A P P E N D I X : S O U R C E S

A N D D A T A

An empirical examination of the bargaining approach to pact-making requires what Russell Hardinsaid any examination of constitutional origins must entail:“a bracing dip into cold historical facts”(Hardin 1988, 529).This is perhaps all the more true to the extent the goal is to adduce independ-ent evidence for the beliefs and intentions—in addition to the actions—of pact-makers. Fortunatelyand quite uncommonly the historical record of the Hungarian roundtable talks is well documented.

The data for the intentions, institutional strategies, and beliefs of the MSZMP include draft plansfor each of the institutions in question as well as MSZMP Politburo and Central Committee (KB)minutes, briefings, and resolutions. Early draft plans for the presidency, and the constitutionalcourt are also available from the Ministries of the Interior and Justice. Information on MSZMPperceptions and beliefs about the opposition is also available, in addition to the above sources, ininterviews with participants and secret police surveillance reports of the EKA prepared for theMSZMP.

Beyond comprehensive secondary sources, the most important data on the goals, strategies, andperceptions of the risk-taking and risk-averse opposition parties are the complete transcripts to thedeliberations of the EKA and NKA contained in the multi-volume collection edited by AndrásBozóki, A Rendszerváltás Forgatókönyve: Kerekasztal-Tárgyalások 1989-ben (The Script of the RegimeChange: Roundtable Negotiations in 1989) Volumes I–IV, Budapest: Magvetπ, 1999;Volumes V–VIII,Budapest: Új Mandátum, 2000.They are cited in the text as:ARF (Year,Volume, page number).

This is also the most important source for the bargaining at the NKA between the MSZMP andthe EKA.The series contains the transcripts to the negotiations at the middle, political, as well as atthe working group level.The middle-level transcripts are word for word; the working group min-utes are summary statements of the positions of each side and the agreements and disagreementsreached. Newspaper accounts of the talks and surrounding events in the major dailies—MagyarHírlap, Magyar Nemzet, and Népszabadság—also provide evidence for many of the relevant actions ofthe parties away from the negotiating table. Finally, there is a growing secondary literature inHungarian on various aspects of Hungary’s transition in general and the roundtable negotiations inparticular, including volume seven in the ARF series.

I collected the data during two research stays in Budapest, from January to August 1995 and inJuly 1997. Most of the unpublished material I gathered on the MSZMP is located in theMDP–MSZMP collection of the Hungarian National Archives. Parliamentary ratification as well assome early government draft plans can be found in the Parliamentary Library and in theParliamentary Archives. Relevant identification information for sources from these archives is

provided in the endnotes. The Kortörténeti Division of the István Széchényi National Librarycontained useful background information on the roundtable as well as offering a comprehensivenewspaper collection. Finally, I conducted over 30 interviews with nearly every major participant inthe negotiations, including experts from both sides in every working committee, dissidents andopposition party members, middle-level MSZMP officials, and MSZMP and government leaders.The list of these interviews follows.

List of Interviews

All interviews took place in Budapest, Hungary, unless otherwise noted. Party affiliations and titlesare those held in 1989.

Áder, János, FIDESZ,August 25, 1995.Bálint, Magyar, SZDSZ,August 4, 1994.Balsai, István, MDF, July 27, 1995.Bogdán,Tibor, MSZMP, Justice Ministry expert, June 26, 1997.Boross, Imre, FKGP,August 8, 1994; June 24, 1997.Budzsáklia Mátyás, MSZMP, Central Committee expert, June 25, 1997.Fejti,György,MSZMP,Central Committee Secretary,Political Steering Committee member,August

4, 1994; July 31, 1995; June 12, 1997.Fekete, János, MSZMP MP,August 31, 1995.Filló, Pál, MSZMP MP, July 20, 1995.Gál, Zoltán, MSZMP, Deputy Minister of the Interior,August 25, 1994.György, István, MSZMP, Central Committee expert,August 26, 1994; June 17, 1997.Haraszti, Miklós, SZDSZ, December 3, 1997, New York, USA.Horváth, Balázs, MDF, June 24, 1997,Veszprém.Kajdi, József, MSZMP, Justice Ministry expert, June 6, 1997.Kilényi, Géza, MSZMP, Deputy Minister of Justice, June 19, 1995.Kis, János, SZDSZ,August 30, 1994.Kónya, Imre, FJF, July 5, 1995.Kövér, László, FIDESZ, July 25, 1994; June 19, 1997.Kukorelli, István, HNF, Chairman, June 20, 1995.Kulcsár, Kálmán, MSZMP, Minister of Justice, June 9, 1997.Orbán,Viktor, FIDESZ,April, 1988.Petπ, Iván, SZDSZ, June 20, 1997.Pozsgay, Imre, MSZMP, Politburo member, Deputy Minister of State, August 30, 1995; June 20,

1997.Solyóm, László, MDF, June 9, 1997.Somogyvári, István, MSZMP, Justice Ministry expert, June 5, 1997.Szabad, György, MDF, July 27, 1994; June 17, 1997.Torgyán, József, FKGP, July 7, 1995.Tóth,András, MSZMP, Central Committee official,August 16, 1994; July 21, 1995.Tóth, Zoltán, MSZMP, Interior Ministry expert, June 27, 1995 with Kenneth Benoit; July 12, 1995.Tölgyessy, Péter, SZDSZ,August 29, 1994; July 3, 1995; June 16, 1997.Varga, Csaba, MNP, June 25, 1997, Nagykovácsi.Vigh, Károly, BZSBT, May 22, 1995.Zétényi, Zsolt, BZSBT, June 10, 1997.

Appendix180

N O T E S

Introduction

1. Interview with MSZMP Central Committee Secretary and roundtable negotiator György Fejti,June 12, 1997.

2. In Hungary, the regime was also supported by the Soviet threat, which had diminished followingthe conclusion of the Polish roundtable. Nevertheless, as chapter two will show, there was realuncertainty—and fear—surrounding Soviet intentions at least among the cautious opposition.There was similar, if less intense, uncertainty and fear about Hungary’s domestic security services.The near use of Interior Ministry troops against demonstrators in Ukraine in fall 2004 serves asjust the most recent reminder that violence remains an option; things could have turned out verydifferently in Hungary as well. See “Back Channels: A Crackdown Averted; How Top Spies inUkraine Changed the Nation’s Path.” New York Times, C.J. Chivers, January 17, 2005.

3. My use of risk-taking and risk-aversion differs from that in formal decision and game theory.See section 1.3 in chapter one.

4. Up to a point. Even risk-takers will back down under some conditions. See section 1.3 in chapter one.

5. Bermeo’s (1997) argument against the moderation assumption refers to popular mobilization.My argument differs from hers to the extent I focus on risk attitudes toward negotiations and itseffects on bargaining power rather than popular mobilization.The two approaches, however, aremutually compatible.

Chapter One Pact-Making, Bargaining, and Institutional Choice

1. “Elπterjesztés néhány idπszer¢ politikai kérdésrπl” [On Several Timely Political Questions],n.d., 21. Selections reprinted in Zárt Kör, I(1), 1993, 21.This document and the committee whichcreated it is discussed in more detail in chapter three.

2. “Javaslat a Politikai Bizottsághoz a köztarsasági elnöki intézményrπl szóló térvény elveire[Proposal to the Politburo on the Principles on the Law on the Institution of the President of theRepublic], 2, 4. Kálmán Kulcsár,April 10, 1989. Document (c), Jegyzökönyv a Politikai Bizottsáy1989 április 19-e megtartott ülésröl [Minutes of the April 19, 1989 meeting of the Politburo].In MOL, 288.f.5/1062. π.e.

Notes1823. Pozsgay was the most popular politician from September 1988 through July 1989

(Népszabadság,August 10, 1989, 5) and topped the list in a July 20, 1989 poll measuring supportfor presidential candidates (Magyar Nemzet, July 20, 1989, 4).

4. An amendment to the law on the court stripped the court of this power in February, 1998(1998. évi I. törvény,“Az Alkotmánybíróságról szóló 1989. évi XXXII. törvény módosításáról”[“Amendment to Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court”],Magyar Közlöny, 10/1998,February 18, 1998.

5. Interview with László Sólyom, a negotiator for the opposition in 1989 and Chief Justice of theConstitutional Court from 1990 to 1998. Budapest, June 9, 1997.

6. “Elπterjesztés néhány idπszer¢ politikai kérdésπl” (“Submission on several timely political ques-tions”), (d.u.). Selections reprinted in Zárt Kör, I(1), 1993, 20–22.

7. Interview with MSZMP constitutional expert and author of the MSZMP draft plan JózsefKajdi, June 6, 1997.

8. For the origins of the electoral law, see Schiemann (2001) and Benoit and Schiemann (2001).9. Jegzπkönyv a Politkai Bizottság 1988 május 31-eje megtartott ülésrπl [Minutes of the May 31,

1988 meeting of the Politburo], 3 (69). In MOL 288.f.5/1027.π.e..10. Crawford and Ostrom (1995) attempt to integrate various definitions of institutions into one

conceptual framework.This definition draws on, but differs somewhat from their approach. Bylimiting the concept’s referents to formal rules, I adopt a narrower definition than those whoinclude norms and customs in the extension of the concept “institution” (Crawford and Ostrom1995; North 1990; Knight 1992).

11. Discussing institutions in terms of their individual rules does not imply that these rules arecompletely independent of one another (or of rules in other institutions). Political institutions atthe constitutional level are interdependent and their design is path dependent, so that where onestarts constrains where one can go. Indeed, the discussion of the Hungarian case will show that itwas precisely the knowledge of this mutual dependency of institutions that motivated the differentstrategies of the regime and the opposition. I thank Jon Elster for forcing me to clarify this point.

12. In the end, if the risk-taking actor believes her opponent is somehow precommitted to a “baddeal” which is nevertheless better than the disagreement outcome, the first actor will accept theoffer; a threat to forgo such a gain would be incredible.

13. I am not arguing for interpersonal comparison of utilities; the point is just to illustrate the effectsof different estimates of outcomes on actor choices.

14. Labor-capital bargaining provides another example.A firm might incur heavy costs if it does notagree with a union on a contract within a certain period of time, say because of lost marketshare, while the union possesses an ample strike fund and is able to continue striking beyondthat point.Assuming both facts are common knowledge between the firm and the union andeverything else is equal, the union’s patience will translate into superior bargaining power,enabling it to extract more concessions from the firm.

15. Conceptualizing the regime’s choice in terms of probabilities this way treats the opposition’sdilemma as a decision problem rather than a game theory problem, ignoring the motivation ofthe regime. See Schiemann (2005a) for a formalization of pact-making as a signaling game.Casting the opposition’s dilemma as a decision problem is sufficient, however, to illustrate theeffects of different beliefs (estimates of p) on negotiator choices, my main concern. In the end,after considering the goals and available options of the regime and before making its ownchoice, the opposition must come up with its best guess as to what the regime will do anddifferent guesses can lead to different choices.

16. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), for example, review psychological research, including bothexperiments and field studies, showing that bargainers systematically bias their estimates offairness in a self-serving matter—even when they have identical information. Introspectionhelps here too.As anyone who has ever been in an intimate relationship will attest, two peoplecan draw very different inferences from the same information.

17. Low- and high-cost estimating mental models are distinct from, but can be influenced bypervasive cognitive biases and heuristics such as representativeness, availability, and anchoringused to cope with them, all of which affect rational decision-making (Hastie and Dawes 2001;Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Kahneman et al. 1982; McDermott 2001).

18. To this degree, Denzau and North are right that “an understanding of how mental modelsevolve and the relationship among them is the single most important step that research inthe social sciences can make to replace the black box of the ‘rationality’ assumption usedin . . . rational choice models (2000, 24–25).”While chapter two suggests possible origins fordivergent mental models among opposition negotiators in Hungary, a full exploration is beyondthe scope of this volume. For an account of divergent beliefs informed by recent findings inneuroscience, see Schiemann (2005b).

19. This is true of both game theoretic and nongame theoretic approaches to transitions. See, forexample,Linz and Stepan (1996,61) and O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986).Most game theoreticaccounts adopt the same assumption, classifying actors in terms of their preference orderingsover possible outcomes (Casper and Taylor 1996; Colomer 1995, 1991; Zielinski 1995).Although she does not explicitly divide actors into radicals and moderates, Karl does rely on theviolence–nonviolence distinction to generate her typology of outcomes. In this model there are“two strategies of the transition,”“compromise” or “use force” (1990, 8–9).

20. The reason for this is that while both the distribution of agreements as well as the probabilityof an agreement being reached are functions of risk-taking, their relationships are inverse.Thatis, while taking risky actions (a high level of risk-taking) increases the distributional share fromany particular agreement, it also decreases the likelihood that an agreement will be reachedat all.

21. The place of counterfactuals in the empirical analysis is discussed further below.22. Hawkins (2001) makes the same point about the need to study non-transitions.23. Rational choice theorists, however, have largely tended to ignore this admittedly sticky problem.

Indeed, even rational choice theorists who claim affinity with interpretive approaches explicitlyreject the need to acquire independent evidence for intentions and beliefs, instead resorting to“revealed preferences and behavior” (Bates et al. 2000, 698; also Riker 1990, 173–174). Butreliance on revealed preferences strips rational choice theory to a bare and tautological hollow.

Chapter Two Pact-Making in Hungary:The 1989 Hungarian Roundtable Talks

1. Risk-taking softliners controlled the MSZMP negotiating team for a short period, as did, to alesser extent, risk-averse opposition parties at the very end of the talks, generating some variationwithin the single Hungarian “case.” See chapter six.

2. The Polish regime’s failure to secure support for economic reforms involving steep priceincreases in a 1987 referendum (due to low voter turnout) may have convinced the Hungarianruling party that it would have to offer something to society in return—as their Polish counterpartshad not (Brown 1991, 86).

3. Pozsgay’s memoirs contain a transcript of the interview, 222–227.4. For a detailed history of the urbanist dissident opposition see Csizmadia (1995).5. Published as a special issue (#20) of Beszélπ in June 1987 and contained in BÖK (1992,

II/749–791) and in Csizmadia (1995, II, 431–487). Other dissident groupings in the democraticopposition put forth their own programs around this time, but none were as comprehensive asthe “Social Contract,”nor did they have anywhere near the same impact on either the intelligentsiaor the MSZMP leadership.For an overview of these proposals see Csizmadia (1995, I, 368–374),also Gyarmathy and Lévay (1990).

Notes 183

6. “Van kiút:A Szabad Kezdeményezések Hálózata Ideiglenes Tanácsnak nyilatkozata” (“There isa way out:The Declaration of the Interim Council of the Network of Free Initiatives”), May1988. Reprinted in Csizmadia (1995, II, 488–490).

7. Interview with Bálint Magyar in Csizmadia (1995, III, 356); also Richter (1990: 41–42).8. In a SZDSZ leader’s words, “we, in contrast to those at Lakitelek, in contrast to the MDF,

accepted that we are ‘in opposition,’ the opposition of the party-state” (Interview with FerencKπszeg in Csizmadia 1995, III, 154). See also the interview with Bálint Magyar in the samevolume, 357.The MDF’s formation is discussed in more detail below.

9. Interview with Viktor Orbán and Dr. József Szájer, April 1988. For FIDESZ’s legal argumentthat they were well within the bounds of the law, see the pamphlet “Jogi kommentár egyközleményhez,” April 1988, in the author’s possession. FIDESZ’s struggle with the authoritiescan be followed in a series of documents collected in Bozóki (1992).

10. Personal communication from a founding member of FIDESZ,April 1987.11. See, e.g., the reports on the sit down strike in front of the Chinese embassy in both Magyar

Nemzet and Népszabadság, May 26, 1989, page 5 in both. FIDESZ leader László Kövér placedparticular emphasis on FIDESZ’s street demonstrations and other actions as defining itsrisk-taking in the eyes of the cautious opposition groups as well as the regime. Interview,June 19, 1997.

12. For the text of this speech, as well as various reactions to it, see Bozóki (1992, 154–165).13. For background on the populist intelligentsia, see Borbándi (1983).14. The minutes to the meeting as well as the closing declaration and a list of participants are

contained in Lakitelek (1991).15. Interview, June 17, 1997. See also Csizmadia (1995, I, 409; Ripp 2000, 222).16. See Lengyel (1991, 31).17. Interview with Imre Boross, June 24, 1997.18. Keresztes was nearly executed by the fascist Hungarian regime at the end of World War II

for his resistance activities and was later imprisoned by the communist regime for his participationin the failed revolution of 1956 (ARF 1999,VIII, 254–255).

19. According to Keresztes, the organizing meeting began its work on March 17, 1989 (Richter1990, 247). Apparently the MDF’s Antall also argued against the KDNP becoming a party inlate 1988,when he declined Keresztes’s offer to write the bylaws of the KDNP (Révész 1995,31).

20. Heged¢s became a Vice President in 1989 (Hermann 1992, 778).21. Heged¢s again demonstrates the close ties between the populists and para-regime organizations.

In early 1989 he was simultaneously acting president of the Veres Society,Vice President of theMNP, and Vice President and Secretary of the HNF (Hermann 1992, 778).

22. Baranyai, e.g., returned in the early 1960s (Richter 1990, 224).23. Interview with Tibor Baranyai in Richter.24. Interviews with members of the MSZMP negotiating team István György and András Tóth,

August 29, 1994, August 16, 1994, respectively. Reports on these meetings can be found inMagyar Nemzet and Népszabadság almost daily from late February to late March.

25. “Tájékoztató a Politikai Bizottságnak az MSZMP, valamint a különbözπ politikai, társadalmiszervezetek között folytatott tárgyalások elsπ szakaszáról” [“Briefing to the Politburo on thefirst phase of the talks conducted between the MSZMP and the various political and societalorganizations”],March 10,1989.MOL288.f.5/1057 PB 1989.március.14,177–184.Page numbersin the following text refer to this report.

26. For more on the competition between urbanist dissident and populist intellectual oppositiongroups during this period, see Csizmadia (1995, I, 453ff ).

27. For a more detailed look at the EKA see Bozóki (1993) and Ripp (2000).28. The Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) joined the EKA on June 7 (ARF 1999, I,

521–566).

Notes184

29. Indeed,Tölgyessy’s complaints about MSZMP knowledge of EKA deliberations back on April 22were repeated word for word in the Daily Operative Information reports prepared by the secretpolice and sent to the MSZMP leadership (Kiszely 2001, 288).

30. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1989.május 2-én megtartott ülésrπl” [“Minutes of theMay 2, 1989 meeting of the Politburo”], 4. MOL288.f.5/1063.π.e.

31. It is perhaps worth noting here a point to be discussed below, namely that Fejti’s statementsprovide clear evidence that regime risk-takers adopted relatively confrontational strategies toachieve their objectives—but that they were also in a hurry for them. In terms of the bargain-ing profiles from chapter two, they were risk-taking but impatient, making them weakernegotiators.

32. “Jegyzπkönyv a PB 1989.május.16 megtartott ülésrπl” [“Minutes of the May 16, 1989 meetingof the Politburo”], 23. MOL288.f.5/1065.π.e.

33. MSZMP negotiator András Tóth emphasized the difficulties posed for the MSZMP negotiating team by being “caught between a rock and a hard place” of the Reform Circles onthe one hand and a “leftist, orthodox group” in the Central Committee. Interview, July 21,1995.

34. “Tájékoztató a Politikai Bizottságnak az Ellezéki Kerekasztal összejövetelérπl” [“Briefing tothe Politburo on the Opposition Roundtable Meeting”], May 25, 1989. In “Jegyzπkönyv a PB1989.május.26 megtartott ülésrπl” [“Minutes of the May 26, 1989 meeting of the Politburo.”],204–209. MOL288.f.5/1066.π.e.

35. The report also included as an appendix the text of the declaration drafted during the EKAmeeting.

36. For more on the MSZMP’s fears of the reburial, see János (2000).37. The MSZMP’s sense of urgency was made public knowledge in a newspaper report on

Fejti’s meeting with reform circle representatives, which emphasized his desire that substantivenegotiations start in early June (Népszabadság, May 29, 1989, 4).

38. Interview, June 16, 1997.39. The wording became contentious in the course of the talks as the EKA repeatedly interpreted

this statement to mean that the third side had no veto rights. As a result of this, the NationalCouncil of Trade Unions (SZOT) left the negotiations in protest on August 30. It is clear fromboth the written transcripts to the negotiations and interviews with MSZMP and EKA partic-ipants that the third side could not veto agreements between the EKA and the MSZMP.For thisreason I do not include them in figure 2.1 and ignore them generally.

40. See Szalai ([1990] 1994) for more on the economic negotiations.41. Although the MSZMP-dominated parliament would have to pass any roundtable agreements

into law, this was perceived by roundtable negotiators in the summer of 1989 as imposing littleconstraint on their bargaining, given the ruling party’s overwhelming dominance of that bodyand its history as a rubber stamp for MSZMP policy. Consequently both the MSZMP and theEKA all but ignored parliament during the negotiations over the institutions.

42. For a more comprehensive overview of the competition between regime factions in the springand summer of 1989, see Tπkés (1996, 314–332).

43. By early September these estimates were as high as 200,000 (Tπkés 1996, 332).44. Berecz, a long-time conservative, was also removed from his Central Committee secretary

position, completing his fall from power (KB 1993, 1234).45. Except for several weeks beginning in mid-July, when Fejti directed negotiations for the

MSZMP during Pozsgay’s absence and the talks came to a virtual standstill (Bozóki andKarácsony 2000, 398). I discuss this period in more detail in chapter six.

46. Interview with SZDSZ leader Bálint Magyar in Csizmadia (1995, I, 357).47. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy,August 29, 1994.48. Interview, July 31, 1995.

