Apollo Experience Report Test and Checkout

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N A S A T ECHN I CA L NO T E NASA TN D-7683M00hazcUL/)4z C A ! L ECOPY#

APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT -TEST AND CHECKOUTby Joseph E. MecibelayLyndon B. Johnson S p a e CenterHouston, Texm 77058NAT ION AL AERONAUTICS AN D SPACE ADMINISTR ATION WASHINGTON, D. C . M A Y 1 9 7 4


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3. Recipient's Catalog No.

5. Report Date

1. Reporr Nu. 2. Government Accession No.TN D-7683

4. Tit le and Subtit le

._ . - -7. Aut twr(s1

APOLLOEXPERIENCEREPORTTEST AN D CHECKOUT8. Performin g Organization Rep ort No.

May 1974 ~6. Performing Organization Codet-

K G e y Words (Suggested by Author(s))* Space Vehicle Checkout Program' Te st Documentation* Spacecraft Testing' Acceptance' Retesting Plan s

* Te st Philosophy'Apollo Testing

------__ I--8. D ist r ibut ion StatementSubject Category 31

JSC S-3921 c W o r k U n i t No. -II_---__oseph E. Mechelay, JSC l--_ ---_ I -.-

19. Security Classif. (o f th is report ) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21 . NO. of PagesNone None 39

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

22 . Price$3.25

11. Contract or Grant No.-t3. Type o f Report and Period CoveredHouston, Texas 77058--_._I--____I-. ~ _.__I- _ _ -I--__-

2 . Sponsoring Agency Name and AddressNational Aeronau tics and Space AdministrationWashington, D. C. 20546

I Technical Note14. Sponsoring Agency Code

6. AbstractThe problem a rea s encountered during the development of the acceptan ce testing and preflightcheckout r equi rem ents and procedures f or Apollo spacecraft are discussed. Recommendationsa r e given fo r c as es in which methods used in the Apollo Pro gra m a r e considered to apply to futurespace flight progra ms.


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CONTENTSSectionSUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHECKOUT DOCUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TEST CONFIGURATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .RETEST PHILOSOPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Retest Ground Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Retes t Ground Rules for Electrical Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Retest Ground Rules for Fluid and Mechanical Systems . . . . . . . . . . .

DESTACKING CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .DESIRABILITY OF PREINSTALLATION ACCEPTANCE TESTS . . . . . . . .FACTORY OR FIELD TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USE OF NONFLIGHT EQUIPMENT DURING CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . .DESIRABILITY O F PROPULSION SYSTEM FIRING TESTS . . . . . . . . . . .VACUUM TESTING CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CREW EQUIPMENT STOWAGE TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHECKOUT OF REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INTEGRATED SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHECKOUTTOLERANCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDMA-GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX B- POLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO . 26B . . . . . . . . . .

Page112566777888

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FIGURESFigure Page

Example of documentation of tes t requirements and 34

1 specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Example of form used for test change notices . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 Fac tory checkout flow910

11121314

(a) Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(b) P a r t 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(c) Y a r t 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(d) P a r t 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .( e ) P a r t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The KSC test sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORTTEST AND CHECKOUT

By Joseph E. M e c h e l a yL y n d o n B. J o h n s o n S pace C e n t e r

S U M M A R YAcceptance testing of Apollo spacecraft was conducted during manufacturing andassembly to determine conformity to design or specifications as a basis for acceptance.Testing at the launch sit e was conducted primarily to reverify perfo rmance of individ-u a l launch vehicle sta ges and modules as received fr om the factory. Experience gainedin dealing with many of the problems encountered during the Apollo Prog ram in theseareas of activity can be applied to future space flight progra ms. The following repre -sentative problem a re as are discussed: checkout documentation, change implementa-tion, test configuration control, ret es t philosophy, destacking considerations,desirabil ity of preinstallation acceptance te st s, factory o r fie ld test ing, use of nonflightequipment during checkout, desirabil ity of propulsion system firing tes ts , vacuum te st -ing considerations , crew equipment stowage te st s, checkout of redundant functions, in-tegrated subsystem checkout, and checkout tolerances.

I N T R O D U C T I O NThe orig inal Apollo philosophy was to provide flight-ready vehicles to the launchsi te . The re as on s fo r establishing this objective were twofold: first, the early detec-tion of any hardware defects would resu lt in an earli er resolution of any problem and,second, the factory would be better equipped to replace hardware. This philosophy wasnot completely real ized because pa rt s were not available and because subsequent iden-tification of requ irements f or some testing facilities requ ired the installation of thepar ts a t locations other than the factori es for reasons of safety and economy.Acceptance testing of an Apollo spacecraft was conducted in conjunction with themanufacturing and assembly process . Testing was conducted at the launch si te prim ar -ily to e ns ur e that the performance of each subsystem had not degraded after factorycheckout and to verify that the spacecraft/launch vehicle interface, launch team, andlaunch support equipment were ready.Problem areas encountered during the Apollo Program are discussed in this re-port. In general, the ar ea s discussed are within the scope of the spacecra ft testing ac-tivities; however, se ve ra l examples pertain to launch vehicle testing. Two approachesare taken in the discuss ion of the test and checkout activities. One approach is to state


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CHANGE IMPLEMENTATIONHardware, software, and procedura l changes requi ring implementation duringtesting and checkout led to difficulties that could have been prevented i f inadequacies

had been recognized ea rl ie r. Examples of difficulties that were experienced are citedin the following paragraphs, and procedures to minimize delays and prevent accidentsa r e recommended.Tests were disrupted when connectors were disconnected o r ground support equip-ment (GSE) w a s shut off to permit a change. A technique was developed to alleviateproblems of this na ture by including periods i n the te st flow to incorporate blocks ofchanges. Use of th is technique allowed uninterrupted test ing and optimized work ac-complishment during modification periods.In some cases, malfunctions resulted when seemingly straightforward activitiesthat should have been conducted in series were performed in paral lel. During a modi-

fication period, all activ ities should be controlled in a manner similar to that exercisedduring the te st activity. This provides proper integration of al l activities and ensuresthat systems safety is not compromised.Another difficulty occurred when all aspects of a major change were not incor-porated at one time, even though modification periods wer e in effect. The compatibilityof a total change was normally proofed in an integrated systems ground test article, buta partial change w a s generally not tested in that program. Partial changes resulted inmany aborted acceptance te st s. A procedure should be implemented to flag par tia lchange incorporation. A special assessment must be made to determine the effective-ne ss of te st s tha t a r e conducted before completion of the total change.Another area of concern was the cancellation of a major change after it had beenpartially incorporated. In some cases , partially incorporated changes resulted in un-necessary equipment and circuits that could have caused flight failures. For example,electr ical wiring installed as part of a major change and left installed after the majorchange w a s canceled resulted in an elect rical shorting condition in the command mod-ule during one unmanned Apollo flight, An administrative procedure is required to pre-vent this type of occurrence.The converse of the preceding example also applies. Changes incorporated todeactivate equipment already installed require positive assurance that all interfaceshave been deactivated. For electromechanical equipment, deactivating only the me-

chanical functions could produce an electrical hazard o r result in a flight failure . Inthe command module, a waste management system blower w a s deactivated by discon-necting and plugging the hardlines; however, electr ical control of the blower w a s notchanged or deact ivated. The inadvertent activation of a switch caused the blower tooperate against a deadheaded system, resulting in burning out the blower motor. Thefa il ur e modes and effects analysis should be updated for each contemplated change toprevent situations such as this from occurring.

