Appendix: The Agreement on Agriculture - Springer978-0-230-39008-9/1.pdf · Appendix: The Agreement...

Appendix: The Agreement on Agriculture Source: Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994; Annex 1A Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods.

KEY TERMS

AMS Tariffication Rice Clause Amber Box Blue Box Green Box Red Box Peace Clause

CONTENTS

Article 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Definition of Terms Product Coverage Incorporation of Concessions and Commitments Market Access Special Safeguard Provisions Domestic Support Commitments General Disciplines on Domestic Support Export Competition Commitments Export Subsidy Commitments Prevention of Circumvention of Export Subsidy Commitments Incorporated Products Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions Due Restraint Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Special and Differential Treatment Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries Committee on Agriculture Review of the Implementation of Commitments Consultation and Dispute Settlement Continuation of the Reform Process Final Provisions

167 169 169 170 172 173 174 175 175 178 180 180 180 182 182 183 183 184 185 185 186

164

Articles 1 and 6, Annex 3 Article 4.2 (border measures) Article 4.2 and Annex 5 Article 6 and Annex 3 (domestic policies) Article 6.5 (domestic policies) Article 7 and Annex 2 (domestic policies) Article 8 (third country competition) Article 13

The Agreement on Agriculture 165

Annex 1 Product Coverage 187 2 Domestic Support: the Basis for Exemption from the Reduction

Commitment 188 3 Domestic Support: Calculation of Aggregate Measurement of Support 190 4 Domestic Support: Calculation of Equivalent Measurement of Support 192 5 Special Treatment with Respect to Paragraph 2 of Article 4 193

Ministerial Decisions and Declarations 196 Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries

Excerpts

Members, Having decided to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture in line with the objectives of the negotiations as set out in the Punta del Este Declaration;

Commentary

The Punta Declaration (Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, reproduced in Croome, 1995, pp. 382-92) said:

The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world agricultural markets.'

'Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general principles governing the negotiations, by: (i) improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of import barriers; (ii) improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes [...]

166 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

Recalling that their long-term objective as agreed at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round 'is to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a reform process should be initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines';

The Punta Declaration called for negotiations to be completed within four years, and created the possibility for the Trade Negotiations Committee to meet at Ministerial level for a mid-term review. The Ministerial meeting of the TNC in Montreal in December 1988 was designed as a mechanism both to maintain political momentum in the negotiations and to allow for an 'early harvest' in areas where agreement had already been reached. The Brussels Ministerial of 1990 was intended to be the conclusion of the Round. The mid-term review, held in Montreal in 1988, showed there was still conflict between the objectives of stabilization and liberalization; and still difficulty drawing common conclusions about policy implications of the Farm War.

Recalling further that 'the above-mentioned long-term objective is to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets';

Note that reductions and liberalization are tools, not objectives.

Committed to achieving specific binding commitments in each of the following areas: market access; domestic support; export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary issues;

This language is from the 1991 framework agreement.

Having agreed that in implementing their commitments on market access, developed countiy Members would take fully into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country Members by providing for greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of particular interest to these Members, including the fullest

This language was in the Modalities section of the Draft Final Act.

The Punta declaration had called for the 'fullest liberalization' of tropical products, and had allowed for the possibility a of early implementation, notwithstanding the Single Undertaking. In the Secretariat's initial assessment of the bindings in country schedules, the overall tariff


Excerpts Commentary

liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products as agreed at the Mid-Term Review, and for products of particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops;

Noting that commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform programme on least-developed and net food-importing developing countries;

Hereby agree as follows: Part I Article I Definition of Terms

In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) 'Aggregate Measurement of Support' and 'AMS' mean the annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural product or non-product-specific support provided in favour of agricultural producers in general, other than support provided under exempt programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement, which is: (i) with respect to support provided during the base period, specified in the relevant tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member's Schedule; and (ii) with respect to support provided during any year of the implementation

reduction for all Members amounted to 36 per cent for all agricultural products and 42 per cent for tropical products (GATT, 1993a, Table 20).

These commitments are given limited effect in Articles 12,15, 16, 20(c) and the related Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.

The AMS reduction commitment is in Article 6 below, see also Article 1 (h) below.

