee,D.Charters,“Counter-insurgencyintelligence:TheEvolutionofBritishTheoryandPractice”,JournalofConflictStudies,Vol.29(2009).85Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60,p.502.86Aldrich,TheHiddenHand:Britain,AmericaandColdWarSecretIntelligence,p.494.87Kitson,BunchofFive,p.286andThompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency,p.84.88H.Miller,JungleWarinMalaya,fn90,p.90.89B.Stewart,“WinninginMalaya:Anintelligencesuccessstory”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.267-283.
43
thecoerciveaspectsoftheEmergencyhavenotdirectlyquestionedtheroleofintelligence,
butratherthevalueofintelligenceobtainedbyduress.
Andyet,thereisnotonesingleoverallstudyofdevelopment,managementandimpactof
intelligenceduringtheEmergency.ThestrongestattempttodosoisComber’smonographof
SpecialBranchbut,asdiscussedabove,thishassignificantlimitationsinrelationtoaccuracy,
methodologyandassessment.Indeed,intelligenceduringtheEmergencyencompassedfar
morethantheworkofSpecialBranch.LittleisknownaboutwhytheMSSwasabolishedor
whatitactuallysaidaboutthethreatposedbytheMCP.Understandingofhowthepolice
forcecontributedandsupportedtheirSpecialBranchcolleaguesisnotfullydeveloped.The
roleofSIFE,eitherasanintelligence-gatheringorganisationorasintelligenceclearing-house,
remainsopaque.TheroleoftheJIC(FE)inrelationtotheEmergencyissimplyabsentfrom
theexistinghistoriography.TheintelligencefunctionsundertakenbytheRoyalAirForceare
givenonlycursoryconsiderationandgenerallydismissedas inconsequential.Similarly, the
mannerinwhichtheArmyattemptedtogenerateanduseintelligenceisunderdevelopedand
oftensimplyincorporatedintothewidertheoriesofhowtheEmergencydeveloped.Noris
there one coherent exploration of the relationship between the Army operations and
intelligence.Morefundamentally, there isa lackofclarityofhowtheMalayanauthorities
attemptedtointegratetheseindividualcomponentsintoacoherentandefficientintelligence
machine.
ThelanguageoftheEmergency
The interpretation of the past via contemporary concepts and language is a perennial
challengeforhistorians.Althoughtheseissuesposefewerproblemsforscholarsinterested
intheEmergencythan,say,medievalorancienthistorians,therearestilldifficultissuesto
confront.Oneofthemost interesting istheway inwhichBritishdocumentsrefertotheir
Communist foes. For instance, within British documents Chin Peng’s party is consistently
calledtheMalayanCommunistParty(MCP).However,inhisbiography,ChinPengusedthe
termtheCommunityPartyofMalaya(CPM)whichhassubsequentlybeenadoptedbysome
commentatorssuchasLeonComber.90Undoubtedlythisisduetothevagariesoftranslation,
90ChinPeng,AliasChinPeng–MySideofHistory.
44
however it provides an indication of the complications which intelligence analysts
encounteredduringtheEmergencyandwhichmaystilltripuphistorians.
The issueof language is complicatedby thedeliberatepolicies appliedby theBritish and
MalayanauthoritiestodescribetheCommunistforces.Forinstance,PhillipDeeryhasargued
thatalthoughnotanewappellation, theBritishauthoritieschoseto label theCommunist
insurgentsinMalayaas‘bandits.’Thiswas,hesuggests,adeliberateattempt“todenythe
legitimacyof theopponents.”However, the ‘bandits’provedtobea toughopponentand
withintwoyearsColonialOfficeofficialswerebeginningtoquestionwhetherthetermwas
underplayingthemagnitudeofthechallengeposedbytheCommunistforces.Asaresultin
May1952,theterminologywaschangedfrom‘bandit’toterrorist.’91Toavoidfallingfoulof
prerogativeterms,thisthesiswillusetheword‘insurgent’ratherthan‘bandit’,‘terrorist’or
indeed‘guerrilla’,unlesscommentinguponorquotingdirectprimarysourceevidence.
Moreover,theself-describingnomenclaturesusedbytheCommunistforcesinMalayavaried
considerably. The Malayan Communist Party’s armed wing was based on the wartime
resistanceforcecalledtheMalayaPeople’sAnti-JapaneseArmy(MPAJA).Veryquicklyafter
theendoftheSecondWorldWar,thisforcewentbackintothejungleandrenameditselfthe
Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army (MPABA). Once the Emergency was declared, the
Communists’ armedwing became known as theMalayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).
Subsequently it became apparent that this termwas amistranslation of the Chinese for
Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA).92 Moreover, throughout the Emergency the
Communist’sarmedwingwassupportedbytheMinYuen.Thereare,therefore,numerous
termstodescribethevariouscomponentsoftheMCP,andthesetermschangedovertime
andaccordingtotranslation.Unfortunately, thebarrageofacronymscontinueswhenone
considerstheintelligenceagenciesinexistenceduringtheEmergency,notleasttheSecurity
Service(MI5);theSecretIntelligenceService(SIS,akaMI6);theJointIntelligenceCommittee
91P.Deery,“TheTerminologyofTerrorism:Malaya,1948-52”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,32:2(June2003),pp.236-245.SeealsoS.Carruthers,WinningHeartsandMinds–BritishGovernments,theMediaandColonialCounter-Insurgency1944-1960(London1995),p.85.92K.Hack&C.C.Chin,‘TheMalayaEmergency’,C.C.Chin&K.Hack,DialogueswithChinPeng:NewLightontheMalayanCommunistParty,pp.3-5;Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,pp.61-3;Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice,p.14.
45
(JIC);SecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE).BritishDefenceCoordinatingCommittee/FarEast
(BDCC/FE)andtheMalayanSecurityService(MSS).Inharmonywithstanceoutlinedabove,
thediscussionwillemploythetermsmostfrequentlyfoundinthedocuments.Asignificant
caveat, however, is that the terms JIC (London) or the metropolitan JIC will be used to
differentiateitfromotherregionalJICs.
Arriving at suitable language to codify British counter-insurgency strategy during the
Emergency is also problematic. This is because counter-insurgency is a highly complex
undertaking, involving numerous arms of government, each of which might operate
accordingtodifferentdoctrineandorganisationalconcepts.Theissueiscompoundbytime.
Forinstance,counter-insurgency,particularlyagainstanenemyfollowingaMaoist-inspired
strategy,was a new development for both theMalayan and British authorities. Thiswas
recognisedwithinmonthsofthedeclarationofEmergencybytheColonialSecretary,James
Griffiths,whoinstructedtheMalayanHighCommissioner,SirHenryGurney,toreviewthe
campaignthusfarsothatothercolonialterritoriesmightpreparethemselvesforoutbreaks
ofsimilar,Communist,insurgencies.93Gurney’ssubsequentreport,SecretDespatchNo.5,
has become a superlative treatise on counter-insurgency that emphasised that it was
fundamentallyacivilianactivity.94Moreover,itforcedtheauthoritiestoreconsiderdoctrine,
particularlyinrelationtopolicingandtheroletobeplayedbythearmedforcesinirregular
warfare, something they had to do whilst conducting the counter-insurgency campaign
againsttheMCPforces.
Timealsooffersthetemptationofusingcontemporaryconceptsofdoctrinetounderstand
thecounter-insurgencycampaigninMalaya.However,thisisproblematic,notleastbecause
themilitaryinMalayadidnotusetermssuchas‘tactical’,‘operational’,and‘strategic’-terms
thatwillbefamiliartocontemporarycounter-insurgents-withanyprecisionoruniformity.
Thisisbecauseterminologyhaschangedovertimeandthecurrentdoctrineisrelativelynew.
For instance,HuwStrachanhasdemonstratedhow the conceptof ‘strategy’has changed
sinceitfirstenteredEuropeanmilitarydiscourseinthemid18thCentury.Inparticular,hehas
93CO537/6403,NotebyJ.Morgan,entitled,‘HistoryofCircularDespatchofCommentaryonSirHenryGurney’sDespatchNo.5of1949’,21stJune1950.94Ibid.,DespatchNo5,GurneytoCreechJones,30thMay1949.
46
arguedpersuasivelythattheconceptbecameconflatedwiththenotionof‘policy’,leadingto
theterm‘grandstrategy’.95Similarly,JohnKiszelyremarks,theideaofan‘operationallevel’
did not feature in Britishmilitary doctrine for almost 40 years after the [SecondWorld]
War.”96 For example, the Royal Air Force Doctrine published in 1957 explained that ‘the
TacticalAirForce’was‘closelyassociatedwithoperationsonland…andisnormallypartofa
theatreairforce.’Inthisdocument,theterms‘tactical’and‘operations’areoftenconflated.97
Moreover,the‘bible’ofBritishmilitaryoperations intheEmergency,TheConductofAnti-
Terrorist Operations inMalaya, simply does notmention ideas of tactical, operational or
strategiclevelsofwarfare.98
This reflects the fact that the military were acting in support of the civilian authorities
throughout the Emergency and organised themselves predominantly upon the civilian
administrativestructures.However,eventhisprinciplewasnotentirelyclear.Forinstance,in
1949TheWarOfficeproducedthemanualofImperialPolicingandDutiesinAidoftheCivil
Power which superseded pre-war doctrine. It stated that the “the sole object ofmilitary
intervention in civil disputes…is the restorationof lawandorderbymilitarymeanswhen
othermethods failed,orappear certain to fail.” Critically, themanual then said, “oncea
request has been made for military assistance of any kind, the military commander,
irrespectiveofhisrank,isentirelyresponsiblefortheformwhichtheactionshalltakeand
theamountofforceused…”InrelationtotheEmergency,thetoneoftheseinstructionswas
atoddswithbothGurney’sSecretDespatchNo.5andthereportbytheColonialSecretary’s
adviseronpolicing.Forinstance,Gurneyclaimed,“militaryforcestotheaidofthecivilpower
should be at the disposal of the Commissioner of Police and operate under his general
direction.”99
95H.Strachan,TheDirectionofWar–ContemporaryStrategyinHistoricalPerspective(Cambridge2013),pp.26-46.96J.Kiszely,“TheBritishArmyandThinkingAbouttheOperationalLevel”,Bailey,Iron&Strachan(eds),BritishGeneralsinBlair’sWars,p.121.97RoyalAirForce,Manual–OperationsAP1300(AirMinistry,March1957).98FederationofMalaya,TheConductofAnti-TerroristOperationsinMalaya(3rdedition1958,reprintedinSt.Petersburg,Florida,2006)99WO21/2193,DespatchNo5,GurneytoCreechJones,30thMay1949.SeethisfilealsohasacopyofImperialPolicingandDutiesinAidoftheCivilPower1949(WarOffice,13June1949).
47
Inreality,themilitaryinMalayaoperatedatthebehestofcivilianauthoritiesandveryoften
were organised along the Federation’s administrative lines of demarcation (i.e. District,
State/SettlementandFederallevels).Asaresult,thisthesiswilldefertotheseadministrative
constructs, rather than the more abstract contemporary doctrinal concepts of ‘tactical’,
‘operational’and‘strategic’levelsofwarwhichwouldhavebeenunfamiliartothoseengaged
in restoring lawandorder toMalaya. There isone critical exception,however.While the
militaryorganiseditselfatDistrictandState/Settlementlevels,italsocreatedatheatre-level
intelligencestructurewhicheffectivelynetworkedmultipleindividualstrugglestorestorelaw
andorderataDistrictandStatelevel.Moreover,thetheatre-levelstructures,whichtookthe
formof the Land/AirOperations Room (which, later in the Emergency,was renamed the
JointsOperationsCentre)andtheJointAirPhotographicIntelligenceCentre(FarEast),linked
eachofthislocal-levelstruggleswiththeatre-basedresources,mostnotablythephotographic
reconnaissance.ThisisalayerofMalayanintelligenceapparatuswhichhaslargelyescaped
theattentionofpreviouscommentatorsbut,aswillbeseen,willbediscussedatlengthin
chapter7.
Methodology
While terminology presents some interesting challenges, the manner of constructing a
coherent analysis of eventswhich took place half a century ago in a different country is
significantlymoreproblematic.Theselectionofapointtostartandendtheanalysisisthe
firsthurdle.JohnLewisGaddishasarguedthathistorianstendtoidentifythe‘state’which
theywishtoexplainandthenworkbackwards.100Inthecaseoftheintelligenceapparatusin
Malaya,the‘state’isnotattachedtoaprecisedate.However,itislogicaltoconcludethat
1957marks a point in timewhen the progress of the Emergencywas sufficient to allow
transfer of power from Britain to newly independent Malaya and thus the intelligence
structuresatthatpointwerebothmatureandfunctioning.However,itisnotlogicaltoargue
that June 1948 marked the start of the problems with Malaya’s intelligence apparatus.
Rather,itmarksthepointwhentheFederationfeltunabletotackletheemerginglawand
order problem without recourse to Emergency legislation. Some historians have already
recognisedthispoint–forinstance,byAnthonyShortandLeonComberdiscusswhatthey
100J.Gaddis,TheLandscapeofHistory(Oxford2002),p.98.
48
considerthefailureoftheMSSintheeighteenmonthspriortothedeclarationofEmergency.
However,theproblemsinMalaya’sintelligenceapparatusweremuchbroaderthantheMSS.
Althoughonecouldworkbackwardsadinfinitum,theoriginsofthefailuresintheapparatus
stemfromthelegacyprovidedbySouthEastAsiaCommand(SEAC)andthetransitionfrom
wartopeacetimeintheregion.This,therefore,marksanappropriatepointofdeparturefor
theanalysis.
Perhapsthefundamentalissuetoconsiderwhenembarkinguponanhistoricalanalysisisthat
notallofthepastisrecoverable,indeedoftenonlyatinyfractionisavailable.101Asaresult,
as Richard Evans explains in his book InDefence ofHistory, a “dispute ariseswhen some
theorists believe that the selection is largelydeterminedby thenarratives and structures
whichoccur in thepast itself,andthosewhothink it is imposedbythehistorian.”102One
approachtotacklethisconundrumwouldbetocreateachronologicalnarrative.Thiswould,
ineffect,provideaseriesofsnapshotsofthestateofthe intelligenceapparatus,withthe
exposuredeterminedeitheronayear-by-yearbasisorsomeotherchronologicalconstruct,
suchas‘phases’oftheEmergencyortenureofHighCommissioner.
However,thisapproachhassomeinherentdifficulties,notleastthattheintelligenceagencies
duringtheEmergencydidnotoperatetothehistorian’sarbitrarytimeframe.Nordidthey
changeordevelopatthesamerates.Assuch,thereisadangerofcreatingaProcrusteanbed
inwhichissuesandeventsareforcedintoparticularphases,determinedbyyears,tenuresof
High Commissioners, or arbitrary times frames labelled ‘counter-terror’ or ‘stick and
carrot’.103Thisrelatestoamethodologicalproblemwhichhasexercisedhistoriansformany
years.Inhisexpositionofhistoriology,JohnLewisGaddis,hasarguedpersuasivelythathistory
doesnot“proceedatasteadyrate;rather,longperiodsofstabilityare‘punctuated’byabrupt
anddestabilisingchanges.”104Indeed,keyeventsintheevolutionoftheMalayanintelligence
apparatusdonotnecessarilyalign-forinstance,thedeclarationofEmergencyaffectedthe
101G.Elton,ThePracticeofHistory,p.20.102R.Evans,InDefenceofHistory(London1997),p.142.103Forinstance,seeBennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444;Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60.104Gaddis,TheLandscapeofHistory,p.98.
49
MSSdramaticallybutnottheJIC/FEorSIFE;theBriggsPlanaffectedtheuniformedpoliceand
Armysignificantlybut lesssoSpecialBranch; the reforms introducedbyTemplerchanged
fundamentallythewaythepoliceoperatedbutnotnecessarilytheArmyorRoyalAirForce.
AsEvansreflectedabouthisownwork,“therecouldneverbeanyquestionofpresentinga
‘simple’ chronological narrative…because there were far toomany events and processes
goingonatthesametime.Arrangingitallpurelyintermsofchronologywouldhavedelivered
achroniclewithnoexplanatorypowerwhatsoever.”105
Analternativetothestrictchronologicalmethod is todiscusseachof thekeycomponent
partsoftheintelligenceapparatusinturn.Afterall,asMarcBlochasargued“eachtypeof
phenomenonhas itsownparticulardimensionofmeasurementand, so to speak, itsown
specificdecimal.”106Theobviousadvantageisthatthisapproachwillallowaconcentrated
analysisofeachelement,onewhichshouldnotbedilutedbyanexcessivediscussionofthe
wider Emergency. Moreover, this methodology would provide a natural chronological
structure–forinstance,discussionofSEACnaturallyleadstothatoftheJIC(FE),SIFEandthe
MSS.Moreover,intheyearsleadingfromtheendoftheSecondWorldWartothedeclaration
oftheEmergency,thesekeyintelligenceagenciesoperatedinrelativeisolation,whichfurther
suggeststhatseparatediscussionofthesebodiesisappropriate.
However, the situationbecomesmore complicated in relation to the analysis of how the
intelligenceapparatusdevelopedafterthedeclarationofEmergency.Inthefirstinstance,the
pre-Emergencyintelligencebodiestendedtofade,albeitatdifferentrates,fromthecounter-
insurgencycontextintheaftermathoftheEmergency.Theywerereplacedinprominenceby
theArmy,RoyalAirForce,andthePolice,collectivelyknownasthesecurityforces.Fromthe
earliest stages of the Emergency, the security forces began to organise themselves in
committeesbroadlyalignedtotheFederation’sexistingbasicadministrativestructures,ata
District and State/Settlement level. By 1950 the newly appointedDirector of Operations,
General Briggs, mandated the creation of District and State/Settlement War Executive
Committees,thusformalisingwhathademergedspontaneously.Themilitaryadaptedtothis
structurewithrelativeease–forinstance,theseniormilitarycommanderforeachdistrict
105Ibid.,p.147.106M.Bloc,TheHistorian’sCraft(Manchester1952),p.152.
50
becameamemberoftherelevantDWEC(whichwerealwayschairedbytheDistrictOfficer,
reflectingthefundamentallyciviliannatureEmergencyoperations).Critically,however,the
therewasuntil1952 lingeringabsenceofaneffectiveEmergencycoordinationapparatus,
particularlyinrelationtointelligence,ataFederallevel.
ThepositionwasfurthercomplicatedbythestructureoftheMalayanPoliceService.Rather
thanbeingalignedtotheadministrativestructureofMalayanFederation,thepoliceservice
consisted of ten ‘contingents’, each commanded by a Chief Police Officer (who was
answerabletotheCommissionerofPolice).WiththeexceptionofKedahandPerlis,which
sharedacontingent,eachStatewaspolicedbyonecontingent.Eachcontingentwasdivided
intoPoliceCircles,whichweresupervisedbyOfficersSuperintendingPoliceCircles(OSPC).
TheseCirclesweresub-divided intoPoliceDistricts,commandedbyOfficersCommanding
PoliceDistricts(OCPD).Inpractice,however,theseniorpoliceofficerofthedistrictattended
theDWEC,andthiswasmirroredatState/SettlementandFederallevel.
DespitetheslightincongruityofthepolicestructureincomparisontotheFederation’score
administrativestructures, thecriticalpoint is that thekey intelligenceagenciesduringthe
Emergencywerebothalignedto,andintegratedin,theDWECandSWECstructure.Assuch,
itwouldnear impossibletodisaggregatetherolesofthePolice,RoyalAirForceandArmy
during the Emergency because the two military organisations, in particular, were highly
integratedfromtheoutsetoftheEmergency.Forinstance,policejunglepatrolsperformed
thesameroleasArmyplatoons;RAFintelligenceofficersoperatedonthegroundinasimilar
way toArmy intelligenceofficers; andpolice andmilitarypersonnel conducted joint food
denial and resettlement operations. Thiswas inmarked contrast to the siloedmanner in
whichthecivilianintelligenceagenciesoperatedpriortotheEmergency.
However, there are two further complications that militate against a straightforward
assessmentofintelligenceduringtheEmergencyatDistrict,StateandFederallevel.Thefirst
complicationisthattheconstructionandoperationoftheintelligenceapparatusatState/
SettlementlevelwasverymuchamirrorimageofwhatwastakingplacewithintheDistricts
andviceversa,themainpointsofdifferentiationbeingprimarilytheseniorityofstaffand
51
amountofresourcesathand.Thisthereforesuggeststhatitwouldbeappropriatetoconsider
theorganisationofintelligenceatDistrictandState-levelinthesamechapter.
Thesecondcomplicationisthatthemilitaryhadanorganisationaltier,whichwasnotaligned
toDistrict,StateorFederallevelsandwhichhasbeenlargelyoverlookedbyhistorians.This
was the ‘theatre-level’.This relatedto thewaythemilitaryoperated ina jointmanner to
coordinateintelligenceandresourcesacrossmultiplestatesandtooktheformoftheLand/
AirOperations Room and Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Centre, both based at Kuala
Lumpur.Thesewerenotconstructsdesignedto forgepolicy.Norweretheyconfinedtoa
singularDistrictorState.Nevertheless,theimportanceofboththeJOCandJAPIC(FE)tothe
intelligence campaign should not be underestimated – they linked the security forces
prosecutingtheEmergencywithbothastrategiccollectionandassessmentcapability,and
extracombatandlogisticalresourceswhenappropriatetoactuponintelligence.Thissuggests
thataseparatechapterconsidering‘theatre-level’wouldbeappropriate.
Thus,thefirstchapterofthisthesiswillestablishtheorganisationalcontextinwhichthepost-
war Malayan intelligence apparatus developed. This context was shaped by Britain’s
experience during the war, in particularly the development of the metropolitan JIC, the
template provided by Middle East Command and the experiences of SEAC during the
Emergency.While themetropolitan JICandMiddleEastCommand (MEAC)developedkey
organisationalstructuresandprinciplestomanageintelligence,SEACstruggledtoimplement
themintheFarEast.Asaresult,Britisheffortstocreateintelligencestructuressuitablefor
post-warMalayawerebasedoninfirmfoundations.Thischapteractsasa‘prequel’forthe
subsequentdiscussion.
Thefirstsubstantivesectionofthethesisconsistsofthreechapterswhichoutlinethefailure
ofthreeembryoniccivilianintelligenceagenciesinregionconcernedwithMalayafollowing
theabolitionofSEAC,namelytheJIC/FE,SIFE,andtheMSS.TheJIC/FEwasverymuchan
isolatedelementofthewiderregional intelligenceapparatus,when itshouldhavebeena
coordinating,evenmoderating,influence.Itwascreatedinhaste,wasunder-resourcedand
lackedsufficientconfidencetofulfilitsresponsibilities.Similarly,SIFEwasaneworganisation.
Despite itscounter-part inMiddleEastprovidingsignificantorganisationalprecedent,SIFE
52
struggledtounderstandandadapttotheevolvingsecurityintelligencecontextintheFarEast.
Inparticular,therewereinsufficientlinesofdemarcationbetweenitandtheMSS.Moreover,
SIFEsimply lackedtheresourcesandcapabilitiestobecametheall-encompassingregional
securityintelligenceorganisationthatitsmetropolitanmastersinitiallyhoped.TheMSSwas
createdatthesametimeasSIFE.Itsremitwasrelativelyclearbutittoosufferedfromalack
ofresources,particularlyChinese-speakingofficers.Moreover,itsdirector,ColDalley,wasa
divisive character who alienated other actors, not least the Director General of Security
Service, Sir Percy Sillitoe. It was perhaps inevitable that SIFE and MSS would quickly
descended into a debilitating organisational conflict. However, it would be incorrect to
assumethatthefailureoftheMalayanauthoritiestoforecasttheCommunistinsurgencywas
duetotheMSS.Therewasamuchbroaderstructuralfailureoftheintelligenceapparatusin
the region. In fact, the MSS did provide clear and repeated warning of the intent and
capabilityoftheCommunisttothreatenMalaya’sinternalsecurity.Elementsofthediscussion
inthesechaptersprogressbeyond1948,particularlytoexplainwhySIFEfailedtobecomea
key actor in the Emergency. The primary purpose of this section of the discussion is to
establish that the civilian intelligence apparatus inMalayawas in a state of significant of
turmoilevenbeforethepressuresoftheEmergencyrenderedthemasunder.
The second section of the thesis also consists of three chapters. These outline how the
authorities inMalayarebuiltanintelligenceapparatussuitablefortacklingtheCommunist
insurgency.Thefirstchapterofthissectionconsidershowthiswasdoneatalocallevel–that
iswithintheFederation’sDistrictsandStates/Settlements.ThePoliceandArmywerealready
operatingjointlyagainst‘bandit’gangs,includingCommunistgangs,inanumberofdistricts
beforethedeclarationofEmergency.AssoonasthegovernmentinvokedEmergencypowers,
there isclearevidenceof localofficials (DistrictOfficers,PoliceofficersandArmyofficers)
organisingthemselvestotackletheMCP.AstheEmergencyprogressed,theseeffortswere
formalisedintheformofDistrictandStateExecutiveWarCouncils.By1952,thepatternof
operationsandthesystemsataDistrictandState-leveltomanageintelligencewerelargely
establishedbutwereultimately restrictedby the lackof human source intelligencebeing
generatedbySpecialBranch.
53
Thenextchapterofthissectionconsidershowtheauthoritiesdevelopedandcoordinated
intelligence at theatre-level. Two of themost critical organisational constructswithin the
intelligenceapparatus are the least knownabout.Withinweeksof thedeclarationof the
Emergency, theRAFestablisheda jointHQwith theArmy inKualaLumpur,knownas the
Land/AirOperationsRoom.Thisincludedasupportingintelligenceapparatusandformedthe
nucleus of the joint operational planning and intelligence mechanisms throughout the
Emergency. Similarly, by the end of 1948, the RAF and Army had established joint
mechanisms for the tasking, assessment dissemination of photographic intelligence. This
playedavaluable,but little-knownrole, in thecollection,assessmentandcoordinationof
operational intelligence throughout the Emergency. Theatre-level intelligence provided a
significant degree of support to those forces attempting to contain and prosecute the
insurgentswiththeFederation’sDistrictsandStates/Settlements. However,therewasa
limittowhatthemilitarycouldachieve,bothinrelationtointelligenceandthewiderconduct
of the Emergency becauseof the shortcomings of the police and the lack of coordinated
intelligencepolicyinaFederallevel.
The last chapter will explain the fundamental limitations of the key civilian elements of
Malaya’s intelligencemachine (theUniformedandSpecialBranchesofthePoliceandthe
Director of Intelligence) in the critical first six years of the Emergency. Itwill explore the
relationshipbetweentheSpecialBranchandthewiderintelligenceapparatus,howSpecial
Branchwas dependent upon its uniformed colleagues and how the development of joint
coordinating structures at a Federal level reflected the inability of the Special Branch to
manageintelligenceduringthecriticalyearsoftheEmergency.Itwasonlywhenthepolice
hadassumedamoreconsensualstyleofpolicing,thatSpecialBranchwasdecoupledfrom
themainstreamCID,andthataDirectorof Intelligence, independentfromSpecialBranch,
hadbeenappointed,thataneffectiveintelligenceapparatusemergedtocomplementthose
structuresatDistrict/Stateandtheatre-levels.
Unfortunately, all of the key actors within the Malayan intelligence machine are now
deceased.107Therefore,thisthesisisbuiltuponarchivalprimarysources,thevastmajorityof
107Theauthorwasfortunate,however,tohavetheopportunitytospeakwithaformerjuniorinfantryofficerandanofficerwhoworkedwithinJAPIC/FE.
54
whicharedrawnfromTheNationalArchives(TNA)inKew,London.ColonialOfficerecords
(CO series) have been particularly useful because they contain correspondence between
LondonandKualaLumpur,oftenwithsupportingreportsandminuteswhichilluminatethe
thought-processesofofficials in London. These fileshavebeen supplementby the recent
release of the ‘Hanslope’ files (FCO 141 series), which emerged into the public domain
following the court case brought by former Mau Mau prisoners against the British
government.AlthoughfewrelatedirectlytotheEmergency,usefulinformationwasfoundin
thosefilesrelatingtoSingapore.ThisisperhapsnotthatsurprisingbecausetheCommissioner
General for South East Asia, like the head ofMSS and SIFE, was based at Phoenix Park,
Singapore.Inparticular,valuablematerialaboutthecreationoftheMSSwasfoundwithin
the‘Hanslope’files.TheWarOfficefiles(WOseries)andAirMinistry(AIR)filesofferasimilar
levelofcommentaryonpolicy relating to theuseof themilitarybutalsooftencontained
reportsrelatingtospecificoperationsandweeklyintelligencedigests.Thesefilesprovidean
additionallevelofgranularityinunderstandingtheinternalsecuritysituationinMalayaand
theworkofthesecurityforcesduringdifferentphasesoftheEmergency,complementingthe
policy-drivendocumentsintheCOandFCOfiles.Similarvaluewasagainfromaccessingthe
MinistryofDefencefiles(DEFEseries).Incontrast,theCabinetOfficefiles(CABseries)provide
amorestrategiclevelofmaterialinrelationtotheEmergency,notleastviathepapersofthe
CabinetMalayaCommittee.108
However,notallofthecomponentsofMalayanintelligenceapparatuscanbereadilysituated
withinaparticularclassofthearchivesatKew.Indeed,itappearsthatmuchoftheJIC(FE)
material was either destroyed or was not shipped back to the UK after decolonisation.
However,theJIC(London)paperswithintheCABseriesdoesprovidevaluablecommentaries
aboutitsFarEastfacsimile,includingreportsofmutualvisits,listsofJIC(FE)projectsandthe
rare JIC (FE)document.Tracesof the JIC (FE) canalsobe found inColonialOffice files. In
contrastnearlyallthearchivalmaterialheldonSIFEisconfinedtoSecretServicesfiles(KV
series), some of which remain heavily redacted, particularly in relation to the work
108FreedomofInformationRequestswereusedtoreleasefourfiles,specificallyCO537/6403-6.ThisprovidedvitalinformationaboutGurney’sDespatchNo.5,themetropolitanviewofhowbestothercoloniescouldprepareforapotentialCommunistinsurgencyandthepotentialconflictsbetweenthelessonsidentifiedbyGurneyandexistingdoctrine.
55
undertakenbyMI6withinSIFEandalsohowtheunitwaswound-up.Nevertheless, itwas
possibletopiecetogetheraunderstandingoftherolesplayedbyboththeSIFEandJIC(FE)in
the Emergency, crossing checking were possible with other sources such as the Colonial
Office,the‘Hanslope’filesandtheraresecondarysourcewhichdiscussedthetopic.
Whilst invaluable, the sources in The National Archive are by no means complete. For
instance,theColonialOfficefilesholdthevolumesoftheMalayanSecurityServicejournal
thatweresenttoLondonbetweenJanuaryandJuly1948.Thesearecriticaldocumentsthat
areenrichedbytheincisive,unguardedandattimespithycommentsofofficialsasrecorded
intheirminutes.However,theMSSproducedfortnightlyjournalsfromitsinceptioninApril
1946, but only started to send them to London in January 1948. Thus, the collection of
journalsinTheNationalArchiveisincomplete.Fortunately,anentireandunmolestedsetof
MSSJournalsiscontainedattheRhodesHouseLibrary,Oxfordandisessentialreadingifone
istoobtainacomprehensiveunderstandingofhowtheMSS’sassessmentsdevelopedand
changedovertime.Similarly,TheNationalArchivehascomprehensivereportsaboutspecific
Armyoperations in the first twoyearsof theEmergency,but theseappear to fadeas the
Emergency progressed. However, individual regimental museums provide supplementary
sources. For instance, the Gurkha Museum in Winchester, has a detailed collection of
operational reports and diaries of each of its battalions that fought during theMalayan
Emergency. Moreover, the Intelligence Corps Museum provided valuable and previously
unpublishedmaterialonthecampaign.
Thattheprimarysourcesusedforthisthesistendtobe‘official’,oftenoriginallyclassedas
‘secret’andnotwrittenoriginallyforpublicconsumptiondoesnotmeantheyare“anyless
subject to errors or falsehoods than the others.”109 For instance, an obvious example of
acquiescencebiasisfoundinSIFE’sreportsbacktoMI5inrelationtoMSS–itisclearthatthe
H/SIFEwassimplyrepeatingandconfirmingSillitoe’sviews.Onawiderscale,theMalayan
authoritiestendedtoprovideoverlyoptimisticprogressreportstoLondon,particularlyinthe
firsttwoyearsoftheEmergency,theregularprotestationsofimprovementandsuccessare
109M.Bloch,Thehistorian’scraft(2010),p.51.
56
atoddswithoperationalsummarieswrittenbyindividualunits.110Thus,theneedtoassess
the provenance and probative value of historical sources used in this thesis is just as
importantas itwasfortheofficers inPhoenixParkconsidering intelligencereportsduring
Emergency.
110SeeH.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444.
57
Chapter2-StatusQuoAnte:TheFlawedFoundationofSouthEastAsia
Command’sintelligenceApparatus
Therewas,atthebeginningoftheEmergency,athree-tieredintelligenceapparatus
inplacetooverseeBritishinterestsintheFarEast.TheJointIntelligenceCommittee
(Far East) (JIC (FE)) was created in 1946 and was tasked with coordinating and
assessingintelligenceintheregion,bothforthebenefitofregionalauthoritiesand
London.AlsocreatedinthesameyearwastheSecurityService’sregionalout-station
calledSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE).Thethirdlayeroftheintelligenceapparatus
wasformedbythevariouslocalintelligenceserviceswhichwereanswerabletothe
eachterritory’sgoverningbody–inthecaseofMalayaitwastheMalayanSecurity
Service(MSS),whichwasre-establishedfollowingthecreationoftheMalayanUnion,
also in 1946. Each of the three elements that formed the intelligence apparatus
coveringMalayaintheimmediatepost-warperiodwasthereforenewlyconstructed.
However,theconceptswhichunderpinnedthepost-warintelligenceapparatusinthe
Far East were not new. In fact, they were based upon the Joint Intelligence
Organisation(JIO)whichhaddevelopedinLondonduringtheSecondWorldWarand
which policy makers developed in various iterations across the globe during the
conflict,notleasttheMiddleandFarEast.Thenomenclature‘JIO’isusedtodescribe
theclusterofintelligenceorganisations,committeesandboardsconcernedwiththe
collection, assessment, and dissemination of intelligence.1 Regardless of regional
variations, theJoint IntelligenceCommittee(JIC)alwaysformedthenucleusof this
cluster.TheoriginalJICevolvedinLondonfromthemid-1930sasameansofmanaging
theinter-departmentalintelligencerequirementsoftheChiefsofStaff.Throughthe
courseoftheSecondWorldWaritdevelopedresponsibilityforassessingintelligence
andproducingassessments,coordinatingintelligencerequirementsandconsidering
“measures needed to improve the intelligence organisation of the country as a
whole.”2Orbiting,andlinkinginwith,thiscommitteewerevariousbodiessuchasthe
1P.Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentintheBritainandtheUnitedStates,Vol.2:EvolutionoftheUKIntelligenceCommunity(SantaBarbara2012),p.13.2CAB163/8,HistoryoftheJointIntelligenceOrganisation,16thMarch1964.
58
JointIntelligenceBureau(JIB),theJointAerialPhotographicIntelligenceCommittee
(JAPIB),theSecurityService(MI5),andSecretIntelligenceService(SIS,akaMI6).The
constellationwasnotfixed;intelligencebodiesweredrawnintotheJIC’sgravitational
pull,andothersburntup.Theconstant,however,wastheJIC.
The concept and development of themetropolitan JIC has beenwell assessed by
historiansinrecentyears.HarryHinsleyfirstdiscussedtheroleoftheJICinLondonin
hisofficialhistoryof intelligenceduringtheSecondWorldWar.3 In2002,after the
releaseofalargenumberofJICfiles,PercyCradock–himselfaformerJICchairman–
explored the relationshipbetween thecommittee’sestimatesandBritain’s foreign
policy decisions.4 Phillip Davies has examined the broader concept of a Joint
Intelligence Organisation, with the JIC playing a central role, in his comparative
analysisoforganisationalandpoliticalcultureinthedevelopmentoftheintelligence
communitiesinBritainandtheUnitedStates.5Mostrecently,MichaelGoodmanhas
produced the official history of the Joint Intelligence Committee.6 The amount of
historicalinterestinthemetropolitanJIOand,morespecifically,theJIC,reflectsthe
criticalroleitplayedduringtheSecondWorldWarandthefoundationsitprovided
fortheUK’sintelligenceeffortsthroughouttheColdWar.
Perhapslesswellknown,however,isthattheconceptoftheJIO,withtheJICatits
heart,wasexportedacrosstheworldduringtheSecondWorldWar,includingCairo,
Washington,WestAfrica,andSingapore.7ThewartimeJIOsintheMiddleandFarEast
are of particular relevance to the study of theMalayan Emergency because they
3F.Hinsleyetal,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,FiveVolumes(London1979-91).4P.Cradock,KnowYourEnemy–HowtheJointIntelligenceCommitteeSawtheWorld(London2002).5Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentintheBritainandtheUnitedStates,Vol.2.6M.Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Vol.1:FromtheApproachoftheSecondWorldWartotheSuezCrisis(Oxon2014).7ForJIC(Washington),seeGoodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJIC,pp.100-1.ForJIC(Germany)seeGoodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJIC,pp.278-9.ForJIC(MiddleEast&WestAfrica),seeGoodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJIC,pp.112;P.Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying(London2005),p.193;R.Arditti,“SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME):JointSecurityIntelligenceOperationsintheMiddleEast,c.1939-58”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,publishedonline5thMay2015,p.15;ForJIC(FE),seeGoodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJIC,pp,215-28;Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying,p.193;R.Cormac,ConfrontingtheColonies–BritishIntelligenceandCounterinsurgency(London2013),pp.23-64.
59
provided the conceptual and practical foundations upon which Britain’s post-war
intelligenceapparatusintheFarEastwasbased.TheoriginoftheJIOintheMiddle
Eastcanbe traced to the ratherhumble foundationsprovidedby theofficeof the
Security Service representative in Cairo,which became known in 1939 as Security
Intelligence Middle East (SIME).8 This quickly evolved into a sophisticated joint
collectionandassessmentapparatus, incorporating the threemilitary services, the
SecurityService(MI5)andtheSecretIntelligenceService(SIS–akaMI6),coveringa
significantportionoftheMiddleEastfromTripolitaniainthewest,toPalestine,Syria
and the Balkans in the north, and Persia and Iraq in the east. This operating area
encompassed the twin strategic hubs of Egypt and Palestine, both of which had
experiencedconsiderableinternalunrestbeforetheSecondWorldWarandofficials
feared that nationalist forces, perhaps after prompting by Axis agents, would rise
again.Hence,theSIMEapparatushadfromthebeginningofitsexistenceafocusboth
upondefenceandsecurity intelligence.In1943,LondoninstructedtheMiddleEast
DefenceCommitteetocreateaJointIntelligenceCommittee(MiddleEast),subsuming
theJIC(Algiers)whichhadbeencreatedtosupportthealliedinvasionofNorthAfrica.
Thisaddedanextra ‘top-tier’ to the intelligencestructures in theMiddleEast.The
combination of SIME and the JIC (ME) proved a highly effective joint intelligence
apparatus,ananalogueofwhichofficialsattemptedtorecreateintheFarEastafter
theSecondWorldWar.
However, if theMiddle East provided the vision for Britain’s post-war intelligence
structuresintheFarEast,Mountbatten’sSouthEastAsiaCommand(SEAC)provided
thepracticalfoundationsuponwhichthisvisionwouldbebased.Likethestructures
established to service the Middle East Command, SEAC’s intelligence structures
developedwithin itsownoperationalmicrocosmand largelywithoutmetropolitan
influence. Unlike the situation in the Middle East, however, only a very small
proportionofSEAC’soperatingarea(CeylonandpartsofBurma)wasunderBritish
8R.Arditti,“SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME):JointSecurityIntelligenceOperationsintheMiddleEast,c.1939-58)”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,publishedonline5thMay2015;C.Hashimoto,“FightingtheColdWarorPost-Colonialism?BritainintheMiddleEastfrom1945-58:LookingThroughtheRecordsoftheBritishSecurityService”,TheInternationalHistoryReview,36:1(2014),pp.19-44.
60
controlandthussecurity intelligencewasof littleconcerntoMountbattenandhis
intelligence staff. Indeed, SEAC’s intelligence structures were a reflection of its
primarytaskofdefeatingtheJapanesemilitaryintheregionandwerecentredaround
theDirectorofIntelligence,whochairedaJIC,andhistwodeputies,allthreeofwhom
weremilitarymen.TheJIC(SEAC)wasnarrowlyconstituted,composedonlyofthe
headsoftheintelligencestaffsoftheCommanders-in-Chief,theChiefPoliticalofficer
and Head of the Economic Intelligence Section. Hence there were two significant
failuresintheSEACintelligenceapparatus:theomissionofafullyestablishedsecurity
intelligenceapparatusandalimitedinterpretationofaJIC.Theseproblemswereto
provehighlydamagingfortheFederationofMalaya’seffortstocombattheactivityof
theMalayanCommunistPartyinthebuild-upto,andaftermathof,thedeclarationof
emergency.
TheJointIntelligenceCommitteeSystem
TheJICwas(andremains)thebedrockoftheBritishintelligenceapparatus.Itsorigins
canbetracedtothegrowingrealisation inthemid-1930sthatBritainwasfacinga
tangiblethreatfromaresurgentGermanyandtheconsequentacceptanceoftheneed
todeviseaprocesstomanagethegrowingintelligencedemandsacrosskeystreams
of government.9 The problem was compounded because individual government
departmentshadgrownandbecomemoreprofessionalduringtheinter-waryearsbut
thisprocesstendedtowardsstove-pipingandpotentialduplication.10InOctober1935
theDirectorofMilitaryOperationsandIntelligence(DMO&I)highlightedtheneedfor
someformofcentralmachinerytocoordinateintelligence.TheCommitteeofImperial
Defence(CID)consideredtheissueandagreedinJanuary1936totheformationofa
new inter-Service Intelligence Committee (ISIC). Later in year, the committee’s
functionswereexpandedtosupporttheJointPlanningCommittee,wasrenamedthe
JointIntelligenceSub-Committee,andbecameanswerabletotheChiefsofStaff.11
9M.Goodman,“LearningtoWalk:TheOriginsoftheUK’sJointIntelligenceCommittee”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,21:1(2007),pp.40-1.SeealsoSeeGoodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,pp.18-36.10Ibid.11CAB163/8,HistoryoftheJointIntelligenceOrganisation,16thMarch1964.
61
The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee comprised of the Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence,theHeadofMI1(WarOffice)andtheDeputyDirectorofIntelligence,Air
Ministry. Itwasthusentirelyamilitarybody,which lackedadraftingstaffandwas
largely ignoredbytheForeignOffice.12 Asaresult, in thepre-warperiod,“theJIC
playedlittlepartinco-ordinatingtheavailableintelligenceandstilllessinanalysingits
implications.”13ThelimitationsofthecommitteewerehighlightedduringtheEaster
of1939when,asChristopherAndrewexplains,“theAdmiraltytookseriouslywholly
unfoundedintelligencereportsofLuftwaffeplanstoattacktheHomeFleetinharbour,
whiletheForeignOfficedismissedaccuratewarningsoftheinvasionofAlbania…”14
Theproblemwasthattherewasnomeansofassessingintelligence,bothmilitaryand
political, swiftly.Thus, inApril1939, ina tacit recognitionof the limitationsof the
committeeandinresponsetodemandsoftheChiefsofStaff,theMinisterfortheCo-
ordination of Defence established the Situation Report Centre (SRC), which was
charged with “collating intelligence from abroad and of issuing daily situation
reports.”15ThisbodywaschairedbytheForeignOfficeandcomprisedoftheService
DirectorsofIntelligence.Theresultwas,asPhillipDaviesidentifies,thattwonearly
identicalintelligence-coordinatingbodies,theJICandSRC,performednearlyidentical
tasks.16ThissituationwasuntenableandwithintwomonthsofitscreationtheSRC,
theseniorbody,recommendeditsamalgamationwiththeJIC.17Thiswasagreedand
tookeffectinJuly1939,withthenewbodyretainingthetitleof‘JointIntelligenceSub-
Committee’.18TheJointIntelligenceSub-Committeetookonresponsibilityforissuing
dailysummariesandweeklycommentarieswhichhadbeenpreviouslyissuedbythe
SRCbutalso,
a) assessingandco-ordinatingintelligencefromabroadinordertoensurethat
anycommonactionwasbasedonreliableandco-ordinatedinformation;
12C.Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorisedHistoryofMI5(London2010),p.208.13Hinsley,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,Volume1,p.38.14Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealmp.208.15Ibid.,p.20916Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates,Volume2,p.94.17Ibid.18K.Strong,MenofIntelligence,p.113(London1970);Goodman,“LearningtoWalk:TheOriginsoftheUK’sJointIntelligenceCommittee”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,21:1(2007),p.46.
62
b) co-ordinatingintelligencerequiredbytheChiefsofstaffortheJointPlanning
staff;and
c) consideringanymeasuresneededtoimprovetheintelligenceorganisationof
thecountryasawhole.19
Until1939 theWarOfficehadchaired the JIC,with theexceptionofonemeeting.
However,in1938itbecameapparenttoitsnewchair,BrigadierFredrickBeaumont-
Nesbitthatitwasnecessaryforthecommitteetothemakethedistinctionbetween
‘military’intelligenceand‘political’intelligence.ThiswasbecausetheServiceswere
abletoprovideintelligenceaboutforeignmilitarycapabilitybutnottheintentionto
use it.AstheofficialhistoryoftheJICexplains“inessencetheproblem,astheJIC
Chairmansawit,wasthatalthoughFOreportingwassenttotheServices,theydidnot
knowhowbesttoassessit.”20TheChiefsofStaffsubsequentlyagreedtoBeaumont-
Nesbit’ssuggestionthattheForeignOfficeshouldprovidearepresentativetochair
theJIC,primarilytoaddressthisissuebutalsotopreventsomeofthebroaderdisputes
betweenthethreeservicesatthistimeaffecttheworkofthecommittee.
Thus, by the beginning of the Second World War the JIC’s structure and key
responsibilities had been set. However, itwas an immature body. Kenneth Strong
suggests,“evenin1940nooneseemedtounderstanditsfunctionsorhaveanyideas
abouttheprocessbywhichitshouldperformitsrole.”21Nevertheless,theJICmatured
furtherundertheunrelentingpressureofthewar.Fourdevelopmentswerecentralin
its development. First, inMay 1940 the JIC agreed that the heads of the Security
Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, MI6) andMinistry of Economic
Warfare’sIntelligenceDirectorateshouldbecomefullmembers.Thus,thecommittee
broadened its focus toencompass amorediverse rangeof intelligenceneedsand
expertise.Moreover,astheofficialhistoryexplains,“theintroductionofMI5,SIS,and
theMinistry of EconomicWarfare as permanentmembers, also strengthened the
19CAB163/8,HistoryoftheJointIntelligenceOrganisation,16thMarch1964.20Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume1,p.23.21Strong,MenofIntelligence,p.114.
63
Committee’spositionasthecentralco-ordinatorforintelligence.”22Second,through
theiterationsoftheFutureOperationsEnemySection(FOES),theAxisPlanningStaff
(APS), and finally the Joint IntelligenceStaff (JIS), the JICgained itsowndedicated
draftingstaff.23Thisprofessionalisedtheassessmentprocess.Third,asPhillipDavies
explains,duringthewar“theJICreallybecamethelocusofnationalcoordination.This
waschieflybydefault,andinthisroletheJICreallyactedmoreanindependentarbiter
andvehicleofbindingmediationthanoverarchingauthority.”24Theresultwasthat,
overthecourseoftheSecondWorldWar,the“JIC’s…statureroseimmeasurably.”25
Finally,undertheJICanumberofinter-servicebodies“grew-upduringthewar,such
asISTD[InterserviceTopographicalDepartment],CSDIC[CombinedServicesDetailed
InterrogationCentre],andCIU[CentralInterpretationUnit].”26Hence,withtheJICas
itscentreofgravity,aJointIntelligenceOrganisation(JIO)emerged.
GiventhattheJICansweredtotheChiefsofStaffandthatitsformativeyearswere
spent supporting the war against Germany, it might natural to conclude that the
committee focusedupondefence intelligence,at thepotentialexpenseof security
intelligence.However,thiswasnotthecase.Forinstance,MichaelGoodmanexplains
thatasearlyasMay1937theSecurityServicereferredthematterofforeignagents
totheJIC“toallowamoreseniorcommitteetolookintothesubject…”Thefollowing
month a Security Service report included a supporting Secret Intelligence Service
intelligence report that “was distributed by the JIC as the optimum means of
circulatingitscontentsthroughouttheServicedepartments.”27Theseexamplesare
critical because they demonstrate the Security Service, which at the time these
22Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume1,p.84.23Strong,MenofIntelligence,p.114.Goodman,“LearningtoWalk:TheOriginsoftheUK’sJointIntelligenceCommittee”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,21:1(2007),p.49.24Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates,Volume2,p,115.SeealsoAldrich,“SecretIntelligenceforapost-warworld:reshapingtheBritishIntelligenceCommittee,1944-51”,inR.Aldrich(ed.),BritishIntelligence,StrategyandtheColdWar1945-51(Cambridge1992),p.16.25Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume1,p.147.26CAB163/6,TheIntelligenceMachine–ReporttotheJointIntelligenceSub-Committee,10thJanuary1945.27Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume1,pp.49-50.
64
reportswereconsideredwasnotasigningmemberof thecommittee,wasable to
‘push’intelligencetotheJIC,ratherthanwaitforittobe‘pulled.’28
TherelativepositionofsecurityintelligencewithintheorbitoftheJICbecamealittle
moreopaqueinJune1940followingNevilleChamberlain’sdecisiontoestablishthe
HomeDefence(Security)Executive(HD(S)E),chairedbyLordSwinton.29JohnCurry
explainsthatthisdecisionwaspromptedbyconcernsthattheSecurityServicewas
unabletotackletheperceived‘fifthcolumn’presenceintheUK.Assuch,theSecurity
ServicecameunderthedirectionoftheHD(S)E.30Inturn,theExecutiveanswered“to
theHomeSecretaryoncivilianmatters, theSecretaryofState forWaronservices
ones.”31 Phillip Davies also recognises that the HD(S)E was more concerned with
strategic policy rather than operational management of security intelligence, and
“waseffectively,acounterparttotheJIOconcernedwithdomesticsecurity…”32The
JIC remained positioned, however, to consider security intelligence matters.
RegardlessofthecreationoftheHD(S)E,theSecurityServiceremainedchargedwith
investigatingcounter-intelligenceandsecurityinvestigationswithintheUKandacross
heroverseaspossessions.33Moreover,theSecurityServicehadbeensinceMay1940
fullmembersoftheJIC,“thoughtheysignedthosereportsonlythattheyhadhelped
towrite.”34Furthermore,thepost-warreviewofBritain’sintelligencebyDenisCapel-
Dunn emphasised that the JIC had a responsibility to consider a broad range of
intelligence,notleastsecurityintelligence.ThefirstparagraphofCapel-Dunn’sreport,
TheIntelligenceMachine,statedthat“‘intelligence’ inthemilitarysense,coversall
kindsof informationrequired for theconductofwar.Byextension, ithascometo
coversecurity…”Moreover,“withthecomingoftotalwar,themeaningofwarfare
hasbeenextendedtocoverawidearea,embracingsuchfieldsasthoseofeconomic
28Foradiscussionof‘push’and‘pull’intelligencedynamicsseeP.Davies,“SIS’sSingaporeStationandtheRoleoftheFarEastController”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(October1999),pp.105-129.29Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates,Volume2,p.101-2.30J.Curry,TheSecurityService,1908-45(Kew1999),p.49&p.14631Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates,Volume2,p.101.SeealsoP.Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying,p,147.32SeeDavies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates,Volume2,pp.101-2andp.112.33Curry,TheSecurityService,p.7.34CAB163/8,HistoryoftheJointIntelligenceOrganisation,16thMarch1964.
65
warfare, political and psychological warfare and deception. Those responsible for
theselatterformsofwarfarenolessthanthosedirectingourmainoperationsatsea,
on land and in the air, require intelligence.” It was thus clear in the immediate
aftermathoftheSecondWorldWarthatallformsofintelligence,notleastsecurity
intelligence,remainedfirmlywithintheremitoftheJICsystem.
The JIChad, asMichaelGoodmanexplains, “a goodwar,moving forma relatively
obscure and distrusted position one of influence and respect.”35 As Capel-Dunn
concluded,theJIChadevolvedinto“aforumofdiscussionofallmattersofcommon
‘intelligence’interesttoitsmembers,andthusintoakindofBoardofDirectorslaying
down inter-service intelligence and security policy at home and abroad.”36 A key
indication of official confidence in the concept of a JIC was that it was gradually
exportedtodifferentpartsoftheworldunderBritishinfluence.Thisstartedin1943,
whenitwasdecidedtocreateaJICinWashington,whichconsequentlypromptedthe
UnitedStates to create itsownequivalentorganisation, theAmericanSenior Joint
IntelligenceCommittee.37AyearlaterthedecisionwasmadetocreateaJIC(Middle
East)toservetheMiddleEastDefenceCommittee.TheJIC(ME)waschairedbyMrC.
E. Steel, a Foreign Office official, and included representatives of the Political
IntelligenceCentre(MiddleEast),theMinistryofEconomicWarfare,theservicesand
theheadofSecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast.Itwaschargedwiththe“organisation,
co-ordinationanddisseminationofalltypesoftheintelligenceproducedwithinthe
MiddleEastMilitaryCommand.”38Infact,theJIC(ME)waslargelya‘bolt-on’toan
alreadysophisticatedinteragencyintelligenceapparatusintheregionthatdeveloped
largelyinparallelwiththemetropolitanJIO.Ironically,theintelligenceapparatusin
theMiddle Eastmanaged to combine defence and security intelligence in amuch
morecogentmannerthantheJIOintheUKorSEACandprovedtobemodeltowhich
plannersaspiredtoreplicateinthepost-warFarEast.
35Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume,p.147.36CAB163/6,TheIntelligenceMachine–ReporttotheJointIntelligenceSub-Committee,10January1945.37Goodman,“LearningtoWalk:TheOriginsoftheUK’sJointIntelligenceCommittee”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,21:1(2007)pp.49-50.38WO204/8564,CharterforJointIntelligenceCommittee(MiddleEast),March1944.
66
IntelligenceManagementintheMiddleEast39
TheoriginsoftheBritishintelligenceapparatusintheMiddleEastcanbetracedto
September1939whentheChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff(CIGS)whodispatched
theDirectorofMilitaryIntelligence(DMI),ColonelElphinstone,toreviewintelligence
in theMiddle East.40 Already in existencewas theMiddle East Intelligence Centre
(MEIC), a tri-service intelligence collation centre serving the GOC-in-C, General
ArchibaldWavell.However,theMEIChadonlybeeninexistenceforamatterofweeks
andtherewereconcernsthatitwouldnotbeinapositiontomeettheintelligence
demandsintheeventofconflict intheregion.Inparticular,MEIC’scharterdidnot
provide itwithanyexecutiveauthority.Moreover, the issueof jurisdiction loomed
large:MI5retainedresponsibilityforsecuritywithintheEmpireandMI6hadauthority
for collection of intelligence in foreign territories but was not authorised to take
counter-measures. The matter was further complicated as any future wartime
operational area within the region was likely to span both British and foreign
territories,andthusencompassbothorganisations.BothElphinstoneandWavellthus
recognised that there was no coordinating body competent to deal with axis
penetrationintheMiddleEastorthemeanstotakeappropriatecountermeasures.41
The discussions between Elphinstone, Wavell and Colonel Maunsell (the MI5
representativeinCairo)outlinedanumberofdifficultissues,notleasthowtoprovide
the GOC-in-C with suitable interservice intelligence; how to develop the counter-
espionage capability in region (particularly outside of Imperial territory); how to
secure Allied lines against subversion; and how to coordinate the wider security
intelligencefunction.Wavellwasparticularlyanxioustoinjectafocusuponwhatwas
termedPreventativeIntelligenceintheArabWorld(PIAW),thatiscounter-subversion
intheregion.HethereforeproposedtotheWarOfficethataI(b)securitysectionbe
formedunderMEIC,andthatMaunsellshouldbemadeavailablebyMI5tocoordinate
39MuchofthissectionhasbeentakenfromR.Arditti,“SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME):JointSecurityIntelligenceOperationsintheMiddleEast,c.1939-58”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,publishedonline5thMay2015,pp.1-28.40KV4/305,MaunselltoPetrie,26thSeptember1939.41Ibid.,ConferenceatWarOffice,1stNovember1939.
67
thissection,inadditiontohiscoreDSOduties.Wavellarguedthatthe“sectionwould
strengthenandsupplementexistingsecurityorganisationwithwhichitwouldwork
closelywithoutinanywayinterferingwiththepresentrelationsbetweenMI5andits
localrepresentative.”42 WithoutwaitingfordiscussionswithLondon,Wavellasked
Maunsell to coordinate security work in theMiddle East via the new intelligence
section.Maunsellprovisionallyagreed,pendingMI5’sapproval.
Wavell’sproposalsdidnotreceiveuniversalacceptance.However,acompromisewas
reached quickly. TheWar Office suggested that theMEIC would be retained in a
coordinating role. However, they sanctioned the creation of a separate security
intelligencesectionwithinGHQMiddleEast.ThissectionwasformedupontheDSO
Cairooffice,underMaunsell(whowassecondedfromMI5totheGOCMiddleEast,as
GSO1) who answered to the Director ofMilitary Intelligence,Middle East. To get
aroundthethornyissueofrunningagentsinnon-imperialterritoriesintheregion(and
perhapstheequallyproblematicissueofconsultationwithSIS)itwasarrangedforan
SISofficertoworkasaGSOIIunderMaunsell.Athirdofficer,CaptainSholto-Douglas,
wasprovidedbytheWarOfficetocoordinatesecurityintelligenceintheMiddleEast,
otherthaninforeigncountries.43Thenewsecuritysectionwastasked:
a) TowatchandreportonthegeneraleffectintheMiddleEastoftheactivities
of hostile agents whether of enemy nationality or working under enemy
influence.
b) To ensure that adequate liaison is maintained with the Director of the
IntelligenceBureau,GovernmentofIndia,theG.H.Q.India,asregardsenemy
agentsworkinginAfghanistan,alsoNorthWestfrontierofIndiaandSinkiang.
c) ToformulateplansfortheorganisationofSecurityIntelligenceServicesinthe
Middle East and for the improvement and coordination of the existing
machinery.
42Ibid.,GOC-in-C(ME)toWarOffice,27thSeptember1939.43KV4/306,OrganisationoftheMiddleEastSection(I.B.),22ndNovember1939.
68
d) Toactasaco-ordinatingcentre for thevariousorganisations referred to in
paragraph(c)aboveandtoco-ordinatemeasurestobetakentocounteract
theactivitiesofenemyagents.
e) To produce a periodical report of hostile activities and progress made in
counteraction for submission through the MEIC to the Joint Intelligence
CommitteeoftheWarCabinet,alsodraftsforinclusioninMEICIntelligence
Summariesandappreciations.44
Thus,within threemonthsof theWarOffice’s initialenquiries inSeptember1939,
significantprogresshadbeenmade.First,MEIC’s remithadbeenscaleddownbut
Londonrecognisedthatneedforcoordinatedinter-serviceintelligenceandposteda
GSO1toruntheunit.Second,theDSO'sofficehadbeengivenresponsibilityforPIAW,
andineffecthadbecomethecontrollingstationforMI5representativesthroughout
the region. Third,Wavell created an overarching I(b) security intelligence section,
chargedwith identifying and countering enemy espionage activities which was to
become known as Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME). The latter was not,
however,atrulyjointorganisationfromitsinception:itwasstaffedoverwhelmingly
by Army Officers and NCOs who ultimately answered to GHQ Middle East; even
Maunsell who, at heart was an MI5 officer, was given a wartime commission.
Nevertheless, under the immense pressure of preparing Britain’s Middle East
territories for war, themilitary,MI5 andMI6 devised a practical formulawithout
precedent–theCairoDSOofficebecameadefactoregionalhub;MI5officersinthe
regionwerespecificallychargedwithobtainingandactinguponPIAW;andSIMEwas
abletorunagentsbothwithinandwithoutimperialborders.Itwasamodelthatwas
toremain,withlittlealteration,forthedurationofthewar.
Despitethehasteofitsconceptionandhybridnature,atleastfromMI5’sperspective,
SIME quickly evolved into a highly effective construct. For instance, in a letter to
Maunsell,dated27October1941,Petriecongratulatedhimfortheprogresshehad
made.HealludedtothedifficultiesexperiencedbySIMEcausedbyItaly’sentryinto
44Ibid.,AppendixB,22ndNovember1939.
69
war,thelessthanhelpfulattitudeoftheEgyptiangovernmentandpopulace,andthe
“variousso-calledneutraldiplomatswhowereonlytoowillingtohelptheAxis;and
the Japanese who were enemy in both thought and deed.” Nevertheless, Petrie
suggestedtoMaunsellthatheshouldcongratulatehimselfforgettingtoa“position
that is so satisfactory and in which you feel you have got a measure of German
Intelligenceaswell.”45Moreover,asuccessionofvisitorsfromLondonoverthecourse
of theSecondWorldWarreported favourablyuponSIME.For instance,an initially
scepticalT.A.Robinsonconcludedareviewbystatingthat“Security intheMiddle
Eastisinthebestpossiblehands…theorganisationisnotonlyaverygoodone,but
mostimportantly,isrun,inmyhumbleopinion,onthebestlines.”46
That senior figures were able to comment so favourably about SIME is more
remarkablewhenoneconsidersthescaleoftheorganisation’soperationalarea. In
1942Robertsonnotedthatithadresponsibility“fromtheWesternDesertintheWest,
tothebordersofPersiaandAfghanistanintheEast;fromtheBlackSeaintheNorth,
totheGulfofAdenintheSouth.”Itwas,henoted,“aformidablearea”.47Withinthat
area, SIME had two key functions: civil security (which included intelligence on
political, tribal and minority activities of a subversive character and subsequent
executive action) and counter-intelligence (including the investigation, detection,
penetration and prosecution by all means of enemy espionage, sabotage, and
propagandaorganisations).48To fulfil these responsibilities therewasanetworkof
DSOsacrossthearea,linkedtoSIMEHQinCairo.SIFEalsoundertookcommunications
intercept work, ‘Ports’ security (including the issuing of passes and permits), and
registrywork.Moreover,theheadquarters’staffliaisedwithMiddleEastCommand
(viaheadofMEIC,thethreeservicedirectorsofintelligence,andtheDMI),andthe
headofSIMEwas“inconstanttouchwiththeEmbassyoverpoliticalmatters.”49The
45Ibid.,PetrietoMaunsell,27thOctober1941.Petriealsosaid“IhaveoftentoldSISthattheybadlyrequiredoneclearing-houseatSingaporeandanotheratCairo,andofthelatterISLDrepresents,Ihope,atleastsomekindoffoundation.IwouldgladlyseeitsMI5counterpartestablished,althoughIratherdoubtifthiswouldbepracticalpoliticsduringwar.”46KV4/234,ReportonVisittoEgyptbyMajorT.A.Robertson,20thMarch–17thApril1942.47Ibid.48KV4/307,Charter:SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast,21stJanuary1943.49KV4/234,ReportonVisittoEgyptbyMajorT.A.Robertson,20thMarch–17thApril1942.
70
breadthof SIME’s responsibilitieswas extraordinary, perhaps evenmore so if one
considersitshumbleoriginsandrelativelyfewmembersofstaff.50
AkeyfeatureofSIME’sapparentsuccesswasitsabilitytoworkwithMI6, ineffect
switchingtheorthodoxmetropolitanlineofdemarcationbetweenMI5andMI6based
onterritorytoanewregionalnormbaseduponfunction.ItwillberecalledthatSIME
wasconceivedwithanMI6officerasaGSOII.However,thiswasnotinitiallyrealised,
perhapsbecause localcircumstancesdidnotwarrant it.MI5’s firstreviewofSIME,
whichwasconductedbyRobinsonbetweenMarch-April1942,notedthecloseliaison
betweenSIMEandtheInter-ServicesLiaisonDepartment(ISLD–SIS’sregionalcover
name). Thiswas attributed to the close friendship between the heads of the two
departments and to the co-location of their offices.51 The arrangement in Cairo
stimulated co-operation and the free exchange of information between the two
organisationsoccurredthroughouttheregion.
However,thecordiallocalrelationshipbetweenSIMEandISLDwasthreatenedshortly
afterRobinson’sreport.Achangeofaccommodationputphysicaldistancebetween
thetwoorganisations.Moreover,MaunselldiscoveredthatMI6haddespatchedan
officertotheMiddleEastto“coordinatecounterespionageinwhatMI6pleasetocall
‘their’territories.”Maunselltookexceptiontothis,arguingthatallcountriesinthe
MiddleEastshouldbecontrolledbySIMEonbehalfoftheCommanders-in-Chief.52A
further factor in thisequationwas ‘AForce’,amilitaryorganisation runbyLt.Col.
Dudley Clarke created specifically to run deception operations in theMiddle East.
MaunsellrecognisedthatAForcehadakeeninterest“intherunningofdoubleagents
fromtheC.E.point-of-view”and that“ColonelDudleyClarke’sorganisationshould
50ThiswasanissueidentifiedbyDickWhiteduringhisvisitin1943.Asaresult,extrastaffweredraftedintoSIFEHQ,whichitselfwasreorganised.Moreover,WhiteandPetrierecognisedthatratherthanSIMEoperatinginisolation,asanearautonomousbody,itwasimportantthatLondonstrengthenitsMiddleEastsectionandincreasetheflowofinformationtoCairo,inparticularISOSmaterial.SeeKV4/240,MinutefromWhitetoPetrie,29thMarch1943.51KV4/234,ReportonVisittoEgyptbyMajorT.A.Robertson,20thMarch–17thApril1942.52KV4/307,MaunselltoPetrie,4thJuly1942.
71
eitherberepresentedintheSectionorshouldhaveclosetouchwithit.”53Theseissues
had the potential to generate a sense of competition rather than co-operation
betweenSIMEandISLDandthemannerofitsresolutionisillustrativeofthepractical,
collaborative,natureoftheintelligenceservicesintheMiddleEastatthistime.
Maunsell called a meeting in Cairo in March 1942, during which the relationship
betweencounter-espionage(conductedbyMI5/SIME)andtheuseofISOS/MEand
SpecialAgents(conductedbyISLD)wasdiscussed.Maunsell,anunnamedISLDofficer
and Clarke concluded that counter-espionage, the management of ISOS and
deceptionsoperationswerecomponentelementsofoneproblemandtherefore“not
logicallydivisible.”54AsaresultMaunsellproposedthecreationofaSpecialSection
toreconcileandcoordinatetheinterestsandactivitiesofISLDandSIME.Theheadof
thecounter-espionagesectionofISLDwouldruntheSpecialSection,buttheSpecial
SectionitselfwouldformanintegralpartofSIME,andthuscommandedbyMaunsell.
TheSpecialSectionwouldhavetwosubsections;onemanagingSpecialagentsand
headedbyanMI5officer; theothermanaging ISOSmaterialandofficeredby ISLD
personnel.Acentralregistrywouldservicethesesubsections.Reflectingthecloseand
collegial relationshipsbetween the keyactors associatedwith SIME, itwasagreed
“thatthedecisionastowhetheranyMI5orSISagentshouldbeoperatedasadouble
agentandhandedovertotheSpecialSectionshouldbemadebyCaptain[unnamed
ISLDofficer],Lt.Col.MaunsellandLt.Col.Dudley-Clarke.”55Consequently,Maunsell
informedLondon“wehavethereforearrivedatsatisfactorypositionofhavingformed
ajointMI5-MI6organisationtodealwiththemattersabove.”56
Afurtheropportunitytofoster inter-serviceco-operationwastheformationofthe
ThirtyCommittee“fortheco-ordinationoftheactivitiesofAdvanceH.Q.‘A’Force,
SIME Special Section, and ‘B’ Section, I.S.L.D. for the purpose of GALVESTON [the
53KV4/197,NoteofameetingbetweenRobertson,MaunsellandunnamedISLDrepresentative,30thMarch1942.Formoreon‘A’ForceseeHinsley&Simkins,BritishintelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,Volume4,pp.153,189;C.Walton,EmpireofSecrets(London2013),p.41.54Ibid.55Ibid.56KV4/307,MaunselltoPetrie,4thJuly1942.
72
codenameforAForce].”Morespecifically,theCommitteewastasked“a)toestablish
and maintain channels for passing false information to the enemy through the
mediumofspecialagents,b)transitinformationtotheenemyontheinstructionsof
Comd. ‘A’ Force or his representative.” SIME served the Thirty Committee by
developingpotentialdeceptionchannels,providingadviceonreliabilityofchannels
andrunningagents.Thismodelprovedsuccessfulandwaseffectively‘franchised’to
localDSO’swhowereencouragedtocreatetheirownSpecialSections,andregional
‘Thirties’committeesinBeirutandBaghdad.57
MaunsellalsoexportedtheDSOsystemintoIraqandPersia,thelatterbeingunder
thecommandoftheAirMinistry,theformerbeinganindependentcountryinwhich
noBritish intelligenceorganisationswereoperating.58 InNovember1942Maunsell
visited both countries and concluded that the Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq
(CICI),whichansweredtotheauthorities inBaghdadwasnotfunctioningproperly.
Despite being armed with authority from the Minister of State to disband CICI,
Maunsellshrewdlychoose“topreservegoodrelations”byaligningittoSIME.Thus
CICItookdirection“fromSIMEinmattersofcounter-intelligenceinthesamemanner
astheDefenceSecurityOfficersnowforminganintegralpartofSIMEorganisation.”59
Itwouldbetoosimpletosuggest thatthiswasaneasyrelationship; indeed, there
were subsequent concerns that SIME strayed from strict counter-intelligence into
aspects of Persia’s ‘political security’ and that CICI should report directly to the
DefenceCommittee.60Moreover,therewassomefrictionbetweenCICIandMI6.For
instance, in May 1944 Colonel Wood (H/CICI) complained to Petrie that the MI6
representative in Tehran was ‘plundering’ CICI reports to answer requests from
London.61PetriewroteareassuringreplytoWoodbutsuggestedthatheshouldnot
worryaboutduplicationofeffortbecause“somedayCICImayfadeoutofPerisaand,
57KV4/240,ReportbyMrWhiteonvisittotheMiddleEast,AppendixXX,“ThirtyCommitteeCharter”.58KV4/223,AnotefromGeneralAllentoPetrie,22ndJanuary1944.TheCICIoriginatedasintheaftermathofthe1941rebellioninIraq,seeKV4/223,HistoryoftheCombinedIntelligenceCentre,IraqandPersia,June1941-December1944.59Ibid.,MemorandumonCounter-IntelligenceintheMiddleEastAreawithSpecialReferencetoIraqandPersia,SIME,4thJune1943.60Ibid.61Ibid.,WoodtoPetrie,8thMay1944;seealsoWoodtoSpencer,10thOctober1944.
73
ifthatshouldhappen,theMI6representativewillbeonhisown.”62Maunsellseized
uponthiscomment.HesuggestedthatBSectionofISLD“werenottrainedtocarry
outthetaskswerequire”andthatitwouldbedisastrousifthesecuritycomponents
ofCICI(i.eDSO’sPersiaandIraq)weredissolvedeitherinthenearfutureorafterthe
war.”Maunsellrecognised,however,thatthisissuewas“partofthegreaterproblem
whichwould have to be decided as to whether we shall be able tomaintain the
coordinationofcounter-intelligenceafterthewaronthesamesatisfactorybasisasit
isnowcoordinated.”63
The speed of its inception, crossed organisational lines, broad remit and vast
geographical reach allwould lend an impartial observer to suggest that SIMEwas
basedonsuchinfirmfoundationsthatitsearlydemisewasinevitable.AndyetSIME
workedremarkablywell.Pointsoftension,suchasitsinitialallegiancetoMEIC,the
operationalboundarieswithISLD,anditsrelationshipwithCICIweredealtwithavery
realsenseofcollegiality.This isclearly illustratedbythefirstH/SIME- referringto
SIME’sconsiderabledisquietatbeingshackledtoMEIC,Maunselllaternotedthatthey
“justgotonwithourjobs”,ataskmadeeasierforMaunsellbecausetheheadofMEIC
washisbest friend.64Thecommonsensesolutionsatwhich thekeyactorsarrived
wereground-breaking, the integrationofofficers fromthe threeservices,MI5and
MI6withinSIMEHQ,andthecrossdeploymentoftheseofficersacrosstheregionon
functional rather than territorial lines being the most notable achievements.
Furthermore, the creation of the JIC (ME) in 1943 added a degree of strategic
oversight,inpreparationforthepost-warsettlementintheregion.Itisnotsurprising
thereforethatofficialslookedtoSIMEfortheinspirationwhenplanningthepost-war
intelligenceapparatusintheFarEast.Unfortunately,however,plannerswereforced
to create this apparatus upon the far less effective foundations provided SEAC’s
intelligencestructures
62Ibid.,PetrietoWood,26thMay1944.63Ibid.,MaunselltoPetrie,7thJune1944.64ImperialWarMuseum(IWM),80/30/1,BrigadierR.J.Maunsell,SecurityIntelligenceintheMiddleEast1914-34and1934-44.
74
IntelligenceintheFarEast
LikethatintheMiddleEast,theintelligenceapparatusintheFarEastdevelopedinits
own microcosm. Unlike SIME, which catered for both defence and security
intelligence,theintelligenceapparatusintheFarEastwasverymuchmilitary-oriented
andfocuseduponthealliedefforttodrivetheJapanesefromtheregion.Thefactthat
theintelligencearchitectureinFarEastevolvedinadifferentmannerfromthatinthe
Middle East or London is a reflection of the decision taken during the Quebec
conferenceinAugust1943toappointaSupremeCommanderforSouth-EastAsia.The
ideahadbeenraisedthreemonthsearlier.Itwasmostvociferouslychampionedby
LeoAmery,theSecretaryofStateforIndia,whoconsideredGeneralArchibaldWavell,
the Commander-in Chief, India, a ‘spent force.’ Winston Churchill considered the
militarysituationintheregionasparticularlydifficult.TheBritishhadbeenevicted
fromBurmainApril1942,theIndianArmywasinadequatelyequipped,poorlytrained
and demoralised, and the RAF was in a similarly weak position. In addition, the
intelligenceapparatusintheregionhadlargelydisintegrated.Churchillbemoanedthe
fact that his commanders in the region seemed determined to “magnify the
difficulties, to demand even larger forces and to prescribe far longer delays.” He
thereforechampionedtheappointment“ofayoung,competentsoldier,welltrained
inwar,tobecomeSupremeCommanderandtore-examinethewholeproblemofthe
waronthisfrontastoinfusevigourandauthorityintotheoperation.”65
The appointment of Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) was
announcedonthe24thAugust1943.Mountbattenwasexcitedthat ithadfallento
him“tobetheoutwardandvisiblesymboloftheBritishEmpire’sintentiontoreturn
to theattack inAsia.”However,Mountbatten’s taskwasenormous.His command
includedBurma,Ceylon,Siam,theMalayPeninsulaandSumatra,allofwhichother
thanCeylonandsmallpartsofBurmawasinenemyhands.Moreover,Mountbatten’s
commandnotonlyencompassedBritishinterestbutalsoChina,Franceandthoseof
theUnitedStates(which,viatheOfficeofStrategicServices(OSS),hadaconsiderable
intelligencepresenceintheregion).
