Appeasement Notes

8/21/2019 Appeasement Notes

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Appeasement

The following notes are a guide to the topic of appeasement. These are not the lastwords on the subject, but they will provide you with a rough outline of the main topics

and themes. To answer an exam question successfully on this topic, you will need to doyour own reading and create your own notes. This set of notes should only be a

beginning.

Contents

• What is appeasement?

• The origins of appeasement

• Was appeasement a traditional British foreign policy?

• isarmament and British !ilitary "lanning.

• #apan and the !anchurian $ncident of %&'%• $taly and !ussolini

• The (byssinian )risis of %&'*

• +itlers foreign policy - rearmament and the hineland )risis %&'/

• The (nschluss of %&'0

• The 1udetenland )risis of %&'0

• "oland %&'&

• 2rance in the %&'3s

• 4conomic appeasement

•

The +ossbach !emorandum• Was )hamberlain guilty?

• 5atest thoughts on appeasement - obert "earce

• Test yourself

What was appeasement?

(ppeasement was the policy of giving in to some of the demands of dictators li6e+itler and !ussolini in the hope that they would be satisfied and not as6 for more. This

policy has been most closely identified with British and 2rench foreign policy in the%&'3s. The leading figure in Britain was 7eville )hamberlain, but it must not beforgotten that his predecessors amsay !aconald and 1tanley Baldwin were alsoappeasers.

These notes will concentrate solely on the relationships between Britain and 2ranceand the aggressor powers in the %&'3s. 8ou will need to loo6 elsewhere forinformation on the rise of the dictators.

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Revision Notes: Appeasement

Summary of sub-topics

%. The definition of (ppeasement 9 especially in relation to :ermany, $taly and #apan.

;. The reasons for Britain


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series of crises which could have spar6ed a major war, but it was only when theassassination of (rchdu6e 2ran92erdinand of (ustria9+ungary by a 1erb nationalist in1arajevo in %&%> occurred that a major war bro6e out. The countries of the twoarmed camps pledged to support each other and 4urope was plunged into a war.

The two armed camps were@

The Triple Alliance - ermany! Austria-"ungary an# $taly

The Triple %ntente - &rance! Russia an# reat 'ritain(

!any other countries were involved, including #apan and the A1( after %&%CD. The4mpires of the :reat "owers were also involved in the conflict which caused the warto widen into a World War.

The suffering of the participants in the :reat War was so appalling, that when the war

came to an end in 7ovember %&%0, many hoped never to repeat such an experienceagain, and a mood of pacifism grew in the %&;3s.

2rance had suffered particularly badly in the war, so when the diplomats met at the"aris "eace )onference in %&%&, their representatives, led by "rime !inister eorgesClemenceau, pledged to ma6e :ermany pay.

Britain, led by "rime !inister )avi# *loy#-eorge, was more sympathetic to:ermany. 5loyd9:eorge realised that if :ermany was harshly punished this wouldcause great resentment amongst the :ermans and could cause tensions in the future.+e also believed that a strong :ermany would be a good trading partner for Britain,

and that a healthy :erman economy would prevent the rise of extremist parties either)ommunists or 2ascists. =n the other hand 5loyd9:eorge had to listen to British public opinion which was calling for :ermany to be


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were in power, +itler set about reversing these terms. Britain believed that +itlershould be allowed to do this and this policy of letting the :ermans ta6e bac6 theirlands and building their armed services was called (ppeasement.

Britain also appeased $taly and #apan. $taly joined Britain and 2rance in %&%* after

territorial gains were promised to the $talians if they fought against the :ermans. $n%&%& $taly gained very little and felt snubbed.

#apan had fought alongside Britain in the 2irst World War but was snubbed by the:reat "owers in %&%&. Both $taly and #apan faced economic problems in the %&;3s andwere dominated by right9wing extreme governments. To solve their problems bothcountries set about creating empires. Britain and 2rance let them get away with this asthey were not prepared to start a major war. This was appeasement.

Was appeasement a tra#itional 'ritish foreign policy?


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%D to try to 6eep aloof from dangerous foreign alliances except in the cases of the 5ow)ountries and 2rance.

;D to give most attention to the 4mpire, )ommonwealth and World trade.

'D to 6eep arms expenditure compatible with sound finance and a strong economy.

>D to concentrate on naval, air and commercial warfare, if war became a necessity.

*D to maintain a free hand in 4uropean and World affairs wherever possible.

+ow had Britain responded to :ermany in the nineteenth century?

$n the early 7ineteenth )entury :ermany had been a collection of small statesgenerally dominated by "russia and (ustria. Ander the leadership of 'ismarc "russiaforced the unification of these :erman states to form :ermany. The new :ermany was

created from a series of internal conflicts in %0>0, a war with (ustria in %0// and a war with 2rance in %0C3IC%.

Britain had supported this unification for a number of reasons@

9 The :ermans were of the same racial 1axon stoc6 and were natural allies9 ( strong :ermany was good for trade and prosperity9 :ermany acted as an effective bloc6 to 2rance and ussia

The same beliefs held in the %&'3s. The appeasers accepted that a unified, nationalist:erman state existed whose sie, resources, geographical location and industrial

development inevitably made her the leading power in )entral 4urope. Britaintraditionally held the view that 4astern 4urope fell under :ermany


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its nineteenth century position. )hamberlain also failed to recognise that 2ascism and 7aism were unappeasable.

What 6ept the balance of power from wor6ing in the %&'3s?

7ineteenth century British foreign policy in relation to )entral 4urope had wor6ed, butits continuation under the name of appeasement failed. Why?

9 there was a relative decline in the power of the West i.e. 2rance and Britain9 )ommunist ussia had been alienated by the West9 the collapse of (ustria9+ungary in %&%0 left a power vacuum in 4astern 4urope9 modern warfare was transformedJ total warfare could reach any part of the world9 +itler and the aims, power and methods of 7ai :ermany were alien to the British9 the balance of power could not be maintained without containment of :ermany9 Britain failed to recognise that (ustria9+ungary had acted as a chec6 on :ermany

"erhaps the collapse of (ustria9+ungary was one of the greatest threats to peace in4urope. The small successor states were not a chec6 on :ermany, but were in fact anopen field for :erman expansionism. Britain had been largely irrelevant to the

problems of 4astern 4urope in the 7ineteenth )entury and was even more so in the%&'3s. Ander these circumstances, what other policy was open to the appeasers?

1chroeder concludes that appeasement was inevitable, and that any other policy wasinconceivable. Huite apart from the tradition of Britain


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aD )entral and 4astern 4urope bD the World?

;. Britain supported a united :ermany in the nineteenth century, why did Britaincontinue to support a strong :ermany even after the 2irst World War?

'. What is meant by the following historical terms@aD balance of power

bD sphere of influencecD hegemony?

>. (ccording to 1chroeder


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Between %&;*9'; there were moves to call a isarmament )onference. This actuallymet in %&';, but fell apart once :ermany had withdrawn from it and from the 5eagueof 7ations in %&''. +itlers territorial ambitions necessitated the construction of aneffective military machine. $n %&'* +itler announced the existence of the 5uftwaffe.Britains response was to appease :ermany by signing the (nglo9:erman 7aval

(greement. This permitted :ermany to have parity with Britain in terms of thenumbers of submarines, while the overall sie of the :erman navy was limited to '*Lof Britains. Baldwins government thought they may as well try to limit :erman naval

power, after all if they didnt come to an arrangement the :ermans would probablyrebuild anyway. 2rance and $taly were not consulted over this agreement and feltslighted. (s the %&'3s drew to a close it was apparent that disarmament was a deadduc6. (ll the powers began to re9arm rapidly, especially after the !unich )risis of%&'0. $ndeed )hamberlain is often given credit for preventing war in %&'0 and thus

buying valuable time for Britain to re9arm. 1ee notes in )onclusion for an alternativeview.D

(ccording to !ichael +oward British Appeasement and the Origins of World War II 4d. .#.H. (damsD British military planners faced three major problems in the(ppeasement period@

%D the need to protect a World 4mpire,;D the vulnerability of the British $sles to air attac6,

'D the fact that there wasnt enough money to spend on building huge armed forcesabove and beyond what already existed to defend the 4mpire. (dditionalexpenditure at this time could have endangered Britains wea6ened economiccondition and could have been politically unpopular.