The base period for the AMS is 1986-8; for export subsidies, the base period is 1986-1990, with a possibility of using 1991-2 levels.

'Methodology' refers to the 'Modalities for the Establishment of Specific

168 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

period and thereafter, calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of this Agreement and taking into account the constituent data and methodology used in the tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member's Schedule; (b) 'basic agricultural product' in relation to domestic support commitments is defined as the product as close as practicable to the point of first sale as specified in a Member's Schedule and in the related supporting material; (c) 'budgetary outlays' or 'outlays' includes revenue foregone;

(d) 'Equivalent Measurement of Support' means the annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided to producers of a basic agricultural product through the application of one or more measures, the calculation of which in accordance with the AMS methodology is impracticable, other than support provided under programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement [...]; (e) 'export subsidies' refers to subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement; (0 'implementation period' means the six-year period commencing in the year 1995, except that, for the purposes of Article 13, it means the nine-year period commencing in 1995; (g) 'market access concessions' includes all market access commitments undertaken pursuant to this Agreement; (h) 'Total Aggregate Measurement of Support' and Total AMS' mean the

Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme' which was originally Part B of the Draft Final Act, was modified by the Blair House Accord, but which is not part of the Agreement. General rules are in the agreement, but specific commitments are in the schedules.

Tax expenditures can be a subsidy -the definition of a subsidy in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 1.1 (a)(1)(h).

Such support must be calculated in accordance with Annex 4 and then specified in a country's Schedules.

In accordance with Article 21 of this Agreement, the definition of 'subsidy' is that found in Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the first time the GATT has had a definition of 'subsidy.' Article 13 is the 'Peace Clause' which means that 'due restraint' must be exercised until 4 years after the scheduled start of the new negotiations specified in Article 20.

In paragraph 1 (a) above, the AMS is product specific as a result of Blair


Excerpts Commentary

sum of all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural products, all non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support and all equivalent measurements of support for agricultural products [...];

Article 2 Product Coverage This Agreement applies to the products listed in Annex 1 to this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as agricultural products.

Part II Article 3 Incorporation of Concessions and Commitments 1. The domestic support and export subsidy commitments in Part IV of each Member's Schedule constitute commitments limiting subsidization and are hereby made an integral part of GATT 1994.

House. The EU insisted on basing the reductions in Article 6 below on a 'Total AMS' which allows for some reinstrumentation' or 'rebalancing' of support (on rebalancing, see McDonald, 1990, 307; see also Odell, 1993; Odell and Matzinger-Tchakerian, 1993).

There is still no definition of 'agriculture' other than by reference to tariff lines. 'Tropical products' are included, but not industrial commodities like rubber, jute, sisal, abacu or coin. The principles of this Agreement, including the obligation to reduce domestic support, do not apply to products properly covered under other goods agreements.

Agricultural policy is hereby explicitly acknowledged to be subject to all GATT disciplines, though much of the rest of the Agreement is a framework for walling agriculture off from the GATT. The basis of the Agreement is the detailed commitments in the Schedules, which are relatively easy to monitor, rather than complex rules, which require interpretation (for an overview of the new commitments in the schedules on tariffication, the AMS and export subsidies, see GATT, 1994c, pp. 19, 21, 22, 24, 26,76,77).

2. Subject to the provisions of Article 6, a Member shall not provide support in favour of domestic producers in excess of the commitment levels specified in Section I of Part IV of its Schedule.

Support for agriculture is capped -cannot increase in future.

3. Subject to the provisions of There may be peaks and valleys during paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9, the transition.

170 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

a Member shall not provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products or groups of products specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of any agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.

No new subsidies can be introduced where the product concerned was not subsidized during the base period.

Part III Article 4 Market Access 1. Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified therein.

The 'Modalities' require a formula cut (not 'request and offer') in all tariffs of an average of 36 per cent over the 6 year transition (24 per cent over ten years for developing countries), with a minimum cut in any line of 15 per cent (10 per cent for developing countries) There must also be tariff quotas providing an 'opportnity' for minimum market access of 3 per cent to 5 per cent of 1986-8 consumption for all products.