65P.Ziegler,Mountbatten–TheOfficialBiography(1985),p,219.
75
Lieutenant-GeneralJosephStillwell,theChiangKai-Shek’sAmericanchiefofstaff,was
appointed Mountbatten’s deputy, a decision that reflected the not insignificant
interestsoftheUnitedStatesinSouthEastAsia.However,SEAC’scommandsenior
commandstructureprovedhighlycomplicated,withthethreeServiceCommanders-
in-Chiefs working to multiple reporting lines. For instance, Admiral Somerville,
CommanderoftheBritishEasternFleet,wasonlyunderSEACinmattersconcerning
thesecurityandsupportoflandcampaignsandamphibiousoperations.Otherwise,
hewasunderAdmiraltycontrol.66Moreover,eachoftheservicechiefshadtheirown
planningstaff,inadditiontotheSupremeAlliedCommandinSouthEastAsia(SACSEA)
HQ’s War Staff and Combined Operations Sections. This inevitably led to friction
betweenthedifferentplanningbodies.67
Theprovisionandmanagementofintelligenceinsuchcircumstanceswasparticularly
difficult. An initial briefing document which considered the potential intelligence
structure forSACSEAnoted that“in thenewset-up theSupremeCommander, the
Viceroy inhiscapacityasMinisterofState,andtheC. inC. Indiawillallneedtoa
greaterorlesserextent,commonintelligenceandthattheywillallbeconsideredin
general intelligencepolicy.”AlthoughMountbatten’staskwasto injectmomentum
into thealliedcampaign in theFarEast,SEAC’s intelligenceprovisionwouldbe, to
some degree, tied to existing “static and semi static organisations such as CSDIC
[CombinedServicesIntelligenceCentre]”whichwerebasedinIndia.Theproblemsof
coordinating these interests were compounded by a “great shortage of skilled
intelligencepersonnelwithqualificationssuitableforFarEastIntelligence.”68
Mountbatten’sinitialproposalwastobuilduptheintelligenceorganisationsatDelhi,
duringthetimethathisHeadquarterswerethere,sothatwhenSEACmovedtoanew
forwardlocationasthewarintheFarEastprogressed,“thenecessaryadditionalstaffs
66E.Stewart,BritishIntelligenceandSouthEastAsiaCommand,1943-1946,UnpublishedMADissertation,BrunelUniversity,September2014.67SeeappendixA,TheBalladoftheCINCandSACs.68TheIndiaOfficeLibrary,L/WS/1/1274,NoteontheintelligencelayoutforthesupremecommandinSouthEastAsia(authorunclear).
76
wouldavailabletoprovidetheorganisationsthathewouldrequire,andatthesame
timeleavewhatwasnecessaryatDelhi.”69However,MountbattenalsoinvitedtheJIC
(London) to “prepare a paper for him, giving their proposals for the intelligence
organisationfortheSouth-EastAsiaCommand.”70ThesubsequentJICreport,which
wasproduced in September1943,emphasised that itsproposalswere consciously
basedupon“ourownexperienceoftheintelligenceorganisationcentredinWhitehall
as it has developed during the present war and also out of knowledge of the
experience gained in the establishment of other inter-Service and inter-Allied
intelligenceorganisations…”However,theJICnotedthatthenewalliedcommandin
theFarEastwoulddifferin“importantrespectsfromanyoftheexistingmodels”;that
theirrecommendationswereonly‘tentative’,andthatMountbattenwouldhaveto
makehisownassessmentoftheexisting intelligenceorganisations inDelhiandhis
futurerequirementswhenhearrivedinIndia.TheJICreportwasindeed‘tentative’.It
outlinedtheneedfor“themaintenanceofseparateoperationalintelligencesections
byeachService”,butthe“integrationonaninter-Servicebasiswhereverpossibleof
allotherintelligencesections,eachunderonehand,whomaybelongtoanyService.”
ThecommitteealsostressedtheneedforcooperationwiththeAmericans.However,
it did not provide any fully defined intelligence models for Mountbatten’s
consideration.71
UponarrivalinIndia,MountbattenfollowedtheJIC’sadviceandconductedareview
of the existing intelligencemachinery. InNovember 1943 he reported to theWar
Officethat itwasprobablethatthatSEACHQand11ArmyGroupwouldrequirea
intelligence staff of about 150 officers and 170 clerks, a third ofwhom should be
Americans.72 In January 1944, he proposed the Inter Service Topographical
Department(India)should“bereorganisedandtransferredtoSEAC.”73Ifnothingelse,
Mountbatten was clearly doing all he could to ensure sufficient numbers of
69WO203/5038,JIC(43),Minutesofthe44thMeeting,31stAugust1943.70Ibid.71Ibid.,“TheIntelligenceOrganisationinSouth-EastAsiaCommand”,areportbytheJointIntelligenceSub-Committee,14thSeptember1943.72Ibid.,AirMinistrySpecialCypherSection(forCabinetOffices)fromSACSEA13thNovember1943.73Ibid.,4thJanuary1944.
77
intelligence staff for his organisation. He advocated a “senior officer should be
appointedtothestaffoftheSupremeCommanderchargedwiththegeneralcontrol
anddevelopmentofintelligenceinbothIndiaandEastAsiacommandsand,withit
the provision of the necessary strategic and overall intelligence for the Supreme
Commander,theViceroyandtheC-in-CIndiaCommand.Hemightbeknownasthe
DirectorofIntelligence[DOI].”ItwasproposedthattheDOIwouldbesupportedby
“asmallinteralliedandinterservicestaff,includingtheheadsoftheNaval,Armyand
Airintelligencestaffs.Thelatterwithrepresentativesofthecivilorganisationssuchas
OSS [Office of Strategic Services], OWI [Office of War Information], SOE [Special
Operations Executive], PWE [PoliticalWarfare Executive] coupled when necessary
shouldformaJICtoadvisetheDofI,prepareappreciationsetc.”Moreover,adeputy
DOIwouldoverseethe‘static’intelligenceorganisationsbasedinIndia,and“meetthe
‘I’requirementsoftheViceroyandtheCinCIndiaasfaraspurelyIndianaspectsare
concerned.”74 The DOI would be responsible for taking “decisions on intelligence
policyandapprovedraftappreciationsina‘DofI’sMeeting.’”AJointIntelligencestaff
(JIS)wouldbe formed, consistingof “the seniorNaval,military andAir Force staff
officers(BritishandAmerican)onthestaffoftheDirectorofIntelligence,astaffofficer
representing the Chief Political Advisor and one from the US Army Forces, CBI. A
representativeoftheEIS(EconomicIntelligenceSection)willbeco-optedfortheJIS
asnecessary.”75
TheeventualshapeoftheSACSEAintelligencemachinewasnotdissimilartotheinitial
proposal:theDOIhadresponsibility,
a) ForalljointandcombinedintelligenceregardingthewaragainstJapan.
b) Fortheorganisation,co-ordinationandsupervisionofallinter-Serviceand
inter-Alliedintelligenceagenciesandactivities.
74L/WS/1/1274,NoteontheintelligencelayoutforthesupremecommandinSouthEastAsia.SeealsoWO203/5038,ProposedIntelligenceOrganisationSouthEastAsiaCommand,byGeneralCharlesLamplough,DirectorofIntelligence.75WO203/5038,headquarters,SouthEastAsiaCommand,SecretaryPlans,SAC(44),38/1,5thFebruary1944.
78
c) For communicating to the Heads of the Intelligence Staffs of the
Commanders-in-Chiefanypolicyorpriorities laiddownby theSupreme
alliedCommanderinconnectionwith(a)and(b).76
Thereweretwodeputydirectorsofintelligence,knownasDDI(A)andDDI(B).The
formerwasresponsibletotheDofIforalloperationalintelligence.Thiswasabroad
portfolio.AnotebytheJIC(London)explainedthattheDDI(A)had“underhimthe
Navy, Army, Air and Economic Intelligence Sections and Intelligence Section
(Operations).Heisresponsibleforco-ordinatingtheworkoftheInter-ServiceTarget
Section,thePhotographicReconnaissanceandModelsBoardandtheEnemyLogistic
Committee.HeisalsoresponsibleforliaisonwiththeChiefPoliticalAdvisorandthe
clandestineorganisationsthroughPDivisions,withCommandUnitsandwithSignal
Intelligence. He is also Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Staff.” The DDI (B) was
responsibleforallcounter-intelligenceandcounter-espionage,forcensorshipandfor
supervisionoftheCounter-IntelligenceCo-ordinationBoard.”Hewasalsoresponsible
for theCommandUnitsand the IntelligenceDivision.Furthermore, theDirectorof
Intelligence(India)actedasaDeputyDirectorofIntelligencetoHQSACSEA.TheHeads
ofSectionwithintheSACSEAintelligencemachinehadadualresponsibility,bothto
theirownsectionandtotheDofI.77
ThebreadthoftheSACSEAintelligencemachinewassignificant.Forinstance,thetwo
deputy directors of intelligence had responsibility for a total of fifteen different
sections,forwhichthereweretwokeymeansofcoordination.Thefirstwasviathe
SACSEAJointIntelligenceCommittee(JIC),whichwaschairedbytheDofIandwas
composedoftheHeadsoftheintelligencestaffsoftheCommanders-in-Chief,theCPA
[ChiefsPoliticalAdvisor],HeadoftheEIS[EconomicIntelligenceSection],theDDI(A)
and,whenrequired,theDDI(B).TheprimaryfunctionoftheJICwas“tosubmitjoint
intelligenceappreciationscoveringallaspectsoftheenemysituationtotheSupreme
76LiddellHartCentreforMilitaryArchives,KingsCollege(London),ThePapersofMajorGeneralRonaldPenney,JIC(45)20,AnnexedPamphletwrittenbyPenneyentitled‘OrganisationofIntelligence,HQSACSEA,6thOctober1945.77Ibid.
79
Allied Commander and to keep under review thewhole intelligencemachinery of
SEAC.”LikeotherJICmodelsinoperationthroughouttheempireduringtheSecond
WorldWar,theSEACJICwassupportedbyaJISwhichwastaskedto“keeptheenemy
situation in all its aspects under continuous review and, jointly, to submit
appreciations on particular aspects to the Joint Intelligence Committee for
consideration.” It was also “required to keep constant touch with the JPS [Joint
PlanningStaff]and,onitsownlevel,provideanswerstospecificquestionsofajoint
intelligencenature.”78
The Priorities Division (P Division) provided the second means of coordinating
intelligencewithin SEAC. This originatedbecauseMountbattenwasdetermined to
keep some form of operational control over the myriad of different intelligence
organisationsoperatingwithinhisareaofcommand.Hethereforeissuedadirective
inDecember1943whichstatedthatBritishandAmerica‘quasimilitary’andirregular
forceswithinSEACwouldnotoperatewithouthisauthority.Norwouldanysecret
services operate into South East Asia from other areas without his authority.
Importantly, Mountbatten insisted that no operations could take place without
clearancebyPriorities(‘P’)Division.79Thus,whiletheJIC(SEAC)maintainedastrategic
oversightofintelligencemattersintheregion,PDivisionwaschargedwithrefereeing
the various and often-conflicting demands of the various intelligence agencies in
SouthEastagencies.ReflectingSEACsAnglo-Americannature,PDivisionwaschaired
byCaptainG.A.Garnons-Williams,RN,supportedbyLtCommanderEdmondTaylor
ofOSSasdeputy.AlthoughPDivisionmetasacommittee,RichardAldrichsuggests
thatthekeydecisionsweremadebyGarnons-Williamsoutsideofthisstructure,“after
innumerableliaisonmeetingswithothersectionsofSEAC.”80
78Ibid.SeealsoWO203/5606,aletterfromElserDening,1stOctober1944.TheDofI’smeetingsappeartohave‘morphed’intoaJICSACSEAinJune1945.Thereasonforthischangewasto“emphasisetheoverallresponsibilityofallconcernedintheproductionofjointintelligenceforthisheadquarters.SeeWO203/5038,ReorganisationoftheIntelligenceDivision,SACESA,22ndJune1945.79R.Aldrich,IntelligenceandtheWarAgainstJapan–Politics,AmericaandthePoliticsofSecretService(Cambridge2000),p.179-80.80Ibid.,p.182
80
Whereas the co-location of the key intelligence agencies in the Middle East
encouragedco-operation,themoresiloednatureofthecomponentpartsofSEAC’s
intelligenceapparatusfosteredcompetition.For instance,asRichardAldrichnotes,
“SISandSOEinAsiawereincontinualcompetitionforscarceairtransporttoallowthe
insertion of their agents and also to re-supply them.”81While therewere clear, if
unconventionallinesofdemarcationbetweenSISandMI5intheMiddleEast,those
betweenSISandSOEinAsiawere,atbest,blurred.Indeed,PhillipDavieshasnoted
that“separatingthedirectionofclandestineparamilitaryactionfromcovertHUMINT
collectionbeingconductedinthesametheatrewasboundtocreateanassortmentof
overlaps and rivalries.”82Moreover, as the war progressed, GeneralWIlliam Slim,
commanderofthe14thArmy,pushedSISintoprovidingtacticalintelligence,arolefor
whichitwasnotpreparedandwhenSOEhadthemoreextensivenetworkofagents
capable of providing political intelligence. Against this background, P Division
struggled to contain the centrifugal forces that threatened to fracture SEAC’s
intelligence apparatus and, perhaps only did so, due to the efforts of Garnons-
Williams.83
TheoneexceptiontothisprevailingdynamicappearstobetheCounter-Intelligence
Combined Board (CICB). This was established in April 1945 with responsibility for
“collecting, collatingandevaluating information fromall sourceswithinSouth-East
Asia and from appropriate agencies in other theatres of war on the Japanese
Intelligence Services and all subversive, sabotage or espionage organisations
operatingonbehalfoftheJapaneseoragainsttheAlliedForceswithinSouth-EastAsia
and for assessing their degree of danger.”84 The CICB was, according to Richard
Aldrich,“averydiversebodywithstafffromMI5,SISSectionV(counter-intelligence),
OSSX-2andSEACIntelligenceDivision’sowncounter-intelligencestaff.”85TheCICB
81Aldrich,“Britain’sSecretIntelligenceServiceinAsiaduringtheSecondWorldWar”,ModernAsianStudies,32:1(1998),p.193.82Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates,p.113.83Aldrich,‘Britain’sSecretIntelligenceServiceinAsiaduringtheSecondWorldWar’,ModernAsianStudies,32:1(1998),p.217.84KingsCollegeLondon,thepapersofMajor-GeneralRonaldPenney,JIC(45)280,JointIntelligenceSub-Committee,OrganisationofIntelligenceHQSACSEA,6thOctober1945.85Aldrich,IntelligenceandtheWarAgainstJapan,p.370.Aldrichnotesthat,amongstotherresponsibilities,theCICBtaskedIntelligenceAssaultUnits–seeHS1/329andWO203/5050.Seealso
81
doesofferatantalizingglimpseofthekindof‘joint’intelligencethatwaspossibleand
formed the foundation for its post-war successor, Security Intelligence Far East.
However,theCICBwasstrangelydislocatedfromthemainstreamSEACintelligence
apparatus.Forinstance,itansweredtotheDeputyDirectorofIntelligence(B)andwas
not represented, directly or indirectly on the JIC (SEAC).86 This is indicative of the
relative lackof importanceplaceduponsecurity intelligencebySEAC.Moreover, it
wasinexistenceforlessthanayearbeforeitwassubsumedbySIFE.87Itis,therefore,
atbestacuriousoutlier.
TheAbolitionofSEAC
TherapidendoftheSecondWorldWarintheFarEastbrought,inturn,rapidchange
to Britain’s presence in the region. Initially, SEAC fought to keep a ‘Supreme’
CommandinSouthEastAsia.ThiswassupportedbytheCommanders-in-Chief,and
ColonialOfficeandForeignOfficeofficialsinregion,whothoughtthiswould“ensure
theretentioninpeaceoftheminimumframeworkofSupremecommandnecessary
forstrategicplanningandforsmoothtransitionfrompeacetowar.”88Nevertheless,
theChiefsofStaffconcludedthatwhen“ourcommitmentsintheNetherlandsEast
Indieshavebeen liquidated, theappointmentofSupremeCommand inSouthEast
Asiashallbeabolished.”89Accordingly,SEACwasabolishedinDecember1946.
ThemagnitudeofchangefromwartopeacefortheBritishandcolonialinterestsin
theregionshouldnotbeoverestimated.AsapaperbytheJointPlanningStafflater
noted,“attheendoftheJapaneseWartheSupremeAlliedCommanderwastheonly
co-ordinating authority for all matters in South East Asia. Subsequently, his
responsibilitiesinotherthanmilitarymatterswereprogressivelyhandedovertothe
WO203/5038,‘ControlandOrganisationoftheSecurityServiceinOverseasTheatres’,HQSACESAtoSecretary,CofSCommittee,2ndJanuary1946.86KingsCollegeLondon,thepapersofMajor-GeneralRonaldPenney,JIC(45)280,JointIntelligenceSub-Committee,OrganisationofIntelligenceHQSACSEA,6thOctober1945.87GuyLiddell’sdiary(KV4/470)suggeststhatSIFEwasalreadyinplacebyJanuary1946,withtheJIC(London)recommendingtheestablishmentofstaffon20thFebruary1946.88WO203/6236,AnalternativeorganisationShouldSupremeCommandnotbeacceptedinSouthAsia,1stJuly1946.89Ibid.,SAC(46)77,FutureIntelligenceOrganisationinSouthEastAsia,17thAugust1946.
82
variouscivilauthorities.”90Moreover, incontrast to therigid,hierarchical,military
natureofSEAC,theimmediatepost-warsettlementforBritishinterestsintheFarEast
wasnotablydiffuse,a reflectionof there-establishmentofvariousadministrations
acrosstheFarEast.Moreover,asPhilipDavieshascommented,“thegovernmental
situationintheregionwassomewhatconfusedastheregionincludedbothBritish-
governedcolonialpossessions(whichfellwithintheremitoftheColonialOffice)and
anassortmentofindependent‘nativestates’suchasBurmaandThailand(strictlythe
concernedoftheForeignOffice).”91Toprovidesomeformofcoordinatingmachinery
intheregionpost-SEAC,MountbattenrecommendedthataDefenceCommitteebe
created, an idea that was subsequently incorporated in a broader paper that
advocatedthecreationofzonesofstrategicresponsibilityfortheCommonwealthas
awhole.Thispaperstated that:“themachinery forco-ordinatingmilitaryandcivil
requirementsineachzoneshouldtaketheformofadefencecommitteeconsistingof
the representatives of the civil administrations andmilitary authorities within the
zone.”92
ConsequentlytheDefenceCommitteeinSouthEastAsiawasestablishedinJune1946,
andwassubsequentlybecameknownastheBritishDefenceCoordinatingCommittee
(FarEast)(BDCE(FE)).Ithadanarrowcomposition,consistingonlyoftheGovernor
General,MalcolmMacDonald,whowas the chair, the Special Commissioner, Lord
Killearn, and Mountbatten, whose place on the committee was filled, after the
abolitionofSEAC,bytheCommanders-in-Chief.Thecommitteewasdesignedtoact
“as a forum for the discussion and coordination of all current and future defence
activities…to furnishco-ordinateadviceandrecommendationson localmatters to
LondonandthroughLondontootherCommonwealthGovernments,[and]preparing
strategicstudiesagainstabackgroundprovidedbyLondon.”93 Itwillbenotedthat
these responsibilities implieda significant intelligencecomponentbut, critically for
90L/WS/1/734,JP(47)68CoS,JointPlanningStaff–BritishDefenceCommitteeinSouthEastAsia,26thJuly1946.91D.Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying(2005),p.192-3.92L/WS/1/734,JP(47)68CoS,JointPlanningStaff–BritishDefenceCommitteeinSouthEastAsia,26thJuly1946.93DO35/2272,CoS(48)221,BritishDefenceCo-ordinationCommittee,FarEastandBritishDefenceCo-ordinationCommittee,MiddleEast–RevisedTermsofReference,22ndDecember1948.
83
future events in Malaya, the committee was focused on matters of defence and
preparationforafutureconventionalwaragainstCommunistforcesintheregion–
theprospectofirregularwarfarepassedtheBDCC(FE)by.
InthenegotiationsthatfollowedthedecisiontoabolishSEAC,GeneralRonaldPenney,
the Director of Intelligence, advocated strongly for the retention of a Central
Intelligence Staff (CIS), compromised of an integrated service staff under his
leadership,ratherthanratherthantheadoptionofaJICmodel,congruentwiththe
LondonandMiddleEastmodels.PenneyarguedinfavouroftheCISmodelforfour
reasons:
a) A nucleus of central Inter-Service Intelligence Staff would thus be proved
capableofrapidextensionwhenwarisimminent.
b) Manpowerwould be saved because all information from foreign countries
(other than information on foreign armed forces) would be collated and
presentedbyoneinter-ServiceStaffinsteadofbythreeseparateHeadquarters
(asitwouldbeundertheJICsystem).
c) Answers to ad hoc questions put by either Governor General, the Special
CommissionerortheCommanders-in-ChiefCommitteewouldbemorequickly
forthcoming form an inter-Service Staff centrally located, than from a JIC
whosemembersareinevitablyscattered.
d) ThenecessarycloseliaisonbetweentheHeadsofSIFE,SignalIntelligenceand
ServiceIntelligenceisbestconductedthroughaDirectorofIntelligencethan
throughthreeHeadsofIntelligenceatthreeseparateHeadquarters.94
LordKillearn(theForeignOffice’sSpecialCommissionerinSouthEastAsia),Malcolm
MacDonald and the Commanders-in-Chief approved this proposal and in October
94WO203/6236,DOI–FutureIntelligenceOrganisationinSouthEastAsia,17thAugust1946.
84
1946 a revised Directive was issued to the Central Intelligence Staff. The DOI
continuedtohaveabroadportfolioofresponsibilities:hewasanswerablebothtothe
Commanders-in-ChiefCommitteeandtheBritishDefenceCommittee inSouthEast
Asiaasawhole,anditsmembersindividually;hewas“toensuretheclosestpossible
liaisonismaintainedbetweentheCentralIntelligenceStaff,Singapore,andallother
BritishandCommonwealthIntelligenceOrganisationsinSouthEastAsiaandtheFar
East;hewasresponsiblealsoforkeepingtheJIC(London)andJIB(London)“informed
onallmattersofinteresttothemarisinginSouthEastAsia.”95
Although Penney had argued successfully against a JIC system, as the Director of
Intelligence,hewasalsothepermanentchairofajointintelligencecommittee.Just
as the JIC (SEAC)was fundamentally amilitary committee, focusedupon issues of
intelligencegeneratedfromtheprosecutionofthewaragainstJapan,thefirstpost-
wariterationoftheJICwasheavilydefence-orientated.Forinstance,adirectivestated
thattheaspectsofintelligencewhichwereofprimaryconcerntotheCISwere:“a)the
study of the internal situation in foreign countrieswhich could possibly affect the
defence or security of this theatre; b) the assessment of over-all readiness and
capacityforwarofpotentialenemies;c)theappreciationofthemilitaryintentions
and strategic plans of foreign countries; d) the study of economic and political
situationsinforeigncountriesandtheassessmentoftheirinfluenceonworldtrade
andrelationships.”96
It is understandable that Penney advocated the retentionof a Central Intelligence
Staff,ratherthantheJICmodel.Afterall,officialsinLondonwerestrugglingtodecide
howtheycouldretainthebestelementsofthewartimeintelligencestructures,whilst
meetingdemandsforeconomyandadaptingtotherapidlyemergingColdWarthreat.
Theretentionofatriedandtestedconcept,andonewhichcouldserveasanucleus
forwar expansion and to serve a SupremeCommand in a future conflict, appears
eminently sensible when officials were so concerned about the intentions of the
95Ibid.,DirectivetotheCentralIntelligenceStaff,Singapore.96Ibid.
85
Chinese Communist Party towards Hong Kong.97Moreover, at this time the exact
natureofBritain’spost-warpoliticalstructuresintheregionwereembryonic.Itwas
not clear how the roles and responsibilities of the Governor-General and Special
Commissioner would develop, nor what intelligence demands they would have.98
However,aswillbeseeninthenextchapter,theCISmodelwasundonewithinthe
spaceofyearonthe instructionbytheChiefsofStafftocreateaJoint Intelligence
Committee(FarEast).
Conclusion
The three key intelligencemodels operating within the empire at the end of the
SecondWorldWarallinfluencedtheevolutionofthepost-warintelligencestructures
intheFarEast.Perhapsthemostsignificantcommondenominatorbetweenthethree
modelswastheuseofajointintelligencecommittee,asamechanismtocoordinate
andmanagementintelligenceassessments.However,theimplementationoftheJIC
conceptandtheevolutionofsupportingstructuresdifferedsignificantly.
ThemostobviousdifferenceisinrelationtohowtheJICsinLondon,theMiddleEast
andFarEastapproachedsecurityintelligence.ThemetropolitanJIChasrightlybeen
characterisedasanovertlymilitarybody.However,itwasalwayschairedbyamember
oftheForeignOfficeandincludedrepresentativesofthecivilianintelligenceagencies.
Moreover,itwascomplementedbytheHD(S)E.Itthushadthepotentialtoconsider
security intelligencematters. In contrast, JIC (SEAC)was an unadulteratedmilitary
body–itwaschairedbytheDirectorofIntelligenceandultimatelyanswerabletothe
Supreme Commander. While the Chief Political Advisor provided a token civilian
presenceontheJIC,theSecurityService,InterserviceLiaisonDepartment(ISLD,the
covernameforMI6)northeSpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE)wererepresented.
ThusthefocusoftheJIC(SEAC)wasuponthecoordinationofintelligenceforthewar
effortagainsttheJapanese.
97L/WS/1/174,CabinetOfficestoSEAC,December194698Davies,MachineryofSpying,p.192;C.BaylyandT.Harper,ForgottenWars–theendofBritain’sAsianEmpire(2008),p.216and279.
86
ThecontrastbetweentheMiddleandFarEast is,arguably,evengreater.Although
SIMEwasnominallyamilitarybody,itwasbaseduponanucleusofSecurityService
officers,albeititwithwartimecommissions,towhichserviceintelligenceofficersand
representativesoftheSecretIntelligenceServicewereattachedtoformacohesive
joint collationand tasking centre.Moreover, the JIC (ME),whichwas chairedbya
ForeignOfficeofficialandanswerabletotheMiddleEastDefenceCommittee,wasfar
moreakintothemetropolitanmodelthanitsnamesakethatoperatedwithinSEAC.
Arguably SIME provided the definitive regional model for the collection and
appreciationofdefenceandsecurity intelligence.Whilst thecollationfunctionwas
confinedtoSIME’sheadquarters inEgypt, ithadbothovertandcovert intelligence
officers drawn from the services,MI5 andMI6, distributed throughout its area of
operations. In contrast, the intelligence structures serving SEAC were far more
stovepiped – each intelligence agency, including the OSS, worked predominantly
autonomously, being drawn together only via P Division for practical tasking and
coordination. P Division struggled to contain centrifugal forces that constantly
threatenedSEAC’sintelligencestructures.ThefunctionalcontrastbetweenSIMEand
SEAC’swartime experiences illustrates the poor foundations for Britain’s post-war
intelligenceapparatusintheFarEast.Putsimply,therewaslittlerecentinstitutional
knowledgeorlegacyofmanagingsecurityintelligence(thatisintelligencepertaining
tosubversionorinternalsecurity)asopposedtodefenceintelligence,orrunningan
effectiveJICasconstitutedonmetropolitanlines.
87
AppendixA–TheBalladoftheSACKandSINK99
“At a time when the difficulties between the ‘SAC’s Planners’ and the ‘C IN C’s
Planners’wereattheirheightthefollowingBallardwaswritten.Itisreproducedhere
asawarningagainsttryingtoruntwoseparateJointPlanningteams.
OhSinksareSinksandSacksareSacks,
Andeachoftheothermustthink
Thattheyoughttoberuthlesslyprunedwithanaxe,
Orbedrownedinanoceanofink
TheSinker'sworkwillneverwin
Thewar,saySacker'splanners;
Itjustconsistsofthrowingin
Obscurelogisticspanners.
Andsotheirplanareoftrepu
diatedbytheSackers
(Who,intheSinker'shumbleview,
aredefinitelycrackers).
SuchSacker'sworkthatseesthelight
ofdayishandedback;
Thisisthereasonforthetrite
expression"culdeSac"
Oh,manyandfruitythejokestobecracked
andmanythetoaststobedrunk
BeforetheSinkersarefinallysacked
99WO203/6193,Headquarters,SupremeAlliedCommandSouthEastAsia,‘TheOrganisationandWorkingoftheJointPlanningStaffinSEAC’,SAC(46)8,1stFebruary1946,AppendixB.
88
OrtheSackersaretotallysunk.
Anendtolevityletussee;
Letsacksandsinksbelink'd;
Andlettheirfutureeffusionsbe
Brief,lucidandsac-sinct.”
89
Chapter3-TheroleofTheJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)andtheMalayan
Emergency
Introduction
Thecreationof the Joint IntelligenceCommittee (FarEast) (JIC (FE)) in1946wasa
significantelementintheattemptbypolicymakerstocreateanintelligenceapparatus
in theFarEastcapableofmanagingregional intelligencerequirements inharmony
withthemetropolitansystem.TheJIC(FE)waschargedwiththe“coordinationofall
intelligence activities within the region…and the exchange, discussion and
appreciationof intelligence.”1 Theoretically, therefore, the committee shouldhave
actedasanarbiteroftheinteragencydisputesintheregion,particularlybetweenthe
SecurityService(MI5)andtheMalayaSecurityService(MSS),andbeenawareofthe
growingCommunistthreattotheFederation.However,itfailedinbothrespects,with
significantconsequencesforthesubsequentprosecutionoftheEmergency.
Given its position as Britain’s primary post-war intelligence assessment and
coordinationbodyintheFarEast,asurprisinglysmallamounthasbeenwrittenabout
theJIC(FE)oritsroleintheMalayanEmergency.Itissimplynotmentionedbythekey
secondaryaccountsoftheEmergencysuchasthoseprovidedbyRichardClutterbuck
and Richard Stubbs.2 None of the seven articles by Karl Hack on the Emergency
considertheroleoftheJIC(FE).3AnthonyShortdoesmakereferencetotheJIC(FE)
but it is fleeting.4Ofthosewithaprimary interest intheEmergency,LeonComber
makesperhapsthemostsubstantiveattempttoplacetheJIC(FE)intosomeformof
context. However, this is limited for two reasons. First, while his discussion is of
greater depth than that provided by other commentators, it is limited to two
1CO537/2653,NotebyJICSecretaryentitled,CompositionandFunctionsofJIC(FarEast),AppendixB,DraftJIC(FE)Charter,5thJanuary1948.2R.Clutterbuck,TheLongLongWar:theEmergencyinMalaya1948-60(London1966);R.Stubbs,HeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare:TheMalayanEmergency1948-60(Singapore1989).3Forinstance,K.Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.211-241;Hack,“BritishIntelligenceandcounter-insurgencyintheeraofdecolonisation:theexampleofMalaya”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:2(1999),pp.125-155;Hack,“TheMalayanEmergencyasCounter-InsurgencyParadigm”,TheJournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.383-414.4A.Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60(London,1975).
90
paragraphswithinhishistoryofSpecialBranch.Second,hisdiscussioncontainssome
significant inaccuracies: for instance, the JIC (London) was not part of the British
CabinetOffice at the time the Emergencywas declared inMalaya, rather it came
undertheMinistryofDefence.NordidtheColonialOfficeself-nominateapermanent
positionontheJIC(London)in1948.5Moreover,theinfluence,orotherwise,ofthe
JIC(FE)uponeventsinMalayaissimplynotconsidered
TheJIC(FE)isalsogivenlittleattentionbythosehistorianswhoseprimaryinterestis
orientatedtowardsbroaderintelligenceissuesofthetime.Forinstance,discussionof
thecommitteeislimitedtofootnotesinRichardAldrich’sBritishIntelligence,Strategy
and theColdWar, 1945-5.6 CalderWaltonnotes thedebate aboutpositionof the
Director of theMalayan Security Service (MSS) on the JIC (FE), but provides little
substantivediscussionaboutthecommitteeitself.7PhillipDaviesprovidesabriefbut
usefulassessmentoftherelationshipbetweenSecretIntelligenceService(SIS-MI6)
andtheJIC(FE),andoftheotherregionalJICswithinthecontextofawiderdiscussion
oftheJointIntelligenceOrganisation.8Similarly,therecentlypublishedofficialhistory
oftheJIC(London)providesabriefdiscussionofthespreadofregionalfacsimilesand
how the JIC (FE) subsequently provided a means of awaking concern about
Communismintheregion.9
However,perhapsthemostvaluablecontributiontoourunderstandingoftheJIC(FE)
is as a by-product of a chapter in Rory Cormac’s recent study of the role of the
metropolitan JIC in various post-war counter-insurgencies, including Malaya. 10
5L.Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60(2008),pp.96-7.6R.Aldrich,BritishIntelligence,Strategy,andtheColdWar,1945-51(1992).SeealsoM.Goodman,“LearningtoWalk:TheOriginsoftheUK’sJointIntelligenceCommittee’,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,21:1(2007),pp.40-56.7C.Walton,EmpireofSecrets(2013),p.166.8P.Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying(London2004),p.193.SeealsoP.Davies,IntelligenceandGovernment,Volume2–EvolutionoftheUKIntelligenceCommunity(SanaBarbara2012).9SeeM.Goodman,TheOfficialHistoryoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee,Volume1(Oxford2014),pp.217-18,328-331.10R.Cormac,FindingaRole:TheJointIntelligenceCommitteeandCounterinsurgencyattheEndofEmpire,Phd,King’sCollegeLondon,2011;Cormac,“‘AWhitehall‘Showdown’?ColonialOffice–JointIntelligenceCommitteeRelationsintheMid-1950s”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,39:2(2011),pp.249-267;Cormac,ConfrontingtheColonies–BritishIntelligenceandCounterinsurgency(London2013).
91
Cormac argues that in the aftermath of the SecondWorld War the JIC (London)
struggledtofindapeacetimerole.InrelationtoMalaya,hesuggeststheJIC(London)
was hampered by the “lack of Colonial Office influence in the central intelligence
machineryofWhitehall.”EvenwhentheColonialOfficejoinedthemetropolitanJIC
there remainedadegreeofdislocation,at leastuntilGeneral SirGeraldTempler’s
1955reportoncolonialsecurity.11AlthoughtheJIC(London)istheprimaryfocusof
hisstudy,Cormacmakessomeinterestingpointsaboutitscounter-partintheFarEast.
HesuggeststhattheboththemetropolitanJICandtheJIC(FE)weretroubledwith
structural ‘issues’ and ‘bureaucratic confusion’ which further limited their
performanceinrelationtotheviolenceinMalaya.TheJIC(London)providedguidance
totheJIC(FE)butthelatterhadfreedomtoinitiateitsownreports.However,itwas
notacollectionbodyandwasahostagetothequalityofinformationitreceived.He
arguesthattheinformationtheJIC(FE)receivedinrelationtoMalayawasparticularly
poor and, therefore, itwas understandable that the JIC (FE) failed to forecast the
Emergency.Moreover,hesuggestsithadnoexplicitlydefinedwarningroleenshrined
initscharter.12
ContrarytoCormac’sanalysis,thereis,however,astrongargumenttosuggesttheJIC
(FE)shouldhaveprovidedwarningtoLondonoftheriseinviolencewhichledtothe
declarationofEmergencyandwentontoposeadirectthreatbothtotheFederation
ofMalayaandBritishstrategic interests intheregion.Asdiscussed intheprevious
chapter, the JICs in London and the Middle East both had Security Service
representationforanumberofyears–inthecaseofJIC(London)since1941andfrom
the inceptionof JIC (MiddleEast) in1943.Given that theSecurity Servicehad the
clearlydefinedremitoftackling,amongstotherthings,subversion,theJICsinLondon
andMiddleEastprovidedaprecedentfortheinclusionofsecurityintelligencewithin
theheartoftheJICsystem.13Indeed,boththeheadofSecurityIntelligenceFarEast
(SIFE)andtheMalayanSecurityService(MSS)weremembersoftheJIC(FE).Hence,
11R.Cormac,“OrganisingIntelligence:anintroductiontothe1955Reportoncolonialsecurity”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,25:6(2010),pp.800-22.12Cormac,ConfrontingtheColonies,pp.32-39.13Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm(London2010),pp.129-30.Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates–Volume2,p.21.
92
thecommitteehadnotonlythewartimeprecedenttodrawupon,ithadtheregional
intelligencesecurityexpertswithinitsmidst.
Moreover, the1945Capel-DunnReportemphasised theneed for JICs toassessall
typesofintelligence,ratherthanjustmilitaryintelligence.14Londonexpresslyasked
theJIC(FE)tousetheremitalreadyadoptedbyitscounter-partintheMiddleEast,
which stated the committee would direct “the organisation, co-ordination and
disseminationof all typesof intelligenceproducedwithin theMiddle EastMilitary
Command.”15Subsequently,theJIC(FE)’scharterconfirmedthatithadresponsibility,
amongotherthings,“tocoordinateallintelligenceandsecurityintelligenceactivities,
andtoallocatepriorities….[and]furnishtheBritishDefenceCoordinationCommittee
(Far East), and Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Far East), or individual
Commanders-in-Chief, with joint intelligence reports and appreciations.”16 It is
interesting to note that the JIC (FE)’s charter specially included the term ‘security
intelligence’beforetheJIC(London)’scharterwasamendedtoincludethesameterm
in1948.17
However,atthetimeofthedeclarationofemergency,theJIC(FE)wasanimmature
body, besetwith practical administrative problems andmore profound existential
doubts.AndyetithadthewartimeprecedentsoftheJIC(London)andJIC(ME),the
presenceofregionalsecurityintelligenceexperts,andacharterthatexpresslystated
itwasresponsibleforthecoordinationofsecurityintelligenceandprovidingrelevant
appreciations.Thus,thefundamentalquestioniswhydidtheJIC(FE)sosinglyfailto
provide any of the relevant authorities with an appreciation of the deteriorating
security situation in Malaya and the potentially significant impact upon Britain’s
strategicinterestsintheregion?
14CAB163/3,“TheIntelligenceMachine”,ReporttotheJointIntelligence-Committee,10thJanuary1945.SeeDavies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates–Volume2,p.123.15WO204/8564,JointIntelligenceCommitteeMiddleEast,Charter,March1944.16CO537/2653,JIC(48)10,ReviewoftheIntelligenceOrganisationintheFarEast–ReportbytheJointIntelligenceCommittee:Annex–DraftCharterfortheJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast),15thJune1948.17Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates–Volume2,pp.142-3.
93
ExportingtheJICsystemtotheFarEast
In1946theJIC(London)wasforcedurgentlytoconsidertheintelligencemachineryin
FarEast.ThiswaspromptedbytheabolitionofSouthEastAsiaCommand(SEAC)and
theconsequentchangesinareasofresponsibilityoftheCommanders-in-Chief(CoS).
The future intelligence architecture in the region was further complicated by the
creationoftheSecurityService’sregionalnetworkcalledSecurityIntelligenceFarEast
(SIFE),whichwillbediscussedinthenextchapter,andtheSecretIntelligenceService’s
FarEastControllingStation.18Therewas,therefore,anurgentneedtocreateanew
management structure to reflect the Britain’s changing presence in the region to
coordinatethevariousintelligencebodiesandensure“themosteffectiveIntelligence
service to the Commanders and Civil authorities there, and to our intelligence
organisationasawhole.”19
TheJIC(London)consideredbutdismissedtheideaofcontinuingsomeformofCentral
IntelligenceStaff(CIS),preferringinsteadtoexportamodelbasedontheirownimage.
As noted in the previous chapter, this was not without precedent. Thus, the JIC
(London)explainedtoSEACthattheJointIntelligenceCommittee/JointIntelligence
staffsystemhadaproventrackrecordinwarandpeace,waseconomicalinmanpower
andavoidedthe“duplicationofwork,whichappear inevitable inthecasewherea
Central Intelligence Staff exists in addition to the Service Intelligence Staffs.” Pre-
empting concerns about how the intelligence needs of the Governor General and
SpecialCommissioner’sofficesmightbemet, the JIC (London) suggested that“the
necessaryColonialOfficeandForeignOfficerepresentativesareincludedontheJoint
IntelligenceCommitteeforthepurposesofpolitical intelligence,andthenecessary
full-timeColonialOfficeandForeignOfficerepresentativescanbemadeavailablefor
theJointIntelligenceStaff.”20
18P.Davies,“TheSISSingaporestationandtheroleofthefareastcontroller:Secretintelligencestructureandtheprocessinpost-warcolonialadministration”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.105-129.19IndiaOfficeLibrary,L/WS/1/734,JIC(46)105,OrganisationofIntelligenceinSouthEastAsia–ReportbytheJointIntelligenceSub-Committee,9thDecember1946.20L/WS/1/734,CabinetOfficetoSEAC,9thDecember1946.
94
The tone of these early exchanges is illuminating. Under the Evill Report, the JIC
(London)hadamandateto“supervisetheIntelligenceOrganisationasawhole”and
“toadvisetheChiefsofStaffofwhatchangesaredeemednecessary.”21Thisclearly
gaveJIC(London)aresponsibilitytooverseethebroaderintelligencemachinebutit
reliedupontheChiefsofStaffforauthority.JIC(London)wasthereforeinadifficult
position,particularlyinrelationtotheFarEastwherethemilitaryadministrationwas
beingdismantled in favourcivil structuresdominatedbytheColonialOffice,which
itselfwas not permanently represented in themetropolitan JIC at this time. Thus,
therewasbothageographicalandculturaldistancebetweenJIC(London)andJIC(Far
East), and the language used between the two was diplomatic and considered,
favouringpersuasionratherthaninstruction.Thisdynamicenduredthroughoutthe
criticalphasesoftheEmergency.
ReflectingthelackofdirectinstructionfromLondon,theJIC(FE)wascreatedin1947,
butwithoutaformalcharter.ChristineWarburton,thesecretarytotheJIC(FE),later
notedthatthiscausedgeneraluncertaintyastothestructureofthecommittee.22This
was addressed in November 1947 when JIC (London) requested their Far East
franchiseadapta charterbasedon thatalreadyagreedwith the JIC (MiddleEast).
SubsequentlytheJIC(FE)defineditsfunctionas“toprovideamediumfor:-
a) Theco-ordinationofallintelligenceactivitieswithin[anareacoterminouswith
theBritishDefenceCoordinatingCommittee,FarEast];
b) Theexchange,discussionandappreciationofintelligence.23
Theself-definedresponsibilitiesfortheJIC(FE)includedtheprovisionofadvicetothe
British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Far East (BDCC (FE)) on all matters of
intelligence and counter-intelligence policy, organisation and coordination; and
providing both the BDCC (FE) and JIC (London) with intelligence reports and
21CAB163/7,TheEvillReport,6thNovember1947.22CO537/2653,NotebyJICSecretaryentitled,CompositionandFunctionsofJIC(FarEast),AppendixA,JIC(FE)toJIC(London),17thJanuary1948.23Ibid.
95
appreciations.ItwastobechairedbytheDeputySpecialCommissionerinSouthEast
Asiaandincludedtheintelligencechiefsforthethreeservices,theHeadofSIFE,the
headofSIS(FE),arepresentativefromtheJointIntelligenceBureau(Singapore)and
theAustralianCommissionerinMalaya,byinvitation,asanobserver.24
However, prior to sending the draft charter to London, the chair of the JIC (FE)
approachedtheBDCC(FE)toseektheirapprovalofthedraftcharter.Subsequently,
the BDCC (FE) decided the JIC (FE) should be responsible to them and not the
Commanders-in-Chief. Mrs Warburton explained to London that the BDCC (FE)
consideredthisappropriateas the JIC (FE)hadtodealwithcivilaswellasmilitary
mattersandshouldthusreporttoajointcivil-militarybody.Thisappearedrationalas
theCommanders-in-ChiefalsosatonBDCC(FE)aswellasthepurelymilitaryC-in-Cs
committee.TheBDCC(FE)alsoarguedthattherewas“noparallelinthisrespectwith
thedefenceorganisationoftheUK…”andthereforeitwaswrongtoforcethefullJIC
modeluponthestructuresinFarEast.Thiswasacuriousargumenttomakebecause
theparallel structure in theUKwas in fact thenewlycreatedDefenceCommittee:
eithertheBDCC(FE)wasnotcognisantofthebody(perhapsduetodistanceandthe
difficultiesofcommunicatingeffectivelybetweenLondonandSingapore)ordidnot
realiseitssignificance.BothexplanationsilluminatethedislocationoftheJIC(FE)and
BDCC(FE)fromLondon.Furthermore,theBDCC(FE)instructedthattheheadsofSIFE,
SIS(FE)andJIBweretobeobserversandnotfullmembersoftheJIC(FE),contraryto
London’sproposals.25
TheColonialOfficesupportedtheBDCC(FE)’ssuggestionthatJIC(FE)reporttothem.
A.B. Acheson, assistant secretary in the Colonial Office, believed that it reflected
accuratelytheadministrativestructuresintheregion,particularlytheexistenceofthe
BDCC(FE)forwhichtherewasnoparallelbodyintheUK.Hethereforearguedthat“it
isamisconceptiontosuggestthatitwouldbeadeparturefromthemodeloftheJIC.,
LondonthattheJIC.,FarEast,shouldbemaderesponsibletotheBDCC.,FarEast.”
However, by imposing the JIC (London) model directly upon the existing
24Ibid.,AppendixB,DraftJIC(FE)Charter,5thJanuary1948.25Ibid.,AppendixA,JIC(FE)toJIC(London),17thJanuary1948
96
administrativestructuresintheFarEast,Achesonsawthepotentialforduplication,
whereby “intelligence appreciations which the BDCC require would have to be
considered twice over by the Commanders-in-Chief – first sitting separately as
Commanders-in-Chief Committee and secondly sitting with their Chairman as the
BDCC.”Acheson’ssolutionwasthattheJIC(FE)shouldhaveajointresponsibilityto
theCommanders-in-ChiefCommitteeandtheBDCC,asituationwhichhefeltwould
becomeareality,regardlessofthe‘paperposition.’26
TheJIC(London)tookanopposingview.TheyhighlightedthattheChiefsofStaffhad
alreadydecidedthatJICsabroadshouldbemodelledonthemetropolitanmodel.Also
the JIC (FE) was already part of the Joint Staff serving the Commanders-in-Chief.
Furthermore,theywerealsoconcernedaboutthepotentialforduallinesofreporting.
AbriefingnotefortheChiefsofStaffindicateditwouldbe“mostundesirableifthe
JICinLondon,were,forinstance,toreportdirecttotheDefenceCommitteesincethe
Governmentwould then receive adviceon intelligence from the JIC aswell as the
ChiefsofStaffCommitteewhoaretheirmilitaryadvisers.Suchasystemmightwork
smoothlyintheFarEastwherethemachineofgovernmentisverymuchsmallerbut,
althoughthedifferenceinfactmaynotamounttomuch,thedifferenceinprincipalis
considerable.”27AfurthersignificantpointofdeparturebetweenLondonandFarEast
wasthattheformer’sconceptionofwhataJICshoulddodifferedsignificantlyfrom
theBDCC(FE),andsuggested,“itshoulddealincivilmatter[sic]onlyinsofarasthey
affectDefenceintheFarEast.”Indeed,JIC(London)posited,“thesubjectmatterof
certainreportspreparedbyJIC(FE)indicatesthattheyareatpresentcalleduponto
examineproblemswhichhavenoconnectionwithDefence.”28Thiswasakeyissue,
whichranunresolvedthroughtheformativeyearsoftheJIC(FE).
SirWilliamHayter,thechairmanofJIC(London)discussedthesituationwithMalcolm
MacDonald,theGovernorGeneralofSouthEastAsia,whenhereturnedtoLondon
26Ibid.,NotebyAcheson,19thFebruary1948.27Ibid.,draftminutefromtheMoDtoColonialOffice,17thApril1948.28Ibid.,JIC(48)10,ReviewofIntelligenceOrganisationintheFarEast–adraftreportbytheJointIntelligenceCommittee,13thFebruary1948.
97
fortalksinApril1948.Hayterclearlydisagreedwiththecompromiseproposedbythe
ColonialOfficethattheJIC(FE)shouldberesponsibletoboththeBDCC(FE)andChiefs
of Staff. He explained that “although the Joint Intelligence Committee [London]
considered intelligencematters relating to political aswell as tomilitary subjects,
nevertheless,theirreportswerechannelledthroughtheChiefsofStaffandtherewas
no danger of the Government receiving advice from two separate bodies.”
MacDonald,inturn,arguedthatthesituationintheFarEastwasnotcomparableto
that in London: the BDCC (FE) was predominantly military in character and the
Commanders-in-Chief had the opportunity to discuss issues when they met; in
contrast, in London “the Defence Committee was composed primarily of civilian
members and that, therefore, it was necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to prepare
reportsforconsiderationbyCommitteepriortoameeting.”UnderlyingMacDonald’s
rebuttalwasthebeliefthattheJIC(FarEast)hadtoconsiderintelligenceissueswhich
were broader than purely defence matters. He argued that already the JIC (FE)
“consideredquestionscoveringawidefieldmanyofwhichtheCommanders-in-Chief
Committeewerethemselvesnotsufficientlywellinformedtoadvise.”Headded“as
theJointIntelligenceCommittee,FarEast,dealtwithavarietyofproblemsonwhich
the Commanders-in-Chief could give no independent advice it would be more
appropriate for theBritishDefenceCoordinatingCommittee tobeacceptedas the
parentbodyoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee.”29
TheissuewasescalatedtotheChiefsofStaffCommittee,whichMacDonaldaddressed
whenitmeton21April1948.Despitetherobustargumentspreviouslyputforward
bytheJIC(London),theCoSunanimouslyagreedthattheJIC(FE)shouldreporttothe
BDCC(FE),withthecaveatthat“intelligencemattersofpurelymilitaryconcernwere
submitted in the first place to the Commanders-in-Chief Committee. Lord
Montgomery (Chief of the Imperial General Staff - CIGS) said it was “immaterial
whethertheJointIntelligenceCommitteeFarEast,reportedtotheCommanders-in-
Chief,ortotheBritishDefenceCo-ordinationCommittee.Thedecisionastowhichit
shouldreportshouldbemadeinSingapore.”Perhapsrecognisingthathehadbeen
29Ibid.,ExtractfromJIC48),34thMeeting,extractfromminutes,16thApril1948.
98
out-manoeuvred, Hayter changed tack, suggesting the issue was “of minor
importance…more theoretical than practical”, and agreed to allow Singapore to
decide.30
TheCoSdecidedthechainofcommandfortheJIC(FE),andthusitscharacter,with
deceptiveease.Yettheepisodeprovidesimportantilluminationofthenatureofboth
theJIC(London)anditscounterpartinFarEast.ThemostobviousissueisthattheJIC
(London)wasnotsupportedbytheCoSinthisissue,thelatterapparentlypersuaded
bytheargumentsoftheColonialOffice.Thelanguageusedintheminutessuggests
thattheCoSconsideredthepointofdiscussionrelativelytrivial.Andyetthedecision
served to undermine the JIC (London)’s responsibility, enacted in its charter, “to
supervise the intelligence Organisation as a whole.”31 Indeed, despite all the
forthcoming problems with the intelligence organisation in the Far East, the JIC
(London)didnot attempt to guide, let alone supervise, the JIC (Far East) until the
TemplerReportof1955.32Thesecondissueisoneofdistance,bothconceptuallyand
physically. The conceptual distance between London and Singapore related to the
fundamentalvisionofwhataJointIntelligenceCommitteeshoulddo:Londonfeltthat
itshouldbe limitedtoall intelligencemattersrelatingtodefence;Singaporehada
broadervisionwhichencompassedcivilmatters.Aswillbediscussedbelow,Singapore
wontheargumentabouttowhichbodytheJIC(FE)shouldreport,buttheytookon
London’sviewregardingthescopeof its remitwhichprovedto isolatetheJIC (FE)
fromtheEmergency.ThephysicaldistancebetweenLondonandSingaporeandthe
problemsincommunicatinginanagewithoutsatellitetelephonesandsecureinternet
connections is also emphasised in these debates. It is noticeable how the pace of
debate acceleratedwith the arrival ofMalcolmMacDonald for talks.Without this
catalyst,theissuemaywellhavebeenunresolvedforagooddeallonger.Asitwas,it
tookeighteenmonthsfortheJIC(FE)todefineitscharterand,inthemeantime,the
intelligencemachineintheregionwasadriftanddesperatelyinneedofananchor.
30Ibid.,COS(48)55thMeeting,extractfromminutes,21stApril1948.31CAB163/7,TheEvillReport,6thNovember1947.32Cormac,“OrganisingIntelligence:AnIntroductiontothe1955ReportonColonialSecurity”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,25:6,(2010),pp.800-22.
99
JIC(FE)andtheDeclarationofEmergencyinMalaya
DespitetakingeighteenmonthsfortheJIC(FE)tohaveacharter,therewasaclear
expectationthatitwouldcoordinateintelligenceandcounterintelligenceactivitiesin
the region; after all, this was a key principle of the JIC ‘template’, which was
subsequentlyconfirmedasakeytenetoftheJIC(FE)’sself-definedcharter.Yetinthe
contextofsinglebiggestchallengetoconfronttheJIC(FE)–thatisMalaya’sdescent
into a state of insurgency – it singly failed to co-ordinate, supervise or oversee
intelligencewithintheregion.Thiscanbeattributedtothestructuralproblemswithin
thecommittee;thattheJIC(FE)becameembroiledbythedisputebetweentheMSS
andSIFE;anditsadherencetoastrategicagendashapedbyLondon.
Guy Liddell’s diary hints at metropolitan frustration with the JIC (FE) prior to the
declarationofEmergency:hisentryforthe23rdMay1947statesthatthesecretaries
andchairmanofJICsabroadshouldexperiencehowtheJIC(London)operated;inJune
1947henotesthe“untidy”and“wooly”stateofJIC(FE);andinDecemberheinformed
theJIC(London)aboutthe“somewhatunsatisfactorystateofaffairsintheJIC(FE).33
AninternalSIFEdocumenthighlightedanumberofstructuralconcernsabouttheJIC
(FE).Forinstance,itwasfelttobetoo‘bulky’–AlecKellar,theheadofSIFE,noted
thattheareaoftheBritishDefenceCommittee(FarEast)hadbeenbroadenedandhe
questioned how the governors ofMalaya and Singapore, H/MSS or theAustralian
representativeoftheJIC/FEcouldbe“inapositiontocontributeanythingusefulon
theconditionsinChina.”Kellaralsoarguedthatthe‘topheavy’natureoftheJIC/FE
made it difficult to discussmatters of a top-secret nature.34 There was particular
concernaboutthepositionofJohnDalley,H/MSS,onthecommittee.Thisconcern
echoedthatofSirPercySillitoe,DirectorGeneraloftheSecurityService,andwasa
symptomofawiderconflictaboutrespectiverolesoftheMSSandSIFE.
SillitoequestionedwhethertheheadoftheMSSshouldhaveapermanentposition
ontheJIC(FE).Achesonwrote,onbehalfofMalcolmMacDonald,theCommissioner
33KV4/468&KV4/469DiariesofGuyLiddell.34KV4/422,KellartoSillitoe,18thAugust1948.
100
General,toSillitoeinApril1948.HeexplainedthatthecompositionoftheJIC(FE)had
beendiscussedwhilstMacDonaldwasinLondonfortalks(whenSillitoewasvisiting
Australia).Heoutlined thecase for streamlining the JIC (FE),butnoted thatwhilst
MacDonald“appreciatethelogicofthisargumenthedidnotfeelthatinpracticeit
shouldprevail in relation to theDirectorof theMalayaSecurityService.”Thiswas
becauseMacDonaldbelieved that “security considerations inMalayawereof such
general importance to defence arrangements in the regional as a whole that the
Director of the Malayan Security Service ought to be a full member of the
Committee.”35
Sillitoe’sresponsetoMacDonald’srebuttalwasswift.Ittooktheformofasummary
of the JIC (FE)history.Henoted that asoriginally constituted “it hadnotonly the
intelligencerepresentativesofthethreeServices,theJIB,theGovernorGeneraland
the Special Commissioner, but also the Director of Malayan Security Service and
certainotherofficialsinSingapore.”ThemembersoftheJIC(FE)hadlittleexperience
of the JICsystem“andoccasionallyappeared todesire tobringwith theirCharter,
subjectswhichcouldnotstrictlyspeakingberegardedasmattersofconcerntoaJoint
IntelligenceCommittee.”Moreover,theJIC/FE,arguedSillitoe,concentratedalmost
entirely upon matters of purely local Malayan concern. Indeed, he considered it
“illogicalthattheDirectoroftheMalayanSecurityService,whocanonlybeconcerned
withasmallpositionoftheterritoriescoveredbytheJIC(FE),shouldafullmemberof
aJICwhoseareaofresponsibilityextendsfromBurmatoJapan.”36Itisinterestingto
notethatSillitoedeliberatelymadethepointthattheissueofMSSrepresentationwas
not one instigated by the Security Service. George Seel, the first Colonial Office
representativeontheJIC(London),reviewedSillitoe’sargumentandconcededthat
hemade rathera strongcase.Consequently, SeeladvisedMacDonald thathewas
unlikelytogetthesupportoftheJIC(London)andthathisbesttacticmightbetoseek
theirapprovaltoresolvethematterlocally(itwillberecalledthiswasthetacticused
35CO537/2653,AchesontoSillitoe,28thApril1948.TherealisationthatlocalissuesmightadverselyimpactBritain’swidestrategicinterestsintheregionwasnotnew.SeeWO203/6236,DirectiveoftheCentralIntelligenceStaff,Singapore,26thOctober1946.36Ibid.,SillitoetoAcheson,7thMay1948.
101
to resolve to whom the JIC/FE was responsible).37 Seel’s views may have been
influencedbyHayterwhosidedstronglywithSillitoe,suggestingthattheinclusionof
theH/MSSintherevisedcharterfortheJIC(FE)would“tendtodiverttheattention
of the Committee away from its main purpose of considering strategic matters
towardsparochialaffairs.”38JIC(London)agreedforthe issuetobedecided locally
and,despiteMacDonald’ssupportforDalley,themilitarycomponentoftheJIC(FE)
couldnotbepersuadedof theneed toaccommodate theH/MSSonapermanent
basis.39MacDonaldwasoutmanoeuvred.
WhileHayterandMacDonaldweretradingpointsonthefuturedirectionandshape
oftheJIC(FE),andSillitoeandDalleywereswoppingblowsoversthepositionofthe
MSS in the regional intelligence apparatus, Malaya was descending rapidly into
violence.ThisledthegovernmentofMalayatodeclareastateofEmergencyon17
June1948.RoryCormacsuggeststhat,“astrikingfeatureofthedeclarationwasthat
violencetookthegovernmentbysurprise.”40Certainly,theJIC(FE)failedtoforecast
Malaya’s descent into violence. In the aftermathof thedeclarationof Emergency,
Hayter defended the JIC (FE), blaming “the poor intelligence organisation of the
MalayanPolice.”41Itnowseemsthatthisisaweakargument.Aswillbediscussedin
thenextchapter,theFortnightlyPoliticalIntelligenceJournalsproducedbytheMSS
exposed as early as 1946 that theMCP intended tooverthrow the government in
Malaya.Moreover,theyalsodemonstratedthegrowingcapabilityoftheMCPtoturn
theiraspirationsintoreality.42ThedistributionlistoftheJournalsshowthat,amongst
others, the High Commissioner of Malaya, Governor of Singapore, the Governor
General,ColonialSecretaryofSingaporeandChiefSecretaryofMalaya,theDefence
SecurityOfficer(Singapore),thethreeServicesintelligencechiefs,theGeneralOfficer
Commanding (GOC) Malaya, and the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), Singapore,
37Ibid.,SeeltoMacDonald,19thMay1948.38Ibid,JIC(48)49thMeeting,extractfromminutes,dated11thJune194839Ibid.,COD(48)85,IntelligenceOrganisationintheFarEast,Annex-JIC/FE,‘CompositionofJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)’,12thJune194840Cormac,ConfronttheColonies,p.30.41Ibid.,p.33.42R.Arditti&P.Davies,“RethinkingtheRiseandFalloftheMalayanSecurityService,1946-48”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,43:2(2015),pp.292-316.
102
representativeallreceivedthesereports.Moreover,DalleysatontheJIC(FE),asdid
hisSIFEcounter-part.TheissuewasnotalackofintelligencebutthattheJIC(FE)was
notlistening.
In the absence of clear documentary evidence or oral testimony from JIC (FE)
membersit isdifficulttoattributewithanydegreeofcertaintywhythecommittee
failed to realiseoractupon thegrowing threatposedby theMalayanCommunist
Party.Somecommentatorshavecriticisedthestyle inwhichtheMSSreportswere
written.Theywereundoubtedlybothdetailedandwide-ranging.Attimestheywere
verboseandtacklemultiplepotentialthreatstotheMalayanadministration.43Butto
implythatthemembersoftheJIC(FE)mighthavebeenunwilling,deterredorunable
toappreciatetheMSSreportsbecauseofthestyleinwhichtheywerewrittenisdo
themadisservice.Thatsaid,Dalleywasclearlyapolarisingcharacter:SillitoeandSIFE,
ononehand,appearedtohavedemonisedhim;MacDonaldandGimsonontheother
considered him as an intelligence expert worthy of a place within the regional
intelligencemachinelongafterthedecisiontodisbandtheMSShadbeentaken.The
viewsoftheothermembersoftheJIC(FE)arenotknown,butitisplausiblethatthe
committeewasassplitbyDalleyjustasmuchasthewiderexecutive.Certainlywe
know that SIFE considered itself as the only organisation that could “provide the
DefenceCommitteeortheJIC (FE)oranyotherauthority,withcoordinatedadvice
andinformationonSecurityorCounterEspionagematters.”44IftheJIC(FE)believed
this argument, theywould naturally place lessweight on theMSS.Moreover, the
debatesabouttheJIC(FE)’scharterandcompositionmusthavebeenbothunsettling
and a distracting – indeed, perhaps the obvious questions are that if it could not
regulate andmanage itself, how could the JIC (FE) either pay full attention to the
implicationsofdeterioratingsecurityinMalayaorcoordinateintelligenceacrossthe
region?
43A.Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya1948-60(London1975),pp.82–3.44KV4/422,AssessmentofthevalueofSIFEandtheDSOPointsintheFarEast,undated-believedtobec.January1948.
103
CapabilityofJIC(FE)
Althoughthe JIC (FE)’scharterwasapproved inApril1948,someeighteenmonths
after the committee was first conceived, fundamental problems remained. For
instance,inSeptember1948theJIC(FE)wrotetoLondontoclarifyitsresponsibility
forthe‘collection’and‘collation’ofintelligence.InresponsetheJIC(London)stated
“arrangementsforcollectionandcollationofintelligencewouldbetheresponsibility
ofthe[military]HeadquartersintelligenceinSingapore,subjecttoanydirectionwhich
theyJIC(FE)mightwishtogivethem.”45Thisexchangeisnotablefortworeasons:first
itconfirmsthemilitaryperspectiveofJIC(London).Theydidnot,forinstance,mention
theintelligencecollectioncapabilitiesofSIFE,SIS(FE)orthelocalSpecialBranches.
Second,itisastonishingthattheJIC(FE)requiredclarificationofsuchabasicissue.
A key reason for the on-going problemswith the JIC (FE)was the experience and
capacityofitsmembers.GuyLiddell’sdiaryprovidesadegreeofilluminationonthe
latterpoint–inthepreviousyearhesuggestedtotheCabinetSecretary,SirEdward
Bridges,thattheJIC(FE)chairmanandsecretarieslackedexperienceofJICworking
andthatperhaps“theyshouldgetsomeexperienceoftheworkingsoftheJICinthis
country.”46 Indeed, itwasnotuntilmid1949 that the issueof theexperienceand
capabilityof the JIC (FE)Chairmanwas resolved.Haytervisited theFarEastat the
beginningoftheyearandreportedbacktotheJIC(London)thattheBDCC(FE)lacked
confidenceintheJIC(FE).HepositedthatthiswasbecausetheJIC(FE)hadfailedto
providewarningofthe“CommunistrevoltinMalaya.”Whilsthemaintainedthatthis
wasnotthefaultoftheJIC(FE),HayterreportedthattheBDCC(FE)were‘pressing’for
afulltimechairmanoftheJIC(FE).47InfacttheBDCC(FE)reportedtotheChiefsof
StaffinJanuary1949thattheywereintheprocessof“reviewingthewholefieldsof
intelligenceintheFarEastinviewofthevitalimportanceinthepresentEmergency
ofanefficientintelligenceorganisationatalllevels.”Akeyconcernwasthecapacity
oftheJIC(FE)chairmantodevotesufficientenergiestointelligence.Theyexplained
thatthechairmanwasalsotheheadofthe“ForeignSideofCommissioner-General’s
45CAB159/2,JIC(48),103rdMeeting,22ndSeptember1948.46KV4/469,DiaryofGuyLiddell,23rdMay1947.47CAB159/5,JIC(49)36thMeeting,1stApril1949.
104
and as such responsible for advising the Commissioner-General on Foreign Policy
questions in the area.” Moreover, he was also the link “between Commissioner-
General and his economic organisation and therefore responsible for advising
CommissionerGeneral on such business of the organisation as he requires…” The
BDCC(FE)argued“whateverthepositionmayhavebeenayearagoitisnowaphysical
impossibilityfor,whichasChairman[sic]himselfmaintains,himtodevotesufficient
timetopureintelligence.”48ThematterwasfurthercomplicatedbyMacDonald’swish
toappointanadvisor toproducemorepolitical intelligenceandcombine thispost
withthatofJIC(FE)chairman.49Thiswasnotperhapsascontroversialasitsuggests–
afterallthechairmanofJIC(London)wasaForeignOfficeofficialandthechairmanof
theJIC(FE)was‘ontheForeignSide.’Whatwasdeeplycontroversial,however,was
MacDonald’shopetoemployDalleyinthisrole.Ifthiscametopass,PatrickScrivener,
chairmanof the JIC (FE), informedLloyd that “hemightaswellpackupand leave
S’pore [sic].”50Fortunately forScrivener, theColonialOfficepersuadedMacDonald
thatDalleymight become an embarrassment and this aspect of the proposalwas
dropped.
Nevertheless,theBDCC(FE)andMacDonaldpursuedtheirprimaryrequestforafull-
timechairman.Hayterwasinitiallyfirmlyagainsttheidea.HeinformedtheBDCC(FE)
that he felt “a full-timeChairmanwould carry lessweight than the ForeignOffice
DeputytotheCommissioner-General”andthat“therewasadangerthatafull-time
Chairmanwithnodefiniteprovinceofhisownmighteitherbuildoneupnecessarily
or encroach on someone else’s.” Despite his belief that the proposal was
fundamentallyunsound,HayterrecognisedthedepthoffeelingshownbytheBDCC
(FE)andrecommendedthattheJIC(London)accepttheproposal,whichtheydid.51
48FO371/1691,BDCC(FE)toCoS,19thJanuary1949.SeealsoWO21/2193,Extractfromminutesof9thConferenceheldundertheChairmanshipofHisExcellencytheCommissioner-GeneralfortheUKinSEA,22nd&23rdJanuary1949.49Ibid.,MacDonaldtotheForeignOffice,21stFebruary1949.50Ibid.,minutebyLloyd,27thJanuary1949.51CAB159/5,JIC(49)36thMeeting,1stApril1949.
105
ThereweresimilarproblemswithJointIntelligenceStaff(FarEast)(JIS(FE))duringthe
opening phase of the Emergency.Whilst on a visit to London in September 1948,
Scrivenerexplainedthatduetoalackofmanpower,theJIS(FE)functionedonapart-
timebasis.52AlexKellar,H/SIFE,alsodrewattentiontothisduringaJIC(FE)meeting
inNovember1948.Henotedthegreat‘burden’beingplacedonthepart-timeJISstaff
bythenumberofpaperstheywereexpectedtoprepare.Asaresult,hesaid,“the
quality of the papers suffered and someof themdid not reach the high standard
normallyexpected.”Theothermembersofthecommitteeechoedhisviews:Captain
Evans(RoyalNavy)saidthatthebulkofJISworkwasbeingdonebytheNavaland
Armyrepresentatives;MrGoodwill(JointIntelligenceBureau(Singapore))suggested
thattheJIC(FE)“makefulleruseoftheprincipleofcallingforspecialistpapersfrom
individualservicesordepartments,asforexamplebySIFE.”53Thus,thepicturethat
emergesisofaJIC(FE)thatstruggledtounderstanditsraisond’etre,thatwasstaffed
on a part-time basis for much of the opening and most critical phases of the
Emergency, that failed to appreciate the reports being produced by one its key
intelligence agencies in the region and which was reliant upon its metropolitan
mastersforguidance.
TheMetropolitanInfluenceandperceptionsofthethreat
The JIC (London)maynothavewon thedebateover towhom the JIC (FE) should
report,butitcontinuedtoexertitsinfluenceoveritsagenda.AtatimewhenMalaya
wasrapidlyslippingintothefirstconflictoftheColdWarintheFarEast,Londonwas
concerned that the JIC (FE)was too parochial and neglecting “subjects ofmilitary
importance which would be of greater interest to the Commanders-in-Chief
Committee(FarEast)andtoLondon.”Asaresultitwasdecidedtogiveguidanceto
allJICs“abroadtoenablethemtoplanaheadandallotthenecessaryefforttosubjects
regardingwhichtheymightbecalleduponbyLondon,andsometimesatshortnotice,
tofurnishappreciations.”54TosupporttheregionalJICsinmeetingthistask,theJIC
52CAB159/4,JIC(48)103rdMeeting,22ndSeptember1948.ScriveneralsomentionedthattheForeignOfficeandColonialOfficerepresentativesontheJIC(FE)hadinsufficienttimeto“devotetheirwholeattentiontointelligenceproblems.”53CO537/2654,JIC(FE)91stMeeting,minutes,29thNovember1948.54CAB159/2,JIC48)56thMeeting,9thJune1948
106
(London)madearrangementsfortheJIS(FE)tobe‘indoctrinated’inthelatesttop-
secretsources.55AnupdatefromtheJIC(FE)inOctober1948abouttheprogressof
itswork-in-handisilluminating:titlesincluded‘PossibleRepercussionsintheFarEast
ofthePanIslamicMovementsintheNearandFarEast’,‘TheabilityoftheSovietUnion
toWageWar in the Far East Before the Endof 1948 and its Initial Strategy’, ‘The
DevelopmentofSovietInfluenceintheFarEast’,‘CommunismintheFarEast’,‘The
Advantages of Suppressing the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong’, and
‘Intelligence Organisation for War in the Far East.’56 Four months after the JIC
(London)’sguidance,twothingsstandoutfromthislistofreports:first,perhapsaside
from the report relating to Hong Kong, there was little that could be considered
parochial;second,noneofthereportsspecificallyrelatedtotheEmergencyinMalaya.
TheJIC/FE’sfocuswasveryclearlyonstrategicintelligenceissuesacrosstheFarEast.
AcorollaryofLondon’sattemptstofocustheJIC(FE)towardsmorestrategictopics
wasthedesiretodisaggregatecivilorpolitical intelligence,aboutwhichtheywere
less interested, from purelymilitarymatters. For instance, a briefing note for the
ChiefsofStaffarguedthat“althoughtheJIC(FE)mayberequiredtoexamineproblems
whicharepredominantlycivilincharacter…theyshouldnotberequiredtoexamine
problemswhichareofnotdefenceinterests.(Therehavebeeninstancesofthisinthe
past.)”57Similarly,duringthediscussionsheldbytheChiefsofStaffabouttowhom
theJIC(FE)shouldreport,SirJohnCunninghamstressedtheneed“toensurethatthe
JointIntelligenceCommittee,FarEast,wasnotaskedtoperformtaskswhichshould
more correctly undertaken by the Security Intelligence, Far East.” In this instance,
MacDonald agreed “it was important to avoid overloading the Joint Intelligence
Committee, Far East with matters that were more correctly the responsibility of
Security Intelligence,FarEast.”58 However,thedividing linebetweendefenceand
securityintelligencewasnotsomuchblurredascompletelyundefined.
55Ibid.,ConfidentialAnnex11thJune1948.56CO537/2654,JIC(FE)ProgressReport,2ndOctober1948.57CO537/2653,AbriefingnotefortheChiefsofStaff,entitledJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)–ChannelsofResponsibility,April1948.58Ibid.,COS(48)55thMeeting,extractfromminutes,21stApril1948.
107
Thedebateaboutthedivisionandownershipofpoliticalandintelligencewasmore
intense in Singapore, not least because the issue became linkedwith the conflict
betweentheMSSandSIFE.Foritspart,theJIC(FE)tookabroadinterpretationofthe
issueandattemptedtosecureasmuchrelevantinformationasitcould,regardlessof
thedistinctionbetweenpoliticalanddefenceintelligence.Forinstance,inadiscussion
abouttheflowofinformationfromBritishandBritish-controlledterritorieswithinthe
region,RalphHorne,MacDonald’sdeputy,explained toAcheson that“atone time
there was a disposition to regard such information as not, in the strictest sense,
‘intelligence’.”Nonetheless,theflowofsuchinformationwasdeemed“desirable”and
Horne,onbehalfof theJIC (FE), instructedregionaladministrationstoensurethey
providedregularupdates.59Incontrast,theJIC(London)hadlittleinterestinthemore
‘political’ aspects of information being sent to the JIC (FE) as a result of Horne’s
instruction.Hence,whenPatrickScrivenervisitedtheJIC(London)inOctober1948,
the discussion of the JIC (FE)’s problems in obtaining military and economic
intelligence on areas under US control in the region, particularly Japan, took
precedenceoverdiscussionoftheintelligenceorganisationinMalaya–indeed,the
minutesdonotrecordScrivenerprovidingJIC(London)withanyformofsecurityor
intelligenceupdateabouttheEmergency.60
ThepotentialfortheunrestinMalayatohaveafundamentallydestabilisinginfluence
upon Britain’s regional position (whether fiscally, in terms of damage toMalaya’s
dollarearningpotential;theopportunitycostoffightingaprotractedinsurgency;or
toBritain’scredibility)appearstohavebeenlargelyoverlookedinthebuildupto,and
aftermath of, the declaration of a state of Emergency. This is surprising, not least
becausetherewasanacknowledgementfromtheearliestdaysoftheBritishMilitary
Administration (BMA), that events inMalaya could have an impact upon Britain’s
widerinterestsintheregion.Forinstance,aSEACpaperwritteninJuly1946noted
“the collapse of law and order in any given area…would imply a threat to British
interestsintheareaasawhole.”61Also,bythetimetheauthoritieshaddeclareda
59Ibid.,HonetoAcheson,22ndMay1948.60CAB159/2,JIC(48)103rdMeeting,22ndSeptember1948.61WO203/6236,SurveyofCo-ordinationwithintheTerritoriesofSouthEastAsia,18thJuly1946.