2or much of the ).%&th Britain had developed into a world power, and to some extent

ignored developments in 4urope. $n consequence, Britains military expenditure waslargely confined to the 7avy, which defended Britains overseas territories. Britain hada very small standing army in comparison to the large 4uropean )ontinental armies.

$n the %&'3s #apan was considered to be the biggest threat to Britains 4mpire. #apan

was expanding into )hina and threatened 1ingapore, +ong Mong and (ustralia. The 7avy considered 1ingapore to be the fulcrum of the 7avys defence of the 2ar 4ast i.e.if 1ingapore was 6ept safe, Britain could retain its dominant position in the region.+owever, the (dmiralty believed that it would not be strong enough to maintain its 2ar 4astern strength against #apan and go to war against $taly in the !editerranean at thesame time.

The British (rmy was spread diversely in defence of its overseas territories and did nothave a large presence in the British $sles. When Britain guaranteed the frontiers ofWestern 4urope at the 5ocarno Treaty of %&;*, there was no )ontinental army to bac6 up the guarantee. The =fficers that dominated the (rmy were old fashioned, and were

not very interested in new technology. The (rmy was out of favour with the:overnment, which was more interested in the (2 and 7avy as deterrent forces. The

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:overnment saw the (rmy as an offensive rather than a defensive power. There was areluctance to accept a )ontinental commitment. By late %&'/, even the (rmy )hiefs of 1taff actively encouraged the appeasement of :ermany@

K=ur military bac6wardness and the very unreliable condition of 2rance have

placed us in a very wea6 conditionN.the present situation dictates a policydirected towards an understanding with :ermany.

The (2 was set up after the 2irst World War, when the potential for aerial warfarewas first realised. $t concentrated mostly on protecting the 4mpire, but was not wellfunded by the Treasury. $n %&%0, Britain was the worlds leading air power, but theforce was rapidly disbanded. $n %&;', Britain had only ;> front9line machines availableand this fell to %/ a few months later. (t the same point, the entire air force in $ndiawas grounded through lac6 of spares. By the mid9%&'3s, funding had improved butwas confined mainly to bomber planes. 1trategists at the time saw the (2 as adeterrent to an aerial assault. +arold !acmillan recalled in his memoirs KWe thought of

air warfare in %&'0 rather as people thin6 of nuclear warfare today. (fter 1tanleyBaldwin pointed out that KThe bomber will always get through in %&';, other

politicians became increasingly frightened of :ermanys potential capacity to levelBritish cities. This was proved irrevocably at :uernica in the 1panish )ivil War %&'/9'& when :erman planes aided :eneral 2rancos defeat of the 1panish :overnment.British military planners were expecting the :ermans to be able to drop at least C33tonsIday of explosives on British targets. uring the Blit the worst raid was %333tons, but most were between '39>33 tons. (fter %&'C the (2s role was stiffenedwith the development of anti9aircraft batteries, (( and effective fighter planessuch as the +aw6er +urricane %&'CD and 1upermarine 1pitfire %&'0D.

To spend more might seem a fairly straight forward response to these problems andthis in turn would have allowed )hamberlain to have stood up to the aggressors in the6nowledge that he had a strong military capability to support his policies. +owever, itwas not that simple. $n the %&'3s Britains economy was in severe decline because of aworld9wide recession and because Britains industries came under increasingcompetition from abroad. The Treasury simply did not have enough spare cash to buildup Britains armed forcesJ to have done so would have severely damaged the economicrecovery. )hamberlain as )hancellor of the 4xchequer %&'%9'CD and "rime !inister%&'C9>3D believed that economic stability was the cornerstone of defence policy.

The long9term worry for the British :overnment was that if it ever came to war,

Britain would probably have to face :ermany, $taly and #apan on three fronts7orthern 4urope, 1outhern 4urope and the 2ar 4astD. 2rance was in political turmoilin the %&'3s and could not be relied upon as a strong ally, and there was no guaranteethat the A1( would support Britain in a war in 4urope. 2aced with these problems in4urope and the defence of her 4mpire, Britain was not financially strong enough tosupport military strength which could stand up to the aggressors in the late %&'3s.When war did brea6 out in %&'&, the Treasury estimated that Britain would go

ban6rupt at the end of %&>%. The entry of the A1( into World War Two in late %&>%helped to alleviate thisD.

Britain did start to rearm in %&'/, but it was not on a massive scale. Britains

commitments abroad meant that most new military expenditure went on peace6eepingin $raq and "alestine or bolstering 4gypt against $talian aggression. By %&'0, the

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British 4xpeditionary 2orce consisted of two infantry divisions and one mobiledivision. $n the same year air strength wasnt much better either as this comparison offront9line aircraft shows@ :ermany - *333 , Britain - %*33.

)onclusion

)hamberlain and the British :overnment have been heavily criticised for giving in to+itler at !unich in %&'0, but the raw military figures underline the futility of Britainwaging a war over )echoslova6ia. The :overnment concluded that militaryunpreparedness was so serious that hostilities were to be avoided at all cost.)hamberlain could not stand up to +itler and !ussolini because he had no militaryclout. )hamberlain had to get the best deal he could with a very wea6 hand. 1omecritics believed )hamberlain should have stood up to +itler over the 1udetenlandquestion, but )hamberlain could not have gone to war in %&'0. (fter !unich,)hamberlain ordered the construction of a full9scale )ontinental army of '; divisions.)hamberlain can be praised for Kbuying time at !unich, by delaying war with

:ermany in %&'0, Britain was able to catch up in %&'&.

This analysis is open to criticism. 1ome historians do not believe that )hamberlain was buying time at !unich and that in fact he was trying to achieve a lasting accord with+itler by conceding legitimate claims. 4dward anson British Defence Policy and

Appeasement between the wars 1919-39D, believes that the combined forces of British,2rench and )ech air power would have been more than a match for the :erman5uftwaffe. $n %&'0 the 5uftwaffes role was ground support and it did not have the

plans or the capacity to bomb 5ondon. =f course when +itler rolled into)echoslova6ia in %&'0 he neutralised '* divisions of one of the best trained andequipped armies in 4urope and gained all its equipment and the 16oda armaments

factory.

0apan! the /anchurian $nci#ent of 1231 an# the *eague of Nations

$n many ways #apan was a new nation in the early Twentieth )entury. 2or threehundred years #apan had remained isolated and had resisted foreign intervention. Thenin %0*' #apan was opened up by )ommodore "erry on the behalf of the A1(. The#apanese had no desire to become a Western colony and so modernised rapidly to catchup with the :reat "owers. By the turn of the century #apan had fought successful warswith both )hina and ussia and had made it plain that #apan sought a sphere ofinfluence in the 2ar 4ast.

#apan fought with 2rance, Britain and the A1( in the 2irst World War, but she felt poorly rewarded by the peace settlements of %&%&. uring the %&;3s #apan facedconsiderable problems@

%D The #apanese population was growing at over &33,333 per year, a phenomenalamount which the economy found difficult to support.

;D The A1( closed its doors to cheap #apanese exports and immigrants to the A1((merican $mmigration (ct %&;>D in the %&;3s in a bid to support their owneconomy.

'D #apan lac6ed raw materials such as coal, iron and oil. This became an acute problem

after the 1242 Wall St( Crash, when #apan had Oto export or die.P

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>D There was a strong nationalist element in politics which advocated direct action toget #apan out of its financial difficulties. They wished to conquer new territories on

behalf of the 4mperor.