An 'opportunity' is a policy rather than a quantity commitment. In the case of the EU, for example, much of the minimum access is allocated to existing preferential arrangements, such as the Lome convention, just as in Canada it has gone in some instances to New Zealand.

The reductions are not 'trade-weighted' so countries have taken large cuts in tariffs that affect small amounts of trade while taking the minimum cut in tariffs on 'sensitive' products.

'Bindings' or 'bound rates' refer to tariff rates that result from GATT negotiations and are incorporated in a country's schedule of concessions. Bindings, therefore, are enforceable and form an


Excerpts Commentary

integral part of the GATT. Many bindings, however, are at levels higher than the actual or applied rate, which might allow some Members to use measures similar in effect to the now-banned variable levies.

'Tariff-rate quota' (TRQ) is a two-tiered tariff. Imports up to a certain value limit (the quota) face one duty ('in-tariff quota rates') and imports in excess of that level face a second, higher duty ('over-quota tariff rates').

2. Members shall not maintain, resort to or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties,* except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5.

This is the 'tariffication' provision: all NTBs have to be converted to tariff equivalents based on the difference between world market prices and 1986-8 internal prices. (There is a description of the technique and of the aggregate results in GATT, 1994c, pp. 18-26.) All of these tariffs are now bound, and so cannot be raised, nor can new ones be introduced.

* Note 1: These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-specific derogations from the provisions of GATT 1947, but not measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of

The last clause of this sentence is the 'rice clause' introduced at the last minute for Japan and Korea - it has also apparently been invoked by Israel and the Philippines, however.

These measures are all Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs) some of which were GATT-legal in the past (e.g. import restrictions under Article XI:2[c]) and some of which were so-called 'grey area' measures.

The base period was one of relatively low dollar prices, so EU tariffs denominated in ecu were relatively high, allowing the cuts to start from a high level (Ockenden and Franklin, 1995, p. 58). The fact that tariffs seem high, however, does not mean that they will be prohibitive. The effect of the tariff depends on the gap between

172 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement.

Article 5 Special Safeguard Provisions 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article II of GATT 1994, any Member may take recourse to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 below in connection with the importation of an agricultural product, in respect of which measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of this Agreement have been converted into an ordinary customs duty and which is designated in its Schedule with the symbol lSSG" as being the subject of a concession in respect of which the provisions of this Article may be invoked, if: (a) the volume of imports of that product entering the customs territory of the Member granting the concession during any year exceeds a trigger level which relates to the existing market access opportunity as set out in paragraph 4; or, but not concurrently: (b) the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs territory of the Member granting the concession, as determined on the basis of the c.Lf. import price of the shipment concerned expressed in terms of its domestic currency, falls below a trigger price equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price for the product concerned.

domestic and world prices (OECD, 1995d). Some new tariffs are set in both percentage and nominal terms, in effect continuing the now-banned minimum import prices which, in combination with the special safeguards in the next article, will in practice limit new market access by preserving the wedge between domestic and import prices.

This provision, which allows for the imposition of higher duties in the event of a surge in imports, is an exception to Article II of the GATT, which prohibits duties in excess of those in a country's schedule.

There has been some concern about this clause, because while it does promote some stability in markets, it risks encouraging managed trade.

In its schedules, the EU has reserved the right to use this provision for most producers formerly subject to variable levies, and it has set high trigger prices.

8. Where measures are taken in conformity with paragraphs 1 through 7 above, Members undertake not to have recourse, in respect of such measures, to the provisions of

Note that here again Agriculture is walled off from the GATT.


Excerpts Commentary

paragraphs 1(a) and 3 of Article XIX of GATT 1994 or paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards. 9. The provisions of this Article shall remain in force for the duration of the reform process as determined under Article 20.

Part IV Article 6 Domestic Support Commitments 1. The domestic support reduction commitments of each Member contained in Part IV of its Schedule shall apply to all of its domestic suport measures in favour of agricultural producers with the exception of domestic measures which are not subject to reduction in terms of the criteria set out in this Article and in Annex 2 to this Agreement. The commitments are expressed in terms of Total Agreement Measurement of Support and 'Annual and Final Bound Commitments Levels'.

This paragraph, by limiting the duration of the special safeguards, provides an inducement to continue negotiations after the transition period.