108
state of Emergency, the MSS had been providing fortnightly updates to relevant
partiesabouttheintentandcapabilityoftheMCPtodestabiliseMalaya.62Moreover,
theJIC(FE)charterchargeditwiththeresponsibilityoftheexchange,discussionand
appreciationofintelligence.
However,itshouldbenotedthatthecommentaryfromtheMSSonthethreatposed
bytheMCPtookplaceagainsta‘whitenoise’ofgeneralcriminality,labourdisputes,
thespectreofMalayandIndiannationalism,andadivisiveinternalconflictbetween
theMSSandMI5.Asaresultthemessagebecamediluted.Inmid-1948therewasa
lackofcertaintyamongsttheMalayanexecutiveandcolonialauthoritiesontheexact
causeoftheviolencethatledtothemurderofthreeBritishplantersinJune1948and
the subsequent declaration of Emergency.63 Thus, in thatmonth a senior Colonial
Officeofficialminutedthathewasnotclearwhether“thepresentoutragewasthe
workofgangrobbers,orofgangstersemployedbypoliticalgroups.”64Thisstateof
complacencywasexacerbatedbyhowtheColonialOfficechosetodescribetheMCP
and its military wing, the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army. In June 1948, the
ColonialOffice created an office of the Information ResearchDepartment (IRD) in
Phoenix Park, Singapore, which assumed responsibility for how the Communist
insurgentswere portrayed.65 ByNovember it had been “decided that the criminal
elementsengagedinactsofviolenceinMalayashouldbereferredtoas‘bandits.’On
no account should the term ‘insurgents’, which might suggest a genuine popular
rising, be used.”66 Moreover, as Cormac and Bennett have suggested, the
‘underplaying’ofthethreatposedbytheMCPwasperpetuatedby“atendencyto
62Ibid,FortnightlyReviewofCommunismintheColonies,17thJuly1948.63Stockwell,“‘Awidespreadandlong-concoctedplottooverthrowtheGovernmentinMalaya?’TheOriginsoftheMalayanEmergency”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,21:3(1993),pp.66-88.;Stockwell,“ChinPengandtheStruggleforMalaya”,JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,3:16(2006),p.286.SeealsoP.Deery,“Britain’sAsianColdWar?”,JournalofColdWarStudies,9:1(Winter2007),pp.29-54.64CO717/172,MinutebyOMorrismadewhilstdraftingabriefforCreechJones,inpreparationforhismeetingwithadelegationrepresentingEuropeanbusinessintereststodiscussMalayanlawlessnessandGent’scounter-measures,22ndJune1948.65P.Deery,“TheTerminologyofTerrorism:Malaya,1948-52”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,34:2(June2003),pp.231-247.66CO534/4762,‘DesignationofbanditsinMalaya’,MinutebyHighamtoBlackburne,12thNovember1948,quotedbyibid.,p236.
109
justify theauthorities’ownperformanceandon-going strategy.”67 As such, in the
earliest phase of the Emergency, the relatively low-level and local nature of the
violencedidnotmakethesubjectivethresholdsnecessarytotriggerconcernfromJIC
(FE). In other words, the JIC (FE) was concerned with identifying potential
conventional threats to British interests in the region, particularly fromChina and
Russia,ratherthanapparentlylow-level‘bandit’activity.
The dynamic between the metropolitan and Far East JICs was constrained by
competingpriorities.JIC(London)wasprimarilyconcernedwithintelligenceaboutthe
defence of British interests across the Far East and intelligence relating to ‘single-
issues’rarelyappeartohavestimulatedtheirinterest.TheJIC(FE)predominantlytook
theirleadfromLondon,asreflectedinperiodicprogressreportsoftheassessments
uponwhich theywereworking. In contrast, theColonialOffice, as representedby
MacDonald,wasmore interested inpoliticaland territoryspecific intelligence,and
enlistedthedraftingskillsofJIS(FE)tosupportthis,buttheirworkdidnotbecomeJIC
(FE) papers. Moreover, as Templer was later to highlight, the Colonial Office
consideredthattheobjectofintelligencewas“toservetheColonialGovernments,on
whom the responsibility for action falls in the first place; London is consequently
regarded as an ‘information’ rather than an ‘action’ addressee.”68 The flow of
intelligencefromtheFarEasttoLondonwasfurtherhinderedbecausetheColonial
OfficewasonlyrepresentedontheJIC(London)fromOctober1948andwasnota
signatory of the JIC charter, nor an issuing authority of JIC reports. Thus, the
effectivenessoftheflowofintelligenceabouttheEmergencybetweentheFarEast
andLondondependedupontheJIC(FE)havingthefreedomandinclinationtosetits
own agenda and JIC (London) being receptive to the product that was sent to it
(backedupbyaclearlineofcommunicationwithintheColonialOffice).Yet,inthefirst
twoyearsoftheEmergencyandarguablynotuntilafterthe1955Templerreport,the
67R.Cormac,FindingaRole:TheJointIntelligenceCommitteeandCounterinsurgencyattheEndofEmpire,Phd,King’sCollegeLondon,2011,p.5;H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444.SeealsoDeery,“TheTerminologyofTerrorism:Malaya,1948-52”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,32:2(June2003),pp.236-245.68CAB21/2925,‘ReportonColonialSecuritybyGeneralSirGeraldTempler’,April1955.
110
intelligencedynamicbetweentheFarEastandLondonwasstymied:JIC(London)was
focusedonstrategicintelligence,JIC(FE)followedsuit,and,theColonialOfficelacked
theinfluencetoalterthesepriorities.
LocalIntelligenceCommittee–themissingcommittee?
ThischapterhasthusfararguedthattheJIC(FE)shouldhavetakenactiontomanage
thedisparateandfracturedintelligenceapparatusintheFarEast,notleastMalaya.It
shouldbenoted, however, that it did attempt in the year after thedeclarationof
Emergencytotakeremedialactionbyproposingthatterritoriesintheregioncreate
LocalIntelligenceCommittees(LICs).However,theJIC(FE)failedtoinfluencetheHigh
CommissionerofMalaya,SirHenryGurney,todoso.Theoriginsofthisproposalcan
betracedtolateJuly1948whentheJIC(FE)expressedtotheBDCC(FE)frustration
regarding thedelays inobtaining local intelligence fromMalaya.Therewas similar
concern in London. For instance, inAugust1948 theDirectorofNaval Intelligence
receivedminutesoffiveJIC(FE)meetingsheldbetween1stJulyand3rdAugust.Having
readthem,hefeltthatthe“thelackofanadequateintelligenceorganisationatKuala
LumpurshouldbebroughttotheattentionoftheJICwithaviewofallpossibleaction
being taken to remedy this state of affairs.”69 In the following month, Patrick
Scrivener,chairmanoftheJIC(FE)tooktheopportunityaffordedbyavisittoLondon
toproposetotheCoSthateachBritishterritoryintheFarEastshouldcreateaLocal
Intelligence Committee (LIC).70 The proposed LICs would not have any executive
powers–theirkeyfunctionswouldbe:
a) To advise the Local Defence Committee on all matters of policy and
organisationconcerningintelligenceandsecurityintelligence;
b) To co-ordinate all intelligence and security activities within the area of
responsibility;
69CO537/2653,DNItoJICSecretary,23rdAugust1948.70CAB159/4,JICMinutes,JIC(48)103rdMeeting,22ndSeptember1948.
111
c) TofurnishtheLocalDefenceCommittee(orindividualmembersoftheLocal
Defence Committee on request) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far
East)withjointintelligencereportsandappreciations.71
The JIC (FE)’s proposal overlapped with a wider review of ‘local organisation for
defence’ in thecolonies.This includeda requestbyCreech Jones, theSecretaryof
StatefortheColonies,forlocaladministrationstoconsidercreatingLocalIntelligence
Committees.72TheBDCC(FE)discussedthematterinAugust.SirAlexanderGrantham,
governorofHongKong, informedhiscolleaguesontheBDCC(FE)thathisterritory
had set-up a LIC in 1946 but it did not work well and was allowed to lapse. He
expressedstrongresistancetotheideaofresurrectingtheidea,arguingthatthe“the
settingupofacommitteemightimposeadelaywithoutanypracticalcompensating
advantage.” As such he though the idea “unnecessary, and it might be positively
harmful.”MacDonaldattemptedtoreassureGranthambysuggesting“itcouldbelaid
downthatitwasnofunctionofthelocalintelligencecommitteetoeditthereports
from the Special Branch, or to produce information on its own, but simply be
responsible for producing joint comments and appreciations on the information
available.” In contrast to Grantham, Sir Franklin Gimson, governor of Singapore,
informedtheBDCC(FE)thattheLICinhiscolonywasflourishing.He“foundajoint
intelligencecommitteeessentialformaintainingliaisonandpoolinginformation,and
wassurethatitwasnecessaryintimesofquietsothatitcouldfunctionassoonasan
Emergencyarose.”PerhapsbecauseSirAlexanderNewboltwasonlyadministering
the interregnum in Malaya between Sir Edward Gent and Sir Henry Gurney, he
expressedonlylimitedopinionsontheidea.73Thiswasamissedopportunityandthe
idea lay dormant until Sir Henry Gurney referred to LICs in his influential fifth
despatch,ayearlater.
71CAB176/19,BDCC(FE)toCoS,18thAugust1948.72CO537/4306,ExtractfromMinutesof10thMeetingofS’pore[sic],LocalDefenceCommitteeheldon7thSeptember1948.73CO537/2653,Extractfromminutesof11thMeetingoftheBritishDefenceCoordinationCommittee(FarEast),7thAugust1948.
112
GurneyresistedstronglyLondon’scallstocreateaLIC.74Hejustifiedthispositionby
arguingthatafixedcommittee“mayappealtothetidymind,butisnotsousefulin
practiceasaflexiblesystemofconferencesandtheappointmentofacorrespondent
whom the Joint Intelligence Committee can approachwhen they need a paper or
information.”75At theheart of thedebatewere two fundamental issues: how the
Federation (andeveryother colonial territory in the region) collectedandcollated
politicalandsecurityintelligence,andhowtheJICcouldbe“enabledtocarryoutits
keytaskbybeinggivenproperbackingbyColonialterritories.”Gurneyarguedthat
SpecialBranchshouldcollectandcollate“allsourcesofcivilintelligence.”IftheSpecial
Branchwasworkingeffectively,therewasnoneedforaLIC.76Moreover,theColonial
Office felt that the JIC (FE) was unsuitable “for the handling of certain political
intelligencematters.”77Indeed,Gurneynotedthatthe“JointIntelligenceCommittee
contains no representative of the Governments or Police Forces of the Colonial
Territories in its area.” As a result, security concerns could not be adequately
monitored by the JIC (FE). The High Commissioner was also concerned that a LIC
“wouldnaturallybesubordinatetotheLocalDefenceCommitteewhichmayinclude
unofficialrepresentation”,andthusposeathreattosecurity.78
In the subsequent discussion the JIC (London) noted that Gurney appeared to
misunderstandthepositionofLICwithinthewiderintelligencemachinery:ratherthan
answeringtotheLocalDefenceCouncil,aLICshould,theyposited,workalongsidethe
JIC (FE), “two bodies maintaining a close correspondence and an exchange of
informationwitheachother.”79TheJIC(FE)arguedthattheadvantagesofcreatinga
LICfaroutweighedanydisadvantages,inparticular:
74SeeCO537/4306,GimsontoCreechJones,7thOctober1948.75DEFE11/33,DespatchNo.5,GurneytoCreechJones,30thMay1949.76WO21/2193,notetofile,folio24,unsigned.77Ibid,GuidancetoColonialGovernorsonPreservationsofInternationalSecurity,notebyColonialOffice,August1949.78DEFE11/33,DespatchNo.5,GurneytoCreechJones,30thMay1949.79CAB159/6,JIC(49),minutesofthe93rdmeeting,16thSeptember1949.
113
a) TheGovernorofaColonyreceivesreliableinformationfromapermanentbody
whoareconstantlyassessingintelligenceandarealsoabletoobtainadviceon
anyparticularsubjectexperts,and
b) By exchanging intelligencewith a JIC, the LIC is able to keep theGovernor
informedonmattersoutsidetheimmediatepurviewofhisparticularcolony,
andtheJICisabletokeepthecommanders-in-chiefandBDCCs,wherethey
exist,advisedwhennecessaryonmattersaffectingtheindividualcolony.80
However,theColonialOfficewasnotconvincedbythisargument–indeed,itappears
thattheargumentsputforwardtojustifythecreationofLICcouldhavebeendeployed
tojustifytheexistenceoftheJIC(FE).TherealbenefitofaLICinthecontextofthe
MalayanEmergencywouldhavebeenasalocalfocalpointforallkeyactorswithin
the intelligencemachine, a forum for coordination and discussion of all forms of
intelligenceinrelationtodefenceandsecurityissues.Therewerenevermoreperfect
conditionstojustifythecreationofLICandyetneithertheJIC(London),JIC(FarEast),
northeBDCC(FE),wereabletoinfluencetheColonialOfficesufficientlytoovercome
theobjectionsoftheHighCommissioner.AlthoughthedebatecontinuedinLondon
into1950, it gradually fadedwithout resolutionuntilGeneral Templer created the
Federal IntelligenceCommittee (FIC) in 1952. This situation reflects the ineffective
nature of the strategic coordinating bodies, not least the JIC (FE), to coordinate
intelligenceasmuchasitdoesSirHenry’sobstinacyonthetopic.81
Conclusion
The JIC (FE) was the natural medium through which intelligence about the
deteriorating security situation inMalaya and the subsequent state of emergency
shouldhavebeencoordinated.Indeed,thepotentialfortheJIC(FE)toshapeBritain’s
80WO21/2193,notesassociatedwiththedraftmemorandumofcommentaryonDespatchNo5dated30thMay1949.81BriggsdidcreateaJointIntelligenceAdvisoryCommittee,butitwasnotthecoordinatingbodythatcounter-insurgencycampaignsoclearlyneededandfailedbothtopreventrelationswithintheFederation’scoreexecutivedisintegratetothepointofnearfailurein1951orstimulatetheattentionoftheJIC(FE).Itwasnotuntil1956thattheColonialOfficerequiredallcoloniestoestablishaLIC.SeeComac,ConfrontingtheColonies,p.61;DFrench,TheBritishWayinCounter-Insurgency,1945-1967(2011),p.21.
114
intelligenceapparatusinFarEast,andthusinfluencethemanagementofintelligence
duringtheEmergencywassignificant.Yetitfailedtodosoandtheinvolvementofthe
JIC (FE) in the Emergency is a hitherto untold story of local and metropolitan
ineptitudeandmissedopportunities.Itcouldand,arguably,shouldhavereviewedthe
intelligenceapparatusintheregionwhenitwasfirstcreatedfortherewerealready
signsoffrictionandoverlapbetweenSIFEandMSS;itshouldhaveintervenedwhen
thisdisputedegeneratedandtheMSSwasabolished;itappearsnottohavesupplied
meaningfulappreciationsofintelligencerelatingtoMalayaatanytimeduringthefirst
four years of the Emergency; it did not advise the Federation when London was
advocating that all administrations in the region create a Local Intelligence
Committee.82 At the heart of the JIC (FE)’s failures in relation toMalaya are two
intertwinedproblems:itsstructureanditsrelationships.
TherewereanumberofkeyfactorsthatcontributedtotheJIC(FE)’sstructuralflaws.
The first, and perhaps most critical, relates to its raison d’etre. The JIC (FE) was
conceived as a regional facsimile of its metropolitan counter-part to replace the
wartimeintelligencestructuresofSACSEA.In1947,theyearinwhichtheJIC(FE)was
created,thecharteroftheJIC(London)wasunderreview.Nevertheless,therewas
unanimity between the JIC’s 1939 Charter and the recommendations of the Evill
Report that the JIC (London) would have responsibility for “assessing and co-
ordinating intelligence” and “considering any measures needed to improve the
intelligenceorganisationofthecountryasawhole.”83Similarly,thecharterfortheJIC
(ME), upon which the JIC (FE) was asked to model its own charter, contained
provisions for the tasking, assessment and the overall organisation of intelligence
within the region. Inherentwithin the JIC system, therefore,was a ‘management’
function.Yet,thisaspectoftheJIC(FE)’sself-definedcharterwasweak:itprovided
that the JIC (FE)’s function was as “a medium for the coordination of all
82InsteadofreviewingtheintelligencefailurethepresagedthedeclarationofEmergencyin1948,theJIC(FE)conductedareviewforitsmetropolitancounterpartoftheintelligenceapparatusintheFarEastduringtheSecondWorld.SeeCAB176/19&JIC/1461/48LessonsoftheOrganisationofIntelligenceintheFarEast,5thAugust1948.83CAB163/8,HistoryoftheJointIntelligenceOrganisation,p.2.
115
intelligence…theexchangediscussionandappreciationofintelligence.”84Asaresult,
duringtheperiodunderdiscussion,theJIC(FE)attemptedtoco-ordinateintelligence
butnotimprove,organiseormanagetheintelligencestructuresresponsibleforthe
production of such intelligence across the region. Hence, it failed to make any
meaningful contributions to debate about the MSS, the future of Dalley, the
developmentofSIFE,ortheintroductionofaLICinMalaya.
Afurtherstructuralissuerevolvedaroundthecompetence,trainingandcapacityof
theJIC (FE) to fulfil its responsibilities.Whileonlyone,andapotentiallysubjective
source, Guy Liddell was concerned about both the original JIC (FE) chairman and
secretary’slackofexperienceoftheJICsystem.Indeed,hesuggestedthattheyshould
returntoLondonforfamiliarisation.Anxietyaboutstaffcontinuedatleastuntil1950,
particularlyinrelationtothecapacityoftheJIC(FE)chairmantodevotesufficienttime
tohisroleaswellservingastheGovernorGeneral’sadvisoronForeignAffairs,and
alsotheJIS(FE).TheoverallimpressionisthatJIC(FE)wasstrugglingtoachievethe
level of professionalism and competence demonstrated by its metropolitan
colleagues.
The final structural flaw relates to the JIC (FE)’s line of responsibility. The
CommissionerGeneralwonthedisputewiththeJIC(London)toensurethattheJIC
(FE)answeredtotheBDCC(FE),whichhechaired,andnottheCommanders-in-Chief.
Ostensiblythiswasasensibleacknowledgementoftheuniqueadministrativeset-up
intheFarEastandawaytoreducetheburdenontheCs-in-CwhosatontheBDCC
(FE).Ironically,havingtakenontheJIC(London),MacDonaldwasunabletopersuade
GurneytoestablishaLIC.TheeffectwasasubtledevaluingoftheJIC(FE)’sstock.For
instance,theJIS(FE)gotsided-trackedintodraftingpoliticalintelligencereportsfor
theCommissionerGeneral.Indeed,theColonialOfficewasanon-signatorymember
oftheJIC(London)andtheperceptionofitsrelativelylowlystatuswasextendedto
theJIC(FE)becauseofitslineofresponsibilitytotheCommissionerGeneralrather
thantheCs-in-C.
84CO537/2653,NotebyJICSecretaryentitled,CompositionandFunctionsofJIC(FarEast),AppendixA,JIC(FE)toJIC(London),17thJanuary1948.
116
The JIC (FE)’s relationshipwith Londonwas also ambiguous. Officials in Singapore
prevailedinthedisputewithHayteroverthechainofcommandandthepositionof
the JIC (FE) chairman, which suggests a degree of autonomy and self-assurance.
However,theJIC(FE)progressreportsandthelimitednumberoftheirpapersthat
survive show that the Committee followed London’s lead in relation to topics for
assessment.RoryCormacsuggests“thatinformationonMalayawaslessdetailedthan
onothercountriesisindicativeofthelackofsubstantialinputfromtheColonialOffice
into the JICmachine,whichwas limited tomonthly reviews andadhoc structural
arrangementspreventingfullintegrateddiscussion.”85Certainly,theJIC(London)did
notattemptto‘pull’intelligenceassessmentfromSingaporeinrelationtotheMCP’s
insurgency–theywerefocusedonabroader,regionallevelandthelackofColonial
Office influence on the metropolitan committee must have been a factor. But,
conversely, the JIC (FE)doesnotappear tohavehadan ‘independentconscience.’
Thereislittleevidenceofit‘pushing’intelligenceaboutthepotentialthreattoBritish
interests inMalaya to JIC (London) even during the periodic visits by Scrivener to
London or Hayter to the Far East. A further important consideration is that the
metropolitanJICwasinastateoffluxatbeginningoftheEmergency,notleastin1947-
8asaresultoftheEvillReport.86Hence,itsabilitytoguideitsFarEastfacsimilewas
diminished.
TheroleoftheJIC(FE)intheMalayanEmergency,particularlyduringthebuild-upto,
and immediateaftermathof, thedeclarationofEmergency, isas importantforthe
omissions and failures asmuch as any positive action. The result of this strategic
intelligence vacuum was that additional pressure was placed upon Security
IntelligenceFarEast,theMalayanSecurityServiceand,subsequently,SpecialBranch.
Moreover, all threewere immature bodies and all three struggled significantly to
respondeffectivelytoCommunistinsurgency.
85Cormac,“‘AWhitehall‘Showdown’?ColonialOffice–JointIntelligenceCommitteeRelationsintheMid-1950s”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,39:2(2011),p.252.86Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates–Volume2,pp.142-3.
117
Chapter4-TheSecurityServiceandMalayanEmergency
Introduction
WhiletheJointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)(JIC(FE))shouldhaveprovidedthe
mechanismtoproducestrategic intelligenceassessmentsandcoordinatethewider
intelligence set-up in the region, the Security Service (MI5) had a responsibility to
support the JIC (FE), the colonial governments in the region and its metropolitan
mastersbycollectingandassessingintelligencerelatingtosubversionandcounter-
intelligence within each territory. To do this, the Security Service created in the
aftermathoftheSecondWordWararegionalhubbasedatPhoenixPark,Singapore,
calledSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE).Thiswasestablishedtocollect,collateand
disseminate“tointerestedandappropriateServiceandCivilDepartmentsallSecurity
IntelligenceaffectingBritishterritoriesintheFarEast.”Thisincluded“anypoliticalor
subversivemovement,whetherindigenousorforeign,whichisadangerorpotential
dangertoBritishsecurity.”1Thus,thepotentialthreatposedbytheCommunistforces
inMalayawasfirmlywithinSIFE’sjurisdiction.
AndyetSIFEbarelyfeatureswithinthecurrentassessmentsoftheSecurityServicein
theearlycoldwarera.Forinstance,SIFEisrelegatedtoanalbeitusefulfootnotein
Christopher Andrew’s Defence of the Realm.2 Nigel West refers to SIFE as the
“CombinedIntelligenceFarEast”butdoesnotexpanduponthis.3InTheHiddenHand,
RichardAldrichmakes a briefmention of SIFE’s assessment of Communism in the
regionjustpriortotheoutbreakoftheMalayanEmergencybutdoesnotprovideany
moredetailaboutitsstructure,otherthantosaythatSIFEworkedcloselywithofficers
fromtheSecretIntelligenceService(SIS,akaMI6)taskedwithcounter-intelligencein
1KV4/421,CharterfortheSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE),6thAugust1946;MemorandumofInstructionforColonelC.E.Dixon,HeadofSecurityIntelligenceFarEast,6thAugust1946.2C.Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm(London2010),p.937,Fn.42.3N.West,MI5,1945-72–AMatterofTrust(London1982),p.20.
118
neighbouringcountries.4ThesameauthorprovidesalittlemoredetailaboutSIFEin
BritishIntelligence,StrategyandColdWar.5
CalderWalton’srecentlypublishedmonograph,EmpireofSecrets,setsoutspecifically
toexaminetheroleofintelligenceattheendofempire.6Makinguseofanumberof
recentlyde-classifiedSecurityServicefiles,Waltonprovidesausefuldiscussionofthe
Combined Services Intelligence Centre (CSDIC) and Special Branch training school,
both of which the Security Service helped to establish in Malaya during the
Emergency. Overall, however, his discussion of SIFE is disappointing. For instance,
therearesomefactualinaccuracies,suchashisassertionthatSIFE’scounterpartin
the Middle East did not have a collection role.7 More importantly, there is no
explorationofSIFE’sorigins,itsrelationshipwiththeothercomponentsofthelocalor
regional intelligenceapparatus,or its rolewithin thecounter-insurgency inMalaya
effortif,indeed,ithadone.
Moreover, SIFE simply does not feature within the existing historiography of the
Emergency.Thiscanbepartlyexplainedbythescarcityofprimarysourceswhichare
largely limited to the KV series in TheNational Archive (TNA), supportedby some
materialintheCOseries.Butperhapsmoresaliently,despitetheremitofSIFEand
the loftyambitionsof itsmetropolitanmasters,theSecurityService intheFarEast
simplyfailedtomakeasubstantialcontributiontotheMalayaauthorities’counter-
insurgencyefforts.Anexplorationofwhythiswasthecaseiscriticaltoestablishan
accurateunderstandingofwhythebroaderMalayanintelligenceapparatusstruggled
sosignificantlyinthebuildupto,andaftermathof,thedeclarationofEmergency.
4R.Aldrich,TheHiddenHand:Britain,AmericaandColdWarSecretIntelligence(London2006),pp.99-101.5R.Aldrich,“Secret Intelligence forapost-warworld: reshaping theBritish IntelligenceCommittee,1944-51”,inR.Aldrich(ed.),BritishIntelligence,StrategyandtheColdWar1945-51(Cambridge1992).6C.Walton,EmpireofSecrets(London2013).7Ibid.,p.172.SeeR.Arditti,“SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME):JointSecurityIntelligenceOperationsintheMiddleEast,c.1939-58”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,publishedonline5thMay2015.
119
SIFEwasoneofthreestructurescreatedbyofficialstomanageBritain’sintelligence
requirementsintheFarEastintheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWar,theothers
beingtheJIC(FE)and,inthecaseofMalaya,theMalayanSecurityService(MSS).All
threeorganisationswere‘stood-up’in1946andSIFEremainedoperationaluntilthe
late1950s–atimeperiodthusspanningthebulkoftheconflictbetweenthecolonial
authorities and theMalayanCommunist Party (MCP). SIFE should havehada key-
supporting role in this conflict. It was created to be the analogue of its more
establishedcounter-partintheMiddleEast(SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast–SIME).
Itwas thus the naturalmedium throughwhich the Security Service could fulfil its
responsibilities in relation to subversion and counter-intelligence within British
territoriesintheFarEastinthepost-warera,notleastinMalaya.
However,thelinesofdemarcationbetweenSIFEandotheragencies,particularlythe
MSS, were ambiguous and, from its inception, SIFE was engaged in inter-
organisationalconflict.ThiswascompoundedbythefailureoftheSecurityServiceto
establish clearly whether SIFE’s key function was the collection or assessment of
intelligence, or a combination of both. Nor was the issue of whether SIFE was
concernedwith‘political’intelligenceeverresolvedsatisfactorily.Thiswaslargelydue
toSIFEhavingtwomasters–theSecretServiceinLondonandthecolonialauthorities
intheFarEast,bothofwhomhaddifferingdemands.Thesefundamental,structural
flaws,inevitablydistractedSIFE’sofficersfromidentifyingthreatstoBritishinterests
intheFarEastingeneraland,morespecifically,detractedfromtheirabilitytosupport
thecolonialauthoritiesinMalayaattemptingtocountertheinsurgentthreatposed
bytheMCP.
As a result of these problems, SIFE changed significantly over its relatively short-
existence. It originated as the Security Service’s intelligence hub, for which its
metropolitan masters had ambitions to develop both collation and assessment
functions,withanemphasisonbothsecurityandcounter-intelligence.However, it
evolvedintoajointSecurityServiceandSecretIntelligenceServiceassessmentcentre
thatconcentrateduponcounter-intelligence–averydifferentorganisationfromthat
initiallyenvisaged.AsSIFEevolved,itmovedfurtherawayfromastancedesignedto
120
tacklesubversion.Ultimately,thestoryofSIFE’sinvolvementintheEmergencyisone
of inter-organisational squabbling,missed opportunity and under-performance. Its
historicalimportanceinrelationtothecounter-insurgencycampaigninMalayarelates
nottoitscontributionsbutitsfailures,andtheconsequentimpactupontherestof
theintelligenceapparatusconcernedwithrestoringsecuritytotheFederation.
TheOriginsofSIFE
The origins of SIFE can be traced to the creation in late 1940 of the Far Eastern
SecuritySection(FESS)whichwasestablishedinSingapore“tocollect,co-ordinateand
passtotheauthoritiesconcernedreportsofanti-Britishactivitiesintheareacovered
bythePacificNavalIntelligenceOrganisation.”8However,theeventsofearly1942in
the Far East effectively destroyed the immediateneed to focus upon security and
counter-intelligence–itwastheallieswhowereactingassubversivesandinsurgents
againsttheoccupyingJapaneseforces,ratherthantheotherwayaround.Thismeant,
aswasdiscussedinchaptertwo,thatSouthEastAsiaCommand(SEAC)lackedatthe
endoftheSecondWorldWaranoperationallymatureintelligencesecurityapparatus,
akintothatintheMiddleEast.Thiswastohaveasignificantandadverseimpactupon
theeventualpreparednessoftheofficialstotacklethethreatposedbyCommunist
forcestoMalayathatbecameapparentveryquicklyafterthereturnoftheBritishto
thecolonyin1945.
Nevertheless,theperiodbetweenthefallofSingaporeandrestorationoftheBritish
inMalayain1945witnessedasignificantamountofsoul-searchinginLondonabout
thenatureandshapeoftheeventualpost-warsecurityintelligenceapparatusinthe
FarEast.EvenbeforeSingapore fell inFebruary1942,BrigadierHarker,A/Director
GeneralofMI5,realisedtheimportanceofplanninghowbesttocreatetheSecurity
Service’spost-warnetwork in Far East.9 Thepre-war ‘link’ systemhadbeenbased
upononpersonalcontactbetweenhispredecessor,SirVenonKell,andthegovernors
8FO371/24715,TelegramfromtheForeignOfficetovariousUKterritoriesintheMiddleEast,datedJanuary1941.9BrigadierOswald‘Jasper’HawkerreplacedSirVernonKellasDirectoroftheSecurityServiceinJune1940.HewasreplacedbySirDavidPetriein1941butstayedonastheDeputyDirectorGeneral.
121
of the Colonies who acted as ‘correspondents’. However, many of Kell’s original
contactshadmovedor retired,and successorshadnotbeen ‘recruited’.Henceby
1941the‘link’systemwasinstateofdisrepair.AsaresultHarkersuggestedthatthe
SecurityServicedevelopadirectworkingrelationshipwiththecolonialpoliceasthe
firstpointofcontact,ratherthanthegovernors.10
TheSecurityService’sOverseasControl(OC)alsorecognisedtheneedforchange.11A
1943reportstatedthat“oncewehavewonthewar,wehavestillgottowinthePeace,
andinmyopiniontheSecurityService,particularlyoverseas,willplayaverylargepart
in this latter phase.” The unnamedbut prescient author realised that the pre-war
systemofhavingkeyfigureswithincolonialgovernmenttoactas‘links’forMI5was
ineffective. Instead, the author suggested professionalising the Service’s overseas
representation,byabandoningthe“pre-warpolicyofemployingofficerswithprivate
meansonlowsalaries”infavourofmakingthe“SecurityService…acareertowhich
therighttypeofmanwillbeattractedbythetermsofservice,aswellastheinterest
ofthework.”Thereportpositedthatdespiteinevitablepost-warausterity,itwould
bepossibletomaintainSecurityServiceofficers,knownasDefenceSecurityOfficers
(DSOs), in fortressareas (Gibraltar,MaltaandSingapore)andanyvulnerableareas
(suchasEgypt), supplemented inallothercoloniesandDominionswith“anactive
correspondentorLinkwhoisknownpersonallytous.”12
AfurtherpaperbyOCin1943expandeduponsomeoftheseideas,andrepeatedthe
convictionthatthepre-wararrangements,“whichweregovernedlargelybyfinance
weremost unsatisfactory.” The report stressed that eachDefence SecurityOffice,
required “at least one DSO and Assistant DSO, rather than being comprised of
temporaryassistantsbeingrecruitedfromlocalregiments,who,inmostcases,leftas
soonastheywereofvalue.”Instead,theSecurityServiceshouldrecruit“menofthe
10SeeKV4/442,anotebyA.S.Jelf,13thNovember1940andanunsignedletterbyHarker,21stJanuary1941.11KV4/18.InJuly1941theSecurityServicedecidedtoraisethestatusofSectionA.5,whichdealtwithOverseasAdministration,tothatofasectionresponsibledirectlytotheDirectorofA.Division.12KV4/442,ExtractfromReportbyO.C.toD.Gdated8thJune1943ontheDevelopmentandFutureneedsofOverseasControl.
122
world,attractedbyreasonabletermsandconditions”,whowouldworkonfourorfive
yearpostingsacrosstheempire,brokenbyasojournofayear’spostinginLondon.
Finally OC suggested “within the next 12 months we should endeavour to place
trainedDSOsandA/DSOsiftheyarenottherealready,inallourpotentialpost-war
stations.”WhileofficerscouldbeconsideredforplacessuchasEgypt,Malta,Gibraltar
and Jamaica, theauthorof the report somewhat laconicallynoted,“Singaporecan
wait.”13
GeoffreyDenham,theSecretIntelligenceService’sFarEastcontroller,developedthe
ideaofBritain’soverseaspost-warintelligenceorganisation.14Onecanfirstseethe
ideaofaseriesofregionalout-stationsbeingarticulatedincorrespondencebetween
Denham and Sir David Petrie, who succeeded Harker as Director General of the
SecurityService,writtenintheendof1943.Denhamsuggestedthatif“wehaveto
‘policetheworld’afterwar,thefirstpointofconsiderationiswhereour‘pools’should
be situated. London is naturally theheadquarters of theOrganisation, but various
centresallovertheEmpiremustbeselectedasthecorrectplaceswhereIntelligence
canbecollatedanddisseminatedtoconnectedBranches.”Denhamproposedregional
centresinAccra,Cairo,Johannesburg,Singapore,Melbourne,Jamaica,andOttawa.15
However,hisreportwasnotaccepteduncritically.AnunsignedminutetotheDeputy
Director General (DDG) took exception both to Denham’s presumption that Great
Britainwouldbepolicingthepost-warworldandhissuggestionthatDSOsshouldbe
postedtotheDominions.16
Nevertheless, Denham’s report proved pivotal in the philosophical origins of SIFE,
particularlyinrelationtothefutureroleoftheSecurityServiceintacklingpost-war
13Ibid,untitledreportbyO.C.,dated25thOctober1943.14GeoffreyDenhamwasbusinessmanwithinterestsinJava.InMay1941hewasdespatchedtoSingaporetounderareviewofSISorganisationintheFarEastandsubsequentlybecamethefirstSISregionaldirector.SeeR.Aldrich,“Britain’sSecretIntelligenceServiceinAsiaduringtheSecondWorldWar”,ModernAsianStudies,32:1,(1998),p.188;P.Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying(2004),p.130;P.Davies,“TheSISSingaporestationandtheroleofthefareastcontroller:Secretintelligencestructureandprocessinpost-warcolonialadministration”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),p.113.15KV4/442,DenhamtoPetrie,22ndDecember1943.16Ibid.,DraftminutetotheDDG,undated.
123
colonialsubversion.Forinstance,ithelpedshapetheapproachofPetrietoSirGeorge
Gater,PermanentUnderSecretary for theColonies,on the subject.17 TheDirector
Generalsaidthat“itisreasonabletosupposethatforafewyearsafterthewarour
DSOsandlinkwillnotneedtospendmuchtimeandenergyoncounter-espionage,
anditseemsprobablethatoneoftheirmainusesmightbetoinvestigatesubversive
tendencies, someofwhichmaybe cloakedbypoliticalmovements.”Whilst Petrie
acknowledged that some of these movements might be of purely local interest,
“othersmayhaveworldwideramifications,anditwillthereforebenecessaryforthe
SecurityServicetokeepadequaterecordofallsuchmovementsandtotakeactive
interestinadvisingourDSOsandlinksonallmattersofmutualinterest.”Petriealso
saidthatthere“wasapossibilitythatsomeformoffederationmaytakeplaceinthese
areaswhichmightnecessitatetheformationofaSecurityIntelligenceBureaueither
directlyunder,orworkingincloseconsultationwiththeSecurityServiceonthelines
ofSIMEinEgyptandtheMiddleEast.”18
However,threedifficult issuesaroseduringthewartimeplanning.Despitethebest
effortsofPetrieandGater, these issues remained largelyunresolved,plaguing the
organisation for which they were planning. The first was constitutional. Gater
recognisedthattheendofthewarwaslikelytoacceleratetheprogressofthecolonies
towardsself-government.However,by1944,thiswasprovingasourceofdifficultyin
Ceylon,wherethepoliceservicewasundertheadministrativeandfinancialcontrolof
ministersandGaterpredictedthatsimilardifficultieswerelikelyinthenearfuturein
suchasplacesasMaltaandJamaica.Therewas,therefore,aneedtofindamechanism
toensureSecurityServiceofficerspostedtothepost-warcoloniesremaineddirectly
under the control of London.19 The position of the Dominions was a further
complication. Denham “felt strongly that in order to establish a proper Security
Service throughout the Empire, the Dominions should come into the scheme.”20
17SirDavidPetriewasDirectorGeneraloftheSecurityServicefrom1941-6.18KV4/442,PetrietoGater,17thFebruary1944.SeealsoNoteofLordSwinton’sdiscussionwithSirGeorgeCater,1stAugust1944.SeealsoExtractfrompersonallettertotheDirector-GeneralfromLt.Col.G.J.Jenkins,DSOEgypt,dated22ndSeptember1944.19Ibid.,GatertoPetrie,17thJuly1944.20Ibid.,AreportbyMrDenhamentitled,‘Post-WarMI5Organisation,’22ndDecember1943.
124
However,theColonialOfficewaslessconvinced-GaterinformedPetriethathewas
“doubtfulwhethertheproblemswhichwillexistinpeacetimearesufficientlygreat
tojustifytheappointmentofawholetimeliaisonofficertoanyofourDominions.”21
Moreover,theDominionsOfficemovedquicklytodistancetheDominionsfromsuch
planning.22 ItwasthereforeagreedthattheDominionswouldnotfeatureinfuture
‘link’planning,butthatthe“alreadyexcellentliaison”wouldbe“strengthenedbya
more frequent interchange of visits between Security Service representatives and
representativesoftheSecurityorganisationsintheDominionsconcerned.”23
Thesecond issuewastheoperationalcontext inwhichanypotentially refashioned
SecurityServicepresence in thecolonieswould function. InitiallyOverseasControl
envisagedasysteminwhichtheDSOswouldbesupportedbyadedicatedcolonial
policeofficerwhoseprimaryfocuswouldbeinternalsecurityandwhowouldreport
directlytotheCommissionerofPoliceorHeadofCID.InthiswaytheDSOcouldfocus
entirelyontheneedsoftheSecurityServicewhilethepoliceofficercouldconcentrate
onthespecific localneedsofhiscolony.Moreover,thissystemhadtheadvantage
thatthepoliceofficercouldtakeoverthefilesandcardindicesintheeventthatthe
DSOwasremovedfromtheterritoryafterthewarduetoanycost-savingmeasures.24
Petrie realised thatwhatever form the Service’s post-war presencewould take, it
wouldbereliantupontheColonialPolice.HethereforesuggestedtoGaterthatthe
Colonial Office should review “at an early date the facilitieswhich Colonial Police
Forces have at present for carrying out of general local security duties.” He
acknowledged that “this is entirely a Colonial Office matter, but since our own
efficiencyissodependentonthePolice,itseemsessentialthatweshouldraisethe
point.”25Whilethispointwasraised,itwasnotresolved.Thisprovedtohaveprofound
implicationsforSIFEthroughoutmuchofitsexistence.
21Ibid.,DraftminutetotheDDG,undated.22Ibid.,SirJohnStephensontoPetrie,22ndMarch1944.23Ibid.,DraftletterfromPetrietoStephenson,13thFebruary1946.24Ibid.,ExtractfromReportbyO.C.toD.Gdated8thJune1943ontheDevelopmentandFutureneedsofOverseasControl.25Ibid.,PetrietoGater,17thFebruary1944.
125
Thethirdproblem,thatof finance,alsohungheavilyoverSIFE.The1943Overseas
Controlreportnotedthat“thereisnodoubtthatfinancewillprecludehavingalarge
numberofDSOsandweshallthereforerequiretohavereallyfirstclassmaterial.”26
PetrieadmittedtoGaterinFebruary1944that“thereareagreatmanyimponderable
factors,notleastbeingtheamountofmoneymadeavailable.Theonlythingonecan
say,withalmostcompletecertainty,isthatitisboundtobeverymaterialreduced.”27
ThisraisedthethornyproblemofhowtopayforMI5’spost-waroverseaspresence.
Vernon Kell’s ‘links’ system operated on good-will. However, wartime planners
recognisedthatthiswasnotsustainable–intelligencewasanincreasinglyexpensive
commoditythatdemandedmorethangood-will.Yet,theSecurityServicedidnothave
fundstosupply the future ‘links’andtheColonialofficewasnot in thepositionto
supply secret funds.28 In a rather confused minute on the subject, Petrie
acknowledged his dislike of the “proposal that we should get mixed up in the
administration of any funds other than those from SS [Security Service] sources.”
However,heagreed,“ifa‘link’requiresfundsforexpenditurewhichisprimarilyinour
interest, we should supply them.”29 Clearly conscious of the inevitable post-war
strugglewiththeTreasury,PetriemovedtosecureaunitedfrontwiththeColonial
Office.30Asaresult,Gatersaidhe“hadnohesitationingivingyoutheassurancefor
whichyouask…weattachimportancetothecontinuanceoftheDSOsystemandare
readytosupportanyapplicationthatyoumaymaketotheTreasuryforthenecessary
fundstomaintainit.”31
By1944theSecurityServicehadconcludedthatthepre-warconceptof‘Links’was
redundantandwasdeterminedtodevelopamorestructured,professionalsystem.In
orderto“provideacentrewhereallintelligenceconcerningespionage,sabotageand
othersubversiveandillicitactivitiesispooled”,Petrierealisedthatheneededtocover
26Ibid.,ExtractfromReportbyO.C.toD.Gdated8thJune1943ontheDevelopmentandFutureneedsofOverseasControl.27Ibid.,PetrietoGater,17thFebruary1944.28Ibid.,Minute88,OCtoDG,dated16thDecember1944.29Ibid.,Minute93,DAtoDDG,dated21stDecember1944;minute94fromDDGtoDG,dated21stDecember1944;andminute95fromDGtoDDG,dated22ndDecember1944.30Ibid.,PetrietoGater,22ndJune1944.31Ibid.,GatertoPetrie,17thJuly1944.
126
theEmpire“effectivelywithaseriesofout-stations.”Duetothepotentialexpense,
hedidnotsuggesthavingSecurityServiceofficersinalloftheColoniesand“inany
case,wedonotwanttoplantourofficersinplaceswherethereisnoneedforthem.”
Instead,heproposedto“‘wire’ thewhole Imperialarea insuchawaythatwecan
‘plug in’ justwhenandwherewewantto.”Petriemadeadistinctionbetweenthe
fortresses (Gibraltar,Malta, Singapore,HongKingandEgypt)and theColonies.He
groupedthelatterintofourgroups:WestIndies(JamaicaandTrinidad);EastAfrica
(Kenyaand theRhodesias);WestAfrica (Accra) and,potentially, Ceylon.OneDSO,
supported by an assistant and a small office staff, would cover each of these
territories.Moreover, Petrie asserted that itwas “desirable to set-up at least two
regionalcentresinthewayofclearinghousesforinformation,sothatonlytherefined
product from Security Intelligence Reports would come through them to
Headquarters.”HeproposedthattheSecurityServiceofficesatCairoandSingapore
shouldperformthisfunction.32Hence,theseedoftheconceptofSIFEwassown.
TheEstablishmentofSIFE
TheissueoftheSecurityService’soverseasrepresentationwasnotdevelopedfurther
until the end of the SecondWorldWar when, as Petrie explained to Gater, “the
businessofexaminingthepost-warrequirementsofthisorganisationhasnaturally
assumedmoreimmediateimportance…”PetrieconsultedwiththeJointIntelligence
Committee (JIC), and it was confirmed that the Security Service would assume
responsibilityforsecurityintelligenceinboththeMiddleEastandFarEast.Post-war
re-organisationintheMiddleEastwasarelativelystraightforwardaffair–theSecurity
ServicetookoverfromthemilitarythedirectionandcontrolofSecurityIntelligence
MiddleEast(SIME),whichwas,infact,“awar-timeexpansiononalargescaleforthe
dischargeofthefunctionsthatformerlypertainedtoourDefenceSecurityOfficerin
Egypt.”33IntheFarEast,however,theissuewaslessclear.
32Ibid.,PetrietoGater,2ndJune1944.33Ibid.,PetrietoGater,20thApril1946.SeealsoR.Arditti,“SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME):JointSecurityIntelligenceOperationsintheMiddleEast,c.1939-58”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,publishedonline5thMay2015.
127
OstensiblytherewasnoequivalenttoSIMEintheFarEastduringtheSecondWorld
War, certainly not in name. There was, however, recent precedent for inter-
organisationalco-operationinsecurityintelligenceintheregion.Attheoutbreakof
war, Captain Wylie (RN), established the Far East Combined Intelligence Bureau
(FECB).Thiswasatri-serviceorganisation,drawinginformationfrom“MilitaryandAir
intelligence; SIS [Secret Intelligence Service]; French Intelligence Service; Defence
SecurityOfficers;DiplomaticandConsularOfficers; InformationfromNavalsources
whichisobtainedfromthewholeareaembracedbyPNIO.”TheFarEasternSecurity
Section(FESS)was locatedwithintheFECBandwasresponsible forestablishing“a
comprehensive picture of the persons and organisations working against British
securityintheFarEastandtoconveythispicturetothevariousorganisationswhoare
inapositiontomakeuseofit.”34
Whilst theFECBdisappeared inthewakeoftheJapanese invasionofSingapore, in
1945SouthEastAsiaCommand (SEAC) formed theCounter-IntelligenceCombined
Board(CICB)toperformasimilarfunction.35Thiswasajointintelligenceorganisation,
runbyColonelC.E.DixonandCourtneyYoung,whooversawastaffofintelligence
officersdrawnfromMI5,SIS,OSSOfficeofStrategicServices[OSS]andSEAC.36The
CICB “made a specialised study of the Japanese Intelligence Services and was
responsibleforcollecting,collating,anddisseminating information inthis field.”To
support this, CICB “had teams of Counter-Intelligence specialists attached to
formationsandcomposedofmembersofMI5,SISandselectedArmyofficers.”37
However, the end of the war against Japan also signalled the end of CICB.
Mountbatten subsequently suggested, “the South East Asia theatre security
34FO371/24715,TheFarEasternCombinedIntelligenceBureau,areportbyJ.Godfrey,DirectorofNavalIntelligence,30thMarch1940.35R.Aldrich,IntelligenceandtheWarAgainstJapan(Cambridge2000),p.370.Aldrichnotesthat,amongstotherresponsibilities,theCICBtaskedIntelligenceAssaultUnits–seeHS1/329andWO203/5050.36LittleisknownaboutDixon.However,CourtenayYounghaddistinguishedcareerintheSecurityService,notleastasthefirstSLOwithASIO,H/SIFE,andtheheadof‘B’Section.37WO203/5038,‘ControlandOrganizationoftheSecurityServiceinOverseasTheatres’,HQSACSEAtoSecretary,CofSCommittee,2ndJanuary1946.
128
organisationmightwellbemodelledonthatapprovedfortheMiddleEast.”38Thiswas
inharmonywithPetrie’sthoughtsonthesubjectanditwasdecidedtousetheCICB
asthebasisofamuchbroadercivilorganisationwhichwouldactasBritain’sregional
security intelligence hub, run by the Security Service, to be known as Security
IntelligenceFarEast.WhilstSIFEwastobecommandedbyaSecurityServiceofficer
(and, like SIME,move frommilitary to civilian control), Petrie envisaged it tobea
‘joint’unit,comprisingnotjustofSecurityServiceofficers,butstaffdrawnfromthe
threeservicesandwithpotentialrepresentationfromtheAustralianSecurityService
andtheIntelligenceBureauoftheGovernmentofIndia.39SIFEwasthus‘stood-up’in
early1946andincludedfourstaffofficersdrawnfromAlliedLandForcesSouthEast
Asia (ALFSEA), two Royal Navy officers, two Royal Air Force officers, and a still
classifiednumberofMI5andMI6officers.Dixon,formerheadofCICB,wasretained
toleadthenewunit.
Sir Percy Sillitoe, Petrie’s successor, issuedSIFE’sCharteron6August 1946.40 This
stipulated that SIFE’s primary responsibility was “the collection, collation and
dissemination to interested and appropriative Service andCivil Departments of all
Security IntelligenceaffectingBritish territories in theFarEast.41More specifically,
SillitoeindicatedthatSIFEshouldprovide“interestedandappropriatedepartments
withinformationandadviceuponthefollowingsubjects:-
a) Any foreign IntelligenceServicewhoseactivitiesaredirectedagainstBritish
territoryintheFarEastorinimicaltoBritishinterestsorsecurity.
b) Anypoliticalorsubversivemovement,whetherindigenousorforeign,whichis
adangerorpotentialdangertoBritishsecurity.
c) Arrangementsforthedetectionofillicitsignalsandotherclandestinemeans
ofcommunication.
38Ibid.,39KV4/442,PetrietoGater,20thFebruary1946.40Liddell’sdiarysuggeststhatSIFEwasalreadyinplacebyJanuary1946,withtheJIC(London)recommendingtheestablishmentofstaffon20thFebruary1946.41KV4/421,CharterforSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE),6thAugust1946.
129
d) Coordination of Security policy relating to Travel Control of arms and
explosives,theprotectionofvitalinstallationsandthepreventionofsabotage.
e) InformationfromSIFErecordswhichassisttheDSOsorappropriatebodiesin
checking the credentials and back history of doubtful aliens, residents and
visitors.”
Inaddition,Dixonwasgiventheresponsibilitytocoordinateandsupervisethework
oftherepresentativesoftheSecurityService–DefenceSecurityOfficers(DSO)–in
Burma,theMalayanUnionandHongKong.Initsset-upandremit,SIFEwasthusnear
identicaltoitshighlysuccessfulcounterpartintheMiddleEast.42
However, SIFE’s lines of commandwere tortuous. In the first instance, Dixonwas
primarily responsible to the Director General of the Security Service in London.43
However,Dixonwasalsoresponsibletotheregionalservicechiefsviathe‘Defence
Committee’.44The‘DefenceCommittee’(subsequentlyknownastheBritishDefence
CoordinatingCommittee (Far East))was formed twomonthsbefore SIFE. It lacked
executivepowersbutwaschargedwithcoordinatingbothcivilandmilitarydefence
activities, providing information and advice to the Chiefs of Staff in London, and
preparingstrategicstudies for thedefenceof thearea.45Thesituationwas further
complicatedbythecreationoftheJIC(FE),whichhadresponsibilityforallintelligence
andcounter-intelligenceactivitiesintheregion.46H/SIFEwasacontributorybutnon-
signatory member of JIC (FE).47 Moreover, a SIFE officer was seconded to the
42KV4/421,MemorandumofInstructionforColonelC.E.Dixon,HeadofSecurityIntelligenceFarEast,6thAugust1946.43TherewereatleastsixH/SIFEs:C.Dixon(August–November1946);M.Johnston(November1946–c.August1948,diedinservice);A.Kellar(August1948–May1949);J.Morton(May1949–April1952);C.Young(May1952–August1955);R.Thistlewaite(August1955–unknown).44Ibid.45IOLR,L/WS/1/734,ChiefsofStaffCommittee,‘SouthEastAsia:SecretariatforDefenceCommittee’,26thNovember194646L/WS/1/1050,‘OrganisationofIntelligenceinFarEastAsia’,reportbytheJointIntelligenceSub-Committee’,9thDecember1946.ItisinterestingtonotethattheearlymemorandafromtheCabinetOfficersregardingthecreationofJIC(FE)mentionstheimportanceofColonialOfficeandForeignOfficerepresentationontheCommitteeandwithintheJointIntelligenceStaff.Itappearsovertime,becauseofSIFE’sco-locationwiththeCommissionerGeneral’sstaffatPhoenixPark,SIFEbecamedraggedintoanincreasingamountChancerywork,realisingoneoftheinitialconcernsaboutthecreationoftheJIC(FE).SeeL/WS/1/734CabinetOfficestoSEAC,26thNovember1946.47Ibid.SeealsoP.Davies,MachineryofSpying,p.193.
130
committee’sJointIntelligenceStaff(JIS).48InitiallytheJIC(FE)wasresponsibletothe
ChiefsofStaffCommittee.However,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,theJoint
Planning Staff (JPS) proposed in early 1948 that this was changed to the British
DefenceCoordinatingCommittee(BDCC(FE)),onthebasisthatCoSdealtwithpurely
militarymatterswhiletheBDCC(FE)wasajointmilitary-civilstructureandtherefore
morereflectiveofmatterswithwhichtheJIC(FE)dealt.49Therefore,inadditiontoits
SecurityServicemasters,SIFEhadregionalreportinglinesbothtotheBDCC(FE),the
JIC(FE)andultimatelytotheGovernor-General,FarEastAsia,MalcolmMacDonald.50
In addition, itwas subject tomultiple separate tasking processes, via the Security
Service,theServiceChiefs,theBDCC(FE)andtheGovernorGeneral’soffice.51
SIFEwasthusbisectedbylocalandmetropolitanresponsibilities.Thiswasreflectedin
the relationship between the DSOs (based initially in Singapore, Burma and Hong
Kong), their respective colonial governments and SIFE.52 For instance, Dixon’s
MemorandumofInstructionstatedthathewasresponsibleforensuringthattheDSOs
passed“toSIFEallrelevantsecurityinformation.”Thisresponsibilitywasconsidered
nottobeinconflict“withthelocalresponsibilitiesofDefenceSecurityOfficerstotheir
respective Governors and to Service Commanders as defined in their respective
memorandaofinstructions.”53Nevertheless,eventsweretoprovethatmaintaining
thebalanceofresponsibilitieswastobeasourceofsignificantandunresolvedtension
forthedurationofSIFE’sexistence.
48SeeKV4/421,MemorandumofInstructionforColonelC.E.Dixon,HeadofSecurityIntelligenceFarEast,6thAugust1946.Also,L/WS/1/734,ChiefsofStaffCommittee,‘SouthEastAsia:SecretariatforDefenceCommittee’,26thNovember1946;L/WS/1/1050,CompositionandFunctionsoftheJIC(FarEast),NotebytheSecretaryoftheChiefsofStaffCommittee,JointIntelligenceCommittee,AnnexA,26thJanuary1948.49IOLR,L/WS/1/734,“SouthEastAsia:SecretariatforDefenceCommittee”,reportbytheSecretaryforChiefsofDefenceCommittee,26thNovember1946.SeealsoL/WS/1/1050,See‘ReviewofintelligenceOrganisationintheFarEast’,notebytheSecretaryoftheChiefsofStaffCommittee,24thApril1948.50Theterm‘Governor-General’wastobereplacedwith‘CommissionerGeneral’whentheMalayanUnionwasscrappedinfavouroftheFederationofMalaya.51ForaninterestingparallelwiththeMI6positionintheFarEastseeP.Davies,“TheSISSingaporestationandtheroleoftheFarEastController:SecretIntelligencestructureandprocessinpost-warcolonialadministration”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.105-129.52Hence,PetrieensuredthattheColonialOfficewereconsultedontheir“MemorandaofInstruction’forissuetotheDSOs.SeeKV4/442,DraftletterfromPetrietoGater,13thFebruary1946.53KV4/421,MemorandumofInstructionforColonelC.E.Dixon,HeadofSecurityIntelligenceFarEast,6thAugust1946.
131
RegionalRelations
Unsurprisingly, SIFEwasbesetwithproblems from theoutset.Withinweeksof its
creation,DixonfelloutwithSillitoe.ThisappearstostemfromDixon’scomplaintthat
SIFE’sdependenceontheArmyforaccommodation,transportandlogisticalsupport
wascompromisingsecurity.54SillitoefeltitnecessarytoremindDixonthat“SIFEand
itsDSOsconstituteanovert Inter-Service IntelligenceOrganisationandwillbe ina
similarpositiontotheIntelligenceBureauIndiawhichisquiteopenlyrecognisedasa
departmentof theGovernment. Theexistenceof anorganisation calledSIFEmust
naturally become generally known in view of the numerous Service and civilian
contactsitsnumberswillhavetomake.”55Itseemsquiteremarkablethattheheadof
the Security Service had to remind his theatre head that SIFE was not a covert
organisation.WithinmonthsMalcolm Johnston, formerly of the Delhi Intelligence
Bureau,replacedDixonasH/SIFE.56WhilstitseemsthattherecruitmentofJohnston
wasnotconnectedwithDixon’sconfusionaboutSIFE’ssecuritystatus,itisclearthat
SIFEdidnothaveanauspiciousbeginning.
JohnstonsoonfoundfaultwithintelligenceenvironmentinwhichSIFEwasoperating.
Inparticular,thefeltthatvariouslocalpoliceandintelligenceforcesuponwhichSIFE
depended, including theMSS,werenot providing SIFEwith sufficient information.
JohnstonexplainedtoSillitoethat“whenthelocalintelligenceorganisationswere[sic]
insufficienttocoveranyparticularaspectsofSecurityIntelligencetoextentrequired,
itwillbethedutyofSIFEtosupplementthoseresourceswithitsown.”57TheDirector
Generalactively supported Johnston’s recommendationsandbegan theprocessof
transforming SIFE from being a primarily collating and assessment organ to an
operationalheadquartersforintelligencecollection.58Hence,inNovember1947,the
LSOinBurma,andDSOsinSingapore,Malaya,andHongKongweretaskedtostart
54Ibid.,DixontoSillitoe,29thJuly1946.55Ibid.,SillitoetoDixon,12thAugust1946.56Ibid.,DickWhite(MI5)toBates(ColonialOffice),13thAugust1946.57KV4/421,SLOSingaporetoDG,17thFebruary1947.58SillitoealsoenvisagedSIFEandtheDSOshavingabroader“intangible”but“essentialfunction”ofproviding a means of inciting the local security authorities to do their job efficiently, akin toInspectorate,KV4/422,AssessmentofthevalueofS.I.F.EandD.S.OPointsintheFarEast.
132
collecting “basic intelligence data…in respect of organisationswhich are operating
clandestinely.”59 This move placed SIFE in direct conflict with the regional
governments, the Commissioner General and Colonial Office, themost significant
being that with the MSS which will be discussed at length in the next chapter.
However,itisimportanttorecognisethatitwasnotjusttheMSSthatSIFEseemedto
clash.Forinstance,Johnston’ssuccessor,AlecKellarexperiencedfractiousrelations
withtheCommissionerGeneralandtheCommissionerofPoliceinHongKong(whom
theH/SIFEsuggestedwas“the touchiestofmortals”),due toSIFE’scriticismofhis
force’s inability to undertake “the total commitment of secret postal censorship.”
RelationswereevenworsewithGimson,theGovernorofSingapore.Kellarreported
toSillitoethathehad,“quitefrankly,thepoorestopinionofGimsonwho,apartfrom
hismuddle-headedness,isbehavinginanentirelypartisanway.”60
Attheheartoftheseproblemswasafundamentaltensioninthebalancebetween
metropolitan,regionalandlocalintelligencerequirementsandexpectation.SIFE,as
its charter highlighted, wasMI5’s regional centre for the collection, collation and
disseminationofSecurityintelligence,thatisintelligencerelatingtothoseindividuals
andorganisationsthatmighthavebeenengaged inespionageorsubversion inthe
variousBritishterritories intheFarEast.61However,theproblemswith itsregional
partners prompted London to redefine three key functions for SIFE: Security
Intelligence;CounterEspionageandPreventativeSecurity.Thelattertwotermswere
relativelysimple,buttheformerprovedbothcontentiousandambiguous.62
Securityintelligence-thatisinformationconcerningsuchsubversive,illegalorsecret
activitiesasmaybedetrimentaltothedefenceoftherealmasawhole-wasseenas
central to SIFE’s role. Indeed, itwas this aspect of SIFE’s remitwhich ensured the
59Ibid.,SIFEtoDSOSingapore,MalayaUnion,HongKong,andSLOBurma,25thNovember1947.ThetermDefenceSecurityOfficerwasusedtodescribeSecurityServiceofficersstationedincolonialterritories,whilethetermLocalSecurityOfficerorSecurityLiaisonOfficerswasusedtodescribedofficersstationedinindependentcountries.60KV4/423,KellartoMacDonald,19thDecember1948.61KV4/421,CharterforSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE),6thAugust1946.62KV4/422,WinterborntoDSOHongKing,Singapore,MalayanUnionandBurma,12thJanuary1948.WinterbornwasActingH/SIFE.
133
organisationhadacontinuedresponsibilitytotheofficials inMalayaattemptingto
combat the threat from the MCP. However, Sillitoe sought to disaggregate the
conceptsofsecurityandpoliticalintelligence.Thereasonwhyhechosetodothisare
noteasytounderstand,particularlywhentherecanbesuchafinelevelofdistinction
betweenpoliticalintelligence(forinstance,relatingtotheideologicaldevelopmentof
MCP) and security intelligence (for instance, informationwhich indicated that the
MCP aspired to overthrow the colonial regime in Malaya). Potentially Sillitoe’s
attempt todistinguishbetweensecurityandpolitical intelligencemayhavebeena
ploytoallowhisscantresourcesintheFarEasttofocusuponthewiderthreatposed
byinternationalCommunismbutthisexplanationislargelyunderminedbytheregular
criticismmadebySIFEthattheMSSwasfailingtosharelocalintelligencewiththem.
Sillitoeappearstohavewanteditbothways–tobeprovidedwithintelligencebylocal
policeorintelligenceagenciesbutnottohaveanyresponsibilityforthisintelligence
unless it related to the security of the United Kingdom (rather than individual
territoriesintheregion).ThiswasclearlyinconflictwithSIFE’scoreresponsibilities.63
Whilethesedebatesweretakingplace,Malayawasdescendingintonearanarchy.By
June1948theFederationconsideredthatitwasunabletohaltofCommunistviolence
usingnormallegislationanddeclaredastateofemergency.Aswillbediscussedinthe
nextchapter,theMalayangovernmentandsubsequenthistoriansapportionblameto
theMSSforfailingtoforecasttheCommunistinsurgency.Itcouldequallybeargued,
however,that itwasclearlywithinSIFE’sremitto identifysubversivegroupswhich
threatenedBritain’s interests, including those inMalaya,but theydidnotdoso in
relationtotheMCP.IllustrativeofSIFE’sapparentlackinterestineventstakingplace
inMalaya was the organisation’s response to the declaration of emergency. Alec
Kellar,thenewlyappointedH/SIFE,requestedthatSillitoesendoutaregistryexpert
tosupporttherecentlycreatedSpecialBranchoftheMalayanPolice.ItwasKellar’s
viewthatitwas“oftheutmostimportancetoourfuturerelationswithnewlycreated
MalayanSpecialBranches[sic]thatweimpressonthelatterourwillingnesstospare
noefforttoassistthemintheformativestages.Innowaycanwedemonstratethis
63Ibid.
134
moreeffectivelythaninmatterofregistrytechniqueandpracticewherelackoflocal
experience is fully recognised.”64 Whilst useful, this was hardly a comprehensive
response from SIFE to the first Communist insurgency to be encountered by the
Empire.Evenworse,Sillitoerefusedtoaccedetothisrequest.Eventuallyaregistry
expert from theMetropolitan Police was sent out from London to Kuala Lumpur
instead.65NotonlywasthisamissedopportunitytobuildSIFE’sworkingrelationship
with officials in Malaya, it demonstrates SIFE’s ineffective response to the very
pressinginternalsecuritysituationinthecountry.
Dissatisfaction with SIFE’s response to the declaration of Emergency prompted
Malcolm Macdonald, the Commissioner General, to write three telegrams to the
ColonialOffice.66MacDonaldneverintendedthetelegramtobepassedtoSIFE,but
KellarreceivedcopiesviatheChiefsofStaff.Oneofthekeyviewsexpressedbythe
CommissionerGeneralwasthattheH/SIFEshouldhavelocalknowledge,whichclearly
stungKellar.67Therefolloweda‘frank’meetingbetweenKellar,MacDonaldandhis
deputy, Ralph Hone. Kellar’s report of the conversation suggests that he made a
vigorousdefenceofSIFE,arguing thathewas“notprepared to seeSIFEusedasa
whippingboybyGovernorswhoweredilatoryintrainingtheirSpecialBranchesinto
effectiveunits.”68Moreover,herebuttedthechargethatSIFElackedlocalknowledge
by arguing thatwhilst desirable, “qualitiesof leadership, organisational ability and
technicalefficiencyweremoreimportantprovidedhehadanucleusofofficerswith
localknowledge.”69
ThebroadercriticismmadebyMacDonaldwasthatSIFEwassimplyineffective.Kellar
feltthatatrootofthissuggestionwasawas“veryconsiderableconfusionofthought
regarding the functionsandpurposesofSIFEand itsDefenceSecurityOfficersand
64Ibid.,KellartoSillitoe,16thAugust1948.65SeeCO537/4322.66KV4/423,MacDonaldtoLloyd,13thDecember1948.Unfortunately,itappearscopiesofthesetelegramsarenotonrecord,buttheyweresubsequentlyreferredtointelegramsandminutes,bothwithintheSecurityServiceandbetweentheSecurityServiceandtheColonialOffice,allowingthereadertoascertainthecriticismsmade.67Ibid.,KellartoDG,19thDecember1948.68Ibid.,KellartoDG,12thDecember1948.69Ibid.
135
theirrelationsvis-à-visColonialPoliceForces.”HethusexplainedtheroleoftheDSO
was“toensure…thatallSecurity Intelligence flowing intoSecurityServicechannels
andbearingontheintelligenceproblemsoftheColonytowhichheisaccredited,is
made available to that Colony and, as a corollary, to ensure that Intelligence of a
regional interest obtained within the Colony is in turn passed back to SIFE to be
collatedandappreciatedfortheatrepurposesagainstawiderbackground.”70Kellar
emphasisedthatitwasoftheutmostimportancetoestablishbeyondalldoubt,and
at the earliest possible moment, the direct responsibility of the Police for the
collectionandcollationoftheirownlocalintelligence.”71Thisclearvoltefacefromthe
expansionistdriveof1947-8,appearstostemfromthewiderdiscussionsinLondon
between the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service about their
respective roles and lines of demarcation and also a growing realisation that SIFE
simplydidnothavetheresourcestoundertakewidespreadcollectiondutiesinthe
region.72
The disclosure ofMacDonald’s ‘thinking aloud’ telegrams caused concern both in
London and the Far East: the Chiefs Of Staff took umbrage that MacDonald had
criticisedaunitwhichwasatleastinpartresponsibletothem;theSecurityService
feltthatMacDonaldwasmeddlinginmatterswhichhedidnotunderstandfully;while
the Colonial Office took a surprisingly conciliatory linewith the Security Service.73
There was some discussion that the Chiefs of Staff might order a complete
reassessment of the intelligence apparatus in the Far East. Sillitoewas anxious to
instigatesuchareviewandofferedtovisittheregion.74Inhindsight,thismayhave
beenthebestoption.However,bothSIFEandtheGovernorGeneralwithdrewfrom
the brink. MacDonald retreated, claiming that the telegrams expressed tentative,
embryonic,viewsintendedonlyfordiscussionwiththeColonialOffice.Kellardidnot
70KV4/423,KellartoMacDonald,19thDecember1948.71Ibid.72Ibid.,KellartoDG,2ndMarch1949.Seealso“FunctionsofSecurityLiaisonOfficers”,21stApril1949.NotethatDSOsintheregionwereseeminglyarbitrarilyrenamedSecurityLiaisonOfficers(SLOs)on11thMay1949.SeealsoFO1093/393,LiddelltoSillitoe,RelationsbetweentheSecretService(SIS)andSecurityService,29thApril1949.73KV4/470,diaryentriesfor14thand29thDecember1948;KV4/423,KellartoDG,22ndDecember1948.74KV4/423,MacDonaldtoLloyd,13thDecember1948.
136
deploythebigguns,advisingSillitoenottovisit theregionfor fearofallowingthe
ColonialOffice to imply that itwas only SIFE that required review. Instead,Hone,
MacDonaldandKellarattemptedtoresolvetheirdifficultieslocallythroughaseries
ofmeetingsinwhichthreekeyissueswereconsidered:therelationshipbetweenSIFE
and the local police forces; SIFE’s remit; and the role ofMI6 in the region.75 The
relationship between SIFE and local police forces was arguably themost pressing
matter,largelybecauseitwassopoor.
AnumberofpracticalinitiativesresultedfromthecrisisinrelationsbetweenSIFEand
its Colonial ‘customers.’ For instance, over a seriesof talks, including theRegional
IntelligenceConferenceheld in Singapore inApril 1949, itwasagreed that Special
BranchofficerswouldbeginattachmentswithSIFEandajointSpecialBranch/SIFE
unit was created in Singapore (the former providing the resources, the latter the
planningandcoordinationfunction).76SIFEalsocreateabespoketrainingcoursefor
allexistingseniorSpecialBranchofficersthatreflectedanemphasis“uponcounter-
intelligence work as opposed to the mere collection of information.” The course
comprised “instruction on counter-intelligence methods, on Communism, both
generallyandinMalaya,practicalinstructionintradecraftofvariousdescriptionsand
inadditionlecturesonvariousotheraspectsoftheGovernmentwithwhichfromtime
totimeaSpecialBranchOfficermustbecomeinvolved.”77Moreover,asmentioned
above,Morton,asH/SIFE,helpedSpecialBranchestablishadedicatedinterrogation
centreinMalaya.However,thereisnoevidenceavailablethatSIFEeithercollected
any intelligence or provided any assessments of the Communist threat to the
Federation, surely the most pressing and dramatic manifestation of Communist
75Ibid.,LloydtoSillitoe,31stDecember1948.76FortheattachmentofSpecialBranchOfficerstoSIFEseeKV4/423,ExtractfromMinutesofGovernor’sConferenceheldon22nd-23rdJanuary1949;fortheinterrogationunitseeKV4/423,KellartoDG,10thMay1949andKV4/424,YoungtoDG,17thMay1949;forthejointoperationsUnitinSingaporeseeKV4/423,SIFEtoDG,16thOctober1948andSIFEtoDG,10thNovember1948–whilethisunitpre-datedthe‘thinkingaloud’telegrams,andrelationsbetweenSIFEandGimsonremainedfractious,theunitprovidedanexampleoflocalcollegialityuponwhichfutureworkingcouldbebased.77MSSBritEmpire,S.486,3/1,TheYoungPapers,Areviewofdevelopmentsin1952,undated.Seealso,C.Walton,EmpireofSecrets,p.191.
137
subversioninBritishterritoriesintheFarEastatthistime.78Indeed,SIFE’spractical
involvementintheEmergencywaslimitedtotheseactivitiesandwasveryfarfrom
theomnipotentsecurityintelligencepresenceenvisagedbySillitoe.79
OneoftheCommissionerGeneral’scomplaintsinhis‘thinkingaloud’telegrams,was
thatneitherMI5norSISwereworkingeffectively.Thisprovedtohavefarreaching
consequencesforSIFE’sraisond’etre.Asaresultofthecomplaint,GuyLiddellheld
negotiationswithSIS“inordertoobtaintheiragreementtothesecondmentofone
of theirofficers toSIFE inorder thatall reportsonsecurity intelligencecanbeco-
ordinatedonthesamebasisasthoseintheMiddleEast.”80Thisagaincausedsome
considerablediscussionbothintheFarEastandLondon.MacDonaldraisedtheissue
of why the Security Service had a Security Liaison Officer (LSO) in Burma, a non-
Colonial country, therefore more normally within the jurisdiction of the Secret
IntelligenceService.Kellarexplainedinthiscase“technicalconsiderations”hadbeen
waived by both intelligence agencies “to meet the clearly expressed wish of the
Burmesetohaveovert liaisononsecuritymatters.”Moreover,theSecurityService
hadovertrepresentationintheMiddleEastand“liaisonwiththeFrenchandBelgians
inWestandCentralAfrica.”81ThelinesofdemarcationbetweenMI5andMI6were
thus,inplaces,alreadyblurred.
Liddellnoted thatKellarwas in favourofhavingSecurityService representation in
countriesadjacenttoMalaya“owingtothefactthatthereareseveralorganisations
in each of these counties handling CE [counter-espionage] matters, and that this
difficulty can only be overcome by local representation.” However, SIS offered
78TheFarEastMilitaryAttaches’Conferencein1950providesanexampleofSIFE’spriorities.MortongaveadetailedbriefingtotheConferenceatGHQFARLEFaboutCommunismintheFarEast,whilethepresentationaboutthecounter-insurgencycampaignintheFederationwaslefttoarelativelyjuniorintelligenceofficerfromHQMalayaDistrict.SeeWO208/4835,ReportonFarEastMilitaryAttaches’ConferenceHeldatGHQFARELF,Singapore,21st-23rdMarch1950,‘SIFE’byJ.P.MortonEsq,OBE,HeadofSIFE.79Arguably,itwasalsofarfrombeingthehubofBritain’sintelligenceinterestsintheFarEast,assuggestedbyLeonComber.SeeComber,Malaya’sSecretPolice,p.96.80KV4/470,Kellar’sdiaryentriesfor29thDecember1948.SeealsoDGtoLloyd,31stDecember1948,explainingthatasaresultofMacDonald’stelegramsMI5andMI6hadformed“asmallrepresentativecommitteetoexaminethisandotherpointsconcerningtherelationshipsofourtwoorganisations.”81KV4/423,KellartoSillitoe,2ndMarch1949.
138
“preciselytheoppositeargument.”82TherefollowedcomplexdiscussionswithSISon
the nature of counter-espionage and more mundane conversations within the
SecurityServiceaboutresourcing,personnelandaccommodation.83Althoughthefinal
detail of these deliberations are not clear, a subsequent briefing note stated that
“when the Communist threat from China developed and fanned out over Asia, it
became apparent that there was a great deal to gain from having a single CI
organisationtomeetthethreatofespionage,sabotageandsubversion.Thusby1950
it was decided to amalgamate SIFE’s Intelligence Division with MI6’s regional
apparatustoformaJointIntelligenceDivision[JID].”84Moreover,SIFEtookoverthe
R5[Counter-intelligence]functionsofMI6.85By1952SIFEwasconsideredasajoint
SecurityService/SISOffice.86Itisthussomewhatironicthatoneofthekeyeffectsof
Macdonald’s ‘thinking aloud’ telegrams was to prompt a renaissance in relations
between MI5 and MI6 which significantly shifted SIFE’s role away from security
intelligenceandthustheEmergency.Indeed,intheperiodbetweenitsinceptionand
amalgamationwithSIS, theSecurityService’sperceptionof its role in theFarEast
changedsignificantly.
TerminalDecline.