#apan had long had an economic interest in /anchuria, a part of 7orthern )hina.

)hina was a complete mess by the %&;3sJ it was a country torn apart by warlords andextremist politicians. $n %&'% the #apanese stage9managed an attac6 on the !anchurianrailway by O)hinese bandits.P The railway was owned by the #apanese and to safeguardtheir interests the #apanese army too6 control of the whole region. Both )hina and#apan appealed to the *eague of Nations to arbitrate.

The significance of the /anchurian $nci#ent is that it was the first real test of the5eague of 7ations principle of collective security. Theoretically the 5eague shouldhave placed economic and military sanctions upon the aggressive member state. The

problem was that the 5eague was seriously wea6ened by the non9membership of theA1( and ussia. $n effect the 5eague was comprised of only two :reat "owers,

Britain and 2rance, and a host of lesser nations. (ny act of collective security wouldinevitably call for the leadership of Britain and 2rance, but in the economiccircumstances of the post9Wall 1t. )rash period, this was virtually impossible for thesetwo leading nations. The result was that #apan was appeased and got away with adding!anchuria later /anchuuoD to her empire.

The 5eague appeared to ta6e action over the !anchurian $ncident by sending *or#*ytton to the region to enquire as to the real nature of the aggression. 5ytton too6 ayear to report bac6 to the 5eague that #apan was the aggressive nation in this case.The fact that 5ytton too6 so long to report was a de facto act of appeasement byBritain and 2rance, the leading members of the 5eague. (s each day and wee6 passed

the #apanese became increasingly entrenched in !anchuria. "erhaps this appeasementis understandable under the circumstancesJ it is very unli6ely that the general public inBritain and 2rance would have had the stomach for a major war with #apan in the 2ar4ast, literally thousands of miles from 4urope, a region which meant very little toordinary people. $t is unli6ely that the navies of Britain and 2rance would have feltcomfortable with or even have afforded such a conflict. The consequences of failuremeant not only a loss of prestige, but also involved a direct threat to 4uropeancolonies in the 2ar 4ast.

The consequences of the !anchurian $ncident held dire warnings for the future, forthose that cared to listen@

%D Branded as the aggressor, #apan left the 5eague in %&'', this wea6ened it in twoways. 2irstly the 5eague had lost a powerful member state, but secondly and moreimportantly its principles of standing up to aggression, especially to that of amember state, had been openly flouted.

;D #apan acted as a role model for other aggressive nations in the %&'3s. +itlerwithdrew from the 5eague in %&'', followed by $taly in %&'C. Both countries wereencouraged to ignore the 5eagues principle of collective security to meet their ownforeign policy objectives. (fter the !anchurian $ncident, the threats of Britain and2rance through the 5eague or otherwise, in relation to a whole series of crises in the%&'3s, were perceived to be hollow indeed. Britain and 2rance had no stomach to

uphold the principles of the 5eague. (ppeasement was the only other foreign policyoption in the %&'3s.

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'D )hina felt betrayed by the 5eague and the 4uropean powers and turned to)ommunism in the %&>3s.

/ussolini an# &ascism

Born the son of a village blac6smith and schoolmistress in %00', Benito !ussolini fledto 1witerland in %&3; to evade military service. +is dramatically varied early careerincluded activity as manual labourer and socialist agitator, before he finally served andwas wounded in the 2irst World War.

$n %&%& he founded the Kfascisti di combattimento, which in %&;% became the$talian2ascist party. $ts bac6ing and !ussolini


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building, or reviving 9 the nation. But there have been nationalists who accept liberalrights, or who welcome diversity. The fascist conception of the nation was moreholisticJ it sought to overcome divisive differences and to forge a strong sense ofshared purpose Qcommunity rather than individualR. The second part relates more tosocio9economic policy. $ntellectual fascists were often to term themselves supporters

of a


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abbit or not, !ussolini was an extraordinary man in an extraordinary age. The son ofa blac6smith, a prisoner on eleven occasions, a teacher, a 1ocialist agitator, an armycorporal and a journalist, this man was a mass of contradictions. +ow had he becomeleader, the uce, of $taly?

(t the end of the 2irst World War, $taly was on the victorious allied side, yet there wasa strong feeling of discontentment in $taly. Why was this?

aD $taly had initially fought on the :erman and (ustro9+ungarian side until %&%*. (tthe Treaty of *on#on, the British and 2rench persuaded the $talians to swap sidesin return for land at the end of the war. $n fact $taly did gain some lands from(ustria9+ungary in %&%&, but generally the $talians felt snubbed at Gersailles andwere not treated as a :reat "ower as they had expected.

bD The cost of WW% was %>0 billion lire, twice the entire government expenditure between %0/%9%&%'. This put a heavy strain on the economy and many ex9soldiers

found difficulty in gaining employment.cD $taly was and is mar6edly divided between 7orth and 1outh. Basically the 7orth is

much richer than the 1outh and this has caused a lot of resentment on both sidessince the foundation of the Mingdom of $taly in %0/%.

dD (s a whole $taly was poor, there was little demand for $talian goods in the post9war period and many businesses struggled to survive.

eD The Roman Catholic Church was still quarrelling with the $talian government.When $taly had been formed in %0/%, the "ope lost the +apal States a large

portion of )entral $talyD.fD The $talians were encouraged to thin6 of themselves as a :reat "ower and yet their

trac6 record in military terms was poor. They had been defeated by native troops in

Abyssinia 4thiopiaD in %0&/ and had suffered severe losses during WW%. The$talian image of themselves did not match up to the reality.

(s a consequence of these factors, $taly in %&%& was ripe for a strong leader to restore$talian pride. This was /ussolini after %&;;.

The Abyssinian Crisis of 1235

KThe (byssinian )risis by Telford Taylor from !unich@ the price of peace %&C&, pp;;09;'', quoted in .#.H (dams British (ppeasement and the origins World War $$

!ussolini had had his eye on (byssinia 4thiopiaD for many years. +e wanted toconquer it and add it to the Knew oman 4mpire of which he was the glorious leader.!ussolini wanted also to gain revenge for the embarrassing defeat the $talians hadsuffered against the 4thiopians at A#owa in %0&/.

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Britains policy towards $taly at this time was one of Kdouble bluff, on the one handBritain adopted a Kget tough policy with $taly and yet on the other hand Britainseemed to want to let $taly get away with aggression against 4thiopia. 7either policywas followed whole9heartedly and as a result British policy not only failed to dealeffectively with !ussolini but in fact drove him into the arms of +itler.

The 6ey players in this fiasco were@

Samuel "oare - British 2oreign 1ecretary %&'* Stanley 'al#win - British "rime !inister %&'*9'CAnthony %#en - British 2oreign 1ecretary %&'*9'0+ierre *aval - 2rench "rime !inister %&'*9'/

The crisis over (byssinia came to a head in the (utumn of %&'*. !ussolini demandedextensive annexation of territories in (byssiniaJ in response the British 7avy moved its!editerranean 2leet from !alta to (lexandria. +oare prepared a speech for the

5eague of 7ations in which he gave the impression that Britain would stand up to any$talian aggression. +oare pledged publicly that Britain would fully bac6 the 5eaguesideal of isolating aggressive powers through collective security. "rivately +oare and5aval agreed that a war with $taly was totally out of the question in %&'* and couldlead to who96nows9what in the future. !any were ta6en in by +oares strong stance,although !ussolini was not overawed. $taly invaded (byssinia and all eyes turned tothe British, as a leading member of the 5eague, to ma6e good their promises of

punishing $taly. $n a tight spot, the )abinet sent (nthony 4den to :eneva to co9operatewith the 5eague in establishing sanctions with $taly, although he was told not to initiateanything.