Note that the 20 per cent cut required by the Modalities is not mentioned in the text.

2. [deleted]

3. A Member shall be considered to be in compliance with its domestic support reduction commitments in any year in which its domestic support in favour of agricultural producers expressed in terms of Current Total AMS does not exceed the corresponding annual or final bound

The deleted paragraph contains an exception for developing countries as part of the commitment to 'special and differential treatment' in Article 15 (below) on the grounds that measures of assistance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development, including investment and input subsidies, are an integral part of the development programmes of developing countries. Subsidies to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops are also exempt.

The negotiated schedule takes precedence over any rule. There can be no dispute over the legitimacy of a particular measure. The only issue will be whether the level of support, which should be relatively easy to measure, is consistent with commitments in the schedule.

174 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

commitment level specified in Part IV of the Member's Schedule.

4. (a) A Member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total AMS and shall not be required to reduce: [support that does not exceed 5 per cent]

(b) For developing country Members, the de minimis percentage under this paragraph shall be 10 per cent.

5.(a) Direct payments under production-limiting programmes shall not be subject to the commitment to reduce domestic support if: (i) such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or (ii) such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; or (iii) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head. (b) The exemption from the reduction commitment for direct payments meeting the above criteria shall be reflected by the exclusion of the value of those direct payments in a Member's calculation of its Current Total AMS.

de minimis provisions are sensible, and help to stop trivial harassment. The calculation is product-specific but the reduction is by Total AMS, which allows flexibility. It also allows countries to choose their own mix of quota and price adjustments. This provision is part of the 'special and differential treatment' for developing countries.

This is the Blue Box created by the Blair House Accord. Note that it is an exception from the Amber Box not an addition to the Green Box. (i) is the exemption for US set asides and deficiency payments; (ii) and (iii) are exemptions for EU CAP reform.

There is no question that this provision makes the Agreement easier to accept for the two largest Members since it allows them to meet their AMS targets more easily. But note below: the limitation in the peace clause to 1992 levels means that the real value of the Blue Box will erode over time.

Article 7 General Disciplines on Domestic Support 1. Each Member shall ensure that any domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers which are not subject to reduction commitments because they qualify under the criteria set out in Annex 2 to this Agreement are maintained in conformity therewith. 2. (a) Any domestic support measure in favour of agricultural producers, including any modification to such

This provision is the Green Box; it is comparable to the non-actionable category of the Subsidies Agreement, but because Green Box measures though 'minimally trade distorting' are 'specific' they might be actionable in the Subsidies Agreement were they not exempted by Article 13. There could be many disputes over the eligibility of measures for inclusion in the Green Box, though the three-way criteria


Excerpts

measure, and any measure that is subsequently introduced that cannot be shown to satisfy the criteria in Annex 2 to this Agreement or to be exempt from reduction by reason of any other provision of this Agreement shall be included in the Member's calculation of its Current Total AMS. (b) Where no Total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of a Member's Schedule, the Member shall not provide support to agricultural producers in excess of the relevant de minimis level set out in paragraph 4 of Article 6.

Commentary

in Annex 2 should help reduce conflict.

Note that developing countries cannot afford most Green Box policies, though over time they may develop cost-effective decoupled support as alternatives to current price-based measures.

Part V Article 8 Export Competition Commitments Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that Member's Schedule.

Article 9 Export Subsidy Commitments 1. The following export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments under his Agreement:

In the Subsidies Agreement, this would be the Red Box for 'prohibited' subsidies conditional on export performance, except that Article 3.1 of that Agreement explicitly defers to this Agreement. In light of Article 3.3 of this Agreement, the Red Box can be read as a general prohibition of export subsidies, for new products, with exceptions for products subsidized in the base period, a period of low prices. Discipline on export subsidies is the basis for the ceasefire in the Farm War.

By specifying existing subsidies in their schedules, there can no longer be debates about the level of subsidies. More important, there is no reference to 'equitable shares of world markets' as in Article XVI:3 of GATT 1947.