AtthesametimethatCourtneyYoung,whosucceedMortonasH/SIFE,wasbuilding
uponhispredecessorsworktoimproverelationswithlocalSpecialBranches,hebegan
todoubttheverybasisuponwhichhisorganisationexisted.Thegermofthisdoubt
maybetracedtoameetinghehadinJuly1952withAlanDudley,thenewDeputy
CommissionerGeneral.AfterhearingYoung’sexplanationofSIFE’srole,Dudleyasked
“whycouldnotalltheworkofSIFEheadquartersbedoneinLondon?”Thisquestion
appears to have taken Young by surprise – he noted in his subsequent report to
Londonthat“thisisinfactthefirsttimeasfarasIknowthisquestionhaseverbeen
asked.”InresponseYounggavethreereasonswhySIFE’sheadquarterswereinthe
82KV4/470,Kellar’sdiaryentryfor23rdFebruary1949.83Ibid.,Kellar’sdiaryentriesfor27thApril,2ndMay,20thJune,24thJuly,13thOctober1949.84KV4/427,BriefforthevisittotheFarEastofJIC(London)Delegation,December1955.SeealsoWO208/4835,ReportonFarEastMilitaryAttaches’ConferenceHeldatGHQFARELF,Singapore,21st-23rdMarch1950,‘SIFE’byJ.P.MortonEsq,OBE,HeadofSIFE.85KV4/424,J.Collard(ActingH/SIFE),NoteonSIFEOrganisationandFunction,6thMay1952.86KV4/425,Young,TheBasicProblemsofSIFEAreaPorts,25thSeptember1953.
139
FarEast.First,thatitslocationprovidedgreatercontextualunderstandingtoregional
issues.Second“aslongastherewasaCommissionerGeneral’sOfficeandaBDCC,so
longtheywouldrequireanorganisationtoprovidethemwithSecurity Intelligence
andadvice.”Finally,“aslongastheForeignServicerestrictedtheSIFErepresentation
inforeignpoststoone,solongwoulditbeimpossiblefortheoutstationinforeign
territory to produce satisfactory collated and appreciated reports.”87 Young’s
attemptstojustifyhisorganisationappearflimsy.
AsaresultofthisconversationwithDudley,Youngproducedaneloquentandincisive
report into SIFE, which articulated the organisation’s structural weaknesses in a
manner that itsvariouscritics in theColonialOffice triedbut failed todoover the
previous six years. Younghighlighted flaws in SIFE’s Security LiaisonPostsonboth
Britishcolonialandforeignterritory,aswellasSIFEheadquarters.InrelationtoSIFE’s
LiaisonPostsoncolonial territory in theregion,heexplainedthat the localSpecial
BrancheswereresponsibletotheColonialgovernmentforalmostallmattersonwhich
the Security LiaisonOfficer [SLO] is called to advise. They also held almost all the
intelligencewhichtheSLOhadinstructionstocollect.Therefore“iftheSLOadvises
thegovernmentthatanyaspectof itssecuritymachine isat faulthe is,at leastby
implication, criticising the department on which he depends for his information.”
Indeed Young explained, “the very fact that he [the SLO] holds a position of
independenceisarestraintuponfrankness,exemplifiedbythefactthattothisdayno
SLOintheareaisallowedunrestrictedaccesstoSpecialBranchfiles.”88
Unfortunately, much of Young’s comment on the state of SIFE’s Liaison Posts on
foreignterritoryremainsheavilyredacted.Itispossibletodiscern,however,thathe
feltthattherewasacleardifferenceinworkingpracticesbetweenSISandSecurity
Serviceofficers.SIFEheadquartersexpectedSLOstoundertaketheirownappreciation
[assessment]process.However,YoungbelievedthatSISofficersperformingthisrole
were ‘short-termist’ and excessively operationally focused, neglecting the
appreciation aspect of their work. According to Young, this was contrary to the
87KV4/425,YoungtoDG,25thJuly1953.88KV4/424,SIFEReviewofSecurityIntelligenceintheFarEast,12thMay1952.
140
concept of SIFE which envisaged SLOs “making their post a self-contained local
intelligenceunit,abletofeedinprocessedreportsreadyforcollation.”Thisledtoan
imbalanceintheregistryand,inrelationtoBDivision(counter-subversion)work,“the
trendhasbeenforthemorepressingcallsof‘steerage’totakeprecedenceoverlong-
termstudyandcollation.”89
However, perhaps the greatest problems, according to Young, related to the
functioning of SIFE HQ. There were two main issues. First, the integration of SIS
officers intoSLOpostshadincreasedproductionof intelligence,but“atthecostof
turningSIFEawayfromaregionaloutlooktowardsaterritorialone.”Consequently
thetaskingprocesswasout-of-balance,andacquisitionofinformationhadbecome
anend in itself.90 Second,Young identified that thecontinuingambiguitybetween
politicalandsecurityintelligencewashavingaseriousanddetrimentalimpactupon
theworkofSIFE.Heacknowledgedthatthepointofdemarcationbetweenthetwo
conceptswasnearimpossibletodrawandthatitwasinevitablethatSIFEwouldbe
drawnintopoliticalproblems.However,theresultwasnotonlythat“officers’timeis
spentoncommentandreportswhichcouldbemadeequallywellelsewherebutthat
politicalinformationisdeliberatelycollectedandstudiedforthispurpose.91Young’s
solutionwasdramatic.HeproposedthatSLOpostsincolonialterritoriesintheregion
beclosed,andtheirresponsibilitiesbeassumedbySpecialBranch;thatthedivisionof
workbetweenfieldpostsonforeignterritoriesandSIFEHQbere-balanced(although
to remain resourced on a jointMI5/MI6 basis); that BDivision of SIFEHQbe re-
structuredbyfunction,ratherthanterritory(thusshiftingfromaterritorialtoregional
focus),andcreatingmoresectionheads(providinggreatersupervision).92
Young’sreportraisedissuesof“fundamental,nottosayrevolutionary,importance”
and,notsurprisingly,promptedconsiderabledebateinLondon.93However,itstruck
89Ibid.90SeealsoKV4/426,forafurther,moredevelopedreportbyYoungentitled‘ReorganisationofSIFEHeadquartersandOutstationsinForeignTerritory’,11thNovember1953.91KV4/424,SIFEReviewofSecurityIntelligenceintheFarEast,12thMay1952.92Ibid.93KV4/425,minute262,DOStoDG,2ndOctober1953.
141
achordwithDickWhite,Sillitoe’ssuccessor.94Thiswaspartlyduetotheeconomies
which re-structuringorcompletedisbandmentmightafford.Moreover,Whitewas
uncomfortable with the amount of ‘political’ work SIFE was doing for the
Commissioner-General’s office, which he felt should not be considered a high-
poweredregionalpolicy-makingbody.Indeed,headmitted,“ifithadnotbeenforthe
war,and itsaftermath, theSIFE regionalheadquarterswouldprobablyneverhave
come into existence.”95 White felt that SIFE headquarters was ‘top heavy’ and
recommendedthatthepositionofdeputyH/SIFEbeabolished.Moreover,hethought
therewastoomuchcentralisationinSingaporeandthusproposed“devolvingmore
of thestrengthatpresentheld inSingaporeto theoutstations,both inBritishand
foreign territories.”96 Indeed there had already been a degree of decentralisation,
suchasthedeploymentofSecurityServiceofficerstoresearchsectionsinsideSpecial
Branches of the Federation and Singapore, and the redeployment of staff in SIFE
headquarterstoindividualterritories.97
However, Dick White was not quite ready to let go of his Far East organisation
completely. During the course of discussions in Singapore in February 1954, the
‘Ransome’or‘ThirdForcePlan’wasproposedasanalternativetotheYoungPlan.This
involvedthescalingdownbothofSLOposts(withSIStakingupagreaternumberof
regionaldeploymentsintheregion)andheadquarters,leavingthelattertoact“asa
sortofsuperSLO.”Atthesametime,SecurityServiceofficerswouldbeattachedto
theregionalSpecialBranchesforatransitionalperiod.Perhapsconsciousthatplans
wereafootforthewithdrawaloftheCommissioner-General’soffice,Whitewasdrawn
tothe‘ThirdForcePlan’becauseitwouldallowthe“statusquo…tobemaintainedfor
anotheryearwiththeweightbeingputintothefieldasthepostsfellvacantandthe
postofDeputyH/SIFEabolished.”98
94SirDickWhitesucceededSirPercySillitoeasDGin1953.In1956hewasappointedheadofSIS(‘C’)untilretirementin1968.95KV4/426,NotesofmeetingheldinDG’sroomon5thJanuary1954.96Ibid.,DGto‘C’,29thMarch1954.97KV4/425,‘ResearchSectionofSingaporeSpecialBranch’,10thSeptember1953andKV4/426,DGto‘C’,29thMarch1954.98KV4/426,ExtractfrompaperdiscussedbyDGandH/SIFEonvisittoSingapore,February1954.
142
The ‘Third Force’ Plan was implemented but the pace of change in the Far East,
particularlyMalaya, showed it to be rather redundant. Indeed, there was further
pressureforchangeinthefollowingyear.AsearlyasJanuary1955(i.eevenbefore
thefirstlocalelectionshadbeenheldinMalaya99),thePermanentUnderSecretaryat
the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, indicated to Dick White that the
CommissionerGeneral’sOffice,whichprovidedmuchof the raisond’être forSIFE,
wouldlikelytoremaininexistencefornotmuchmorethanayear.Whiteformedthe
viewthat,whilsttherewasnoimmediatedemandtowindupSIFE,theyneededto
plan for “the disappearance of the Commissioner General’s organisation…and the
generalpropositionthatasmuchcollationaspossibleshouldbedoneinLondon.”100
Therewerealsofurtherindicatorsoftheimminentneedforchangeoriginatingfrom
Singapore.Thistlethwaite,Young’ssuccessorasH/SIFE,reportedtoWhitethat”itis
cleartoeverybody…fromtheSecretaryofStatewhohasjustbegunouthere,tothe
meanest shop-keeper that a new era has begun in Singapore and the Federation.
Therearethebeginningsofself-governmentinbothandtherewillbeasnowballof
demand for complete autonomy which it may be possible to guide, but not to
resist.”101 This paceof change forced the Security Service to confront theneed to
reconfigure their regional presence for a post-colonial world, onewhere the new
nationswereunlikelytobereceptivetoanovertBritishintelligencepresence.102
MuchofthedeliberationfocuseduponSIFEHeadquarters,andhowmuchofthework
oftheJointIntelligenceDivision(JID-thecombinedSIS/MI5assessmentandanalysis
centre)couldbeconductedbyindividualregionalstations.103Thistlethwaitewaskeen
toreducehisJIDtoonecollatingmemberofstaff.ThiscausedconcerninLondon.For
instance, Bill Magan (the former H/SIME104) noted that while he did “not
99SeeA.Stockwell,“BritishimperialpolicyanddecolonisationinMalaya,1942-52”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,13:1(October1984),pp.68-87.100KV4/426,ExtractfromnoteofdiscussionbetweenDGandSirIvoneKirkpatrickon13thJanuary1955.101KV4/427,H/SIFEtoDG,26thAugust1955.102Ibid.,‘BriefforvisittoFarEastofJIC(London)Delegation.’103Ibid.,DGtoH/SIFE,6thDecember1955;H/SIFEtoDG,16thDecember1955.ForthebackgroundtotheJIDsee‘BriefforvisittotheFarEastofJIC(London)Delegation,undatedinthesamefile.104W.Magan,MiddleEasternApproaches–ExperiencesandTravelsofanIntelligenceOfficer1939-1948(Norwich2001).
143
underestimatethegreatvalueofvelocity,and itmaybethat it is the firstneed in
SouthEastAsiaatthemoment,butthatisnotasufficientreasontoabandonthe-
albeit slow – conventional British Secretariat machinery.”105 Whilst Magan was
concerned that thingsweremovingat toogreatapace,a formerSIFE intelligence
officersimplyhaddoubtsaboutthewisdomofreducingtooneofficer.106Thepaceof
changeaside,thedebateinLondonessentiallyrevolvedaroundthequestionofwhere
the analytical process should take place. Both SIS and the Security Service had
acceptedthatoutstationshadtodotheirowncollation.Therewereclearbenefitsof
the appreciation (assessment) processes being done ‘in theatre’, not least local
understandingandexpertise,andtostandardisethemethodofcarding(eachofthree
regionalSpecialBranchesuseddifferentmethodstorecordChinesenames).107Yet,
movingtheprocesstoLondonwouldreducecostandcreatescaled-downintelligence
presence intheregion,appropriateforthe loomingpost-colonialworld.Ultimately
thelatterviewprevailed.
ThenatureofSIFE’sdeath’sthroesremainfrustratinglyobscure–theSecretService
filesreleasedinTheNationalArchivesimplyceasewiththelastentrybeing30July
1956, atwhichpoint SIFE remained inexistence.Moreover, theprevious two files
relatingtoSIFEremainheavilyredacted.However,theydoindicateaclearmovetoa
post-colonialstanceintheFarEast.Forinstance,SLOswerereintroducedintoMalaya
andSingaporebecauseWhiterealisedthatthepostofDirectorofIntelligence(which
hadactedasSLOforthetwoterritoriessince1954)wasfragileandnotviableinan
independentMalaya.SLOswereretainedintheexistingSIFEareasandagreementwas
madewiththeForeignOfficeoverSIScoverageinnon-colonialterritories.Moreover,
the remit of JID was changed to focus upon short-term collation and operational
matters,withlonger-termappreciationseitherdonebytheSecurityServiceinLondon
ortheForeignOffice.Whiletheexactdateofitsterminationisnotavailable,itisclear
thatby1955thepreparatoryworkhadbeendone–allthatwasrequiredtomoveto
the post colonial model of British intelligence in the Far East was to replace any
105Ibid.,minute337,byW.Magan,dated24thNovember1955.106Ibid.,minute336,byW.Oughton,dated23rdNovember1955.107Ibid.,H/SIFEtoDG,21stDecember1955.
144
lingeringSecurityServiceSLOswithSISstaff,andtowithdrawtheJIDinfavourofaSIS
regionalstation.108
Conclusion.
WithoutdoubttheoriginalideaofSIFEwassound.Britainexpectedtoreturntoher
FarEastterritoriesafterthedefeatofJapanandthusrequiredsomeformofSecurity
Servicepresencemoreefficientthanthepre-war‘link’system.Decolonisationinthe
regionwasseenasadistinctpossibilitybutlimitedtoself-governmentratherthanfull
independence, and over a protracted time period. Therefore, the Security Service
wouldrequireanintelligencehub,collatingregionaltrends,particularlyinrelationto
thetwinthreatsofCommunismandnationalismwhichwereofconcerntoLondon,
and supporting both the colonial governments in the Far East and Commissioner-
GeneraltoidentifyandmanageanysubversivemovementsinBritishterritories.
SIFE’sremitplaceditattheforefrontofBritain’sintelligenceapparatusintheregion,
not least in relation to threat posed by the Malayan Communist Party. And yet
betweenconceptionanddelivery,SIFEwentsignificantlyastray.Inthefirstinstance,
therewasafundamentalfailuretoclarifySIFE’sworkingpractices.Thisisreflectedin
thenumerousre-draftsofSIFE’scharterandmemorandumofinstructionforitsDSOs
andSLOs.TheuncertaintyaboutSIFE’sfunctionwasborneoutbySillitoe’sdrivefor
SIFE to develop a collecting function.Moreover, discussions about the distinction
betweenpoliticalandsecurityintelligencereoccuratalmostmonotonousregularity
intheavailablefilescoveringSIFE’sexistence.ThisissuewasattheheartofSillitoe’s
visionof SIFE’s strategic position in the region, the subsequentdebates about the
integration of SIS officers into the SIFE and the fate of the JID and the support it
providedtheCommissionerGeneral’soffice. However, theSecurityService’s ideas
appearnottohavebeenfixed–SillitoewasrabidlyagainstSIFEbecominginvolvedin
political intelligence, yet SIFE officers complained that SIS colleagues were too
108FormoreinformationonSIS’sFarEaststationseeDavies,“TheSISSingaporestationandtheroleoftheFarEastcontroller:Secretintelligencestructureandprocessinpost-warcolonialadministration”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.105-129.
145
operationallyfocusedandneglectedthepoliticalcontext.Moreover,asSIFEmatured,
itsheadquarters staff in the shapeof the JIDbecame, ineffect, theCommissioner
General’sChancery(ironicallyprovidingakeyreasontoprolongthelifeofSIFE).Itis
surprising that, throughout thesedebates, thesuggestion thatpolitical intelligence
mightbeintegraltosecurityintelligencewasnotraised.
SIFE was based upon the practical foundations provided by the CICB and the
conceptualfoundationsprovidedbySIME.Yetfromwhatwere,particularlyinrelation
toSIME,keyexamplesof‘jointry’,SIFEbecameanorganisationthatenjoyedfractious
relationswithnearlyall itspartners.Therewasareal lackofunderstandingbythe
SecurityServiceof theexisting local (colonial) securityarrangementsandhowSIFE
mightco-exist, letaloneintegratewiththem.Thiswasexacerbatedbythevariable
diplomaticskillsdemonstratedbythevariousheadsofSIFE–PercySillitoeandAlec
Kellarmadeaparticularlycombativepair.IncontrastJackMortonandCourtneyYoung
appear to have been far better at working with partners across the region.
Nevertheless, it is clear that key actors, including the Director of the MSS, the
Commissioner for the Hong Kong police, the Governor of Singapore and the
CommissionerGeneralstrugglednotonlywithSillitoeandKellar,butwiththebroader
concept of SIFE and its relationship to their spheres of interest. Conversely, the
warmth and candour in communications between the various H/SIFE and London
indicatethatdespitewhatmightbeonpaper,SIFEoweditsallegianceprimarilyto
London,attheexpenseofrelationshipswithregionalpartners.
SIFE’sresponsibilityfordealingwithsubversivethreatstoBritishterritoriesintheFar
East was enshrined in its remit. However, despite this, it contribution to the
EmergencyinMalayawasverylargelynegative.Itsufferedfromalackofresources–
notleastpeopleontheground–and,inrelationtoMalaya,washostagetotheMSS
andsubsequentlythenewlyre-constitutedSpecialBranch,forintelligence.Thereis
noevidencethatitcollectedevidenceagainsttheMCPinthebuild-upto,oraftermath
of,thedeclarationofemergency.Nordiditprovideanymeaningfulassessmentsin
thesametimeperiodabouttheCommunistthreattoMalaya.Moreover,SIFE’splace,
bothwithintheMalayanintelligenceapparatusandwiderregionalintelligenceambit,
146
was ambiguous. Questions of whether SIFE should be a collection or assessment
agencyandwhetherpolitical intelligenceequatedtosecurity intelligenceremained
unclearforlargeperiodsoftime.TheseissuesundoubtedlysignificantlyblurredSIFE’s
operationalfocus.Moreover,asaresultoftheinter-agencydisputesandmetropolitan
restructuringoftheintelligenceservices,SIFEevolvedintheperiod1946-52quickly
from an embryonic security intelligence-clearing house to a far more strategic
counter-intelligenceregionalheadquartersforbothMI5andSIS.Asitdid,SIFEquietly
movedaway fromthe intelligencedebacle takingplace inMalaya.However,SIFE’s
primaryeffectuponthecounter-insurgencyeffort inMalayahas thus farnotbeen
explored.Aswillbediscussedinthenextchapter,SirPercySillitoeandSIFEactively
subvertedandfinallydestroyedtheoneorganisationwhichhadaccuratelyforecast
thethreatposedbytheMCPtotheexistenceoftheMalayanUnionfromasearlyas
1946.Theimplicationsofthisactwereevidentformanyyearsandhadafundamental
impactuponthecourseoftheMalayanEmergency.
147
Chapter5–TheMalayanSecurityService1
Introduction
The disinterest of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) (JIC (FE)) and
ineffectiveness of Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), meant that the Malayan
SecurityServicewasleftalonetosafeguardtheFederation’sinternalsecurity.While
theJIC(FE)andSIFEhavenearlyentirelyescapedtheattentionofhistorians,theMSS
hasbeenroundlycriticisedasanorganisationthatwassetup‘unsound’,withalimited
pool of raw intelligence sources and an equally poor output in terms of finished
intelligence.Itsdirector,Lt.Col.JohnDalley,ischaracterisedbycontemporaries(such
asSirPercySillitoe,DirectorGeneraloftheSecurityService)andhistorians(suchas
LeonComberandAntonyShort)asamaverick,preoccupiedwiththelargelyillusionary
threatfromMalayandIndonesiannationalismratherthantheMCP.Indeed,theMSS
appearstohavefailedtoforecastthelaunchoftheMCP’sinsurgencyinJune1948.As
a result,at theheightof thegovernment’s confusionandwhen theyneeded their
intelligenceapparatusworkingatfullcapacity,theunprecedenteddecisionwasmade
notjusttoreplaceDalleybutalsotodisbandtheentireMSS.
However, this picture is not wholly accurate. Despite undoubted operational
difficulties,theMSS identifiedtheMCPasacrediblethreattoMalaya’ssecurityas
earlyas1946.Moreover,theMSShighlightedthroughout1947andthefirsthalfof
1948,factorswhichindicatedthattheMCP’spotentialtodestabilisetheFederation
was growing significantly, to the extent that it is difficult to understand why the
violenceofJune1948cameasasurprisetotheMalayanauthorities. It isaccepted
that theMSSdidnotpredict theactsofmurder thatprompted thedeclarationof
Emergencysimplybecausethesewerelikelytohavebeenspontaneousacts,butitdid
provideclearmedium-termwarningofboththeintentandcapabilityoftheMCPto
challengetheMalayangovernment.
1Aversionofthischapterhasbeenpublishedasajournalarticle.PleaseseeR.Arditti&P.Davies,“RethinkingtheRiseandFalloftheMalayanSecurityService,1946-8”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,43:2(2015),pp.292-316.
148
NotpreviouslyfullyappreciatedinexistingnarrativesisthedegreetowhichtheMSS
had to contend not only with Malaya’s deteriorating internal security but the
machinationsofSirPercySillitoe,theheadoftheSecurityService(MI5).Whilstthis
maywellhavehadapersonaledge,theprimarycauseoftheconflictbetweenthetwo
menwas Sillitoe’s agenda for the role and status ofMI5’s regional headquarters,
Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE). Indeed, Sillitoe effectively subverted theMSS
withinthecorridorsofWhitehallandtheverandasofSingaporebeforethestateof
Emergencyhadevenbeendeclared.Indeed,areassessmentoftheMSSsuggeststhe
MalayanEmergencybegannotonlywiththeFederation’sprimaryintelligenceagency
on the brink of abolition, but with the wider inter-agency intelligence apparatus
fracturedanddislocated.
The implicationsforourunderstandingaboutoriginsoftheEmergency,theroleof
intelligence during the campaign and the subsequent formation of doctrine are
significant.FromtheearliestdaysoftheEmergencycommentatorshavespeculated
thattheauthoritieseitherknewabouttheimpendingCommunistcampaignorused
thedeclarationofEmergencyasapre-emptivestrike.2However,theMSScouldnot
haveforecasttheexacttimingofthestartoftheCommunistcampaignbutdidprovide
adequatewarningofanimpedingcrisis.Thesewarningsfellondeafears,notbecause
of a poor intelligence product but because the wider intelligence apparatus was
dysfunctional. There is no credible evidence to support the theory that the
governmentactedproactivelyagainsttheMCP.TheMSSwasabolishedbecauseof
inter-agencydiscord,notbecauseofitsperformance.TheresultwasthattheMalayan
authoritieswereforcedtotackletheMCPthreatwhilstreconstitutingitsintelligence
structures,aprocesswhichtookatleastfouryearstocomplete.
2A.Stockwell,“‘Awidespreadandlong-concoctedplottooverthrowtheGovernmentinMalaya?’TheOriginsoftheMalayanEmergency’”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,21:3(Sept.1993),pp.66-88;K.Hack,“TheOriginsoftheAsianColdWar:Malaya1948”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,40:3(2009),pp.471-496;P.Deery,“Britain’sAsianColdWar?”,JournalofColdWarStudies,9:1(Winter2007),pp.29-54.
149
HistoriographyandMythologyoftheMSS
DespitetheresurgenceofinterestintheMalayanEmergencyinrecentyears,theMSS
haslargelyescapedthedetailedattentionofhistorians.Mostwhohaveconsidered
theMSSdosoaspartof thepreambletowiderdiscussionsof theEmergencyand
instinctivelylinkitsdemisedirectlytothefailuretoforecasttheoutbreakofMCP’s
insurgency.3 Commentators attribute this failure to a combination of three key
factors: the structure of the MSS, the operational difficulties it faced, and the
leadershipofDalley.
AnthonyShort,authorofperhapsthedefinitiveaccountoftheMalayanEmergency,
hasalsomentionsDalley’simpactupontheworkoftheMSS,inparticularhisapparent
pre-occupationwithMalaynationalismandIndonesia,ratherthantheMCP.Shortis
highlycriticaloftheintelligencereportsbytheMSSsuggestingthatDalley“hedged
his bets”, and presided over an organisationwhichmade “lurid forecasts”, one of
whichcontained“themostastonishingseriesoferrorsfromwhatwasanintelligence
ratherthanaclairvoyantorganisation.”4
LeonComberhasprovidedthemostcomprehensiveexaminationoftheMSSthusfar.5
He highlights the practical difficulties faced by the MSS, in particular the lack of
intelligence officers, Chinese-speaking staff and human sources within the MCP.
ComberalsodiscussestheapparentinadequacyoftheMSS’skeyintelligenceproduct,
thefortnightlyPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,theinformationinwhichheconsidersto
be“diffuseandspreadoverawiderangeoftopics,withoutnecessarilysinglingout
3A.Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya1948-60(London1975);D.MacKay,TheMalayanEmergency1948-60-TheDominothatStood(London1997);R.Stubbs,HeartsandMindsinGuerrillaWarfare-TheMalayanEmergency1948-60(Singapore1989);H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444.SeealsoK.Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(2008),pp.211-241.4Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,pp.82–3.5LeonComber’s2003article,replicatedinMalaya’sSecretPolice,istheonlyworkdedicatedtohistoryoftheMSS.Unfortunately,itislargelynarrativeinnatureandfailstoexplainfullywhytheMSSwasabolished.SeeL.Comber,“TheMalayanSecurityService(1945-48)”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,18:3(2003),pp.128-153;Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60(Singapore2008).
150
theCPM[CommunistPartyofMalaya]asthemaintarget.”6HealsoalludestoDalley’s
difficultpersonality,andtheantagonismbetweenhimandSirPercySillitoe.Thelatter
aspectisalsomentionedbyChristopherAndrewinhissurveyoftheSecurityService
butneitherauthordevelopsthistheme.7GeorginaSinclair’srecentarticleonSpecial
BranchalsoprovidesafurtherperspectiveaboutourunderstandingoftheMSS.She
reintroducesaviewfirstexpressedbySillitoesomesixtyyearsagothattheMSSwas
structurallyunsound.Thisleavesunansweredthequestionofwhynotsimplyreform
theMSS rather thandisband it entirelywhenconfrontingamajordeterioration in
internalsecuritywhichwaspossiblyexternallyorchestrated?8
Thus, the prevailing view of theMSS is of an organisation that was operationally
challenged, with few, if any, reliable human sources within the MCP. This was
compoundedbyDalley’spreoccupationwiththepotentialthreatsposedbyMalayand
Indonesiannationalism,ratherthanthatfromtheCommunism.Moreover,Dalleyis
portrayedasanirascible,indeedbelligerent,manwhoantagonisedhispeers,notleast
the head of Security Service. But above all, theMSS simply failed to forecast the
Communist insurrectionandwasdisbandedasadirectconsequence.However,the
prevailingviewhasthreesignificantlimitations.First,itdoesnotexplainwhyDalley,
having apparently failed to warn the Malayan government of the Communist
insurgency,retainedasignificantbodyofsupportwithintheregionalcoreexecutive.
Indeed, primary sources show that Sir FrankGimson9,Governorof Singapore, and
Malcolm MacDonald10, Commissioner-General for South East Asia, valued the
intelligenceprovidedby theMSSandcontinued toholdDalley inhigh regard,and
6Ibid.,p.397C.Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorisedHistoryofMI5(London2010).8G.Sinclair,“‘TheSharpEndoftheIntelligenceMachine’:theriseoftheMalayanPoliceSpecialBranch1948-1955’,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,26:4(2011),pp.460-77.9SirFranklinGimson(b.1890–d.1975)servedwiththeBritishCeylonCivilServicebetween1914-1941.HeassumedthepostofColonialSecretaryofHongKongin1941.HespentthedurationoftheSecondWorldWarasaprisonerofwar.HewasGovernorofSingaporefrom1946-52.10MalcolmMacDonald(b.1901–d.1981)LabourMP,wasSecretaryofStatefortheColoniesin1935andagainbetween1938-40,HighCommissionertoCanadabetween1941-6,GovernorGeneral,MalayaandBorneo1946-48,andCommissionerGeneralforSouthEastAsia1948-55.
151
advocatedtheneedtointegrateDalleywithinthenewintelligenceapparatus.11This
supportappearsincongruentwiththecurrentviewthatthefailingsoftheMSSwere
linkeddirectlytoDalley’sleadership.
Second, one can detect within the current historiography a layering pathology in
which theallegeddeficienciesofMSSreportsareacceptedwithoutcritical review.
Without doubt the fortnightly Political Intelligence Journal became increasingly
voluminous,consideredpotentialthreatsfrommultiplequartersandtendedtofocus
onMalayanationalism.However,aclosereadingofthematerialproducedbytheMSS
clearly indicatesthattheir intelligencereportsrecognisedthattheMCPthreatwas
growing, thatwerewas increasingCommunist-inspiredunrestdevelopingamongst
Malaya’stinmineandrubberplantation,andthatthiswasbuildingtoacrescendo.
Thisisnotreadilyacknowledgedintheexistingliterature.
ThethirdlimitationoftheexistingunderstandingoftheMSSis,asComberappearsto
acknowledge,thecontinueddifficultytoanswerthecentralquestionrelatingtothe
organisation’sshorthistory;thatiswhydidthecolonialauthoritiestakethedramatic
andoperationallycounter-intuitivedecisiontoabolishtheMSSentirely,ratherthan
simply remove Dalley and reform the organisation he had built?12 Intelligence
failureswerehardlynewtotheUK’ssecurityforces,butabolishinganentireagency
inpeacetimewasvirtuallyunprecedented.13Thisarticlewill suggest thatamore
coherentexplanationfortheriseandfalloftheMSScanbefoundinanexamination
ofitsinteragencyrelationshipsasmuchasitsallegedfailures.
TheOriginsoftheMSS
TheoriginsoftheMSScanbetracedtoitsestablishmentinSeptember1939byArthur
11LessisknownabouttheviewsofSirEdwardGent,HighCommissionerofMalaya,largelybecausehediedoninanaircraftcrashon4thJuly1948,whilstbeingrecalledtoLondonfortalksaboutthesecuritysituation.12Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,pp.45-6.13WartimeagenciessuchastheSpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE)andMinistryofEconomicWarfare(MEW)were,ofcourse,woundupattheendofhostilitiesbutlargelybecausetheirestablishmenthadbeentheresultofatemporarycrisis-drivenexpansionofactivitiesthatcouldbeabsorbedelsewhereingovernmentduringpeace.See,e.g.P.Davies,MI6andtheMachineryofSpying(London2004)pp.199-210;W.N.Medlicott,TheEconomicBlockage(London1959)pp.628-629.
152
Dickinson,theInspectorGeneraloftheStraitsSettlementsPolice.14TheideaofaPan-
Malayaintelligenceorganisationwasconceivedtoaddressthefragmentedpre-war
structures where the Straits Settlements’ Special Branches (formerly the Political
IntelligenceBureau),andtheFederatedMalayStates’PoliceIntelligenceBureauhad
responsibility for political intelligence in their respective territories. However, as
Dalley later explained to Sir Ralph Hone (Secretary General in the Commissioner
General’soffice),thegreatdrawback“toallthiswasthattherewasnoco-ordination
between the Intelligence Bureau in the F.M.S and Special Branch in the Straits
Settlements, and at the same time there was no organised coverage of the 4
Unfederated States.” Thus, in an effort to remove the difficulties of co-ordination
betweentheunwieldycollectionofStraitsSettlements,FederatedandUnfederated
MalayStates,theMSSwasformedin1939withresponsibilityforpoliticalandsecurity
intelligence across the entire Malayan peninsula and Singapore.15 The MSS was
established as a non-executive ‘co-coordinating’ body and was separate from the
Police.However,thewarwithJapanmeantthepre-warincarnationoftheMSSwas
short-lived.
RecentlyreleasedpapersclearlyshowthattheMSSwasre-constitutedafreshin1946,
mirroringthecreationoftheMalayanUnion.Thebasicpremiseofanon-executive,
pan-Malaya,intelligenceorganisationremainedthesamehowever.Thenewagency
startedworkon1stAprilwithoutasubstantivedirectoror,moreimportantly,aclearly
defined remit or formal charter, both of which subsequently became subject of
significant negotiation.16 As will be discussed below, matters were significantly
complicatedbytheparallelcreationofSIFEandtheJointIntelligenceCommittee(Far
East),withwhomtheMSShadaresponsibilitytomaintainaclose liaison.Assuch,
Short has described the MSS as being “designed as a sort of super intelligence
14Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,pp.26-7.15RhodesHouseLibrary,MSSInd.Ocn.S254,memorandumfromDalleytoRalphHone,13thJuly1948.SeealsoCO537/2647,SillitoetoLloyd,17thDecember1947.SeealsotheintroductiontothefirstFortnightlyPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,01/46(30thApril1946),MSSInd.Ocn.S251.ThesedocumentscastdoubtonComber’sassertion,whichisechoedbySinclair,thattheMSSwasformedbeforetheSecondWorldWar.16SeeFCO141/14360andthediscussionbelow.ThesepapersarepartofthefifthtrancheofsuchmaterialsrecentlymigratedfromtheForeignandCommonwealthOfficetoTheNationalArchive.
153
organisation”,whichsharedkeyorganisationalcharacteristicswith itsmetropolitan
equivalent,MI5.17Inmoreunderstatedterms,theMSSwasactuallytypicalofthekind
of joint-service intelligence coordinating and analytical centre that had become
increasingly common practice for the UK defence and intelligence communities
throughouttheSecondWorldWar.18
Dalleymaynothavebeenaformerintelligenceofficerbuthadrelevantprofessional
backgroundinothersignificantrespects.Priortocaptureandspendingthemuchof
thewarasa Japaneseprisonerofwar,Dalleyhadbeenamemberof thepre-war
Federated Malay States’ Police Force and then an active combatant in irregular
warfare against the Japanese Army. At the outbreak of hostilities with Japan he
assembledDalley’sCompany(Dalco)whichwasan irregular,allvolunteer,guerrilla
force.He later formedDalforce,whichcomprisedChinesecivilian irregulars.When
Singaporefell,asignificantelementofDalforceretreatedintothejungleandmerged
withtheMalayanPeople’sAnti-JapaneseArmy(MPAJA).19ThusDalleycametothe
postwithsubstantialpriorexperienceofMalayaandexperienceofguerrillawarfare,
the latter engendering what even Comber acknowledges was considerable
intelligenceexperience.20
ThroughouttheMSS’sshortexistence,Dalleystruggledwithasignificantshortageof
staff.Forinstance,intheweekspriortoitsdisbandment,theMSSwasshortoffour
LocalSecurityOfficers(LSOs),fourteenassistantLSOs,fourteenenquirystaffandfive
17Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,p.80.18See,e.g.,P.DaviesIntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates:aComparativeApproach(SantaBarbara2012).ExampleswouldincludetheJointIntelligenceOrganisation,theInter-ServiceTopographicalDepartment(ISTD)anditspostwarsuccessortheJointIntelligenceBureauinLondon,theMiddleEastIntelligenceCentre(MEIC)andSecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME)inCairoandPDivisionofSoutheastAsiaCommand(SEAC)inKandy.19AttheendoftheWartheMPAJA,Dalley’sownformerunit,reformeditselfintotheMalayanPeople’sAnti-BritishArmy(MPABA).SeeComber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.48(fn.23);D.Mackay,TheDominothatStood-TheMalayanEmergency,1948-60(London1997),p.31;M.Shennan,OurManinMalaya(London2007),pp.17,27-8.20ComberMalaya’sSecretPolice,p.31;Comber’stextactuallyreads“Dalley…whohadconsiderate[sic]intelligenceexperience…”.
154
translators.21ThisstaffinggapresultedinnopermanentMSSpresenceinTrengganu
andKelantan.Moreover,onlyoneLSOcouldspeakChinese–clearlyahugeobstacle,
asthiswastheprimarylanguageofnearlyfortypercentofthepopulationofMalaya.22
Dalley was so concerned about the lack of qualified staff, that he asked the two
CommissionersofPoliceinMalaya“tosupplysuitablestaffforMalayaSecurityService
fromtheirstrengthtobringM.S.Suptoestablishment.Thisrequirementwasnever
fullyaccededto…”Similarly,heexplainedtoHonethat“repeatedrequestshavebeen
madeforsuitableratesofpay,buteventodayatranslatorintheM.S.S.,-whohandles
verysecretdocumentsandhasavailabletohiminformationofahighlysecretnature
–ispaidlessthanatranslatorintheChineseSecretariatwhere,atmost,theyhandle
confidentialinformation.”23AlthoughthesecommentswerewrittenwhenDalleyhad
learnt from a third party that his organisation was about to be disbanded, his
frustrationatnothavingsufficientandwell-remuneratedstaffisclear.
Dalleyalsomadeclearhisfrustrationwiththelackofexecutivepowers.LikeMI5,its
metropolitancousin,theMSSdependeduponthepoliceserviceforpowersofsearch
andarrest. TheMSSdidpass “muchdetailed information to various authorities in
Malaya,includingthePolice,mostofwhichrecommendedaction.”However,Dalley
feltit“unfortunatethatinmanycasesnoactionwastakenandthatinalargemeasure
has led to the present situation of Malaya.” He further stated “much of this
informationhasbeenwastedbynoactionornoproperactionbeingtakeninsomany
cases.”Heillustratedthisclaimbymakingreferencetofailureofthepoliceeitherto
heed theMSS’s warning to guard the village of Jerantut or to make coordinated
searchesofsubversiveorganisationsandthearrestofleadingpersonalities.Despite
beingtheprimaryintelligencebodyinMalaya,Dalleybemoanedthefact“therehas
21MSSInd.Ocn.S254,memorandumfromDalleytoRalphHone,13thJuly1948.Dalleyquotesfiguresforactualvsapprovedestablishmentfor1stMay1946.Comberprovidessimilarfiguresfor1948,seeComber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.32.22Ibid.,p.34.23MSSInd.Ocn.S254,memorandumfromDalleytoRalphHone,13thJuly1948.
155
beenandtherestillis,nomachinerywherebytheM.S.S.canco-ordinateaction.All
thatM.S.S.candoatthemomentistorecommendaction.”24
ThePoliceshouldhavebeenboth“aprolificsourceofinformation”andexecutivearm
fortheMSS.25However,Malayawasinanearanarchicstateanditisnotsurprising
thatthePolicestruggledtosupporttheMSS.TheFortnightlyReportsfromHQMalaya
for1946-7,paint,inthewordsofoneofficial,“agrimpicture.”Thecostofricehad
risen from $1.50 permonth before thewar to $20 in 1946. Serious crimewas at
alarming levels – therewere 78 recordedmurders in January 1946 and 109 ‘gang
robberies.’26 Throughout this period, industrial unrest caused the Police great
concern,asdiddeteriorationinSino-Malayrelations,linksbetweenMalayNationalist
Party and Indonesian nationalists, and activities of Chinese KMT gangs.27 Little
wonder,then,thatDalleystatedthatbecausethePolice“havebeensoabsorbedin
theinvestigationofcriminalactivitiestheamountofinformationreceived…hasbeen
negligible.”28
Moreover, the Police Service was in parlous state. Stockwell explains how the
EuropeancontingentofthePoliceforcehadbeendecimatedbywarandinternment,
and those who survived were in ill-health and low spirits. ‘Old Malayan hands’
mistrusted newcomers from other dependencies. The normally steadfast Indian
elementofthePoliceforcesufferedsimilardeprivationsbytheJapaneseandsome
hadjoinedtheanti-BritishIndianNationalArmy.29Inaddition,manyMalayconstables
weretaintedbywartimecollaborationwiththeJapaneseandweresubjecttopost-
warreprisalsbytheMPAJA.30Asaresult,therewereveryfewskilledofficerstotackle
suchproblems.Forinstance,theCID(CriminalInvestigationDepartment)inthestate
24Ibid.SeealsoC.Sanger,MalcolmMacDonald–BringinganEndtoEmpire(1995),pp.293-4.25Ibid.26CO537/1581,MinutebyMrMorgan,28thMarch1946.27Seeibid.,CO537/1582andCO537/2140fortheHQMalayaCommandWeeklyIntelligencereviews(February1946-July1946).28MSSInd.Ocn.S254,memorandumfromDalleytoRalphHone,13thJuly1948.29A.Stockwell,“PolicingduringtheMalayanEmergency,1948-60:communism,communalismanddecolonisation”,inD.AndersonandD.Killingrayeds.,PolicingandDecolonisation:PoliticsNationalism,andthePolice,1917-65(Manchester1992),p.108-9.30Comber,“TheMalayanSecurityService(1945-48)”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,18:3(2003),p.131.
156
ofPerakwasstaffedwithonlytwodetectives,oneMalayandoneChinese.31Evenif
thePolicewerefreefromtheirprimaryresponsibilitytomaintain lawandorderto
concentratefullyuponsupportingtheMSS,engagementwiththeChinesecommunity,
whichconstituted38%ofMalaya’spopulation,wasnearimpossible.32Bennettpoints
thatjust2.5%ofthe9000strongPolicewereChineseandonlytwelveBritishPolice
officerscouldspeakaChinesedialect.Moreover,thelegacyoftheKempetaimeant
that the idea of agents and intelligence was tainted particularly for the Chinese
community.33TheconceptoftheMSSdependeduponthePolicebothfortheuseof
executivepowersandasaconduitforinformation.YettheMalayanPolicestruggled
tofulfiltheircoreresponsibilitytomaintainlawandorderandwereinnopositionto
offertheMSSthelevelofsupportDalleyrequired.
ThePoliticalIntelligenceJournals
ItwasagainstthisbackgroundofoperationaldifficultythattheMSShadtoproduce
intelligenceassessments,notonlyabouttheCommunistthreatbutthoseposedby
labour unrest, different strands of Malay and Indian nationalism, and potential
Indonesianexpansionism.Theorganisation’sintelligencereportshavebeenroundly
criticisedbycommentators.34Yet,MalcolmMacDonald,theCommissionerGeneral,
feltthattheMSSgaveadequatewarningoftheCommunistthreat,andthattheHigh
Commissioner, Sir EdwardGent, simply did not react effectively.35Whilst theMSS
reportsdidattractsomecriticismfromtheColonialOfficeforbeingtoodetailed,there
isgoodevidencethatkey‘consumers’werecontentwiththeserviceprovidedbythe
MSS,evenintheaftermathofthedeclarationofEmergency.
31Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,p.80.ThisproblemwasexacerbatedbytheuseofatleastfourregionaldialectsamongstthevariousChinesesub-ethnicgroupsinSoutheastAsiaincludingSouthernMinor‘Amoy’Hokkienese,Cantonese,Teochewand,lesscommonlyatthetime,GuoyeuorMandarin32J.Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife–CounterinsurgencyLessonsfromMalayaandVietnam(Chicago2002),p.60.33Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(2008),p.213;seealsoComber,“TheMalayanSecurityService(1945-48)”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,18:3(2003),p.133.34Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,pp.82–3;Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.139;Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies(2009),32:3,p.423.35Sanger,MalcolmMacDonald–BringinganEndtoEmpire,pp.292-3.
157
ThefirstPoliticalIntelligenceJournal(PIJ)wasproducedinApril1946,themonththat
saw the inauguration of both theMSS and theMalayanUnion. For the first eight
monthsoftheMSSexistence,theJournalsweresignedoffL.Knight(A/Director)orN.
Morris(D/Director)becauseDalleywasonhomeleave.36Theinitialdistributionlist
included seniorMSS officers, the Police Commissioners ofMalaya and Singapore,
ChiefPoliceOfficerforeachsettlement,theGovernorsofMalayaandSingapore,the
Governor-GeneralofMalaya,theDSOMalaya.37Ofnote,isthatneithertheMSSnor
theMalayangovernmentsentcopiesoftheJournaltotheColonialOfficeinLondon
until1948.38WhilstcopiesoftheJournalweresenttoSpecialBranchinCalcutta(the
Tamil labour force being one of the common points of interest between the two
intelligenceagencies),itisclearthattheJournalwasaparochialproduct.
The structureof the Journals reflected the chaotic stateof post-warMalaya. Each
issuewasdividedintotwosections:thefirstprovidedabriefsummaryofthegeneral
situation;thesecondprovidingmoredetaileddiscussion“ofvarioussubjectionsand
organisationswhichappeartobeofinterest.”39Thefirstsectioninvariablyfeatured
comment about the Communists, the Kuomintang, union / labour affairs, Indian
politics, Sino-Malay relations and Malay nationalism. The subject of the second
sectionoftheJournalsdependeduponwhatwastopicaland,during1946,notevery
issueprovidedasecondsection.Topicsthatwerecoveredincludedreactionstothe
MalayanUnion,LabourDay,theMalayanGeneralLabourUnion,politicalpartiesof
China,YouthMovements,InvulnerabilityCults,theAngkatanPemudaYangInsaaf(API
lit. Youth Justice Group, a Malay leftist organisation)), and Indonesian National
Movements.
TheJournalsoverseenbyKnightandMorriswererelativelysuccinct,averagingeight
pagesoftypedfoolscappaperperissue.Justovertenpercentoftheircontentwas
36ForabriefbiographicalnoteforNigelMorrisseeL.Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.51,fn.37.37MSSInd.Ocn.S.251,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,4/46.38SeeCO537/3751,minutebyMrSeel,20thFebruary1948.39MSSInd.Ocn.S.251,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,1/46.
158
devoted to theMalayan Communist Party.40 During 1946 one can trace theMSS
movingfromrelativecomplacencyabouttheMCPtooneofgrowingconcern.Initially,
they believed that Communist activities had been “considerably sobered by the
expulsiononthefirstdayofthenewgovernmentoftenleadersoftheGeneralLabour
Union.”41AlsotheMCPappearedtobesofinanciallyweakthatithadbeenforcedto
closedownallofitsbranchesinMalaya,exceptthetwoheadquartersatSingapore
andKualaLumpur.TheMSSdid,however,cautionthattheMCPfelt“itcouldexert
sufficientinfluencethroughoutthecountrythroughtheirsubsidiaryorganisations,the
NDYL[NewDemocraticYouthLeague]andGLU[GeneralLabourUnion].”42 Indeed,
theJournalsconveyasenseofreliefthattheMayDaycelebrationspassedoffwithout
significant incident. However, theMSS’s concern that theMCPmight manipulate
labourdisputestoraiseitsprofileseemtobeconfirmedbyanoutbreakofstrikesin
MalayaandSingaporeinJuly.InthefollowingmonththeMSSnotedtwoparallellines
ofconcernaboutCommunism:thefactthattheGLUwasunderthedirectcontrolof
theMCPandtheriseofradicalrhetoricfromtheMPAJA.Indeed,thelatteraspectwas
emphasisedbyareport,albeitfromaKMTsource,thattheMPAJAinPahangwere
makingpreparationsincasetheydecidedtotakeuparmsagain.Thus,thesituationin
relationtoCommunistactivityuponDalley’sreturntoMalayaattheendof1946was
tense:theMCPwasbelievedtobefinanciallyweak,butretainedthecontroloverthe
GLU; Singapore continued to be plagued by GLU-instigated strikes; MPAJA
propagandawasbecomingincreasinglyradicalandsporadicreportswereappearing
relatingtothediscoveryofarmsdumps.43
ThenatureandtoneoftheJournalchangedonceDalleyassumedresponsibilityfor
theMSS.Themostobviouschangeisthelengthofeachissue-in1946theaverage
lengthofthejournalwaseight-pagesbutthisincreasedoverthreefoldin1947toan
averageofjustovertwenty-sixpages.Theeditorialtonealsochanged.NeitherMorris
40Byparagraphcount,roughlyanalogoustocountingcolumninchesinthecontentanalysisofprintmediareporting.41MSSInd.Ocn.S.251,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,1/46.Incontrast,underDalleytheaveragepagecountincreasedfromeighttotwenty-sevenpagesperJournal,some13%ofwhichwasdevotedtoCommunism.42Ibid.,9/4643Ibid.,01/47.
159
nor Knight drew strong inferences from the facts that they reported. In contrast,
Dalleymadeaneffortnotonlytoassessthecapabilitiesandintentionsofthereports’
subjectsbutalsotoforecastbasedonthoseassessments,attemptingsomethingmore
akintogenuineintelligenceanalysis.Forinstance,inFebruary1947heasserted“the
progress of theMCP programme for the control of labour through labour unions,
infiltration into and control of the policies of nationalists movements and the
discreditingoftheMalayangovernmentsisgatheringmomentum.”Hecontinuedto
state“whentheyhavesufficientlyconsolidatedtheirposition,andthisisaperiodof
consolidation, the Communist Party intends to proceed with the next part of its
programme which is the other overthrow of the Malayan government and the
establishmentofaCommuniststateinSouthEastAsia.”44Itisimpossibletonowknow
whether Dalley’s forthright analysis can be attributed to an attempt to assert his
leadership over theMSS or perhaps to demonstrate a prescient and authoritative
understandingoftheMCPthreat.Whatisclear,however,isthatasearlyasJanuary
1947hechosetoportraytheMCPasaclearandpresentdangertoMalaya.
A review of the subsequent twenty-one Journals produced by the MSS in 1947
highlightsfourkeythemesinrelationtothreatposedbytheMCP.Thefirstisthebelief
thattheMCPwasattemptingtobroadenitsappealtodifferentracesinMalaya.For
instance, inhisfirstJournal,DalleysuggestedthatMalayextremistswerereceiving
strongsupportandencouragementfrombothIndonesianrevolutionariesbutalsothe
MCP.InApril itwasreportedthattheMCP’scentralcommitteewastryingto“play
downChineseinfluence,notonlytoattractmoreMalaysandIndianstothePartybut
also in order to be able to give support toMalay and Indian political associations
withoutthoseassociationsbeingaccusedofenlistingaliensupport.”45TheJournalsof
thespringof1947notedthattheMCPhadbeentryingtoinfluenceIndianlabourers
in Kedhah [sic] and Johore but were struggling to “exact full and continuous
discipline.”46 InMay theMSS suggested that theMCPwouldnot “provoke” Indian
labourtostrikeagain“unlessanduntiltheyareinapositiontoemployitstendency
44Ibid.,02/47.45Ibid.,05/47(basedonatranslationofFreedomPress).Seealso06/47.46Ibid.,03/47.
160
to violence.”47Nevertheless, later in the year theMSS reported thatR. Balan, the
MCP’s Indiandelegate to theEmpireCommunistConference in London,entereda
prolonged power struggle for control for rural labour in Perak, pitching the
Communist-controlled Perak Estate Employees union against the Estate Workers
Union.48 Dalley also remained concerned about theMCP’s intentions towards the
Malaycommunity.Forinstance,inSeptember,whilstnotingthattheCommunistshad
been“subduedoflate”,hereportedthat“itsundergroundactivitiescontinueandare
particularly noticeable among the Malays.” The MSS also highlighted the MCP’s
apparentlinkswiththeAPI.49InOctobertheMSSassertedthatthe“CommunistParty
isincreasingitseffortstoobtaincontrolofleft-wingMalayorganisations.”50
ThesecondthemewithintheJournalsfor1947istheMCP’sinternationalistoutlook
andambitions,uponwhichDalleyplacedasmuchifnotmoreemphasisuponthanits
linkswithMalaynationalism.Thereappearstobeareasonableevidencebaseupon
whichthesejudgementswerebased.Forinstance,inearly1947Dalleycommented
uponfivemembersoftheChinaCommunistParty,whohadenteredMalayawitha
“definitemission.”51Inthesummer,theMSSfoundadistributionlistfortheMCP’s
FreedomNewswhichshowedthatithadlinkswiththeCommunistpartiesinBurma,
Cyprus, Australia, India, Palestine, Canada and the Soviet Union.52 Other seized
documentsshowedtheMCPweredistributingpamphletsextollingthevirtuesofLenin
andthe‘RegFlag.’53AfurtherdocumentdisclosedthattheMCPintendedtoestablish
“aRepublicofMalaya;there-organisationoftheMPAJAintoaregularArmyofthe
Republic of Malaya, and unity with Russia and China in a campaign to help all
oppressednationsintheFarEasttosetuptheirindependentgovernments.”54Dalley
wasalsoconcernedaboutSovietactivity inSouthEastAsia, inparticular itsuseof
propaganda,aimedatweaken‘WesternDemocracies’intheregion.ThefinalJournal
47Ibid.,07/47.48Ibid.,8/47.49Ibid.,16/47.50Ibid.,19/47.51Ibid.,04/47.52Ibid.,13/47.53Ibid.,16/47.54Ibid.,17/47.
161
of1947makesnoteofaproposedsecretmeetingofCommunistssomewhereinSouth
AsiaandtravelsofLeeSoong(aNewDemocraticYouthLeaguemember) fromthe
WorldFederationofYouthConferenceatPraguetoCalcuttafortheFarEasternYouth
Congress,duetobeheldon15thFebruary1948.Thus,whileDalleysharedneither
evidencenoropinionduring1947thattheMCPwouldlaunchacampaignofexternally
directed insurgency (largely because such a plan did not exist), it is nevertheless
evident that theMSSbelieved theMCP tobeadistinct threat,madeall themore
concerningbecauseof its expansionistCommunist agenda, international links, and
widespreaduseofpropaganda.
The third theme within the Journals is the continued unease about the MCP’s
influenceuponlabour,bothinSingaporeandMalaya,throughout1947.Forinstance,
inhisfirstJournal,DalleystatedthattheMCP’sprogrammeforthecontroloflabour
unions was gathering momentum.55 Whilst the majority of Dalley’s concern was
directed towards the industrial unrest in Singapore, there are frequent indicators
withintheJournalsthattheMCPalsohadaspirationstostimulateunrestinMalaya’s
rubberplantationsandtinmines.Asdiscussedabove,theMCPhadflirtedwithIndian
labours inKedhahandJohorebutwasbelievedtohavepulledbackfor fearofnot
being able to control any unrest. Nevertheless in April, labourers, most of whom
belongedtotheIndianEstateWorkersUnion,ontwohundredandfortyestates in
Selangorsubmitteddemandstomanagers.InAugustthePanMalayanRubberEstate
Worker’s Union held a one-day strike. More presciently, also in August, theMSS
highlightedthevulnerabilityofChinesesquattersto“thepropagandaoftheMCPand
itssatellite,theNewDemocraticYouthLeaguewhohavetakeneveryopportunityto
propagandise amongst these unfortunate people.”56 Thus, the Journals provide
evidenceofadevelopingawarenessduring1947withintheMSSthattheMCPthreat
wasnotconfinedtoSingapore.
The fourth discernible theme is the increasing reference to the activities and
confrontationaloutlookoftheEx-ComradesAssociation.TheMSSreceivedincreasing
55MSSInd.Ocn.S.251,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,02/47.56Ibid.,14/47.
162
numbersofreportsduring1947aboutarmsdumpsbeingfoundacrossMalaya.This
wasperhapsnotsurprisinggiventhatmostweretheremnantsofarmssuppliedby
theBritishtosupporttheMPAJAduringthewar.57However,thereportsgenerated
concernbecauseofthepolitical,vehementlyanti-Britishandpro-Communist,nature
ofthepost-warMPAJA.58InOctober1947Dalleyadmittedthathewasnotcertainto
what extent the MPAJA was taking part in the lawlessness in parts of Malaya.
However,“itwasknownthatitistheCommunistParty’sintentiontomakethepublic
losetheirconfidence inGovernment,andoneof theirmethods is tocreatesucha
stateoflawlessnessaswillinduceageneralfeelingofpersonalinsecurity.”59Thereis
littledoubtthat,bythe latterhalfof1947,Dalleyhad identifiedtheMPAJAasthe
MCP’s guerrilla Army in-waiting, and one which had ready access to a significant
amountofweapons.
One of the most significant methodological problems with the PIJs was that the
intelligencereportsdidnotbenefitfromaformal,systematicanalyticalprocessorthe
levelofdraftingprofessionalpracticethathadbeentakingshapeelsewhereintheUK
intelligence community. It is relatively clear,however, that the fortnightly journals
providedsufficient informationduringthecourseof1947tosuggest that theMCP
posed a credible threat toMalaya’s internal security: MCP propaganda, captured
documentsandapparentlinkswithinternationalCommunisthighlighteditsintentto
overthrowtheBritishadministration;itsinfluenceoverlabourgaveitapotentialto
impactMalaya’s economy,while control over theMPAJA clearly posed a risk to it
internalsecurity.
Hacksuggeststhat“theMSShadlittlenewtosayaboutCommunistplansinthefirst
threemonthsof1948,forthesimplereasonthatMalayanCommunistParty(MCP)
strategyhadchangedlittleoverthepreviousyear.”60Yet,toacceptthisstatementis
57ItshouldbenotedthatChinPengtakesanalternativeview–hesuggeststhatthevastmajorityofMPAJAweaponsweretakenfromJapaneseduringandimmediatelyaftertheWar.SeeChinPeng,AliasChinPeng–MySideofHistory(Singapore2003),p.118.58MSSInd.Ocn.S.251,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,06/47.59Ibid.,17/47.60K.Hack,“TheoriginsoftheAsianColdWar:Malaya1948”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,40:3(October2009),p.471.
163
toignorethepossibilitythatthePartywasdevelopingamomentum.Indeed,thePIJs
in the firsthalfof1948didprovide furtherclear indicators that thethreat ‘vector’
posedbytheMCPwasgrowingrapidly.Forinstance,theMCP’sfinancialpositionhad
improvedsignifcantly.IntheaftermathofLoiTak’sdisappearancewithasignificant
proportionoftheParty’s funds inearly1947,theMCP launchedawidespreadand
rather desperate attempt to secure additionalmoney. It appealed to other leftist
organisations,suchasregionaltradesunions,fordonationsandusedtheMPAJAto
sellcommemorationcards.61ThisgeneratedasignificantflowofmoneybackintoMCP
funds.For instance, the ‘specialcontributionweek’held inSingapore in Julyraised
$11,000 and the sale of memorial cards by the Singapore MPAJA raised about
$8,000.62PerhapsthemostsignificantaspectwasnotsomuchthestateoftheMCP’s
finances but that it was able to tap into various sources of support to obtain
meaningfulcontributionsatatimeofacuteeconomydifficulty.
TheabilityoftheMCPtoreachthewiderleftistorganisationswithinMalayawaspartly
afunctionofwhattheMSSsawastheirtighteninggriponlabour.Forinstance,the
Journal for 31st January 1948 stated “a close study of the activities of known
Communist agents, the organisationswhich they control, and theirmanoeuvrings,
indicates renewed efforts to gain control of all organised labour in Malaya by
infiltrating into and disrupting trade unions not yet under the control of the
Communist Party…the indications are that through thesemethods and by implied
intimidation,theywillgainsufficientcontroltobeinapositiontodisrupttheeconomy
of thewholeofMalaya.Thereare indications thataneffortwillbemade through
theseCommunistParty-controlledlabourunionstocreatelabourunrestthroughout
Malayaduring this coming year.”63 InApril theMSS reported that therehadbeen
“indications that the Communists, working through labour unions have been
preparingforsomeimportantevent.WhethertheyweremerelypreparingforMay
Day,orwhethertheywereworkingtofit inwithawiderworldpattern(theItalian
Elections,eventsinBerlin,eventsinBurma)isnotyetknown…”TheJournalexplained
61MSSInd.Ocn.S.251,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,10&11/47.62CO537/3751,MSSPoliticalIntelligenceJournal,2/48.63Ibid.,2/48.
164
that theSingaporeFederationof TradeUnionshadbeenattempting toorganisea
seriesofstrikes,culminatingindisorderduringthemassrallyandprocessionplanned
for1stMay.Dueto“twotacticalerrors”madebytheSFTU,theSingaporegovernment
wasabletobanboththerallyandpossession,scoringasignificantpropagandavictory.
Nevertheless,Dalleywarnedthat“althoughrecenteventsinSingaporeresultedinthe
defeatoftheir immediateplans, it isunlikelythattheCommunistswillaccept itas
totaldefeat.”64
TheMSSremainedconsciousthattheMCPwaslikelytoremainfocusedonmobilising
labour in Singapore. Yet the Journals in the firsthalfof1948did reveal increasing
reportsofCommunistactivityinMalaya’srubberestatesandtinmines.Forinstance,
on15thApril1948theMSSagainreported“inPeraktheCommunistBALANisplanting
his agentson rubberestates inall areasand it looksas if hemaybe successful in
gainingcontroloveranumberofimportantlabourunionsinthatarea.”65Againonthe
30thAprilDalleystatedthatBalan,hadobtainedcontrolofrubberestatelabourover
suchawiderarea,wecananticipatestrikesandperhapsdisorderinthatarea.”Inthe
sameJournal,Dalleysaid“thereareindicationsthattheCommunistPartymaynow
doastheydidlastyear–turntheirattentiontoIndianrubberestatesandincitethem
to strikes and riots.66 In the following Journal, theMSS reported that “Balan has
extendedhisactivitiestoParit…some2000IndianandChineselabourersstruckwork
on3rdMay.”ThestrikeatParitwasnotanisolatedincident–atthebeginningofMay
therehadbeen“troublebrewingontheBrooklandsEstate,Banting,Selangorsince
April;strikesinvolvingintimdationweretakingplaceattheLoongSinTinMine,Salak
South,andattheKillinghall,HongKingandIpohtindredgesinSelangor;attheFook
HengRubberWorks,Menglembu,Perak;andariotattheBingSengRubberMilling
Factory which resulted in arson causing one million dollars worth of damage.
Moreover,theJohoreStateWorker’sUnionwereengaginginviolence,includingan
attack on a Police patrol at Bikit Sorempang.”67 Thus, the rise in Communist-
64Ibid.,8/48.65Ibid.,7/48.66Ibid.,8/48.67Ibid.,9/48.
165
orchestrated, agitation and violence in rural areas were events that were not
uncommoninthemonthspriortothemurdersinJunethatpromptedthedeclaration
of Emergency. Indeed, it is hard to conclude that an increase in rural violence, as
experiencedinJune1948andwhichpromptedthegovernmenttodeclaredastateof
Emergency,wouldcomeasashock.
AreassessmentofthePoliticalIntelligenceJournalsshowthattheMSSidentifiedthe
MCPasarealandcrediblethreattoFederation,repeatedlyexpressingthebeliefthat
theMCPhadboththemeansandintentiontodestabilisetheFederation.Ratherthan
havingnothingnewtosayinthefirstmonthsof1948,theJournalsclearlytrackeda
change in Communist activity –whilst the focus remained on industrial trouble in
Singapore,thelevelsofstriking,intimidationandviolenceonMalaya’stinminesand
rubberplantationswasescalatingrapidly.Andyet,theMSSfailedtoforecastthatthe
MCPwastoturnfromincitingurbanandindustrialunrest,toarural-basedcampaign
ofinsurgency.OneexplanationofwhytheMSSfailedtodothisrevolvesaroundthe
disappearanceinearly1947ofthechairmanontheMCP,LoiTak. Loihad, infact,
beentheMSS’sprimarysourceofhumanintelligenceontheMCP’sleadership.Whilst
thisepisodehasbeencoveredsufficientlyalreadyintheliterature,itisimportantto
notethatDalleywasleftwithoutanalternativesourcewithintheheartoftheMCP.68
Hence from spring 1947 the Journals relymore prominently upondocuments and
lowerlevelinformants.69However,whilstsignificant,theLoiTakepisodedoesappear
tobeafalsetrail.AsStockwellexplains,historianshavelongsinceabandonedtheview
theMCPmounteditsinsurgencyfollowingordersfromMoscow.70Indeed,sincethe
68Y.Akashi,“TheMalayanCommunistParty,LaiTeckandtheJapanesePeriod:1942-5”,inC.C.Chin&K.Hack,DialogueswithChinPeng:NewLightontheMalayanCommunistParty(Singapore2004),p.252-5;ChinPeng,AliasChinPeng,pp.149-195;L.Comber,“‘TraitorofallTraitors’–SecretAgentExtraordinaire:LaiTeck,Secretary-General,CommunistPartyofMalaya(1939-1947)”,JournaloftheMalaysianBranchoftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,83:2(2010),pp.1-25.69YuenYuetLeng,aformerSpecialBranchofficerduringtheEmergency,hassuggestedthat“BritishintelligenceandSpecialBranch’sskillfulhandlingoftripleagentLaiTek…thwartedandcontainedpossiblymoreextensiveCPMsuccess.’SeeYuenYuetLeng,NationBeforeSelf–Andvaluesthatdonotdie(KualaLumpur,2008),p28.70A.Stockwell,“ChinPengandtheStruggleforMalaya”,JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,series16:3(2006),p.284.Seealso,Hack,“TheoriginsoftheAsianColdWar:Malaya1948”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,40:3(October2009),pp.471-496;P.Deery,“Malaya,1948–Britain’sAsianColdWar?”,JournalofColdWarStudies,9:1(Winter2007),pp.29-54.
166
publicationofChinPeng’smemoirs in2003 theconsensus is that theMCPCentral
Committee did not trigger themurders in June that prompted the declaration of
Emergency.71Hence, even ifDalley had a source akin to Loi Takwithin theMCP’s
politburo,hewouldbeunabletoforecasttheeventsofJune1948.
TheJournalsarebynomeanspolishedexamplesof intelligenceanalysis.Reflecting
theturmoil,indeednearanarchy,ofpost-warMalaya,thefortnightlyconsiderationof
theMCPisimmersedincompetingthreatvectors.Commentatorshavemademuch
of Dalley’s concern aboutMalay and Indonesian nationalism and these topics do
occupyalargeproportionofeachJournal.Moreover,theColonialOfficeofficials,who
begantoreceivetheJournalsinearly1948,expressedsomedifficultlyindisentangling
thevariouscommentaries,onesuggestingthatit“wasratherdifficulttoseethewood
from the trees.”72 That said, the information about theMCP, is clear: the Party’s
strategic intent remained fixed, and its capability was growing quickly (not least
because of the groundswell of rural unrest). The onlymissing elementwithin the
MSS’sunderstandingofthreatfromtheMCPwashowthePartyintendedtopursue
thestruggle.Thus,whatappearstohavebeenreasonablygoodperformanceasan
operational and analytic entity serves only to deepen the mystery of the MSS’s
seeminglyuntimelydemise.
SillitoeandSIFE
WithoutcompellingevidencethattheMSSwasthekindoffailureasanintelligence
agency that theconventionalwisdomclaims, itbecomesnecessary to look further
afieldforcauses,specificallyattheMSS’sinteragencyenvironmentwithintheBritish
machineryofgovernmentinSoutheastAsiaandLondon.Onthesefronts,Dalleyfaced
afarmoreinsidiousandultimatelydangerousthreatfromasurprisingquarter,namely
a campaign of back-briefing by Percy Sillitoe, the Director General of MI5, which
effectively subverted MSS within the Colonial Office and Malayan executive. The
71AcontraryviewisthatmurderswerethelogicaloutcomeoftheMay1948CentralExecutiveCommitteetointimidateandkill‘scabs’.However,appearsadislocationofaquantumnaturebetweenanorderofthiskind,effectivelyaimedagainstnativelabour,andthemurderoftheex-patriotBritishplanters.72CO537/3751,minutesbyMrSeal,24thFebruaryand1stMarch1948.
167
originsof thisdispute relate tooverlapping remitsbetweenSIFEand theMSS,but
hinged upon Sillitoe’s desire to secure hegemony for his Far East intelligence
apparatus.
TheoriginalMSScharterstatedthatitwouldundertakethefollowingtasks:
1. Tocollectandcollateinformationonsubversiveorganisationsand
personalitiesinMalayaandSingapore.
2. To advise, so far as they [sic] are able, the twoGovernments [Malaya and
Singapore] as to the extent towhich Internal Security is threatenedby the
activitiesofsuchanorganisation[sic].
3. TokeepthetwoGovernmentsinformedofthetrendsofpublicopinionwhich
affect,orarelikelytoaffecttheSecurityofMalaya.
4. TomaintainaCentralRegistryofAliens.
5. TomaintainacloseliaisonwithotherSecurityIntelligenceOrganisations,and
theDefenceSecurityOfficer.73
However,asdiscussed in thepreviouschapter, theSecurityServicealsocreated in
1946SIFEtooperateasan“interservicesorganisationresponsibleforthecollection,
collation and dissemination to interested and appropriate Service and Civil
departmentsofallSecurityIntelligenceaffectingBritishterritoriesintheFarEast.”74
Fromthe inceptionofSIFEandthereconstitutionofMSS, therewasconcern from
both London and Singapore about potential overlap. Although the ‘Pan Malayan
IntelligenceBureau’,astheMSSwasoccasionallyknowninitsinfancy,was‘stood-up’
on1April1946,thedetailsaboutitsremitwerestilltobedecidedintheweeksand
monthsfollowingthatdate.SimilarlyitwasnotuntilAugust1946thattheCharterfor
SIFE,andmemorandumofinstructionfortheHeadofSIFEandtheDefenceSecurity
OfficersarrivedinSingaporefordiscussion.ItisduringthistimethattheSecretaryof
73MSSInd.Ocn.S254,memorandumfromDalleytoRalphHone,13thJuly1948.SeealsoCO537/2647,SillitoetoLloyd,17thDecember1947fortheformer’sinterpretationofthefirstdraftandfinaldraftsoftheMSScharter.74KV4/421,CharterfortheSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(S.I.F.E),6thAugust1946;CO537/2647,BriefingnoteforMalcolmMacDonald,January1947.
168
State for the Colonies passed on to the governors of Malaya and Singapore the
SecurityService’sconcernthat“anyproposalsputforwardwillberelatedtoandco-
ordinatedwiththefunctionsofexistingSecurityOrganisationinFarEast.”Similarly,
MacDonaldinformedGimson“itseemstomethatinamatterofthissortweneedthe
best advice available and that any security organisation that is set up is properly
dovetailed into other security organisations which might exist.”75 There followed,
throughouttheautumnof1946,aseriesofdiscussionsbetweenSIFE,thePoliceand
MSS about their roles and responsibilities in relation to security and political
intelligence.
TheinitialreactionKnight,theActingDirectoroftheMSS,totheCharterforSIFEwas
“fairlystrong”,becauseheconsidered“thatanormalreadingwouldinevitablyleadto
theunderstandingthataseparate(andrival)organisationwasabouttobesetup,and
theMSSwastobeby-passed.”Moreover,headmitted,“afirstreading…gavemethe
impressionofa sortofaGestapoorganisation”whoseDSOwouldencounter such
“antagonismincertainspecialistdepartmentsthathewouldbeseriouslyhandicapped
incarryingouthisduties.”However,Knightdiscussedthedocuments“point-by-point”
withH/SIFEandcametoabetterunderstandingofhowthetwoorganisationswould
co-exist.76InSeptember,itwasagreedthat“SIFEcouldfunctionadequatelyinMalaya
according to its charter if the MSS were suitably organised.” As a result, initial
proposalsfortheCIDtobeexpandedtotakeonpoliticalsecurityweredroppedand
theMSSresponsibilitywaslimitedtointernalsecurity;theCommissionerofPolicefor
Singaporeexplainedthat“ameetingheldon2September“wasunanimouslyofthe
option that the former proposalwould notwork as itwould tend to create three
smallersecurityservicesinsteadofone.”77Whilstdiscussionseffectivelyremovedthe
Policefromsecurityintelligence,itisnotclearhowSIFEandMSSintendedtowork‘as
one.’Itisclear,however,fromthesediscussionsthattheestablishmentofSIFEand
75FCO141/14360,GimsontoMacDonald,24thJuly194676Ibid.,L.Knight,CommentaryonInstructionstoDSOMalayanUnion,27thAugust1946.77Ibid.,CommissionerofPolice(Singapore)toColonialSecretary,Singapore,6thSeptember1946.ItispossiblethatkeyactorsthoughtthatSIFEwouldberesponsibletotheDefenceCommitteeandMSStothegovernors,andthusbeclearlyseparateorganisations.SeeExtractfromMinutesofGovernorsGeneral’sconferenceheldatSingaporeon25thSeptember1946.
169
reconstitutionof theMSSwasadhoc, lackingcentral coordinationanddependent
largely upon the ability of key practitioners to establish informal working
arrangementstoworkaroundtheambiguityoftheirformalremits.
SIFEwas initially overseen by Col. C. E. Dixon,whowas the ‘theatre head’ of the
SecurityServiceintheFarEastandanswerabletoSillitoe.78Inadditiontoproducing
intelligence about “any foreign intelligence service whose activities are directed
againstBritishterritoryintheFarEastorinimicaltoBritishinterestsofsecurity”,Dixon
was chargedwith advising about “any potential or subversivemovementwhether
indigenousorforeign,whichisadangerorpotentialdangertoBritishsecurity…”79A
briefingdocumentforMacDonaldwritteninJanuary1948,indicatesthatwhetherSIFE
choose to keep representatives (Defence Security Officers80) ‘on the ground’
dependedontheterritory.Ifso,theirprimarytaskwastoworkwiththelocalPolice
andsecurityorganisations,actingasliaisonofficers.InrelationtoMalaya,thisliaison
shouldhavebeeneasierbecauseboththeSIFEandMSShadtheirheadquarters in
Singapore.81Indeed,theGovernorGeneral’sofficestatedthattherewasnoreason,
“givengoodwillandaspiritofco-operation”,whytheSIFEandMSSshouldnotwork
harmoniously.”82Nonetheless, therewasanobviouspotential foroverlapbetween
localandregionalintelligenceorganisations.Thiswashighlightedinaletterwrittenin
August1946byLtColYoungaboutSIFE’slinkswiththeSecretIntelligenceService(SIS)
intheregion.Youngsuggestedthatthe“onlywayinwhichtheD.S.Ocanjustifyhis
78InaletterwrittentoSillitoeon29thJuly1946(receivedon7thAugust)Dixonexpresseddisagreementwiththeformer’ssuggestionsaroundsomeadministrative/logisticalarrangementsforSIFE.On9thAugust,SillitoesentDixonatelegramstatingthathewillbereplacedbyMalcolmJohnstonfromtheDelhiIntelligenceServicetotheSecurityService.AletterfromDickWhitetoD.BatesoftheColonialOfficewrittenon13thAuguststatesthatSillitoemadean“urgentapplicationtotransfer”JohnstontotheSecurityService.79KV4/421,CharterfortheSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(S.I.F.E),6thAugust1946.80MI5representativesholdingmilitarystatusweredesignatedDefenceSecurityOfficersandtypicallybasedwitharmedservicecommands;civilianrepresentativeswereSecurityLiaisonOfficers(SLOs).See,e.g.WO208/4696“ReorganisationofMOandMI,”DMO&I307a.81Comber,aformerMalayanPoliceSpecialBranchofficerstatesthatSIFEdidnotrunagentsinMalaya.SeeComber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.96.ThisiscontrarytothebriefingnotetoMacDonaldwhichclearstatesthat“thereareDefenceSecurityOfficersunderhim[MajorWinterborn]inSingaporeandtheMalayanUnion.”Therealsoappearsadifferenceofterminology.ComberstatesthatMSSstaterepresentativesweretermedLocalSecurityOfficers,whereasShortusesthetermSecurityLiaisonOfficer.82CO537/2647,anotefordiscussionwithSirPSillitoe,undated,c.January1948.