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TEST CONFIGURATION CONTROLThe vehicle configuration must be verif ied before any te st is started. This veri-fication includes determining that the latest modifications have been incorporated; as-suring that all required components have been installed, required elec trica l connectors

mated, and fluid lines connected; and assuring that cabin valves, circui t bre ake rs , andswitches a r e in proper positions. With respec t to the GSE, the setup must be verified,the requir ed fluid samples taken, and the sw itch ha lv e configuration verified.Once the test is started, rigid control must be exercised to maintain test disci-pline. This is accomplished by having approved procedures for test and by requiringdocumentation of discrepancies . (Documentation of checkout te st anomalies proved tobe very difficult to control during the Apollo Program. ) Usually, discrepant conditionsshould be analyzed before a test is continued, but this is not always possible . Discrep-ancies should be thoroughly documented as to how the vehicle/GSE is configured and howthe problem manifests itself. The troubleshooting philosophy should be approved, andeach s tep must be documented before its accomplishment.For example, during the pre launch checkout of the Apollo 16 spacecraft, a situa-tion occurred as a re su lt of improp er tes t configuration evaluation. During the trouble-shooting of a leaking quick-disconnect fitting, the pre ssure was vented fro m the GSEmanifold to facilitate the valve changeout. However, the GSE/spacecraft configurationwas such that venting of the manifold placed a negative pressure on the spacecraft burstdisks. This negative pre ss ur e caused the burst disks to rupt ure and the spacecraftpropellant tank bladders to collapse. As a result, the spacecraft had to be destackedso that the propellant tanks and integral bladders could be replaced.

RETEST PHILO SO PHYTh er e a r e many instances during the lifetime of a vehicle when connectors aredisconnected, li nes broken, components replaced, and si mi la r actions taken. Occur-re nc es such as these cause los s of confidence in previously established t es t integrity;therefore, a ret est philosophy and plan are required. System-level and vehicle-levelacceptance test s a r e continually proofing the integrity of the ent ire svstem and/orvehicle. A plan that will se t forth the philosophy and basic requir ements fo r the re-establishment of proof of integrity is required in the early sta ges of checkout. The

detailed retest plan will be a major undertaking in any futu re program. Such a planwas developed for the Apollo Program. Thi s plan contained a matrix of all spacecraftconnectors and showed where the integrity of ea ch connector w a s verified during thecheckout pro ces s. Many connectors were verified more than once, and thi s plan re -flected each verification. Because of this matrix, rapid determinations of re te st r e -quirements were easily made. In addition, when verification of connectors could bedelayed until a later test date, valuable te st time w a s saved because special re te st swer e not required. The re te st philosophy used in the Apollo Pr og ra m is presented inthe following subsect ions . Thi s philosophy is recommended as a baseline for retestrequirements.


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G e n e r a l R e t es t G r o u n d R u l e sReverification may require additional testing or may utilize downstream testing,but the reverification should be accomplished before beginning the Flight ReadinessTest. However, i f troubleshooting or a replacement is required during the FlightReadiness T est , the reverification must be accomplished before completing the FlightReadiness Tes t by rerunning the appropria te tes t procedures sequences. The documen-tation that identifies and authorizes the operation resulting in invalidation of previoustesting must include the specific re te st requirements for reverification and the vehicleor test constraints.Retes t procedures for each connector, control panel, and spacecraf t componentshould be prepared before test as an adjunct to the st andard operational tes t procedures.Retesting combinations of panels, components, and connectors will often result in someit em s being checked two or mor e times. The number of combinations involved is enor-mous. Constraints, switch mat ric es, and GSE usage, for example, have to be evalu-ated. Because of these factors, retest procedures cannot always be preplanned unlessit is decided to repeat all basic operational checkout procedures , which would necessi-tate excessive retes t time. It w a s often necessary in the Apollo Program to cr eate re-test procedures in real time by combining pa rt s of existing procedures and creating newones as the ca se demanded.

R e t e st G r o u n d R u l e s f o r E l e c t ri c a l A s s e m b l i e sBefore a replacement assembly is installed, i t must be preinstallation tested inaccordance with existing specifications and time limitations to verify that the assembly,by itself, meets the requi red performance cri ter ia. Any suspect or failed assemblyremoved fr om the spacecraft must be recyc led through a preinstallation test and any

additional bench-level test required to isolate malfunctions. U n i t s that exhibit inter-mittent failures should not be reinstalled in the spacecraft until the cau se of the failureis found and corrected.When an electronic assembly is replaced in the spacecraft by a different unit, allfunctional modes and all functional paths to and through the replacement assembly shouldbe reveri fied and, in some instances , an end-to-end recalibration conducted. Nonsus-pect assemb lies removed from the spacecraft t o allow access to other equipment do notreq uir e bench-level testing before reinstallation. In this instance, an interface integritytest should be performed. A ll connectors that are demated must have continuity rever-ified after remating. After replacement or rep air , continuity and electri cal isolationshould be reverifi ed.

R e te st G r o u n d R u l e s for F l u i d a nd M e c h a n i c a l S y s t e m sThe replacement of components or the breaking of any fluid sys tem requires , a ta minimum, leak tests of the remated connections and cleanliness reverification of thereworked area. Functional verification in the spacecraft is required on replacedcomponents.

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- rService module reaction Command modulelservicecontrol system leak and module mated interface -functional test

Mechanica ldocking test - Post-chambertestsAl t i tudetests

Figure 4. - The KSC test sequence.