The listing of specific rather than illustrative criteria in Article 9 is fairly exhaustive of export subsidies currently in use. The provision is thought to be easy to implement and to monitor - though the commitments aggregate subsidies for each

176 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

(a) the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export performance; (b) the sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of noncommercial stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market;

(c) payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported product is derived; (d) the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products (other than widely available export

exporter, which means there could be nasty fights over specific import markets. Article 13(c) seems to move these direct and indirect subsidies from the Red or 'prohibited' category into the 'actionable' or Amber category of the Subsidies Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994; they would only be at risk of countervailing duties, therefore, if there was a determination that the subsidy caused injury or serious prejudice to another party. NB There is no restriction on 'unsubsidized' exports. Some think that the potential exists to evade the Agreement by moving support to other measures (Folmer et al, 1995, p. 226).

This provision would apply to the Canadian Wheat Board. State-trading enterprises were not a major focus of negotiations though they are (loosely) subject to the Agreement (see also Note 1 to Article 4.2.). Such firms are also subject to the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII, which deals with State-Trading.


Excerpts Commentary

promotion and advisory services) including handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the costs of international transport and freight; (e) internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments;

(f) subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products. 2. (a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), the export subsidy commitment levels for each year of the implementation period, as specified in a Member's Schedule, represent with respect to the export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of this Article:

(i) in the case of budgetary outlay reduction commitments, the maximum level of expenditure for such subsidies that may be allocated or incurred in that year in respect of the agricultural product, or group of products, concerned; and

This provision applied to Canada's decades old 'Crow Rate.' The annual C$560 million subsidy to the railways under the Western Grain Transportation Act was eliminated in 1995. A package of transition measures was provided, however, including a payment of C$1.6 billion to owners of Prairie farm land. This change, taken as much for fiscal as trade reasons, makes it easy for Canada to meet its reduction commitments, since the Crow Rate was red, but the new payment is green.

This provision creates ceilings on future subsidization. There is no possibility of ex ante adjudication, however: parties can only tell if limits were exceeded at the end of a period, after the damage has been done. The base period in this case is 1986-1990 - see Article 9.2 (b) (iv). There is a provision in the Modalities, apparently added in a so-called second Blair House in 1993, allowing 1991-2 to be used as the base period where subsidized exports had increased since the earlier base period, allowing some countries higher subsidized exports in the first years of the transition than would otherwise have been the case - with no effect on the final levels. For example, wheat in the EU, US, and Canada; dairy in the EU, Australia, and Canada (OECD, 1995d). The 'commitments' as specified in the 'Modalities' are a reduction of 36 per cent in expenditure during the transition and 21 per cent in volume of subsidized exports (for developing countries the figures are 21 per cent and 14 per cent over ten years). The

178 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

(ii) in the case of export quantity reduction commitments, the maximum quantity of an agricultural product, or group of products, in respect of which such export subsidies may be granted in that year, (b) In any of the second through fifth years of the implementation period, a Member may provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 above in a given year in excess of the corresponding annual commitment levels in respect of the products or groups of products specified in Part IV of the Member's Schedule, provided that: [sub-paragraph deleted]

3. Commitments relating to limitations on the extension of the scope of export subsidization are as specified in Schedules. 4. During the implementation period, developing country Members shall not be required to undertake commitments in respect of the export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 1 above, provided that these are not applied in a manner that would circumvent reduction commitments.

Dunkel text had specified a volume cut of 24 per cent, which would have been harder for the EU to accept. These commitments are apparently oriented to quantities not policies, but see the discussion in the text. p. 131

These provisions were agreed in the Blair House accord at the request of the EU. The base period is 1986-90. It has no effect on the final bound levels at the end of the transition. The effect is to 'front-load' the reductions which allows some subsidized reduction of stocks overhanging the market (see Table II. 10 in GATT, 1994c).

'Special and differential' treatment for developing countries. To the extent that subsidies hurt the exporter not the importer, this exception does not necessarily help developing country governments.

Article 10 Prevention of Circumvention of Export Subsidy Commitments 1. Export subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 shall not be applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments; nor shall noncommercial transactions be used to circumvent such commitments. 2. Members undertake to work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines to govern the

Export credits, long subject to disciplines at the OECD, have proved difficult for GATT/WTO.