Notes 185

49. Several of these experts, for example, were the authors of the Interior and Justice Ministries’ lawdrafts which served as a negotiating basis at the NKA.

50. Interview, June 17, 1997. On at least one occasion this principal-agent problem approachedoutright rebellion, according to experts from two different working groups and indirectlyconfirmed by Fejti. Fejti once called a meeting of the MSZMP experts to all six workinggroups in order to prepare for the next round of negotiations.When members of the constitu-tional group reported on the status of their talks with the opposition, Fejti rebuked them foroverstepping their mandate and instructed them to overturn their agreements with the oppo-sition on several points.At that point the experts stood up, declared that they couldn’t negoti-ate in this manner and walked out of the meeting. Although they continued to negotiate forthe MSZMP, Fejti thenceforth never exercised the same degree of control over them.Interviews with István György,August 26, 1994, June 17, 1997, and with István Somogyvári,June 5, 1997.

51. Risk-taker János Berecz made a similar statement (KB 1993, 191).52. Interviews,August 30, 1995 and June 20, 1997. In his memoirs, Pozsgay emphasizes his desire to

reach an agreement “as quickly as possible” (Pozsgay 1993, 162).53. Interview with György Fejti, June 12, 1997.54. Interview with MSZMP constitutional expert István Somogyvári, June 5, 1997.55. See, e.g., the MSZMP’s protests in the July 17 meeting of the constitutional working committee

(ARF 2000,VI, 59–66).56. The date emerged as the new goal in the August 15 meeting of the Politburo.The leadership

proposed that the Central Committee meeting of September 1 authorize the MSZMP negotiatingteam to sign the roundtable agreement. See. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politikai Intézπ Bizottság 1989augusztus 15-én megtartott ülésrπl” [Minutes of the August 15 meeting of the Political SteeringCommittee], 4. MOL 288.f.5/1075.π.e.

57. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.58. On the differences within the opposition over the electoral system see Benoit and Schiemann

(2001).59. Interviews with various EKA members.60. Interviews with MSZMP expert members of each committee revealed that if an expert

perceived any differences at all between EKA representatives, these were tactical differencesonly, with SZDSZ members “tougher” (kemény) and MDF members “softer” ( puha). MSZMPexperts’ perceptions are discussed in greater detail below.

61. Interview, June 25, 1997.62. Interview, June 19, 1997. The SZDSZ’s Iván Petπ made an identical assessment about the

historical parties, “who were constantly afraid that things would turn back here.This . . . wasirrational, but they were like this.These parties were truly afraid.They were pliant negotiators.”Interview, June 20, 1997.

63. Interview with Imre Boross, June 24, 1997.64. MDF delegate to the EKA György Szabad, e.g., noted that the MDF saw the reformers as a

guarantee to execute the agreements at the roundtable. Interview, June 17, 1997.65. Interview, June 16, 1997.66. The next two chapters provide concrete instances of the general approach taken by each group

discussed here.67. See the interview with Péter Tölgyessy in Richter (1990, 149–150).68. Interview, June 25, 1997. The MNP paid a steep price for this inattention to institutional

“details”: it failed to make the 4 percent threshold in the 1990 multiparty elections andsubsequently disappeared from parliamentary politics.

69. There were important exceptions of course. In the case of the electoral law, for example, mostof the historical party negotiators were very aware of their interests and lobbied hard for a listPR system. See Benoit and Schiemann (2001).

70. Interview, June 16, 1997.

Notes186

71. Interview, June 16, 1997.72. Both József Antall of the MDF and Iván Petπ of the SZDSZ state this in their interviews in

Richter (1990, 159, 183).73. Interview, June 9, 1997.74. Although lower than the historical parties, in the early period the MDF’s estimates were still

higher than the SZDSZ or FIDESZ, which considered any negative actions by the MSZMP orthe Soviet Union extremely unlikely.

75. MDF representatives to the EKA László Solyóm and György Szabad expressed similar views ininterviews, June 9, 1997 and June 17, 1997, respectively.

76. Interview with SZDSZ EKA representative Miklós Haraszti, December 3, 1997. Haraszti alsoclaimed that the MDF became very impatient for an agreement in the beginning of Septemberbecause of its short term interests in governing.The moderate BZSBT/MDF member ZsoltZétényi also underlined the different levels of patience in September between the risk-averseand risk-taking opposition parties. “The SZDSZ’s logic was that it isn’t necessary to hurry; itisn’t necessary to agree with them on everything no matter what.The Antalls would have lovedabove all a quick result.” Interview, June 10, 1997.

77. On the MDF’s dearth of experts see also Tπkés (1996, 337; 342) and Révész (33–34).78. SZDSZ expert on the party law, Iván Petπ, for example, claimed that “it was important to me that

[MDF I/2 expert] Balazs Horváth not relate what happened in the I/2 committee, but insteadthat I do so because I felt that he would intentionally present it softly.” Interview, June 20, 1997.

79. Interview,August 4, 1994.80. Interview, June 17, 1997.

Chapter Three Presidentialism,Parliamentarism, and

Opposition Intransigence:The Presidency

1. Changes made to government drafts by members of the Central Committee working groupindicate that the latter exercised ultimate political control, despite later claims to the contrary byJustice Minister Kálmán Kulcsár and others (Kilényi 1991, I/154; II/195–289).

2. “Javaslat a Politikai Bizottsághoz a köztarsasági elnöki intézményrπl szóló térvény elveire[Proposal to the Politburo on the Principles on the Law on the Institution of the President ofthe Republic], 2, 4. Kálmán Kulcsár,April 10, 1989. Document (c) in “Jegyzπkönyv a PolitikaiBizottság 1989.aprilis.19-én megtartott ülésrπl” [“Minutes of the April 19, 1989 meeting of thePolitburo”], MOL 288.f.5/1062.π.e.

3. István Somogyvári, an expert in the Ministry of Justice and later a member of the MSZMP’sdelegation to the NKA was the author of the January 30 draft and reported that he received adirect “political order” from the party center to draw up a bill for a directly elected president tobe established prior to the free parliamentary elections. Interview, June 5, 1997.

4. “Elπterjesztés néhány idπszer¢ politikai kérdésrπl” [On Several Timely Political Questions],(d.u.), 21. Selections reprinted in Zárt Kör, I(1), 1993, 20–22.

5. “Elπterjesztés néhány idπszer¢ politikai kérdésrπl” [On Several Timely Political Questions],(d.u.), 21. Selections reprinted in Zárt Kör, I(1), 1993, 21.

6. This decision was made public in Népszabadság, June 26, 1989.7. An August 10, 1989 poll, for example, showed Pozsgay to be the consistently most popular

politician from September 1988 through July 1989 (Népszabadság,August 10, 1989, 5). Pozsgayalso topped the list in a July 20, 1989 poll measuring support for presidential candidates (MagyarNemzet, July 20, 1989, 4).

Notes 187

8. See interviews with various EKA members in Richter (1990) as well as interview with BálintMagyar in Csizmadia (1995).

9. At this point the MSZMP believed the worst it would do in the legislative elections is be forcedto include the MDF or the Social Democrats in a coalition government. The MSZMP didnot really begin to worry about the parliamentary elections until the July 1989 parliamentaryby-election losses. See Benoit and Schiemann (2001).

10. Interviews with Imre Pozsgay and György Fejti,August 30, 1996 and July 31, 1996, respectively.11. Interview with Minister of Justice Kálmán Kulcsár, June 9, 1997.Kulcsár went on to say that this

was also the reason behind the MSZMP’s support for an office of the Vice President. WhenKulcsár presented this before the Politburo, Pozsgay’s competitor Grósz energetically secondedthe proposal for a Vice President as a check on Pozsgay.

12. As László Kövér, a FIDESZ representative at the EKA put it, the differences between the MDFon the one hand and the SZDSZ and FIDESZ on the other “were tactical differences; in no waywere they differences of principle.” Interview, June 19, 1997. FKGP representative Imre Borosssimilarly characterized his party and the other historical parties as cautious,while the SZDSZ andFIDESZ he considered “radical” in terms of their negotiating style. Interview, June 24, 1997.

13. See, for example, the proposals by FIDESZ negotiator János Áder and the cautious BZSBT(later MDF MP) EKA negotiator Zsolt Zétényi in Kilényi (1989).

14. For the public accounts of these events, see Népszabadság, July 13, Magyar Nemzet, July 15,Magyar Hírlap, July 17. As a high-ranking member of the Patriotic Peoples’ Front (HNF), theMNP’s Varga would also have been aware of Central Committee discussions of negative pressurefrom some Warsaw Pact countries (KB 1993, 1294).

15. See, for example, Kilényi’s remarks at the beginning of the July 27 PET session (ARF 1999, II,646) and in the August 2 MSZMP news conference (Népszabadság,August 3, 1989, 3).

16. See Magyar Nemzet,August 18, 1989, 3 and ARF (VI, I/1, 112, 115).17. Kilényi claims that this was his own action and that he resigned in order to distance the

government from the MSZMP. Leading MSZMP negotiator Fejti asserts that the whole thingwas planned in an MSZMP tactical session the evening before. Interviews, March 13, 1995 andJuly 31, 1995, respectively. Fejti’s claim is supported by the minutes of a Politburo meeting inwhich the leadership decided the negotiating position of the MSZMP on various issues, includ-ing the election rules on the presidency. According to these minutes, the MSZMP delegationshould continue to insist upon the direct election of the president. “Jegyzπkönyv a PolitikaiIntézπ Bizottság 1989.augusztus 15-én megtartott ülésrπl” [Minutes of the August 15 Meetingof the Political Steering Committee],August 15, 1989, 4, MOL288.f.5/1075.

18. That the MSZMP did in fact make “all important political decisions” at least through theconclusion of the NKA is clear from Politburo documents and interviews with MSZMP leaderssuch as György Fejti. Interview, July 31, 1995.

19. The more resolute stand adopted had favorable consequences in the constitutional workingcommittee meeting that day. The MSZMP made important concessions on constitutionalregulations of the armed forces and police following the EKA’s protest (ARF 1999, III,225–226).

20. For the full text see ARF (III, fn. 10, 223–225).21. Presidential powers in this proposal are discussed in section 3.3.22. That Boross’s (FKGP) position was due to his (high) estimates of a negative MSZMP reaction

and not his preferences is clear from an interview. When asked why he and the FKGP hadoriginally supported a “very weak President,” he replied “because at that time we judged thatPozsgay would be the President of the Republic. In other words, if it is going to be a communist,then the powers should be weak.” June 24, 1997.

23. Interview with FIDESZ delegate to the EKA, László Kövér, June 19, 1997. The SZDSZ’sTölgyessy echoed these sentiments. Interview, August 29, 1994. In a later interview,Tölgyessyalso emphasized the risk-taking parties’ fear that the EKA would break up and the SZDSZand FIDESZ would lose any further opportunities to influence the drafting of the laws, since

Notes188

negotiations would continue between the MSZMP and the MDF-led cautious parties.June 16, 1997.