Cryogenic storage- ystem leak andfunctional test+ ISpacecraft llau nc hmate verification- ehic le pre -e lec t r ica l

Flight-readiness firings and initial environmental t es ts should meet factory orspecial-test-s ite requirements . Complete functional and environmental tes ts of thevarious Saturn launch vehicle stages occur red before delivery of the launch vehiclesto the launch site. However, sta tic firings were not conducted on Apollo spacecraftpropulsion sys tems because of the unique considerations resulting fr om the use of en-gines requiring hypergolic propellants. These considerations we re , pr imar ily, thatthe propulsion sys tems wer e difficult to purge and clean, the propellant caused cor ro -sion of system components, and the toxicity of the propel lant presen ted a hazardousworking condition.

- Spacecraft l lau nc hvehic le e lec t r ica l Overa l l t es t -1 - l ight read iness _.m ate and em ergency p lugs- in tes t testdetection system test

4 --

Two different vacuum-chamber tests were conducted on the Apollo spacecraft.For economy, the chambers were installed at KSC to reduce the requ irements fo r con-struction of special facilities at the pr ime contractor's plants and to allow the vacuumchambers to be used fo r follow-on programs. Hazardous tests of manned modules,such as vacuum-chamber altitude simulations, should be conducted late in the te st flow.A t that time, the spacecraft modules ar e clos er to flight configuration and gr ea te r as-suranc e of crew safety exi sts .

tLau nch escape system

U SE OF N O N FL I G H T EQ U I PM EN T D U R I N G C H EC K OU T

Countdowndem onst ra t ion Countdownress ure test and

In the Apollo Prog ra m, the us e of nonflight equipment or substitute units duringvehicle-level tests w a s a continuous sou rce of discussion. These units were used whenrepeated testing o r continuous cycling could be detrimental to criti cal flight items . Forexample, nonflightworthy reaction control engines were used fo r lunar module factorycheckout. Substitute units may be required f o r us e in place of sensitive electronicpackages, especially those exhibiting a high change rate or a high failu re rate. Thesa me principle applies to guidance computer pr og ra ms , o r software, in which lateavailability could be a problem.

- ypergolic servicingeight and balance andthru st vector a l inem ent

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One argument against using nonflight hardware and software is that i t may notrepresent the proper flight configuration. This is especially undesirable during aperiod in which change activity is high. This situation can be controlled with a rigidconfiguration management system that en su res change effectivity in the flight substi-tutes. Questions then will arise as to when in the test flow flight software should beused instead of test software and when substitute units should no longer be used. Apolloexperience indicates that flight software can be incorporated into the spacecraft ex-tremely late i n the launch-site checkout flow, provided that rigorous means of verifica-tion and reverificat ion by an independent source have been used.D E S I R A B I L I T Y OF P R O P U L S IO N S Y S T EM F I R I N G T ES TS

The requirement for stage- or module-level propulsion system firing tests, oftencalled flight-readiness fi rings, was another debatable is sue. Every stage of the Saturnlaunch vehicle was subjected to an aeceptance firing. It has been stated that a vehicle-level firing test additionally serves as a good vibration test fo r al l vehicle equipment.This was true fo r the launch vehicle stages because the vibration environment duringground firing w a s more s eve re than that encountered during flight. However, this wasnot tru e for all spacecraft propulsion modules because of the lower thrust levels ofsom e engines. This is su e must be settled early in subsequent prog ram s so that thevehicles can be built and the test flow planned to accommodate an acceptance fir ing.

The Apollo lunar module ascent and descent engines we re not capable of beingfired at sea level conditions, and purging and cleanup requirements after firing of en-gines using hypergolic propellant would have decreased the confidence that the firinghad produced. The Apollo service module engine also was not acceptance fired af terinstallation because of the hypergolic considerations. However, production units weresuccessfully fired during unmanned flights of both vehicles. An addit ional confidencefiring of a nonflight production service module w a s performed. Satisfactory systemperformance w a s verified, but teardown of the system confirmed the existence ofcontamination and corrosion, thus reinforcing the decision not to perform groundfirings of flight syst ems. Arguments against acceptance firings are the increasedcost and the scheduling problems that would result.

V A C U U M T E S TI NG CONS1 DERATIONSIn the Apollo Progr am, vehicle-level vacuum te st s were conducted late in the

test and checkout flow. An "all uprf vehicle ( a completely assembled CSM) was sub-jected to the vacuum environment to find faults that re su lt f ro m vacuum-induced expan-sion, and the complete environmental control system (ECS) was tes ted with the suitedcrewmen. Because vehicle-level te st s were conducted, not all individual syst em s andequipment were previously exposed to a vacuum environment. It is recommended, how-ev er , that vacuum test ing of specific sys te ms and types of equipment be accomplishedbefore vehicle-level testing to minimize the possibility of problems i n the later tes ts

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and the resulting impact on schedules. A s a minimum, the following categories ofequipment should be individually tested in a vacuum environment.1. Items for which additional confidence is desired, such as life-support systemsequipment2. Items that have marginal or questionable environmental sensitivity, such aselectronic equipment packages containing soft potting3 . Items that would require destacking or removal of a major struc ture for theirreplacement

CREW EQU I PMENT STOWAGE TESTSManned spacecraft test programs should include crew equipment stowage tests atthe factory to ensure the adequacy of sto rage space and to check accessibility and utility.

Because crew equipment is generally one of the las t ite ms to be delivered, the require-ment for these te st s establishes fir m goals fo r crew equipment delivery. The initialtests should be conducted by experienced crewmen to ensure that the stowage will beacceptable in the flight environment.CHECKOUT OF REDUNDANT FUNC TlO N S

Crew safety w a s enhanced by minimizing the number of single-point-failure poss i-bilit ies in the Apollo spacecraft design. This was accomplished primarily by providingcompletely separate or alternate sy ste ms to perform the sa me function. If a missionfunction was critical , two identical primary paths were provided, and both paths usuallyoperated simultaneously. Within each parallel path, additional ser ies redundancy wasusually provided when the paths contained cri ti ca l pa r ts and components. Parallel re-dundancy assured that a function was accomplished when requi red; ser ies redundancyass ure d that a function would not be accomplished before it w a s required.In addition to the primary mode, a secondary o r backup mode was provided fo rvery critical functions. The backup mode w a s generally a manual and more dir ec tmethod of accomplishing the mission function; that is , it bypassed some of the devicesthat had to opera te in each of the prima ry paths. The backup mode generally did notoperate simultaneously with the primary mode, and redundancy may or may not have

been incorporated.An example is given fo r additional clarification. Escape-tower je ttison was amission function requi red i n the manual launch sequence. The pr im ar y mode of towerjettison was ignition of the tower jettison motor and separation of the tower bolts . Th iswas accomplished automatically by the mission sequencers . Full end-to-end p aralle lredundancy w a s provided fr om the initiating mechanism to the function-accomplishingmechanism. One of the parall el paths was called the pr im ar y path and the other theredundant path. The backup mode for tower jettison was initiated manually. A switch

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was actuated that ignited the launch escape motor and separated the tower bolts. Thisuse of mo re than one relay , either parallel- or series-ins talled, provided circuitredundancy.Thr ee aspects of verifying pro per operation of redundant functions and backupmodes need to be considered; each usually requires a separ ate te st and checkout

method. The processes ar e as follows.11. The primary and redundant functions ar e tested in thr ee st eps in the space-craft. Each paral lel path is tested individually, end to end, and the parall el paths a r etested simultaneously in the third step. This three-step checkout does not tes t thebackup mode.