Excerpts Commentary

provision of export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes and, after agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes only in conformity therewith. 3. Any Member which claims that any quantity exported in excess of a reduction commitment level is not subsidized must establish that no export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not, has been granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question. 4. Members donors of international food aid shall ensure:

(a) that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products to recipient countries;

(b) that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is monetized, shall be carried out in accordance with the FAO 'Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations', including, where appropriate, the system of Usual Marketing Requirements (UMRs); and (c) that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986.

See also (below) the Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed And Net Food-Importing Developing Countries It is essential to ensure that food aid is not a disguised production-related subsidy, used only for transactions that would not otherwise take place. The first question is to whom aid is given, where the issue is the extent of effective demand, if any, in the recipient country. This provision would tend to limit food aid in situations where a recipient might otherwise be able to purchase food in favour of those countries where effective demand (that is, people with money to buy food) is low or non-existent. The FAO CSD and the World Food Programme UMR are explicitly designed to try to limit the trade distorting potential of food aid.

The second question is in what form the aid is given, where the issue is how the food is acquired by the donor - cash grants through multilateral agencies for open market purchases are obviously the least trade distorting (for a discussion of the issues, see Magiera etal, 1990, pp. 22-4).

180 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

Article 11 Incorporated Products In no case may the per-unit subsidy paid on an incorporated agricultural primary product exceed the per-unit export subsidy that would be payable on exports of the primary product as such.

Part VI Article 12 Disciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions 1. Where any Member institutes any new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of G ATT 1994, the Member shall observe the following provisions:

(a) the Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due consideration to the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members' food security; [There are provisions in sub-paragraph (b) for notification and consultation. Paragraph 2 contains an exemption for developing countries.]

Article XI 2(a) of the GATT 1997 allows 'Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.' Greater discipline on this provision was important to Japan. Any claims for food security were strenuously rejected by the Cairns Group and by the USA, which submitted a separate paper on the subject in 1988 (see Stewart, 1993, pp. 177-8, 183-4, 186-9). Japan and Korea had wanted to eliminate Article XI 2(a) of the GATT 1947. This Article maintains the provision because of the food security concerns of certain LDCs, but puts constraints on its use in the interests of Japan and Korea.

Part VII Article 13 Due Restraint During the implementation period, notwithstanding the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (referred to in this Article as the 'Subsidies Agreement'):

This article is the 'Peace Clause.' It is an exception from the GATT good for 9 years - that is, until well after the next round of negotiations is supposed to have started. This sunset provision is an inducement, therefore, to resume negotiations and to conclude them expeditiously. The inducement is increased by the fact that there is no inflation adjustment. It may have been easy to agree to the first round of


Excerpts Commentary

(a) domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Annex 2 to this Agreement shall be: (i) non-actionable subsidies for purposes of countervailing duties; (ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 and Part III of the Subsidies Agreement; and (iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994; (b) domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Article 6 of this Agreement including direct payments that conform to the requirements of paragraph 5 thereof, as reflected in each Member's Schedule, as well as domestic support within de minimis levels and in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 6, shall be: (i) exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties unless a determination of injury or threat thereof is made in accordance with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies Agreement, and due restraint shall be shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations; (ii) exempt from actions based on paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement, provided that such measures do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992 marketing year; and

reductions, but the bound limits will inevitably become constraining at some point. For further certainty, these exceptions are explicitly mentioned in the Subsidies Agreement. See commentary on Article 19. This provision is a complete but time limited exemption for the Green Box

'Nullification and impairment' provisions give states recourse when otherwise legal actions eliminate a benefit obtained in a negotiation.

This provision is the exemption for the Amber and Blue Boxes, ensuring that e.g. CAP reform cannot be challenged in the GATT during the transition even if the subsidy involved would normally be actionable, unless a particular measure causes injury to another Member.

This provision tends to limit increases in support for an commodity because it is not based on 'Total AMS'.

182 Appendix

(Excerpts Commentary

iii) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of GATT 1994, in the sense of paragraph 1 (b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, provided that such measures do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992 marketing year; (c) export subsidies that conform fully to the provisions of Part V of this Agreement, as reflected in each Member's Schedule, shall be: (i) subject to countervailing duties only upon a determination of injury or threat thereof based on volume, effect on prices, or consequent impact in accordance with Article VI of GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies Agreement, and due restraint shall be shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations; and (ii) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement.