24. For the MSZMP’s immediate and angry reaction, see the editorial in the party daily Népszabadság,September 7, 1989, 3.

25. For the text of this law, see ARF III (fn. 32, 645–648).26. Applied to the expected size of the future Hungarian parliament, this would have meant

between one-fourth and one-third of MPs.27. Decree powers are also legislative powers.Since,however,decree rights of the Hungarian president

are limited to states of emergency, they are discussed with emergency powers.28. At this point the MSZMP still counted on packing the court with loyalists for life terms.

“To strengthen the constitutional court in this way, to give the president the right to turn to theconstitutional court, was because of the fear about the types of decisions that a parliamentof unknown composition might make which would hurt serious interests.This was a protec-tion mechanism.” Interview with MSZMP Central Committee and I./1 expert, István György,June 17, 1989.

29. Tölgyessy considered this part of the 1946 system and hence didn’t feel it provided the presidentwith any significant power. Interview, June 16, 1997.

30. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.31. This appears as Version A in (IM August 21, 1989, 13).32. Recall that the EKA at this point thought that the speaker of parliament would exercise the

office of head of state.33. The president was also authorized to dissolve the assembly on the recommendation of the

government.34. Interview, June 16, 1997.35. In an irony of history, the opposition used the 1946 provision, which was designed to prevent

a noncommunist president from interfering with Soviet military control, to prevent a communistpresident from supporting Soviet military control. See MKT (1946, I, 108).

36. According to Tölgyessy, the EKA agreed to make the president commander in chief partly toallay Soviet fears of a future opposition government becoming privy to Warsaw Pact secrets.Even so, they agreed consciously to “quite ambiguous” rules on this point so that the provisioncould be interpreted both ways: a manner which would satisfy the Soviets and a way whichwould prevent the MSZMP from claiming a reserve domain when the opposition won theelections. Interview, June 16, 1997.This intentional vagueness did indeed cause conflict follow-ing the first free elections, but between the prime minister and the president, not with theSoviet Union.

37. Moreover, state secretaries could be appointed/dismissed only on the recommendation of therelevant minister via the prime minister.

38. Again, nominations for appointment and dismissal were required from separate nongovernmentalbodies defined in a separate law.

39. Contained in a separate clause of the MSZMP’s proposal, 30/A.§(3)(a–d) (IM May 29, 11).40. Contained in a separate clause of the MSZMP’s proposal, 30/A.§(3)(a–d) (IM May 29, 11).41. Since the MSZMP was writing the presidency for itself, this rule may have been intended as a

way to maintain MSZMP control over Hungarian foreign policy—i.e., keep Hungary in theSoviet bloc.

42. See also comments by SZDSZ negotiator Iván Petπ in Magyar Nemzet, ( July 29, 1989, 4).43. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politikai Intézπ Bizottság 1989.augusztus 15-én megtartott ülésrπl” [Minutes of

the August 15, 1989 meeting of the Political Steering Committee], 4. MOL288.f.5/1075.π.e.See also Vass (1994, 634–639).

44. Discussed in section 3.2 earlier.45. As it turned out it was simply too late in the year for the second compromise to be realistic;

there was not enough time to organize elections under an electoral law still being drafted at the

Notes 189

roundtable. The first compromise met with little resistance; both risk-averse and risk-takingsoftliners were overwhelmingly concerned with the immediate election, not one, four, five, orsix years in the future.

46. Interview, June 9, 1997.This assessment was confirmed in interviews with representatives of theother risk-averse parties.

47. Indeed, it was during this session that FIDESZ proposed the EKA withdraw from negotiationsentirely due to a scandal involving the Workers’ Guard illegally saving its property (ARF 1999,IV, 361).The cautious MNP and BZSBT quickly disagreed and while the SZDSZ supportedFIDESZ, the former recognized that the majority in the EKA felt that withdrawing from thetalks would be “too strong” a move (ARF 1999, IV, 361–362).

48. The MSZDP also promised not to veto; the Liga also refused to sign, but as an observer had noveto rights.

49. The Social Democrats took an intermediary position; they signed the agreement but attached acodicil expressing their disagreement with the presidential election rules.

50. The planned referendum contained three other questions on the MSZMP’s property, itsorganizations in the workplace, and its paramilitary arm, the Workers’ Guard. See Schiemann(1999).

51. For more on the referendum see ARF (2000,V, 137, fn.13).52. Figure 3.1 contains only the most important of these rules; numerous minor provisions

are omitted. In the interest of clarity and to focus on the distributional results, I also omitrules which were the product of a compromise (equal concessions on the rule or atrade between rules) or which one of the two sides did not contest and hence did not negotiateover.

53. As the SZDSZ’s Tölgyessy pointed out in an interview, the only significant actions for whichthe president is not required to obtain permission from other offices and institutions is the vetoand forwarding to the constitutional court—where someone else makes the decision anyway.June 16, 1997.

54. As both MDF and SZDSZ constitutional experts noted, the 1946 proposal also served as a focalpoint for resolving the increasingly sharp divisions between risk-taking and risk-averse partieswithin the EKA itself. Interview with László Sólyom June 9, 1997 and Péter Tölgyessy, June 16,1997.

55. On the strategic uses of argument, see Elster (1991).56. Interview, June 16, 1997.The FIDESZ’s László Kövér and the FKGP’s Imre Boross made similar

statements in interviews, June 19, 1997 and June 24, 1997, respectively.57. Interview with István György, June 17, 1997.58. Interview with Imre Pozsgay,August 30, 1995.59. Interview with István Somogyvári, June 5, 1989.60. The parliamentary executive has become stronger over time, leading to chancellorization of the

executive along the German model (Schiemann 2004).

Chapter Four From Perverse Checks and Balances to Guardian of the Constitution:

The Constitutional Court

1. Interview, with István György, MSZMP expert negotiator, June 17, 1997.This was one of theMSZMP’s more prescient moves. In March 1992 the court struck down the Zétényi-TakácsAct, an attempt at retroactive justice by the center right government aimed at bypassing the

Notes190

statute of limitations and prosecuting those responsible for crimes during and following the1956 revolution. For more on this, see Arato (1993: 676) and Paczolay (1993: 33–35).

2. “Koncepció az Alkotmány felülvizsgalatához” [Conception Toward the Review of theConstitution], Deputy Minister of Justice Géza Kilényi, September 20, 1988. Reprinted inKilényi (1991: 65–102).

3. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politkai Bizottság 1988 november 8-án megtartott ülésérπl” [Minutes of theNovember 8, 1989 meeting of the Politburo], 5–6; “Javaslat a Politikai Bizottságnak azAlkotmány egyes rendelkezéseinek módositására” [Proposal to the Politburo for Amendments toIndividual Provisions of the Constitution]” (October 28, 1988), 129. In MOL 288.f.5/1042(November 8, 1988), 128–131.

4. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1989.február 7-én megtartott ülésérπl” (Minutes of theFebruary 7, 1989 meeting of the Politburo), reprinted in Zárt Kör, 1(1), (1993), 17–18.

5. “Javaslat a Politkai Bizottságnak az alkotmány korszer¢sítésének koncepciójára” [Proposal to thePolitburo on the Conception of Modernizing the Constitution],February 1, 1989,Zárt Kör 1(1)(1993), 18.

6. Others seconded the need to set up the court “as soon as possible” (KB 1993: 230).7. For the text of this proposal, see Kulcsár Kálmán, Minister of Justice, “Elπterjesztés a Politikai

Bizottsághoz az Alkotmánybiróságról szóló törvény elveirπl” (Submission to the Politburo onthe Principles of the Law on the constitutional court) (March 6, 1989), in MOL 288.f.5/1057(March 14, 1989), 44–54.The principles were published in a special section of the government’sdaily Magyar Hírlap, February 23, 1989. References in the following are to the Politburosubmission.

8. István György, the MSZMP legal expert from the Central Committee claimed that this was a“political gesture” designed to convince the opposition that the MSZMP “took it seriously thatthere would be free elections.” Interview June 17, 1997.This was not much of a concession inany event, since the MSZMP still believed in early 1989 that it would dominate the first freelyelected parliament—still insuring it a majority on the court.

9. Based on answers to the question: “If the election were held Sunday, for whom would youvote?” Source: Magyar Közvéleménykutató Intézet, 1989.

10. “A Magyar Népköztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic ofHungary],” Act XX. 1949, amended Act I. 1972 in Hatályos Jogszabályok Gy¢jteménye,1945–1987, 1988, 11.

11. Interview with MSZMP constitutional expert József Kajdi, June 6, 1997. Kajdi noted that theMSZMP was particularly concerned with finding “the legal basis for prohibiting FIDESZ.”

12. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1989.március 14-én megtartott ülésérπl” [Minutes of the ofthe March 14, 1989 meeting of the Politburo], MOL 288.f.5/1057 (March 14, 1989), 2–3.

13. The “planned and properly prepared” reference is from Fejti’s written proposal to the CentralCommittee, “Javaslat a Központi Bizottságnak az új Alkotmány koncepciójával kapcsolatosállásfoglalásra,” György Fejti, February 8, 1989. Published as appendix number 2 to the minutesof February 20–21, 1989 meeting of the Central Committee in KB (1993, 408).

14. The following draws on Igazságügyi Miniszterium,“Törvényjavaslat az Alkotmánybiróságról”[Draft Law on the constitutional court] (May 29, 1989), 1–31. Országgy¢lésiKönyvtár [Parliamentary Library], Deák Terem. Also published in Magyar Nemzet, May 6,1989, 7.

15. When asked about this concession, the MSZMP constitutional expert under Fejti at theCentral Committee replied that “this was pure tactics. Let’s think from the perspective ofGyörgy Fejti, who was more hardline than Pozsgay. He [Fejti] clearly thought that theMSZ[M]P was going to win, somehow, not alone, but with another [party] the MSZMP willwin [the parliamentary elections]. So such a political gesture on his part was very easy to make,because he said,well of course, later . . . when we are the new power,well then we’ll put in whowe want to.” Interview with István György, June 17, 1997. In a separate interview, Fejti

Notes 191

confirmed this perception about both his motivations behind the concessions on staggeredelections and the likely outcome of the next elections. June 12, 1997. Fejti was both the liasonfor constitutional affairs between the Central Committee and the Ministry of Justice as well asthe chief of the MSZMP negotiating team for preparatory talks with the opposition. He wasthus well-placed to make such gestures prior to the formal negotiations.

16. Interview with MSZMP expert József Kajdi, June 6, 1997.17. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.18. Thus, while the MSZMP retained the right for parliament to override court rulings, it raised

the override requirement from an absolute majority to two-thirds between March and May asa result of opposition protests against the MSZMP draft plan.

19. Annulments would not, however, affect pre-annulment legal relations, rights, and duties, unlessit would mean the reduction or elimination of criminal sentences.