2. The backup mode is tested in one step, end to end.3 . The previously described end-to-end tes ts verify the open (permiss ive) posi-

tion of the redundancy. To verify the closed position, each item is checked separately.This is a relatively easy task i f test points a r e provided between each item. These tes tpoints, however, are frequently not designed into the equipment for spacecraf t-levelcheckout, and a true test can only be made during component fabrication or assemblyand checkout of the equipment before installation in the spacecraft.

Adequate testing a t the fac tor ies constitutes complete verification of all redundantfunctions (case 1) and all backup modes (case 2) and a par tia l verification of redundancy(case 3) . The redundancy verification not accomplished at a spacecraft level must beidentified. Checkout of the redundant functions at the launch site should be accomplishedas late as is practical i n the spacecraft f low and should include all the redundant andbackup modes that can be assessed.

1 NTEGRATED SUB SYS TEM CHECKOUTThe initial lunar module checkout philosophy w a s to verify each subsystem indi-vidually before ver ification of the next subsystem. This process w a s extremely longand costly. To save factory te st t ime and to use the GSE hardware and software capa-bilities to the ir fullest advantage, an integrated subsystem checkout concept was i m-plemented. This concept allowed several subsystems to be under test simultaneouslyunder ove rall contro l of a ma st er te st document. With this method, when checkout ofone subsystem was constrained because of an anomaly, the checkout flow for the re-maining subsystems could continue. Th is philosophy did re qu ir e considerable planning

1The te rm "pr imary and redundant functions'' refers to the operation of bothpaths of a pa ir of simi larly constructed primary paths used to accomplish a singlemission function.2The t e r m "redundancy" refers, in this sense, to the provision of two or moreidentical pa rt s o r components used in a primary o r redundant function o r backup modepath.

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effor t to optimize the testing, troubleshooting, re pa ir s, and replacements and to reducethe number of test constraints. The end result w a s that the spacecraft delivery mile-stones were met with substantially less test time on the spacecraft than under the pre -vious system of test ing each subsys tem independently.CHECKOUT TOLERANCES

Satisfactory performance of the ECS was di fficult to verify during factory checkoutof the first manned vehicle. An investigation revealed that the tolerance values beingused for vehicle-level te st s were those specified by the supplier f or the individual com-ponents. The re su lt s were that many failure s wer e being reported, components wer ebeing replaced unnecessarily , and the resulting re te st s were severely hampering thecheckout flow. The tolerance being used did not take into account te st configuration andGSE differences that did not permit measuring to these tight tole rances. Consequently,the tolerances were adjusted to the mission requirements and then narrowed from thesevalues by a root -sum-square technique that accounted fo r GSE inaccurac ies and space-cra ft hardware measurement tolerances. Subsequent vehicle checkout pro gre sse d sat-isfactori ly and no flight fa ilures that could be attributed to checkout tol erances beingtoo broad have been observed.CONCL UDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDAT IONS

Although Apollo test and checkout methods were based, to a large extent, on ex-perience gained from previous programs , many additional lessons were learned as theApollo Program progressed. Some of the more significant aspects of Apollo acceptancetesting and preflight checkout experience have been discussed, and recommendationsfor future programs ar e summarized here.

1 . The Apollo te st documentation method of combining requirements and specif i-cations into a multiple-spacecraft document is practical and is recommended for futureuse.2 . Rigidly controlled procedures are recommended fo r the incorporat ion andtesting of hardware and software changes made during the acceptance tes ting and check-out process. In addition, vehicle/support equipment configuration control and documen-tation control must be s tric tly adhered to during all tes t periods.3 . A comprehensive retest plan is requi red during the earl y st ages of checkout,

delineating requirements for demonstration of vehicle integrity a fte r rep lacements ,modifications, re pa ir , et cete ra . Retention of the Apollo philosophy as a baseline fo restablishing retest requirements is recommended.4. Requirements for destacking of multimodule or multistage vehicles should beheld to a minimum during the production acceptance-test phase.

favor of vendor acceptance te st s.5 . Consideratim should be given to deleting preins tallation acceptance tests in

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6. Where feasible, new or fi rs t-t ime tes ts should not be performed on individ-ual stages o r modules a t the launch sit e; these test s should be conducted a t the factory.7. The us e of nonflight equipment for checkout should be discouraged. Whensubstitu tes a r e required , the design should duplicate the functional chara cte ri sti cs ofthe flight ite ms.8. Where feasible, at lea st one propulsion syst em firing should be conductedon a flight-configured stage or module as a proof of the production, te st , and checkoutprocesses.9. Vacuum tes ting should be performed at the component (black box) or highestprac tical level of assembly on all flight equipment susceptible to failure under vacuumexposure. Thi s should be performed before vehicle vacuum testing.

10. A cre w equipment stowage tes t should be conducted a t the factory .11. Complete verification of all redundant functions and backup modes should beaccomplished at the fac tory, and, to the extent possible, component redundancy shouldbe verified. The redundancy verification not accomplished at the spacecraft level mustbe identified. Checkout of the redundant functions at the launch si te should be accom-plished as late as is practi cal and should include all redundant and backup modes thatcan be asses sed.12. Apollo factory experience indica tes that par all el checkout of selected space-craft subsystems is a prac tical consideration and can decr ease overall checkout time.13. Checkout tolerances should be based on mission requirements and shouldconsider the accuracy of both the spacecra ft and ground support equipment measuring

systems.Lyndon B. Johnson Space CenterNational Aeronautics and Space AdministrationHouston, Texas, January 23, 1974914-11-00-00-72

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APPENDIX AGLOSSARY

All-up vehicle - A completely assembled moduleBench-level testing - Testing performed on a component basis or module basis outsidethe spacecraftFailure mode and ef fec ts analysis - Analysis of failure modes and their effect on sys-tems and on mission performanceFlight Readiness Test - Last major test conducted before the Countdown Demonstrat ionTest to verify that all spacecraft systems are i n a state of flight readiness; in-cludes systems compatibility during abort modes and during a normal missionFunctional mode - The termina l activity o r indication that is the end result of a trans-mitted signal o r initiating forceFunctional path - One or more routes by which a transmitted signal or initiating fo rcecan be directed to accomplish a desir ed activity or indicationInterface integrity - Completeness of mechanical, electr ical , and functional mate oftwo or more modules or stagesSoftware - Computer programing, tes t procedures

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OFFIC E OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTPROGRAM DIRECTIVEI I

DATEDecember 8, 1970-D MA 1400.135(Proiect)

APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO. 2 6 ~TO : DISTRIBUTION FROM : L d , %

ROCCO A. PETRONEAPOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Addendum 1 o Apollo Program Di rec tiv e No. 2 6 ~Preparation of Tes t and Checkout Pl an s and Proce dure s a t KSCI. PURPOSE

The purpose of t h i s addendum i s t o re q u i r e t h a t p r op er l e v e l s o fapproval f o r hazardous t e s t and checkout of troubleshooting pro-cedures be id en ti f i ed i n KSC Operations Dire ctiv es.