This section in effect exempts the Red Box from certain challenges.

This provision is dependent on an effects test, but has the virtue of specifying how injury is to be determined.

Agriculture export subsidies would be 'prohibited' under the Subsidies agreement without this exemption.

Part VIII Article 14 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application the the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.

Part IX Article 15 Special and Differential Treatment 1. In keeping with the recognition that differential and more favourable treatment for developing country Members is an integral part of the negotiation, special and differential treatment in respect of commitments shall be provided as set out in the

The Punta Declaration and the Single Undertaking c eate the requirement for this political recognition of the need for differentiation (whether developing countries should delay reform is another question). The precise obligations as specified in Articles 13-10 of the


Excerpts Commentary

relevant provisions of this Agreement and embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments.

2. Developing country Members shall have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments over a period of up to 10 years. Least-developed country Members shall not be required to undertake reduction commitments.

PartX Article 16 Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries 1. Developed country Members shall take such action as is provided for within the framework of the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. 2. The Committee on Agriculture shall monitor, as appropriate, the follow-up to this Decision.

'Modalities' are incorporated in the Agreement here, in the Preamble, and in Articles 4.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4 (b), and 9.4 (for a listing of all the examples of special treatment, see GATT, 1993a, pp. 70-4). In the 'Modalities,' developing countries are generally allowed to make reductions only two thirds the size of developed countries, and least-developed countries are allowed to make none (see Article 9.2 [a][i]). Note, however, that all developing countries are required to adopt the new rules as a whole, with no exemptions, so that their policies are disciplined in the same way as those of developed countries. It is also significant that for many developing countries, their policies are also shaped by IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which also tend to push policy away from price-based measures and towards support for investment in agricultural infrastructure. SAPs and the Uruguay Round will push policy in a reform direction, 'special and differential treatment' notwithstanding (FAO, 1994, pp. 73-4).

Part XI Article 17 Committee on Agriculture A Committee on Agriculture is hereby established.

In the Tokyo Round participants were unable to create such a body though a

184 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

Article 18 Review of the Implementation of Commitments 1. Progress in the implementation of commitments negotiated under the Uruguay Round reform programme shall be reviewed by the Committee on Agriculture.

2. The review process shall be undertaken on the basis of notifications submitted by Members in relation to such matters and at such intervals as shall be determined, as well as on the basis of such documentation as the Secretariat may be requested to prepare in order to facilitate the review process.

3. In addition to the notifications to be submitted under paragraph 2, any new domestic support measure, or modification of an existing measure, for which exemption from reduction is claimed shall be notified promptly. This notification shall contain details of the new or modified measure and its conformity with the agreed criteria as set out either in Article 6 or in Annex 2.

limited-mandate Committee on Agriculture was later set up by the 1982 GATT Ministerial, and it made an important contribution in preparing for the Uruguay Round.

Surveillance is an essential part of trade agreements, useful for clarifying understandings, ensuring transparency and as a guide to domestic policymakers. Compare Article 18.6 below.

Consistent with well-established GATT practice, there may well be derogations from the 'mles,' if agreed by the Members themselves.

Members were to notify their tariff rates and show how they intended to implement their quota commitments, All significant agricultural traders to whom this applies, except Brazil, India, and Mexico, had notified by 27 November 1995.

4. In the review process Members shall give due consideration to the influence of excessive rates of inflation on the ability of any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments.

Tangerman stresses that macroeconomic factors can affect the outcome of the Agreement. The definition of the reference price, for example, makes the AMS a nominal amount in domestic currency, which makes it vulnerable to domestic inflation. Tangerman thinks that if countries with high inflation feel


Excerpts Commentary

too much pressed by these provisions, the Committee may have to develop some sort of exemption formula during the review process, which could be contentious.

5. Members agree to consult annually in the Committee on Agriculture with respect to their participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products within the framework of the commitments on export subsidies under this Agreement.

This provisions risks a return to the old Article XVI:3 debates on 'an equitable share of world export trade'.