!eanwhile the British people elected Baldwin as "rime !inister in 7ovember %&'* partly on the basis of +oares pro95eague speech in 1eptember %&'*. 2ew had yetunderstood that the British had no intention of going to war with $taly over (byssinia,despite their public posturing. $n ecember %&'* the )abinet met to decide what todo. There was a split between 4den and )hamberlain on one side who wanted toextend sanctions while on the other +oare and others were worried that sanctionsmight provo6e !ussolini to something worse. +oare decided to go to 1witerland fora brea6. +e was not well and wanted to get fit practising figure9s6ating, at which hewas expert.

1ecretly +oare met 5aval in "aris en route for 1witerland. Between them the drew up

a proposal for a settlement with $taly over the (byssinian )risis. The "oare-*aval +act or Agreement can be summarised as follows@

%D $taly was to gain extensive territories in (byssinia;D $taly was to gain extensive economic concessions.

Baldwin, 4den and the rest of the )abinet came round to +oares proposal. (fter allthey could hardly prevent $talys aggression in (byssinia and this proposal might still6eep !ussolini roughly in line with Britain and 2rance. Anfortunately the British publicdid not see it that wayJ all they saw was +oare giving in to aggression when only a fewmonths before he was upholding the 5eagues principle of collective security against

aggressors. +oare had to resign. To ma6e matters even worse, he had just bro6en hisnose on the iceED

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The results of the fiasco can be summarised li6e this@

aD Britain lost respect in :eneva as a leading member of the 5eague, bD The 5eague was seriously undermined by Britains unwillingness to get tough,

cD Britain continued to support sanctions against $taly until #uly %&'/, by which time!ussolini was thoroughly annoyed by Britain and the 5eague which $taly, left in%&'C,

dD !ussolini completed the conquest of (byssinia despite Britain and the 5eague,eD !ussolini began to lean towards an alliance with +itler and Britain lost all

opportunity of 6eeping !ussolini Kon the side of the angels.

British policy in %&'* should have been either to go to war with !ussolini and to have brought him down or to have conceded !ussolinis claims and brought $taly into analliance with Britain and 2rance. 7either policy was properly followed and disaster wasthe result.

"itler6s aims in foreign policy 1233-37

+itler aimed to ma6e :ermany into a great power again and this he hoped to achieve by@

S destroying the hated Gersailles settlement,

S building up the army,S recovering lost territory such as the 1aar and the "olish )orridor, andS bringing all :ermans within the eich.

This last aim would involve the annexation of (ustria and the acquisition of territoryfrom )echoslova6ia and "oland, both of which had large :erman minorities as aresult of Gersailles.

There is some disagreement about what, if anything, +itler intended beyond theseaims. !ost historians believe that the annexation of (ustria and parts of)echoslova6ia and "oland was only a beginning, to be followed by the seiure of the

rest of )echoslova6ia and "oland and by the conquest and permanent occupation ofussia as far east as the Aral !ountains. This would give him what the :ermans called

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lebensra%m living spaceD which would provide food for the :erman people and anarea in which the excess :erman population could settle and colonise. (n additionaladvantage was that communism would be destroyed. +owever not all historians agreeabout these further aimsJ (.#.". Taylor, for example, claims that +itler never intended amajor war and at most was prepared for only a limited war against "oland.

Whatever the truth about his long9term intentions, +itler began his foreign policy witha series of brilliant successes one of the main reasons for his popularity in :ermanyD.By the end of %&'0 almost every one of the first set of aims had been achieved, withoutwar and with the approval of Britain. =nly the :ermans of "oland remained to be

brought within the eich. Anfortunately it was when he failed to achieve this by peaceful means that +itler too6 his fateful decision to invade "oland.

1233-37

aD :iven that :ermany was still militarily wea6 in %&'', +itler had to move cautiously

at first. +e withdrew from the isarmament )onference and the 5eague of 7ations onthe grounds that 2rance would not agree to :erman equality of armaments. (t thesame time he insisted that :ermany was willing to disarm if other states agreed to dothe same, and that he wanted only peace. This was one of his favourite techniques@ toact boldly while soothing his opponents with the sort of conciliatory speeches he 6newthey wanted to hear.

bD 7ext +itler signed a ten9year non9aggression pact with the "oles #anuary %&'>Dwho were showing alarm in case the :ermans tried to ta6e bac6 the "olish corridor.This was something of a triumph for +itler@

S Britain too6 it as further evidence of his peaceful intentions,S it ruined the 2rench &ittle 'ntente which depended very much on "oland, andS it guaranteed "olish neutrality whenever :ermany should move against (ustria and

)echslova6ia.

=n the other hand it improved relations between 2rance and ussia, who were bothworried by the apparent threat from 7ai :ermany.

cD #uly %&'> saw +itler suffer a setbac6 to his ambitions of an Anschl%ss unionD between :ermany and (ustria. The (ustrian 7ais, encoraged by +itler, staged arevolt and murdered the )hancellor, 4gelbert ollfuss, the protege of !ussolini.

+owever, when !ussolini moved $talian troops to the (ustrian frontier and warned the:ermans off, the revolt collapsedJ +itler, ta6en abac6, had to accept that :ermany wasnot yet strong enough to force the issue and disclaimed responsibility for the actions of the (ustrian 7ais.

dD The 1aar was returned to :ermany #anuary %&'*D after a plebiscite resulting in a&3L vote in favour. Though the plebiscite had been provided for at Gersailles, 7ai

propaganda made the most of the success, and +itler announced that now all causes of grievance between 2rance and :ermany had been removed.

eD +itlers first successful breach of Gersailles came in !arch %&'* when he announced

the reintroduction of conscription. +is excuse was that Britain had just announced airforce increases and 2rance had extended consription from %; to %0 months their

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justification was :erman rearmamentD. !uch to their consternation, +itler told hisstartled generals and the rest of the world that he would build up his peacetime army to'/ divisions about /33,333 menD. The generals need not have worried@ although the1tresa 2ront condmned this violation of Gersailles, no action was ta6en, the 5eaguewas helpless, and the 2ront collapsed anyway as a result of +itlers next success.

fD 1hrewdly realising how frail the 1tresa 2ront was, +itler detached Britain by offeringto limit the :erman navy to '*L of the strength of the British navy. Britain eagerlyaccepted in the resulting (nglo9:erman 7aval (greement #une %&'*D apparently

believeing that since the :ermans were already brea6ing Gersailles by building a fleet,it would be as well to have it limited. Without consulting her two allies 2rance and$talyD, Britain had condoned :erman rearmamentJ from now on it was going to beimpossible to prevent that rearmament, which proceeded with gathering momentum.By the end of %&'0 the army stood at *% divisions about 033,333 menD plus reserves,there were ;% large naval vessels battleships, cruisers and destroyersD, many moreunder construction, and >C A9boats. ( large air force of over ;333 aircraft had been

built up.

gD !eanwhile, encouraged by his successes, +itler too6 the calculated ris6 of sendingtroops into the demilitarised one of the hineland !arch %&'/D 9 a breach of bothGersailles and 5ocarno. Though the troops had orders to withdraw at the first sign of2rench opposition, no resistance was offered beyond the usual protests. at the sametime, well aware of the mood of pacifism among his opponents, +itler soothed them byoffering a peace treaty to last for ;* years.

hD 5ater in %&'/ +itler consolidated :ermanys position by reaching an understandingwith !ussolini the ome9Berlin (xisD and by signing the (nti9)omintern "act with

#apan also joined by $taly in %&'CD. :ermans and $talians gained military experiencehelping 2ranco to victory in the 1panish )ivil War, one of the most notorious exploits being the bombing of the defenceless Basque mar6et town of :uernica by the :erman)ondor 5egion.

iD The Anschl%ss with (ustria !arch %&'0D was +itlers greatest success to date.!atters came to a head when the (ustrian 7ais staged huge demonstrations inGienna, :ra and 5in, which )hancellor 1chuschniggs government could not control.ealising that this could be the prelude to a :erman invasion, 1chuschnigg announceda plebiscite about whether or not (ustria should remain independent. +itler decided toact before this too6 place, in case the vote went against unionJ :erman troops moved

in and (ustria became part of the Third (eich. $t was a triumph for :ermany@

S it revealed the wea6nesses of Britain and 2rance who again did no more than protest,

S it demonstrated the value of the new underta6ing with $taly, andS it dealt a severe strategic blow at )echoslova6ia which could now be attac6ed

from the south as well as from the west and north.