11. Hazardous Op eratio ns Approval RequirementsKSC Opera tions Direc t ives sh a l l ide nt i fy approva l lev e l s f o r t e s t so r t roubleshooting procedures involving hazardous operations o r t e s to r t roubleshoot ing procedures not previous ly ver i f ied a t the launcho r f a c to r y s i t es .

111. ImplementationThe requirement es ta bl is he d by th i s addendum i s ef fec t i ve immedia te lyand implementation i s a pp l i c a b le to a l l missi ons. Copies of imple-menting i ns t ruc t io ns s ha l l be forwarded t o MA.

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OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTPROGRAM DIRECTIVE

APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO. 26-BMA OO9-026-1B

DATEDecember 6 , 1967-D 1400.075(Project)

TO : DISTRIBUTION FROM:

APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTORSUBJECT: Preparation of T e s t and Checkout Pl an s and Procedu res a t KSC

I .

11.

111.

I V .

V.

PURPOSEThi s Program Dir ect iv e covers th e prepa ratio n and con tro l of t e s tand checkout plan s and procedures f o r th e pre para tion and launchof Apollo-Saturn space ve hi cl es a t KSC.SCOPEThis D i r e c t ive de f ine s th e r equ i re m en t s , r e sp ons ib i l i t i e s andin te r - c e n te r c oord ina t ion ne c e ssa ry t o the development, revisionand execution of t e s t and checkout plans and procedures for theprep arati on and launch of Apollo-Saturn space veh icl es a t KSC.RESPONSIBILITYThe D ire c to rs of KSC, MSC, and MSFC are r e spons ib le f o r t a k ing a c -t i o n as necessary t o implement t h i s Dir ec t ive .assigned i n t h i s Direc t i ve may be de legated except in ins t ance swhere the de le ga t ion of res po nsi b i l i ty sh a l l be no lower than thele v e l spe c i f i e d he re in .

R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

TIME COMPLIANCEThis Direc t ive i s e f f e c t i v e f o r a l l subsequent Apollo/Saturn m i s -si on s except t h a t t h e use of st and ard ize d names fo r KSC Test andCheckout Plans and T e s t and Checkout Procedures s ha ll be ef fe ct iv ef o r AS-205 and AS-503 and subsequent missions.IMPLEMENTATIONA . The Manned Space Fli gh t C ente rs s ha ll prepare di re ct iv es t oimplement th e res po ns ib i l i t ie s ass igned he re in and submit copie s

t o Apollo Program D irect or .B. Any in te r -cente r problem ar is in g i n th e implementat ion of t h i s

Dire c t iv e which cannot be resolv ed s ha l l be b ro ug ht t o t h eimmediate a tt en ti o n of t h e Apollo Program Dir ect or.

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V I . GENERALA.

B.

C.

D .

E .

December 6, 1967I-D 2 400.075(Proiect)Development organizations (MSFC and MSC) are r e s p o n s i b l e fo rd e f i n i n g s p ec i f i c t e s t and checkout requir emen ts t h a t must bep er fo rm ed on f l i g h t v eh i c l e s a t t h e f ac t o ry p r i o r t o accept an ceand a t the launch s i t e p r i o r t o f l i g h t.requirements t o demonstrate th e performance of ground supportequipment provided by the development organization which i sasso c ia t ed wi th fac t o ry accep tance and launch s i t e p rep a ra t i o ns h a l l be included. The t e s t and checkout requirements sh a l lc lear ly def ine what i s t o be t e s t e d . Test methods, hardwareco n f i g u ra t i o n , t e s t sequence and o ther cons t ra in t s sha l l bei d en t i f i ed t o t h e ex t en t n eces sa ry t o a s s u re a t ta in m en t oft e s t objectives, protect hardware from damage and provide fort h e safety of personnel.The combined f a c to ry and launch s i t e t e s t and checkout require-ments sh a l l provide an in t egr ate d f low of t es t i ng . The objec-t i v e o f t h e i n t e gr a t e d t e s t f lo w s h a l l be t o pe rm it v e r i f i c a t i o nof t he func t iona l performance o f ess en t ia l systems and t h e i rin t eg r a t i on in to th e space veh ic le withou t unnecessary repe t i -t i o n of f a c t o r y l e v e l t e s t i n g . To t h e e x t e n t p r a c t i c a b l e , t h eo v e r a l l t e s t f low sh a l l permit cor rel at i on of dat a betweenf a c t o r y and l au nc h s i t e t e s t i n g f o r c r i t i c a l f l i g h t ha rdw arecomponents .

Test and checkout

Development organizations a re respons ib le fo r p rov id ing t e s ts p e c i f i ca t i o n s and c r i t e r i a or l imits inc lud ing red l i ne va luesand assoc ia ted conf igura t ion cons t ra in t s by which t o judgeac ce pta ble performance of f l i g h t hardware and ground supportequipment fur nish ed by t h e development org aniz atio n.The development organizations use d i f f e r e n t t i t l e s and formatsfor T e s t and Checkout Requirements and Test Speci f ica t ion andC r i t e r i a documents. A t t h e e a r l i e s t t i m e convenient withoutrep ubl is hing e xi s t in g documents these sh al l be renamed as t h eT e s t and Checkout Requirem ents Document and t h e Test andCheckout S pec if i cat ion s and Cri te r ia Document.t h e l a t e r document may be included as a p a r t of t h e T e s t andCheckout Requirements Document.MSC and MSFC s h a l l pre pa re and approve Test and Checkout Re-quirements and T e s t and Checkout Specifications and Cri ter iaDocuments f o r t h e f l i g h t v eh ic le s and GSE which th ey develo p.Approved documents sh a ll be provided t o th e launch or gan iza tio n(KSC) no l a t e r than four months p r io r t o de l iv ery o f f l ig h tv eh i c l e s t o t h e Cape.