20. The high state offices were parliament, any standing committee of parliament, any Member ofParliament, the President of the Republic, the Government or any member of it, the Presidentof the State Audit Office, the President of the Supreme court, the Supreme Prosecutor, any statesecretary directing state bodies with national jurisdiction.

21. The citation is from Szabad Demokraták, 3, 1989, 22.The SZDSZ’s position on a constitutionalcourt is found in its “blue book” program, SZDSZ (1989: 36).

22. The other opposition parties did not work out any draft plans.23. See chapter two.24. Interview, László Sólyom, June 9, 1997.25. For the full text see (ARF 2000,VI, I/1, I/1, 35–36, fn. 2).26. A discussion of the constitutional amendments achieved at the roundtable is beyond the scope

of this chapter. Suffice it to say that the EKA succeeded in removing many of the ideologicaland institutional references to socialism, including those in sections on property forms, citizenrights, and the definition of the state.The scope of the EKA’s achievement can be readily seenby a comparison of the pre-NKA constitution in HJGY (1988: I, 11–16) and the NKA agreementpassed by parliament as Act XXXI. 1989 in T&R (1990: 130–38). For more on constitutionalchanges, see Arato (2000).

27. The evidence for the MSZMP’s impatience comes at the outset of the meeting, when theMSZMP urged an acceleration of the talks and proposed that the working committee “meetevery day if necessary.” The more patient EKA responded by rejecting a “rule binding it tomeetings every day” and went on to remind the MSZMP that “progress is not simply a functionof the time put into it, but at least as much a function of the capacity to compromise” (ARF2000, VI, I/1, 79–80).

28. See chapter three, footnote 17. Kilényi’s career ambition’s may have also played a role in hisactions.According to a constitutional expert who worked for him, he was terrified that Pozsgaywould trade away the court in order to win acceptance for the direct election of the president.Interview, István Somogyvári, June 5, 1997.As the next paragraph shows, he had good reason tobe afraid.

29. “Jegyzπkönyv a Politikai Intézπ Bizottság 1989.augusztus 15-én megtartott ülésrπl” [Minutesof the August 15, 1989 meeting of the Political Steering Committee], August 15, 1989, 4,MOL288.f.5/1075.

30. MSZMP constitutional expert István Somogyvári captures the ineffectiveness of the MSZMP’sthreat nicely.“This did not affect the negotiations themselves, for Pozsgay issued a declarationdistancing himself from this immediately the next day. Moreover, we also negotiated the nextday and I don’t think that we gave it much attention; it was as if nothing had happened and wejust continued negotiating.” Interview, June 5, 1997.

31. Interview, June 16, 1997. MDF constitutional expert László Sólyom voiced a similar view.“Now, when it appeared at the end of August that the new constitution is complete . . . , thequestion was whether there should be a law on the constitutional court now, given that there

Notes192

was now a constitution to protect.The position of the EKA was that it’s possible to do this.”Interview, June 9, 1997.

32. Further conditions are discussed in section 4.3.33. Interview, June 16, 1997.34. Interview, József Kajdi, June 6, 1997.The horse trading over the selection of the first five justices

is discussed below.35. When, for example, Kilényi rejected the EKA standing rule that anyone could petition the court

for certain types of review, he said “please, then we’ll have a lot of work” (ARF 1999, IV, 450).36. Interview, József Kajdi, June 6, 1997.37. Tölgyessy claims that the EKA was fully aware that Kilényi and Kulcsár of the Justice Ministry

were bent on becoming court justices and Tölgyessy proposed the “excluding rule” precisely toprevent their election to the court. In this he was only partly successful. Interview, June 16, 1997.

38. Interview, József Kajdi, June 6, 1998.39. In an interview Tölgyessy hinted that he perceived the MSZMP position on this to be immovable.

In any event, the EKA was able to secure MSZMP concessions on important jurisdictional andtwo other appointment rules—including divvying up the appointment of the first five justices—in exchange for this one appointment rule.

40. Interview, Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.41. Interview, László Sólyom, June 9, 1997. According to both Tölgyessy and Sólyom, the EKA

would not have agreed to the institution without these guarantees.42. Interviews with György Fejti, Péter Tölgyessy (SZDSZ), László Sólyom (MDF), István

Somogyvári (MSZMP), and József Kajdi (MSZMP).43. Interview with József Kajdi, June 6, 1997.44. Interviews, László Sólyom and József Kajdi, June 9 and June 6, 1997, respectively. Sólyom was

frank about how he came to be an EKA nominee.“The question [during the talks] was, whowants to be a politician, who wants to play any kind of role at all, and when Antall . . . asked mewhether we should negotiate the law on the constitutional court, I said yes, it’s worth doing itnow and I also said right away that . . . I would like to be a constitutional court Justice.”

45. In the words of MSZMP expert István Somogyvári,“Kilényi himself attempted to organize thingsin such a way that it would be possible for him to become [vice president] of the constitutionalcourt . . . He did all kinds of things, I don’t particularly care to reveal everything, but one thing isfor sure, . . . that he would have liked nominees from both the MSZMP as well as the Oppositionroundtable who would vote for him and not someone else in the election.” Interview, June 5,1997.

46. Interview with László Sólyom, June 9, 1997.47. MSZMP constitutional expert József Kajdi claims that the MSZMP resisted this proposal in

order to alleviate the burden on the court, but that the EKA “forced this compromise” on theMSZMP. Interview, June 6, 1997. For the EKA’s part, Sólyom said that he was “astonished” athow easily the MSZMP agreed to the open boundary rule and the authority rule permittingthe court to annul laws and that the MSZMP was much more preoccupied with the questionsurrounding the selection of the justices. Interview, June 9, 1997.

48. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.49. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.50. Interview, June 16, 1997.51. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy, June 16, 1997.52. Thus, the table does not account for concessions by the MSZMP during the drafting process from

March to May 1989, before the beginning of formal negotiations. If we were to include these aswell, the number of individual rules and values in the opposition column would be even greater.

53. Though it might be argued that with a completely rewritten constitution these rules mightactually favor the weaker opposition. In any event, the loss of key provisions in the constitutionmeans that they should not be considered gains for the MSZMP, at least in terms of itsperspective in October 1989.

Notes 193

54. As pointed out above, this is not truly a distributive gain for the MSZMP anyway, given that thedistribution in the bargaining context here was between the EKA and the MSZMP and notwhich individuals within the MSZMP would become justices.

Chapter Five Comparative Perspectives:South Africa, Poland, and China

1. Herman Schwartz spoke of all the new constitutional courts of Eastern Europe as happysurprises, but singled out the Hungarian court as especially powerful (Schwartz 2000, 75, 106).

2. In a letter to Botha prior to the meeting,Mandela had made clear to Botha that the ANC wouldnot agree to Pretoria’s preconditions for negotiations (ANC, July 5, 1989). See also the ANC“Discussion paper on the Issue of Negotiations” (ANC, June 16, 1989). Botha was similarlyintransigent.

3. This was Mandela’s own view of de Klerk’s motivation (Mandela 1994, 480).4. On the effectiveness of the armed struggle, Mandela admitted that “it had a popularity out of

proportion to what it had achieved on the ground” (Mandela 1994, 511).5. For a full discussion of the parties institutional preferences and the bargaining process, see Sisk (1995).6. ANC support for a more proportional electoral system was motivated by more than fairness or

the need to satisfy what would be a key regime demand. PR (with closed lists) also providesgreater central party control over candidates, an important goal of a party struggling with thetransition from a broad-based revolutionary movement to an electoral party (Adam andMoodley 1993, ch.3).

7. See the letter from Mandela to de Klerk and the ANC’s National Executive Committee statementof June 23, 1992.Available respectively at: �http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/Mandela/memo920626.html� and �http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1992/pr920623.html�.

8. See also de Klerk’s July 2, 1992 letter to Mandela, in which he places the blame for the deadlockon the radicals from the SACP/Cosatu holding the ANC “captive.” Available at: �http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/lett2july.html�.

9. See the exchange of letters between de Klerk and Mandela between September 16 andSeptember 24, 1992, as well as the Record of Understanding on September 26, 1992.Availableat: �http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/let160992a.html, [let160992.html],[fwleter092492.html], [let24sept92.html], [record.html]�.

10. The following draws primarily on Sisk (1995, 224, 238–243).11. For the PUWP’s close attention to opinion polls and their influence on leaders’ beliefs about

electoral outcomes, see Kaminski (1999).12. As reported by Andrzej Stelmachowski, a Wa2esa advisor negotiating secretly with the govern-

ment.13. The August 1987 confidential report on the domestic situation, for example, referred to prepa-

rations for “terrorist” actions (Machcewicz 2001,100).Whether, in fact, these reports were accurateor not, they contributed to regime’s unease about maintaining the status quo.

14. In a November 1988 internal PUWP poll, for example, 60 percent of district party secretariesthought the best political arrangement for Poland would be the totalitarian system of 1948 to1956.This group thus provides a good example of the difference between extremist hardlinersand risk-taking, tough bargaining, softliners.

15. These were warnings and not threats because the PUWP hardliner response was beyond theleadership’s control. Common knowledge thus supported the validity of the truth claim ratherthan the credibility of a threat. See Elster (1991).

16. Contrast this with the Hungarian roundtable, where party leaders faced a principal-agentproblem in the opposite direction: committed reformers dominated the expert negotiatingteams. See chapter two.

Notes194

17. Some of the most prominent examples besides Wa2esa include Zbigniew Bujak, Bronis2awGeremek, Jacek Kuro†,Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Adam Michnik.

18. Catastrophe was a very real possibility.Underground Solidarity leader Zbigniew Bujak reportedthat he and other leaders had to work hard in the early period of martial law to convince youngmembers of the underground to sink weapons they had obtained for an uprising in the VistulaRiver (Bujak 1999).

19. See the letters to the Solidarity negotiating team by the Working Group of the NationalCommission (Machcewicz 2001, 109–112).

20. Mazowiecki was cautious even after Solidarity won the election, initially opposing a Solidarity-ledgovernment because “there are other centers of power . . . we are not at a stage, when parlia-mentary elections decide” (Machcewicz 2001, 119).

21. The two sides had already agreed to the general idea of partially free elections in the winterpreparatory talks, as well as a draft of a law on associations (Osiatynski 1996, 64, fn. 15).A thirdissue area, social and economic policy, received less attention and achieved few results.

22. The following relies on Osiatynski (1996, 56–58).23. According to Dai Qing, a prominent pro-reform journalist, softliners were dominant when the

protests began (Qing 1999).24. They were even delivered in an extremely traditional and nonconfrontational manner—

kowtowing on their knees in the traditional manner of Confucian scholars (Perry 1991, 132).25. See also Zhao’s remarks defending his approach at the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central

Committee where he was formally stripped of his posts (Zhang 2001, 442).26. For further evidence of student willingness and preparation for negotiations see Ogden et al.