(ll was ready for the beginning of +itlers campaign to acquire the :erman9spea6ing1udetenland, a campaign which ended in triumph at the !unich )onference in1eptember %&'0.

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The Anschluss of 1237

=ne of +itlers objectives was the annexation of (ustria which had been forbidden byGersailles( The "ossbach /emoran#um revealed +itlers intentions and by %&'C

!ussolini had been drawn away from the Stresa &ront and was now a part of theRome-'erlin A8is. This suited +itler who had been worried that $taly might opposethe (nschluss.

The (ustrian "rime !inister was rather dominated by +itler, who demanded that1chuschnigg reinstate the (ustrian 7ai "arty which had been banned in %&'0.1chuschnigg was summoned to Berchtesgaden and told that he had to@

aD reinstate the (ustrian 7ai "arty bD accept 1eyss9$nquart and other 7ais in his cabinet.

1chuschnigg agreed and was subsequently treated with contempt by his newcolleagues. To try to get out of :erman domination, 1chuschnigg organised a

plebiscite on %'th !arch %&'0 which would as6 the (ustrians if they wanted to be free.

+itler prepared to mobilise.

aD he reassured $taly to respect the (ustrian border with $taly the Brenner "assD bD he reassured the )echs that he had no hostile intentions against them.

1chuschnigg agreed to cancel the plebiscite and then resigned in favour of 1eyss9$nquart who as6ed for military assistance from :ermany. :erman troops invaded

(ustria on %;th !arch %&'0. (ustria became a province of :ermany.

$n a plebiscite &&.C*L of (ustrians supported the (nschluss.

Britain and 2rance did nothing. Why?

aD appeasers believed (ustria was :erman bD the (ustrians appeared to want the (nschlusscD it was not worth a war dD Britain and 2rance would not get help from $taly.

The Su#etenlan# Crisis of 1237

(fter the (nschluss +itler turned his attention to )echoslova6ia and the more than

three million 1udeten :ermans. The region was now bordered by :ermany on ' sides.$n (pril %&'0 )hamberlain and +alifax made it clear to aladier that they would not

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guarantee 2rance or )echoslova6ia if the latter were attac6ed. Britain and 2rance put pressure on Benes, the )ech "resident to give in to :ermany. )hamberlain tried toconvince +itler that he could have what he wanted without resorting to war.

The $ssues

)echoslova6ia was a new country, born out of the collapse of the (ustro9+ungarian4mpire. The new state was set up as part of the Treaty of St( ermain the treatywhich had dealt with (ustria9+ungary in %&%&.D 4thnically )echoslova6ia was diversewith large numbers of )echs, 1lova6s, "oles and +ungarians. =ne of the largestminority groups was the 1udeten :ermans who lived in the mountainous region ofwestern )echoslova6ia. This region was relatively wealthy compared to the rest of thecountry and contained all the major industrial complexes such as 16oda. +itlerdetested )echoslova6ia for its 1lav peoples, especially as they had control over ethnic:ermansJ he also disli6ed the fact that )echoslova6ia was a successful democracy. $nfact in %&'0 it was the last democracy in eastern 4urope. =nce (ustria had been

incorporated into the eich,. :ermany turned to the 1udeten question.

Monrad +enlein

+itler encouraged and supported the 1udeten :ermans claim for self9determination. $nthe middle of the %&'3s Monrad +enlein had come to prominence as the leadingexponent of 1udeten :erman nationalism. +itler fuelled +enleins political agitationand there were a number of riots and marches led by +enlein in opposition to )echcontrol of the region. +itler provo6ed problems in the region by mobilising :ermantroops and the )echs did the same in retaliation.

Ander pressure from Britain and 2rance, Benes, the )ech "resident offered +enleinvirtually everything he had been calling for, even home rule. +enlein refusedJ under pressure from +itler, +enlein did not accept Benes offers because +itler wanted anexcuse for invasion. $n an effort to calm things down, )hamberlain flew to meet +itlerin a series of three meetings.

)hamberlain

$t is at this moment that appeasement reached its most notorious point. )hamberlainmet +itler on three occasions before a peace deal could be thrashed out@

%D 'erchtesga#en - %*th

1eptember %&'0;D o#esberg - ;;nd 1eptember %&'0'D /unich - ;&th 1eptember %&'0

(t Berchtesgaden )hamberlain made it clear to +itler that Britain would accept self9determination for the 1udetenland. This seemed straightforward, but +itler upped theante by sending troops to the )echoslova6 borders and by encouraging the "oles andthe +ungarians to do the same.

( wee6 later )hamberlain flew to meet +itler at Bad :odesberg to finalise theagreement made at Berchtesgaden. When he arrived he found that +itler was not just

as6ing for the 1udetenlands right of self9determination, but was as6ing for thewithdrawal of )ech troops from the 1udetenland and was also demanding territories

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on behalf of "oland and +ungary. This was a clever piece of diplomacy on +itlers part. By pressing "olish claims for Teschen and +ungarian claims for 1outh 1lova6ia,+itler had won the support of two countries who might otherwise have allied with)echoslova6ia against :erman aggression. Britain and 2rance were reluctant to agreeto these demands and so )hamberlain returned to 5ondon to prepare for war. 2or the

next wee6 tension built as each country began to mobilise. Then !ussolini stepped intothe arena with the proposal for a four9power conference in !unich on the ;& th 1eptember.

)hamberlain flew to meet +itler, !ussolini and aladier at !unich. +ere )hamberlaineagerly gave into :erman claims for the 1udetenland@ the price of peace. Benes andthe )echs were completely ignored by this decision, as were the ussians. This laterled the ussians to see6 their own accomadation with +itler in the %&'& 7ai91oviet"act which destroyed "oland, but gave ussia valuable time to help prepare for anattac6 by :ermany in the future.D

2or a brief moment )hamberlain was triumphant. +e returned to Britain with his Kpieceof paper which had averted war and which promised peace between :ermany andBritain in the future. =n =ctober %st :ermany too6 the 1udetenland and "oland and+ungary gained the territories they had been see6ing. (s the wee6s passed the gloss of )hamberlains success began to fade and when +itler invaded the rest of)echoslova6ia in !arch %&'&, the policy of appeasement was seen to have failed.

)onclusion of the 1udeten )risis

What are the conclusions one can draw from this episode?

•+itler became increasingly popular in :ermany, he had achieved victory without awar and it encouraged him to loo6 for other foreign policy successes i.e. "oland.

• )echoslova6ia was destroyed. ( small, but strong democracy had been abandoned

by the :reat "owers.

• ussia had not been included in the !unich (greement and 1talin felt compelled to

come his own arrangement with :ermany 7ai91oviet "act %&'&D.

• $t can be argued that !unich saw appeasement fail, that +itler could not be

trusted. +owever it has been argued that )hamberlain bought time at !unich, timein which Britain could rearm for conflicts in the future.

+olan# 1232

The "olish Huestion

5i6e )echoslova6ia modern "oland was born out of the "aris "eace Treaties of %&%&.+itler heartely disli6ed "oland, especially as it drove a wedge between :ermany

proper and 4ast "russia. This +olish Corri#or gave the "olish state access to the seaat anig :dans6D. +itler started to ma6e moves against "oland in !arch %&'& justas :ermany invaded the rest of )echoslova6ia. +itler demanded the city of !emel

from 5ithuania which suggested that he had territorial ambitions in the Baltic 1ea. (t

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the same time anti9"olish propaganda was published in :ermanyJ this suggested that:ermans living in the "olish )orridor were being mistreated by the "oles.