If d es i r ed ,

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r-- DATEOFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTPROGRAM DIRECTIVE December 6, 1967IM-D 1400.075(Project)F. MSC i s respon s ib le fo r p repar ing f l i g h t c rew procedures fo r

use on launch day and during f l i g h t . These procedures andchanges the re to sh al l be made a va i la ble t o KSC f or use i n pre-paring t e s t and checkout procedures involving flight crewp a r t i c i p a t i o n .

G. The above documentation pro vid es t h e framework w it hi n whicht h e l au n ch o rg an i za t i o n p rep a re s t e s t and checkout plans fori n t e g r a t i n g a l l t e s t a c t i v i t i e s a t t h e l aun ch s i t e and developsd e t a i l e d t e s t and checkout procedures f or each t e s t .

V I I . TEST AND CHECKOUT PLAN*A. A t e s t and checkout plan s h a l l be prepa red by KSC. I t s h a l l

provide an out l ine f o r accomplishing center t e s t and checkoutrequ i rem en ts a t t h e l aun ch s i t e and s h a l l i n c l u de any ad d i t i o n a lt e s t r eq ui re me nt s n e ce ss a ry t o v e r i f y l au nc h f a c i l i t y , i n t e r -fa ce and com pati b i l i ty with t h e Miss ion Control Center - Houstonand t h e Manned Space F l ig h t Network, and launc h crew re ad in es sor sa t i s f y range and saf e ty requi rements .

B. The fol lowing information s h al l be included:1. A f low plan d esig nat i ng the sequence of t e s t s t o beperformed.2. I d e n t i f i c a ti o n o f t h e f a c i l i t i e s i n vo lv ed i n t h e o v e r a l lt e s t flow.3 . S p e c i f i c o u t l i n e s f o r e ac h t e s t inc lud ing the fo l lowing :

a. T e s t t i t l e and procedure number.b . T es t o b j ec t i v e s .c . T e s t l o c a t i o n and f a c i l i t y .d . T es t d e s c ri p t io n i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l t o d e f i ne t h eprocedure i n o u t l i ne form.e. Flight hardware and GSE conf igu ra t ion requi rements .f . Software requirements .

*Denotes change.

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OFFIC E OF MANNED SPACE FLIG HTPROGRAM DIRECTIVE December 6 , 1967M-D MA 1b00.075(Proiect)

g.h .i.

5 .

k .

Signif icant support requirements .Ide n t i f i c a t i on o f any hazardous opera t ions .Saf ety requirements including any sp eci al equipment,personnel , procedures or t r a i n i n g r e q u ir e d f o r t e s t .Id en t i fy o rg an i za t i o n s o u t s i d e of KSC t h a t w i l l beinvolved.A cross re ference to the deve lopment cen ter t es trequirements where applicable.

4. A d e t a i l e d l i s t of devi ati ons from development c en te rt e s t r equ ir em ent s .V I I I . TEST AND CHECKOUT PROCEDURES

A .

B.

C.

D.

E .

T e s t and Checkout Proc edur es s h a l l be prep esed by KSC. AT e s t and Checkout Procedure sh al l defi ne th e d et ai le d s tep-by-s tep sequence of even ts i n a spec i f i c t e s t and sh a l l begenerated for each t e s t during prepar ation and launch off l i g h t v e h i c l e s .KSC and co n tr ac t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and i n t e r f a ces i n t h epreparation, revision and execution of Test and CheckoutProcedures sh a l l be c le ar ly defined by a KSC ManagenentIn st ru ct io n or o t her su i t ab le document approved by the KS CDirec to r . Th is document sha l l des igna te th e o f f i c i a l , a t anappr opri atel y h igh le ve l i n th e KSC orga niza t ion, who i s r e -sponsible for determining which t e s t s axe hazardous.MSC and MSFC may ex e rc i se an op tion t o rev iew T e s t and Check-out Procedures as deemed nece ssary. Any recommended changessh a l l be provided t o KSC no l a t e r t h an 1 5 da ys p r i o r t o t h es t a r t of the t e s t .MSC and MSFC s h a l l e s t a b l i s h a mechanism t o pro ces s launchs i t e recommended changes in fa ct or y tes ti ng .The following guidelines shall be u sed i n t h e p rep a ra t i o n ,re vi si on and execution o f KSC t e s t and checkout procedures.1. F a ct or y o r t e s t s i t e t e s t and checkout procedures which

have been approved by t h e development o rga niz ati on s h a llbe used as a bas el i ne i n the development of Launch S i t eT e s t and Checkout Proc edur es. Whenever p os si bl e , T e s tand Checkout Procedures wr it te n f or use i n the f a c t o r y

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I I DATEOFF ICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTPROGRAM DIRECTIVE December 6 , 1967IM-D 1400.075(Proiect)w i l l be modified for use a t the launch s i t e t o f i t uniquef a c i l i t y r equ ir ement s, s a fe t y co n s i d e ra t io n s , i n t eg ra t edspace veh ic le t e s t requirements and t o meet o b j ec t i v e si n t h e t e s t and checkout plan.

2. MSC i s requ i red t o de l ive r approved f l ig h t crew procedurest o KSC a t l e a s t 40 d ay s p r i o r t o a t e s t o r checkout opera-t i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e f l i g h t c r e w (See paragraph I X , B-2).Fl i g h t C r e w Procedures as approved and published by MSCs h a l l be use d by KSC when app l icab le i n prepar ing thoset e s t and checkout procedures involving th e f l ig ht crew.I n any cases where in co mp at ib il i t y between t e s t and check-out procedures and fl ig h t crew procedures e xi st s, KSCw i l l obt ain MSC approval of t he T e s t and CheckoutProcedure.

3 . A l l Test and Checkout Procedures involving hazardous op-e r a t i o n s s h a l l c o n t a i n o r p rov i de s p ec i f i c r e fe ren ce t owr i t t en i n s t ru c t i o n s fo r i d en t i fy i n g emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,sa fi ng of hardware and implementing emergency 'a ct io ns re-qu i red t o evacuate o r safeguard personnel and combat o rl i m i t the extent of the damage should an emergency a r i s e .

4. Test and Checkout Procedures s h a l l be sta ndardi zed i nregard t o the fo l lowing i t ems .a.

b .

C .

a.e.

f .

Q.

Major policy and procedure matters regarding prepara-t i on , review, approval and change cycle.