(1992, 176ff).27. The Elders were a group of eight senior members of the party who had participated in the

revolution and who had held important posts in the communist regime. Most were officiallyretired from all posts, though some, such as Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun still held one ortwo offices. See Nathan (2001, xxix) and Scobell (1992). Manion (1990) makes a similar argu-ment to what follows. My interpretation differs from hers to the extent that I emphasize thediffering beliefs of the risk-taking and risk-averse regime elements and devote less attention tothe escalation of the conflict than she does in her more lengthy treatment.

28. It might be argued that Li’s meeting was no attempt at serious negotiation, since martial law hadbeen secretly agreed to (but not announced) just the day before.Troops, however, had alreadybeen ordered toward Beijing on May 12 and both this move and martial law can be seen as yetanother attempt to “intimidate the students” in an attempt to get them to clear the square ratherthan as a final decision to clear the square with military force (Ogden et al. 1992, 187; Scobell1992, 197). Indeed, the regime had waited a full month to declare martial law (May 19) becauseeven the Elders hoped for a nonviolent resolution to the conflict.The regime’s delay of anothertwo weeks before using military force to put down the demonstrations and evacuate the squareonly reinforces this view.

29. The hunger strike declared on May 12 was another “high-risk strategy in the students’ ongoingnegotiations with the government” in that the regime would interpret it as especially disruptivedue to the popular support it would receive (Ogden et al. 1992, 195).

30. This was true, for example, in both the critical April 26 editorial and the dialogue betweenLi Peng and student representatives on May 18 (Oksenberg et al. 1990, 279).

31. For example,Wang Dan, later a leader of the student movement, had been organizing democracysalons at Beijing University attended by the dissident Fang Lizhi. See Ogden et al. (1992, 46–50)for a sense of the topics raised there.

32. Eleven percent of the respondents were uncertain what would happen.33. But not one of which the regime should have been unaware.A State Security Ministry report

to the leadership on May 17 noted that the students believed that public support would forcethe regime to give in to the two student demands: revision of the April 26 editorial and a livebroadcast of a substantive dialogue with the students (Zhang 2001, 195).

Notes 195

34. On May 14, for example, students rejected a call by 12 prominent intellectuals for them to withdrawfrom the square, one student calling them “spineless” (Zhang 2001, 169). See also the May 24letter by older intellectuals with the same aim (Han 1990, 324–326).

35. Deng, Li Peng and other risk-takers constantly repeated this refrain in formal meetings andinformal discussions among the top leadership from April 23 forward (Zhang 2001, 53, 73,86, 88, 106, 117–118, 126, 129, 141, 177, 185, 188–189, 204–209, 330–338, 355–362;Oksenberg et al. 1990, 321).

36. For more on the sense of desperation among the Elders, see Scobell (1992, 197–199).37. See also the remarks of Hu Qili at various meetings and Li Ruihuan at the May 10 Politburo

meeting (Zhang 2001, 134).38. See also Zhao’s remarks at the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee (Zhang

2001, 192; 445).

Conclusion

1. The last point would require, for example, that actions taken by actors do not presuppose beliefssustained by knowledge impossible to have at the time. Tetlock and Belkin identify severalstandards for counterfactuals (1996, 19–31).The criteria above draw on, but overlap with, someof their standards. See also King et al. (1994, 77–78) and Fearon (1991).

2. From the very beginning,EKA devoted many of its discussions about negotiating strategy to thebalance of forces between conservatives and reformers in the MSZMP. For an explicit discus-sion about the security of Pozsgay’s position, see the EKA discussion on July 27, 1989 followingthe MSZMP reneging on an earlier agreement to account for its property (discussed later)(ARF 2000, II, 565–568). For Pozsgay’s own reflections on how precarious was the reformers’positions, see Pozsgay (1998, 939).

3. It may be objected that unless he pushed for the presidency in the negotiations, he wouldn’t beable to get the institution he needed to satisfy those ambitions in the first place. Recall, how-ever, that whatever their fears and reservations about Pozsgay—and there were many—theMSZMP leadership recognized he was the only figure in the regime who could create a pow-erful bandwagon effect outside the MSZMP’s narrow traditional constituency and they wanteda Pozsgay presidency almost as much as he did.

4. Meeting Tetlock and Belkin’s “projectabilty” standard for counterfactuals (1996, 30–31).5. Interview, July 31, 1995. See also Fejti (1998, 908).6. For the full text of the draft agreement, see ARF (2000,VI, July 21, 1989, fn.2, 207–208).7. For the text of the EKA memo listing its demands with respect to MSZMP property see ARF

(2000,VI, July 5, 1989, 186–187, fn.11). For the MSZMP itemized response, see ARF (2000,VI,July 19, 1989, 201–202, fn.12).

8. Interview with Mátyás Budzsáklia, June 25, 1997.9. See ARF (2000, selections 62 and 63).

10. See the interview with FJF founder and EKA organizer Imre Konya in Kasza (1994, 44).11. Interview, June 17, 1997.12. The still-MSZMP government legislated the ruling party’s withdrawal from the workplace,

a formal accounting of its assets, and the disbanding of the MSZMP paramilitary force at theend of October,prior to the referendum,but only under the pressure of the referendum campaign.Without public pressure generally and the referendum campaign in particular, it is unlikely theregime would have taken such disadvantageous measures.

13. It is important to note that while the conjunction of any two independent events is less likelythan either event alone, the independence condition does not hold for counterfactual analysis.In the “possible world” of the counterfactual, where the balance within the regime and the

Notes196

opposition mutually influence one another, these events are not independent.Whether or notthe conjunction is less likely is uncertain; the point here is that it is not by definition less likely.

14. The anecdote on the FIDESZ demonstration was relayed to me by László Kövér, a leading EKAnegotiator for FIDESZ. Interview, June 19, 1997. The desire to placate the Soviet Union isevident in an August EKA meeting with the Soviet ambassador, when the MNP’s Vargarequested that opposition parties have the opportunity to take relations with the Soviet Uniondirectly, not just with the MSZMP (ARF 2000, III, 243).

15. Vaclav Havel’s negotiations with the Czechoslovak communist regime is a shining example(Hanzel 1991).

Notes 197

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References208

African National Congress (ANC), 5–6,9, 139–46; mass action and, 143–44;power-sharing with National Party, 17,142–43, 162–63. See also Mandela,Nelson

Alliance of Free Democrats. See SZDSZAlliance of Young Democrats. See

FIDESZAntall, József, 78, 79, 83, 94, 113; on

presidential elections, 106, 109, 110appointment of judges, 117, 120, 130,

131–35, 137appointment power, 103Argentina, 19Aristotelian optimism, xi, xii, 24, 25–26,

27, 174Association of Hungarian Lawyers, 120,

133, 134authoritarian regimes, xii, 2, 7, 20, 29; in

Hungary, 39–41, 101, 174; in LatinAmerica, 27; opposition and, 23, 34; inPoland, 146; presidential power in, 101

Autonomous Students Federation, 155, 159

“bad deal,” 21–22Bajcsy-Zsilinsky Friendship Society. See

BZSBTBaranyai,Tibor, 47–48bargaining game, 7, 10, 20, 21–23, 174bargaining power, 7, 20–21, 29, 177;

patience and, 25, 65; risk-attitudes and,24–25, 30, 80

bargaining radicalism, 3Berecz, János, 40, 66, 68Beszélπ ( journal), 42, 45bilateral consultative talks (1989), 49–50Bisho massacre (1992), 144, 145Bolivia, 19Boross, Imre, 46, 78bosberaad (secret meeting), 140, 145Botha, P.W., 139–40, 142Brazil, 19, 33Bruszt, László, xiii, 76Bulgaria, 11Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 144, 145BZSBT (Bajcsy-Zsilinsky Friendship

Society), 50, 51, 79, 172; on electionsrules, 106, 108; presidency and, 89, 93,94, 96; risk-aversion of, 61, 93, 94, 96,108, 175

Carey, John M., 97cautious pact-makers, 3, 21; as high-cost

estimators, 26, 27. See also MDF;regime softliners; risk-averse pact-makers

censorship, 91Central Committee (MSZMP), 16, 41,

84, 167, 173; constitutional court and,116–17, 119, 124, 125; on electionsrules, 105–6, 107, 108; negotiationswith EKA, 54–55, 57–58, 59; NKAtalks and, 67–68, 69–70, 76, 83;presidency and, 86, 87, 90

I N D E X

Central Committee (PUWP), 5, 148,149, 150

Chile, 19, 33China, student movement in, 35,

153–62, 163, 164; failed negotiation in, 6, 9, 18, 19, 36, 166; martial law in,157, 158, 159, 160–62; Polish Solidarity and, 159–60

Christian Democrats. See KDNP(Christian Democratic People’s Party)

Ciosek, Stanis2aw, 5, 147, 149Civic Forum/Public Against Violence

(Czechoslovakia), 21, 25Codesa (Conference for a Democratic

South Africa), 6, 8, 142, 143, 162, 164Colombia, 19commander-in-chief, 86, 97, 98,

101–3, 152Communist Party (China), Elders of, 155,

156, 165; martial law and, 6, 158–59,160, 161–62; risk-attitudes of, 9, 160

Communist Party (Hungary). SeeMSZMP

consensus, 50, 142, 146, 171; MSZMPdefinition of, 108–9, 110; in NKAtalks, 64, 65, 91

Constitution (Hungary, 1949), 94, 116,124, 126, 127–28, 173

constitution (South Africa), 143, 145constitutional amendments (Hungary),

16–17, 86, 110, 126–28, 130Constitutional Court (Hungary), 12–14,

17, 99, 113, 115–38; appointments to,and dismissals, 117, 120, 130, 131–35;bargaining over, 131–38; constitutionalamendments and, 17, 126–28, 130;jurisdiction of, 117, 119, 120–24,135–36, 138; MSZMP strategy and, 8,13–14, 115–38, 177–78; oppositionand, 124–38; political parties and, 118,119; public debate on, 121

constitutional rights violations,122–23, 135

constitutional working group, 172.See also I/1 expert committee

Consultative Council (Poland), 146–47Cosatu (Congress of South Africa Trade

Unions), 143Costa Rica, 19cost-estimating models, 26–27, 28, 35, 36,

54, 177counterfactual arguments, 31–32, 36, 165;

in China, 9, 154, 166; in Hungary,166–73

court. See Constitutional Courtcrackdown, fears of, 89, 92Csurka, István, 45Cultural Revolution (China), 6, 158Czechoslovakia, 21, 25, 89

Defiance Campaign, 141de Klerk, F.W., 8, 141, 142, 162, 165;

change in risk-attitude and, 140, 145;white referendum and, 143, 144

delay, in bargaining, 23DEMISZ (Hungarian communist youth

group), 91–92, 106Democratic Party (Poland), 152, 163democratization: as bargaining game, 7,

20, 174; in China, 154, 160; inHungary, 1–2, 42, 43; in Poland, 5, 149,152; third-wave, 2–3

demonstrations, 22; in Czechoslovakia, 25;in Hungary, 39, 42, 43–44, 66, 175;student demonstrations, xi, 151. See alsostudent movement, in China