)hamberlain reluctantly agreed to guarantee "olish security from :erman attac6. (tthis point )hamberlain believed that appeasement could still solve the problem of

:erman aggression. +itler was furious and abandoned the Anglo-erman NavalAgreement of 1239 see isarmamentD. !ussolini invaded (lbania in (pril %&'& andin !ay $taly and :ermany signed the +act of Steel. )hamberlain 6new that Britaincould never effectively secure "oland, )hamberlain hoped to appease :ermany, butthings too6 a turn for the worse in (ugust %&'&.

The 7ai91oviet "act %&'&

espite their political differences both :ermany and the A11 needed each otherscooperation in the autumn of %&'&. (s +itler prepared to ta6e bac6 the "olish )orridor he did not want to get embroiled in a war with ussia. 1talin was well aware of

:erman ambitions on ussia, but saw this pact as an opportunity to give time in orderto further prepare defences and for ussia to control an even greater buffer oneagainst :ermany. The "act was totally cynical on both sides, but it paved the way forthe :erman invasion of "oland.

$n fact )hurchill had urged Britain to sign an agreement with ussia all through thesummer of %&'& despite his own personal antipathy towards communism. Britain didnot hurry the negotiations with ussia believing that there was still time to spare. 1eeTy6e pp*39*% for more details.D

War

(s +itler prepared himself for war with "oland he began to offer )hamberlain the hopeof negotiation and appeasement. +itler believed that Britain would withdraw itsguarantee to "oland just as it had done with )echoslova6ia. $n the end however)hamberlain was swayed by public opinion and his party to stand by "oland, so in1eptember %&'& Britain declared war on :ermany in response to the :erman invasionof "oland.

&rance in the 123s

uring the %&'3s successive 2rench governments generally followed Britains lead inthe series of crises that appeasement attempted to deal with. (lthough 2rance wasfairly strong economically, and had not been too badly harmed by the Wall 1t. )rash,2rance remained very wea6 politically. The 2rench were very nervous of further:erman aggression and attempted to wea6en :ermany as far as possible. The 2rench

put their faith in a series of alliances with the new 4astern 4uropean states, these were6nown as the *ittle %ntentes. !ilitarily the 2rench established a huge networ6 ofmilitary defences on the :erman border 6nown as the /aginot *ine.

(t this time 2rench governments were 6nown as the Third epublic. Between %&%C9

%&>3 2rances democracy produced >> governments under ;3 different "rime!inisters.

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There were some dominant characters in the %&;3s such as )lemenceau, Briand and"oincare. But they had either all died or had been sidelined by %&';. They weresucceeded by lesser men who tended to follow Britains leadership.

$n the early %&;3s 2rench politics were dominated by nationalism and anti9:ermanism.The right9wing 'loc National pushed for harsh treatment of :ermany and was behindthe uhr $nvasion of %&;' which was initiated by Raymon# +oincare.

(fter %&;*, 2rench foreign policy was under the leadership of the left9wing Aristi#e'rian#. +e favoured a more international and conciliatory approach than his

predecessors and helped to build the Mellogg9Briand "act of %&;0.

2rom %&;&9%&'/ 2rench politics became increasingly unstable with over ;3 ministerialcrises. Things came to a head over the Stavisy Affair of %&'>. 1tavis6y was afinancier whose Ksuicide was suspected as a political murder to conceal governmental

corruption.

The 1tavis6y (ffair coincided with economic and social unrest and with acute politicalwea6nesses. iots bro6e out and there was a call for a general stri6e. aladiersgovernment of #anuary %&'> only lasted & daysE )alls for strong government whetherfascist or communist were to be heard on the streets of "aris. ( broad coalitiongovernment held the republic together until there were new elections in %&'/.

$n %&'/ a "opular 2ront of left9wing parties formed government under *eon 'lum and later )hautemps. %#war# )ala#ier succeeded them from %&'09>3. aladier wasvery anxious to 6eep 2rance out of a war and he was the one who ignored the 2rench

alliance with )echoslova6ia in order to 6eep the peace. When war bro6e out "etain became the leader of 2rance. +e and "ierre 5aval led the Gichy government until %&>;."etain was imprisoned, 5aval was shot.

The wea6ness of 2rench politics and the acute internal divisions between right and leftcaused the relative decline of 2rance as a great power. This decline deprived Britain ofthe one strong ally who could have helped to stand up to :ermany. 2rench wea6nesswas thus a determining factor in Britains adoption of appeasement in the %&'3s.

%conomic Appeasement

The =rigins of the 1econd World War by .#. =very)hapter ' 4conomic and $mperial ivalry

The recession

aD K7o single factor more important in explaining the brea6down of the diplomaticsystem in the %&'3s.

%&;&9999recession ;3L9''L of wor6force unemployed in the industrial powers.D

The system of world trade collapsed because of war debts and a wea6 pound. (ustriaand :ermany were on the brin6 of ban6ruptcy in %&'%.

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bD :overnments sought to protect themselves through the raising of tariffs

(merica put up tariffs in %&'32rance manipulated the value of the 2ranc

Britain abandoned the gold standard and free trade

5ittle or no investment came out of 5ondon or "aris after %&;&. 1maller and wea6ercountries were left in desperate straits which led to resentment.

cD 1ome countries adopted ;autary6 or self9sufficiency so that national economieswould not become dependent upon shifts in the world mar6ets. (utar6y was

popular in 2ascist states such as :ermany and $taly where economic independencewas seen as popular on nationalistic grounds. To some extent this situation wasforced upon :ermany and $taly and #apan which were naturally poor in naturalresources.

dD !ussolini described the situation as ;have6 and ;have-not6 states. $t was arguedthat Khave states li6e Britain and 2rance could weather financial crises by relyingon empiresJ Khave9not states used this argument to develop their own empires.

KThe world economic crises thus had the effect of sharpening conflicts over mar6etsand raw materials, undermining economic co9operation, and arousing once againdreams of imperial conquest.

$mperial "ower

aD $mperialism did not vanish in %&%0, it was just reorganised. Britain and 2rance ruled''L of the world either directly or indirectly in %&%0.

4mpire was the source of Britains greatness, without )hamberlain remar6ed thatBritain would be only a fourth rate power. "restige and influence was bound up withempire, Britain would fight to defend it.

(fter %&;& the empires were increasingly important to shore up finances and protectinternal producers e.g.

Trade between 2rance and her empire rose from &L in %&%> to ''L in %&;&.Trade between Britain and empire rose from ''L in %&%3 to *3L in %&'0.

4mpire was seen as a source of strength and political stability was said to depend uponempire, thus the defence of the empire became a 6ey foreign policy aim in the %&'3sand helps to explain why the policy of appeasement was adopted.

bD 1ome argue that the empire was a liability, helped to undermine Britain and 2rancesability to maintain their empires and contain the aggressor powers. The empireswere not united and were gripped by nationalism which was expensive to maintain.

4g a large part of Britains military capacity in %&'& was in the !iddle 4ast 9 $raq,$ndia, "alestine and 4gypt.

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$ndia consumed more than she gave.

cD The empires were perceived to be the source of Britain and 2rances strength, yetthey were wrac6ed by insecurity and crises. efence of the empire was very

expensive and threatened stability. 2ailure to defend would end Britain and 2rancesstatus as world powers.

The have9not powers

aD The reality of empire did not deter the have9not powers in trying to build their own.Britain and 2rance were perceived as has9beens who were ripe for overthrow bynew and younger nations. To be great #apan, $taly and :ermany imitated whatBritain and 2rance had done before.

(ll three have9nots assumed that@

%D economic survival;D survival of their peoples

depended upon the acquisition of large areas with raw materials, cheap labour and landfor surplus populations.