170
positionas‘securityadvisertotheGovernor’istobeabletopresentthelargepicture
ofsubversion,andSIFEshouldbethesourceofthisthroughMI6.”Ratherpresciently
Youngwarnedthat“fortheDSOtosetupanagentnetworkincompetitiontoM.S.S.
wouldonlyendintears.”83
However,itwasnotSISthatwouldclashwiththeMSS,buttheDirectorGeneral(DG)
ofMI5,SirPercySillitoe.Sillitoewassomethingofananomalyamongsthispeersin
theUKintelligencecommunity. AcareeruniformedPoliceofficer,hewasnotwell
received by the senior staff at the Security Service, his own Deputy, Guy Liddell,
dismissing Sillitoe’s appointment as a ‘mistake’ which ‘generally down-grades the
office[MI5]’.Sillitoewasnolessuncomfortablewiththeappointmentandtheethos
ofhisneworganisation,deridingthecareerintelligenceofficersheledinhismemoire
as ‘Oxbridge’ ‘long-haired intellectuals’.84Despite a successful track record against
organised crime in the 1930s and heading Kent regional Police Service during the
threatof imminentGerman invasionduring thewar, Sillitoehad littleornodirect
experience of intelligence either as an operational activity or an institutional
environment.
As early as November 1946, even before Dalley had returned to Malaya, Liddell
concludedthatthe“MalayanSecurityisusurpingthefunctionsofSIFE.”85Ayearlater
thissameconcernpromptedSillitoetowritetotheColonialOffice.Heallegedthat
Dalley claimed “he was, and is, in a position to run agents into Siam and the
NetherlandsEastIndies,andhealsomaintainsliaisonwithrepresentativesofforeign
intelligenceorganisationsinSingapore,asforexampletheDutchandAmericans.”86
SillitoedidnotprovideanyevidencethatDalley’sclaimswerevalid.Indeed,giventhe
staffingdifficultiesdiscussedabove,itisnearimpossibletoconsiderthattheclaims
were anythingmore than hyperbole, if indeed they weremade at all. In fact, six
monthslater,aColonialOfficeofficialnotedthatonthequestionoftheMSSrunning
83KV4/421,ExtractofaletterfromLt.Co.Young(SIFE),19thAugust1948.84C.Andrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorisedHistoryofMI5(London2010),p.322.85KV4/470,DiaryofGuyLiddell(D/DGMI5),November1946.86CO537/2647,SillitoetoLloyd,17thDecember1947.
171
agentsintoforeignterritoryit“doesnotseeminfacttohavedonetoanysubstantial
extent.”87
Sillitoeacknowledgedthepotentialofbeingseento“interfere inwhat isobviously
primarily a matter for the Colonial Office, and local Governments concerned.”
Nevertheless,hecontinuedtosuggestthattherootoftheproblemsweredueto“the
curiouspositionoftheMalayanSecurityService”,its“unsoundset-up”,“andfroma
lackofanycleardefinitionastothedivisionorworkbetweenthemandSIFEandof
their intelligencefunctions.”88Withinamonth,Sillitoereinforcedhiscomplaint.He
claimedthatinadditiontorunningagentsinforeignterritories,“theS.I.F.E.,through
the DSCO [sic] is not receiving from the M.S.S. the information about internal
subversive activities in the Malayan Union and Singapore which it has a right to
expect.”Moreover,therewerereportsof“seriousfrictionbetweentheheadofS.I.F.E
(MajorWinterborn)andtheheadofM.S.S.(MrDalley).”AsaresultSillitoeofferedto
stop inMalaya, on his way to Australia, to look into thematter.89 However, Guy
Liddell’sdiariesmakeitclearthatSillitoehadalreadydeterminedto“concentrateon
gettingtheorganisationalset-upchanged,namely,thedivisionoftheM.S.S.intotwo
SpecialBranches,onefortheSingaporePoliceandotherfortheMalayanPolice.”90
OstensiblySillitoe’svisittoMalayawasasuccess.GentreportedtoLloyd,permanent
under-secretaryintheColonialOffice,that“wehaditoutwithDalleyandS.I.F.E,and
Ihopethatwehaveclearedupthepersonaltroubleswhichwereresponsibleforwhat
wasmainlyabickeringbutmighthavegotworse,ifnotchecked.Ishallkeepawatch
on itwithGimson.”91However,Combersuggests thatthemeetingwithDalleyand
Sillitoewasparticularlydifficult,not leastas itstartedwiththeDirectorGeneralof
87Ibid.,SeeltoLloydandWilliams,22ndMay1948.88Ibid.,SillitoetoLloyd,17thDecember1947.89Grimsonoffersaninterestingcounterpoint.HewelcomedSillitoe’svisittodiscusstherelationsbetweentheMSSandSIFE.HeinformedtheColonialOfficethat“Ihavetoobeenworriedabouttheserelations,asIfearthatthereisatendencyonpartoftheU.K.SecurityServicestationedinSingaporetofailtoappreciatetheknowledgewhichourSecurityServicehasoflocalconditionsandtheabilityofthisServicetoviewanydataattheirdisposalagainstanorientalbackground.”SeeCO537/2647,GimsontoLloyd,3rdFebruary1948.90KV4/470,DiaryofGuyLiddell(D/DGMI5),23rdJanuary1948.91CO537/2647,GenttoLloyd,7May1948.OnepracticalmeasuresresultfromthemeetingwasaredraftingofinstructionsforDefenceSecurityOfficerfortheFederationofMalayaandSingapore.
172
MI5questioningwhethertheDirectoroftheMSShadcalledhima“Glasgowcorner
boy.”92DespiteGent’s optimism, the animosity betweenMI5 / SIFE againstDalley
appearstohavegrownstrongerafterSillitoe’svisittoMalaya.Forinstance,aninternal
SIFE telegram in which Keller states “the difficulties as regards the relationships
betweenS.I.F.E,D.S.O’sandM.S.SliesprincipallyinthepersonalityofitsDirectorMr.
J. Dalley, who is an Empire builder and not content with his proper function of
producingSecurityinformationregardingM.U.andSingapore,isattemptingtocover
awiderarea.”93
Undoubtedlytherewasasignificantelementofpersonalantagonismwhichfuelled
Sillitoe’scampaignagainsttheMSS.However,thiswasanaggravatingfactor,notthe
casus belli,which appears to be Sillitoe’s ambitions for SIFE. TheDirector-General
contended correctly that SIFE was the only organisation which could provide the
Defence Committee or the JIC (FE) with coordinated advice and information on
securityorcounterespionagematters.Hewarnedthatif“ifS.I.F.E.didnotexistthe
wholeattitudeandactiontowardssuchmatterswouldreverttothepre-warposition.
Thensuchmatterswerestudiesinlocalandinsemi-watertightcompartmentsbylocal
Policeorlocalserviceauthorities,actingindependentlyofeachothers.”Aswehave
seen,thisrolewasalreadybringfulfilledbytheMSS.Itwasnottheprincipalofhaving
suchafusioncentretowhichSillitoeobjected,butthatthetaskwasbeingperformed
byanagencyotherthanhisown.Itwasonthisbasisthat,uponhisreturntoLondon,
SillitoecontinuedtopushtheprospectofdisbandingoftheMSSinfavourofbringing
it“withinthegeneralstructureofthePoliceDepartments,onthelinesoftheSpecial
Branchesinthiscountryandanumberofcolonies.”94
However,SillitoeclearlyhadavisionfortheroleofMI5’spresencethroughSIFEthat
clashedsubstantiallywiththepresenceandroleoftheMSS.Therewasalsoalocal
initiativetopromoteSIFE’sstatuswithintheregionalintelligencecommunity.Onthe
onehand, this involvedamove to shift theorganisation from itsoriginal roleasa
92Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.43.SeeKV4/470,LiddellDiary,13thApril1947.93KV4/422,SIFE(Keller)toDGSecurityService,16thAugust1948.94CO537/2647,SeeltoGimson,10thJune1948.
173
collatingagencytoonethatcollectedintelligenceaswellwhileontheothertherewas
anefforttogiveitamorecentralpositionintheinteragencyapparatus.Bothatlocal
andheadquarterslevels,therefore,MSSstoodinthewayofMI5’sviewofitsrolein
SoutheastAsianintelligenceandsecurityarrangements.
DismantlingtheMSS
Despitewhatmightbeconsideredanambient,medium-termwarningofagrowing
threatfromtheMCP,themurderofthreeplantersintheSungeiSiputareaofPerak
on16 June1948, appeared to comeas a shock toboth theMalayaexecutiveand
colonialofficials.Forinstance,Commander-in-Chief,FarEastLandForces,GeneralSir
NeilRitchie,recalledthatitwasnotuntiltheeveningof22Junethathewasinformed
"bythecivilauthoritiesof theconditionsofunrestexisting inMalaya."Ritchiehad
“justreturnedfromabriefvisittotheUKwhereIhadtoldthethenCIGSthatinmy
viewMalaya could be regarded as the one relatively stable area in an otherwise
disturbedSouthEastAsia.”95ItisinterestingtonotethechangeintoneintheColonial
OfficeminutesaccompanyingthePIJsreceivedinLondon.InmidJune,amonthafter
callingDalleya‘genius’andsuggestingthattheMSSreportswereinvaluabletothe
Malayan government, Williams noted “I have no wish to be over-critical of the
Malayan Security Service, but I think it is right to draw attention to this rather
remarkable lack of foresight shown on the present Report, since a defect in
Intelligence(inthetechnicalsense)seemstobeofthegreatweaknessesinMalaya
today.”96
Nevertheless, Dalley clearly retained the support of his regional colleagues in the
Malayancoreexecutive.Forinstance,aletterfromRalphHonetotheColonialOffice
95WO106/5448,GeneralSirN.Ritchie,ReportonOperationsinMalaya,June1948-July1949.However,recenthistoriographicaldevelopments,particularlythememoirsofChinPeng,indicatethattheriseinruralviolencewasalsoashocktotheMCPbecauseitwasspontaneousandthuslargelyunpredictableseriesofevents.SeeChin&Hack(eds),DialogueswithChinPeng:NewLightontheMalayanCommunistParty;Hack,“TheOriginsoftheAsianColdWar:Malaya1948”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies40:3(2009),pp.471-496;Derry,“Malaya1948:Britain’sAsianColdWar?”,JournalofColdWarStudies9:1(2007),pp.29-54;Stockwell,“ChinPengandtheStruggleforMalaya”,JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,16:3(2006),pp.279-97.96CO537/3751,minutesbyMrWilliams,22ndJune1948.SeealsoCO537/3753,minutesbyMrMorris,18thJune;MrWilliams,22ndJune;MrSeel23rdJune1948.
174
alludestothedifficultyofpersuadingGenttoacceptSillitoe’sproposaltodisbandthe
MSS.97 Moreover, in a conference on 13 July 1948 (i.e. after the Emergency was
declared),MacDonaldunequivocallystatedthathe“hadbeenmuchimpressedwith
thepolitical intelligenceproducedbytheM.S.S.Theyprovedtobetheonlysource
fromwhichreliableinformationhadbeenobtained.Thedifficultyappearedtobethat
muchoftheinformationthattheyhadcirculatedhadnotbeenacteduponorfully
understood.”HewenttosaythatDalleywas“anexceptionallyablemaninthisclass
ofworkandthereweremanypeoplewhohadagooddealofconfidenceinhim.”98
Moreover,inOctoberGimsoninformedCreechJones,theSecretaryofStateforthe
Colonies, that he had been “entirely satisfied with the Security Intelligence
informationwhichIreceivedfromtheformerMalayanSecurityServiceasorganised
and directed by Dalley.” He said he had the highest regard for Dalley’s “almost
uncannyflairforsecuritywork.”99
RegardlessofthesupportshowninparticularbyMacDonaldandHone,theswellof
opinioninofficialcircles,whichhadbeenwhipped-upbySillitoe,meantthattheMSS
couldnotsurvive.Sillitoe’smachinations,inparticularrelatingtoapparentstructural
problemswiththeMSS,hadalreadytakeneffectamongstmetropolitanofficialsprior
to the declaration of Emergency, and combined with a local sense of urgency to
addressthedemandsoftheEmergency.Alittlelessthanamonthafterthedeclaration
of Emergency, Sir Alec Newboult persuaded MacDonald to accept the need to
reallocateresponsibilityforintelligencefromtheMSStotheMalayanandSingapore
PoliceSpecialBranches,aproposalwhichwasacceptedon13July1948.100
ThedecisiontodisbandtheMSSledtoadebatewithinbothcolonialandmetropolitan
circles about what form the new intelligencemachine should take. Running large
throughthisdebatewastheon-goingfrictionbetweenDalleyandSillitoe.However,
97Ibid.,HonetoSeal,26thJuly1948.98CO537/2647,minutesoftheGovernorGeneral’sConference,13thJuly1948.99CO537/4306,GrimsontoCreechJones,7thOctober1948.100CO537/2647,MinutesoftheGovernorGeneral’sConference,13thJuly1948.SirAlecNewboultwasChiefSecretaryintheFederationofMalaya’sadministration.HewasOfficerAdministratingtheGovernment(OAG)intheinterregnumbetweenHighCommissioner,SirEdwardGent’sdeathon4thJuly1948andthearrivalofSirHenryGurneyon13thSeptember1948.
175
thesubstanceof thediscussion isalso indicativeof thewiderconfusionwithinthe
executiveaboutthedifferencesbetweenpolitical,criminalandsecurityintelligence,
and their respective place within the administration. Newboult, who had been
particularlyswayedbySillitoe’spreviousbriefingagainsttheMSS,believedthatthat
“politicalandcriminalintelligencewereinextricablymixedupanditseemedtohim
necessarytointegratethestaffwhichworkedonpoliticalintelligencewiththatofthe
CID.”101Keller, Sillitoe’s representative in the region, supported this argumentand
alsomade the distinction between political intelligence (which he felt Dalley was
interestedin)andsecurityintelligence(whichhefeltDalleywasnot).BothSillitoeand
KellerwereveryclearthatSIFEshouldnotbecomeinvolvedinpoliticalintelligence.
Indeed,KellerarguedthatDalleymisunderstoodthedistinctionbetweensecurityand
politicalintelligenceandthatthelatteraspect“wasnopartofthebusinessofSIFE.”102
In retrospect, the distinction between political and security intelligence appears
ratherartificial.GiventhattherewasgraveconcernbothlocallyandinLondonthat
theMCP’sinsurgencywaspartofawiderCommunistplan,thedemarcationbetween
whatwaspoliticalintelligence(i.e.localandwithintheremitofSpecialBranch)and
security intelligence(i.e.whichhadawiderbearinguponthedefenceoftherealm
andthuswithintheremitofSIFE)was,atbest,ambiguous.Moreover,eventswereto
proveanincongruencebetween‘criminal’and‘political’intelligence.103
Whilstofficialsdebatedthesemanticsofintelligence,Sillitoeproveddeterminedto
removeanypossibilityofDalleyinfluencingthenewintelligenceapparatus.Thisled
tocontinuingconflictwithregionalcolonialofficialswhosupportedDalley.Although
MacDonaldandHonehadreluctantlyacceptedSillitoe’sargumentthattheMSShad
tobedisbanded,bothmenpushedhardforameaningfulroletobefoundforDalley,
evensuggestingthathislocalknowledgewouldmakehimidealtoheadSIFE.Keller
stronglyrecommendedagainstthisproposalonthebasisthatDalley’s“personality
101CO537/2647,MinutesoftheConferenceheldunderthechairmanshipofhisExcellency,theCommissionerGeneralfortheUKinSEA,attheCathayBuilding,on13thJuly1948.102CO537/4322,MinutesoftheConferenceheldunderthechairmanshipofhisExcellency,theCommissionerGeneralfortheUKinSEA,attheCathayBuilding,onMonday,9thAugust1948.103ThiswasadistinctionidentifiedbytheSecretaryofStatefortheColoniesbutwhichappearsnottohavebeenfollowedup.SeeCO537/4306,aminutebytheColonialSecretary,Singapore,30thSeptember1948.
176
and qualifications were not such as would in my opinion make him satisfactory
H/SIFE.”104 The Colonial Office was also against this, concerned that Dalleymight
becomean“embarrassment”toMacDonaldandsuggestedhebefoundaroleinthe
FederalSecretariat.105SillitoewasaghastattheprospectofDalleybeingofferedany
positioninSIFE,andonreceiptofKeller’stelegram,movedswiftlytooffertheposition
ofH/SIFEtoKellerhimself.106AsaresultnosuitableroleforDalleywasfoundwithin
anyofthenewintelligencestructuresandtheMSSheadquartersstaffweredivided
amongstthetwoSpecialBranches.107
Conclusion
Sillitoe’smanoeuvringdeprivedtheBritishcolonialauthoritiesinMalayaofaviable
intelligencecapabilityatpreciselythemomenttheymostneededit,withlastingand
serious consequences for the conduct of the Emergency. In fairness, Sillitoe’s
objectionstotheMSSasanorganisationthatduplicatedtheroleofMI5anditsFar
EastpresenceSIFEwereconsistentwiththeinstitutionalarrangementsthatprevailed
in London. A Cabinet Secretariat Secret Service Committee review in 1931 had
formallydeclaredMI5ImperialSecurityService,thusincludingallofBritain’scolonies
anddominionswithinitsoperationaljurisdiction.108Indeed,withitsnetworkofSLOs
andDSOs abroadMI5’s international presencewas almost as extensive as that of
SIS.109ColonialSpecialBrancheswereexpectedtoworkwiththoserepresentativesin
a fashionanalogous to theMetropolitanSpecialBranchandMI5’sheadquarters in
London.ThusSillitoe’sargumentthattheintelligenceapparatusinMalayaneededto
bebroughtintolinewithexistingpracticeelsewhereinempirewasbasedontheidea
thatallofthevariousSpecialBranchesacrosstheempirewereexpectedtoworkwith
MI5astheimperialratherthanjustmainlandUKSecurityService.
104KV4/422,KellertoSillitoe,17thAugust1948.105CO537/2647,SeeltoHone,9thAugust1948.106KV4/422,SillitoetoKeller,18thAugust1948.107ForKeller’sreactiontothenewsthatSillitoehadblockedallmovestorelocateDalleywithintheSIFEstructureseeKV4/423,KellertoSillitoe,5thNovember1948.108F.H.HinsleyandC.A.G.Simkins,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWarVolumeFour:SecurityandCounterintelligence(London1990),pp.8;J.Curry,TheSecurityService1908–1945:TheOfficialHistory(London1999),pp.102.109From1946-1949SIFEofficersweretermedDefenceSecurityOfficers.ThischangedinMay1949whentheDSOsinSingapore,MalayaandHongKongwererenamedSecurityLiaisonOfficers.OfficersstationedinforeignterritoriesintheregionalappeartohaveremainedDSOs.
177
Prior to taking up the post of Director of theMSS, Dalley visited Guy Liddell, the
DeputyDirectorGeneraloftheSecurityService.LiddellnotedinhisdiarythatDalley
hesitatedinacceptingtheposition,partlybecausehe“originallyconceivedtheidea
oftheMSSonthelinesofSIFEbutinviewoftheestablishmentofSIFE,hethought
thepositionwasunsatisfactory.”Instead,DalleytoldLiddellthat“eitherthereshould
be an Inspector General to cover all Malayan Police forces and to stimulate SB
activities, or the MSS should…collate information received from Police Special
Branches.”110Ironically,therefore,inNovember1946,itappearsthattherewassome
commonality of thought between Dalley’s position and that which Sillitoe would
develop over subsequent eighteenmonths. However, during this period, Sillitoe’s
viewsdivergedrapidlyfromDalley’s.
Tobesure,thedesiretodisaggregatetheremitsofSIFEandtheMSSappearjustified
in principle, but Sillitoewas not a product of the collegiality and joint operational
ethos thatone contemporary commentatorhasdescribedas ‘symptomatic’ of the
UK’s defence and intelligence communities.111 Rather than pursuing the kind of
collaborativesolutionadoptedinothertheatres,hetookadvantageofthepost-war
turmoil to aggressively expand the role of his organisation in the Far East. Sillitoe
envisagedSIFEandtheDSOshavingabroader“intangible”but“essentialfunction”of
providingameansofincitingthelocalsecurityauthoritiestodotheirjobefficiently.112
PartofthisentailedshiftingSIFEfrombeingapurelycollatingandassessmentorgan
toanoperationalheadquartersforintelligencecollection.Hence,inNovember1947,
theLSOinBurma,andDSOsinSingapore,Malaya,andHongKongweretaskedtostart
collecting “basic intelligence data…in respect of organisationswhich are operating
clandestinely.”113ASIFEofficialexplainedtoSillitoe that“thisactionwasrendered
necessary by the fact that M.S.S. have never attempted any collation of the
informationoftheiromnibusfilesexceptforthepapersallegedlywrittenbyD/M.S.S.,
110KV4/468,DiaryofGuyLiddell,20thNovember1946.111M.Herman,IntelligencePowerinPeaceandWar(Cambridge1996),pp.728.112KV4/422,AssessmentofthevalueofS.I.F.EandD.S.OPointsintheFarEast,undated.113Ibid.,SIFEtoDSOSingapore,MalayanUnion,HongKong,andSLOBurma,25thNovember1947.
178
themajorityofwhichpertaintosubjectsandterritorieslyingwelloutsidetheM.S.S.
charter.”114 A parallel attempt to enhance theMSS’ position in the administrative
hierarchyJuly1948ledtotheHeadofSIFE,Winterborn,comingintoconflictwiththe
BritishDefenceCo-ordinationCommitteeoveraclumsyattempttoengineeramore
influentialpositionontheJIC(FE).115Hence,theMSSwasnottheonlyorganisationto
finditselfinconflictwithSillitoe’sMI5.
Inthelastanalysis,Sillitoewasmoreconcernedwithwinningabureaucraticturfwar
thandefeatingacolonialinsurgency.Theimplicationsofthisinteragencyconflictwere
significant.Thecurrentevidenceclearlyshowsthattheauthoritieshadaneffective
intelligenceagencyinhandatthetimeoftheoutbreakoftheFirstEmergency.Asa
resulttheimmediateeffectofSillitoe’scampaigntoeliminatetheMSSwastodeprive
theBritishauthoritiesofestablishedandeffectiveintelligencesupportontheMalayan
peninsula at a critical juncture. The decision also meant that responsibility for
Emergencyintelligencewasmovedfromasinglepan-Malaya,non-executivebody,to
asub-setofCriminalIntelligenceDepartment(CID)withintwoseparatePoliceforces.
As a result, the intelligence machine in Malaya was dislocated and, arguably,
dysfunctional,duringthefirstfourcriticalyearsoftheEmergency.Itwouldbeleftto
themilitaryto‘holdthering’whilstthecivilianintelligenceorganisationsregrouped.
114Ibid.,SIFE(Alexander)toDGSecurityService,10thJanuary1948.115KV4/422,SIFE(Winterborn)toDGSecurityService,17thJuly1948.
179
Chapter6–TheEvolutionofaLocalIntelligenceApparatus
The situation inMalaya in the autumnof 1948was parlous.Groups of insurgents
intimidatedandattackedMalaya’s vital infrastructure, not least her tinmines and
rubber plantations: local workers were terrorised, expatriate managers were
murdered and plant was destroyed. This was fundamentally local activity, with
violencebreakingoutinvariousdistrictsacrossMalaya.However,individualgroups
ofinsurgentsmergedandthroughout1948-9thereweremultiplereportsof‘gangs’
of up-to three hundred armed men operating in the open, with the intention of
creating liberatedareas.1 Inaddition,theMalayanCommunistParty(MCP)worked
towardsthecreationofaparallelgovernmentalsystem,effectivelyunderminingthe
Federationfromwithin.
Moreover,theFederation’sintelligenceapparatuswasincrisis:theJointIntelligence
Committee(FarEast)(JIC(FE))wasstrugglingtodefineitself;SecurityIntelligenceFar
East(SIFE)lackedanymeaningfulresources‘ontheground’anditsheadquartersstaff
werealsopreoccupiedwiththeirtermsofreference;andtheMalayanSecurityService
(MSS)–whichofferedthemostsubstantialintelligencecapacity,howeverimperfect,
tothebeleagueredFederation-wasabouttobeabolishedinfavourofahastilyre-
constitutedandwhollyunpreparedSpecialBranchofthePoliceService.Furthermore,
keyactorswithintheapparatuswerealreadyindeepdisputewitheachother.Assuch,
thestateofEmergencywasdeclaredwhile theFederation’s intelligenceapparatus
was deeply fractured, with the civilian agencies being ripped apart by centrifugal
forcesandnorealisticprospectofanyquickfixes.
Recognising that the situation ‘on the ground’ was rapidly getting beyond their
control, British officials chose to enact emergency legislation.2 The few previously
identifiedMCPactivistswhohadnotalreadytakentothejunglewerequicklyarrested.
1Forusefulaccountsofthesituation‘ontheground’inMalaya,priortoandafterthedeclarationofEmergencyseeB.Hembry,MalayaSpymaster(Singapore2011);M.Shennan,OurManinMalaya(Stroud2007);C.Bayly&T.Harper,ForgottenWars–TheEndofBritain’sAsianEmpire(London2007).2DEFE11/11,DespatchNo.5,GurneytoCreechJones,30thMay1949.
180
Thebiographiesofsomeplanterssuggestthat‘locals’eitherkneworsuspectedthose
tobeorchestratingtheviolenceandsomeintelligencereportsnamedringleaders.3
But these opportunities quickly dried up because the Police lacked any form of
meaningfulpresenceontheground,letaloneadecentnetworkofinformers.More
fundamentally,Malaya’scommunities,particularlytheChinese,lackedconfidencein
thegovernment’sabilitytorestorelawandorderandfearedreprisalsforproviding
information.4AsGeneral SirHaroldBriggs, the futureDirectorofOperations, later
noted,“ourinformationmustcomefromthepopulationorfromdesertersand,until
we can instil confidence by successes and security among the population, our
informationwillbeworsethanthatoftheCommunists.”5However,itwasnotuntil
themid 1950s that the authoritieswere able to generate this level of confidence
amongstthepeopleofMalaya.
Inthemeantime,themilitaryandPolicehadtotackletheviolencebreakingoutacross
theFederation.Counter-insurgency,fromthebeginningoftheEmergencywasajoint
activity.Indeed,thereisclearevidencethatthePoliceenlistedthesupportfromthe
ArmyinanumberoflargeoperationsagainstCommunist‘bandits’monthsbeforethe
formaldeclarationofEmergency.ThePolice,however,wereverymuchtheweaklink.
ThescaleoftheviolenceassociatedwiththeMCP’sinsurgencyforcedthemtoadopt
a paramilitary strategy. Whilst necessary in the short-term, this strategy had an
adverseeffectupontheabilityofthePolicetosecurehumanintelligence.Untilthen,
thesecurityforceshadtomakethemostofotherformsofintelligence,forinstance
from captured documents, captured or surrendered insurgents, aerial surveillance
and photographic reconnaissance. It was apparent from the earliest stages of the
Emergencythatitwasnecessarytocoordinatethesevariousstreamsofintelligence
at a local level. Subsequently, the Commissioner General, Malcolm MacDonald,
3Forinstance,seeB.Hembry,MalayaSpymaster.SeealsothecollectioninRhodesHouse,OxfordofPoliticalIntelligenceJournalsissuedbytheMalayanSecurityServicebetween1946-8.4KarlHackhasarguedthattheChinesepopulationwerecaughtbetweentworepressiveregimes,theBritishandCommunist,“liabletosupportwhoeversubjectedthemtogreaterpressure.”SeeK.Hack,“Everyonelivedinfear:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),p.681.5AIR20/7777,ReportbySirHaroldBriggsontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951.
181
sanctionedthecreationofintelligencecommitteesatDistrictlevel.Thesecommittees
were supported by similar constructs at State / Settlement level and a broader,
theatre-levelapparatuswhichwillbediscussed inmoredetail in thenextchapter.
Together,theyformedthebedrockofthesecurityforces’intelligenceapparatusfor
thedurationoftheEmergency.
However,thisapparatuswas,untilthemid-1950sstarvedofinformation,particularly
human intelligence (humint). In lieu of this intelligence, the security forces were
forcedtofallbackupon‘junglebashing’,oftenusingbattalionsoftroops,supported
byairpowerandartillery,tocordonandsearchareassuspectedofinsurgentactivity,
simplyinthehopeofgeneratinga‘contact’andthustheopportunityeithertodevelop
intelligenceorneutralisesome insurgents. Itwasnotuntil therestof theMalayan
intelligencemachine,particularlytheuniformedPoliceandSpecialBranch,wasinthe
position to increase the flow of intelligence that the security forces were able to
developmoreefficientoperationalmethods.Intheinterim,duringthefirsthalfofthe
Emergency,themilitarymanagedtocontainandgraduallyerode,butnoteliminate,
theCommunistinsurgency.
ThePrecursortoEmergencyOperations
TheconventionalwisdomisthatthestartoftheCommunist insurgencycaughtthe
Malayanauthoritiesbysurprise.TheCommander-in-Chief,FarEastLandForces(C-in-
CFELF),GeneralSirNeilRitchie,recalledthatitwasnotuntiltheeveningof22June
thathewasinformed"bythecivilauthoritiesoftheconditionsofunrestexistingin
Malaya."Ritchiehad“justreturnedfromabriefvisittotheUKwhereIhadtoldthe
then CIGS [Chief of the Imperial General Staff] that in my viewMalaya could be
regardedastheonerelativelystableareainanotherwisedisturbedSouthEastAsia.”
AccordingtoRitchie,theCommander-in-ChiefFarEastAirForce(C-in-CFEAF)hadalso
expressedthesameviewtotheChiefsofStaff(CoS)and“theGOCMalayaDistrictwas
equallyinthedarkregardingtheinternalsituation.”6Perhapstheexacttimingofthe
murders that led to the declaration did indeed come as a surprise. However, as
6WO106/5448,GeneralSirNRitchie,ReportonOperationsinMalaya,June1948-July1949.
182
discussed in the previous chapter, there can be little doubt that the authorities
expectedsomeformofconfrontationwiththeMCP,notleastbecausetheMSShad
been providing clear warning about the Communist’s capability and intent to
stimulatearevolutionwithinthecountryforthepreviouseighteenmonths.
Moreover, there is clear evidence that the Army,working in conjunctionwith the
PoliceandtheRoyalAirForce,werealreadyengagedin‘antibandit’operationsbefore
thedeclarationofEmergency.TheQuarterlyHistoricalReportofNorthMalayaSub
District explains that British and Malay units were engaged on ‘internal security’
duties,undertaking“intensivedayandnightpatrolling”,inApril,MayandJune1948.
Forinstance,between23Apriland25May1948troopsoftheKingsOwnYorkshire
Light Infantry, plus local Police officers, took part inOperationHaystack,with the
intentionof“breakingthebanditorganisationknowntooperating…inthearea.”Four
“enemycamps”wereidentifiedbutthe“banditswerenotonanyoccasionbroughtto
battledueto:
i. theirdistinctreluctancetobeingengagedbyanarmedforce
ii. theirsuperiorknowledgeandmobilityinthejungle
iii. theirexcellentwarningsystem.7
Similarly,onthenightof25-26MayintheKehah/Perlisarea,the1/6GurkhaRifles
launchedOperationPathan,its“firstoperationalroleagainstwhatisnowknownas
theinsurgentmovementinMalaya.”PathanwascreatedatthebehestoftheChief
PoliceOfficer (CPO) inKedahandPerliswho“requiredanattackby troopson the
bandit camp reported at MR 638193 (approx.) map 2 ¼.” Subsequently the CPO
requested“abackingoftroopstoassistthePoliceinsearchingsquattercampNorth
of Kg CHAROK BUNTING…” The operationwas under the overall command of the
OfficerCommand1/6GRbutwasjointlyplannedwiththeCPO.Moreover,twoPolice
officersandanumberofChinesedetectivesaccompaniedthetroopsontheraid.The
Northern Sub District subsequently reported “two platoons 1/6 GR with Police
7WO268/584,QuarterlyHistoricalReportofNorthMalayaSubDistrict,Quarter1APR–30JUN48,AppendixC,ReportonOpHaystack,23thApr–25thMay1948.
183
attackedatdawn26Maytofindthatthecamphadbeenvacatedapossibletwodays
previously.Abundantmaterial evidencewas foundwhichestablished the fact that
parties of armedmenhad been in occupation over a period of time and that the
controllingorganisationwasCommunist.Thecampwasdestroyed,whileapartyof
Police searched nearby squatter areas and made several arrests.”8 Haystack and
Pathanwere but two of a number of operations undertaken by the Army against
‘bandits’priortothedeclarationofEmergency.Theyareimportantfortworeasons.
First,intermsofchronologyofthecampaign,theyshowtroopsengagedininternal
securityoperationsmonthspriortotheformaldeclarationofEmergency.Thiscasts
furtherdoubtonthetheorythattheriseofCommunist-inspiredviolenceinthelate
springof1948cameasasurprisetotheFederation.Second,HaystackandPathan
indicatesthat,actingonintelligence,thePolicewereinapositiontocallinmilitary
supporttocreateandexecuteajointoperation–thebasisofjointcounter-insurgency
operationswereinplacepriortothedeclarationofastateofemergency.
AnotebyMrJ.Miller,theBritishAdviserinPerakprovidesafascinatingglimpseinto
how the Emergency evolved, at a local level, in response to local evidence, and
relationshipbetweenthePoliceandcivilianauthorities.9On1 June1948 theChief
PoliceOfficer(CPO),PerakinformedMrMillarthatarepresentativeoftheplantersin
Sungei Siput had expressed concerns about unrest among their workers and
requested Police protection. The representative was Boris Hembry who, in his
autobiography,providedanaccountremarkablysimilartoMiller’s.Hembryalsonotes
thatheranadefactonetworkofinformerstogainadvancewarningoflabourunrest,
whichwasverylikelypassedbacktotheMSSbecauseHembryandJohnDalley,Head
of theMSS,were close friends. 10 Certainly the area appeared volatile: Police had
already recently raided the premises of the Federation of EstateWorker’s Union,
SungeiSiputandtheRubberWorker’sUnion,Chemor.Moreover,therewerestrikes
ontheKamuningandSungeiKruddaEstates,andafurtheronewasthreatenedonthe
8Ibid.,HQMalayaDistrict,ReportonOperation‘Pathan’,28thMay1948.9WO268/584,NotebyBritishAdviser,Perak–MovementofMilitarytoSUNGEISIPUTattherequestofPoliceingeneralsupportoflawandorder,2ndJune1948.10Hembry,MalayaSpymaster,pp.308-322.
184
LeeHin Estate.11 The CPO explained that therewere insufficient Police officers to
provide adequate protection and recommended enlisting military support.
Coincidently,DalleywasvisitingMilleratthetimeandconfirmedthattheplanters’
concernswerevalid.Millervisitedthe‘MentriBesar’[sic–FirstMinister],whohad
alreadysignedawarrantforthearrestofachiefMCPactivist,MrBalan,andagreed
totheuseoftheArmytoprotecttherubberplantationsinthearea.12Millerreported,
“theMentrifurthersuggestedthatwitheverycontingentofMilitarypatrolintroubled
areasthereshould,ifpossible,beamemberofthePoliceForcetoeffectarrests.”As
a result, “it was decided on behalf of the State Government to give the
recommendationthefullestsupport.”13
However,thedeploymentoftheArmyacrossplantationsinSungeiSiput(aswellas
otherareasofMalaya)hadlimitedimpact.Onthe16thJunethreeEuropeanplanters
weremurderedbymembersoftheMCPontheElphilandPhinSoonEstatesinPerak.
InthepreviousmonthoneEuropeanminingsuperintendent,twelveAsianmanagers
andaforemanwerealsomurdered.14Policewereabletoascertainfromwitnesses
that themurdersof theEuropeanson the16th Junewerecommittedbyagangof
twelveChinesemenarmedwithStenguns,andthattheattacksingeneraldisplayed
"certaincommoncharacteristics,viz.Theyaretheworkofgangsofwellarmedgun
menmovingfromscenetoscene;theyareconfinedtovillagesandisolatedbungalows
inremotecountryareas;andtheyaredirectedagainstthemanagerialstaffofestates,
leadersofKMTparties,andwitnessesinintimidationcases."15Theclamourforaction
fromtheexpatriatecommunitywas fierceand theHighCommissioner,SirEdward
11InthefirsthalfofJunetherewere19murdersandattemptedmurders,3arsons,andarmedattacksonisolatedpolicestationsinPahang,Selangor,NegriSembilan,Johore,aswellasPerak.SeeL.Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice,1945-60(Singapore2008),p.36.12ThemodernspellingofFirstMinisterinJawiis‘Menteri’.However,thedocumentsconsistentlyusethespelling‘Mentri’.Thecontemporaryspellingwillbeadoptedforthisdiscussion.Similarly,themodernspellingofthelocationwhereemergencypowersweredeclaredis‘SungaiSiput’.However,thedocumentsconsistentlyusethespelling‘SungeiSiput.Again,thelatter,older,spellingwillbeused.13WO268/584,NotebyBritishAdviser,Perak–MovementofMilitarytoSUNGEISIPUTattherequestofPoliceingeneralsupportoflawandorder,2ndJune1948.14Bayly&Harper,ForgottenWars,p.426.15CO537/2638,FortnightlyReviewofCommunismintheColonies,18thJune1948.
185
Gent,hadlittlechoicebuttodeclareastateofEmergencyinPerakandinpartsof
Johore,andquicklyextendedthisacrossthewholeoftheFederation.
Themonths of leading-up to the declaration of Emergency illuminate two critical
aspectstotheArmy’sroleinthesubsequentcounter-insurgency.First,itisclearthat
atleastthebattalionsthattookpartinHaystackandPathanwerealreadycomfortable
in taking part in joint operations and had informal networks with the Police and
plantersinthearea.Second,andperhapsmostobviously,theArmywereverymuch
areactiveforce,dependentonthePoliceforintelligenceandthecivilauthoritiesfor
direction.Forinstance,operationsHaystackandPathanwereclearlyinitiatedonthe
behest of the Chief Police Officer, and the deployment of Gurkha to protect
plantationsinPerakoriginatedfromhadsimilarorigins.16
TheConsequencesofPoliceFailure
TheprimaryresponsibilityfortheFederation’sresponsetotheCommunistinsurgency
lay with the Commissioner of Police, Col. W. Nicol Gray. The Federation’s Local
DefenceCommittee (LDC) reported that the immediate task for thePolicewas“to
protectthepublicagainstbandits…[and]tooperateagainstbandits,eitherbypurely
policemethodswithaviewtobringthemtojusticeorbypoliceorpoliceandarmed
forcesoperations.”17ThePolice–specificallytheSpecialBranch-wasalsocharged
withobtaining“allpossibleinformationrelatingtobanditsandtheiractivities.”The
keytoachievingthiswasbyengendering“confidenceamongstthecivilianpopulation
tosuchanextentthatadequateinformationmaybeforthcomingfromthemandthat
they refuse to harbour bandits.”18 As Anthony Short explains, the Police’s initial
responsetobreakdowninlawandorderwasthreefold:“first,theestablishmentand
16Ofcourse,theArmycouldnotconstitutionallyactunilaterallyandtheneedtoactinsupportofthecivilianauthoritieswasupheldineverysubsequentnotablereviewoftheEmergency.SeeWO106/5448,GeneralSirNRitchie,ReportonOperationsinMalaya,June1948-July1949;WO21/2193,FederationofMalaya,DispatchNo.5,30thMay1949;AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggs;AIR20/10377,DirectorofOperationsMalaya,ReviewoftheEmergencyinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957.Morebroadly,foradiscussionwithintheColonialOfficein1950aboutmilitaryaidtocivilianpowers,seeCO537/6403-6whichwerereleasedfollowingaFreedomofInformationRequestmadebytheauthorinFebruary2014.17CO537/3688,LocalDefenceCommittee,FederationofMalaya,16thSept1948.18Ibid.
186
maintenanceofviablePolicestationsinordertodisputeterritorywithguerrillasand
theirlocalsupporters.Secondtoadaptitsnormalpeacetimerolesoastoprovidea
majorstrikingforce.Third,totrainthevastlyexpandednumbersoftheregularand
ancillarypolice.”19Moreover,thePolice(supportedheavilybytheArmy)wereused
toenforceEmergencypowers,particularlythoseofdetentionandbanishment,with
the intentionofrenderingpowerlessknownCommunistsorsympathiserswhohad
notyettakentothejungle.
In absolute terms, the number of Police officers available to tackle the insurgents
equalledorexceeded thenumberof troops. For instance,RichardClutterbuckhas
explainedthataninfantrybattalioninMalayahadaboutsevenhundredmen,ofwhich
roughlyfourhundredwouldbeavailabletobeputintothefield.GeneralAstonWade,
GOCMalaya,hadapproximatelyfourthousandsoldiers,perhapslessifonetakesinto
accountthechronicshortagesinthebattalionsinMalayain1948,tocombatroughly
asimilarnumberofinsurgents.20Inaddition,attheoutbreakoftheinsurgency,the
Federationhadsome9000Policeofficersattemptingtorestorelawandorder.This
pattern continued as the Emergency progressed: in 1951 there were twenty-four
battalions engaged in counter-insurgency operations, compared to some 60,000
regularandspecialconstabularyPoliceofficers.21
Despite the numerical superiority over the insurgents, the number of counter-
insurgentsavailable totheFederation in the first fouryearsof theEmergencywas
barelysufficient,notleastbecausethelimitednumberofinsurgentscouldeasilytake
refuge inMalaya’splantationsor insquatterareas,blending intothe jungleor the
localChinesepopulation.Forexample,atthebeginningoftheEmergency,thestate
ofJohore(whichhadanareaof7,300squaremilesandapopulationof730,000)was
19Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60,p.131.20R.Clutterbuck,TheLongLongWar–TheEmergencyinMalaya,1948-60(Michigan1966),p.43;J.Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife(Chicago2002),p.63.Sunderlandhasahigherestimate:hesuggeststhereweresome7784fightingtroopsand5660administrativetroopsinMalayainMalaya.Eitherway,Wadedidnothaveasurfeitoftroops.See,R.Sunderland,AntiguerrillaIntelligenceinMalaya,1948-1960(Rand1964),p,24-5.21AIR20/10377,DirectorofOperationsMalaya,ReviewoftheEmergencyinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957,September1957.
187
protected by a squadron of the RAF Regiment, three companies of Seaforth
Highlanders, threeplatoonsofGhurkhas,anda reserveof100men.22Thesecurity
forcesweresoonthusengulfedbyvasttractsofswap,jungle,rubberplantationsand
mountains,“lookingforaveryviciousneedleinaveryunpleasanthaystack.”23
Moreover, both the uniformed and Special Branches of the Police were in a
particularlypoorpositiontomeetthedemandsplaceduponthem.TheSecondWorld
WarhadadevastatingimpactupontheMalayanPolice–manyofitsexperiencedand
knowledgeable European officers were killed or interned and many of the Asian
membersoftheforcewereforcedtoworkwiththeJapaneseoccupyingpowers.24The
resultwastwofold.First,themilitaryweredraftedintosupportthePolice.General
CharlesBoucher(whosucceedWadeasGOC,Malaya,inthesamemonththatstate
ofEmergencywasdeclared)planned,inthefirstinstance,tousetheArmytosecure
staticpositions,and“regaincontrolandstabilityincertainareas.”Once“information”
becameavailableBoucherplannedtoreleaseforcesfromthestaticrole“togoout
andhuntandkill thebandits.”25 Second, it fell toNicolGray,whowasappointed
CommissionerofPolice inAugust1948, toconvertaPolice force“whichhadbeen
competenttodealwithpre-Emergencyconditions,intoonewellfittedtodealwith
theverydifferentsituationcreatedbytheorganisedeffortsofwell-armedterrorists
todisruptthecivil lifeofMalaya.”26Tomeetthischallenge,Grayrecommendedto
CreechJonestherapid“strengtheningofMalayanPoliceforcewithrecruitsfromthe
recently disbanded Palestine Police and recruiting an additional sixty experienced
Policeofficers toactasassistant superintendents,manyofwhowouldbebrought
from Palestine where they had experience in counter-insurgency techniques.”27
Creech Jones agreed and consequently the size of the Federation’s Police force
22Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,p.114.23CO537/4751,DraftBroadcastbyMajorGeneralKirkman,ChiefofStaffFARLEF,April1949.24A.Stockwell,“PolicingduringtheMalayanEmergency,1948-60:communism,communalism,anddecolonisation”,inD.Anderson&D.Killingrayeds.,PolicingandDecolonisation:politics,nationalismandthepolice(Manchester1992),p.108.25AIR24/1924,AQHMalaya,OperationalOrderNo,24/48,30thJune1948;WO268/9,Lt-Col.Shepheard,GSOI,FELF‘LessonsfromOperations’,8thNovember1948.26Ibid.27B.Grob-Fitzgibbon,ImperialEndgame–Britain’sDirtyWarsandtheEndofEmpire(Basingstoke2011),p.110.
188
swelleddramatically from12,767men in early 1949 to a peakof 36,737by 1953.
Moreover,theMalayanSpecialConstabularyrosefrom10,000inAugust1948to44,
878 inmid-1952. The influx of over five hundred former Palestine Police officers,
includingGrayhimself, injectedabattle-hardenedcoretoMalayaPolicewhichwas
stillstrugglingtorecoverfromthehorrorsofJapaneseoccupation.
Consequently, the Police, under the influence of the ex-Palestine officers, rapidly
becameaparamilitaryforce.This ismostclearlyseenbythecreationofthePolice
JungleSquads,whichperformedvirtuallythesameroleastheregularArmyplatoons
patrolling the squatter camps and jungles that surrounded them.28 This attracted
muchcriticism fromthe ‘OldMalayans’whoaccusedGrayof ‘Commandostyle’or
‘Gendarmerie’policing.SuchcriticismwassupportedbythefindingsofthePolicing
MissionandtheJohnstonreport(whichwillbediscussedinchapter8).29However,as
Hurstargues,“thiswasnotasituationwithintheexperienceofapoliceman.Thiswas
awar,andachaoticandpeculiarwarthatdemandedunusualexpertise.Graywasnot
pickedbyaccident,orbecausehewasalikeablechap….Graywasnotappointedasa
diplomat,norevenasapoliceman,butasasolidertakingcommandofagendarmerie
thatwasingravedangeroflosingcontrol.”30
The task of going on the offensive with a rapidly expanded Police force had
widespreadimplicationsfortheintelligencewar.31Inparticular,aswillbediscussed
inmoredetail ina later chapter,Gray’sparamilitary strategyhada significantand
adverseeffectuponthewillingnessof theMalaya’sChinesecommunitytoprovide
information about the insurgents.More immediately, however, it quickly became
apparentthat“theFederationPolicewerenotsufficientlywellorganised,orequipped
nor in sufficient strength to play their full role as the leading partner.” This
necessitated“theArmyhavingtotaketheleadinplanningandcontrolofoperations
28J.Moran,SpearheadinMalaya(London1959).29SeeCO537/5440,ReportofthePoliceAdvisortotheSecretaryofStatesfortheColonies,December1949;MEPO2/9710,TheReportofthePoliceMissiontoMalaya,March1950.30Hurst,“ColonelGrayandthearmouredcars:TheMalayanPolice,1948-152”,CentreofSoutheastAsianStudies,WorkingPaper119,(Monash2003),p.7.31R.Komer,TheMalayanEmergencyinRetrospect:OrganizationofaSuccessfulCounterinsurgencyEffort(Rand1972),p.26.
189
atall levels.”32 In theweeksafter thedeclarationofEmergency, “theC.s-in-C,and
particularly theG.O.CMalaya,complainedbitterlyof theserious lackofbattlefield
intelligenceintheFederation,andthelackofco-ordinationbetweentheintelligence
staffs of the Army, Air Force, MSS and CID.”33 As a result, Malcolm MacDonald,
Commissioner General of South East Asia directed the creation of a Combined
Intelligence Staff (CIS), located at Kuala Lumpur.34 Thiswas replicatedwithin each
State or Statement, where local intelligence centres were established “under a
suitableofficeranswerabletotheChiefofPoliceoftheStateofSettlement.Theofficer
normallyresponsibleforintelligencetotheChiefofPolicewouldbetheMSSofficer
intheStateorSettlement.”Moreover,withineachStateorSettlementtheColonial
Officereportedthattherewouldbeanumberoflocal‘ReportCentres’(theDistrict
levelcommittees,comprisedofatriumvirateoftheDistrictOfficer,seniorPoliceand
Army officers in the area), “which would be collecting agencies for the all local
intelligence,whichwasthentobepassedtotheStateorSettlementcentre,whereit
would be screened and evaluated and, if appropriate, passed to the Central
IntelligenceCentreatKualaLumpur.”35Thecommitteesat“PoliceOffice/CoyComd
[Company Commander] level’ often had representatives from all other local
authorities concerned and from local unofficial organisations such as Planter’s
associationsetc.”36Thus,asearlyasAugust1948,eachoftheMalaystateshadformed
anintelligencecommitteeonaninterservice-civilianbasis.37By1949Ritchiereported
thattheseCommitteeshavebeen“createdonthelevelofallmilitarySub-Districtsand
insomecasesonunitlevelaswell…”andwerechargedwith“makinguseofavailable
intelligence reaching them from their own local resources and from superior
Headquarters.”38
32WO268/9,Lt-Col.Shepherd,GSOI,FELF‘LessonsfromOperations’,p.8thNovember1948.33Ibid.34T.Jones,PostwarCounterinsurgencyandtheSAS(Oxon2007),p.86.35CO537/2647,HonetoSeel,26thJuly1948.36WO268/9,Lt-Col.Shepherd,GSOI,FELF‘LessonsfromOperations’,p.8thNovember1948.37Sunderland,OrganisingCOINinMalaya,p.2738WO106/5884,GeneralSirNeilRitchie,‘ReportonOperationsinMalaya:June1948toJuly1949,6thSeptember1949.
190
IntelligenceImpasse
It isoftenpositedthattheintelligencestructuresinMalayaatthebeginningofthe
Emergencywerefundamentallyflawed.39Atleastatalocallevel,thisdoesnotseem
tobethecase.Theauthoritiesquicklyorganisedlocalcommitteesandbeganworking
collectivelyfromthebeginningoftheEmergency.However,afteraninitialflurryof
activitywhen Police,with Army support, arrested known Communist activists and
targetedthearmedbandsofup-to-threehundredinsurgentsthatwereroamingthe
countryside,intelligencebeganto‘dry-up’.
Asaresultanumberofplantersandcivilservants,whowereex-Force136members,
consideredhowbesttoidentifyandneutralisetheMCPforces.JohnDavis,Richard
Broome,NoelAlexanderandRobertThompsonadvocatedcreatinganirregularforce,
modelledonForce136,“tobreakdownthebandit’sfeelingofownershipofthejungle
byferretingthemoutfromtheircover.”DavisbelievedtheFerretForcewouldbe“the
bestandperhapsonlymethodofcopingwithCommunistterroristsoncetheygetinto
thejungle.”40Theirdiscussionscoincidedwiththeauthoritiesrealisingtheneedfor
someformofspecialistorirregularcounter-insurgencyforce,because“thevalueof
largeandelaboratesweepsisdoubtful.”41
BothRitchieandCharlesBoucher,GOCMalaya,sawtheneedforsuchforce-indeed,
the former claimed the initial idea for the forcewas his, while Robert Thompson
subsequentlyattributedthegenesisoftheforcetothelatter.Thedecisiontocreate
a “special jungle guerrilla force” was made by Boucher in July 1948. The force
consistedinitiallyoffourFerretGroups,eachconsistingwitheightmen,halfofwhom
wereciviliansonthree-monthcontracts.42MalcolmMacDonald,explainedinaradio
broadcastthat“for junglewarfareagainstguerrillabands,squadsof junglefighters
arenecessary.Thesewillbeformedandtrained,partlyfromexistingtroopsandpartly
39Seeforinstance,H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),p.421.40M.Sheenan,OurManinMalaya–JohnDavies,SOEForce136andPostwarCounter-insurgency(2007),p.156.41Jones,PostwarCounterinsurgencyandtheSAS,p.102.42Ibid.,p.91.
191
fromvolunteernewcomerswhoarefamiliarwiththewildforestpathsalongwhich
many pursuits and engagements will take place. 43 The first two groups started
operationsattheendofJuly.TheforceconsistedofBritish,MalayandGurkhaunits
ledbytheirownofficers,butcommandedbyex-membersofForce136.BySeptember
fivegroups,eachcomprisedofsixtymenplusinterpreters,guidesandtwohundred
DyaktrackersflowninfromSarawak,hadbeenestablished.
Whilst thework of the Ferret Forcewas considered a “considerable success”, the
MalayRegimentQuarterlyHistoricalReport forperiodending31stDecember1948
notedwithsomefrustrationthedifficultlyinsharingintelligenceamongthedifferent
organisationsinvolvedwiththecounter-insurgencyeffort.Henoted,
…informationwhichtheArmyhadwasnotalwaysatthedisposalofthePolice
andViceVersa,while informationwhichtheDistrictOfficersandPenghulus
[Headman]hadwasnotpassedtoanybody.Thiswasevenmoreviciousinthe
caseof theplanters,manyofwhomhaveexcellent and reliable sourcesof
informationnotavailabletotheMilitaryorPolice.44
Tohelpmitigatethisproblem,theauthoritiessanctionedthecreationofCivilLiaison
Corps(CLC),whichconsistedofaEuropeanOfficer,ChineseandMalayinterpreters
andsometimesatracker.ThepurposeoftheformationoftheCorps“wastoassist
unitsoperatingagainstthebanditsin:-
a) Gaining information.Bygainingaclosecontactwith the inhabitantsof the
country, i.e. local Government officials, Police, Planters, Miners and the
squattersthemselves.
b) Havingavailableadvisersonlocalconditionsandongovernmentpolicy.
c) Havingameansofbreakingdownthebarriersofdifferentlanguages.45
43AIR20/8876,CommissionerGeneralSouthEastAsiatoForeignOffice,textoftheCommissionerGeneral’sbroadcast,7thJuly1948.44WO268/647,RHQTheMalayRegimentQuarterlyHistoricalReportforPeriodEnding31stDec48.45Ibid.
192
ThefactthattheFerretForcewasdisbandedattheendof1948mightimplythatit
wasinconsequentialtoBoucher.JohnDavieswascertainlyleftfuming.Helatersaid
that“theendwasalmost indecentlyhastenedbyour jack-inthe-box littlegeneral,
whogotover-excitedaboutusinthebeginningandthendecidedtowriteusoffafter
only six weeks because we had not won his war for him.”46 Davies’s attitude is
understandable, not least because the Ferret Force appeared to unearth valuable
intelligence about the insurgents.47However, the decision to terminate the Ferret
Force experiment should not be viewed as Boucher and Ritchie’s disinclination to
develop intelligence-led operations. Both men were concerned about the
developmentof ‘privatearmies’but,morepertinently, theFerretForcewasnever
goingtobeaviablelong-termoptiontotacklethescaleoftheproblempresentedby
theMPAJA.48Instead,BoucherwantedthelessonsandethosoftheFerretForcetobe
inculcated to all front line units. Indeed, he stated, “all coys [companies] will be
regardedasferrets.”49Toachievethis,heorderedColonelWalker,theFerretForce’s
trainingofficer,toestablishtheFarEasternLandForceTrainingCentre(FTC).50This
wasameasuredesignedtoinstitutionaliseandembeddedthelessonslearntfromthe
formerForce136/FerretForceintothewiderArmy.51
Althoughprimarilyaconsumerofintelligence,theArmydidhaveasmall,dedicated,
intelligence-gatheringcapability.UponthereoccupationofMalaya,theIntelligence
CorpsestablishedtheFieldSecurityService(MalayaCommand).Thiswascommanded
byMajorPeterLeefe(GSOII)andcomprisedofeightSecuritySections,eachwithsmall
numberofNCOs–forinstance,thedetachmentatIpohwasconsistedofaCaptain
and sixteen others, including six interpreters. The main task of the Field Security
Service (FSS)was to round up people on the black and grey listswhich had been
46Sheenan,OurManinMalaya,p.161.47A.Hoe&E.Morris,Re-entertheSAS(London1994),p.41.48WO106/5884,ReportonOperationsinMalayabyGeneralNeilRitchie,June1948toJuly1948.49WO268/582,MinutesofaCOMDsConferenceheldatHQJohoreSubDistricton12thJanuary1949.50Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,p.69.FormoreonWalkersee,T.Pocock,FightingGeneral–ThePublicandPrivateCampaignsofGeneralSirWalterWalker(London1973).51WO216/116,HalfYearlyTrainingReports;WO26310,MinutesofPart1oftheCommander’s-in-ChiefCommanders’Conference,25thApril1949.
193
preparedinNewDelhiwellbeforetheinvasion,aswellastointernthemembersof
the India National Army (INA) which had been formed by the Japanese.52 An
unpublishedhistorywrittenbytheIntelligenceCorpssuggeststhatinMay1946the
FSS(Selangor)turneditsattentionfrominvestigatingwarcrimesto“internalproblems
of Communism and secret society activity.” Unfortunately, the history does not
providemuchdetailbutdoesstatethatlocallyemployedinterpreters“wereutilised
extensively inwarcrime investigations,working longhoursandoften interrogating
Japaneseprisonersofwarthemselves.Later,theywerealsousedtoreporttheresults
ofCommunistmeetings,whichwereatthistimeheldopenlyastheCommunistParty
was legally recognised.” Interestingly the history suggests that the FSS gave
indications as early as June 1946 of an armed MCP movement in Johore but
“apparentlythecivilianauthoritieswereeitherunwillingtotaketotakeanyaction,or
notinterested,andnothingfurtherwasheardofthematter.”53Thesimilaritieswith
theunheededwarningsprovidedbytheMSS,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,
areclear.LittlefurtherisknownabouttheworkofFSS,particularlybetween1948-53,
but it does appear that in the first five years of the Emergency the FSSwere not
attachedtothevariousbattalionsoflinepostedtoMalayaandworkedindependently.
DespitetheeffortsoftheFerretForce, JungleTrainingSchool,andthe Intelligence
Corps, the authorities struggled to obtain humint of goodquality and in sufficient
quantitiesandthecounter-insurgencycampaignlabouredsignificantly.Akeyreason
forthiswasthatthePolice,whichshouldhavebeentheprimarygeneratorsofhumint,
weretheprimaryenforcersofdraconianEmergencylegislation,includingthepower
toarrestonsuspicionanddetentionwithouttrialforfourteendays;thepowerfora
ChiefPoliceOfficetodestroyorauthorisethedestructionofanysuspectbuildingor
structure; thepowerofdeportation; and thepower tonominate ‘special areas’ in
which the security forces couldarrest,using lethal force if necessary, anyonewho
failedtostopandsubmittosearchwhencalledtodo.54Indeed,thefunctionsofthe
52IntelligenceCorpMuseum,AccNo.576/2–NotesontheIntelligenceCorpsinSouthEastAsia,undated,believedtobemid-1953.53Ibid.,Acc882–AHistoryoftheIntelligenceCorpsinMalaya1945-70.54Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009).
194
MalayanPoliceServiceunderwentasignificantandrapidtransformationinthefirst
fouryearsoftheEmergency.AsthePoliceMissionreportsubsequentlyidentified,
in jungle operations the functions of a policeman are similar to those of a
soldier; in ordinary police work they are dissimilar…the functions of a
policemaninordinarytimesaretopreservethepeaceandindoingsotouse
theminimumforce:hemustavoidtheuseofforceifpossible,andifforceis
unavoidable,hemustusenomorethanisnecessary.Whilehemustbefirm
andresolute,hemustbecautiousandnot impulsive…thecontrastbetween
thatbentandtheattitudeofmindrequiredforwar-likeobjectivesissuchthat
trainingforjungleoperationscandolittleornothingtodevelopthehabitof
thoughtandactionrequiredforordinarypolicework.55
Onoccasiontheenforcementofthesebluntinstrumentsandpara-militarynatureof
policingunderNicolGrayledtoactsofextremeandunwarrantedviolence,suchas
theshootingoftwenty-fourunarmedvillagersatBatangKalionthe12thDecember
1948.56Furthermore,themajorityofsecuritypersonneloperatinginandaroundthe
squatters could not even speak Chinese.57 It is not surprising that the flow of
intelligencegatheredbythePoliceinthesquatterareaswaslimited.
Thetaskofacquiringintelligenceinthefirstyearsoftheemergencyprovedanear
unsolvable conundrum. The security forces had to provide local, semi-static
protection to the population. As Ritchie explained, unless this is done “vulnerable
pointsareinsecure,allsenseofpersonalsecurityamongsttheCivilianpopulationis
lacking…furthermore, willingness on part of the unprotected civilians to provide
informationandintelligenceceases,andwithoutthis,thetaskofthesecurityforces
55MEPO2/9710,ReportofthePoliceMissiontoMalaya,1950.56Seeibid.AlsoC.Hale,MassacreinMalaya-exposingBritain’sMyLai(London2013);K.Hack,‘Everyonelivedinfear:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency’,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),pp.671-699;D.French,TheBritishWayinCounter-insurgency1945-67(Oxford2011).57CO537/4374,AnotebyCIGStotheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,15thNovember1949.
195
isreducedtoconditionsakintosearchingforaneedleinahaystack.”58Andyetan
inabilitytogoontheoffensivewouldallowtheinsurgentstooperatelargelyatwill.
On balance, Richite favoured the offensive but, without security intelligence, the
effortsofthesecurityforceswasoftenfruitless.SirWilliamSlim,ChiefoftheImperial
GeneralStaff,visitedMalayain1949andfound,
…abandhavingbeen located inanarea,amilitary forceproceeds tobeat
throughawideexpanseofjungleandlocatetheband.Contactisusuallymade
withoneortwoindividualbanditsactingasoutpostsbutthemainbodyisable
toevacuate its campanddisperse to rallyagain in somepre-arrangedarea
manymilesaway.TheArmythenlaboriouslyrepeatstheprocess.59
Indeed, it quickly became apparent that it was “virtually impossible to protect or
secure”thesquattercommunities:theyweretoodispersed;therewereinsufficient
troops,insufficientPoliceofficersandadministrators,andanabsolutelackofChinese-
speakers. Consequently, as subsequently noted by General Sir Harold Briggs, the
squatters “weremore inclined to support the Communists, whom they had good
reasontoexpecttowin.Asaresult,therewaslittleinformationforthcomingabout
theCTs,andthebulkoftheArmywasdeployedonlargescaleandfruitlesssearches
inthejungle.”60
SirHaroldBriggs
ItwastheneedtomanagetheeffortsbetweenthePoliceandmilitarythatledthe
HighCommissioner,SirHenryGurney,tosuggest in1950theappointmentof“one
officer to plan, co-ordinate and generally direct the anti-bandit operations of the
police and fighting services.” He argued that not “it is not feasible for the
CommissionerofPolicetoplan,co-ordinateanddirectallsuchoperationsexceptat
theexpenseofhisfunctionsasheadofthepoliceforce.Noristhereanycivilofficer
58WO106/5884,GeneralSirNeilRitchie,‘ReportonOperationsinMalaya:June1948toJuly1949,6thSeptember1949.59CO537/4374,AnotebyCIGStotheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,15thNovember1949.60AIR20/10377,ReviewoftheEmergencyinMalayafromJune1948-August1957.
196
otherthanmyselfinapositiontogivedirectionstotheGOCandtheAOC.”TheHigh
Commissioner therefore proposed the secondment to Malaya of an experienced
military officer to a newly created civil post, with the responsibility of creating a
“general plan for offensive action and the allocation of tasks to the various
componentsofthesecurityforces.”Thepost-holderwouldhavenoexecutivepower,
and would be expected to exercise control through “heads of police and fighting
services”,butalsobe“inclosetouchwithcivilauthoritiesresponsibleforessential
featuresofthecampaign,suchassettlementandcontrolofsquatters,propaganda,
immigrationcontroland the settlementof labourdisputes.”61 JamesGriffiths, the
SecretaryofStatefortheColonies,andEmmanuelShinwell,theSecretaryofStatefor
Defence,approvedtheproposalandSlimproposedthathisfriend,GeneralSirHarold
Briggs, should be encouraged to leave retirement in Cyprus to take-up the post.
Remarkably,onlysixweekselapsedbetweenGurneyfirstraisingtheideawithLondon
toBriggsarrivinginKualaLumpur.
Briggs subsequently presented his plan “for the elimination of the Communist
organisation and armed forces in Malaya” to British Defence Co-ordination
Committee,FarEast(BDCC/FE)on24thMay1950.Theplanwasbasedonthepremise
thattheMalayanRacesLiberationArmy(MRLA)relied“verylargelyforfood,money,
informationandpropagandaontheMinYen(literally“People’sOrganisation”)inthe
populatedareasincludingtownsandvillagesaswellasuncontrolledsquatterareas,
unsupervised Chinese estates and small holdings, estate labour lines and timber
kongsis.”Thus,hesuggestedthattoendtheEmergencytheauthoritieswouldneed
to destroy both the Min Yuen and MRLA - the first task being “primarily the
responsibilityofthecivilauthoritiesandsecondoftheServices,mainlytheArmy.”62
TheBriggsplanhadfourkeycomponents.Heintendedto“clearthecountry,stepby
step,fromSouthtoNorth,by:
61CO537/5994,GurneytoCreechJones,23rdFebruary1950.62AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggs,p.6.
197
a) dominatingthepopulatedareasandbuildingupafeelingofcompletesecurity
in them, with the object of obtaining a steady and increasing flow of
informationfromallsources;
b) breakingupMinYuenwithinthepopulatedareas;
c) thereby isolating the bandits from their food and information supply
organisationinthepopulatedareas;
d) and finallydestroying thebanditsby forcing them toattackusonourown
ground.”
To achieve this, Briggs planned that in all States, the Policewould be focused on
“fulfillingnormalPolicefunctions includingtheobtainingof intelligencethroughits
SpecialBranchorganisationinallpopulatedareas.”TheArmywouldmaintainineach
Statemaintaina‘framework’oftroopstosupportthePolice.Thiswould,heexplained,
“entailthesettingupofaseriousofstrongpointswhereonpatrolswillbebased.”The
Armywould“superimposefurtherstrikeforcesuponthisframework,onastate-by-
statebasis,todominatethetracksonwhichthebanditsrelytomakecontactwith
their information and supply organisation, thus forcing the bandits either to fight,
disintegrateortoleavethearea.”63
Briggs was concerned to ensure “the closest possible coordination and liaison
betweentheFightingServices,thePoliceandtheCivilAdministration.”Thus, inhis
first directive, issued on 16 April 1950, the Director of Operations instructed that
officialswouldsetup“StateandSettlementWarExecutiveCommitteesandcombined
operationalheadquartersatall levels.”64This, therefore, recognisedandenhanced
thestatusof thecommittees initially createdatDistrict levelacrossMalayaat the
beginning of the Emergency, and created parallel structures at State / Settlement
level. These became known as the District and State / SettlementWar Executive
Committees(D/SWECs).
63Ibid.SeealsoCAB104/263,CabinetMalayaCommittee,FutureAntiPolicyinMalaya–AmemorandumbytheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,12thMay1950.64AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggs,p.12.
198
In the followingmonth theDirectorofOperations issueda seconddirectivewhich
stipulatedthatthatthetacticalheadquartersoftheseniorArmycommanderineach
StateorSettlementwillbesitedclosetotheheadquartersoftheChiefPoliceOfficer.65
Consequently,aBrigadeHeadquarterswasnormallylocatedateachContingentPolice
Headquarters in a State / Settlement capital. The Brigade Commander was
operationallyresponsibletotheSWEC,ofwhichhewasamember.Similarly,Battalion
Headquarters were co-located with the Police Circle Headquarters at the
administrativeCentreofaCivilDistrict,withtheBattalionCommanderoperationally
responsible to and a member of the DWEC. Finally Company Headquarters was
generallyco-locatedwithPoliceDistrictHeadquarters.66
Crucially,DirectiveNo2alsostipulated,“thatajointoperations/intelligenceroomwill
bemaintained.Thisintelligenceroomwillbeapermanentrequirementandwillbea
partoftheContingentHeadquarters.”Moreover,“thisprinciplewillapplyatalllevels
includingPoliceCirclesandAdministrativeDistricts.”67Theoperationsroomincluded
seniorofficersofthePoliceandmilitary,amemberofspecialbranch,andoneofficer
(either Police ormilitary) acted as an ad hoc G-3.68 Also, RAF intelligence officers
attachedthemselvestotheseoperationsroomtofacilitatecoordinationoftacticalair
supportmissions. Briggswasdoggedly egalitarian in relation to the staffingof the
operationsrooms–hestated“itisimmaterialwhetherthelocalmilitarycommander
isaLieutenant-ColonelandthelocalPoliceOfficerisasergeantorwhethertheyare
respectively aMajor anda Superintendent; in each case theywill establish a joint
headquarters and will work in the closest co-operation also with the local
administrativeofficer.”69Theseintelligencestructuresfurtherreflectedtheintimate,
co-dependentrelationshipbetweenthekeyactorsintheEmergency.
65CAB21/1681,DirectorofOperations,Malaya–DirectiveNo.2,12thMay1950.66AIR20/10377,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957,bytheDirectorofOperations,September1957.67CAB134/497,DirectorofOperationsMalaya,DirectiveNo.2,12thMay1950.68Sunderland,OrganisingCOINinMalaya,p.45.69CAB21/1681,DirectorofOperations,Malaya–DirectiveNo.2,12thMay1950.
199
Resettlement,confidenceandintelligence
The concept of resettlementwas been closely linkedwith intelligence conundrum
whichconfrontedGurneyandBriggs,andisatthecruxofthelatter’splantorestore
securitytoMalaya.Theproblemremainedthelackofintelligencebeinggatheredby
thePolicefromtheChinesecommunity.Forinstance,theCabinetMalayaCommittee
noted “more and better information is needed, particularly from the Chinese
community,andthisinformationcanbeobtainedonlyiftheChinesehaveconfidence
intheAdministration.”70TheSecretaryofStatefortheColoniesconsideredhowto
address this inaperceptivememorandumwritten in July1950.Henoted that the
reluctance for theChinese toprovide informationwasa resultof“themostbrutal
intimidationbythecompatriotsintheCommunistranks”whichhadresultedseven
hundreddeathswiththatcommunity.Henotedthat“weshallnotgetthefullactive
cooperation of the Chinese (even though the vast majority of them are not in
sympathywiththeCommunistideology)untilweareinapositiontoofferthepeople
securityandprotectionagainstthebanditsandtheconvictionthat,iftheythrowin
theirlotwiththeforcesoflawandorder,theywillbeincorporatedasfullmembers
ofthebodypolitic.”71
TheproblemposedbythelargenumbersofungovernedChinesewasrecognisedat
theverybeginningoftheEmergency.Forinstance,asAnthonyShortergues,“inPerak,
andnodoubt in other states, therewas in 1948 an administrativenoman’s land,
which,undertheinfluenceofCommunism,threatenedtobecomeavastsprawling
statewithinastateextendingoverhugeareasofwhatwereonceForestReserves,
MalayReservations,MiningorAgricultural landandconsiderableareasofprivately
ownedestates,particularlyEuropean,whichwere felledduring theOccupation.”72
Without effective government, the squatters were “easy prey for Communist
intimidation, and became his [the insurgent’s] chief source of both supplies and
70CAB104/263,CabinetMalayaCommittee,minutesofameetingheldon19thApril1950.71CAB21/1681,CabinetMalayaCommittee,Malaya–GeneralBackground–MemorandumbytheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,14thJuly1950.72Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,p.174.
200
recruits.”73 Even prior to the declaration of Emergency, the MSS highlighted the
importanceoflinksbetweensquatterareasandtheMPAJAandrecommendedthat
squatterswhoprovidedinsurgentswithsustenanceshouldberelocated.74Similarly,
instructionsfortheCivilLiaisonOfficers issuedin late1948notedthat“thereisno
doubtthatsquatterareasarethemainsourceofsupplyofthebanditsandthekeyto
theirexterminationisthedenialoftheuseoftheseareastothem.”75Thus,in1949
thegovernmentappointedSquatterCommitteerecommendedthat:
a. Thatwhereverpossible squatters shouldbesettled in theareasalready
occupiedbythem;
b. Thatwheresettlement inexistingareaswasnotpossible,analternative
suitableareashouldbemadeavailableforresettlement;
c. That,ifthesquattershouldrefusesettlementorresettlementontheterms
offered,heshouldbeliabletocompulsoryrepatriation;
d. That emergencymeasures to dealwith the security problem of certain
areas should be supported by administrative measures designed
permanentlytore-establishtheauthorityofgovernment;
e. That legal means should be introduced to provide for the eviction of
squattersbysummaryprocess.76
Gurneyrealisedthatnotonlydidtheadministrationhavetobreakthelinkbetween
the squatters and the MRLA, but that any benefits of resettlement would be
temporary“ifwedonotatonceshowthepotentially loyalsquatterswhatwecan
offertheminthewayofapeacefullivelihood,freefromintimidation.”Asaresulthe
placedpressureontheStategovernmentstoaccelerateresettlementoperationsand
usetheprovisionsinEmergencyregulationsforbanishment.77
73WO106/5884,ReportonOperationsinMalayabyGeneralNeilRitchie,June1948toJuly1948.Seealso,CO537/4374,AnoteonthevisitoftheCIGStoSouthEastAsia,November1949.74Jones,PostwarCounterinsurgencyandtheSAS,p.80.75WO268/647,AdministrativeInstructionNo.8,CivilLiaisonCorps,ActionAgainstSquatterAreas.76Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,p.186.77 CO 537/4751, Minute by HE The High Commissioner, 31 May 1949. See also, Bayly & Harper,ForgottenWars, p. 482; T.Mockaitis,British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (London 1990), p. 114-5;Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,p.175,pp.185-6.
201
PronouncementsbyHQMalayaDistrictinthefirsteighteenmonthsofthecampaign
abouttheimpactofresettlementundersecurityoperationsprovedtobeprescient.
Forinstance,theWeeklyIntelligenceReviewfortheweekending13January1949,
issuedbyHQMalayaDistrict,stated“foodisnowtheprimefactorinthecampaign,
andthedenialofittothebandits,byremovalofsquattersandothermeans,becomes
themaintask. It isof interesttonotethat, justasthesupplyofricewasthemain
factorintheinternalsituationbeforetheinsurrection,andisthemostpowerfulanti-
Communist weapon, so the lack of it will drive the bandits out of battle.”78 As
farsightedasthisstatementwas,itwouldbeafurthertwoyearsbeforesecurityforces
wouldseetangibleoperationalbenefitasaresultofpopulationcontrol.Thiswasdue
tothreekeyreasons.First,thesuccessoftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP)ended
theagreementwithChina todeporthercitizens fromMalaya.Second,contrary to
Ritiche’s wishes, there were no little or no resources available to bring effective
governmenttothesquatterarea,whetherinsituorresettlementcamps.Theresult
wasthattheChinesewhowerere-settledweretransportedtoareasentirelyunsuited
forhabitation,withlittlerunningwaterorotheramenities.Third,neitherthemilitary
nor the Federal government had any powers to compel state governments to
undertakeacoordinatedprogramofresettlement.79
The Briggs Plan brought a renewed focus on resettlement, the detail of which is
outsideofthescopeofthisdiscussion.Thesalientpointis,however,thatregardless
ofanythemoraljudgement,resettlementmadepossibletheimplementationoffood
denial operations that really began to yield intelligence dividends later in the
Emergency.80OperationHammer,whichranbetweenOctober1952andApril1953,
wasatypicalfooddenialoperationmadepossiblebytheresettlementofsquatters
intoNewVillages.Itoriginatedafterthesecurityforcesobtaineddetailedintelligence
ontheCommunistorganisationinSelangorfromaninsurgentkilledduringanambush
78WO208/4104,HQMalayaDistrictWeeklyIntelligenceReviewNo11,forWeekEnding13thJanuary1949.79Short,TheCommunistInsurrection,p.181.80Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),p.438-441.