Deng Xiaoping, 6, 9, 155, 158, 159, 165;martial law and, 160, 161–62

dictatorship. See authoritarian rule

Eastern Europe, 9, 11, 13, 20–21, 25, 29,159. See also specific country

East Germany, 21, 89economic pressure: in Hungary, 37,

38–39; in South Africa, 144EKA parties (Hungary), 37, 45, 50–63,

73–83, 78, 165; constitutionalamendments and, 126–28;Constitutional Court and, 99, 116, 119,124, 125–38; counterfactual arguments

Index210

and, 170–73; division in, 44, 53, 77;domination by risk-takers, 55, 56–62,82–83, 166–67; electoral law and, 15,73; formation of, 50, 171; historicalparties in, 79–80; judicial appointmentrules and, 130, 131–35; at NKA talks,47, 63, 64–65, 69–70, 72; on politicalparties, 169; presidency and, 88–97,112; presidential elections and, 105–11;on presidential powers, 97–105; unitedfront of, 73–74. See also specific parties

Elders, Chinese Communist Party. SeeCommunist Party (China), Elders of

elections: in Poland, 152–53; in SouthAfrica, 144–45

elections, in Hungary, xi, 129; electorallaw, 14–15, 73, 79, 105, 119;parliamentary, 15, 71, 72, 87, 105, 107,120, 125, 126. See also presidentialelections

Elster, John, xii, 121ex ante review, 117, 122exclusion rule, 133, 134executive powers, 99–105, 112. See also

presidential powersex post review, 117, 122

Fejti, György, 40, 115, 134, 172–73, 176;bilateral talks and, 49–50; constitutionalcourt and, 117, 118, 119, 129;counterfactual analysis and, 166–70; onelection rules, 107–8; negotiating withEKA, 51, 53, 54–57, 59; at NKA talks,63, 71, 72, 73, 82–83; and Pozsgaycompared, 68–69, 84, 166–68;presidency and, 87, 89, 90; risk-takingattitude of, 56–57, 63, 69, 73, 84, 90,107–8, 129

FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats),xii, 74, 162, 177; constitutional courtand, 125, 136; domination of EKA talksby, 39, 49, 51, 53–56, 58–62, 171;election rules and, 106, 107, 109–11;emergence of, 43–44; at NKA talks, 63,75, 77, 170; Polish Solidarity and, 76;

Pozsgay’s consensus and, 108–9;presidency and, 89, 90–91, 93, 95–96;referendum campaign, 111, 168–69,172; risk-taking attitude of, 55, 61, 62,77, 79, 109, 125, 136, 175

FKGP (Independent Smallholders Party),39, 48, 50, 111, 173; election rules and, 106, 108; at NKA talks, 63, 76,77, 78; presidency and, 89, 93, 94–95;risk-aversion of, 46, 48, 63, 95

foreign policy, 104four-player transition model, 2–3, 4, 10,

28. See also hardliners; moderates;radicals; softliners

Friedheim, Daniel V., 21Für, Lajos, 45

Gaskó, István, 106Geremek, Bronislaw, 5, 146, 151; risk-

aversion of, 150Gorbachev, Mikhail, 66, 75, 89, 150, 164Groote-Schuur Accord (South Africa,

1990), 141Grósz, Károly, 40, 41, 66, 67–68, 70,

167, 176György, István, 69, 83, 172

Harare Declaration (South Africa, 1989),141

Haraszti, Miklós, xi, xiihardliners. See regime hardlinersHavel,Vaclav, 25Heged¢s, S. László, 47Helsinki accord, 135high-cost estimators, 26–27, 28, 54historical parties, 39, 91, 171–72, 173;

caution in, 56, 74–75, 79, 81, 93, 106,175; leadership struggles in, 45–46, 53,77–79. See also FKGP; KDNP; MNP;MSZPD

HNF (Patriotic People’s Front, Hungary),47, 173

Honduras, 19Horn, Gyula, 40, 67Horváth, István, 40

Index 211

human rights accord, 135Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 120,

133, 134Hungarian Democratic Forum. See MDFHungarian People’s Party. See MNPHungarian revolution (1956), 40, 44, 47,

48, 74, 176Hungarian Social Democratic Party. See

MSZDPHungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. See

MSZMPHungary, 1–2, 9, 34–35, 36, 37–138, 165;

Constitutional amendments in, 16–17;Constitutional Court in, 12–14, 17;counterfactual pactmaking in, 166–73;economic crisis in, 37, 38–39;negotiated transition in, 139; politicalparty law in, 16; Pozsgay’s reform in,161; presidency in, 11–12. See also EKAparties; MSZMP (Hungarian SocialistWorkers’ Party)

hunger strike, 155, 156, 164Hu Qili, 154, 162; risk-aversion of, 161Husák, Gustav, 25Hu Yaobang, 156

I/1 expert committee, 64, 65, 69, 72,78, 113

impatience in bargaining, 23, 70;MSZMP, 55, 59, 62–63, 71, 73, 83,128–29. See also patience

Independent Lawyers’ Forum, 124, 171Independent Student’s Association

(Poland), 151independent trade unions. See LigaInkatha (South Africa), 141, 144, 145institution, pact as, 18institutional choice model, 3, 7, 174institutional rules, 10, 19, 29, 65intellectuals/intelligentsia, 29, 66, 147,

152; in China, 156, 157, 159, 161; inHungary, 8, 39, 42, 47, 168, 171, 175

international agreements, 104Iványi, Pál, 68

Jaruzelski,Wojciech, 5, 88, 89, 149, 165;Consultative Council and, 146–47;risk-taking attitude of, 9, 150

judges, appointment and dismissal of, 117,120, 130, 131–35, 137

judicial review, 8, 13. See alsoConstitutional Court

jurisdiction, Constitutional Court(Hungary), 117, 119, 120–24,135–36, 138

Justice Ministry (Hungary), 16, 49, 65, 69,86, 87; constitutional court and, 116,118–19, 125

Kádár, János, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 176KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s

Party), 39, 78, 79, 172; constitutionalcourt and, 125; election rules and, 105,106; presidency and, 89, 91, 92–93, 94;risk-aversion of, 46–47, 48, 63, 91,92–93

Kerényi, Imre, 61Keresztes, Sándor, 46, 47, 48Khrushchev, Nikita, 150Kilényi, Géza, 72, 91–92; constitutional

court and, 116, 129, 130, 132, 134–35Kis, János, 1, 3, 25, 95Kiszczak, Czes2aw, 5, 147, 148, 149, 151Knight, Jack, 177Konya, László, 37, 61Kövér, László, 61, 75, 76, 110Kulcsár, Kálmán, 40, 118Kuron, Jacek, 5, 148Kwa«niewski,Alexander, 149

labor unions: in China, 6, 159; inHungary (see Liga); in South Africa(Cosatu), 143. See also Solidarity(Poland)

Lakitelek meetings, 45, 46, 168Latin America, 9, 19, 27, 29legislative veto, 97, 98–99, 112legislature: in Poland (Sejm), 18, 152, 153;

in South Africa, 142, 143, 146

Index212

legislature, in Hungary. See parliament(Hungary)

Liga (Hungarian trade union), 39, 50,51, 61, 110; presidency and, 89, 90,93, 94–95

Li Peng, 6, 155, 159, 160; risk-attitudeand, 9, 156, 155

Li Tieying, 156low-cost estimators, 26–27, 28, 54

Magyar, Bálint, 51, 62, 126majoritarian systems, 15, 153Mandela, Nelson, 8, 140–42, 165;

change in risk-attitude of, 141,143–44, 145, 162

Manion, Melanie, 157March 15 (Hungary, 1989)

demonstrations, 39, 43, 66, 175martial law, 146; in China, 6, 157, 158,

159, 160–62; in Poland, 148, 151,163, 164

Marxist-Leninist Unity Platform, 71mass action, 143–44Mazowiecki,Tadeusz, 146, 151;

risk-aversion of, 195MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum),

39, 42, 118, 167, 174; bilateral talks and,49, 50; EKA and, 50, 51, 53–56, 60, 62,171, 173; election rules and, 105, 106,107, 108, 110; emergence of, 44–46,168; at NKA talks, 63, 74–76, 77,79–82, 84; presidency and, 89, 93–94,96; risk-attitude of, 44, 48, 63, 177

Mécs, Imre, 56media, 64, 110, 154, 156, 175; regime

monopoly in Poland, 153mental models, 7, 10, 75, 80, 160, 176;

cost-estimating, 26–27, 28, 35, 36, 54Mexico, 19Meyer, Roelf, 145Michnik,Adam, 5, 25, 148; risk-aversion

of, 151military powers, in presidency, 86, 97, 98,

101–3. See also martial law

MNP (Hungarian People’s Party), 37, 39,49, 51, 63, 172; in EKA talks, 50, 61,62; presidency and, 89, 90–91, 92–94,95; risk-aversion of, 48, 63;Varga of, 47,75, 76, 78–79, 91, 173

moderates, 2, 27, 29, 149moderation, in pact-making, 2, 4–5,

34, 174Monor Conference (1985), 45MSZDP (Hungarian Social Democratic

Party), 39, 47, 49, 78, 108–9; in EKA,50, 61; on election rules, 105, 106,108–9, 110, 111; presidency and, 93,94, 95–96; risk-taking attitude of, 48,74, 106, 109, 175; weakness of, 78

MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’Party), 7, 46, 162, 165, 169; bilateraltalks and, 49–50; constitutionalamendments and, 17, 126–28, 130;constitutional court and, 8, 13–14,115–38, 177–78; disintegration of,70–71; divided leadership of, 37,39–41, 111, 176; EKA parties and,50–63, 84; EKA presidency and, 88–97;electoral law and, 15; fears of, 74–75;impatience of, 55, 59, 62–63, 71, 73,83, 128–29; judicial appointment rulesand, 132–35; lost negotiations of, 19;and moderates in MDF, 44–45;multiparty system and, 40–41, 42, 49; atNKA talks, xi–xii, 1, 63, 64–66;opposition parties and, 42, 48, 73–83;political parties law and, 16, 115, 170;presidential elections and, 105–11; onpresidential powers, 97–105;presidential proposal of, 11–12, 14,85–88, 112; principal-agent problemin, 60; Reform Circles within, 57–58,66–67; risk-taking softliners in, 70–71,73;“third side” proposal of, 59, 60–61,62, 63, 64; weakness of, 4;Workers’Guard and, 16, 43, 67, 77, 106, 175.See also Central Committee; Politburo(MSZMP)

Index 213

MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party,successor to MSZMP), 111

multiparty system, 40–41, 42, 49

Nagy, Imre, reburial of, 44, 59, 60, 61, 67National Conference of Reform Circles,