Control , approval level and documentat ion of t rouble-shoo ting durin g th e conduct of Te st and CheckoutProcedures.Extent of q u a l i t y c o n t r o l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a nd s i g n offduring execut ion of T e s t and Checkout Procedures.Ex ten t o f sa f e ty and med ica l o rgan iza t ion par t i c ip a-t ion . (See NMT 8900.1)Recording and approval l e v e l fo r dev ia t ions encoun teredduring implementation of Test and Checkout Procedures.Po l icy concern ing mul t i p le e f f ec t i v i ty o f Tes t andCheckout Procedures.In c l u s i o n o r ex c l u s i o n o f p rep a ra t i o n s t ep s i n Testand Checkout Procedures.

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" 5 .

" 6 .

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

DATEDecember 6, 1967-D 1400.075(Proiect)

h. Recording of 01s channels during exe cuti on of Testand Checkout Procedures.

i. Appropriate use of warning and ca uti on note s.P r i o r t o p u b l i ca t i on of a tes t and checkout procedure (TCP)f o r : ( a ) oper at ion al checkout of f l i gh t hardware; (b ) func-t i o n a l v e r i f i c a t i o n and o pe ra t i o n a l co n t ro l of GSE; and(c ) op e ra t i o n a l i n s t ru c t i o n s t o s e rv i ce , h and l e, and t r an s -po rt end item f l i g h t hardware duri ng prelaunch and launchopera t ions ; it s h a l l be approved by the KS C Safe t y Of f i cefo r a s su ran ce t h a t o p e rat i o ns are compatible with KS CS af et y c r i t e r i a KMI 1710.13 and use app ropr ia te sa f e typersonn el, tech niqu es, and equipment.P r i o r t o p u bl i c at i on o f a technical procedure to :tho r iz e work, (b ) p rov ide engineer ing ins t ru c t i ons ; and( c ) es ta bl is h methods of work con tro l; and involvinghazardous operat ions , it s h a l l b e approved by the KS CSafe ty Off ice for assurance that operat ions are compati-b l e w i t h KSC s a f e t y c r i t e r i a KMI 1710.13 and use appro-p r i a t e s a fe t y pe r s o nn e l , t e ch ni q ues and equipment.

( a ) au-

Test and checkout procedures involving human t e s t s u b j ec t ssh a l l be coord ina ted wi th medica l personnel f o r assu rancet h a t p o t e n ti a l r i s k s t o t h e h e a lt h of t e s t s u b je c t s areminimized. (See NMI 8900.1)

Tes t and Checkout Procedures sh a l l be provided t o t heKSC Launch Vehicl e or Spacecraf t Qu al i ty Surve i l l anc eDivis ion f or review and use i n preparing for p a r t i c i p a t i o ni n t e s t and checkout operations.T e s t and Checkout Procedures and changes th er et o f o r t e s t si n v ol v i ng f l i g h t crew p a r t i c i p a t i o n s h a l l h av e s i g n a t u reapproval of MSC.Approved Test and Checkout Procedures s h a l l be di st ri bu te done month p r io r t o the da te of th e t e s t .A T e s t and Checkout Procedure control system shall. beest abl ish ed which place s posi t ive contr ol over changessubsequen t t o th e d i s t r i bu t ion of approved cop ies t o th et e s t team. Only those changes i n sp ace craf t , launch vehi-c l e or space vehicle t e s t and checkout procedures whichw i l l improve safety or a r e mandatory because of l a t echanges i n hardware configura t ion s ha l l be approved i n

"Denotes change.~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~

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t h e l a s t seven calendar days before scheduled s t a r t of at e s t u n l e s s approved by th e fo l lowing organ iza t iona l l ev e lf o r t h e t e s t i n d i c a t e d .

DATEDecember 6 , 1967-D 1400.075(Proiect)

a . Launch Operations Manager(1) Fl ight Readiness( 2 ) Countdown Demonstration(3 ) Countdown

b. Test Supervisor(1)( 2 )( 3 )

CSM or LM al t i tude chamber t e s t s i n MSOBCSM or LM f i n a l i n t e g r a t e d sy st em s t e s t i n MSOBCSM or LM i n t e g r a t e d t e s t i n VAB or on pad priort o mat ing wi th space veh ic l eL/V o v e r a l l t e s t s 1 and 2 i n VAB or on pad4)

( 5 ) S/V o v e r a l l t e s t s 1 an d 2 i n VAB or on pad( 6 )( 7 )

S/C or L/V propel lant loading on padS/V s imula ted f l ig h t i n VAB or on pad

( 8 ) Pyrotechnic i n s t a l l a t i o n i n VAB or on pad12.

13.

Revisions t o Test an d Checkout Procedures s h a ll be pro-v id e d t o t e s t team members a t l e a s t 48 hours i n advanceof t h e s t a r t of the t e s t . Waivers t o t h i s r equ i rements h a l l be approved a t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l e s t a b l i sh e dby the KSC Dir ec to r except t h a t t h i s approval cannot bede legated lower than spe c i f i ed i n Vi11 E-11 above f o r t h et e s t s i n d i c a t e d .P r io r t o i n i t i a t i o n of a t e s t , b r i e f i n g s shall be con-ducted for a l l key m e m b e r s o f t h e t e s t team t o r ev ie wthe sequence of t e s t a c t i v i t i e s , t h e T e s t and CheckoutProcedures and any hazardous op era tio ns or emergencyprocedures.

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I DATEDecember 6 , 1967IM-D 1400.075(Proiect)

14. P r io r t o i n i t i a t i n g a t e s t , a review shall ' be made ofa l l open work recorded aga ins t t he har dwar e to be t e s t e d .A determination s h al l be made t h a t th e hardware ( in clud -ing GFE) i s proper l y conf igured and th a t th e T e s t an dCheckout Procedure, Flight Crew Procedure and hardwarear e compatible . This determination sh al l be recordedand approved by KSC and co nt ra ct or or ga ni za ti on s involve di n t he t e s t . The procedure f or recording and th e l ev elof approva l sh a l l be as sp eci fie d by th e KSC Dir ec to r.For sp acecra f t hardware t e s t s involv ing f l i g h t c rew par -t i c ipa t io n , t h i s de te rm ina tion sha l l have s igna tu r eapproval of MSC.

15. Approval t o i n i t i a t e non-hazardous t e s t s sh a l l be a t t h eorg aniz atio nal le ve l est abli shed by th e KSC Dir ecto r .