202
in July. Subsequently theauthoritiesplanned “a long-termoperation combing civil
administrativemeasureswithaconcentrationofPoliceandArmy.”Theobjectofthe
operationwas:
a) TodisrupttheterroristsupplyorganisationinKUALALANGATForestReserve
(North)areaofSELANGOR,andtopreventfood,especiallyrice,reachingthem.
b) Topreventtheterroristsfromre-establishingtheirsupplyorganisationandso
forcethemtosurrenderortofightfortheirfood.
Thefirstphaseoftheplaninvolvedtheremovalofsurplusriceandarrestsofallknown
orsuspectedfoodsuppliers.Asaresult“theworstNewVillages,Kampongsandlabour
lines…weresubjectedinturntoSpecialBranchscreening;collectionofsurplusfood
byFoodControlTeams;explanationstothelocalpopulationbyInformationService
Teamsoftheneedfor increasedrestrictionsand instructionsoncooperation.”The
second phase called for the security forces “preventing the insurgents from re-
establishingtheirsupplyorganisationandkillingorcapturinganyterroristinthearea.”
The authorities used various joint methods to achieve this, including restricting
movements and carrying of food supplies, convoying civilian vehicles carrying
restrictedarticles,frequentroadchecksandsurprisechecksbyFoodControlTeams.
These activities were supplemented by air strikes by the RAF and coastal
bombardmentsof“selectedareasinthejungle,dayandnight,toharasstheenemy.”
It is debatable whether the results of this resource intensive operation were
commensurate with the investment - the security forces killed just seventeen
terroristsduring the courseof the sevenmonth-longoperation.However, another
twenty-four insurgents were induced to surrender. Moreover, the post-operation
reportnoted“fullusewasmadeofthesesurrenders,theCTsbeingsentbackintothe
jungletopersuadetheirformercolleaguestogivethemselvesup,ortoleadthemin
SecurityForceambushes.TheInformationServicesalsoutilisedthemtodemonstrate
the failure of the Communists and the good treatment meted out to those who
surrendered.”81
81LiddellHartArchives,PapersofGeneralStockwell,OperationHammer.SeealsoWO216/874,DirectorofOperations’Directive,February1955.Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,p.98-9;
203
OperationalRefinementunderTempler
Theappointmentin1952ofGeneralTemplerasHighCommissionerandDirectorof
Operations, following themurder of Sir Henry Gurney and retirement of General
Briggs, heralded a mixture of continuity and structural change. Hence, Templer
adheredtothebasicprinciplesoftheBriggsPlanthatmeantataDistrict level,the
securityforcescontinuedtheprocessofresettlingtheChinesesquattercommunity
andpatrollingthejunglefringes,withaparticularemphasisonfooddenialoperations.
ThemainstructuralchangesrelatedtotheorganisationofthePoliceService.Aswill
bediscussedinalaterchapter,SpecialBranchwasfinallyseparatedfromtheshackles
ofthebroaderCIDapparatus.AlsoColonelArthurYoung,whoreplacedColonelNicol
Gray,begantheprocessofmovingthePoliceServicefromaparamilitarymodeltoone
basedonconsent.
TemplermadeverylittlechangetotheintelligenceapparatusatDistrictlevel.Hedid,
however,reviewhowtheS/DWECsystemwasoperating.Therewassomeconcern
thatthesizeofDistrictcommittees,inparticular,hadbecameexcessive.Asaresult,
GeneralWalker(1/6thGurkhaRifles)explainedthat“headsofdepartmentsproduce
fordiscussionmattersofminorpolicywhichmerelywastevaluabletime…sessionslast
from4-7hourswhichisabsurd.”ThekeyofficersintheWarExecutiveCommittees
weretheDistrictOfficer,ChiefPoliceOffice,andSeniorArmyOfficer.Theyformeda
natural triumvirate. However, there was no “no clear method of ironing out
differencesofopinionbetweenpoliceandmilitaryandobviouslythesemustattimes
occur.” Therewasparticular concern that the “policemust let theArmyknow full
detailsofallinfoavailable…andnotholdback‘plum’information.Converselymilitary
patrolreportsmustbefrankandtrue…unfoundedclaimsbythemilitaryofkillsand
woundedarealwaysfinally laidbarebylaterSEPorcaptureddocs,andonlycause
lackofconfidenceamongsttheirpolice.”82
Mockaitis,BritishCounterinsurgency,p.116-7;R.Clutterbuck,TheEmergencyinMalaya,1948-60(1966),p.116-121.82LiddellHartCollection(KingsCollegeLondon)–thepapersofGeneralWalterWalker,aletterfromWalkertoGraham,12thJuly1952.
204
Asaresult,GeneralSirRobertLockhart,D/DirectorofOperations,createdaspecific
coursetohelpmembersofDWECoperateeffectively.Interestingly,thiscoursewas
entirelyArmy-led.83Theobjectiveofthecoursewas:
a) topracticeDWECsinjointplanning;
b) to study all aspects of the Emergency with a direct or indirect effect on
operationalplanningbyDWECs;
c) toexchangeviewsof thevariousproblems thathaveconfrontedDWECs in
various parts of the country so that local experience gained can be shared
throughouttheFederation;
d) to analyse the relationship between Civil, Police and Military so that the
maximum effect may be obtained in planning and execution of measures
necessarytodefeattheenemy;
e) tostudysomeofthedifferenttypesofoperationswithwhichDWECshaveto
deal.84
Toachieve this,membersof theDWECs received lectureson theorganisationand
characteristics of the MCP and MRLA; the intelligence organisation (particularly
SpecialBranchorganisation,methods,sourcesandexploitationof information,and
thedifferencebetweenpoliticalandoperationalinformation);theorganisationofthe
Police Force (its functions and problems); and the machinery of command for
operationalplanning(particularlytherelationshipbetweentheDistrictOfficer,Police
andMilitary,andtheorganisationandfunctionsoftheJointOperationsRoomandits
relationshipwithSpecialBranch).TherewerefurtherlecturesontheHomeGuard,Air
andNaval support and the Army. Each course also had to complete a number of
syndicateexercises.Forinstance,Exercise‘Co-operation’testedthedelegatesinhow
they would tackle a theoretical area in which the “general situation vis-à-vis the
83FollowingthedeathofSirEdwardGurneyandretirementofGeneralSirHaroldBriggsattheendof1951,SirGeneralSirGeraldTemplerbecame,inthefollowingyear,bothHighCommissionerandDirectorofOperations.GeneralSirRobertLockhartwasthusappointedasTempler’sDeputyDirectorofOperations.84Ibid.,DirectorofOperations,CoursesforMembersofDWECs,1stAugust1952.
205
enemyisunsatisfactory.”Thisrequiredthemtoconsiderspecialmeasurestocontrol
timberworkersinthearea,tostudyindetailmeasurestomakefoodcontroleffective,
how to create effective propaganda measures, and how to respond to a major
incident.85
Lockhartbelievedthatbestresultswouldbeachieved“whenaJointOperationsRoom
isestablished[atDistrictlevel]fortheplanningandcontrolofOperations.”Aletter
fromWalker to Col C. Graham (Colonel of the Brigade of Gurkhas) gives a good
indicationofhowthePoliceandArmyconductedjointoperations intheDistrictof
KualaKangsarinmid1952.WalkerexplainedtoGrahamthat“physicalliaisontakes
placeregularlyat0900hrseachday,andthereafterasrequired.Weareindirectcomm
[communication]withthepolsta[policestation]byphoneandanofficergoesdown
atonceatanytimeofday,ifandwheneverrequired.MyIO[intelligenceofficer]or
TacAdjt[tacticaladjutant]spendsmoretimewiththepolicethanhedoeswithme.
ThereisajointopsroomatpoliceHQandifonehadsufficientofficerstheremightbe
anoffr[officer]employedfulltimeatthejointopsroom.However,wemanagevery
wellbyfrequentvisitsthroughouttheday.”86
Moreover,theIntelligenceCorpswasdevelopingitslocalpresenceatthispointofthe
Emergency: Field SecurityWing (Malaya)was formed, replacing 348 Field Security
Section (FSS) in North Malaya (with detachments in Penang, Taiping, Ipoh and
CameronHighlands)and355FSSinSouthMalaya(withdetachmentsinKL,Kluang,
JohoreBahru,Montakab,BentongandSegamat).Theexactnumbersarenotclear,
but the unpublished, in-house, history of the Intelligence Corps in the Far East
suggeststhattheIpohDetachmentconsistedoftwosergeants,twoMOR,andtwo
civilianinterpreters.Thestrengthof355FSSwasapproximatelythirtysoldiers,and
fifteen-eighteeninterpretersanddrivers.ItappearsthateachDetachmentwaslinked
to the local Army battalion. For instance, in 1953, the Detachment at Kuala Lipis
85Ibid.86Ibid.,WalkertoGraham,12thJuly1952.ForadescriptionoftheSungeiSiputJointOperationsRoomin1958see,YuenYuetLeng,NationBeforeSelf–Andvaluesthatdonotdie(KualaLumpur2008),p.127.
206
“supportedaninfantrybattalionprovidingvettingclearanceforlabourersbothforthe
battalionandtheGarrisonintheCameronHighlands.Theyalsooccasionallycollected
intelligence on enemymovements from their sources.” Furthermore, in the same
year,TemplerhadembeddedsixGII(Int),sixGIIIand16IntelligenceOfficersinto
SpecialBranch.Theirtaskwasto“assessandcollecttacticalinformationcollectedby
theSpecialBranchandtopass it tothe jointPolice/MilitaryOperationsroomfor
action.”87
Thus,thebasicjointintelligencestructuresatalocallevelhadbeendefinedbyand
protocolsarrangedfortheirusebytheendofTempler’stenureasHighCommissioner.
However,theEmergencywasfarfromover.Indeed,accordingGeneralBourne,who
tookoverasDirectorofOperationsfollowingTempler’sdeparturefromMalaya,at
theendof1954therewerestill“rathermorethan4,000Communistterrorists”inthe
jungle, who were “able to emerge from the jungle regularly, at points of their
choosing,tocreateanincidentortocollectsupplies,whentheythinktheycandoso
withgreatrisk.”BournewasparticularlyconcernedabouttheMCP’scontinuedability
to launch “terrorist” attacksagainst “small and isolatedpoliceposts and to takea
moredrasticlinewithuncooperativemembersofthepublic,includingtheelimination
ofsuspectedagentsandtheselectivemurderofothercitizensasawarning.”Inthe
longer-term,BournesuspectedthattheCommunistswerewaitingforwhen“outside
assistanceortheoutbreaksofcommunalstriferesultinguponthewithdrawalofthe
British,willenable themtocomeout into theopenand takeover thecountry.”88
Despitethecontinuedeffortsofsomethirty-onebattalionsoftroops,16,840regular
Policeofficersand23,238membersoftheSpecialConstabulary,Bourneconcludedat
theendof1956thattherewas“aconsiderableandcontinuingdangertothesecurity
and stability of Malaya until the Communist Terrorist Organisation has been
thoroughly broken.”89 The security forces were containing the insurgents and
87IntelligenceCorpMuseum,AccNo.576/2–NotesontheIntelligenceCorpsinSouthEastAsia,undated,believedtobemid-1953.88WO208/3219,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheEndof1954,bytheDirectorofOperations,Malaya.89WO208/5356,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1956.ForthetroopandpolicelevelsseeAIR20/10377,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957,bytheDirectorofOperations,September1957.
207
graduallyerodingtheirstrength,butwereunabletoadministeracoupdegrâce.The
fateofMalayadependeduponthePolicetowinthetrustandconfidenceofMalaya’s
Chinese community and for Special Branch to turn this into solid, actionable,
intelligence.Aswillbeseeninchapter8,thisprovedahighlydifficulttaskthatwould
takemanyyears.Intheinterim,thesecurityforcesontheground,includingthePolice,
‘heldthering.’
Conclusion
Considerationofhow the intelligenceapparatus inMalayaevolvedat a local level
revealsthreekeyfactors.ThefirstisthattheresponsetotheCommunistinsurgency
washighlydecentralised.Indeed,theinitialmovetoenlistthemilitarytosupportthe
civilian authoritieswasmade by the Chief PoliceOfficer in Perak, rather than any
Federalofficial.Indeed,insomecriticalareas,suchasPerak,thePoliceandArmywere
alreadyworking together to tackle the rise in banditry prior to the declaration of
Emergency.AsemergencypowersweredeclaredacrossMalaya,thesecurityforcesin
conjunctionwithofficialssuchasDistrictOfficersandunofficialrepresentativesofthe
expatriate communities organised themselves into committees. These committees
consideredwhatintelligencewasavailable,oftenobtainedthroughinformalnetworks
of informants, and directed the local operational response against the insurgent
gangs.OvertimetheFederalauthoritiesoverlaidplansandformalisedthecommittee
structuresbut,fundamentally,theEmergencywasalocalaffair.
Thesecondfactoristhattheoperationalresponsewasahighlycollaborativeaffair.
Althoughthemilitaryactedinsupportofcivilianauthorities,theArmyprovidedthe
focal point for operations. The Police adopted a highly paramilitary stance, as
witnessedbythecreationofthePoliceJungleSquads,anduntil1952wereadefacto
adjunctofthemilitary.Thelevelofco-operationwiththeRAFwasalsosignificantand
hasbeenunderplayedbyprevious commentators. For instance, theRAFRegiment
undertook regular patrols in the jungle and RAF intelligence officers were often
attachedtoDWECsandalsowentonpatrolwiththeirArmycolleagues.However,as
willbediscussedinthenextchapter,perhapsthemostnoteworthyexampleofthis
interagencycooperationarethereports,veryearlyintheEmergency,ofPoliceofficers
208
actingasspottersintheRAF’slightaircraftwhichwereflownbyArmyAirCorppilots.
In contrast to the civilian intelligence agencies, the military demonstrated an
instinctiveabilitytoworktogetherwithlittlefrictionfromtheverybeginningofthe
Emergency.
Thethirdfactoristhatthekeystructuresformanagingoperationalintelligencethat
were created at the beginning of the Emergency did not change significantly
throughoutthedurationofthecampaign.SirHaroldBriggsstandardisedtheworking
of the local committees,and re-named themasDistrictorState /SettlementWar
ExecutiveCouncilsandSirGeraldTemplerrefinedtheirpracticesbutthefundamental
structuresandprocessesremainedthesame.Aswillbediscussedinthenextchapter,
theD/SWECsystemwassupportedattheatre-levelwithasophisticatedintelligence
coordinatingapparatus,intheformoftheLand/AirOperationsRoomandtheJoint
AirPhotographicIntelligenceBoard(FarEast).
TheweaklinkinthesystemwastheFederation’sPoliceforce. Inthefirst instance,
orthodoxpolicingwasforgottenasGrayquicklyturnedtheFederation’sPoliceforce
intoapseudo-militaryforce. Inpractice,therewasvery littledifferencebetweena
contingentPolicesquadandaninfantrycompany.Moreover,thePoliceandmilitary
regularly worked in conjunction to mount patrols, stage ambushes, and enforce
Emergencyregulations,suchasdeportationandresettlement.Asaresult,thePolice
wereunabletomaintainordevelopcontactswithintheChinesecommunitywhich
were necessary to generate the human intelligence vital for turning security force
operations from cumbersome speculative affairs into more precise, targeted
operations.Officialswere caught in a conundrum - thePolice dependedupon the
Armytogenerateaperceptionofsecurity,whiletheArmyweredependentuponthe
Policetoprovidehuminttoenableeffectiveoperations.Inthefirstfouryearsofthe
Emergency,boththePoliceandArmytriedtogenerateaperceptionofsecuritybut,
withouthumint,this largelyfailed.Thisoftenbredresentmentandmistrust,rather
thanconfidence.Thus,foralargeproportionoftheEmergency–atleastuntilthemid
1950s–theArmy‘heldthering’untilthecivilianauthoritieswereabletoprovidea
moreeffectiveresponsetothedemandsofthecounter-insurgencycampaign.
209
IntheinterimtheArmyattemptedtostimulatetheflowofintelligenceatlocallevel–
aswitnessedbytheexperimentoftheFerretForceandtheuseofthe Intelligence
Corps’FieldSecuritySections.Moreoftenthannot,however,localcommandersfelt
the need to implement large-unit sweeps of the jungle, often supported by aerial
bombardmentssimplyinthehopeofgeneratingacontactwiththeinsurgentforces
andfinding intelligence,suchasacaptureddocuments.Moreover,theArmyrelied
heavilyupontheRAFtosupplementthelimitedsupplyofhumintfromthePolicewith
visualsurveillanceandphotographicintelligence.However,thiswasnosubstitutefor
humint.
TheEmergencywasfundamentalacivilianaffairandthemilitarywereactingatall
times in supportof theadministration.Theabilityof the security forces todo this
relatively effectively arguably prevented the insurgents fromdeveloping ‘liberated
areas’andgainingfurthermomentum.However,thelocalintelligenceset-upwas,in
fact,slavetoamuchwiderapparatus.Realsuccesswouldonlyberealisedwhenall
theelementsofthecounter-insurgencycampaignweresynchronised,includingthe
civilian intelligence structures, the policing strategy, the psychological warfare
programme and the transition to self-government. As will be discussed in the
followingchapter,akeybutunder-recognisedprecursortothiswasthecreationof
suitableintelligencemechanismstolinkthelocaloperationalintelligencestructures
tothoseattheatre-level.
210
Chapter7–NetworkingIntelligence:creatingatheatre-levelintelligence
apparatus1
AsthesecurityforcesbegantotackletheinsurgentthreatacrossMalaya,theneedto
coordinatethefledgingintelligenceapparatusatabroader,pan-State,levelbecame
apparent.Inparticular,theintelligenceneedsofthesecurityforcesconfrontingthe
insurgentsinvillages,rubberplantationsandjunglesacrossMalayahadtobealigned
to the theatre-level resources, such as the Royal Air Force’s photographic
reconnaissance squadron. Nearly all assessments of the Emergency make some
referencetothecreationofvariousmechanismstooverseetheinteragencycounter-
insurgencyeffort,suchasthecreationofacommitteesystemortheappointmentof
aDirectorofIntelligence(whichwillbediscussedinalaterchapter).However,there
is a distinct lacuna in the literature relation to the evolution of theatre-level
intelligenceapparatus.
Thereare,inparticular,twocriticalomissions.Thefirstconcernstheestablishmentin
thefirstweeksoftheEmergencyofaLand/AirOperationsRoom(laterknownasthe
JointOperationsCentre)tolinkoperational‘consumers’withtheatre-level‘suppliers’.
The Land / Air Operations Room coordinated counter-insurgency operations,
including the assessment, dissemination and tasking of intelligence between the
Army,RoyalAir ForceandPoliceat theatre-level. Itwasalso themedium through
which requests for tactical air support were routed and, later in the Emergency,
coordinatedtheworkofthepsychologicalwarfareteams.Moreover,theLand/Air
OperationsroominKualaLumpurprovidedthetemplateforthecreationoffacsimiles
ataStateandDistrictlevelacrossMalayawhichwereintroducedundertheauspices
oftheBriggsPlan.2
1AnarticlebasedonthischapterhasbeenacceptedforpublicationbySmallWarsandInsurgencies.PleaseseeR.Arditti,“TheViewfromAbove:HowtheRoyalAirForceprovidedastrategicvisionforoperationalintelligenceduringtheMalayanEmergency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,26:5(2015),pp.762-786.2TheLand/AirOperationsRoomwasestablishedinKualaLumpurinthesummerof1948.GeneralBriggsdictatedthattheconceptbeextendeddowntoState/SettlementandDistrictlevelin1950andthetermsJointOperationsCentre/Roomswerelaterusedtoreflectthis.SeeM.Postgate,OperationFiredog(London1992),p.53andAIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafrom
211
The second omission in the historiography relates to the creation of the Joint Air
Photographic Intelligence Centre (Far East) (JAPIC(FE)) in 1948. This was a quite
remarkable‘joint’body,whichperformedacriticalroleinthecoordination,collection,
assessment and dissemination of photographic intelligence. It was answerable
throughtheJointAirPhotographic IntelligenceBoard (FarEast) (JAPIB(FE))tothe
JointIntelligenceCommittee(FarEast)(JIC(FE))which,itwillberecalledfromchapter
three,was in a state of significant disarray at the beginning of the Emergency. In
contrast,JAPIC(FE)managedinter-agencytensionswellandwasabletoensureboth
RoyalAirForceandArmyresourceswerefocuseduponprovidingaconsistent,high-
level,ofaerialintelligencesupporttothesecurityforces‘ontheground’.Notonlydid
airreconnaissanceenablecommanderstocharthithertounexploredareasofMalaya
andupdatetheirstockofpre-warmaps,italsoprovidedthemeanstoidentifysigns
ofinsurgentactivity(i.e.campsandareasofcultivation)andcorroborateintelligence
beingprovidedbyothersources.Infact,airreconnaissanceaffordedavitalandlargely
continuous stream of intelligence throughout the counter-insurgency campaign.
Moreover, JAPIB(FE)constitutedtheonlyfunctioningstrategic intelligencebody in
MalayauntilthecreationoftheFederalIntelligenceCommittee(FIC)in1952.
Therapiddevelopmentbythemilitaryofatheatre-wideintelligenceapparatusinthe
shapeoftheLand/AirRoom(s)andJAPIC(FE)wasofparticularimportancebecause,
for at least the first four years of the counter-insurgency campaign, the civilian
authoritieswere ina stateof turmoil. Itwillbe recalled that theMalayanSecurity
Service(MSS)wasdisbandedasaresultofMI5’sempire-building;SecurityIntelligence
FarEast (SIFE) lacked resources to fill thegap thatwas tobe leftby theMSS; the
fledgling Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) failed to provide any form of
leadershiporsupport;and,aswillbediscussedinthenextchapter,thePolicefaced
theprospectofcreatingaSpecialBranchwhileatthesametimerestoringlawand
ordertoMalaya.Indeed,thePolicewerebesetwithbitterinternaldivisionsanditwas
notuntil 1952 that SpecialBranchbecamea separatedivisionwithin theMalayan
April1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggsandCAB21/1681,DirectorofOperationsMalaya,DirectiveNo.2,12thMay1950.
212
Police Service. In contrast, the military were affected by none of the difficult
organisational problems that beset the civilian apparatus in the first half of the
Emergency. Together the Land/Air Rooms, JAPIB (FE) and JAPIC (FE) provided the
means to ‘network’ the intelligenceactivities takingplace,often spontaneously, at
both a District and State level across Malaya. This formed a vital layer in the
Federation’sintelligenceapparatus,onewhichenabledthesecurityforcestocontain
anddegradetheinsurgentsuntilthecivilianintelligenceagencieswereabletoadapt
tothedemandsoftheEmergency.
Land/AirOperationsRoom(s)
In June 1948, when the state of emergency was declared in Malaya, neither the
militarynorthecivilianauthoritieswereorganisedtoconfrontthechallengesposed
theMalayanCommunistParty(MCP).Atafederal-level,theCommanders-in-Chiefof
eachoftheservicesandtheCommissionerofPolicesatwiththeHighCommissioner
of the Federation and the Governor of Singapore on a Local Defence Committee
(LDC).3Thedecisiontodeclareastateofemergencywasaconsciousdecisionnotto
declaremartiallaw.Theinsurgencywasconsideredacriminalproblem,ratherthana
military one. However, the Police were ill-prepared to address the problem and
neededverysignificantsupportfromthemilitary.
The RAF might have been forgiven for not getting too involved in this low-level
‘policing’action.Notonlyweretheactionsoftheinsurgentsconsideredasaproblem
ofcriminality,buttheRAFdidnotevenhaveabaseontheMalayapeninsular-allRAF
resources were based on Singapore Island.4 Nevertheless, they were tasked by
Boucherto:
a) “AssisttheArmyinthecourseoftheirOperationsinphase1…
b) FlyovervariousareaswiththeobjectofrestoringmoraleinisolatedAreas
3T.Jones,PostwarCounterinsurgencyandtheSAS,1945-1952(Oxon2001),p.84.4Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.34.
213
c) Reconnoitre theNorthern Frontier and theNorthernAreasof the East and
WestCoasts;theobjectbeingtoamassinformationtoenableustocutdown,
andeventuallystop,infiltrationbytheInsurgentsintoMalaya.”5
To achieve this, a task force comprised of Dakota transport aircraft fromNo. 110
SquadronandSpitfiresfromNo.28and60SquadronswasdespatchedfromSingapore
to Kuala Lumpur, under the command of Air Vice Marshall A. C. Sanderson.
BeaufightersfromNo.45SquadronjoinedtheSpitfiresinJuly,significantlyincreasing
thefirepoweravailablepotentiallytobringtobearagainstany identified insurgent
positions.6 However, Sanderson realised that the control of the rear and forward
elementsoftheRAFinMalayaandSingaporecouldnotbeexercisedbythemainAir
Headquarters(AHQ)atChangi.HethereforedecidedtoestablishtheAdvancedAHQ
atKualaLumpur.7Importantly,however,theRAFchosetolocatetheAdvancedAHQ
notatRAFKualaLumpurbutinthecity,co-locatedwithArmyHeadquarters,Malaya
District. The co-location of both the Army and RAF headquarters in Kuala Lumpur
allowed the creation of the Land/Air Operations room. Group Captain Slater
subsequentlyexplainedto theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) that this“was
located in themainAirHeadquarters immediately alongsideHeadquartersMalaya
Command,wheretheAOCandtheGOChadadjoiningoffices,closetotheirrespective
staffs.”Asaresult,“controllerswereabletoreferanycontroversialdecisionsormajor
allocationsofairefforttothetwocommandersortheirprincipalstaffofficerswithout
delay.”Hence,the“commandandcontrolorganisationfinallyadoptedapproximately
fairlycloselytothestandardArmy/TacticalAirForceset-up.”8
5A.Short,CommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60(1977),p.136-7.SeealsoAIR24/1924,AQHMalaya,OperationalOrderNo,24/48,30thJune1948.6J.CorumandW.Johnson,AirpowerinSmallWars–FightingInsurgentsandTerrorists(London2003),pp.191-2;M.Robinson,“OffensiveAirOperations,Beaufighter/Brigand”RoyalAirForceHistoricalSocietyJournal,21(2000),p.22.7AIR24/1917,OperationsRecordBook,AHQMalaya,July1948.Initially,thosesquadronsbasedinSingaporebutwhichsupportedgroundforcesinsouthernMalayaremainedunderthecontroloftherearAHQ,matchingtheArmy’sdivisionofcommand.However,wasrectifiedinNovember1949whenthecontroloftheJahoreSub-DistrictwaspassedfromGOCSingaporeDistricttoGOCMalayaDistrict,thusenablingAHQtohaveoperationalcontroloverallaircraftoperatingagainsttheinsurgents.SeeAIR23/8435,ReportontheRAFOperationsinMalaya,April1949toDecember1950(AHQRAFMalaya,8thJanuary1951.8K.Slater,“AirOperationsinMalaya”,RoyalUnitedServicesInstituteJournal,102:607(1957),p.38;SeealsoR.Sunderland,ArmyOperationsinMalaya,1947-60(Rand1964),p.225.Thatsaid,even
214
Initially, however, the staffing of the intelligence component of the Land / Air
Operations Room was a significant concern. Due to the scaling down of the Air
CommandFarEast (ACFE)after thewarwith Japan, therewasadearthof trained
intelligenceofficersatthestartoftheEmergency.Hence,anintelligenceofficerwas
‘borrowed’fromHQACFEandanumberofgeneraldutiesofficersweredraftedinto
actasSquadronorStationintelligenceofficers.Theseofficersweresupportedbythe
appointment of anArmyMajor as Air LiaisonOfficer. 9 However, itwas not until
SeptemberthatfivededicatedIntelligenceOfficers,underthecommandofSquadron
Leader Dent, arrived in Kuala Lumpur to bolster AHQ intelligence capacity.10 The
difficultiesinestablishinganewintelligencecellwithinAHQledasubsequentreport
to suggest “whatever the strictures of man-power economy may be, it is an ill
conceivedeconomy todowithout any intelligence staff in anAirHeadquarters.”11
Despitetheseinitialtroubles,theAHQ’sintelligencecellwasfullyoperationalbythe
autumn of 1948 andwent on to form a key element of the joint operations and
intelligencecentreset-upatArmyHQ.12
A critical role of the Land / Air Operations Roomwas to coordinate theatre-level
resourcesandoperationalrequests.Thisinvolvedlinkingtheintelligence,oftenbut
notexclusivelyprovidedbyaerialreconnaissance,withoperationalcommandersand,
where necessary, providing offensive air support. In the first few months of the
Emergency,theinsurgentspresentedthemselvesinrelativelylargeformations.The
operationalsummaries(opsums)forthefirstfewmonthsoftheEmergencyshowa
surprising degree of integration between air and land,which contradict Sebastian
laterintheEmergency,informallinesofcommunicationandcommanddeveloped,wherelocalgroundcommanderswouldsimplyringdirectasquadronforassistanceinpre-plannedoperations–withmanythankstothestaffofTheMilitaryHistoryMuseum,Chicksands.9AIR24/1917,OperationsRecordBook,AHQMalaya,July1948.10AIR23/8435,ReportontheRAFOperationsinMalaya,27thJune1948–31stMarch1949(AHQRAFMalaya,9thMay1949).11Ibid.12Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.34-5.ThisisverymuchatoddswiththeassertionsmadebyDonaldMackay.SeeD.Mackay,TheDominoThatStood–TheMalayanEmergency1948-60(London1997),p.37.
215
Ritiche’ssuggestionaboutthelackofimmediateairsupport.13Indeed,fromthevery
beginningoftheEmergency,groundforcesofplatoonsizedid incorporate ‘ground
contactteams’whichrequestedbyradiotacticalairsupportorlogisticsupportfrom
theLand/AirOperationsRoomatKualaLumpur,whichwouldinturnforwardthe
requesttotherelevantRAFsquadron.14Forinstance,on2August1948twoSpitfires
attackedatemple,hutsandajunglepathwhichhadbeenindicatedtothembyanair
contactteam, intheguiseofanArmyvehicleequippedwithradioequipment.The
followingdaytheACFEreportedtotheAirMinistry,“twoSpitfireswerescrambledon
request from [a]Shawforceair contact teamandsuccessfulattackwasmadewith
cannonandmachinegunsagainstinsurgentsholding?[sic]againstanadvanceparty
ofShawforce.”Similarly,on21August,troopsonpatrolmadecontactwithaDakota
transport aircraft via radio to arrange air cover for the following day.15 A further
exampleofeffectivelocaljointoperationsattheverybeginningoftheEmergencyis
providedintheopsumfor13August1948,whichreportedthataRoyalNavalofficer
accompanied a Dakota on a visual reconnaissance operation off the coast of
Selangor.16
Visual reconnaissance typifies the interservice (but RAF-led) intelligence support
whichwascoordinatedbytheLand/AirRoom.Thebulkofvisualreconnaissancewas
conductedbyno.1914AirObservationPlatform(AOP)Flight,therumpofNo.656
Squadronthathadbeendisbandedin1946.No1914Flightwasinitiallyplacedunder
theoperationalcontrolofArmyHeadquartersatFortCanning,Singaporeandthen
AHQMalaya.However,withinweeksofthedeclarationofEmergency,thedemand
for itsAuster lightaircraftoutstrippedsupplyandtheArmywereaskedtoprovide
sufficient aircraft to transform no. 1914 Flight back into No. 656 Air Observation
13S.Ritchie,TheRAF,SmallWarsandInsurgencies:LateColonialOperations,1945-1975(AirHistoricalBranch,2011),pp.23-4.14Thesituationwasbynomeansperfect,however.Forinstance,thejungletendedtoreducethenormalefficiencyoftheArmy’swirelesssetsbyuptoseventy-fivepercent.SeePostgate,OperationFiredog,pp.41-2.IamgratefultoGordonLeith,CuratoroftheRAFMuseum,HendonforexplainingtomehowAirContactTeamsoperated.15AIR23/8421,HQACFEtoAirMinistryLondon,AirOperationsMalaya,10thAugust1948.Shawforcewasahybridunitofthe2nd/6thGurkhasandPolicewhichwascommandedbyLt.Col.N.F.B.Shaw(seeAIR23/8435,ReportontheRoyalAirForceOperationsinMalaya,27thJune1948–31stMarch1949(AHQRAFMalaya,9thMay1949)).16Ibid,13thAugust1948.
216
Squadron.17Thisallowedeachbrigadeareatobeallocateditsownflightoffiveorsix
Austers drawn from 656 Air Observation Squadron to provide regular visual
reconnaissance, “in particular, the routine and systematic searching for terrorist
camps and other signs of their presence in order to remedy the general lack of
informationabouttheirwhereaboutsthatwasthebiggestsingledrawbacktoSecurity
Forceoperations.”18
Visual reconnaissance was a distinctively ‘low tech’ approach to generating
intelligencebuttheoperationalsummariesclearlyshowthatitcouldbeeffective.For
instance,thereportforthe11thJanuary1949statedthat:
acapturedinsurgentwasflownwithapoliceofficeroveranareainPerakin
anAuster.AsaresultanairstrikewascalledinviaaContactCar.TheAuster
remainedonstationtoguideathreeBeaufightersandfourSpitfiresontothe
target.A combined forceofArmyandpoliceofficers subsequently founda
camp suitable for over one hundred insurgents, two of whomwere found
dead.Eightotherinsurgentswerebelievedtohaveescaped;threeorwhom
werethoughttobewounded.19
Thisentryisnotableforanumberofreasons:thatbothaninsurgentandPoliceofficer
werebroughtintoanoperationalaircraft;thattheAusterwasabletolocatethecamp;
thatitwasabletocallinanairstrike.Moreover,itwasnotauniqueoperation.Tactics
hadtochangeastheEmergencydeveloped.Inparticular,increasingcautiononbehalf
of the insurgents and the growing effectiveness of food denial campaigns by the
groundforcesmeantthatpilotshadtorefinetheir termsofsearchfrominsurgent
17Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.129.AusterswereregularlysupplementedinthisrolebyDakotatransportaircraftfromNo.110Squadron.See,forinstance,AIR24/1917,OperationalSummaryforSeptember1948.18Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.127;AusterswereregularlysupplementedinthisrolebyDakotatransportaircraftfromNo.110Squadron.See,forinstance,AIR24/1917,OperationalSummaryforSeptember1948.19AIR25/1925,OPSUM,11thJanuary1949.Thescaleofthevisualreconnaissanceeffortwasremarkable–in1955itwastheequivalenttokeepingfiveAusterspermanentlyoverthejunglethroughoutthehoursofdaylightoneverydayoftheyear.SeeSlater,“AirOperationsinMalaya”,RUSI,102:607(1957),p.380.
217
campsorformationsonthefringesofthejungleatthebeginningoftheEmergencyto
areasofcultivation,cookingfiresorwaterholesindeeperjungle.20Oncefound,the
Auster fleet would mark targets, for instance by using smoke for tactical aircraft
attemptingairstrikesortoguidegroundforcestothearea.21
Moreover,thebrigadeAusterfleetwasalsoabletoenhancethesituationalawareness
ofgroundforcesbyactingasanairbornerelaystationwhichallowed,for instance,
different sections involved in a pre-planned ambush to have effective
communications.Aswillbediscussedbelow,themapsavailabletogroundforcesat
thebeginningoftheEmergencywerepoorandground-to-groundcommunicationvia
theno.38radiosetswasproblematic.However,AustersusingtheNo.62radioset
couldactasanairbornerelaystationwhichallowed,forinstance,differentsections
involved in an pre-planned ambush to have effective communications.Moreover,
“sectionsfrequentlylosttheirbearingsinthickcountry,andanAusterwasinvaluable
foreithertellingthemwheretogonext,or,alternatively,wheretheywerenow.”22
This level of ‘joint’ action at such an early stage of the Emergency is even more
remarkable when contrasted with the shambolic and fractured nature of the
relationshipbetweentheMalayanSecurityService(MSS)andSecurityIntelligenceFar
East(SIFE),andthein-fightingwhichbesetthePolice.
CoordinationandControlofAirAssets
TheconceptoftheLand/AirOperationsroomprovedsoeffectivethat,asdiscussed
in the previous chapter, General Harold Briggs stipulated in Directive No 2 that
facsimilesbecreatedatStateandDistrictlevelsacrossMalaya.23Toavoidconfusion,
the original Federal-level Land/Air Operations room became known as the Joint
OperationsCentre(JOC),whichwasthussupportedatStateandDistrictlevelbyJoint
OperationsRooms.Nevertheless,thesystemwasnotwithoutproblems.Indeed,there
20J.Chynoweth,HuntingTerroristsintheJungle(Stroud2007),p.88.21AIR20/8928,DirectorofOperations,Malaya:ReconnaissanceofCultivatedAreas,AppendixA(SprayingFoodCropswithPoisonfromtheAir).22G.Warner,FromAustertoApache–TheHistoryof656SquadronRAF/AAC1942-2012(Barnsley2012),p.70.23CAB21/1681,DirectorofOperations,Malaya–DirectiveNo.2,12thMay1950.
218
was an inherent structural tension in the command and control regime: ground
operationsweredevolveddowntostateanddistrictlevel,whileairoperationshadto
remaincentralisedintheAirHeadquarters.GroupCaptainSlatertoldtheRoyalUnited
ServicesInstitute“controlofairoperationsinMalayaiscomplicatedbythefactthat,
forpoliticalreasons,itisnecessarytodecentralisecontrolofgroundoperationsdown
to State and DistrictWar Executive Committees [S/DWECs]; whereas, because air
effort is indivisible, control of air operations had to remain centralised under Air
Headquarters.”Slaterexplainedthat“theneedforthisisobviouswhenonereflects
thatitisquitepossibletolayonamajoroperationtotakeplaceatdawninJohore,
using bombers, airborne forces, helicopters, and in fact every type of aircraft,
operatinginavarietyofroles,andthen,usingthesameaircraft,tomountasimilar
operationinPerakintheafternoon.”24
Thesolutiontotheproblemofhavingthedecentralisedgroundforcesandcentralised
airresourceswastoenablelocalStateandDistrictWarExecutiveCommitteestocall
upontheservicesofmobileteamsofAirStaffplanners.25Theideafortheseteams
evolved in the context of growing controversy about the value of using Lincoln
bombers in the counter-insurgency campaign. The Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO)
recommendedembeddingRAFintelligenceofficerswithinState/SettlementPolice
headquartersto“getrawintelligenceandbealtogetherclosertothebanditwar.”He
explainedtoAirViceMarshalSirFrancisMellersh,AOCMalaya,thattherewerethree
keyreasonstodothis.First,“intelligenceinevitablycomesslowly;itmustbefetched
if it is to be fresh.” Second, “police andArmy in the field, regardless of themany
instructionsthatareissued,areneverquitesurewhenorhowtocallforair.”Finally,
he stated that RAF intelligence officers, if deployed within State / Settlement
headquarters“couldgethotintelligenceandknowingwhattheaircando,couldsee
in such intelligence, opportunities for air action, which a laymanwould inevitably
miss.”26Mellershagreedwiththeidea.Consequently,RAFintelligenceofficerswere
attachedtotheSWECandDWECJointOperationsRooms,whichwere“mannedby
24Slater,‘AirOperationsinMalaya’,RUSI,102:607(1957),p.386.25Ibid.26AIR24/8347,SASOtoAOC,3rdNovember1950.
219
the military and police on a 24hr basis to bring together and display relevant
intelligence and operational data.”27 In addition, it was not uncommon for these
officerstogoonpatrolwiththegroundofficerstheyweresupporting.28Theseofficers
would “channel all bids for air support from the Army, the police, and the civil
administration through the Land / Air Operations Room, which functioned as the
controllingagencyforallday-to-dayoperationsthroughouttheEmergency.”29
ThechangeofstrategyemployedbytheMCPfollowingtheadoptionbytheMalayan
authorities of the Briggs Plan in 1950 caused the security forces to reassess the
manner inwhich intelligencewas tasked to air assets.30 Heralded by the October
Directives,theMCPchanged“itspolicyofwholesaleterrorismtooneofinfiltrationby
planting cells in villages and Kampongs and of establishing camps in the jungle to
cultivate small plots for food.”31Nevertheless, theMalayan authorities recognised
thattheinsurgents“tendedtocarryoutmoreincidentsclosetoresettlementareas,
bothtoboosttheirownmoraleandtointimidatethepopulation.”Thisstrategymeant
thatthatArmyandPoliceshiftedemphasis“fromdeepjunglepenetrationtooffensive
patrollinginthejungle/rubberedges.”32Thisissuewasapotentialsourceoffriction
between theRAFand theDirectorofOperations,and theRAFwasorderednot to
acceptanytargetthatwaslikelytodamagerubberplantations,unlessFederalPolice
Headquarters had approved the operation beforehand. The RAF argued that the
increased risk to rubber plantswas acceptable if it enabled strike aircraft to flush
insurgentsfromthejunglefringeintoawaitinggroundforceambushes.Inanycase,it
argued,“thenumberofrubbertreesdamagebyairattackwillbesmallcomparedto
rubberslashing.”TheDirectorofOperations’committeenotedthe“necessityforthe
RAFtobeabletogiveairsupportclosertotheedgesofrubberplantations.”However,
27R.Komer,TheMalayanEmergencyinRetrospect:OrganisationofaSuccessfulCounterinsurgencyEffort(Rand1972),p.28.28Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.53.29Slater,“AirOperationsinMalaya”,RUSI,102:607(1957),p.386.30AIR20/8925,DirectorofOperation’sCommitteeMinutes,13thDecember1951,AppendixCtoAgendadated7thDecember1951,Anappreciationontherequirementforjungle/rubberedgeairsupport.31AIR23/8853,HQFEAFtoAirMinistryLondon,17thDecember1952.32AIR20/8925,D/Op’sCommitteeMinutes,13thDecember1951,AppendixC,dated7thDecember1951.
220
“suchapolicyentailedgreaterriskstoinnocentpeopleandthereforemadethetask
ofthelocalpoliceingivingclearanceforanairstrikemoredifficult.”33
Veryquickly,however,arevisedtaskingprocesswasestablished.WhiletheDirector
ofOperationsrecognisedtheArmytobekey‘employer’ofairpower,itwasaccepted
thatthePolicecouldalsotaskairpowerand,insomecircumstances,providethefinal
approvalforspecifictargets.However,noPoliceclearancewasneededwhenthere
wasanimmediaterequestforoffensiveairsupport.Thus,ataskingwouldbesent“by
the fastest means” by the commander of the ground security forces to the AHQ
Operations Room (within the Joint Operations Centre) which would consider the
requestandtheninformthePoliceHQOperationsInformationBranchofthedecision.
In the case of pre-planned offensive air support, the Army or Police commander
initiating the requestwould informAdvancedAHQOperationsRoomand the local
Police.ThelatterwouldconsultwiththeDWECandensurethat:
I. Noinnocentperson,lawfulhabitationorpropertyliabletodamageisinthe
targetarea.
II. Anyinnocentperson, lawfulhabitationorpropertyinsidethetargetareaor
within1500yardsofit,whichtheairattackmustavoid,isdescribedintheAir
SupportDemand.
III. Arrangements are made if necessary to remove from the target area any
innocentpersonsknownorbelievedtobeinthetargetareawithin1500yards
fromit.34
FollowingconsultationwiththeDWEC,theChiefofPolicewouldrecommendwhether
ornottoapproveapre-plannedairstrike.However,theDirectorofOperationsmade
itclear thatairattackswithin1500yardsof innocentpersons, lawfulhabitationor
propertywouldonlybeprosecutedin“exceptionalcircumstances.”Intheeventofthe
33Ibid.Theauthoritiesalsoexperimentedwiththeuseofclusterbombstoisolatebombblastsandminimisedamagetorubberplantations,seeAIR20/8927,D/OpsCommitteemeeting29/52,27thAugust1952(AppendixA–TrialoftheClusterBombAgainstATargetinRubber).34AIR20/8928,D/Ops,InstructionNo,14,OffensiveAirSupport,November1952.
221
Police recommending a strike, the Advanced AHQ had final “responsibility for
acceptingorrefusingthetargetandintheeventofacceptance,forissuingordersto
theAirForcesinvolvedtoavoidthoseinnocentpersonsandlawfulproperty.”35
JointOperationsRoomsandPsychologicalWarfareOperations
AfurtherimportantfunctionfortheJointOperationsRoomsattachedtotheSWECs
wasthecoordinationofpsychologicalwarfareoperations,particularlytheuseofvoice
aircraft.By1950itwascleartoallthattheFederationwasinabattlewiththeMCP
fortheconfidenceandloyaltyofMalayanpeople.Hence,theBriggsPlanstatedthat
“security, and with it confidence and information” could only be restored and
maintained if measures to extend the effective administration and control of all
populatedareascouldbeexploited“withgoodpropaganda,bothconstructiveand
destructive.”36Asaresult,JamesGriffiths,SecretaryofStatefortheColonies,secured
theservicesfromtheBBCofHughCarletonGreene,brotherofthenovelistGraham
Greene,toheadthenewlycreatedEmergencyInformationServices(EIS).Greenewas
chargedwith three objectives: “to raise public confidence in theGovernment and
increasetheflowofinformationfromthepublictothePolice;secondto‘attackthe
moraleof themembersof theMRLA,MinYuenand their supporters’and ‘drivea
wedgebetweentheleadersandtherankandfile’soastoencourage‘defection’;and
‘to create an awareness of the democratic way of life’ being threatened by
Communism.”37
In many ways, the Federation’s propaganda services were aligned to the familiar
committee structure. The EISHeadquarters provided the theatre-level hub. Itwas
located in Bluff Road, Kuala Lumpur, near to the Federal PoliceHeadquarters and
Greene appears to have enjoyed cordial relations with both Nicol Grey, the
CommissionerofPolice,andWilliamJenkin,theDirectorofIntelligence.EachState
andSettlementwasallocatedanEmergency InformationOfficer (SEIO),withafull-
35Ibid.36AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggs.37K.Ramakrishna,EmergencyPropaganda:TheWinningofMalayanHeartsandMinds1948-58(London2001),p.106.
222
time Chinese assistant.38 However, the shortage of Chinese-speaking staff was a
perennialproblemwithinthewiderintelligenceapparatusandtherewereinsufficient
numberstoprovideeachDistrictwithanEmergencyLiaisonOfficer.Instead,DWECs
eithercalledupontheSEIOforassistanceorChinese-speakingofficials,suchasDistrict
OfficersandResettlementOfficerstookonthetaskasa‘secondaryduty.’39Although
theroleofSEIOswasnottoactasaconsciencetothoseplanningoperations,Greene
“triedtoensureeffectivecontacts‘downtheline’betweenSEIOsandChiefOfficers,
ContingentIntelligenceOfficers[withintheSWEC]andOfficerCommanding,Troops,
withtheresultthatSEIOsby1951wereattendingSWECmeetingsregularly.”40
TherealimportanceofSEIOswasthattheylinkedoperationaldemandwiththeatre-
levelresources,viatheJointOperationsRooms.Forinstance,theLand/AirWarfare
Liaison Letter for July-December 1952 noted, “as the lot of the CTs in the jungle
deteriorates,thereisanincreasinglydemandforpsychologicalwarfaresothatthey
may be induced to give up the struggle and betray their leaders.” Hence, the EIS
experimentedwithwaysofachievingthis,andtherewasawidespreaduseofleaflet
dropsfromaircraft.ItwasreportedthatinNovember1952,“nearlyeverysurrendered
CT in the past month has carried one of these leaflets and the severe penalties
imposedbythecommunistleadersforreadingthemshowsthattheyare,infact,a
potentweaponinthistypeofwarfare.”41Alessobviousmethodofsupportingsecurity
forces on the ground was by using aircraft fitted with loudspeakers to broadcast
selectedmessagestoinsurgentsbelievedtobelocatedinthearea.42Theeffectiveness
oftheseoperationsoftendependedongoodinitialintelligence,whichwouldenable
the EIS to tailor themessages appropriately. Hence, during the first trial of voice
aircraftinsouthernandwesternSelangor,theEISbroadcastthatLiewLonKimhad
beenshotdeadbysecurityforcesandthatanyinsurgentwishingtosurrenderwould
38Ibid.39TheEISwasset-uptoworkinparallelwiththeexistingDepartmentofInformation.HencetheEmergencypropagandaapparatus(responsibletotheDirectorofOperations)hadtoworkalongsidetheday-to-dayinformationservices(responsibletoMemberofHomeAffairs.Moreover,Greenehadnopowersofcoordination.Ibid.,p.118.40Ibid.,p.108.41DEFE4/39,Land/AirWarfareLiaisonLetterNo.6,July-December1952.42Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.115.
223
bewelltreated.Withindays“DistrictCommitteeMemberWeiKeionggavehimselfup
andon9thNovember,hebroadcasttothesameareasthathehadsurrenderedand
urgedotherstogiveup.Sixdayslater,AhYokeandAhFong,bothsurrendered.”43By
1954 the process had been refined to ensure the authorities could ‘exploit’ the
psychologicalmomentcausedbyasecurityforcesuccess‘ontheground’orspecific
intelligence:theSEIOsignalledtheirrequestforvoiceaircrafttotheJointOperations
CentreatKualaLumpur,whereitwasreceivedbytheVoiceAircraftCommittee(VAC).
ThiscommitteeconsistedofaPoliceofficerandtwomembersofthePsychological
Warfare Section (PWS –the Operations Division of Information Services had been
hivedofftotheDirectorofOperation’sStaffinMarch1954,andrenamedthePWS),
andwasresponsibleforpreparingsuitablemessagesandliaisonwiththeRAF.44Again,
this provides another excellent example of how joint theatre-level intelligence
machinery evolved, largely because of the precedent set at the beginning of the
EmergencywiththeformationoftheLand/AirOperationsroom.
JointAirPhotographicIntelligenceCentre/FarEast
Thesecondcriticalelementofthetheatre-levelintelligenceapparatusinMalayawas
Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Centre (Far East) (JAPIC (FE)). Photographic
intelligence (photint) constituted a critical stream of intelligence during the
Emergency but has subsequently been largely overlooked. To some degree this is
understandable: the insurgencywasprimarilyan ideologicalbattleand therewere
significant obstacles in usingoffensive airpoweror photoreconnaissance, not least
becausetheinsurgentswerescatteredinvastjunglecoveredmountainsandindeep
“tracklessevergreenforestandundergrowth.”45Moreover,theRAFlackedeventhe
most basic aids such as accurate maps, let alone anything like modern ISTAR
equipmentthatallowsmoderncounter-insurgentstostream‘realtime’,discreetly-
obtained, multi-spectrum images of their foes from drones to tactical ground
commanders.
43Ramakrishna,EmergencyPropaganda,p.158.44Ibid.,p.188.45TheConductofAnti-TerroristOperationsinMalaya(GovernmentofMalaya,3rdEdition,1958),ChapterXIV,p.9.
224
Nevertheless,photintheldforthosechargedwithrestoringlawandordertoMalaya
themeansofupdatingtheexistingstockofpre-warmaps,tosurveyareaspreviously
unmapped,andofidentifyingindicationsofinsurgentactivity(suchasacamporareas
ofcultivation).Whentheinsurgentsdidchoosetogatherinlargerformations,asthey
didinthefirsteighteenmonthsoftheEmergency,photintwasonewaythesecurity
authorities forcesmight determine their exact location. The value of this form of
intelligencewasonlymagnifiedbythedearthofqualityhumanintelligence(humint)
being collected by Special Branch from Malaya’s Chinese population. Indeed, as
MalcolmPostgate says, “notonlywas aerial reconnaissanceaprofitable sourceof
basicintelligencebutitalsoplayedanimportantpartinconfirmingandpinpointing
targetswhichhadbeenreported,usuallyinaccurately,bypoliceinformersandother
agents.”46
JAPIC (FE)was created in1948andwas chargedwithmanaging theproductionof
photint in the region. JAPIC (FE) had its roots in the interservice photographic
intelligence machinery of the Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU) which was
based inLondonduringtheSecondWorldWar.TheACIUwasadministeredbythe
RoyalAirForcebutwasunderthepolicydirectionoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee
(JIC).47 In1945 the JIC tasked itself to “review theexisting intelligence systemand
examine the possibilities of a post-war intelligence system.” Written by the JIC
Secretary,Denis Capel-Dunn, the reportwas issued in January 1945.48 Capel-Dunn
clearly recognisedthevalueofphotint.Henoted,“itwouldbe invidious,even if it
werepossible,toassesstherelativevaluesofdifferenttypesofintelligence.Allare
complementary.Intelligenceobtainedbyonemeansmaygivetointelligenceobtained
byothermeansavaluewhichitwouldnototherwisepossess.Yetinsheervolume,
the product of aerial photographical reconnaissance has probably provided the
46Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.123.47P.Davies,“ImageryintheUK:Britain’stroubledimageryintelligencearchitecture”,ReviewofInternationalStudies,35:4(2009),p.693.48P.Davies,IntelligenceandGovernmentinBritainandtheUnitedStates–Volume2:EvolutionoftheUKIntelligenceCommunity(SantaBarbara,2012),p.121.
225
greatestsinglecontribution.”49InrelationtohowBritainwouldmanagethisformof
intelligenceinthepost-warcontext,Capel-Dunnarguedthat“whiletheprincipalpart
inaerialphotographicreconnaissancemust…beundertakenbytheRoyalAirForce,
sinceitistheywhohavetooperatetheaircraft,theinterestoftheconsumersisso
considerablethatwedonotbelievethatanyoneMinistryshouldbeburdenedwith
the exclusive responsibility for the general control and direction of this branch of
intelligence.”50Therefore,herecommendedthatoperationalcontrolofthepost-war
aerialphotographicreconnaissanceshouldremainwiththeRoyalAirForce,whilethe
directionofpolicyshouldrestwiththeJointIntelligenceCommittee’sPhotographic
Reconnaissancesub-Committee.Asaresult,theJAPICwascreated.Inthefollowing
year,theUKexporteditsJICsystemtotheFarEastandconsequentlytheJAPIC/FEwas
created.
The directive creating JAPIC/FE explained that it would be “a joint service unit
comprisinganRAFelementandanArmyelement,andalsowithNavalrepresentation
as and when required.” The three service “elements, although having separate
establishments,will normallywork togetherasan integratedorganisation inorder
that the greatest efficiency may be obtained by the most economical use of the
resourcesavailable.”Morespecifically,JAPIC/FEwaschargedwith:
I. CompilationandmaintenanceofaPrintLibraryandanIntelligenceLibrary.
II. Productionandmaintenanceofcovermapsandtraces.
III. Plottingnewcover.
IV. Preparationofinterpretationreports.
V. Adviceonallaspectsofairphotographicintelligence.
VI. Productionofsuchpapersandmanualsasmayberequiredonphotographic
interpretationintropiccountries.
VII. Training in reading and interpretation of aerial photography as may be
requiredbytheServices.
49CAB163/6,‘TheIntelligencemachine’ReporttotheJointIntelligenceSub-Committee,10thJanuary1945.50Ibid.
226
VIII. To provide interpreters and draughtsmen for operations, training and
instructionasrequiredbyGHQFARELF[GeneralHeadquartersFarEastLand
Forces]andFEAF[FarEastAirForce],forphotographicinterpretation.51
JAPIC(FE)’spositionwithinMalaya’sbroaderintelligencestructureswascomplicated.
ThesecretaryoftheJAPIC(FE)laterexplainedthatpolicy“iscontrolledbytheJoint
IntelligenceCommittee, through the JointAir Photographic IntelligenceBoard (Far
East) (JAPIB (FE)),which is itselfasub-committeeof theJIC (FE).”52TheBoardwas
chairedbytheChiefIntelligenceOfficer,FarEastAirForceandhadrepresentativesof
theChiefStaffOfficer(Intelligence)FarEastStation,Colonel(Intelligence)GHQ,Far
EastLandForces,andtheJointIntelligenceBureau(JIB).53TheBoardwasresponsible
to the JIC (FE) for “ensuring that requests from the three Services and the JIB
Representativeforairphotographicintelligencematerialforwhateverpurposeitmay
berequiredaremetasfarpossiblefromresources,orwherenewcoverisrequiredto
recommendpriority.” JAPIBwas thereforeauthorised to “receive, viaHQFEAF, all
demandsforairphotographicintelligencematerialfromServiceagenciesintheFar
East,toassesstheirrelativeprioritiesandtotakeappropriateactiontoensuretheir
fulfilment[viaJAPIC(FE)].”54
Tocomplicatemattersfurther,theArmyhaditsownAirPhotographicInterpretation
Unit(APIU),whichwasanswerablebothtotheArmyandJAPIC(FE)and,consequently,
had twodiffering roles. In relation to the former, theAPIUperformed a distinctly
‘operational’roleandwasresponsiblefor:
a) AdvisingthecommanderonallaspectsofPhotographicInterpretation.
b) ReceivingandcoordinatingallArmyrequestsforPhotoIntelligence.
c) TheprovisionofanddistributionofAirPhotographicIntelligence.
51AIR20/8917,Headquarters,FarEastAirForcetoOfficerCommanding,AirPhotographicIntelligenceUnit(FE),11February1952,AppendixA‘DirectivetoJAPIC(FE)’,dated1June1948.52Ibid.,OrganisationofJointAirPhotographicInterpretationCentre(FarEast),undated.53Ibid.,DirectivefromtheJointIntelligenceCommitteeDefiningtheCompositionandResponsibilitiesoftheJointAirPhotographicIntelligenceBoard(FE)JAPIB(FE),15thSeptember1952.54Ibid.
227
d) ThedistributionofAirPhotomaterial.
e) TheorganisationandrunningofPhotoReadingcoursesforunitsinthefield.
f) Visiting units in the field to assist and advise on the use of Air Photo
Intelligence.55
However, at theatre-level, theAPIU supplied a significant number of personnel to
JAPIC.Indeed,thetwoelementsweresocloselyintertwinedastobeconsideredone
integrated unit under the JAPIC nomenclature. The establishment of JAPIC
Headquartersshowstheclearinterservicenatureoftheunit,foritcomprised,under
RAFleadership,offiveRoyalAirForceOfficers,threeArmyOfficersandoneofficer
from the Royal Navy, supported by 29 other ranks drawn from all three services.
AlthoughstillundertheadministrativecontroloftheOC,APIU(FE),theseseconded
officerswere “directed in their technical employment by JAPIC.”56 The day-to-day
“operationalcontrol” JAPIC(FE)was“guidedbytheoperationalcontrolcommittee
under the chairmanship O.C., A.P.I.U. with representatives of the other two
Services.”57WhiletheJAPICandAPIUheadquarterswereco-locatedatRAFSeletar,
there were joint JAPIC / APIU detachments located at RAF Kuala Lumpur, RAF
Butterworth,RAFTengahandRAFHongKong.JAPIC(FE)wasthusatruly‘joint’unit,
staffed on an interservice basis, providing intelligence tomultiple ‘customers’ and
answerabletocivilian-chairedcommittee.
JAPIC (FE)’s original directive stipulated that “all demands for photographic
intelligence will be submitted to HQ FEAF for consideration by the Joint Air
PhotographicIntelligenceBoard(FE).”58Inreality,however,muchdemandforphotint
originatedfromHQMalaya,viatheAPIU(FE).Ifapproved,theAPIU(FE)wouldsend
therequesttoJAPIB.Inturn,JAPIBwouldallocatea‘jobnumber’andsendtherequest
to the JAPIC (FE), with an indication of priority. As an APIU (FE) memorandum
explained,fromthatpointintheprocess,“thewholequestionoftheproductionof
55Ibid.,APIU(FE)toallAPIU(FE)officers,Reorganisation,APIU–JAPIC,12thSeptember1952.56Ibid.57Ibid.,OrganisationofJointAirPhotographicInterpretationCentre(FarEast),undated.58Ibid.,Headquarters,FEAFtoOC,APIU(FE),11thFebruary1952,AppendixA‘DirectivetoJAPIC(FE)’,dated1stJune1948.
228
prints,mosaicsandinterpretationisthereforenowaJAPICresponsibility.”59However,
by 1952, JIC (FE) felt it necessary to recognise formally the degree of flexibility in
photinttaskingprocessthatappearstohavealreadydevelopedorganically.Hence,it
stipulated JAPIB (FE) was authorised “in times of Emergency, requiring localised
operations, to delegate responsibility for co-ordinating and allocating priorities to
operational demands received from the services, and the local authorities
participatingintheoperation,totheTerritorialAirForceCommander.”60Thiswasa
significant consideration.Whilst the directive outlining the JAPIB’s responsibilities
articulated a defined process, suitable for managing demands for photographic
intelligenceacrosstheregion,theJIC(FE)wassufficientlyastutetorealiseeffective
informal local practice had evolved inMalaya and that not onlywould it be both
fruitlessandfoolishtoattempttopreventitbut,onthecontrary,thatitwouldbewise
to codify such pragmatic behaviour. In many respects this simple clause is
representativeofthewidermanagementofaerialintelligenceintheEmergency.
Although sources about the JAPIC / APIS structures are scare, it appears that the
systemworkedwell.Thehintsofinter-servicefrictionthatareapparentstemnotfrom
fundamental concern over remits, which so plagued elements of the civilian
intelligenceapparatusinMalaya,butresourcing.Forinstance,MajorWilkie,OCofthe
APIU(FE),wrotein1953aletterexpressingsomeconcernaboutadifferenceofviews
betweentheRAFandArmy.Unfortunatelythisletterisnotonfile.However,thepoint
of contention originated from the failure of the War Office to increase the
establishment of the APIU (FE) to meet its operational and theatre-level
commitments.61Theresponsesentonbehalfof thestaffofficerofAirMarshallSir
CliffordSanderson,Commander-in-Chief,HQFarEastAirForce,wasuncompromising.
HisretortstatedthatJAPIC’s“directive isselfexplanatory,andyouwillnoticethat
none of the three Services retain its own identity, all three becoming integrated
membersofJAPIC(FE).”Moreover,hethreatenedthatany“failuretoregardJAPIC
59Ibid,APIU(FE)toAllAPIU(FE)Officers,Reorganisation,APIU–JAPIC,12thSept1952.60Ibid.,DirectivefromJICDefiningtheCompositionandResponsibilitiesoftheJAPIB(FE)JAPIB(FE),15thSeptember1952.61Ibid,HQFARLFtoChairman,JAPIB(FE),27thFebruary1953.
229
(FE)asanintegratedunit,maywellcompeltheRAFtoregardtheAPIU(FE)aspurely
ademanderunitwhowillbecalledupontoreimbursetheRoyalAirForceforservices
rendered.”62 Itwouldbeunreasonabletoexpecta jointunitnottoexperienceany
pointsoffrictionandthisissueappearstoberesolvedspeedily,notleastbecauseit
was agreed to create a dedicated a G (Int) Air Reece post at HQ Malaya, Kuala
Lumpur.63
Photint during the Emergencywas used in four keyways: to identify and confirm
insurgentcamps;theplanningofgroundoperations,ambushes,andescaperoutes;
thebriefingof troops;andrevealing inaccuracieson localmaps.64 Itwas the latter
aspect that proved themost pressing.65 In 1945 the RAF began on behalf of the
Colonial Office a systematic aerial survey of Malaya but at the beginning of the
Emergencyonly16,460oftheFederation’s51,000squaremilesofterritoryhadbeen
mapped.66 The result was that operational commanders and planners had to rely
largelyuponpre-warmapsforoperationsinwesternMalayaandthoseavailablefor
northernandcentralMalayahadsignificanterrorsandomissions.67AirViceMarshal
SirFrancisMellersh,whoin1951returnedtoBritainafteraneighteenmonthtouras
AOCMalaya,toldtheRoyalUnitedServicesInstitutethat
“thevalueofairphotographyasanessentialsupplementtotheinadequate
mapsoftheCountryhasbeenfullyappreciatedbytheGroundforcessincethe
beginningofthecampaign…[mapswere]virtuallyuselesstopatrolsworkingin
thejungle,foralthoughthemostimportantgroundfeaturesareshownwith
someaccuracy,riversarefrequentlyfoundtohavechangedtheircourse,many
ofthesmallerfeaturesareeithergrosslymisplacedorentirelyomitted,and
62Ibid.,HQFEAFtoOCAPIU,11thFebruary1952.63Ibid.,APIU(FE)toOCAPIU(UK),November1953.64AIR23/8435,ReportontheRAFOperationsinMalaya,27thJune1948–31stMarch1949(AHQRAFMalaya,9thMay1949),p.9.65ConceptsDivision,TheAccomplishmentsofAirpowerintheMalayanEmergency,1948-60(AerospaceStudiesInstitute,AirUniversity,MaxwellAirForceBase,USA),p.41.66Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.125.67Seealso,Chynoweth,HuntingTerroristsintheJungle,p.81.
230
therestillremainareas,notablyinTrengganuandSouthPahang,whichappear
quitesimplyonthemapas‘Unexplored.’”68
Asaresult,additionalMosquitosandSpitfiresweredraftedintobolsterthecapacity
ofNo.81Squadron,theprimaryairreconnaissancesquadroninMalaya.By1953,No.
2 Air Survey Liaison Section (the Army unit working with No. 81 Squadron) had
producedatotalof133newmapsthatprovedessentialfortheon-goingcampaign
againsttheinsurgents.69
No. 81 Squadron also provided tactical photographic reconnaissance. As the
Emergency progressed, planners realised that the topography of the battle space
changedregularly.Forinstance,ittookaslittleassixmonthsforsecondaryjungleto
consumevillagesthathadbeenclearedundertheresettlementprogram,rendering
previousaerialphotographslargelyredundant.Thus,asPostgateargues,“itwasclear
that systematic tactical photography of the whole country on a scale which gave
adequateinformationoftracks,cultivationplotsandtemporarycampswastheonly
effectivemethodof recordingthechanging faceof the jungle.”Asresult,between
1951-3,No.81Squadronproduced800‘mosaics’,eachcovering10,000x20,000yards
at1;10,000scale.70 Thiswasparticularly important from1952onwards,whenthe
insurgentspartiallywithdrewintodeepjungle,placingagreaterburdenontheRAF’s
photographic reconnaissanceeffort topinpointareasof cultivationasameansof
identifyingtheinsurgents’camps.71
Thetempoofactivitywassignificant.Forinstance,TheLand/AirWarfareQuarterly
LiaisonLetterforApriltoSept1954reportedthatduringthattimeframe228mosaics
wereproducedby81Squadron.Duringthesameperiod,“theinterpretersof103AIS
andtheJAPIC(FE)detachmentatKUALALUMPURinterpreted225PRscarryingout,
intheprocess,adetailedsearchofover56,000printsandissuing,asaresult,537Type
68Mellersh,“TheCampaignagainsttheTerroristsinMalaya”,RUSIJournal,96:583(1951),p.409.69Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.124-5.70Ibid.,p.126.71DEFE4/39,GeneralHeadquartersFarEastLandForces,Land/AirWarfareQuarterlyLiaisonLetter,No.6,July–December1952.
231
3photomosaics.”DespitethefactthatMalaya’sweatherseverelyhamperedflying
ingeneral,andphotintsortiesparticuarly,veryoften“areashavebeenphotographed
andtheprintsdeliveredtothedemandingformationonthesamedaynecessitating,
inonecase,a350miledeliveryflight.”72Inthesameperiod227‘mosaics’werelaid
bysimilarunitsatTengah,ofwhich128wereusedforthedetailedbriefingofairstrikes
andprovided100pinpointsand131areatargets,whileafurther123pinpointtargets
were afforded by the 53 ‘mosaics’ that were laid by a JAPIC (FE) detachment at
Butterworth.”73Moreover, theLand/AirQuarterlyNewsLettergaveanumberof
examplesofhowphotographicreconnaissancesupportedEmergencyoperations in
theprevioussixmonths.Forinstance,“fromaside-facingobliquephotographofa
builtupareaaninformerrecognisedaparticularhouse.Theoperationmountedasa
resultofthisrecognitioncapturedanimportantCT.”74Nevertheless,perhapsthemost
notablefeatureofphotintinMalayaisnotthevolumeofaerialphotographstaken,or
subsequent successful operations, but the creation and operation of joint
organisationalstructuresthatmadethispossible.
Conclusion
The Land /AirOperationsRoomsand JAPIC (FE) represent a layerof theMalayan
intelligence apparatus which has been largely ignored by existing commentators.
Despite this historical neglect, they constitute an element of the intelligence
apparatuswascriticaltothecounter-insurgencycampaign.AlthoughtheDirectorof
Operations Committee provided some strategic oversight, the DWEC and SWEC
structureeffectivelydecentralisedtheoperationalresponsetotheinsurgentforces.
Hence,theLand/AirOperationsRoomandJAPIC(FE)providedamechanismtolink
the local,operational,efforttotheatre-levelresources, includingadditionalground
support,visualsurveillance,photoreconnaissanceandpsychologicalwarfareteams.
Perhaps one of themost striking aspects of the development of this theatre-level
machinerywasthedecisiveroleoftheRAF.Inmanyrespects,theEmergencywasnot
72Ibid.73Postgate,OperationFiredog,p.127.74Ibid.
232
thenaturalenvironmentfortheRAF.Thereweremanyfactorstomilitateagainstthe
effectivenessofairpower,notleastthattheRAFwasintheprocessoftransitioning
fromthedemandsof theSecondWorldWartotheColdWar.Moreover,Malaya’s
climatecoupledwiththelackoftechnicalaids,meantformostoftheEmergencyRAF
aircraftwereoperatedunderVisualFlightRules;intheearlyyearsofthecampaign
mapsforbothgroundforcesandaircrewwereofteninaccurateandout-of-date;the
limitationsofair-to-groundcommunicationswereexacerbatedby topography;and
theenemywassmallinnumberandshelteredbyboththecanopyofthejungleand
largeelementsoftheChinesecommunity.Moreover,theEmergencywasapolicing
action,notaconventionalwarforwhichtheRAFwasgearedtofight.
However,therewasanacuteneedforaerialintelligencethroughouttheEmergency.
Particularlyinthefirsteighteenmonthsofthecampaign,visualsurveillanceplayeda
critical role in identifying larger formationsof insurgentsandsubsequentlyguiding
eithergroundforcesortacticalairpowertothetargets.AstheEmergencydeveloped
visualsurveillancewasusedtoidentifyareasofthejunglebroughtundercultivation
by the insurgency tomitigate the effects of fooddenial. Photographic intelligence
proved even more important. The mosaics provided by the RAF’s photographic
reconnaissanceelementsequippedground forceswithaccuratemaps,whichwere
perhaps the most basic but critical intelligence ‘product.’ These were constantly
updatedthroughouttheEmergencytoreflectchangingtopography,forinstancewhen
secondary jungle reclaimed villages which had been abandoned due to the
resettlementprogram.Moreover,photographicintelligenceprovidedanothermeans
to identify the insurgents’ whereabouts, particularly in the latter half of the
Emergencywhentheyhadlargelyfledtothedeepjungle.
While the RAF was the lead agency involved in the production of photographic
intelligence,itisimportanttonotethatthiswasverymuchaninter-serviceventure.
Forinstance,theAusterfleetusedinvisualsurveillancewasverymuchacombined
RAF/ArmyforceandthereisevidencethatthePolice(sometimesinconjunctionwith
Surrendered EnemyPersonnel)wereused as ‘spotters’. At theatre-level, JAPIB/FE,
which refereed the competing inter-service demands for photographic
233
reconnaissance,wassimilarlyajointaffair.WhilstchairedbyaseniorRAFofficer,the
JAPIB/FE included the Chief Staff Officer (Intelligence) Far East Station, Colonel
(Intelligence),GHQ,FarEastLandForces;andtheJointIntelligenceBureau.Similarly,
JAPIC/FEwaseffectivelyintegratedwiththeAPIUs,bothatitsheadquartersinKuala
LumpurandthevariousdetachmentsacrossMalaya.Indeed,JAPIC/FEstandsinstark
contrasttomannerinwhichthecivilianinteragencyintelligencebodiesfunctionedin
the first yearsof theEmergency– after all, theMalayan Security Service, Security
IntelligenceFarEast,SpecialBranchandkeyelementsofthecoreexecutivestruggled
toworkharmoniouslyduringthemostcriticalphasesoftheEmergency.
TheRAFalsoplayedadecisiveelementinthecreationoftheLand/AirOperations
Room.TheenlighteneddecisiontocreateaforwardAHQatKualaLumpur,notatthe
airfieldbutalongsideGHQprovedvitaltothesubsequentinter-agencycoordination
ofintelligenceandresources.Inparticular,AHQ’sinvestmentattheearliestphaseof
the Emergency in a dedicated intelligence cell was critical, as was the on-going
determination to use this capacity flexibly (as demonstrated by embedding RAF
intelligenceofficerswithinStatePoliceheadquartersandthenSWECsandDWECs).
Otherkeypracticalexamplesofaflexibleattitudetowardsinter-serviceworkingwas
thedeploymentoftheRAFRegimentoncounter-insurgencypatrols,theworkofNo.
656SquadronandcloseworkingrelationshipbetweentheAPISandJAPIC(whichitself
wasafundamentally‘joint’unit).
It iswithoutdoubt that a greatdeal ofordinancewasexpended for little tangible
benefit. The fundamental problemwas not that the interagency structures were
unable to support the mission but that there was a relative dearth of reliable
intelligence, particular from human sources, to enable the quick and accurate
deploymentoftacticalairpower.Moreover,anyformofBombDamageAnalysis(BDA)
wasverydifficult.Forinstance,areportontheeffectivenessofbombingduring1955
explained “the most direct evidence as to the quality of target information was
providedwhenArmyorPoliceunitssearchedthebombedareasaftertheattacks.This
waspossibleonlyinalimitednumberofcases,andeventhenthedifficultiesofprecise
map-reading and thorough search sometimes made these follow-up reports
234
inconclusive.”75Thustherealimpactofintelligence-driventacticalbombingisunlikely
toeverbefullyquantified.Nevertheless,theOperationalResearchSectiondidstate
in 1955 that “despite very careful sifting at the Joint Operations Centre of the
evidenceuponwhichairstrikedemandswerebased,itwasoftensubsequentlyfound
tohavebeeninaccurate.”76Thatsaid,ChinPengnotedinhisbiographythatinearly
1953hiscampwasspottedbyAusteraircraftwhichcalledinastrikebyLincolnsofthe
RoyalAustralianAirForce:twoofhisbodyguardsbothdiedandthreeotherswere
wounded.Theattackalsobroughttheproblemofdeterioratingmorale,partlyasa
resultofregularattacksfromtheair,totheforefrontofChinPeng’smind.77
TheJointOperationsCentreatKualaLumpur,theJointOperationsRoomsinMalaya’s
StatesandSettlements,andJAPIC/FEprovidedthemeanstolinkandcoordinatethe
decentralised intelligence activities that were taking place in Districts all across
Malaya.Moreover,theyprovidedthemeansforlocalgroundcommanders,whether
Police ormilitary officers, to access theatre-level intelligence resources, particular
photint.Thelatteraspectcaneasilybeoverlooked,butwithoutaccuratemaps–the
mostbasicproductofaerialintelligence–troopsonthegroundwouldnotbeableto
conductmeaningfulpatrols,letalonefindandengagetheinsurgents.However,there
wasa limittowhatthemilitarycouldachieve inwhatwasfundamentallyacivilian
campaigntorestorelawandordertoMalaya.Timelyandaccuratehumintthatwould
leadtotheprosecutionoftheinsurgentforceswasatapremium.Thisrequiredan
effectivePoliceService.UnfortunatelyfortheMalayanauthorities,foratleastthefirst
sixyearsoftheEmergency,ifnotlonger,thePolicewasinfactdysfunctional.During
thistimethemilitarywereleftto‘holdthering.’78
75AIR23/8741,OperationalResearchBranch,MemorandumNo,13:AnAnalysisoftheTypesofTargetAttackedDuringOffensiveAirOperationsinMalayain1955,14thMay1956.76Ibid.77ChinPeng,AliasChinPeng–MySideofHistory(Singapore2003),pp.321-22.78CAB129/48,c(51)26TheSituationinMalaya:aCabinetMemorandumbyLyttelton,dated20thNovember1951.