This was an illusion and become bound up with nationalism and fascism, notions ofracial destiny and delusions of imperial grandeur. There was some truth to their ideas

particularly over oil and because they have9nots felt their supplies could be easily cut9off in times of conflict.

bD (ccess to mar6ets became restricted for the have9nots

#apanese goods were excluded from British and 2rench mar6ets in (sia and (frica:erman trade in the Bal6ans replaced by Britain and 2rance after %&%&$talian emigration to A1( restricted after %&%&#apanese emigration to (ustralia and (merica closed off by the %&'3s.

The slowing down in economic and trade growth and the spread of protectionism bythe haves was perceived as a deliberate attempt to restrict the economies of the have9not countries. 4conomic hostility led to political hostility. They had to get out of this

situation somehow.

cD #apanese expansion began in Morea in %0&> and expanded into )hina in the %&;3s.$n the %&'3s the #apanese tried to set up an (sian K7ew =rder. The )o9"rosperity1phere was set up in the %&'3s.

dD $taly sought an empire to ma6e the $talians wealthy, but to also give them a sense of racial superiority. Britain and 2rance had not interfered with $taly in 4thiopia and1pain, !ussolini believed it was only a matter of time before $taly replaced them in(frica.

eD :ermany was different, she sought world power, not geographically defined. +itlerwanted to revise Gersailles, but he wanted much more too.

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+itler believed that only :ermans and #ews contested for world power, therefore hewould need to destroy the #ews. :erman expansion was in two stages@

%D to dominate ;/itteleuropa6

;D to use these resources as a springboard to the east *ebensraumD. The conquest ofussia would lead to the conquest of $ndia and the !iddle 4ast. 4ventually:ermany would ta6e on (merica. +e ordered 1peer to build victory buildings inBerlin for %&*%D

To begin with the :ermans had to be circumspect, but as they became increasinglyconfident, they moved from diplomacy of opportunity to diplomacy of intention.

The failure of economic appeasement

These problems were recognised in the West@

)hamberlain@ K!ight not a great improvement in :ermanys economic situation resultin her becoming quieter and less interested in political adventures?

Britain understood and respected #apan and :ermanys claims, by conceding certainclaims, peace could be preserved.

4conomic appeasement began in %&'/. They tried to find terms to bring the aggressors bac6 into the world economy as a prelude to a general settlement. "rotection was areal barrier to terms being found.

%&'> 9 some agreements between Britain and :ermany on trade%&'0 9 eastern 4uropean trade rearranged%&'& 9 agreement on coal exports

Britain held out the prospect of returning :erman colonies and a loan. 7o agreementcould be had with #apan.

(ll this was too late, the aggressors tried autar6y and war to get what they wanted.Why?

aD too late

bD unable to get agreements between the western powerscD %&'0 economic recessiondD the aggressors were mistrustful of western motiveseD )hamberlain believed that economic appeasement could help to restore the balance,

yet at the same time did not hesitate to use economic power as a weapon to containthe aggressors.

The result was a sharp increase in economic rivalry in 4astern 4urope, )hina and 5atin(merica.

)onclusion

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id economic rivalry cause war? Communists always believed that Capitalism led towar. This theory is no longer viable. !any leading industrialists were distrustful of thenationalists and wor6ed internationally on trade deals eg trade agreements between:erman and British businessmen in the summer of %&'&.

K4conomic conflict had a basic political cause, the uneven distribution of territory and political power.

KThe war was fought in the end as a contest for political power, the culmination of thatlong and unstable period of empire9building which had begun in the middle of thenineteenth century. $.e. politics was a greater factor than economics.

The "ossbach /emoran#um

$n %&'C +itler called a meeting of the :erman War !inister Blomberg, three chiefs ofstaff and the 2oreign !inister 7eurath. (t this meeting +itler delivered a haranguingmonologue which was recorded by a Colonel "ossbach. (t the Nuremberg trials this+ossbach !emorandum was used as evidence that +itler had planned a major war allalong and had not just wanted small wars to achieve small aims. The meeting can be

summarised as follows@

%D (im of :erman policy was to preserve the racial community and gain space.;D Britain and 2rance were :ermanys main opponents.'D :ermany must use force to secure her objectives.>D :ermany would pea6 in %&>', the problem of space had to be solved by %&>'9>*.*D $f 2rance suffered internal strife, :ermany should seie )echoslova6ia./D $f 2rance was involved in a war, :ermany should seie (ustria and )echoslova6ia.

Britain and $taly would not oppose :ermany in )echoslova6ia. $taly might stilloppose annexation of (ustria. 2rance would no nothing without Britain.

There have been two interpretations of this memorandum@

a< "ugh Trevor-Roper@ +itlers blueprint for war bD A(0(+( Taylor@ +itler was just ranting and saying nothing new, he wanted to avoid a

discussion on steel shortages which is what the meeting was supposed to be about.ates were wrong, ussia was ignored and 2rance did not suffer a civil war.

!ost agree that it is remar6ably accurate in predicting what actually happened

Was Chamberlain guilty?

KThe memory of 7eville )hamberlain and the idea of appeasement go together. 8et heinvented neither policy nor the word. .(.). "ar6er )hamberlain and (ppeasement

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$n the early %&'3s appeasement was an almost universally popular and accepted part of British foreign policy, although later it was most closely associated )hamberlain.)hamberlain stuc6 with this policy and was its leading proponent in the +ouse of)ommons long after doubts were sown about its wisdom. )hamberlains three visits to

+itler in %&'0 see The 1udetenland )risis of %&'0D were of his own underta6ing. Byta6ing the decision to try to negotiate with +itler personally )hamberlain nailed hiscolours to the mast, and had to live with the consquences. +e had total faith in the

policy of appeasement and believed that eventually +itler could be controlled throughappeasement. )hamberlain did not see appeasement as a cynical ploy to buy time to re9arm, he believed in the ultimate success of the policy to prevent another war. +is hopesdeceived him as he admitted with the outbrea6 of hostilities@

K4verything that $ have wor6ed for, everything that $ have hoped for, everything $ have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.

)hamberlain has long been misunderstood and under9rated as a "rime !inister but hewas not a coward, a fool, ignorant or idle. $ndeed, he was cultivated, highly intelligent

and hardwor6ing. Today he is considered the strongest9willed "! of the ).;3th

withthe exception of !argaret Thatcher. But his reputation is as a petty, narrow9minded,

boring provincial. ather as #ohn !ajor was portrayed in the %&&3s.D +e was quite asmall man who hated public spea6ing. +is hobbies included art, and he too6 picturesfrom the 7ational :allery for %% owning 1treet when he was )hancellor of the4xchequer. )hamberlain did not li6e modern art very much, but enjoyed readingliterary criticism and historical biographies. +e was interested in classical music,flowers, trees, bird watching, pheasant shooting and angling. )hamberlain wasconsidered rather old9fashioned even for the %&'3s, he wore dar6 clothes and old9

fashioned collars and he spo6e clearly and precisely. +e respected those who wor6edhard and concentrated, he was not good at socialising and was not considered veryclub9able. )hamberlain disli6ed criticism and opposition, but loved flattery, which+itler exploited to the full when they met.

)hamberlain was a tough politician with strong views that influenced his politics. +etended to dominate the cabinets of !aconald and Baldwin, although they were "rime!inisters at the time. Between %&'%9%&'C he held the post of )hancellor of the4xchequer, at which he had some success in coping with the problems of the recession.With some justification )hamberlain can claim to have helped unemployment to fall, toincrease British exports and to develop trading lin6s with other countries.

But despite his successes in home affairs, )hamberlain was always more interested inforeign affairs. )hamberlain was the dominant political personality in !aconalds

7ational :overnment %&'%9'* and Baldwins :overnment %&'*9'C. )hamberlaindespaired of those politicians around him and came to believe that if it wasnt for himthe whole country would have fallen apart at the seams@

K8ou would be astonished if you 6new how impossible it is to get any decision ta6enunless $ see that it is done myself and sometimes $ wonder what would happen to the:overnment if $ were to be smashed up in a taxi collision.