57–58, 66National Council (South Africa), 139–40National Defense Council (NDC,

Hungary), 12, 86, 101–3National Party (NP, South Africa), 5, 9,

139, 141, 145; power-sharing withANC, 17, 18, 142–43, 162–63

National Peace Accord (South Africa,1991), 142

National Roundtable Talks (NKA,Hungary, 1989), xi, 7–8, 37–38, 47,63–88, 177; constitutional court and,14, 120; DEMISZ initiative and, 91–92;EKA divisions and, 53, 77; electoral lawand, 73, 79, 105; lack of moderation in,34; MNP at, 47; negotiated transitionsand, 1, 2; opposition, 73–83;parliamentary system and, 11, 14; PETand, 64, 72, 77; presidency and, 91–92;regime (MSZMP) at, 66–73

negotiated transitions, 1–2, 7; asbargaining game, 7, 10, 20, 21–23, 174

Németh, Miklós, 40, 67, 68, 92, 108Network of Free Initiatives (SZKH), 42New Forum (East Germany), 21new institutionalist theory, 177Nichomean Ethics (Aristotle), xiNKA. See National Roundtable Talks

(NKA, Hungary, 1984)nomenklatura, 16NP. See National Party (South Africa)Nyers, Rezsπ, 68, 70, 167

O’Donnell, Guillermo, 18, 20, 25, 28–29omission, constitutionality in, 123opposition parties, in Hungary, 2, 4, 8, 38,

41–49; NKA negotiations and, 73–83.See also specific party

Opposition Roundtable. See EKA partiesopposition rules, 19–20, 23optimism, xi, xii, 24–25, 27, 174Orbán,Viktor, 60, 67, 76, 96–97; on

consensus, 109; risk-taking attitude of, 44, 78

parliament (Hungary), 11, 99;Constitutional Court and, 117, 122,123, 133; elections for, 15, 71, 72, 87,105, 107, 120, 125, 126; presidentialpowers and, 12, 86, 98, 100–1,104, 114

parliament (Poland, Sejm), 18, 152, 153patience, 1, 3–4, 25, 65, 70, 106. See also

impatience in bargainingPatriotic People’s Front (HNF), 47, 173Peng Zhen, 158–59Poland, 17–18, 94–95, 146–53, 165, 166;

communist party defeat in, 71;democratization in, 5, 149, 152; martiallaw in, 148, 151, 163, 164; presidencyin, 11, 18, 152; Soviet threat to, 5, 9, 66,94, 150. See also Solidarity (Poland)

Polish United Workers’ Party. See PUWPPolitburo (Chinese Communist Party), 9,

154, 158, 160, 161–62Politburo (MSZMP), 16, 34, 49, 67, 84;

Constitutional Court and, 116–19, 129;negotiation with EKA, 52, 54, 58–59;NKA talks and, 68, 69, 72, 73;presidency and, 86, 87

political parties, in Hungary, 118, 119,133; law on, 16, 115, 169–70, 171. Seealso specific parties

political power, 37, 60, 153. See alsobargaining power; presidential power;veto power

Political Reconciliation Committee(PET), 64, 72, 77

populists, 45, 50, 77;risk-aversion of, 45, 79; See also Pozsgay,Imre; intellectuals/intelligentsia: inHungary

Index214

Pozsgay, Imre, 12, 17, 37, 50, 85, 176;concessions by, 169–70; on consensus,108–9; on constitutional court, 133,136; on elections rules, 105–6; and Fejticompared, 68–69, 84, 166–68;impatience of, 63; initiating reforms,40–41, 58, 67; MDF moderates and, 45;at NKA talks, 63, 66, 70, 72; PatrioticPeople’s Front and, 47; presidency and,91–92, 113, 114; as presidentialcandidate, 87, 88, 97; reforms of, 161;risk-aversion of, 63, 68–69, 84, 108

preference-based approach, 29–30presidency, in Hungary, 8, 11–12, 79,

85–114; MSZMP and, 17, 85–88;opposition groups and, 88–97; term ofoffice, 86. See also presidential elections;presidential powers

presidency, in Poland, 11, 18, 152, 153Presidential Council (Hungary),

89, 110presidential elections (Hungary), 91, 92,

94, 95, 105–11, 112; MSZMP proposalfor, 86, 87; Pozsgay’s consensus and,108–9, 110; referendum campaign and, 111

presidential powers (Hungary), 86–87, 89,97–105; appointments, 103; executivepowers, 99–105, 112; legislative, 97,98–99, 112; military, 86, 97, 98, 101–3;parliament and, 12, 86, 99, 100–101,104, 114; veto power, 11, 18–19

prime minister, 98, 103, 104, 112principle-agent problem, 69“Program for a Regime Change”

(Hungary), 43proportional representation (PR), 14–15,

142, 146, 153Przeworski,Adam, 25, 28public debate, 121PUWP (Polish United Workers’ Party),

17–18, 146–53, 163; CentralCommittee, 5, 148, 149, 150;Consultative Council and, 146–47;

hardliners in, 5, 148, 174; martial lawand, 148, 151, 163; Solidarity challengeto, 147–53, 163

Qiao Shi, 162

radicals, 27, 28Rakowski, Mieczys2aw, 5, 149Ramaphosa, Cyril, 162rational choice theory, xii, 36, 177Realpolitik, 44, 46, 96, 175Red Guard (China), 158, 159referendum: in Hungary, 4, 82, 91, 99,

106, 124; in Poland, 147, 148;risk-taking opposition and, 111,114, 168–69, 172; for South Africanwhites, 143, 144

Reform Circles (MSZMP), 57–58,66–67

regime hardliners, 27; in Hungary, 2; inPoland, 5, 147, 148. See alsoCommunist Party (China), Elders of

regime rules, 19–20regime softliners, 2, 27, 32–33, 175; in

China, 6, 154 (see also Zhao Ziyang); inHungary, 38, 39, 48, 68, 70, 162 (see alsoPozsgay, Imre); in Poland, 149

Remington,Thomas F., 34Révész, Sándor, 48Reykowski, Janusz, 5, 149risk-averse pact-makers, 4, 32–33, 152,

176. See also Pozsgay, Imre; regimesoftliners

risk-averse parties, 54. See also FKGP;KDNP; MDF; MNP

risk-taking pact-makers, 3, 28–29, 38, 96,176; attitudes of, 30–34, 83, 174–75; inbargaining, 21–23; cost estimators,26–27, 28; in opposition groups, 4, 8,28, 30, 33; optimism and, 25. See alsoFejti, György;Tölgyessy, Péter

risk-taking parties. See FIDESZ; MSZDP;SZDSZ

Romania, 11, 89, 149

Index 215

roundtable talks: in Hungary. See NationalRoundtable Talks (Hungary); inPoland, 9, 18, 147–53

SACP (South African Communist Party),140, 143, 145

Schmitter, Philippe C., 18, 20, 28–29secret police: China, 6; Hungary, 52Sejm (Polish parliament), 18, 152, 153Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 97single member district (SMD), 15Slovo, Joe, 144Smallholders’ Party. See FKGPSmith, Stephen S., 34“Social Contract,” 42, 45Social Democrats. See MSZDP

(Hungarian Social Democratic Party)socialist values, 17, 116, 118, 127softliners, 27; risk taking and, 4, 7, 28–29,

32–33, 84. See also regime softlinersSolidarity (Poland), 21, 35, 51, 76, 95;

China and, 159–60; risk-aversion of, 9,153; victory of, 89, 163;Wa2esa and, 5,18, 76, 146, 147, 148, 151

Solnick, Steven L., 31Sólyom, László, 80, 109, 134–35; in EKA

preparatory team, 52, 54, 56, 61South Africa, 5–6, 8–9, 35, 139–46, 166;

power-sharing in, 17, 142–43, 162–63;as two cases, 35, 162

South African Communist Party (SACP),140, 143, 145

Soviet Union, 74, 76, 95, 140, 175–76;Gorbachev and, 66, 75, 89, 150; Polandand, 5, 9, 66, 94, 150

Spain, 34Sparks,Allister, 145“Stalinist” constitution (Hungary), 94,

116, 124, 126, 127–28, 173. See alsounder constitutional amendments(Hungary); Constitutional Court(Hungary)

strikes, 25, 43, 76, 89; in Poland, 9, 147,148, 151; student hunger strike(China), 155, 156, 164

student demonstrations, xi, 151student movement, in China, 9, 18, 35,

36, 153–62, 164; martial law and, 6,157, 158, 159, 160–61, 162

Supreme Court (Hungary), 103,118, 123

Supreme Prosecutor, 103, 118, 123Szabad, György, 45, 56, 60, 126SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), xii,

37, 39, 49, 74, 162, 174; beginnings of,41–43; bilateral talks and, 49, 50;constitutional court and, 125, 136;domination of EKA by, 50, 51, 53–55,57, 58–62, 82–83, 171, 172; electionrules and, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109–11;at NKA talks, 63, 71–72, 77, 79–83,170; Polish Solidarity and, 51, 76;Pozsgay’s consensus and, 108–9;presidency and, 88, 89–90, 93, 95–96,104; referendum campaign, 82, 111,168–69, 172; risk-taking attitude of, 55,61, 62, 77, 79, 109, 125, 175, 177. Seealso Tölgyessy, Péter

Sz"urös, Mátyás, 40

“third side” proposal, 59, 60–61, 62, 63, 64Tiananmen Square massacre, 6, 18, 153,

155, 162. See also student movement, inChina

Tölgyessy, Péter, 37, 72, 78, 79, 80, 83, 85;constitutional court and, 115, 121, 125,129, 133, 134, 136; in constitutionalworking group, 172; in EKAnegotiations, 52–53, 54, 58, 59, 61, 62;on human rights, 135; presidency and,90, 101, 110, 113; on state ofemergency, 76–77

Torgyán, József, 78transaction costs, 177

unconstitutionality in omission, 123uncontested rules, 19unions: bargaining and, 19, 29, 30–31; in

Hungary, 39, 50 (see also Liga)United Peasant Party (Poland), 152, 163

Index216

Urbánek, Karel, 25utility functions, 22

Varga, Csaba, 47, 75, 76, 78–79, 91, 173Venezuela, 19Veres Society, 47veto powers, 82, 164, 171; in Hungarian

presidency, 11, 18–19, 97, 98–99; inSouth Africa, 142, 143

Vigh, Károly, 175von Neumann-Morgenstern utility

functions, 22

Wa2esa, Lech, 5, 18, 76, 147, 148; risk-aversion of, 146, 151. See also Solidarity(Poland)

Wan Li, 161Warsaw Pact, 17, 175Weber, Max, 165Welsh, Helga A., 20–21

Wessels, Leon, 145Western Europe, 29Workers’ Guard (Hungary), 16, 43,

67, 77, 106, 175worker-student alliance, in China, 159.

See also labor unions; Solidarity(Poland)

Wu’er Kaixi, 156

Yang Shangkun, 160, 165Yan Mingfu, 156Yao Yilin, 155, 160, 162youth groups. See DEMISZ;

FIDESZ; under student movement,in China

Yuan Mu, 156

Zhao Ziyang, 6, 9, 159, 165; risk-aversionof, 154, 160–62

Zulus, 141, 144

Index 217