235
Chapter8-TheReconstructionoftheCivilianIntelligenceApparatus.
WithinmonthsofthedeclarationofastateofEmergency,theFederationofMalaya
hadestablishedtheembryonicstructuresnecessaryforthedevelopmentandsharing
ofintelligenceboth‘ontheground’andattheatrelevel.However,thereweretwokey
problems.Thefirstwasaflowofintelligence.Particularlyduringthefirstsixyearsof
the Emergency, the authorities had a limited stream of intelligence - captured
documents and personnel provided indications about the insurgents’ philosophy,
dispositionandintentions,andtheRAFprovidedvaluablephotographicintelligence.1
Missing,however,wasfreelygiven,timelyandaccurateinformationfrominformants
whowishedtoseethegovernmentforcesprevailagainsttheinsurgents.Thesecond
problemwasthelackofstrategicleadershiprequiredtocoordinateanddevelopthe
variousorganisationswhichtogetherformedMalaya’sintelligencemachine.
ThecommondenominatorwastheFederationofMalaya’sPolice force,whichwas
responsible both for the generation of humint and, for the first two years of the
Emergency,thebroadercoordinationofEmergencyintelligence.AsGeneralSirHarold
Briggs,theDirectorofOperations,explainedin1950,“thesecurityofthepopulation
andeliminationoftheCommunistCellsmustbetheprimarytaskofthePolice.”2More
specifically, theSpecialBranchof theMalayanPolicewaschargedwithdeveloping
Emergencyintelligencetoaidtherestorationoflawandorder,aprincipleconfirmed
bynumeroussubsequentreviews.3Thefundamentalproblemwas,however,thatthe
Policewas largely inca pable until themid 1950s of generating sufficient levels of
huminttoallowsecurityforcestotackletheinsurgentseffectively.Norwasitableto
1SeeK.Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(2008),pp.211-241;alsoKV4/408,Theco-ordinationofIntelligenceintheMalayanEmergency,undatedlecturenotesbyJ.Morton2AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggs.3Alsosee,CO537/4374,AnotebytheChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff(SirWilliamSlim)totheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,November1949;CO537/5440,ReportofthePoliceAdvisertotheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies(MrW.C.Johnson),December1949;CO547/5427,ReportofthePoliceMissiontoMalaya,March1950;AIR20/10377,ReviewoftheEmergencyinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957,DirectorofOperations,September1957.
236
providethestrategicleadershipnecessarytogalvanisetheintelligenceapparatusas
whole.
The relationship between Special Branch and their colleagues in the Uniformed
BranchofthePolicehasnotbeenfullyexploredintheliterature.Indeedpolicingand
SpecialBranchtendtobeconsideredastwoseparateentities.4Thisdivision inthe
historiographyisnothelpfulbecauseSpecialBranchcannotbeconsideredinisolation
fromtherestofpolicinginMalaya.ThePoliceServiceasawholewaschargedwith
restoringlawandordertothecountry.Undoubtedly,akeyelementtothiswasSpecial
Branch’s task of gathering ‘political’ intelligence. This involved identifying and
facilitatingtheprosecutionofmembersoftheMalayanCommunistParty(MCP),its
supportwing(theMinYuen)anditsarmedwing(theMalayanRacesLiberationArmy
(MRLA)).Thisfunctionresemblestheconceptof ‘highpolicing’articulatedbyJean-
Paul Brodeur.5However, for a significant periodof the Emergency, Special Branch
lackedtheresourcestoperformthisfunctioneffectively.Forinstance,ithadveryfew
officerswithknowledgeoftheChinesecommunityoritsdialects.Moreimportantly,
itlackedaphysicalpresenceinthatcommunityandwasthereforereliantuponthe
widerPoliceorganisation,particularlytheUniformedBranch,theSpecialconstabulary
andHomeGuard-inBrodeur’sterminology,‘lowpolicing’-togenerateinformation
andpotentialinformants.Withoutaneffectiverelationshipbetweenthe‘low’Police
andtheChinesecommunity,theflowofintelligencetotheSpecialBranchwouldbe
limited,hamperingtheabilityofthesecurityforcestorestoreorder.
LeonComberseestheappointmentofSirWilliamJenkinasMalaya’sfirstDirectorof
Intelligence in 1950 as marking the ‘coming of age’ of Special Branch.6 This is a
4ForgeneralpolicingseeA.Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,1948-60(London,1975);A.Stockwell,“PolicingduringtheMalayanEmergency,1948-60:communism,communalism,anddecolonisation”,inD.Anderson&D.Killingrayeds.,PolicingandDecolonisation:politics,nationalismandthepolice(Manchester1992),p.108.ForSpecialBranchseeL.Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60–TheRoleoftheSpecialBranchintheMalayanEmergency(Monash2008);G.Sinclair,“‘TheSharpEndoftheIntelligenceMachine’:theriseoftheMalayanPoliceSpecialBranch1948-1955”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,26:4(2011),pp.465-67.5J-PBrodeur,“HighPolicingandLowPolicing:RemarksaboutthePolicingofPoliticalActivities”,SocialProblems,30:5(ThematicIssueonJustice,June1983),pp.507-520.6Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,pp.131-46.
237
significant misreading of the evidence. Jenkin’s appointment reflected both that
Special Branch required fundamental reform and the Police, in general, were
incapable of providing strategic leadership to thewider intelligencemachine. The
reasonwhyanindependentcandidatehadtobebroughtintofillthispositionwas
thatnoofficer fromwithinMalayan’spoliceservicewasdeemedcapableofeither
reformingSpecialBranchorcoordinatingEmergencyintelligence.Theappointmentof
Jenkinwas,infact,adamningindictmentofSpecialBranch.Moreover,Jenkinlasted
onlyeighteenmonthsinofficebeforeretiringinastateofnervousexhaustion.Heleft
Malaya with the core executive in a state of near paralysis, with the Director of
Operations, Commissionerof Police andHighCommissioner inopendisagreement
about how best to reform the intelligence apparatus. Jenkin’s appointment thus
markedthefailureofSpecialBranch,notit’scomingofage.
Moreover,until1952theUniformedBranchadoptedaparamilitarystyleofpolicing-
therewas,forinstance,littledifferencebetweenacompanyofsoldiersonpatrolin
the jungleand thePolice Jungle Squads.7Moreover, thePolicewere chargedwith
enforcingEmergencyregulationssuchadetentionwithouttrial,deportation,andthe
wholesale forced resettlementof theChinese squatter camps.Whilst this strategy
mighthavebeennecessarytopreventtheinsurgencygainingfurthermomentum,it
meantthattheChinesepopulationoftenfearedthesecurityforcesasmuch, ifnot
more,thantheinsurgents.Itwasastrategywhichwastheantithesisofthatrequired
to secure accurate, timely and freely given humint. Hence, the change under
CommissionerArthurYoungin1952tomoreconsensualstyleofpolicingwascritical
toSpecialBranchandthedevelopmentofthecivilianintelligencemachineinMalaya,
evenifittooktimetotakehold.
Moreover, thecivilian intelligenceapparatus,ofwhichSpecialBranchwasonekey
element, came to a level of organisational maturity only after a number of key
developments.Inthefirstinstance,theMalayancoreexecutivehadtoberecastto
allowJackMorton,Jenkin’ssuccessor,tocoordinatefreelytheintelligenceapparatus.
7Forinstance,seeA.Campbell,JungleGreen(London1953),J.Chynoweth,HuntingTerroristsintheJungle(Stroud2007)andJ.Moran,SpearheadinMalaya(London1959).
238
His efforts were supported by the creation in 1952 of the Federal Intelligence
Committee(FIC)thatprovidedforthefirsttimeintheEmergencytheadministrative
mechanisms through which the Director of Intelligence could coordinate the
intelligence apparatus. More fundamentally, ordinary policing had to change
significantlytogiveSpecialBranchthelinksitrequiredwithintheChinesecommunity
necessarytoidentifyqualitysourcesofintelligence.
TheRelationshipbetweentheSpecialandUniformedBranchesofthePoliceService
TheSpecialBranchoftheFederation’sPoliceServicewascreatedinhasteintheweeks
followingthedeclarationofastateofEmergencyandtheabolitionoftheMalayan
SecurityService. ThenewlycreatedSpecialBranchhad littleorganisational legacy
uponwhichtodraw–notonlydidtheSecondWorldWardecimatethePolice,but
also prior to the creation of theMalayanUnion in 1946 therewas no single pan-
Malayaforce.8Moreover,ithadtoconfrontsomesignificantorganisationalproblems
whilsttakingtheleadintheintelligenceeffortsagainsttheMCP.Forinstance,likethe
MSS, Special Branch had very few staff: in June 1948 the Special Branch had only
thirteengazettedofficers(justover5%ofthetotalnumberintheforce);forty-four
Asian inspectors (19% of the total number in the force); and while there was an
establishmentof693detectivesworkinginSpecialBranchandCID,theactualnumber
employedinbothdepartmentswasonly132.Thus,SpecialBranch,comparedtothe
10,900uniformedPoliceofficers,wasverysmall.9Indeed,accordingtoSirJackMorton
(DirectorofIntelligence1952-4),“onthegroundtherewasvirtuallynothingtocollect
intelligence.Facilitiesfortranslation,interrogationandagentrunningdidnotexist.”10
While the authorities made concerted efforts to improve Special Branch’s
establishment,particularlyinrelationtonativeChineseofficersandChinesespeakers,
thetaskconfrontingtheorganisationwasenormousandtheseeffortstookyearsto
haveapositiveimpactuponoperationalefficiency.
8RhodesHouseLibrary,TheDalleyPapers,DalleytoHone,13thJuly1948.9Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.60.10KV4/408,LecturenotesbyJ.Mortonentitled‘TheproblemswefacedinMalayaandhowtheyweresolved’,July1954.
239
Tocompoundthesituation,SpecialBranchhadsignificantstructuralproblemswhich
hampered itsability toreceive,assessanddisseminatewhat little informationwas
being collected by the Uniform Branch and its own officers. Within a year of its
creation in 1948, observers were highlighting flaws in the organisation of Special
Branch’s headquarters.While creation of specific ‘desks’ demarcated by racemay
haveappearedlogical,theprimaryintelligenceissuewasthespreadofCommunism
thatcutacrosstheseareas.Hence,EricLeighton,theDefenceSecurityOfficer(DSO)
forMalaya,reported,“therearepossiblynolessthanthreeofficersresponsiblefor
the collationofCommunist activities,one for theChinese section, another for the
IndiansectionandathirdfortheMalaysection.”11Furtherproblemswerehighlighted
byaMetropolitanPoliceSpecialBranchofficer,FrancisCovey,whowassecondedto
Malaya to advise on setting up an effective registry system. He was particularly
concernedabout thepractical implicationsof thedecision toharnesspolitical and
criminalintelligencetogether.Coveyexplainedthat“wheretheseniorC.I.D.officeris
theSpecialBranchofficer,thenhehastobedivertedfromalltheimportanttaskof
directing his staff in itswork of collecting vital information about Communist and
othersubversiveactivities,tosupervisingworkofcriminaldetectivesoftenreporting
trivialcriminalmatters.”12Moreover,asJackMortonlaterreported“SpecialBranch
at this time did not extend beyond the capitals of the Malay States and
Settlements…theintelligenceapparatusintheStatesandSettlementswaspartofthe
CID pursing its own parochial course.” It was, he said, a period “of considerable
muddleandineptitude.”13
Perhapsthemostsignificantproblem,however,wasthatSpecialBranchreliedupon
itsuniformedcolleaguestodeveloplinkswithintheChinesecommunity.Thereliance
ofSpecialBranchupontheuniformedPolicewasconfirmedinanumberofreviewsof
policingwhichtookplaceafterthedeclarationofEmergency.Forinstance,asaresult
oftroubles inMalayaand intheGoldCoast in1948,theSecretaryofStateforthe
Colonies,ArthurCreech Jones,advisedColonialgovernmentseither toestablishor
11KV4/424,LeightontoMorton,28thApril1949.12CO537/4322,ReportbyFrancisCoveytoCommissionerofPoliceMalaya,July1949.13KV4/408,TheCo-ordinationofIntelligenceintheMalayanEmergency.
240
strengthentheirSpecialBranches.14ShortlyafterthisCreechJonesappointedWilliam
Johnson,aformerInspectoroftheColonies,asColonialPoliceAdvisor.15Inrelationto
intelligence, Johnsonsubsequently reported that“although thegeneralpurposeof
such[Special]Branchesisfairlywellknown,Idoubtwhetheritisrealisedthat,quite
apartfromtheirestablishmentandtheallocationoftrainedStaff,inordertoprovide
anefficientserviceofaccurateinformationitisessentialtousethe‘eyesandears’of
thewholePoliceForce.”16
However, as discussed previously, the Federation’s Police Servicewas very poorly
placedeithertodevelopaconsensualrelationshipwiththeChinesecommunityor,in
turn, support their Special Branch colleagues. Theprimary reason for thiswas the
paramilitarystrategyadoptedbythePoliceCommissioner,Col.NicolGray,andthe
associatedrapidexpansionofPolicenumbersneedtoprovidestaticguards,enforce
emergencylegislationandtoundertakejunglepatrols.Whilearguablynecessaryto
preventtheCommunistsdevelopingmoremomentum,SirWilliamSlim,Chiefofthe
Imperial General Staff (CIGS), who visited Malaya in 1949, identified two key
consequencesofthisrapidexpansion.First,henotedthattheinfluxofex-Palestine
Policeofficershadcausedsignificantfrictionwiththerumpofthepre-warMalayan
Police.Notonlydidthishaveanimpactonoverallefficiencybut,moreimportantly,
the Police greatly lacked local knowledge about the communities they were
attemptingtoprotect.Second,heemphasisedthatthelackofChineseandChinese-
speaking Police (and district) officers severely hampered the ability to gather and
analyseintelligence.Forinstance,hesaidthat“roughlyhalfthepopulationisChinese
and yet a civil officialwho can speak Chinese is extremely rare, and there are no
uniformedChineseConstables.Moreover,“seniorBritishcivilandPoliceofficialshave
littleknowledgeoftheChinese,andmostofthesub-ordinateDistrictOfficers,who
shouldbeentrustedwiththedetailedlocaladministration,areMalayswhonotonly
14ForawidedebatewithintheColonialOfficeabouttheroleofSpecialBranchesandthemilitaryincolonialdisorderseeCO537/6403-6.15CO537/2770,TermsofReferenceforthePoliceAdvisortotheSecretaryofStatesfortheColonies,undated.16CO537/5440,ReportofthePoliceAdvisortotheSecretaryofStatesfortheColonies,December1949.
241
disliketheChineseandaredislikedbythem,butareinsomecasesextremelynervous
of entering squatter areas.” Although efforts were being made to spread the
government’sadministrativepresenceby“settingupPolicestationsinareaswhere
theyhaveneverexistedbefore”,because“thewholeof thePoliceareMalays this
merelymeansthatasmallpartyofalienPolicearedumpeddowninapopulations
strangeandoftenhostile to them.17 JackMorton laterexplained thedemographic
issuemoresuccinctly.Hestated“initscomposition,it[thepolice]waspredominantly
Malaya:bycontrastthesecurityproblemwasessentiallyChinese.”18
PerhapsthekeyreasonthatthePolicewerenotfunctioningsatisfactorilywasthatthe
pressures of fighting an insurgency meant it lost sight of what ‘routine’ policing
involved.Grayhimselfreflectedin1950that“althoughtheprogressmadeinnumbers
couldperhapsnothavebeenacceleratedgreatly,progressinpoliceefficiencyhasnot
been adequate to keep abreast of the pressure of events.”19 Perhaps the most
obviousmanifestationofthiswastheuseofthePolicetoenforcetheextraordinary
powersassociatedwiththedeclarationofEmergency.Thesepowersweredraconian,
includingallowingthearrestonsuspicionanddetentionwithouttrialforuptotwo
weeks,permittingtheofficerinchargeofaPolicedistrictto“destroyorauthorisethe
destruction”ofasuspectbuildingorstructure,andallowingaChiefPoliceOfficerto
declareanylocationa“specialarea”,inwhichthesecurityforcescouldsearchanyone
theywishedandcoulduseforcetoarrestanyonewhofailedtostop.20Thepractical
effectofthiswasthatPolicewereconstantlyinvolvedinarmedpatrols,conducting
large-scalecordonandsearchoperations,theexecutingofarrestwarrantsandthe
forcedrelocationoftheChinesesquattercommunities.
InMarch1950thePolicingMissiontoMalayareportedbacktotheSecretaryofState
fortheColonies.WhereasJohnsonwaschargedwithreviewingpolicingincolonies,
the Policing Mission, which was headed by Sir Alexander Maxwell, was asked
17CO537/4374,ReportbySirWilliamSlim,ChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff,15thNovember1949.18KV4/408,‘ThesituationinMalaya–lecturenotes’,undated.19CO537/5993,GraytoCarcosa,21stOctober1950.20H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),p.431.
242
specifically to consider how the Federation’s Police was discharging its functions
whilst coping with the demands of the counterinsurgency campaign. The Policing
MissionemphasisedthetensionbetweentherapidexpansionofthePolicetomeet
theimmediatesecuritythreatandtheimpactuponnormalpolicingduties.Itnoted,
“somuchmanpowerisrequiredforjungleoperationsthatbeatsareundermanned
andmanyofthenormalfunctionsoftheforcecannotbecarriedoutsatisfactorily.”
Moreover,whilstnecessary, jungleoperations fostereda frameofmindentirelyat
oddswiththePoliceman’sprimaryfunctionto“gainingandkeepingthetrustandco-
operation of the public.”21Without trust and confidence of the public, the Police
wouldnotbeabletocollectinformationeffectivelyforSpecialBranchtodevelop.
Maxwell’s report noted the importance of ‘ordinary police work’ and subsequent
dangersofallowingthisworktodecline. Itarguedthat“whenthere isadecline in
policeefficiency,thereiscorrespondingdeclineinpublicconfidenceinthepolice:and
peoplewhohavelittleconfidenceinthepoliceare less likelytowithholdfoodand
moneyfromthebanditsandlesslikelytogivethepoliceinformationwhichwouldbe
helpful for anti-bandit operations.” Unfortunately for the government of Malaya,
therewasampleevidencethatthisviciouscirclewasalreadyhamperingtheircounter-
insurgency efforts.22 For instance, an Australian Mission commanded by General
Bridgeford,whichtouredMalayainAugust1950,reportedtoFieldMarshallSirJohn
Harding,theChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff(CIGS),“thepolice,particularlyonthe
intelligence side, were NOT functioning satisfactorily.”23 Moreover, it would take
manyyearstoreverse.
Thepatternof policingoperationsunderGray couldonly behighly detrimental to
securing the trust and rapport with the Chinese community necessary to elicit
information,particularlyfromhumansources.AsKumarRamakrishnaexplains,“upto
1951, the dearth of adequate intelligence on the identities of terrorists, the
circumstantialrealitythatmostMCPterroristsappearedtobeChinese,andthenotion
21CO537/5427,TheReportofthePoliceMissiontoMalaya,March1950.22Ibid.23CAB21/1682,ReportonthevisitoftheAustralianMilitaryMissiontoMalaya:July–August1950.
243
that a firm hand was needed to deal with the Chinese villagers, compelled the
harassedpoliceandArmytoregardallChineseaspotentialterroristsandsubjectthem
to rough treatment.”24 Indeed, Huw Bennett has argued that the security forces
systematically used collective punishments, including the burning of villages, to
“intimidatethewholeChinesepopulationinMalayaintosubmission.”25Littlewonder,
then,thatoneestimatesuggestedthat“asmanyas70percentoftheMCPrecruits
comprisedruralChineseanxioustoescapefrompolicerepression.”26
Thefailureofleadership
Theproblemwasexacerbated,atleastinthefirstfouryearsoftheEmergency,bythe
absenceof effective leadership of Federation’s intelligence apparatus. For reasons
thatremainopaque,GurneyrefusedtocreateaLocalIntelligenceCommittee(LIC),as
recommended by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) (JIC/FE)). Instead, he
chosetoholdaweekly‘conference’todiscusstheprogressoftheEmergencywiththe
General Officer Command (GOC), the Air Office Commanding (AOC), the Chief
Secretary,theCommissionerofPolice,theSecretaryofDefenceand,whennecessary,
theNavalLiaisonOfficer.WiththeappointmentofGeneralBriggs,theseconferences
werereplacedby theDirectorofOperation’scommittee.However, theDirectorof
Operations had no executive powers and relied upon influence and persuasion to
resolvedifficultiesbetweenkeyactors.Itisthusperhapsunderstandablethatthere
wasobvioustension,andattimeshostility,withintheMalayancoreexecutiveabout
theprogressoftheEmergency.Thiswasparticularlytrueinrelationtopolicingand
intelligence.
Torectifythissituation,thePolicingMissionrecommendedtheappointmentof“some
seniorpoliceofficerwithspecialexperienceofIntelligencework…toactastechnical
24K.Ramakrishna,“Content,credibilityandcontext:PropagandagovernmentsurrenderpolicyandtheMalayaCommunistterroristmasssurrendersof1958”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),p247.25H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),p.417.26Ramakrishna,“Content,credibilityandcontext”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),p247.
244
adviser to the [Criminal Investigation] Department for a limited period.27
ConsequentlySirWilliamJenkin,a formerofficerof the IndianSpecialBranch,was
appointedasadvisortotheCommissionerofPolice.Jenkinhadseenenoughafterfive
months. He gave Stafford Foster Sutton, Acting Chief Secretary, notice of his
resignationon10November1950, stating that itwasbeyondhis “power toeffect
improvement in Malayan Police Intelligence so quickly as deemed necessary.”28
However,thiscoincidedwiththeofferofresignationgivenbyGraytoGurney,relating
totheformer’sumbrageatwhatheconsideredtheHighCommissioner’sinterference
withhisrighttorunthePoliceServiceashesawfit.Inparticular,Gurney’sinsistence
thatthepostofSeniorAssistanceCommissionerCIDwasfilledbyanofficerofpre-
warMalayanexperiencecausedGrayconsiderableconcern.29Therewas,therefore,
averyrealprospectthattheintelligenceapparatuswouldhavetocontendwithouta
CommissionerofPoliceoradvisorforintelligence,andthattheCID(includingSpecial
Branch) would be run be an officer whom Gray felt unfit to discharge those
responsibilitiesandJenkinconsidereddisloyal.
To prevent this possibility Briggs suggested that Jenkin be posted as Deputy
CommissionerCID.However, thismutatedoverthecourseofNovember1950toa
proposal that Jenkins be offered a two-year contract as Director of Intelligence
(DOI)“with direct access to you [theHighCommissioner] on Intelligence, andwith
executive control over the CID and Special Branch.”30 The final charter for the
Director of Intelligence reflected the difficulties officials had in differentiating
between political and security intelligence and criminality. Hence, the DOI was
“generally responsible to Government for the supply of political and security
intelligence.” The DOI would also “act as an Advisor to Government on Security
mattersandshallreinforcephysicalsecuritymeasureswithintelligenceprecautionary
[sic] measures when deemed necessary.”31 The fundamental problem was that
27CO537/5427,TheReportofthePoliceMissiontoMalaya,March1950.28CO537/5973,JenkintoFosterSutton,10thNovember1950.29Ibid.,seeGraytoCarcosa,21October1950andabriefingnotedpreparedbyBriggs,25thOctober1950.30Ibid.,FosterSuttontoGurney,17thNovember1950.31CO537/7260,CharterfortheDirectorofIntelligence.
245
officials considered the Criminal Investigation Department of the Federation of
Malaya Police as “the machinery of Government for the collection of Criminal
Statistics,theinvestigationofCrime,aswellasforthecollectionof intelligence.”It
was therefore not readily apparentwhether the CID should answer to theDOI or
Commissioner of Police. To work around this problem, the DOI was required to
“exercisecontrolincollaborationandconsultationwiththeCommissionerofPolice
andwithregardtotherequirementsoftheCommissionerofPolice,whoisresponsible
toGovernmentforlawandorderintheFederation.”Thus,theDOIappearedtobean
equal partner with the Commissioner of Police. However, the DOI could exercise
controloverCIDsintheFederationsin“respectofpoliticalandsecuritymatters…from
timetotime,inordertopromoteefficiencyandalsocollaborationbetweenCriminal
InvestigationDepartmentsoftheFederation.”Thus,Jenkinhadresponsibilitiesthat
he couldonlydischargevia theCIDapparatus,which remainedan integralpartof
Gray’sPoliceforce.HedidnothaveexecutiveauthorityovertheCIDbutwasableto
controlit“fromtimetotime”.32Moreover,whilehehadaresponsibilitytoworkin
collaborationwithGray,hecouldalwaysappealtotheHighCommissioner.Thisplaced
bothJenkinandGrayinanearimpossibleposition.Theappointmentsimplyservesto
highlightthestructuraltensionsthatbesettheFederation’sintelligenceapparatus.
Jenkindidoverseeanumberofimportantoperationalinitiativesdesignedtoimprove
the management of intelligence, including attempting to increase the number of
ChineseinthePoliceandSpecialBranch,improvingtheoverallstrengthoftheCIDand
Special Branch, bringing detention camps within Special Branch’s remit and the
establishment of Special Branch interrogation units at all Police contingent
headquarters.33However,heremainedconvincedthattheintelligenceapparatusin
itsexistingformwasflawed.LikeDalleybeforehim,hefeltEmergency intelligence
should be overseen by an independent organisation, responsible directly to the
FederalGovernment. Thus,whilstGraywason leave in theUKbetweenApril and
October1951,JenkinaudaciouslyamalgamatedSpecialBranchandCID,creatingthe
32Ibid.33SeeComber,Malaya’sSecretPolice,1945-60,pp.135-145;KV4/408,LecturenotesbyMorton,July1954.
246
Police IntelligenceBureau,with the intentionof devoting all the combinedCID/SB
effortsintoEmergencyintelligenceandleavingallnon-Emergencycriminalmattersto
the Uniformed Branch of Police.34 Jenkin believed that for a Police Service to be
efficient,it“hadtopenetratedeepintothepublicsocialstructureand,ifitlackspublic
respect,cooperationandtrust,itsuffersfromahandicapwhichismostcrippling.”He
recognisedthatthepara-militarystanceadoptedbythePoliceServicewashampering
not only its “primary duty of looking after the people” but also its specialist,
Emergency,responsibilities.Thus,
“byputtingsomeoftheresponsibility[forinvestigations]ontotheUniformed
Police,whereitrightlybelongs,itwillhelpthemtocloserprofitablecontact
withthepeople.Thisshouldresultinthebetterenforcementoflawandorder
and better information coming in, which will be beneficial to important
interests. Itwill also result in the Specialised [sic] Branch being relieved of
routineandmatterswhicharenotpertinenttoparticularissuesandsoenable
themtogivemoretimeandattentiontothebiggerthingsthatcountmore.”35
While these aims were laudable, Gurney argued that it did not necessitate the
abolition of the whole C.I.D. and Special Branch. Also Jenkin’s proposal for direct
accesstotheHighCommissionerwasfraughtwithdanger–Gurneywasnotprepared
for Jenkin to by-pass theCommissioner of Police.36 Furthermore,Gurneywas also
concerned that the establishment of a separate Intelligence Bureau would create
suspicions that the UK was trying to build-up an organ of the British Intelligence
Service working for other agencies other than the government and people of
Malaya.”37UponhisreturntoMalaya,Graywasoutragedandsecuredtheagreement
34Ibid.,MemorandumtoallChiefPoliceOfficer,allContingentIntelligenceOfficers,andCircleIntelligenceRepresentativesfromRobinson(ActingCommissionerofPolice),18thMay1951.35Ibid,JenkintoGray,9thAugust1951.36Ibid.,NotesofameetingwiththeActingChiefSecretary,theCommissionerofPolice,andtheDirectorofIntelligenceon1stSept1951,madeonbehalfofGurney.TheHighCommissioner’slettertoGrayon3rdSeptember1951showshowtheintelligenceexecutivewasfracturedduetopersonality.WhilstGrayhadareputationofbeinghardtogetonwith,Gurney’slettersuggeststhesameaboutJenkin.37Ibid.,minutebyLloydforJimGriffiths,25thSeptember1951.
247
of Gurney and Briggs to abort the changes Jenkin attempted to implement.38
However,theepisodecameatacost:GrayandJenkin(whowassaidtobeclosetoa
breakdown) resigned from their respectiveposts, throwing the intelligence system
into furtherdisarray. 39 Thedebacleof Jenkin’s appointment asDOI canhardly be
describedasheraldingtheriseoftheSpecialBranch,asLeonCombersuggests.40
ReconstructingtheLeadershipApparatus
The near paralysis at the heart of the core executive at the end of 1951 was
compoundedbythemurderbytheMRLAoftheHighCommissioner,SirHenryGurney.
His replacement, Sir Gerald Templer, subsequently arrived in Malaya in February
1952.Heinheritedanintelligencesystemthatwasbroken.For instance,thePolice
wereeffectivelyaparamilitaryforcethattendedtoalienate,ratherthancourt,the
Chinesepopulation.41Thegovernment’suseofpropagandawaslimitedandthepublic
were reluctant to provide information to the Police.42 Moreover, the Police and
militaryoftenhadconflictingintelligencerequirements,theformerwantedtotarget
theMinYuenwhilethelatterwantedtacticalintelligence.43SirOliverLyttelton,the
newlyappointedSecretaryofStatefortheColoniesvisitedMalayainNovember1951.
He found that “the police itself was divided by a great schism between the
CommissionerofPoliceandtheHeadofSpecialBranch.Intelligencewasscantyand
uncoordinatedbetweenthemilitaryandthecivilauthorities.”44Similarly,inMay1952
thenewheadofSecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE),CourtneyYoung,sentSirPercy
Sillitoe (Director General of MI5) a damning assessment of Special Branch’s
38Erroneously,Grob-FitzgibbonsuggestsstatesthatJenkinservedasBriggs’directorofintelligenceand“sointegral,infact,didhispositionbecomethatinMay1951BriggscompletelyseparatedthespecialandbranchandCIDfromtheregularpolice.”SeeGrob-Fitzgibbon,ImperialEndgame–Britain’sDirtyWarsandtheEndofEmpire(Basingstoke2011),p.155.ForGurney’sviews,seeCO537/7260,GurneytoHigham,3rdSeptember1951.39Ibid.,GurneytoLloyd,3rdSeptember1951.40Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.131-46.41SeeStockwell,“PolicingduringtheMalayanEmergency,1948-60:communism,communalism,anddecolonisation”,inAnderson&Killingrayeds.,PolicingandDecolonisation:politics,nationalismandthepolice,pp.108-126;G.Sinclair,Attheendoftheline–Colonialpolicingandtheimperialendgame,1945-80(Manchester2006),p.4.42SeeK.Ramakishna,“‘Transmogrifying’Malaya:theimpactofSirGeraldTempler(1952-54)”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,32:1(February2001),pp.79-92.43KV4/408,undatedlecturenotesbyMortonentitled,‘Theco-ordinationofintelligenceintheMalayanEmergency.’44O.Lyttelton,TheMemoirsofLordChandos(London1962),p.366.
248
understandingoftheMCP.Hestatedthatwhiletherewasgoodinformationabout
theorganisationandseniorpersonalitiesoftheMCP,“littleisavailableonitstactical
deploymentand intentions; its intelligenceandsabotageorganisations; itsexternal
linksandcommunications.Thereisnocounter-espionageinformationand,sofarasis
known,nolong-termorhigh-levelpenetrationoftheMCP.”45
Theneedto“getagripofintelligence”46wasclearlyrecognisedbyTemplerwho,prior
to his departure for Malaya, decided his priorities in Malaya would be to “a)
coordinate intelligence under one person; b) reorganise and retrain the police; c)
ensure that the government information services told the people what the
governmentwasdoing.”47ThecentralityofintelligencetoTempler’splanswasmade
publicuponhisarrivalinMalaya;heinformedTheStraitsTimesthat“theEmergency
willbewonbyourintelligencesystem.”48Heactedquickly.WithinamonththeHigh
Commissionerwrote toLytteltonstatingbluntly that therewas“urgentneed fora
directortoberesponsibleforthecoordinationandevaluationofintelligencefromall
sources.”49However,TemplerdidnotwantsimplytorecruitanotherformerSpecial
BranchofficertoreplaceJenkin.Indeed,hisvisionforthenewDirectorofIntelligence
differedfromthatofhispredecessorsinanumberofways.Oneofthemostobvious
wasthetypeofpersonhewantedtofilltherole.Initially,heaskedforDickWhite,an
MI5officer,tobecomehisDirectorofIntelligence.50WhenWhitedeclinedtheoffer,
Templer turned to Jack Morton who had recently retired as H/SIFE. Templer’s
preference forMI5 officers, rather than former Special Branchmen, reflected the
increasingdesireto‘professionalise’ intelligencewithintheFederationbutalsoon-
goingconcernsaboutpotentialregionaldimensionsoftheEmergency.
45KV4/424,H/SIFEtoDGSecurityService,draftreviewofsecurityintelligenceintheFarEast,21stMay1952.46J.Cloake,Templer–TigerofMalaya(London1985),p.228.47Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.178.48Cloake,Templer–TigerofMalaya,p.227.49CO1022/51,TemplertoLyttelton,13thFebruary1952.50Ibid.SeealsoT.Bowyer,ThePerfectEnglishSpy(London1995),p.136andCloake,Templer-TigerofMalaya,p.228.
249
Templer’s vision for thepostofDOI alsodiffered from thatof his predecessors in
termsofconceptandlocationwithintheMalayanexecutive.Hisfirstinclinationwas
that theDOIshould“haveexecutiveresponsiblity for thecontrolofall intelligence
services, bothmilitary and Service,within the areaof responsibility.”51 Thiswould
haveremediedoneoftheconundrumsthatplaguedJenkinandDalleybeforehim,
bothofwhomhadcomplainedbitterlyabouthavingtheresponsibilityofcoordinating
intelligence but not the power. However, having discussed the idea with Colonel
ArthurYoung(whoreplacedGrayasCommissionerofPoliceinMalaya)andSillitoe,
Templerreconsidered.HeappearstohavebeendissuadedbyconcernsthattheDOI
would labour under the significant administrative burden of having executive
authority over the various intelligence agencies contributing to the Emergency
(includingPolice,SpecialBranch,Navy,Army,AirIntelligence)andalsothepotential
divisionofresponsibility,aswitnessedwhenJenkinbecameanswerabletoboththe
PoliceCommissionerandtheHighCommissioner.52
TemplerwithdrewplanstogivetheDOIexecutiveresponsibilityforintelligence,but
the revisedproposals did little to remove the risks of blurred anddivided lines of
responsibility.For instance,heproposedthattheDOIwouldbeonthestaffof the
DeputyDirectorofOperationsbut“inanyimportantcasewherehisadvicewasnot
takenhewouldbeabletorepresenthisviewsto [the]HighCommissionerdirect.”
DespitetheDOI’slackofexecutivepowers,Templeralsoexpectedtheroleholderto
“beresponsibleforcoordinatingactivitiesoftheaboveagenciesoranyotherwhich
existtodayorwhichmaybeorganisedinthefuture.”Moreover,thenewDOIwould
“becompletelyresponsibleforcollationandevaluationofalltheintelligenceavailable
and for itspresentation to those concerned in theproper form.”53Mortonwould,
therefore,haveall the responsibility formanagingEmergency intelligencebut, like
DalleyandJenkinbeforehim,wouldlackanyauthoritytoensurethisresponsibility
wasdischargedeffectively.TherevisedtermsofreferencefortheDOIwerethusa
51Ibid.,MeetingwithGeneralSirGeraldTempler,31stJanuary1952(JIC289/52).52Ibid.,LuketoReilly,29thJanuary1952.53Ibid.,TemplertoLyttelton,13thFebruary1952.
250
dangerous‘fudge’ratherthananeffectivestructuralsolutiontothedifficultiesofco-
ordinatingEmergencyintelligence.
Unsurprisingly,Templer’srequestcausedsomeconcernwithinLondon–itwasclearly
not lostonofficialsthatTemplerwasindangerofrecreatinganintelligencemodel
basedonthesameinfirmfoundationswhichprovedsodivisivetohispredecessors.
AninternalColonialOfficeminutebyMrJerrom,notedthatalthoughthenewDirector
would not be formally in executive command of any of the various intelligence
agencies,hisadvisorypowersandtherightofdirectdailyaccesstoGeneralTempler
wouldinfactgivehimdefactoexecutivepowersif,inTempler’swords,“heisaman
I cancompletely relyon.” Jerrom felt thiswas “a long stepbackwards towardsSir
William Jenkin’s ideas.” However, it is notable how quickly Jerrom tempered his
concerns.Heconcludedthat“solongasGeneralTemplerisincommandinMalayawe
neednotexpectanymoreGray–Jenkinaffairs…Idonotseethatweneedraisethe
usualfunctionalarguments.”54ClearlytheforceofTempler’spersonalityinfluenced
theColonialOfficeasmuchasthoseclosertohiminMalaya.
TemplerdidseesomedangersinhisproposalforthepostofDOI.Hethussuggested
that, instead of having executive authority, the DOI should have “amore general
authorityoverintelligence,whichshouldbeexercisedthroughthechairmanshipofa
fullyrepresentativeintelligencecommittee.”55ThisledtothecreationinMarch1952
oftheFederalIntelligenceCommittee(FIC),supportedbytheCombinedIntelligence
Staff(CIS).56TheFICwaschairedbytheDOIandincludedtheheadofSpecialBranch,
the Security Liaison Officer, representatives of the three military intelligence
organisations,thePolice,theheadofInformationServicesandboththeSecretaryfor
ChineseAffairsandCommissionerforLabour.ThecharterfortheCommitteeoutlined
itsfourkeyresponsibilities:
54Ibid.,ExtractfromMrJerrom’sminutetoMrHigham,16thMay1952.55Ibid.,LuketoReilly,29thJanuary1952;alsoMeetingwithGeneralSirGeraldTempler,31stJanuary1952(JIC289/52).56Thiswasanon-executivebody,consistingofthreepermanentmembers(SecretaryoftheFIC,andonememberfromtheSpecialBranchandanofficerfromMalayaH.Q)chargedwithpreparingbriefsforeithertheDirectorofOperationsCommitteeortheDirectorofintelligence.
251
i. ToconsiderEmergencyIntelligencemattersandtomakerecommendationsto
the Director of Operations Committee through the Deputy Director of
Operations.
ii. ToconsidermattersofIntelligencepolicywithintheFederationofMalayaand
tomakerecommendationstotheappropriateauthority.
iii. To prepare papers on Intelligence matters as required by the Director of
Operations.
iv. Tocommentonpaperswhichhaveanintelligenceaspectbeforesubmission
totheDirectorofOperationsCommittee.57
However,thisremitalsocausedsignificantconcernwithinWhitehall–itwassimply
not clear what authority the committeewould exercise, if any. Upon reading the
charter,AnthonyGannpresumedthatanyrecommendationsmadebytheFICthat
were accepted by the Deputy Director of Operations would be embodied in an
appropriate directive issued by the High Commissioner, but the line of executive
authoritywasambiguous.Therewasfurtherambiguityaboutthecommittee’sability
to make recommendations on policy matters to the appropriate authority. For
instance,GannquestionedwhethertheFICcouldmakerecommendationsdirectto
SpecialBranch.Hewentontopostulatethatthe“importantpointisthatit[theFIC]
will not direct Emergency Intelligence and nor will its Chairman, the Director of
Intelligence.Itistobeessentiallyacoordinatingbodyonwhichtherepresentativesof
suppliers and users of intelligence decide the policies they would like to see
adopted.”58However,Jerromwasnotconvinced.Heminutedthat“thereisstillthe
doubtjusthowfartheDirectorofIntelligenceinpursuitofhis‘coordinating’function
will influence the S.B. and how far the S.B. will be directly controlled by the
57CO1022/51,CharterfortheFederationIntelligenceCommitteeandCombinedIntelligenceStaff,11thJune1952.TheCharterisnotdissimilartothatproposedforLocalIntelligenceCommitteesbutlackedthelatter’sprovisiontocoordinateintelligence,presumablybecausethiswasthefunctionoftheDOI.FortheLICcharterseeCAB176/19,BDCC(FE)toCoS,18thAugust1948.58Ibid.,MinutebyGann,19thJune1952.
252
Commissioner of Police.” He concluded rather weakly, “we can only await
developments.”59
ReconstructingMalayanPoliceService
StructuralreformtoMalaya’sstrategicintelligenceapparatuswasparamount,evenif
a level of ambiguity about the respective functions of theDirector of Intelligence,
CommissionerofPoliceandtheFICremained.However,asacabinetpapernoted,“it
wouldbefoolishtoexpectanyprofoundimprovement[intheintelligenceapparatus]
evenwithanincreasedandmoreefficientCIDuntilthebasicPolicetrainingofallranks
oftheregular,uniformedPoliceisproved.ItismainlyontheuniformedPolicethat
CIDcounter-measuresmustbebased.WithoutthefirmbaseofaPoliceForceinclose
touchwiththepeople,penetrationofenemyorganisationsbecomesmostdifficult.”60
Thus,itwasfortunatethatTempler’seffortstoredefinethehigherechelonsofthe
Federation’s intelligence apparatus were supported by a broad and ambitious
programmeofPolicereform.ThisprogrammehaditsrootsinthevisittoMalayaby
Lyttelton that took place during the interregnum between Gurney’s death and
appointment of Templer. Lyttelton’s subsequent report stated that “urgent and
drasticaction”wasrequiredinrelationtothepolicingoftheEmergency.Inparticular
Lytteltonwasconcernedthat“theorganisationofthepoliceisinutterdisorderand
eventheRegularForceisinefficient.”61LytteltonthereforeproposedtoreplaceGray,
whomheconsidered“agallantofficerbutwithoutthenecessarygraspoforganisation
intheseexceptionalcircumstances”,withColonelArthurYoung.62
UponarrivalinMalaya,YoungfoundthatthePolicehad“averystrongmilitaryslant
onit.ThisslantisveryfirmlyestablishednowandevensomeoftheoldMalayofficers
havebecomesousedtoitthattheyappearnottonoticeit.Itisverynoticeabletome,
59Ibid.,MinutebyJerrom,19thJune1952.60Ibid.,CabinetPaper,‘AppendixIX–IntelligenceServicesandRelatedCounter-Measures’.,C(51)59,12thDecember1951.61CAB129/48,CabinetMemorandumbytheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,21stDecember1951.SeealsoMSSBritEmpire,S.486,2/3,aReportbyColonelMullertoHughFraser,22ndDecember1951.TheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,OliverLyttelton,claimedtohavesecuredtheresignationofGray,whomheclaimedtobe“gallantofficerbutnotaprofessionalpoliceman.”SeeLyttelton,TheMemoirsofLordChandos,p.374.62Ibid.,CabinetMemorandumbytheSecretaryofStatefortheColonies,21stDecember1951.
253
andI think,tootherwhole-timepolicemenwhohavecomerecently.”Hereported
backtotheColonialOfficethatseventypercentofSpecialConstableshadnotreceived
anytrainingandthat“therecanbenodoubtanenormousamountofcorruptionis
takingplacewhensomanyuntrainedmenreceivingpracticallynosupervisionhave
beenletlooseonthepublicarmedwithmostarbitraryemergencyregulations.”Young
wasunambiguousabouttheimpactofhavingarapidlyexpanded,para-militaryPolice
forceastheleadagencyinthecounter-insurgencycampaign.Hestated“thevalueof
thisforceasaPoliceForceinwhommembersofthepublichaveconfidenceandwill
co-operatemustbepracticallynegligibleoutsidethemaintowns. Ithasevenbeen
said, I believe, that the public aremore afraid of the police than they are of the
bandits.Theyarecertainlygivingthebanditsmoretangibleco-operation.”63
Youngconsideredthetaskbeforehimasbeingnolessthanthere-constructionofthe
Police force.64 This was clearly a daunting challenge, not least the need to effect
culturalchange.Youngacknowledgedthat“policeheadquarters,andforthatmatter
all the gazetted officers, will have to be ‘converted’ to the foregoing idea of
establishing a normal non-military police force.”He “found the above suggestions
werenotacceptableatPoliceheadquarters,andnewideaswilleitherhavetobeput
overorforcedover.”65
Hence,overthenexttwoyears,Youngunleashedaraftofreforms:improvedtraining
oftheauxiliaryPolice;asignificantreductioninthetotalstrengthoftheforce;the
promotion of ‘local officers’; and initiatives like ‘Operation Service’ and the
declarationof‘whiteareas’designedtoshowMalaya’scommunitiesthatthepolicing
stylehadindeedchanged.66However,priortodoingso,Youngrecognisedtheneed
to reorganise Police headquarters.He felt thatGray hadnot developed a suitable
63MSSBritEmpire,S.486,3/1,AnappreciationoftheBasicSituationbyTheCommissioner,March1952.64Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,p.354.SeealsoStockwell,“PolicingduringtheMalayanEmergency,1948-60:communism,communalism,anddecolonisation”,inD.Anderson&D.Killingrayeds.,PolicingandDecolonisation:politics,nationalismandthepolice(Manchester1992),pp.105-126.65MSSBritEmpire,S.486,3/1,YoungtoHughFraser,22ndDecember1951.66Ibid.,YoungtoTempler,3rd&5thFebruary1953.
254
headquarters staff, resulting inhispredecessorbeingoverwhelmed in “day today
administrativeproblemsandagapbetweenHeadquartersandChiefPoliceOfficers.”
Moreover, he recognised that itwas clearlynecessary that SpecialBranch “should
havetheundividedattentionofaSeniorAssistantCommissioneratHeadquarters.”67
Inpracticalterms,“SpecialBranchwasthepoorerrelationofthelargerbodies, i.e.
CID.”68YoungthereforecreatedanewpostofDeputyCommissioner (field),added
threeadditionalpostsofSeniorAssistantCommissioner(SAC),andupgradedallChief
PoliceOfficerstothisrank.Cruciallyforthemanagementofintelligence,thisallowed
theCommissionertodisentangleCIDfromSpecialBranchbycreatingtwoseparate
departments (‘D’ and ‘E’ respectively), the latter being commanded by Senior
AssistantCommissionerGuyMadoc.69
ThisdecisiontodivorcetheSpecialBranchfromCIDwasnot,however,onerootedin
simple administrative efficiency.70 Indeed, it reflected the incongruence of having
Emergency intelligence (whichwasconsidered, touseamodernphrase,an ‘all-of-
government’concept)locatedwithinonenarrowand‘siloed’aspectofpolicing.The
conceptualoriginsofthiscrucialdecisioncanthereforebelinkedtoDalley’sadvocacy
oftheneedforthepostMSSintelligencestructurestohaveadegreeofindependence
fromthePolice,andJenkin’sdoomedeffortstorecastSpecialBranchasitsownentity.
Young’sdecisiontogiveSpecialBranchoperationalautonomy(albeitwithinthewider
confinesofPoliceforce)markedthepracticalrealisationofhispredecessors’ ideas.
Young had thus finally resolved the problem ofwhere the concept of intelligence
would‘sit’withintheFederation’sbroaderadministrativeapparatus.Asaresult,four
yearsintotheEmergency,SpecialBranchwasfinallygiventheorganisationalspaceto
developaccordingtooperationalneeds.
67Ibid.,Areviewofdevelopmentin1952,undated.68KV4/408,‘ThesituationinMalaya–lecturenotes’,byMorton,undated.69Young’sdecisioncausedsomeconcerninLondon,totheextentthatColonialOfficeofficialssoughtameetingwithMorton,whowasonhomeleavepriortotakinguphisnewpositionasDOI.HighamnotedsomewhatscepticallythattheproposalsweresimilartothoseofJenkinwhichGrayandGurneysovigorouslyopposedinthepreviousyearbutdidnothingtodissuadeYoungfromimplementingtheplan.SeeCO1022/51,minutebyHigham,21stJune1952.70K.Hack.“Britishintelligenceandcounter-insurgencyintheeraofdecolonisation:theexampleofMalaya”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:2(Summer1999),p130,fn54&5.
255
YoungalsochangedSpecialBranch’sorganisationalobjectives.Evenpriortohisarrival
in Malaya, he considered his immediate priority upon taking command was “to
developandextendtheSpecialBranch inorder toensureadequatestrengthatall
levelswithacleardirective–(1)toproduceinformationwhichtheMilitaryrequirein
time for effective action; (2) to penetrate the Malayan Communist Party.”71 The
secondaspectoftheCommissioner’splanmarkedasignificantdeparturefromthe
focusunderJenkinandGrayupontheMinYuen–Youngwasaimingattheheartof
theMCP.ThiswasnotareactiontotheassassinationofGurneybutareflectionofthe
growingconcern that“theCommunistsmightgiveup theiruniformedarmandtry
Palestine tactics [i.e terrorism].”72 This concernwasbasedupon the fact that the
intelligence network relied at this point of the Emergency almost entirely upon
informationsuppliedbycaptureddocuments,andsurrenderedorcapturedenemy
personnel(SEP/CEP)who,aftertheirinitialoperationalexploitation,became‘blown’
or‘dead’assourcesofinformation.73Thus,iftheMCPweretodisbandtheMRLAand
reverttofomentinglabourunrestandisolatedterroristtactics,thegovernmentwould
be deprived of the vast majority of intelligence sources.74 As a result Templer’s
Directive21outlinedtheurgentneedtopenetratetheMCPwith‘live’agentsandto
“ensure that theseagents arenot compromisedeitherby indiscreetorpremature
action,particularlyforlow-levelbanditkillsandquickrewards.”75
Young realised Special Branch’s twin objectives required different approaches. In
relationto“tacticalinformationwhichwouldpermitthesecurityforcestoeliminate
armedCommunists”,theCommissionerwelcomedthepostingofMilitaryIntelligence
Officers(MIOs) intoSpecialBranch.However,thetaskofpenetratingtheMCPwas
considered a specialist one, focused upon the SAC and his planning staff at
Headquarters.Tosupportthis,YoungcreatedaplanningroomintheInnerKeepat
BluffRoad.Thisstaffwassupportedbyteamsofspecialistfieldofficers“toexploitthe
veryconsiderablequalityofinformation,whichcannotbehandledbythecollectors
71MSSBritEmpire,S.486,3/1,AdvancedAppreciation,undated.72CO1022/51,aminutebyMrJerrom,19thJune195273Ibid.,DirectorofOperations,DirectiveNo.21–S.B.IntelligenceTargets,24thApril1952.74Ibid.,aminutebyMrJerrom,19thJune195275Ibid.,DirectorofOperations,DirectiveNo.21–S.B.IntelligenceTargets,24thApril1952.
256
ofinformationontheground.”Youngconcludedareviewofdevelopmentsinhisfirst
yearasCommissionerbystating
“there has been a re-orientation of policy within the Special Branch
throughouttheyear,directedtowardsensuringthatintelligenceavailableto
Government remains ‘alive’ whatever may be the results of the efforts of
Security Forces to suppress the ‘shootingwar’.While it is appreciated that
Special Branchdoes have a duty to perform in the provisionof day to day
tactical intelligence, thatmust take secondplace to the penetration of the
Partyatalllevels,bothonalongandashorttermbasis.”76
However, this policy came began to bear fruitmuch later in the Emergency than
previouscommentatorssuggest–certainly later than1951as the ‘incrementalists’
implyor1952astheadvocatesforthe‘stalemate’theoryargue.Asoneofficerwho
joinedMalayanPolicein1952laterrecalled,“notionallywewerepolice,butwewere
reallyaparamilitaryorganisation.Wedidn’thaveanythingreallytodowithnormal
policework,weweren’tconcernedwithburglariesandpeopleridingbicycleswithout
lightsandthatsortofstuff.”77Butwithoutdoing“thatsortofstuff”,thePolicewere
missing the opportunity to engagewith the ordinary Chinesewhomight have the
potentialtobeaninformer.
Thelagbetweenpolicingreformandoperational impactisreflectedinthebroader
measures of the Emergency. For instance, at the end of 1954 the Director of
Operations,GeneralGeoffreyBourne,reportedthattheabsolutenumberofincidents
andcasualtiescontinuedtofallfromthe1951/2peak.However,therewerestill4,000
insurgentsinMalaya’sjungleswhowere“abletoemergefromthejungleregularly,at
pointsoftheirownchoosing,tocreateanincidentortocollectsupplies,whenthey
think theycandosowithoutgreat risk.”Furthermore,hesaid“penetrationof the
MalayanCommunistPartyathighlevelisdifficult…”Bournedidqualifythisstatement
76MSSBritEmpire,S.486,3/1,PartI(Areviewofdevelopmentin1952)andPartII(Asummaryofplansfor1953).77ImperialWarMuseum,Acc.10120–InterviewwithPeterMauleFfinch.
257
bysaying“TheSpecialBranchkeepswellabreastofMalayanCommunistPartypolicy
intentionsandorganisationsatalllevels.”78Inreality,however,withoutwell-placed
andwilling informants, Special Branch at this time continued to rely on captured
documents, and captured / surrendered enemypersonal for this information. The
followingyear,BournereportedtoHarding,that“staticsbynomeansshowthewhole
picture,butitsohappensthatatthemomenttheydoconformthethoughtswhichI
havehadrecently,namelythatthingshavegoneratherbetterontheshootingside
thanIhadbeenexpecting.”Heattributedtheprimaryreasonforthissuccesstobe
the increasing co-operation of the Chinese population.79 However, the supply of
“adequateintelligence”remainedcriticalandSpecialBranchwasorderedtoredouble
efforts.80
However,by1956,theestimatedCommuniststrengthhadhalved,ashadthenumber
of major terrorist-generated incidents, compared to the previous year. The new
DirectorofOperations,GeneralRogerBower,explained, “ahighproportionof the
casualtiesinflictedontheterroristsstemfromactiontakenbytheSecurityForceson
informationreceivedfromintelligencesources.”Thiswasbecause,atlast,thePolice
andmilitarywereworkinginunisonIndeed,hesuggested“probablyoneofthemain
lessonstobelearnedfromtheexperienceofthelasteightyearsisthatunlessthetwo
[Policeandmilitary]aregearedandmaintainedtothesamepitchandwork inthe
closestharmony,successwillnotbeachieved.”81By1957–theyearMalayaachieved
independence from Britain – Bower stated that “the police intelligence system
(SpecialBranch)hasnotonlychartednearlyeverymemberoftheenemyArmy,but
hasbroughtaboutthegreatmajorityofcontactsresultingineliminations.”82Itthus
tooksomefouryearsforTemplerandYoung’sreformstocometofruition,sothatthe
uniformed police, Special Branch and the strategic coordinating apparatus were
78WO208/3219,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheEndof1954,bytheDirectorofOperations,10thJanuary1955.79WO216/885,BournetoHarding,3rdJune1955.80WO216/874,DirectorofOperations’Directive,February1955.81WO208/5356,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheEndof1956,bytheDirectorofOperations,January1957.82AIR20/10377,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957,bytheDirectorofOperations,September1955.
258
workinginharmonywiththeD/SWECsandthetheatrelevelintelligencemachinery.
It was only at this point in the Emergency that the ‘model’ Malayan intelligence
apparatusevolvedintoitsmostmatureandeffectiveform.
Conclusion
The current understanding of policing in the Emergency rightly indicates that the
UniformedBranchofthePoliceServicefollowedtwodistinctpolicingstylesduringthe
Emergency–aparamilitarystancewhichwaspursuedbetween1948-51,followedby
aconsensualapproachfrom1952onwards.Runninginparalleltothisnarrativeisthe
separate argument that Special Branch emerged from the ruins of the MSS to
experienceexponentialandrapidimprovementinoperationalefficiency.Asaresult,
accordingtoLeonComber,SpecialBranchplayedthedefiningpartintheintelligence
war against theMCP, allowing the government “toeschew the ‘rifle andbayonet’
approach…anddefertotheSpecialBranch’smoresubtlemethodsoffightingthewar
bytheuseofhumanintelligence…”83
Thereare,however,twofundamentalproblemswiththecurrentunderstandingofthe
contributionmadebytheFederationofMalayaPoliceService,anditsSpecialBranch,
tointelligenceeffortduringtheEmergency.Thefirstisthefailuretoacknowledgethat
SpecialBranchwasatalltimesanintegralpartoftheFederationofMalaya’sPolice
Service. Special Branch lacked an effective presence amongst Malaya’s Chinese
communityanddependeduponrelatively‘resource-rich’UniformedBranchtobeits
‘eyesandearsontheground.’However,ashasbeendiscussed,theUniformedBranch
wasbesetbynumerousproblemswhichimpededitsabilitytosecurethetrustofthe
Chinese community. The need to implement necessary but draconian Emergency
regulations,thelackofChineseorChinese-speakingofficers,theinfluxofex-Palestine
officers, and the rapid shift to adistinctly paramilitary styleof Police conspired to
preventtheordinaryChinesefromtrustingtheordinaryMalayan‘bobby’.Indeed,the
biggestproblemaffectingSpecialBranchwasthatitsfortuneswereintimatelylinked
withthebroaderpolicingstrategy,andforfirstfourcriticalyearsoftheEmergency
83Comber,Malaya’sSecretPolice1945-60,p.282-3.
259
thisstrategywasentirelyatoddswithtaskofgeneratingintelligence.Theshiftfroma
para-militarytoconsensualstancewascriticalinprovidingSpecialBranchwithmore
rawmaterial but it took time to implement and evenmore time for the Chinese
communitytodevelopconfidence.Hence,SpecialBranchdidnotworkinisolation.On
the contrary, it was heavily dependent upon other elements of the intelligence
apparatus to identify raw intelligence and potential informants which they could
subsequentlydevelopandexploit.
Second,thecreationofthepostofDOIreflectednotthegrowthofSpecialBranchbut
itsinabilitytocoordinateemergencyintelligence.ThiswasrecognisedbythePolicing
Missionwhichrecommendedtheappointmentofanindependentadvisortoresolve
someofthe‘technical’problemsaffectingtheSpecialBranch,anideawhichevolved
into thenon-executive roleofDirectorof Intelligence. It is important tonote that
ratherthanappointtheHeadofSpecialBranchtotherole,orsimplygivetheheadof
SpecialBranchbroaderresponsibilities,itwasdecidedtocreateapostwhichwasnot
embedded fully within the Police and where the role holder could by-pass the
CommissionerofPoliceentirely. Indeed, Jenkin’s tenureasDirectorof Intelligence
endedindisaster.Gradually,reformsintroducedtoensuretheintelligenceapparatus
could function efficiently – not least the desegregated Special Branch, the
developmentoftheroleoftheDirectorofIntelligenceandtheFederal Intelligence
Committee,allofwhichreflectboththecompositenatureofEmergencyintelligence
andshowsthatneithertheSpecialBranchnortheCommissionerwereabletomanage
italone.
ManyproblemsfacedbySpecialBranchduringtheEmergencywereafunctionofthe
peculiarnatureofcounter-insurgencyintelligence,andthedifficultyofficialshadin
categorisingittofittheexistingorganisationalstructures.Youngnotedin1952that,
“policeheadquarterstaketheviewthatbanditryisaformofcrimeandtheirdealing
withitisthenormalfunctionofthepoliceforcewhosedutyitistopreventanddetect
crime.”84Ofcoursethereislogictothatargumentanditwasonethatwasconfirmed
84MSSBritEmpire,S.486,3/1.
260
by numerous reviews and assessments, particularly in the first four years the
Emergency.Inreality,however,thebreadthanddepthoftheinsurgentchallengefar
surpassed normal criminality. This created a clear tension between the type of
intelligencerequiredbySpecialBranchandthatrequiredbythesecurityforces‘on
theground’.Theformerrequiredacomplexmixofintelligencerelatingtoidentifying
theCommunistcellstructures,isolatingtheCommunistarmedunitsfromthesupply
organisation,theidentificationofinformants,allofwhichwouldlead,ideally,tothe
detention or arrest of high rankingmembers of theMCP. Thus to Special Branch,
particularly in the second half of the Emergency, the long-term development of
sources was far more important than quick, tactical, operations. Conversely, the
securityforcesoperatinginDistrictsallofoverMalaya,whileinterestedintheseforms
for intelligence,hadaprimaryfocusuponoperational intelligence– informationto
leading to the arrest or elimination of the MRLA. Emergency intelligence was a
concept that transcended the contemporary epistemology of intelligence. The
attempt by Jenkin to detach Special Branch from themainstream Police, and the
development extraordinary structures, such as the DOI and FIC were increasingly
desperateattemptstocoordinateaconceptthatwaswiderthanorthodoxpolicing.
The suggestion in the current historiography that the concept of Emergency
intelligence was simply synonymous with Special Branch fails to appreciate the
relationship between ‘low’ and ‘high’ policing, the peculiar nature of Emergency
intelligence and extraordinary inter-organisational demands it placed upon the
administration.ThetaskofSpecialBranchduringtheEmergencywasdauntingandits
achievements should be acknowledged. Conversely, however, these achievements
shouldnotbeexaggerated.SpecialBranchwasnotthe‘silverbullet’thatComberand
Sinclairmaintainitwas.
261
Chapter9–Conclusion:TheDevelopmentoftheIntelligenceApparatusduringtheMalayanEmergency
The intelligence apparatus that evolved during theMalayan Emergencywas not a
single-dimensionalentityfocusedsolelyorevenpredominantlyuponSpecialBranch.
Nordidittheapparatusevolveinalinearmanner.Onthecontrary,itwasabroad,
constantlyevolvingphenomenon,respondingbothtointernalfrictionsandexternal
stimuli.Ittookthebestpartofsevenyearstoreachadegreeofstructuralmaturity,
largely because of the infirm foundations laid in the aftermath of the abolition of
South East Asia Command (SEAC) in 1945. The transition from a single military
intelligence apparatus in the region to a diffuse civilian model proved highly
problematic.Consequently,thecivilianagenciesinMalaya(theuniformedandSpecial
branches of the Federation of Malaya’s Police, the Security Service and Joint
IntelligenceCommittee/FarEast)werebesetwithproblemsrelatingtoremitsand
resources, and struggled to generate timely and high-quality intelligence until the
latteryearsof theEmergency.Themilitarywerenot,asothercommentatorshave
suggested,weddedtothetacticsof‘counter-terror’.1Infact,themilitaryattempted
tomovetowhatwouldnowbetermed‘intelligence-led’,small-unit,operationsatthe
verybeginningoftheEmergency,However,theeffortsofthesecurityforcesforthe
bulkoftheEmergencywerefrustratedbecauseofalimitedflowofintelligencefrom
theirciviliancolleagues.Consequentlythesecurityforceswereabletocontainand
reducebutnoteffectivelymitigatethethreatposedbytheMalayanCommunistParty
(MCP)untilthemasssurrendersof1958.Assuch,itisdifficulttoconcludethatthe
Emergencycanprovidethebasisofanexemplaryparadigmformanagingintelligence
during a counter-insurgency campaign as advocated, for instance, by Robert
Thompson.2
Thefirstsubstantialpost-wariterationoftheMalayanintelligencemachinewasthat
inexistencefromtheabolitionofSEACin1945totheabolitionoftheMalayanSecurity
1H.Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444;D.French,TheBritishWayinCounter-insurgency1945-67(Oxford2011);K.Hack,“Everyonelivedinfear:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),pp.671-699.2R.Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency–ExperiencefromMalayaandVietnam(1966)
262
Service(MSS)in1948.ThemovefromSEAC’swartimeintelligencestructurestoanew
paradigmsuitabletoprotectBritain’spost-warterritoriesandcolonies,inthecontext
of the rapidly developing concerns about global Communism, was inevitably
challenging. Planners attempted to address this problem by creating a three-tier
system.First,a Joint IntelligenceCommittee (JIC) (JIC (FE))wouldprovidestrategic
oversighttoBritain’sintelligenceapparatusintheFarEast,providingassessmentsto
itsmetropolitancounter-part,localgovernmentsandtheChiefsofStaff.Second,the
SecurityService’snewlycreatedregionalhub–SecurityIntelligenceFarEast(SIFE)-
wouldcoordinatesecurityintelligenceinregionandbeanswerablebothtoLondon
andlocalgovernments,aswellasbeingrepresentedontheJIC(FE).Finally,SIFEwould
besupportedbythedifferentSpecialBranchesintheregionor,inthepeculiarcaseof
theMalayanUnion,itsownintelligenceagency,theMSS.
The idea of basing Britain’s post-war regional intelligence apparatus around the
conceptof theJICwasnotwithoutprecedent. Indeed,various iterationsof theJIC
wereat theheartofBritain’swartime intelligence structures in London,Cairoand
Singapore.However,theJICrunbyLordLouisMountbatten’sSEAC,whichwentonto
formthebasisoftheJIC(FE),wasperhapstheleastsuitableincarnationoftheconcept
to support the post-war demands both of the Commanders-in-Chief and Britain’s
newlyre-installedcolonialgovernmentsintheregion.Thiswasprimarilybecausethe
committee’skeyfocuswasondefenceintelligencerelatedtothewaragainstJapan.
Perhapsunderstandably, given that so little of SEAC’s operating areawas in allied
hands, security intelligence was simply not a priority. Hence, neither the Security
Service (MI5)nor the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)were representedon the JIC
(SEAC),andtheemphasisondefenceintelligencecontinuedwiththeJIC(FE).
ItisdifficulttoconcludeanythingotherthantheJIC(FE)waspoorlyset-up,notleast
because it was established without a fully-defined remit, full-time chairman or
draftingstaff.Tocompoundtheproblem,theJICansweredtomultiplemasters.Itwas
notuncommonforvariouselementsofBritain’sintelligenceapparatustohavedual
reporting lines at this time, and the JIC (FE) was thus not unique in this respect.
However,beinganswerabletotheChiefsofStaffinLondonandtheBritishDefence
263
Coordination Committee / Far East (BDCC/FE) presented Patrick Scrivener, the JIC
(FE)’s chairman, with some difficult challenges. In particular, London was only
concerned with defence intelligence, as were the Commanders-in-Chief on the
BDCC(FE).However, theBDCC (FE)hadabroader remitand itschairman,Malcolm
MacDonald, had a need for both security and political intelligence. Inevitably,
however,theagendasetbyLondonprevailed.
Inherent,butperhapsnotfullydeveloped,intheJICconceptwastheresponsibilityto
provideawarningfunction.Ofcourse,thiswasdependentupontheotherelements
of thewider intelligencestructureproviding the JIC (FE)withastreamofassessed
intelligencefromtheirvariousdisparatesources.Tofillthegapinrelationtosecurity
intelligence, officials created Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE) asMI5’s regional
intelligencehub.Thiswasbaseduponthehighlysuccessfuljointsecurityintelligence
hub,SecurityIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME)thatwasestablishedinCairojustbefore
theoutbreakoftheSecondWorldWar.ItisclearthatofficalsintendedthatSIFEwould
performasimilarfunction:itsnetworkofDefenceSecurityOfficers(DSOs)wouldact
asconduitsfor informationgatheredby localofficials,whichwouldbeassessedby
SIFEHeadquarters,andthenpassedtotheJIC(FE).
SIFE failed to meet this ideal. This is not surprising given the broader dislocation
among Britain’s intelligence agencies as they attempted tomanage the transition
fromtheSecondWorldWartotheColdWar.Atthemostbasiclevel,SIFEhadvery
fewDSOs–infactithadonlyoneDSOtocoverallofMalaya.EricLeighton,theDSO
forMalaya,wasthusentirelydependentonthePoliceandtheMSSforintelligence.
TheinherentdifficultyinthisprocesswasexacerbatedbythestancetakenbySirPercy
Sillitoe, the Director General of the Security Service. Sillitoe was determined to
entrenchandthenexpandthepositionofhisnewlycreatedregionalhub.Hepushed
SIFEtodevelopacollectionfunctionandsoughttopreventtheMSSfromoperating
outside Malaya, aims which are at least understandable. However, Sillitoe was
determined to go further and subvert completely theMSS,whichheperceived as
directcompetitortoSIFE.ThiswastoprovedisastrousbothfortheMSSandSIFE,as
wellasMalayaitself.
264
TheMSSformedthethirdlayeroftheinitialMalayanintelligenceapparatus.TheMSS
has been widely criticised, if not vilified, both by contemporaries and later
commentators for apparently failing to forecast the start of the Communist
insurgency.Andyetare-readingoftheMSS’sFortnightlyPoliticalIntelligenceJournals
clearly reveals that the organisation warned regularly of the MCP’s intent and
capabilitytothreatenthesecurityoftheFederation.Granted,thereportstendtobe
verboseand,attimes,it isnoteasytodifferentiatebetweenthedifferentlevelsof
threats identified but the concerns about theMCP are clear. The reasonwhy the
outbreakofviolencethatledtothedeclarationofEmergencyapparentlytookofficials
bysurpriserelatestothedysfunctionofthewiderintelligencemachine:Sillitoewas
in the process of doing his best to discredit theMSS; the Commissioner General
retainedfaithinMSSbutSillitoe’smessagewastakinghold;theJIC(FE)wasfocused
ondefence intelligenceand,despite its remit, lacked the influenceorcapability to
interveneintheSIFE/MSSdispute.Moreover,whilst it is impossibletoprove,it is
likelythattheMSS(inadditiontotheHighCommissioner,SirEdwardGent,whodied
in an aircraft crash shortly after the declaration of Emergency) proved to be
convenient ‘scapegoats’ for the failings of wider intelligence and administrative
apparatus.
The second substantial iteration of theMalayan intelligence apparatus developed
quickly intheaftermathofthedeclarationofEmergencyandabolitionoftheMSS.
The JIC (FE) remainedat thenotionalheadof thisapparatusandbenefited froma
confirmed remit, full-time chairman and drafting staff. And yet the JIC (FE)’s
involvement in the Emergency, in relation to its responsibility to co-ordinate the
regionalintelligenceapparatus,appearslimitedtosuggestingthatSirHenryGurney,
the Federation’sHighCommissioner, should create a Local IntelligenceCommittee
(LIC). The JIC (FE) did provide Londonwith some strategic assessments about the
potential relationship between the violence in Malaya and the wider Communist
threat to British interests in the region. However, there is no evidence that it
consideredtheEmergencyinitsownrightuntilGeneralSirHaroldBriggs’demandin
1950formoretroopstoreinforcetheimplementationofhisplantorestorelawand
265
ordertoMalayacoincidedwiththestartoftheKoreaWar.Eventhen,theJIC(FE)’s
involvementwasfocuseduponthepotentialadverseimpactextratroopsmighthave
uponBritain’swiderstrategicconcernsintheregion,ratherthantheconsequencesof
notaccedingtoBriggs’demands.
The abolition of the MSS in August 1948 effectively destroyed the Federation’s
capacity to generate human intelligence (humint) in the short to medium term.
DespiteSillitoe’sloftyambitions,SIFEwasunabletofillthevoid-itlackedboththe
staff and resources to necessary to develop an effective collecting capacity.
Consequently,SIFEremainedlargelydependentuponlocalauthoritiesforaflowof
material which it could then assess and disseminate. Indeed, having secured the
destructionoftheMSS,SIFEwasforcedtoadoptamuchmoredefensiveposturein
thewakeofcriticismfromitsregionalpartners,notleasttheCommissionerGeneral.
Asaresult,theburdenforintelligencecollectioninMalayafellupontheFederation’s
PoliceService.However,thePoliceServicewasgrosslyunder-strength,bothinterms
ofconstablesandofficers,andwasalreadyengagedfullyinattemptingtoreducethe
levelof‘ordinary’crimethatwasrifeinthechaosofpost-warMalaya.Ittoowasthus
unabletoprovidesufficientintelligencetoenablethesecurityforcestoneutralisethe
threatfromtheMCPeffectively.
ItwasthusdecidedtocreateaSpecialBranch.Althoughtherewasaprecedentforthe
existenceof Special Branches in thepre-war Straits and Settlements, theMalayan
UniondidnotfeeltheneedtocreateaSpecialBranchinthenewpost-warstructure.
Thus,whentheMSSwasabolished,theCommissionerofPolice,H.B.Langworthy,had
todosoinhasteandwithlittleinstitutionalknowledge.SomepersonnelfromtheMSS
headquartersweredraftedintothenewlycreatedSpecialBranchbutitsufferedfrom
thesimilarshortageofsuitablestaffthataffecteditspredecessorandthewiderPolice
organisation.Moreover,SpecialBranchwasreconstitutedasanintegralpartofthe
Criminal Investigation Department (CID). In practice, this meant that counter-
insurgency intelligence was subjugated to criminal intelligence until Templer
separatedthetwoelementsin1954.
266
Againstthebackgroundofthisintelligencevacuum,theRoyalAirForceandtheArmy
pickedupthemantle.TheRoyalAirForcetooktheenlighteneddecisionnotonlyto
moveitsforwardheadquarterstoKualaLumpurbutalsotoco-locatewiththeArmy’s
commandcentreinthetownratherthanatairfield.Thiseffectivelycreateda‘J2’cell
right at the beginning of the Emergency. Furthermore, the RAF andArmy created
withinmonthsofthedeclarationofEmergencyacohesivejointphotoreconnaissance
apparatus.IntheabsenceofanadequateflowofintelligencefromSpecialBranch,
thevisualsurveillanceandphotoreconnaissancemissionsprovidedamuchneeded
streamofinformationuponwhichthesecurityforcescouldbasetheireffortsonthe
ground.Once the residualpoolof intelligencegatheredby theout-goingMSShad
beenexhausted,thesurveillanceandreconnaissancemissionsflownbytheRAFthat
playedacriticalpartintheFederation’seffortstopreventtheinsurgentsdeveloping
amomentum,forminglargerarmedunitsandcreatingliberatedareas.Thiswasatruly
‘joint’apparatusandthere isevenevidenceofPoliceofficers taking informantson
visualsurveillanceflightstohelpidentifyinsurgentlocations.
TheArmyalsoattemptedtofilltheintelligencegapfromtheearliestphasesofthe
Emergency.ThedevelopmentoftheFerretForceandCivilLiaisonCorps(aconcept
which are surely the distant precursors of the use of modern anthropological
techniques during the recent conflict in Afghanistan) are excellent examples of
initiativesdesignedtouselocalknowledgeandsmall-unittechniquesto‘ferret’out
the insurgents. That the Ferret Force was cancelled after a matter of months,
seemingly replaced by large-scale cordon and search operations that, at times
includedtheuseofvillageburning,didnot,however,indicatetherejectionofsmall,
intelligence-led,counter-insurgencyoperations.Indeed,GeneralBoucherintendedto
introduceferretunitstoallbattalionsoperatinginMalaya,viatheFarEasternTraining
Centre. Small unit operationswere heavily frustrated, however, particularly in the
period1948-56,bythe lackof timelyandreliable intelligencefromSpecialBranch.