)hamberlains sense of self9importance was strong. When the %&'* 1tresa )onferencewas set up to try and woo !ussolini into a friendly understanding with Britain and

;0


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2rance, )hamberlain remar6ed@ K$ shall have to send Baldwin as well as 4den with1imon. This was quite a chee6, as )hamberlain was )hancellor while Baldwin was"rime !inisterE )hamberlain finally became "rime !inister in !ay %&'C andimmediately too6 control of foreign affairs.

)hamberlains policy of appeasement was popular until %&'0, but after the !unichcrisis, doubts began to grow. )hamberlain too6 sides in the national debate andcontinued to offer appeasement to +itler even after the occupation of "rague in !arch%&'&.

Where has )hamberlains poor reputation come from? )hamberlains poor reputation for giving into +itler comes from two maincontemporary sources@ )ato a group of journalistsI!"s led by the 5abour politician!ichael 2ootD, and Winston )hurchill. Both men survived )hamberlain and livedthrough the experiences of the 1econd World War. )hurchill, in particular, had a

profound influence on )hamberlains later reputation. 7ot only did he succeed)hamberlain, but )hurchill wrote a number of history boo6s which basically criticised)hamberlains adoption of the appeasement as the basis of Britains foreign policy.)hurchill resented having been excluded from office in the %&'3s by leading)onservatives such as Baldwin and )hamberlain. What must not be forgotten is thatappeasement was an extremely popular policy for most people in Britain up until the:erman invasion of the rest of )echoslova6ia in !arch %&'&. 4ven then, many wouldhave continued to support appeasement if it meant avoiding war with :ermany. (fterthe war, it was common to reproach )hamberlain for his attempts at conciliationJhindsight appeared to ma6e a fool of )hamberlain. $t was not until the %&C3s and%&03s that historians began to reappraise )hamberlains contribution. !any today

accept that although )hamberlain may have been foolish, there was little else he coulddo. 1ome historians believe that )hamberlain could do very little other than appeasegiven the wea6ness of 2rance, economic problems, military wea6ness, +itlersdiplomatic genius and the effective exclusion of the A1( and the A11 from 4uropean

politics.

( summary of the different views historians have had of )hamberlain@

aD The :uilty !en %&>3 !ichael 2oot, K)ato attac6ed )hamberlain for@

allowing +itler to ma6e gains without the ris6 of war,

advertising the wea6ness of Britain and 2rance, sacrifice of )echoslova6ia and "oland, encouraging +itler to contemplate war with the West.

bD )hurchills The :athering 1torm %&>0 criticises )hamberlain as@

Kthe narrowest, most ignorant, most ungenerous of men.

)hurchills analysis does not explain the reasons for the 1econd World War. $ts causesare far more complex than being simply )hamberlains fault.

;&


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The following articles are a basic summary of the differing interpretations by historiansof the role of )hamberlain in the appeasement years. 4ssentially the debate has ragedover the degree of )hamberlains Kguilt, if that is an appropriate word. The debate

began in %&>3 with the publication of The :uilty !en by )ato, a collection of politicalwriters led by !ichael 2oot. )ato criticised )hamberlain severely and this theme was

followed up by )hurchill in his The :athering 1torm %&>0D. $n fact, )hurchill had been a leading opponent of )hamberlain and appeasement in the %&'3s when the greatvoice of public opinion was firmly behind the 7ational :overnments foreign policies.By the %&C3s historians began to challenge this prevailing view of )hamberlain. Thesewriters excused )hamberlain on the grounds that there were many factors in)hamberlains adoption of appeasement, i.e. given the circumstances, Britain had noother option but to appease. $n the %&03s and %&&3s the pendulum began to swing

bac6 again, with some historians beginning to point the finger of blame at )hamberlainwhilst at the same time accepting the realities of the political climate in the %&'3s. Thearticles below have been summarised, you need to be aware of the arguments putforward by these historians if you are going to write a critical analysis of )hamberlain.

The articles have all been reprinted in British (ppeasement and the =rigins of WorldWar $$ by .#.H (dams.

Was Chamberlain guilty?

Article ,er#ict Summary

K)hamberlain@ the guiltiestman? 9 (ster %&0&

:uilty )hamberlain identified himself withappeasement. (ster believes that )hamberlaindid not see appeasement just as a delayingtactic that would buy time for Britain torearm for the coming conflict. (ster arguesthat appeasement was )hamberlains finalaim.

'3


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K)hamberlain attemptedthe impossible 9 ouglas%&CC

7otguilty

ouglas argues that )hamberlain had noother option than appeasement given theeconomic, military and political climate of thetimes. +e did the best he could.

K( triumph for all that was best in British life - (.#.".Taylor %&/%D

7otguilty

Taylor saw )hamberlains adoption ofappeasement as a noble attempt by a British

politician to uphold the principle of nationalself9determination as encouraged byWoodrow Wilson and the Treaty of Gersailles.Taylor admits that )hamberlain mademista6es at !unich by indicating to +itlerthat Britain could not effectively respondmilitarily to the :erman threat towards)echoslova6ia. $.e. it was the style in which)hamberlain appeased that was at fault, not

the actual terms of appeasement that Taylorcriticises.

K(ppeasement and itsinterpreters 9 Mennedy%&0/D

!ixedon thefenceD

Mennedy argues that it is too simplistic toargue that )hamberlain was guilty or notguilty. +e believes that )hamberlain mademista6es, but that he faced insurmountable

problems at the same time.

Kec6oning 9 !iddlemass :uilty !iddlemass argues that )hamberlaininherited a series of problems that he

compounded. Britain needed to follow aforeign policy that maintained its status as a:reat "ower yet at the same time recognisedthat this power was waning.

Survival Sills - ;Appeasement6 Robert +earce - "istory Review/arch 1227

obert "earce identifies the points to discuss on issues raised by 6ey (9level questions.

(ppeasement is one of the most controversial and hotly contested issues in modernhistory. The arguments for and against are so finely balanced that it is immenselydifficult for hard9pressed students 9 and academics 9 to ma6e up their minds. 7o longer

can we accept the simplistic theory that portrayed the appeasers, and especially 7eville)hamberlain, as cowardly, short9sighted and wishful9thin6ing :uilty !en who

'%


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encouraged +itler


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• (voiding war would help the 7ational :overnment to win the general election due

by %&>3

• ( war would leave the vast and sprawling British 4mpire vulnerable to attac6

• Britain had too few allies@ neither the 2rench, the (mericans, nor the ussians could

be relied on

• (ppeasement bought time to rearm

• Gersailles was based on false notions of :erman war guilt

• Britain had too many potential enemies and certainly could not afford to get

involved in a war against :ermany, $taly and #apan

• "ublic opinion seemed set against war

• 4vents in central and eastern 4urope were of no direct concern to Britain.

The rationale for appeasement

=nce you are aware of what happened, you should list possible reasons why Britain


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appeasement. 8ou must be sure to avoid giving the impression that the %&'3s were astatic period.

The case for the prosecution

$t is easy to draw up reasons explaining appeasement 9 and even easier to fall into thetrap of supposing that, because a policy can be explained, it was therefore a sensible

policy to pursue, and perhaps the best policy to pursue. +ence it is vital to consider thecase against appeasement, and especially against )hamberlain


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Was )hamberlain right? +e said that he


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>. +ow large an army was :ermany restricted to by the Treaty of Gersailles?

*. What was the 1tresa 2ront of %&'*?

/. Which (frican state was invaded by $taly in %&'*?

C. What was the +oare95aval "act?

0. Why did Britain turn a blind9eye to !ussolini


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.(.). "ar6er, )hamberlain and (ppeasement %&&'DMeith obbins, (ppeasement %&00DWilliam oc6, British (ppeasement in the %&'3s %&CCD

7ote@ "enguin has recently republished The :uilty !en by K)ato a group of > !"s

from the %&>3s under the leadership of !ichael 2oot.D )urrent price is F/.&&.

Tim #ohnson#une %&&&

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Appeasement Notes

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