16. Approval to in i t i a t e any t e s t i nvolv ing a hazardouso p e r at i o n s h a l l be a t t h e o r g a n iz a t i on a l l e v e l e s t a b l i s h e dby th e KSC Dire ctor i n accordance with VI11 E- 11 above.17. The Director, MSC, and th e Dir ect or, MSFC, s h al l dele ga tethe a u th o r i ty e i th e r t o KSC o r t o t h e a p pr o pr i at e o f f i c i a lof t h e i r own organiza t io ns to approve r e a l t i m e de v ia t ions

t o Test and Checkout Procedures i nvo lvi ng compromise i nt e s t and checkout requirements.18. Changes i n f l i g h t hardware config urat ion , t e s t and check-

out requirements, o r t e s t and chec kout s pe c i f i c a t i onsand c r i t e r i a s h a l l be approved by MSC and MSFC f o r t h espacecra f t and launch vehic le res pec t ive l y .19. The fl i g h t crew sh a l l use Test and Checkout Procedures'when pa r t i c ipa t ing i n f l igh t har dwar e t e s t s a t the launchs i t e . Fl ig ht crews sh a l l come under KSC co nt ro l dur ing

t h e t i m e t he y are a c t i v e ly p a r ti c i pa t i ng i n t e s t s of f l i g h tveh ic les except t h a t th e f l i gh t crew may take any ac t io nnecessa ry for i t s s a f e t y .2 0 . Def ic ien c ies encounte red by th e f l ig h t crew whi le par -t i c i pa t i ng i n KSC t e s t s sh a l l be recorded and d ispos i -t ione d us ing th e same documentation system as t h a t u s ed

by the t e s t team.21. KSC s h a l l make an a n al y s i s of T e s t and Checkout Proce-

dures d evi at io ns subsequent t o completion of major t e s t sfo r th e purpose of reducing devia t ion s i n subsequent T e s tand Checkout Procedures.

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OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTP R O G R A M DIRECTIVE December 6, 1967I400.075IM-D MA (Project)

22. Tes ts invo lv ing hazardous oper a t ions s ha l l no t be con-ducted unless communications are adequate t o suppor temergency operations.

I X . CENTER RESPONSIBILITIESA. MSFC and MSC a r e re sp on si bl e fo r :

1. Preparin g an appr op ri at e document which as si gn s respon-s i b i l i t y f o r f u n c t io n s and a c t i o n s c on ta in ed h e r e i n .

2. Est abl ishi ng and maintaining t e s t and checkout require-m en ts , t e s t and check ou t s p ec i f i ca t i o n s and c r i t e r i a ,and launch mission rules inpu ts which a re necessary t oa s s u re t e s t and checkout and f l ig h t rea d iness .

3. Providing sig na tur e a pproval on KSC t e s t and checkoutp l an s .Approving deviations or waivers t o t e s t and checkout re-quirements, t e s t and ch ecko ut s p e c i f i ca t i o n s and c r i t e r i a ,and launch miss ion ru les spec i f ied in I X A-2 above.

4.

5 . Par t i c i p a t i o n i n p rep a ra t i o n , r e v i s i o n and ex ecu ti o n ofKS C Test and Checkout Procedures i n accordance withSec t i o n V I I I .

6. Assur ing tha t adequate t es t ing i s being accomplishedwithout unnecessary overlap and d u p l i ca t i o n .

7 . Prov id ing s igna tu r e approval on KSC c r i t e r i a fo r de te r -mining hazardous operat ions .

B. MSC i s r e s p o n si b l e f o r :1. Advising KS C i n w r i ti n g of t e s t s r e q u i ri n g f l i g h t c rew

a nd /o r f l i g h t c o n t r o l p er so n ne l p a r t i c i p a t i o n .2. Providing approved f l i g h t crew procedure s t o KSC a t

l e a s t 40 d ay s p r i o r t o a t e s t or checkout operationi n v o l v i n g t h e f l i g h t c r ew .

3 . Prov iding si gn at ur e appr oval on KSC Test and CheckoutProcedures involv ing f l ig h t c rew pa r t i c ip a t i on .Providing s ign atu re approval on pr e- te s t reviews ofspace craf t hardware ( inc lud i ng GFE) and T e s t and Check-o u t P roced ure co m p a t i b i l i t y fo r t h o s e t e s t s involvingf l i g h t crew p a r t i c i p a t i o n .

4.

NASA FORM644 ( R E V . J U L . 6 5 ) P R E V I OU S E D I T I ON S A R E O B S O L E T E P A G E 9 O F 1 0 P A G E S

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OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTPROGRAM DIRECTIVE December 6, 1967I-D 1400.075(Proiect)C . KSC i s r e sp o n s i b l e for:

1. Prepar ing an ap pro pr iat e document which as si gn s respon-s i b i l i t y f o r f u n c t i o n s a nd a c ti o n s c o n ta in ed h e r e i n .2. Developing t e s t and checkout pla ns as define d i n Sec-

t i o n V I 1 a t l eas t one month p r io r t o de l iv e ry of f l i g h thardware fo r each mission.3. Sec uri ng MSC and MSFC si gn at ur e appro val on t e s t andcheckout plan s and changes ther et o befo re t he se documentsare approved or implemented.

Prepar ing, rev isi ng and execut ing T e s t and CheckoutProcedures i n accordance wi th Sect i on V I I I .4.

5 . Providing T e s t and Checkout Pro ced ure s t o MSC and MSFCone month p r i o r t o t h e s t a r t o f a t e s t and a s s u ri n ge x p e d i t i o u s d i s t r i b u t i o n of changes there to .Securing MSC signature approval on T e s t and CheckoutProcedures and changes the re t o and th e pr e- tes t reviewsof sp ace cra ft hardware and t e s t and checkout procedurec o m p a t i b i l it y f o r t h o se t e s t s i n which t h e f l i g h t c rewhas a requirement t o p a r t i c i p a t e .

6 .

7 . Assur ing tha t MSC f l ig h t c rew and f l ig h t con t ro l person-n e l are i n t eg ra ted in to the KSC t e s t team f o r t ho s e t e s t si n which they have a requi rement t o pa r t i c i pa t e .Deve loping c r i t e r i a fo r de te rmining hazwdous ope ra t ion sand se cur ing si gn at ur e approval o f MSC and MSFC.

8.

9 . Making f i n a l de terminat ion tha t T e s t and Checkout Proce-dures are adequate, safe an d i n accordance wi th develop-ment o r g a n i z a t i o n s t e s t and checkout requirements, t e s tand checkout spec i f i ca t ions and c r i t e r i a , f l i g h t crewprocedures and launch mission ru le s.

10. Obtaining dev iat ion s and waivers from development organi-z a t i o n s t e s t and checkout requirements, t e s t and check-o u t sp e c i f i c a t i o n s and c r i t e r i a and launch mission ruleswhich w i l l not be f i l f i l l e d .

NASA FORM644 ( R E V . J U L . 6 5 ) P R E V I O U S E DI T I O N S A R E O B S O L E T E P A G E 1 0 0 ~0 A G E S

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