DespitethevalueofvisualsurveillanceandphotoreconnaissanceprovidedbytheRAF,
therewasacriticallackofhumint.
267
InanefforttoisolatetheinsurgentsfromtheChinesesquattercommunity,thePolice
and military became heavily employed in population control measures such as
resettlement.This,asKarlHackhasexplained,forcedtheMCPfromaclassicalMaoist
prescriptionforinsurgencywiththeultimateaimofcreatingliberatedareastoone
designedtoharassandsubvertthecolonialauthoritiesbutwithfeweractsdesigned
toterrorisethecivilianpopulation.3Aspartofthechangeofstrategy,theinsurgents
moved deeper into the jungle. This afforded greater tactical opportunity for the
securityforcestointerdicttheinsurgentswhobecameincreasinglyconcernedwith
obtaining supplies. As a consequence casualties, both to civilians and the security
forces,declinedand thenumbersof insurgentswhochose tosurrender increased.
However,populationcontroldidnot‘breaktheback’oftheEmergency,asKarlHack
claims. Itmerely changed thenatureof it.Hence, the insurgentswere still able to
murder the High Commissioner in 1951. The numbers of surrendered enemy
personnel began to decline after 1952, leaving a hard-core rump of up-to 3,000
insurgents still determined to subvert, if not destroy, colonial government.4
Moreover,theEmergencystillsoaked-upavastamountofresources,whichneither
MalayanorLondoncouldaffordbut,despitethesenumbers,theauthoritiesstruggled
tofindletaloneengagetheirinsurgentopponents.
Thereweretwocriticalfactorsthathinderedtheabilityoftheintelligencemachineto
locatetheinsurgents.Thefirstwasthatitlacked,atleastinthefirstfouryearsofthe
Emergency,aneffectivecommandandcontrolstructure–particularlyatastrategic
level. The military did spontaneously create an efficient operational command
structurewhichwassubsequentlyformalisedintheDistrictandStateExecutiveWar
Committees (D/SWEC) and the Land / Air Operations room which subsequently
3K.Hack,“BritishIntelligenceandCounter-InsurgencyintheEraofDecolonisation:TheExampleofMalaya”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(Summer1999),pp.124-155;Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(2008),pp.211-241;Hack,“‘IronClawsonMalaya’:TheHistoriographyoftheMalayaEmergency”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,30:1(March1999),pp.99-101;Hack,“TheMalayanEmergencyasCounter-InsurgencyParadigm”,TheJournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.383-414;K.Hack,“‘Everyonelivedinfear’:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),pp.671-699.4WO208/5356,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1956,January1957.
268
morphedintotheJointOperationsCentre.However,forthefirsttwoyearstherewas
nocentralfigureorbodytocoordinatetheeffortsoftheintelligenceapparatusasa
whole. This was partially addressed by the appointment of Sir William Jenkin as
Directorof Intelligence(DOI) in1950.Ultimately,however,thisappointmentwasa
significantmissedopportunityandcontributedtotheonsetofanearfatalparalysis
within the Federation’s core executive in 1951. The situation became significantly
better in 1952 when Jack Morton was appointed as Jenkin’s successor and
subsequentlycreatedtheFederalIntelligenceCommittee(FIC).Despitetheinherent
vulnerabilitiesofthesystem,notleastthatitseffectivenessdependedlargelyupon
the force of personality of the newHighCommissioner, SirGerald Templer, these
developmentsprovidedthestrategicdirectionwhichhadbeenlackingevenpriorto
thedeclarationofEmergency.
The second and far more intractable factor which hindered the ability of the
intelligencemachineto locatethe insurgentswasthe ineffectivenessof thePolice.
Between1948-51, under the leadershipofHighCommissioner Sir EdwardGurney,
GeneralSirHaroldBriggsandPoliceCommissionerSirNicolGray,theestablishment
of thePolice grew tonear240,000officers, all ofwhomwerewedded toahighly
paramilitarystrategy.5Theseofficersdressedinaparamilitarystyle,carriedautomatic
weapons, conducted armedpatrols deep into the jungle andwere responsible for
detention and deportation of suspects, enforcing curfews and other Emergency
regulations, includingthesystematicrelocationoftheChinesesquattercommunity
andfoodrestrictions.Suchastrategymaywellhavebeennecessary,particularlyin
the immediate aftermath of the declaration of Emergencywhen therewas a real
possibilitythattheinsurgencymightbeabletocreate‘liberatedzones.’However,the
cost intermsof intelligencewasdramatic.Undersuchastrategy, thePolice found
intelligencelargelythroughcoercion–hencedocumentsmightbefoundasaresultof
searchingallthoseenteringorleavinganarea,orviacapturedinsurgentsbutthiswas
second-ratecomparedtotheultimategoalofall intelligenceorganisations–timely
andaccurateinformationfromwillinganduncompromisedinformants. Indeed,the
5A.Stockwell,“BritishimperialpolicyanddecolonisationinMalaya,1942-52”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,13:1(October1984),pp.68-87.
269
strategyofparamilitarypolicingcouldnotbemoreincompatiblewithsecurethisvital
typeofinformation.
In addition to improving the strategic command and control of the intelligence
operationsinMalaya,Templerattemptedtoresolvethefundamentalproblemswithin
theFederationsPoliceService.SirArthurYoungwasappointedasGray’ssuccessor
witha clearmandate to reformpolicing.Hequickly freedSpecialBranch from the
shacklesoftheCIDandset-abouttransformingthePolicefromapara-militaryforce
to a Police Service. The state of the intelligencemachine at the end of Templer’s
tenurelooksandfeelsmuchmorematurethanthatwhichheinherited.Forthesake
of analysis, onemight consider it the third significant iteration of the intelligence
apparatusinMalayasinceabolitionofSEACin1946.
However,atleastintermsof‘output’,Templer’sreformsdidnotmarkaturningpoint
inthecounter-insurgencystruggle.Acommunity’strustinitsPoliceServicetakestime
tobuildandpublicrelations initiatives likeOperationServicestruggledtocompete
againstthecollectivememoryofdetentionorders,curfewsandforcedresettlement.
Thus,reliableandtimelyinformation,particularlyfromhumansourcesremainedhard
to find. Hence, at the end of 1954, General Bourne, the Director of Operations,
estimatedthattherewerestillsome4,000Communistterroristsatlargewhowere
abletoemergefromthe jungleata timeandplaceof theirownchoosing.Finding
themcontinuedtobelike“huntingforaneedleinahaystack”-ahuntwhichabsorbed
one-thirdofMalaya’stotalrevenue,costtheUK£55millionayearandinvolvedthe
simultaneousdeploymentofuptotwenty-onebattalionsoftroops.6Twoyearslater,
theDirectorofOperationsnotedthatalthoughtheinsurgentswereconcentratingon
subversion,pendingMalayaobtainingself-government,theywere“muchmorealert
and difficult to find.” Moreover, while the absolute number of insurgents was
estimated to have dropped from 4,000 to 2063, the surrender rate had fallen
significantlywhich“severelyhandicappedthesecurityforces.”Henceatthebeginning
of 1957, the Director of Operations concluded “there is still a considerable and
6WO208/3219,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1954,January1955.
270
continuingdangertothesecurityandstabilityofMalayauntiltheCommunistTerrorist
Organisationhasbeenthoroughlybroken.”7ThearrivalofTemplerwasnotthe‘big-
bang’thatothershaveclaimed.8
Ifoneacceptsthattheintelligenceapparatuswasunstableforthevastmajorityofthe
Emergency, one might reasonably question what contribution it actually made
counter-insurgencycampaignandtheendingoftheEmergency?Measuringtheutility
of intelligence is a notoriously problematic endeavour, not least because such
measuresbecomethemeanstogeneraliseorcondenseaverylongandcomplicated
processwithmultiplevariablesintosomethingsimple.Hence,thedeclineincasualty
ratesoranincreaseinsurrenderscouldequallybeattributabletoachangeofstrategy
byeithertheCommunistsorgovernment,theinabilityoftheinsurgentstofindfood
and supplies, an inability to manoeuvre freely, a decrease in political support,
increasingtacticalefficiencyofthesecurityforces,bettercommandandcontrol,the
maturing of the psychological warfare program, or people’s belief that their lives
would be better under a self-governing or independent Malaya rather than a
CommunistMalaya,oracombinationofalltheseaspectsormore.Itisnearimpossible
todisaggregatetheroleoftheintelligenceapparatusfromthesefactorsandhighly
problematictolinkdevelopmentsinthatapparatustoimprovedcounter-insurgency
metrics,suchasthenumberofincidents,contacts,insurgentambushes,securityforce
ambushes,SEPsetc.Thisisapitfallthatmayhaveaffectedthosecommentatorswho
suggestthedecliningcausalityrateseenin1952-3wasadirectreflectionoftheimpact
ofGeneralTempler’sarrivalinMalaya(suchasAnthonyShortandRichardStubbs)or
theOctober1951Directives(suchasKarlHack)ortheorganisationalreformofSpecial
Branch(suchasLeonComber).
Nevertheless,itisaxiomaticthatintelligenceisacriticalfactorincounter-insurgency
operations. Accurate and timely information about who is subverting governing
institutions,whoisposingaphysicalthreattothestateanditscitizens,andwhois
7WO208/5356,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1956,January1957.8A.Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya(London,1975).
271
supporting the insurgent forcesallows thecounter-insurgents tonullify the threat.
Without such information, the insurgentsareable tooperateunhindered.General
Templer set up in 1952 the Operational Research Section (ORS) to “to analyse
incidents and contacts and contacts and extract from themnot only statistics and
patterns,butlessonstobeappliedinfutureoperations,largeorsmall.”9TheResearch
SectionconductednumerousstudiesintothecombateffectivenessoftheArmyand
concludedthatthemajorityoftheArmy’seffortsbetween1952-4(theperiodwhen
mosthistorian’ssuggest thetideof theEmergencyhadalreadybeenturned)were
unproductiveeitherintermsof‘contacts’or‘eliminations’whenoperationswerenot
‘intelligence-led’. For instance, the Research Section undertook an analysis of
patrollingbetweenMayandAugust1952.ItfoundthattheArmyhadlaunched“700
‘intelligence-led’patrolsduringthisperiod,ofwhichonly41[5.85%]madecontact
with the enemy.” However, in the same time period the Army sent out 1853
speculativepatrols,ofwhicheven less– just51 [or2.75] -madecontactwith the
enemy.The‘kill-rate’wasreflectedinthesefigures:whenpatrolswereintelligence-
led, the security forces killed on average 0.65 per patrol, comparedwith 0.39 for
speculative patrols. This study concluded, perhaps obviously, that information
increasedthechanceofpatrolsmakingcontactandthen‘eliminating’theenemy.10
Similarly, theResearchSectionconductedanumberof studiesaimedat improving
ambushes. It noted that intelligence was the “biggest single factor affecting
ambushes.Thechancesofanambushbeingsprung[i.e.governmentforcesengaging
Communistforces]are:-a)oninformation1in10b)onnoinformation1in88.”Asa
result,theResearchSectionconcluded“thatoninformationonecanexpectakillafter
130 hours; on no information one can expect one after 3,900 hours.” These are
astonishing figures.Atperiodof theEmergencywhenmostcommentatorssuggest
thatthebackoftheEmergencyhadbeenbroken,overafourmonthperiod“58,000
ambushpartyhours(say½millionmanhours)havebeenspentinambushesonno
9J.Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife(Chicago2002),p.96;J.Cloake,Templer–TigerofMalaya(London1985),p.242.10WO291/1725ORSMalaya,MemorandumNo.5/52–PatrollingintheMalayanEmergency.Thereportalsohighlightedtheneedtoimprove‘junglecraft’andmarksmanship.
272
informationandhaveonlyachieved15kills.”11Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,suggestthat
theeffortsoftheintelligenceapparatusmadelittlenetimpactuponthecourseofthe
insurgency. Indeed, thework of theORS simply serves to emphasise the value of
intelligenceduringtheEmergency,andthenecessitytohavearobustapparatusto
collect raw information,assess,disseminateandultimatelyuse that intelligence to
furtherthecampaign.
How andwhy then, if the intelligence apparatuswas unable to allow the security
forcestodeliveracoupdegrâcetotheinsurgents,wastheEmergencybroughttoa
successfulconclusion?ThisthesishasalreadyconsideredanddiscountedKarlHack’s
theory that the government achieved security by ‘screwing down the people.’12
Population control was undoubtedly important to the broader counter-insurgent
campaignandinalargeparthelpedconvincetheinsurgentstochangestrategy,but
it was ultimately unable to prevent the hard-core of the insurgents taking to the
deeperareasofthejunglewheretheycontinuedtoposeasignificantthreatMalaya’s
internalsecurity.NorwasTempler’sregimedecisive.ItisclearthatTemplerdidpull
Malaya back from the nadir of his predecessor’s murder and implementedmany
highlyimportantreformsthatwerevitaltothegradualimprovementofthesecurity
situation, not least policing reform. However, as Generals Bourne andMcGillivray
alludetotheirendofyearreportsfor1954and1956,thisdidnothaveinstantresults
– the insurgents continued toposeavery real threat toMalaya,hugeamountsof
resources remained engaged in counter-insurgency operations and the Emergency
continueduntil1960.
11WO291/1724,ORSMalaya,MemorandumNo.4/52-Ambushes,AppendixA.12K.Hack,“Corpses,prisonersofwarandcaptureddocuments:BritishandCommunistnarrativesoftheMalayanEmergency,andthedynamicsofintelligencetransformation”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(2008),pp.211-241;Hack,“‘IronClawsonMalaya’:TheHistoriographyoftheMalayaEmergency”,JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,30:1(March1999),pp.99-101;Hack,‘TheMalayanEmergencyasCounter-InsurgencyParadigm’,TheJournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.383-414;Hack,“‘Everyonelivedinfear’:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5(2012),pp.671-699.K.Hack,“BritishIntelligenceandCounter-InsurgencyintheEraofDecolonisation:TheExampleofMalaya”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(Summer1999),pp.124-155.
273
Indeed,thisthesissitseasilywithneitherthe‘incremental’or‘stalemate’hypotheses
thatdominatethewiderhistoriographyoftheEmergency.However,itdoessupport
Kumar Ramaskrishna’s argument that the various elements of the Federation’s
counter-insurgencycampaigncametomaturity in the latterhalfof the1950s.13 In
particular,thepoliticalsituationhaddevelopedrapidly:municipalandtownelections
wereheld in1952, followedbyStateandFederalelections twoyears later. Tunku
Abdul Rahman, the leader of the powerfulUnitedMalaysNationalOrganisation –
MalayanChineseAssociation(UMNO–MCA)Alliancepoliticalparty,wasappointed
firstministerinJuly1955andthefollowingyearsecuredcontrolofinternaldefence
and security.14 The rise of Tunku Abdul Rahman and the accelerated pace of
decolonisation effectively rendered a central pillar of the MCP’s aspirations
redundant:TunkuAbdulRahmantauntedtheMCPbydeclaring,“yousaythatyouare
fightingforindependence.MyPartyandIhaveachievedit.”15Theprolongedsecurity
campaign,inconjunctionwiththeacceleratedpaceofpoliticaldevelopmentwithin
Malaya, created the conditions in which the government’s propaganda campaign
couldtakeeffectandstimulatedthemasssurrendersof1958,whicheffectivelyended
theCommunistinsurgency.
Correctionofthehistoricalrecord
Asnotedintheintroductiontothisthesis,nearlyallpreviouscommentatorsrecognise
theimportanceofintelligenceduringtheEmergency,acontentionwhichthisthesis
supports.16However,manyassessmentshaveeitherbeenincorrectorbasedoninfirm
foundations.ThishascriticalimplicationsfortheunderstandingoftheEmergency,not
13K.Ramakrishna,EmergencyPropaganda:TheWinningofMalayanHeartsandMinds1948-58(London2001).14SeeStockwell,“BritishimperialpolicyanddecolonisationinMalaya,1942-52”,JournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,13:1(October1984),pp.68-87.15K.Ramakrishna,‘Content,credibilityandcontext:Propaganda,governmentsurrenderpolicyandtheMalayanCommunistterroristmasssurrendersof1958’,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),p.257.16See,forinstance,Short,TheCommunistInsurrectioninMalaya,p.502;R.Aldrich,TheHiddenHand:Britain,AmericaandColdWarSecretIntelligence(London2006),p.494;F.Kitson,BunchofFive(London1977),p.286andR.Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency–ExperiencesfromMalayaandVietnam(London1966),p.84;H.Miller,JungleWarinMalaya,fn.90,p.90;B.Stewart,“WinninginMalaya:Anintelligencesuccessstory”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.267-283.
274
onlyasanepisodeofsignificanthistoricinterestbut,aswillbediscussedbelow,asa
campaignuponwhichmuchoftheUnitedKingdomandUnitedStatesofAmerica’s
currentcounterinsurgencydoctrineisbased.
MostpreviousaccountsstarttheirdiscussionoftheEmergencywitheventsin1948.
However, the contest between the Malayan government and the MCP started
significantly before that, arguably in 1945. The declaration of Emergency merely
signalled the government’s inability to forestall the Communist insurgency using
normal,peacetime,statutoryinstruments.Usingpreviouslyunpublishedmaterialon
theSEACintelligenceapparatusandtheSecurityService’splansformanagingsecurity
intelligenceintheFarEastafterthedefeatofJapan,thisdiscussionhasshownthat
whathaspreviouslybeenperceivedassimplyanintelligencefailurebytheMalayan
SecurityServicein1948was,infact,amuchbroader,systematicfailure,ofBritain’s
post-war intelligence structures in the region. Indeed, the MSS was the junior
memberofatriumvirate,inconjunctionwiththeSIFEandJIC(FE),thathadacollective
responsibilitytosafeguardMalaya’ssecurity.However, thetriumviratewasriddled
withweakremits,competingagendasandinter-organisationaldisputes,theoriginsof
whichcanbetraceddirectlytotheflawedfoundationsprovidedbySouthEastAsia
Command’sintelligenceapparatus.
TherolesplayedbybothSIFEandtheJIC/FEduringtheEmergencyisonewhichnot
previouslybeentold.Thisispartlyduetolimitedsources–theSecurityService’sSIFE
papershaveonlyrecentlyde-declassifiedandveryfewJIC(FE)papersareavailablein
TheNationalArchive.However,itispreciselybecausetheroleofbothbodieswasso
limited thatmakes themasourceof interest.This thesishas shownthatSIFEvery
clearlyhada responsibility in relation to security intelligence in FarEast, including
Malayaand itwaswithintheJIC(FE)’sremitbothtoprovidepertinent intelligence
assessmentsandcoordinatetheintelligenceapparatusintheregion.However,both
bodieswere set up in haste. The result, particularly in relation to SIFE,was inter-
agency competition, conflict and a failure to meet core responsibilities. This
contributedsignificantlytothecollapseofthecivilianagencieswithintheMalayan
intelligencemachineatthebeginningoftheEmergency.Thus,thisthesishas,forthe
275
first time, fully explored the intelligence architecture supporting the Malayan
authorities in the built up to the declaration of Emergency. This is vital to help
understandthepressureontheMSSandsubsequentlythePoliceandSpecialBranch,
andtheimportanceofroleplayedbythemilitaryin‘holdingthering’untilthecivilian
intelligenceagencieswere reconstructed intoa formmore suitable to tackling the
insurgency.
Thediscussionhasshownthat,contrarytopreviousanalysis,theMSSdidprovidein
itsveryfirstFortnightlyPoliticalJournal,andeverysubsequentone,aclearwarning
oftheMCP’sintenttodestabiliseMalayaanditsincreasecapabilitytodoso.However,
SIFE, the JIC (FE) nor officials in theMalaya government listened to thewarnings
providedbytheMSS.Theprecisetimingoftheupsurgeinviolencethatpromptedthe
declaration of a state of Emergencymay have been a surprise to officials but the
existenceofan insurgentcampaignwouldnothavebeen toanyonewho read the
warningsprovidedbytheMSSovertheprevioustwoyears.
Special Branch is at the centre of the discussion about intelligence during the
Emergency in the existing literature. However, this thesis has shown that Special
Branchwasbutoneelementofamuchbroaderintelligenceapparatusthat,untilnow,
hasyettobeexploredindetail.TheapparatusincludedtheJIC/FE,SIFE,theMSS,the
Army,theRoyalAirForce,andthemainstreamPoliceaswellasSpecialBranch.Nor
wasitthemodelintelligenceagencythatthecurrenthistoriographysuggests.Onthe
contraryitwaslargelyineffective,partlybecauseoftheadministrativeshacklesthat
tiedittothemainstreamCIDbut,moreimportantly,becauseofitsdependencyon
thewiderPoliceService.SpecialBranchlackedaviablepresencewithintheChinese
community, with the acute lack of Chinese-speaking officers being a particular
problem.ItthereforerelieduponthewiderPoliceService,notleasttheUniformed
Branch, tosecure the trustof theChinesecommunity,gather raw intelligenceand
identify informants. Hence, intelligence was just as much an overt function,
particularlyoftheUniformedBranch,asitwasacovertfunctionasrepresentedby
SpecialBranch.However,until1952,theUniformedBranchwasaparamilitaryforce,
weddedtoastrategythatalienatedthecommunityitneededtobefriend.Evenwhen
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thisstrategychanged,itwouldtakemorethanleafletdropsandthestaged-managed
‘Operation Service’ to convince members of the Chinese community to take the
significantpersonalriskofprovidinginformationabouttheinsurgentstothePolice.
Moreover,thisthesishasdemonstratedthatSpecialBranchsimplyfailedtoprovide
the leadershipnecessarytoensurethevarious intelligenceorganisations inMalaya
operatedasonecoordinatedapparatusratherthanacollectionofindividualentities.
SirWilliamJenkinwasinitiallybroughttoMalayatohelpimprovethewayinwhich
SpecialBranchwasoperatingasacollectionagency.Hequicklyassessedthesituation
asimpossibleandtenderedhisresignation.Hewas,however,persuadedtostayon,
in the guise asMalaya’s first Director of Intelligence (DOI). Contrary to Comber’s
assertions,thiswasadevelopmentwhichmarkednotSpecialBranch’scomingofage
but its inability tomanage itself, letalone the restof the intelligenceapparatus in
Malaya.UnfortunatelyJenkin’sinitialassessmentprovedcorrectandhewasunable
to function within the already dysfunctional core executive of the Malayan
government.Indeed,heleftthepostwiththePoliceandSpecialBranchinturmoil.It
was not until the creation of the Federal Intelligence Committee (FIC) and the
appointment of Jack Morton, former H/SIFE, as the new DOI that the Malaya
intelligenceapparatusgainedthestrategicleadershipitsodesperatelyrequired.Thus
civil-military co-operation was critical during the Emergency but, in relation to
intelligence,thisco-operationwasgeneratedbythesecondDirectorofIntelligence
andtheFIC,notSpecialBranch.
The final point of departure relates to the role of themilitarywithin the broader
intelligenceapparatus.RatherthanbeingsubordinatetothePolice,simplyanend-
usertoSpecialBranch’sintelligence,themilitaryforthemajorityoftheEmergency
providedthestructuresthatheldtogetherMalaya intelligenceapparatuswhilethe
civilianintelligenceagenciesdisintegratedandwerethenreconstructed.Thiswasdue
to their ability to work in a joint manner. For instance, this discussion has
demonstrated,forthefirsttime,thefullextentofthecontributionmadebytheRoyal
AirForcetotheintelligencecampaignintheEmergency.Indeed,itwastheRAFthat
tookthefirststepstocreateajointcommandcentrewiththeArmy.Therearemany
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practicalexamplesoftheRAFworkingeffectivelyandinnovativelywithotheragencies
fromtheearliestdaysoftheEmergency,includingtakinginformantsinlightaircraft
to identify insurgent locations, using transport aircraft as airborne communication
posts,anddeployingintelligenceofficersintothefield.Furthermore,usingprevious
unpublished material this discussion has shown how the RAF and Army worked
effectively together from 1948 to coordinate throughout the Emergency the
collection,assessmentanddistributionofphotographicreconnaissance.Theseefforts
helpedensuretheinsurgentswerenotabletodevelopthemomentumnecessaryto
createliberatedzonesandprovidedvitalsteamsofintelligenceinlieuofthelackof
humintbeinggeneratedbythePolice.
TheArmyalsodemonstrated instinctiveabilitytodevelopcollaborative, local-level,
intelligencestructuresandworkedwiththePoliceon ‘anti-banditoperations’even
before the formal declaration of Emergency.Moreover, the Army did attempt to
develop more efficient methods of counter-insurgency operations from the very
beginning of the Emergency, for instance via the Ferret Force and Jungle Training
School. Moreover, through rare access to the Intelligence Corps archives, this
discussionhasshownthattheFieldSecuritySectionshadanimportantintelligence-
gatheringroleinEmergency.17
Theinitial,intelligence-led,effortsbythesecurityforcestofindandlocatethelarge
bandsofinsurgentsprobablypreventedtheinsurgencymutatingtoaformofmore
conventionalguerrillawarfareasadvocatedbyMaoZedong.Indeed,itwastheefforts
ofthemilitarythatbroughttimeforthecivilianagencies,particularlySpecialBranch
andthewiderPoliceorganisationtoadjust to thedemandsofcounter-insurgency.
Granted,biographiesandoperationaldebriefsindicatethewidespreaddissatisfaction
within themilitary about the quality of intelligence being provided by the civilian
agenciesforthemajorityoftheEmergency.However,thefactthatkeyelementsof
17ThearchivistsatTheMilitaryHistoryMuseumprovidedtheauthoraccesstotheIntelligenceCorpsarchivesandalsotheMedmenhamCollection(photint).AlthoughIwasunabletofindmaterialrelatingdirectlytoMalayaintheMedmenhamCollectionIwasabletospeakwithtwoofficerswhohadservedinMalayaduringtheEmergency,onewithJAPIC/FE,theotherasyoungsubaltern.Iamverygratefulfortheirtime,insightsandhospitality,andthatoftheIntelligenceCorpsstaff.
278
theapparatuswereunstableforlargeperiodsoftheEmergencyonlyincreasedthe
Federation’sdependenceupontheremainderandmadetheproductionoftimelyand
accurateintelligence,fromwhateversourceoragency,thatmuchmorevaluableto
thecounter-insurgents.Indeed,theintelligencethatdidreachthesecurityforcesand
that which they were able to self-generate through speculative patrols, cordon-
search,fooddenial,andresettlement,undoubtedlycontributedtothefrustrationof
the MCP’s efforts to overthrow the Malayan government. However, the security
forcesstruggledtodeliveracoupd’gracetotheMCPandwereultimatelyfrustrated
bythelackofhumintbeingprovidedbySpecialBranch.Populationcontroldidleadto
food denial operations, but this proved to be effected by the law of diminishing
returns and big unit operations persisted deep into the Emergency, well past
Templer’stenureasHighCommissioner.
This thesis has therefore provided a radically different assessment of intelligence
duringtheEmergency.Usingabroadrangeofsources,manyofwhichhadnotbeen
previouslyanalysed,ithassuggestedthatthepreviousconsensusthattheintelligence
war inMalayawaswonby the lineardevelopmentofSpecialBranch intoamodel
intelligenceagencyis incorrect.SpecialBranchwas, infact,for largeperiodsofthe
Emergency ineffective. It suffered from the lack of Chinese speakers and the
administrativehandicapofbeingtiedtotheCID.However,itsbiggestproblemwasa
dependencyupontheUniformBranch(touseBrodeur’sterm–lowpolicing)towin
the trust of the Chinese community and identify willing informants.18 As such it
struggled to generate sufficient humint to allow the security forces to render the
insurgents a fatal blow. The other civilian intelligence agencies in Malaya also
struggledtoplayameaningfulroleinthecampaignagainsttheCommunistinsurgents:
theMSS,forallitsfaults,didactuallyprovideclearandconsistentwarningbutwas
subvertedbytheSecurityService;SIFEcouldnotfillthevoidfollowingtheabolition
of theMSS;andtheJIC (FE)wassimplytoo immatureanddistractedwithdefence
intelligencetocontributetotheEmergency.Thisthenleftthemilitary.Fortunatelyfor
theMalayangovernment,boththeArmyandtheRoyalAirForcewereabletohold
18J-PBrodeur,“HighPolicingandLowPolicing:RemarksaboutthePolicingofPoliticalActivities”,SocialProblems,30:5(June1983),pp.507-520.
279
thewiderintelligenceapparatustogether,securingvitaltimeforthePolicetochange
tomovefromaparamilitarytoamoreconsensualstrategyin1952;forthecreation
of a FIC and appointment of Morton as DOI; the acceleration of the pace of
decolonisation; and the maturing of the psychological warfare programme. The
intelligencemodelinplaceinMalayain1957wasmatureandsophisticated.However,
theprocessofcreatingthismodelwasfarmoreorganisationallycomplicated,indeed
arduous,thanpreviouscommentatorsallow.
Whilecounter-factualsareoftenoflimitedvalue,itisthought-provokingtoconsider
whatwouldhavehappened inMalaya ifboththemilitaryandcivilianwingsofthe
intelligenceapparatuswereworkingmoreeffectivelyandinharmonymuchearlierin
campaign:itisunlikelythattheEmergencywouldhavelastedforsuchalongtimeor
that so many resources would have been diverted to Malaya; the pace of
decolonisationwasunlikelytohavebeensorapid;indeed,ifthewarningsoftheMSS
hadbeenheededandactedupon,perhapsastateofEmergencymightneverhave
beendeclaredinMalaya.
Relationshiptocurrentcounter-insurgencytheory
The implicationsofthiscorrectionofourunderstandingaboutthemanagementof
intelligenceinMalayamaybesignificantbecausecurrentcounter-insurgencytheory
has its roots in lessons derived from the Emergency. As noted above and in the
introduction to this thesis, it is widely accepted that intelligence is vital to
contemporary counter-insurgency. For instance, the current US Army andMarine
Corps counter-insurgency doctrine (FM 3-24) states, “effective intelligence drives
effectiveoperations.Effectiveoperationsproduceinformation,whichgeneratesmore
intelligence. Similarly, ineffective or inaccurate intelligence produces ineffective
operations,whichproduce theopposite results.”19Moreover, it iswidelyaccepted
thatMalaya isapreeminentexampleofasuccessfulcounter-insurgencycampaign,
the resonances of which are still evident in currentmilitary doctrine. Indeed, the
19USArmy&MarineCorps,CounterinsurgencyFieldManual(Chicago2007).SeeAIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalayafromApril1950toNovember1951byGeneralSirHaroldBriggsfortheoriginalquotation.SeealsoThompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency,p.89.
280
statementabovefromtheUSArmyandMarineCorpscounter-insurgencydoctrineis,
infact,aneardirectquotationfromtheBriggs’Plan.Giventheperceivedimpactthat
Malayamakesuponcurrentdoctrine,itwouldthereforebelogicaltoconcludethat
anaccurateunderstandingoftheMalayanexperienceofmanagingintelligencewould
beattheheartofcurrentcounter-insurgencydoctrine.
Therearetwofundamentalproblemswiththislogic,however.Thefirst,asalreadyhas
beendemonstrated, is that thehistorical recordconcerning intelligenceduring the
Emergencyhasrequiredwholesalecorrection.Thissuggeststhatcurrentdoctrineis
based upon incorrect assumptions. Second, current counter-insurgency doctrine
actuallypaysscantattentiontotheproblemofmanagingintelligencewithinsucha
campaign.Whileitisbeyondthescopeofthisthesistoconsiderfullythevalidityof
contemporaryBritishcounter-insurgencydoctrine, it ishopedthatreassessmentof
thehistoricalrecordpresentedabove,inconjunctionwithabriefassessmentofthe
implicationsfordoctrine,mayencourageotherscholarstodoso.
TheBriggsPlanisarguablytheseminalworkindefiningpost-warcounter-insurgency
theory.20 It will be recalled that General Briggs, in his capacity as Director of
Intelligence,plannedtodominatethepopulatedareastobuildupafeelingofsecurity;
tobreak-uptheinsurgents’physicallinkswiththeChinesecommunity,deprivingthem
ofsuppliesandinformation;andforcethemtoattackinunfavourablesituations.In
aftermathoftheEmergency,RobertThompson,anArmyofficeronthestaffbothof
GeneralSirHaroldBriggsandGeneralSirGeraldTempler,wroteacounter-insurgency
manual based on his experiences in Malaya.21 Defeating Communist Insurgency
proved to be an enduring work and continues to inform the counter-insurgency
doctrineoftheBritainandtheUnitedStates.Thompsonoutlinedfivekeyprinciples
20AnumberofcommentatorstracetheoriginsofBritain’scounter-insurgencytheorybacktoGeneralCallwell’sSmallWars(1898)andCharlesGywnn’sImperialPolicing(1934).ForabroaderdiscussionofBritain’scounterinsurgencytheoryseeA.Alderson,“Britain”,T.Rid&T.Keaney(eds),UnderstandingCounterinsurgency–Doctrine,operationsandchallenges(Oxon2010),pp.28-45;D.Porch,Counterinsurgency–ExposingthemythsoftheNewWayofWar(Cambridge2013),pp.246-268;IBeckett,“Thehistoriographyofinsurgency”,R.Rich&IDuyvesteyn(eds),TheRoutledgeHandbookofInsurgencyandCounterinsurgency,pp.23-31.21Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency.
281
fordefeatinganinsurgency:thatthegovernmentmusthaveaclearpoliticalaim;that
itmustfunctioninaccordancewiththelaw;thatitmusthaveaplan;thatitmustgive
prioritytodefeatingpoliticalsubversion;andthatagovernmentmustsecureitsbase
areafirst.22GeneralSirFrankKitson,whoservedintheemergenciesinMalaya,Kenya
andCyprus,developedsimilar ideas.23Hestressed theneed forgoodcoordinating
machinery;thecreationofapoliticalatmospherewithinwhichmeasurestakenbythe
governmentwillbewillreceived;thatthecampaignmustbeconductedwithinthe
law;andthattheirmustbeaneffectiveintelligenceorganisation.ThomasMockaitis
furtherdevelopedthisstrandofcounter-insurgencytheoryinabroadsurveyofBritish
experience of small wars between 1919-60.24 He concluded success in these
campaignswas based upon the use ofminimum force, thewinning of hearts and
minds,andcivil-militaryco-operation.Takentogether,theseworksformthebedrock
ofclassiccounterinsurgencytheory.
Classiccounterinsurgencytheory,inparticulartheexampleofMalaya,provedhighly
significant in the rewriting in 2007 of the US Army and Marine Corps
counterinsurgencydoctrineasembodiedinFM3-24.25OneofthekeyauthorsofFM3-
24wasJohnNaglwhosePhDtopicwasacomparisonofBritishexperiencesinMalaya
with those of the United States in Vietnam. His thesis was later published as the
influential Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.26 The manual, which provided the
conceptualfoundationsforGeneralDavidPaetraeus’surgeinIraqandhissubsequent
revision of the campaign in Afghanistan, is fundamentally a restatement of classic
counter-insurgency theory, with a particular focus on ‘hearts and minds.’27 The
influenceofMalayaonFM3-24 isclearthroughout–despitebeinganoperational
manual,theauthorsevenfeltitimportanttoincludeatwo-pagecasestudyonroleof
22Ibid.,pp.50-62.23F.Kitson,GangsandCounter-gangs(London1960);Kitson,LowIntensityOperations–Subversion,InsurgencyandPeacekeeping(London1971);Kitson,BunchofFive(London1977).24T.Mockaitis,BritishCounterinsurgency,1919-60(London1990).25USArmy&MarineCorps,CounterinsurgencyFieldManual.26Nagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife.27SeeT.Ricks,TheGamble(London2009);P.Broadwell,AllIn–TheEducationofDavidPetraeus(London2012);F.Kaplan,TheInsurgents(NewYork2013).
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policing during the Emergency. 28 Indeed, the manual states, “at its core, COIN
[counter-insurgency]isastruggleforthepopulation’ssupport.”Thisisastatement
thatcouldeasilyhavebeenmadebyBriggs,Templer,Thompson,orKitson.Although
lesspublicisedand therefore lessdiscussed, thecurrentBritish counter-insurgency
doctrine isalso resolutely ‘population-centric’ andclearlyhas the same ideological
heritageasitsAmericancounterpart.29
Manycommentatorsarguethatclassiccounterinsurgencytheorycontinuestoremain
relevant in the contemporary, post-Iraq and Afghanistan context. For instance,
WarrenChinsuggeststhe“Britishexperience in Iraqdemonstratesthatfailurewas
notduetoanobsoletedoctrinebuthappenedbecausetheBritishneverimplemented
apropercounterinsurgencystrategy.”30SimilarlyIanRigdenhasconcludedthat“the
wholeofGreatBritain’scolonialandpost-colonialcounter-insurgencyexperienceis
relevantandyields16premisesthat,takentogether,constituteatheorythatoutlines
how success can be pursued and when success may no longer be possible when
counteringaninsurgency.”31Moreover,DavidUckohaspositedthatMalayacontinues
tooffer“ausefulandvaluablecasestudyinthesuccessfulpracticalimplementation
oftimetestedcounter-insurgencyprinciples.”32AlthoughFM3-24isbeingrevisedat
thetimeofwriting,classicalcounter-insurgencytheory,andthusMalaya,remainsat
thecentreofbothcurrentBritishandAmericandoctrine.
However,perhapsunsurprisinglygiventhecampaignsinIraqandAfghanistan,others
havequestionedthevalidityofclassicalcounterinsurgencytheory.Inparticular,the
28GianGentile,anardentcriticofFM3-24,arguesthatMalayaformedthe“historicalbedrock”uponwhichcontemporarycounter-insurgencydoctrineisbased.SeeG.Gentile,WrongTurn–America’sDeadlyEmbraceofCounter-insurgency(NewYork2013),pp.12,25,&36.29BritishArmyFieldManual,Volume1,Part10,CounteringInsurgency.Accessedon15July2015,viahttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_Army_manual.pdf30W.Chin,“WhydidItallGoWrong–ReassessingBritishCounterinsurgencyinIraq”,StrategicStudiesQuarterly,Winter2008,p.133.31I.Rigden,TheBritishApproachtoCounter-insurgency:Myths,Realities,andStrategicChallenges,StrategicResearchProject–USArmyWarCollege,abstract.SeealsoD.Ucko,“TheMalayanEmergency:TheLegacyandRelevanceofaCounter-InsurgencySuccessStory”,DefenceStudies,10:1-2(March-June2010),pp.13-39.32D.Ucko,“TheMalayanEmergency:TheLegacyandRelevanceofaCounter-InsurgencySuccessStory”,DefenceStudies,10:1-2(March–June2010),p.36.
283
recent raft of revisionist accounts of Britain’s conduct during her wars of
decolonisation,promptedbythecourtcasesbroughtagainstthegovernmentbythe
relativesofthosekilledbytheScotsGuardsatBatangKaliinMalayaandbyformer
MauMau insurgents inKenya, situncomfortablywith theprinciplesarticulatedby
RobertThompson,FrankKitsonandThomasMockaitis.33Thisimpliesthatthereal
character of the Emergency was one of ‘counter-terror’ rather than ‘hearts and
minds’,somethingwhichclassicalcounter-insurgenttheorists,notleasttheauthors
ofFM3-24,havesubsequentlychosentoignore.Indeed,RobertEgnellhassuggested,
“thedominantnarrativeofBritishcounterinsurgencyexperiencehas…beencriticized
asempiricallyweakandsubjectiveoverthelastfewyears.”34
A number of contemporary counter-insurgents, most notably Gian Gentile, have
joinedrevisionistacademicsinquestioningthevalidityofthelessonsdrawnfromthe
Emergency.Thisappearstohaveorginated,at least inpart, inthereactionagainst
Brigadier Aylwin-Foster’s fierce critique of the United States management of the
‘Phase IV’ of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which he re-emphasised the traditional
British theoryof counter-insurgency,muchofwhichwasdrawn from theMalayan
campaign.35Unfortunately,fortunewassoontorevealthattheBritishperformance
in Basra also appeared not to encompass the lessons from previous counter-
insurgencycampaigns(although,ofcourse,thereisanargumentwhichsuggeststhat
neitherBasranorHelmandwereorthodoxinsurgencies).Thisappears,however,not
to have deflected staff officers from clinging on to past glories. Indeed, as Frank
Ledwidgestates,“novisitortomilitaryheadquartersinIraqor,especially,Afghanistan
couldmissthealmostcompulsorymentionsinpresentationstoguests(andindeed
servingsoldiers)ofthisjunglewar,alongtimeago,farawayandinthemostdifferent
environment imaginable.”36 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the
33See,forinstance,French,TheBritishWayinCounter-insurgency1945-67;Hack,“Everyonelivedinfear:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5,pp.671-699;Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3(2009),pp.415-444.34R.Egnell,“LessonsfromHelmand,Afghanistan:whatnowforBritishcounter-insurgency,”InternationalAffairs,87:2(2011),p.300.35N.Aylwin-Foster,“ChangingtheArmyforCounterinsurgencyOperations”,MilitaryReview,Nov–Dec2005.36F.Ledwidge,LosingSmallWars(2011),p.154.
284
circumstancesinMalayaweresounique–inparticular,thattheMCPdidnothave
external support, that the British were able to use selective but highly coercive
measures, and ultimately, were forced to grant independence to neuter the
Communistcause–thattheEmergencyshouldneverhavebeenusedasamodelupon
whichdoctrinecouldbebased.37
Othershavearguedthatthecontemporarythreatissodifferentfromthepost-war
colonialemergenciesastomaketheBritishcounter-insurgencyexperienceinMalaya
largelyirrelevant.Theinfluentialtheorist,DavidKilcullen,isthekeyprotagonistofthis
argument. He maintains that contemporary insurgents “may not be seeking to
overthrow the state,may have no coherent strategy ormay pursue a faith-based
approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous
competing insurgencies inone theatre,meaning that the counter-insurgencymust
controltheoverallenvironmentratherthandefeataspecificenemy.”38Thus,Kilcullen
argues,“thatnotonlyisclassicalCOINnotthenewdominantparadigmforWestern
intervention,butthatitshouldnotbe…”39
Hence,atthetimeofwriting,thecurrentpositionisthatcounter-insurgencydoctrine
for both Britain and the United States remains founded, in large part, upon the
interpretation of experiences of the Malayan Emergency. While a number of
commentators consider this doctrine as fundamentally sound, it has attracted
significantcriticismfromtwocamps.ThefirstsuggeststhattheMalayanpeoplewere
repressedandcoercedintosubmission,andthatconceptof‘heartsandminds’was
anartificialconstruct,hencethecurrentdoctrineisunsound.Thesecondarguesthe
experiences of the colonial government inMalaya some sixty-years agobear little
resemblancetocontemporarysecuritychallenges.
37Ibid.,p.159;Seealso,Rigden,TheBritishApproachtoCounter-insurgency:Myths,Realities,andStrategicChallenges,p.10;Gentile,WrongTurn,pp.37-9.38D.Kilcullen,“CounterinsurgencyRedux”,Survival,48:4(2006),pp.111-130.39Kilcullen,“Counterinsurgency–Thestateofacontroversialart,”inRichandDuyvesteyneds.,TheRoutledgeHandbookofInsurgencyandCounterinsurgency,p.128.
285
Whilethesecriticismshavemerit,thefundamentalproblemwithclassicalandneo-
classicalcounter-insurgencytheory,asby-productoftheEmergency,relatestothe
abject lackofdetailedconsiderationof intelligence. Forall the rhetoricabout the
importanceofintelligencetocounter-insurgency,thekeydoctrinalpublicationsbased
ontheEmergencyconsidertheissuewithasurprisinglackofrigour.Thiscanbetraced
backtotheBriggsplan,thebedrockuponwhichclassicalandneo-classicalcounter-
insurgencyisbased.Itwillberecalledthattheplancalledforthecreationofa“feeling
completesecurityinthepopulatedareas”inordertosecure“asteadyandincreasing
flowofinformationfromallsources.”ThePolice,viaSpecialBranchwoulddevelop
thisinformation.Theotheraspectsoftheplanwerediscussedinmoreconsiderable
detail, with paragraphs dedicated to the provision of additional District Officers,
increasingthePolice,PolicewirelesscommunicationsthecreationofaFederalWar
Council,road-making,repatriation,propaganda,resettlement,andfinance.However,
the development of intelligence (in relation to collection, analysis or organisation)
simplywasnotsubjecttosimilarelucidation.40Similarly,virtuallyeverysubsequent
majorreviewofEmergency,includingLyttelton’s1951reportandsuccessiveendof
year reports give the issue of intelligence scant consideration.41 Typical isGeneral
Bower’s review of the Emergency written in 1957, in which the discussion of
intelligenceis limitedtofoursmallparagraphs(outofatotalof126).Thefirsttwo
paragraphsgiveabroadoutlineoftheintelligenceapparatus,asitwasin1957.The
second twoparagraphs suggest that SpecialBranchwasperformingadmirablybut
that governmentmust continue to post “really goodmen to Special Branch.” In a
document partly designed to identify lessons for future counter-insurgency
campaigns, it seems almost negligent to distil the development of Malayan
intelligencemachineoverthecourseofnineyearsintothisshallowevaluation.42
40AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalaya,fromApril1950toNovember1951,bySirHaroldBriggs.41SeeCAB129/48,c(51)26TheSituationinMalaya:aCabinetMemorandumbyLyttelton,dated20thNovember1951;WO216/806,SirRobLockhart(DirectorofOperations)toSirWilliamSlim(CIGS),14thJanuary1952;WO208/3219,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,“ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1954”;WO216/885,BournetoHarding,3rdJune1955;WO208/5356,DirectorofOperations,Malaya,“ReviewoftheEmergencySituationinMalayaattheendof1956”.42AIR20/10377,DirectorofOperationsMalaya,ReviewoftheEmergencyinMalayafromJune1948toAugust1957,September1957.
286
This is a pattern that continues in subsequent, post Emergency, assessments of
intelligence during the campaign. For instance, the collection, assessment or
exploitationofintelligencedoesnotevenfeatureasoneofThompson’sfiveprinciples
ofcounter-insurgency.43Theconceptdoes,admittedly,constituteasmallchapterin
Defeating Communist Insurgency in which he highlights a number of points.
Thompsonfirstexplainstheneedforanintelligenceagencytoidentifyandtacklea
threatatthesubversivestage,whichisgenerallytheprecursortoamoredeveloped
campaignofinsurgency.Thisisrelativelyself-evident–thelongerathreathastimeto
mature,theharderitwillbetotackle.However,Thompsondoesnotconsiderhowan
intelligenceagencycouldsetaboutthistask.Hethenarguesthat“ideallythereshould
bejustoneorganisationresponsibleforallsecurityintelligencewithinthecountry.”
ThompsonsuggeststhatthisorganisationshouldbeSpecialBranch.Clearlyreferring
totheinter-organisationalfeudbetweentheMSSandSIFEbetween1946-8,hesays,
“if there is more than one, it is almost impossible to define the respective
responsibilities of each organisation or to devise any means of co-ordinating
activities.”However,thisisproblematicfortworeasons.First,innearlyallcasesthere
is going tobemore thanone intelligenceorganisation, conceivable at least three-
serviceintelligenceorganisationsplusthePolice.Second,inthecaseofMalaya,the
JointIntelligenceCommittee,theproposedLocalIntelligenceCommittee,thepostof
DirectorofIntelligence,andtheFederalIntelligenceCommitteeallprovedpotentially
viablemodelsforthecoordinationintelligence–theproblemwasthatthesystems
were immature and, until the second iteration of the DOI under JackMorton, in
concertwith the FIC, theywere implementedpoorly. The final keypointmadeby
Thompsonwasthat“theintelligenceorganisation,howevergood,muststilllimitits
targetsandnotdisperseitsefforttoowidely.”44This,really,isalsoself-evident.Itis
hard not to conclude that Thompson’s consideration of intelligence, based on the
Malayanexperience,iscursory.
43Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency,pp.50-62.44Ibid.,pp.84-9.
287
However,Kitsongivestheconceptevenlessattention–justovertwopagesinABunch
of Five. Nevertheless, he raises a really important question of how an intelligence
agencycanadjusttothedemandsofanincipientorfullydevelopedinsurgency.He
saysthat
Theproblemaboutestablishingthesortorganisationneededisthatin
normal times the requirement can best be met by a small, highly
centralisedandhighlysecuresystemwhichproducesarelativelysmall
amountofprecise top-level information,whereasoncean insurgent
organisationbuildsup, theoperational requirement is foramassof
lowerlevelinformationwhichmustofnecessitybelessreliable.45
Frank Kitson notes that this is a particularly difficult issue, not least because
“expansion,decentralisationandcontactwiththeoutsideworldintheformofjunior
militarycommandersallbringintheirtrainthepossibilityfortheoddindiscretion.”46
This is certainly a risk that the revisionist historians such as David French, Huw
Bennett, and Karl Hack believe was realised in Malaya.47 Moreover, an influx of
militaryofficersintoanexistingintelligenceorganisationcouldjeopardiseacountry’s
constitutionalstatusquo.Frustratingly,Kitsondoesnotprovideanyremediestothese
problems.Heconcludes,somewhatmeekly,“somehowthegovernmenthastoensure
theessentialrisksareacceptedandnecessaryactionistaken.”48Itisunfortunatethat
Kitsondoesnotexplorethisissueatgreaterlength.
Similarly,thediscussionofintelligencewithinFM3-24islimitedlargelytooperational
considerations, such as pre-deployment intelligence planning, how to define the
threat,andunderstandingdifferentstreamsofintelligenceavailabletoacommander.
45Kitson,BunchofFive,p.287.46Ibid.47Bennett,“‘Averysalutaryeffect’:TheCounter-TerrorStrategyintheEarlyMalayanEmergency,June1948toDecember1949”,JournalofStrategicStudies,32:3,pp.415-444;French,TheBritishWayinCounter-insurgency1945-67(Oxford2011);Hack,“‘Everyonelivedinfear’:MalayaandtheBritishwayofcounter-insurgency”,SmallWarsandInsurgencies,23:4-5,pp.671-699.48Kitson,BunchofFive,p.288.ThomasMockaitisdoesconsiderbrieflytherelationshipbetweentheuseofforceandintelligencebut,generally,BritishCounterinsurgency1960-60,doesnotconsidertheconceptinanymoredetailthanThompsonorKitson.
288
Themanualdoessuggestthatintelligencecollaborationisimportantto“organizethe
collection and analysis actions of various units and organizations into a coherent,
mutually supportive intelligenceeffort.”49Andyet, themanualoffersnoadviceor
guidanceonhowtoensurethisisdoneeffectively.RichardSchultzandAndreaDew
forTheNewYorkTimeshighlightedthisprobleminareviewofanearlydraftofFM3-
24.Theynotedthat
ThePentagonmanualrightly insiststhat ‘intelligencedrivesoperations’and
that‘withoutgoodintelligence,acounter-insurgentislikeablindboxer.’Yet
the document provides no organizational blueprint for collecting such
intelligence…theBritishandIsraelishaveblueprintsforsuccessfulintelligence
architecture.Thisisakeycounterinsurgencytoolthatmustbeincludedinthe
finalversionofthePentagon’scounterinsurgencymanual.50
Thisreviewisinterestingfortworeasons.First,itnotesthedeficiencyinFM3-24in
relationtointelligence.Themanual“rightlyfocusesheavilyuponunderstandingthe
cultural,religious,andsocialsensitivitiesofahostpopulation,abouttheneedtomap
potentialthreats,therelativemeritsofhumanversustechnicalformsofintelligence
gathering.”51However,thereisnodiscussionofhowofficialscanadaptanddevelop
intelligenceagenciestomeetthedemandsofparticularsituation,howtoprioritise
different intelligence requirementsorharmonise thedifferentorganisationswhich
will form an intelligence apparatus. Second, and perhaps evenmore notable, the
reviewers, suggest that Britain (and Israel) have the ‘blueprints for successful
intelligence architecture.’ It is not clear to what blueprint the reviewers refer –
certainlyneitherBriggs,Thompson,Kitson,orMockaitisofferanything likeasetof
planstocreateaintelligenceapparatussuitableforacounter-insurgencycampaign.
Indeed, while many commentators claim to understand the Malayan Emergency,
classicalandneoclassicalcounter-insurgencydoctrineneitherreflectsaccuratelythe
49USArmy&MarineCorps,CounterinsurgencyFieldManual,p.132.50R.SchultzandA.Dew,“Counterinsurgency,bytheBook”,TheNewYorkTimes,7thAugust2006.51Ibid.
289
mannerinwhichintelligenceapparatusevolvedinthatcampaignnorprovidesrobust
‘lessons’,‘principles’or‘blueprints’forfuturecounterinsurgents.
Themythicalblueprintforintelligence?
While theprimaryaimof this thesis isnot toprovideanother setofprinciples for
counter-insurgency,itispossibletodrawsomeinferencesabouttheorganisationand
managementofanintelligenceapparatusinsuchacampaign,baseduponthisrevised
accountoftheexperienceinMalaya.
IndicatorandWarnings
It is self-evident that intelligence is the key commodity in a counter-insurgency
campaign–withoutitthesecurityforceswillbeunabletoidentifythoseintendingto
carryoutactsofsubversionorinsurgencyandprevent,detainoreliminatethem.52
However,asFrankKitson suggests, it is vital togather that intelligenceasearlyas
possible in the insurgent campaign, not least because this will often predate a
governmentresponsebymonths,ifnotyears.Forinstance,thestateofEmergencyin
Malayawasdeclaredonlywhen theMCP’s campaignof violencehadescalated to
unmanageable proportions. As has been discussed, contrary to the orthodox
understanding that informed Thompson et al, theMSS, despite its imperfections,
providedconsistentwarningsofthethreatposedbytheMCPtothesecurityofthe
FederationatleasteighteenmonthspriortothedeclarationofEmergency.Andyet
thesewarningswerenotheeded.ThiswasprimarilybecausetheeffectsofSirPercy
Sillitoe’scampaigntosubverttheMSShadtakeneffect.However,itdoesalsoappear
that the dynamic between officials and the MSS was out-of-balance. Modern
commentators recognise that there needs to be an equilibrium between officials
requesting (or ‘pulling’) intelligence on certain themes or subjects from their
intelligenceagenciesandthelattersending(or‘pushing’)intelligencetotheformer
52Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency,p.84;Kitson,BunchofFive,p.287;D.Galula,CounterinsurgencyWarfare–TheoryandPractice,p.50;FM3-24,CounterinsurgencyFieldManual,p.79;Alderson,“Britain”,inRidandKeaney(eds),UnderstandingCounterinsurgency–Doctrine,operationsandchallenges,p.29.
290
which they think might be of interest.53 In the case ofMalaya, a broad range of
intelligencewas‘pushed’bytheMSSonafortnightlybasistoofficialsbutthereisno
evidence to suggest those officials directed that process in anyway. This raises
questionsabout thepotential value theyplacedon security intelligence ingeneral
and,morespecifically,thatprovidedbytheMSS.
Hence, perhaps the first lesson thatmight drawn from the Emergency is that the
‘push-pull’ dynamic between policy-makers and intelligence agencies needs to be
balanced. This is a problem with which contemporary practitioners continue to
wrestle. For instance, in January 2010 Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul
BatchelorreleasedaninfluentialreportentitledFixingIntel:ABlueprintforMaking
IntelligenceRelevantinAfghanistan.Inittheysay,
Ofcriticalimportancetothewareffortishowacommanderordershisorher
intelligence apparatus to undertake finite collection, production, and
dissemination. “If a commander does not effectively define and prioritise
intelligence requirements,”MarineCorpsdoctrinewarns, “theentire effort
mayfalter.”54
Ifthepush-pulldynamicissuccessfullybalanced,thenextchallengeistoensurethat
policy makers are prepared to accept unpalatable or unforeseen intelligence
assessments, or at least work with the intelligence organisations to probe and
substantiatetheseassessments,ratherthandismissorignore.Ofcourse,intheyears
sincetheendoftheEmergencybothpractitionersandscholarshaveundertakena
great deal of work on cognitive bias and the relationship between intelligence
providersandconsumers.55Andyetsignificantfaultlinesstilloccur,asexemplifiedin
53P.Davies,“TheSISSingaporestationandtheroleoftheFarEastcontroller:Secretintelligencestructureandprocessinpost-warcolonialadministration”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,14:4(1999),pp.105-129.54M.Flynn,M.Pottinger,P.Batchelor,FixingIntel:ABlueprintforMakingIntelligenceRelevantinAfghanistan(CentreforaNewAmericanSecurity,January2010),p.23.Accessedon6July2015viawww.cnas.org/files/.../AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf55See,forinstance,J.Cooper,CuringAnalyticalPathologies–PathwaystoImprovedIntelligenceAnalysis(CentrefortheStudyofIntelligence2005);A.Gendron,“ImprovingtheIC’sAnalyticalPerformance”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,25:2(2012),pp.420-426;
291
theweaponsofmassdestructioninIraqdebacle.56Evenifthisrelationshipissound
(anditisoftennot),arobustandimaginativesetofIndicationsandWarningsmetrics
maypaydividendsbecauseatthepointinwhichabesiegedgovernmentrecognises
thatitisundersignificantthreat,itsopponentsmayhavealreadyspentyearsquietly
preparingintheshadows.57
AgencyAdaptation
Dependinguponhowmaturetheinsurgencyisatthepointofdiscovery,theexisting
intelligenceagenciesare likely tobe required to change focus rapidly tomeet the
threat.Themorematuretheinsurgency,themorerapidlytheintelligenceagencies
mayhavetochange.InthecaseofMalaya,thecivilianelementsoftheintelligence
apparatus struggled to make this change. Indeed, the declaration of Emergency
triggeredanunseemlyapportioningofblamefortheapparentfailuretoforecastthe
startoftheCommunistinsurgency.SirEdwardGent,whodiedinanaircraftcrashon
thewaybacktoLondonfortalks,couldnotdefendhisreputation.Col.JohnDalley,
whohadalreadybeensubjecttoasignificantcampaignofbackbriefingbySirPercy
Sillitoe,wasmadeanscape-goatandtheMSSwasabolished.Inhindsight,thelatter
decision seems extraordinary. The failings that Sillitoe had highlighted over the
previoustwelvemonthswerethattheMSSmightbeoperatingoutsideMalayaand
thatitwasnotsharingintelligencewithSIFE.Thesewereissuesthatcouldeasilybe
remediedanddidnotwarranttheabolitionofMalaya’ssoleintelligenceserviceatthe
timeitwasneededthemost.Thefollyofthisdecisionwashighlightedbytheinability
oftheSecurityServiceintheFarEasttofillthevoidleftbythedemiseofMSSandreal
challenges facedby thenewly createdSpecialBranchof theFederationofMalaya
Police.
S.Marrin,“IntelligenceAnalysisTheory:ExplainingandPredictingAnalyticalResponsibilities”,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,22:6(2008),pp.821-846;S.Marrin,“PreventingIntelligenceFailuresbyLearningfromthePast”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterintelligence,17:4(2004),pp.655-672;C.Wastell,“CognitivePredispositionandIntelligenceAnalystReasoning”,InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,23:3(2010),pp.449-460.56LordButler,ReviewofIntelligenceonWeaponsofMassDestruction(London2004).57Forinstance,seeS.Freyn,“UsingStructuredMethodstoImproveIndicatorandWarningAnalysis”,CompetitiveIntelligence,15:4(October/December2013),pp.22-29.
292
Theepisodehighlightstheproblemsfacedbyintelligenceagencieswhenconfronted
withaparadigm-changingthreat,transitioningfromapeacetimestancetoalevelof
organisational activity suitable for a pseudo war. None of the civilian intelligence
organisations in Malaya adapted quickly or efficiently to the demands of the
emergency:theMSSdidnotgetachancetodoso;theJIC(FE)failedtorecognisethe
needtodoso;despiteSillitoe’sambitions,SIFEsimplylackedcapacitytoreplacethe
MSS; Special Branchwas bereft of both a presence on the ground or an effective
analytical capability; the Uniformed Branch of the Police shifted quickly to a
paramilitarystrategywhich,arguably,wasnecessarytohaltinsurgentmomentumin
theshort-termbutwasentirelyatoddswiththeneedtogenerateintelligenceinthe
long-term.Overtimeandatdifferentrates,theMSS,JIC(FE)andSIFElefttheorbitof
the Emergency. This, then, left the Police alone amongst the civilian intelligence
agenciestoconfronttheMCP.However,itwasnotuntilColArthurYoung’sreforms
tookeffectinthemid-1950sthateithertheSpecialorUniformedBrancheswereable
tocountertheinsurgentthreateffectively.
Incontrasttothecivilianagencies,however,themilitarywereabletoadaptquickly
tothedemandsoftheEmergency.IthasbeenshownhowquicklytheArmymovedto
establishinteragencycommitteestocoordinatelocalcounter-insurgencyefforts.Just
as importantly,theRAF’sdecisiontoco-locateitsforwardHeadquarterswithArmy
allowedthecreationofwhatwouldbeknownastheJointOperationsCentre,which
proved to be the keystone upon which an effective theatre level intelligence
apparatuswasbuilt.Similarly,thecreationofJAPIC(FE)ensuredthattherewasan
effective interagencyphotintcapacityfromtheearlieststagesoftheEmergency.A
central tenet of conventional British counter-insurgency theory states that it is
fundamentallyacivilfunction.However,inrelationtotheintelligenceeffort,itwas
thearmedservicesthatdemonstratedtheinstitutionalagilitytoadapttotheneeds
of the emergency - it was the military, not Special Branch or any of the civilian
intelligenceagenciesthatcreatedthelocalandtheatre-levelintelligenceframework
thatwereinplacethroughouttheEmergency.
293
The presumption displayed by Thompson and Kitson that future British counter-
insurgencycampaignswouldfocusuponaSpecialBranchisalogicalfunctionofthe
colonial context of the time. However, as Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate,
contemporaryBritishcounter-insurgencyoperationsareunlikelytobenefitfroman
effective,consensual-based,localPoliceforce.This,infact,isnotunlikethesituation
inMalayaatleastuntilArthurYoung’sreformsbegantotakeeffect.Contemporary
counter-insurgentsmaywellbenefitfromconsideringtheverysignificantburdenthis
placedupontheArmyandRoyalAirForce‘topickuptheintelligencebaton.’Sucha
burden not only required the military personal to work together effectively, it
demanded a different mind-set. Indeed, many revisionist critics suggest that the
military in Malaya did not alter its mind-set, resulting in repression. Certainly,
repeatingthemantraof‘heartsandminds’isnotsufficient–inthefuturecounter-
insurgency campaigns, and in lieu of an effective local Police force, it is likely the
militarywillhavetobecome‘pseudo’Policeofficerstoenablethemtoreallygetinto
andunderstandthecommunitytheyaretryingtoprotect.
AllSourceIntelligence
TheEmergencywasatrulyamulti-agencyaffair:theuniformbranchofthePolice,the
Special Branch of the Police, the Army, the RAF, and JAPIC (FE) were key actors
throughouttheEmergency.Moreover,theJIC(FE)andtheSecurityServiceintheguise
ofSIFEshouldalsohavebeenkeyactorsbutlargelyfailedtofulfiltheirresponsibilities
andevolvedawayfromthecounterinsurgencycampaign.
DespitethepresenceofthesemultipleintelligenceagenciesduringtheEmergency,
commentatorsfocusnearlyentirelyuponSpecialBranch.Inreality,asthisthesishas
shown,itwouldbeentirelyincorrecttocharacterisetheintelligenceeffortinMalaya
as being solely or predominantly the affair of Special Branch.Arguably, itwas the
ordinary‘bobby’ratherthantheSpecialBranchdetectivewhoheldthefateofMalaya
inhishands– lackingapresenceontheground,particularly in relationtoChinese
speakers, Special Branch depended upon their uniformed colleagues to identify
sources of information from within the Chinese community. Robert Thompson
suggestsintheoryapoliceforceistheideaagencytocounteraninsurgencybecause
294
generally“thepoliceforceisastaticorganisationreachingoutintoeverycornerof
thecountryandwillhavehadlongexperienceofclosecontactwiththepopulation.”58
However,inMalayathiswasnotthecase–duetotheseveredislocationduringthe
SecondWorldWarand its aftermath, theMalayanPolicedidnot reach intoevery
corner the country and its experience of close contact with the population was
interruptedforfouryearsbytheJapaneseoccupyingforces.Itisunderstandablein
theory thatThompsonsubsequently suggested that theArmyshouldnothaveany
responsibility for internal security intelligence. At least in the case of Malaya,
however, thePoliceServicewhollyunpreparedfor thedemandsof insurgencyand
therewas littleoptionotherthantouseamixtureofthemilitaryandparamilitary
forcestofillthevoid.
Thisplacedahugepressureonthemilitarytoassumeanewcharacter–tomovefrom
aweightofnumbersandcontestingforterritorytodecentralisedforces,tocontesting
for the allegiance of the population until the Police were in position to take the
burden. From the earliest days of the Emergency themilitary looked to generate
operational intelligence, whether that was via the Ferret Force, the efforts the
IntelligenceCorpsorRAFintelligenceofficersoutonpatrolwiththeirsecurityforce
colleagues,andtoassessandcoordinatethatinformationviameansofdistrictlevel
intelligencecommittees.SimilarlytheArmyworkedjointlywiththeRAFtodevelop
aerial intelligence.Photintandvisual surveillanceprovidedanon-goingandcritical
streamof intelligence to the security forcesprovidingproducts suchasup-to-date
maps and detailed photographic surveys, and the capability of coordinating
operationsfromtheairandcallinginairstrikes.Therewas,therefore,acleardesireto
injectmomentumintotheintelligencecycle.However,itwasnotuntilthelate1950s
that thePolicewasable toprovide theArmywithsufficienthuman intelligence to
movetoamoretargetedmethodofoperations.Withinthiscontext,theEmergency
showstheimportanceofanintegratedoperationalintelligencecapacityinwhichall
streamsofpotentialinformationareassessed–ifthegovernmentsimplyreliedupon
58Thompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency,p.85;C.Grado,AnticipatingSurprise,AnalysisforStrategicWarning(CentreforStrategicIntelligenceResearch,2002);S.Khalsa,ForecastingTerrorism–IndicatorsandProvenAnalyticTechniques(Oxford2004).
295
theSpecialBranch,asThompsonretrospectivelyadvocated,theEmergencymaywell
havetakenaverydifferentcourse.
The2010FlynnReportsuggestedthat informationgathering incounter-insurgency
differs fromthat in conventionalwarfare: “Ina conventional conflict, groundunits
dependheavilyonintelligencefromhighercommandstohelpthemnavigatethefog
ofwar...informationflowslargelyfromthetopdown.Inacounterinsurgency,theflow
is(orshouldbe)reversed.”59Thisundoubtedlywouldbetheidealposition.Andyet
neitherMalaya nor Afghanistan presented circumstances to allow this position to
developnor,probably,willanycounter-insurgencyenvironment.Perhapsakeypoint
fromMalayawasthatallformsofintelligencewerecritical.Theflowofhumintwas,
for largeperiodsof theEmergency limited,whichonlyelevatedthevalueofother
streamsof intelligence. Just as important, however,was themeansof networking
intelligenceprovidedbytheJointIntelligenceRoomsatDistrictandStatelevel,the
JointOperationsCentreandJAPIC/FEatatheatrelevel,andFICataFederallevel.
StrategicDirection
Allthesestreamsofinformationrequiredcoordination,whichgeneratedanumber
of intractable problems during the first six years of the Emergency. The civilian
intelligenceagenciesinMalayawerebesetbydivisiveinter-organisationalsquabbling
evenpriortothedeclarationofemergency.Thiswaslargelybecauseuntil1952there
wasnooneperson,departmentororganisationabletocoordinateintelligenceand
referee squabbles. The obvious candidate for the role was the JIC (FE), not least
becauseitscharterenshrinedsuchduties.However,thecommitteewastooimmature
and narrowly focused to recognise the need for intervention or the potential
consequences if it didnot. SirHenryGurney refused to create a Local Intelligence
Committee(LIC),whichmaywellhaveprovidedthedirectionandcoordinationthat
wasdesperatelyneeded.WhileGurneydidnotsupporttheideaofaLIC,hediddecide
toestablishthepostofDirectorofIntelligence,partlytoreformSpecialBranchand
59Flynn,Pottinger,andBatchelor,FixingIntel:ABlueprintforMakingIntelligenceRelevantinAfghanistan,p12.
296
partly to coordinate the wider intelligence apparatus. However, in its initial guise
underSirWilliamJenkin,interagencyintelligencetensionsonlyincreased.
Hence,intheeighteenmonthspriortothedeclarationofEmergencyandforatleast
fouryearsof thesubsequentcounter-insurgencycampaign, therewas little, ifany,
strategiccoordinationofintelligence.Thebitterandhighlydestructivefeudbetween
the Security Service and the Malayan Security Service was not forestalled or
minimised. Moreover, Sir Nicol Gray, the Police Commissioner, was unable to
coordinatetheeffortsofthePolice,SpecialBranch,theArmy,theRoyalAirForceand
theSecurityService.Moreover,Jenkinfailedtoresolvethesituation–infacthemade
itworse.Matters improvedsignificantlyunderJackMortonandSirGeraldTempler
butthisismoreattributabletheirstrengthofpersonalitythananyrobust,structural,
resolution to the general problemof coordinating Emergency intelligence and the
particularissueofdefiningtherelationshipbetweentheDirectorofIntelligenceand
theHighCommissioner.
MuchoftheproblemcanbetracedbacktotheprocessofdesigningBritain’spost-war
intelligence apparatus in the Far East. SEAC provided a poor foundation. Its
interpretation of the JIC was arguably the least developed of the iterations in
operationacrosstheglobeduringtheSecondWorldWar.Moreover,SEAC’srelative
lackofdemandforsecurityintelligencemeantthattheCounterIntelligenceCombined
Board provided SIFE with a limited inheritance, both in terms of conceptual a
foundation or practical resources. The planning for the post-war apparatus
exacerbatedthesituation.AlthoughtheideaofSIFEhadbeendebatedforsomeyears,
thecollapseoftheJapaneseattheendoftheSecondWorldWarcaughtofficialsoff-
guardandtherewasapressingneedtocommenceeffectivegovernmentofBritish
territoriesinregionassoonaspossible.TheresultwasthatSIFE,theMSSandJIC(FE)
were introducedquickly,withpoorlydefinedremits.Thismightnothavemattered
hadtheMCPdecidednottodestabiliseMalaya–theissuesemergingfromthelimited
remitscouldhavebeenconsidered,debatedandresolvedwithoutthepressureofan
emerginginsurgency.This,however,wasnotthecase–theEmergencywasdeclared
whenSIFE,theMSS,andtheJIC(FE)wereimmature,lackingtheorganisationagility
297
toadaptquickly to theMCPchallenge.The resultwas that rather thanworking in
concerttheMSSandSIFEwereinastateofdeepconflict.Moreover,theJIC(FE)was
in theprocessofestablishing itself,andsimply ignoredMalaya’s rapiddecline into
conflict.
Withthebenefitofhindsight,thesolutiontothisissueappearsself-evident.Eitherthe
JIC (FE) had to meet the element of its charter that gave it a responsibility for
coordinatingtheintelligenceapparatusintheregionortheFederationhadtocreate
aLocal IntelligenceCommittee,chairedbyanon-executiveDirectorof Intelligence.
Onlyinthiswaycouldadegreeofstrategiccoordinationbeimposeduponthevarious
decentralised components ofMalaya’s intelligencemachine. It remains difficult to
understandwhyGurneyopposedsovigorouslythissolution,particularlywhenone
considershisotherwisesophisticatedandperceptiveunderstandingof thesecurity
problemswithwhichhewas confronted. Theproblemwasnot solveduntil 1952,
whenTemplercreated theFederal IntelligenceCommittee. It isnear impossible to
correlatewithanydegreeofcertainlytheimpactthattheFIChaduponthecounter-
insurgencycampaign.Nevertheless,adecreaseofconflictwithin theMalayancore
executive,achangeininteragencyrelationsfromcompetitiontodependence,anda
general stability characterises the Malaya intelligence apparatus after the
establishmentoftheFIC,whichisinmarkedcontrastwiththefirstfouryearsofthe
Emergency.
The problems experienced by theMalayan authorities in coordinating emergency
intelligencehighlightsaproblemwhichwillinevitablybeapressingchallengeinany
contemporarycounter-insurgencyoperation.The fact that theMalayanauthorities
tookoverfouryearstoresolvethisproblemmeantthattheEmergencywasseverely
compromisedwhensuchinter-organisationstrifecouldbeleastafforded.
FinalThoughts
Far from being irrelevant to contemporary counter-insurgents, the Emergency
continues to provoke discussion about its conceptual legacy and value of the
perceived lessons uponwhich current doctrine in theUnited KingdomandUnited
298
States is based. It is unfortunate that for the best part of fifty-years, through
misinterpretationandwell-intentionedmyth-making,askewedunderstandingofthe
development and management of intelligence has worked its way both into the
historiography of the Emergency and, perhapsmore importantly, into subsequent
counter-insurgency theory.60 Rather being dominated by a Special Branch which
developed in a linear,whiggish, fashion, the intelligence apparatus inMalayawas
broad and diffuse, with different elements developing independently and in non-
linearrates.Theoriginsofitsfailuretoforecastthestartoftheinsurgencywerefar
deeperthanthesimpleexplanationthattheMSSwasflawed.Ratherthanbeingthe
defining element, Special Branch was but one of a number of organisations that
subsequently fought the counter-insurgency.Moreover, it was dependent upon a
Policeforcethatwasunabletoserveasthe‘eyesandears’ofSpecialBranchinany
meaningfulwaytoduetoparamilitarystrategywhichwasemployedinthefirstfour
years of the Emergency. It fell to the military to ‘hold the ring’ until the civilian
elementsoftheintelligenceapparatushadfullyadaptedtothedemandsofcounter-
insurgency. This is a fundamentally different interpretation of the evolution of
intelligenceduringtheEmergency.Moreover,itleadstotheconclusionthateffective
forecasting; the need to react proportionately when a threat is detected; the
importanceoftrulyjointintelligenceoperations;andeffectivestrategiccoordination
aretheenduringlessonsfromtheEmergencyinrelationtointelligence.
General Briggs bemoaned in his plan that intelligence was ‘our Achilles’ heel’.61
Despitehisbestefforts, it remainedthecounter-insurgents’ ‘Achilles’Heel’ for the
bestpartoftheEmergency.TheeffortsoftheFederationtotackletheCommunist
insurgencydonotprovideablueprintormysticalformulaformanagingintelligence
thatmightbeusedwithoutalterationtoothercampaigns.Theprocessofdevisingan
appropriate intelligencestructuresuitable toproducesufficient intelligence tohalt
theEmergencywastortuousandprolonged.Inmanyways,itprovidesthemodelof
60PaulRichandIsabelleDuyvesteynadvocateasimilarargumentinrelationto‘heartsandminds’.SeeRichandDuyvesteyneds.,TheRoutledgeHandbookofInsurgencyandCounterinsurgency,pp.362-3.61AIR20/7777,ReportontheEmergencyinMalaya,fromApril1950toNovember1951,bySirHaroldBriggs.
299
whatnottodo.However,itishopedthatthisthesismayencouragecontemporary
counter-insurgents to reconsider the management of intelligence during the
Emergencyandwhether theeffortsofpeople likeDalley,Gurney,Briggs,Templer,
YoungandMortonmayhavecontinuedrelevanceintoday’sdifficult,unconventional,
securitysituation.
300
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