6. The review process shall provide an opportunity for Members to raise any matter relevant to the implementation of commitments under the reform programme as set out in this Agreement.

7. Any Member may bring to the attention on of the Committee on Agriculture any measure which it considers ought to have been notified by another Member.

Article 19 Consultation and Dispute Settlement The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.

Part XII Article 20 Continuation of the Reform Process Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one year

Agriculture has its own surveillance procedures (Article 18), though it is subject to the TPRM, but disputes will be part of the new WTO integrated dispute settlement system. This reality made the peace clause essential since agriculture policies would otherwise be subject to challenge under other WTO rules, rather than just under this Agreement, as intended.

Tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies are left at relatively high levels by the Agreement. The real achievement is in creating the basis for future negotiations without time-consuming debate about a framework and modalities.

186 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

before the end of the implementation period, taking into account:

(a) the experience to that date from implementing the reduction commitments; (b) the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture; (c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country Members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement; and (d) what further commitments are necessary to achieve the above mentioned long-term objectives.

Part XIII Article 21 Final Provisions I. The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.

It is not clear whether there will be another overall 'Round' in which to incorporate the results and the necessary trade-offs of an Agriculture 'mini-Round.' The implementation period in this case is six years. Note that the agreed standard of evaluation is the 'effect' of the agreement on trade.

As discussed in the text, this provision makes agriculture explicitly part of the GATT, with some continued exceptions. Agriculture is still walled off from the GATT, in other words, but: (a) the provisions are now clear; (b) the provisions mostly mirror the rest of GATT; and (c) the difference in treatment of manufactures and agricultural products is much less than before.

2. The Annexes to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of this Agreement.

The Agreement on Agriculture

ANNEX 1 PRODUCT COVERAGE

1. This Agreement shall cover the following products:

(i) HS Chapters 1 to 24 less fish and fish products, plus*

187

ii) HS Code

HS Code

HS Heading

HS Headings

HS Code

HS Code

HS Headings

HS Heading

HS Headings

HS Headings

HS Headings

HS Heading

HS Heading

2905.43

2905.44

33.01

35.01 to 35.05

3809.10

3823.60

41.01 to 41.03

43.01

50.01 to 50.03

51.01 to 51.03

52.01 to 52.03

53.01

53.02

(mannitol)

(sorbitol)

(essential oils)

(albuminoidal substances, modified starches, glues)

(finishing agents)

(sorbitol n.e.p.)

(hides and skins)

(raw furskins)

(raw silk and silk waste)

(wool and animal hair)

(raw cotton, waste and cotton carded or combed)

(raw flax)

(raw hemp)

* The product descriptions in round brackets are not necessarily exhaustive.

188 Appendix

ANNEX 2 DOMESTIC SUPPORT: THE BASIS FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS

Excerpts Commentary

1. Domestic support measures for which exemption from the reduction commitments is claimed shall meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. Accordingly, all measures for which exemption is claimed shall conform to the following basic criteria: (a) the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government programme (including government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from consumers; and, (b) the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to producers; plus policy-specific criteria and conditions as set out below. Government Service Programmes 2. General services Policies in this category involve

expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programmes which provide services or benefits to agriculture or the rural community. They shall not involve direct payments to producers or processors. Such programmes, which include but are not restricted to the following list, shall meet the general criteria in paragraph 1 above and policy-specific conditions where set out below: (a) research [...] (b) pest and disease control [...] (c) training services, including both general and specialist training facilities; (d) extension and advisory services [...] (e) inspection services [...] (f) marketing and promotion services [...]; and

This annex is the operational definition of the Green Box. This part is general; below there are illustrative and specific criteria. The key ideas, and the basis for monitoring in the Committee on Agriculture will be the need not to distort trade and to move towards direct decoupled support.


Excerpts Commentary

(g) infrastructural services [...]. 3. Public stockholding for food security purposes

4. Domestic food aid Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to the provision of domestic food aid to sections of the population in need.

5. Direct payments to producers Support provided through direct payments (or revenue foregone, including payments in kind) to producers for which exemption from reduction commitments is claimed shall meet the basic criteria set out in paragraph 1 above, plus specific criteria applying to individual types of direct payment as set out in paragraphs 6 through 13 below. [...]

6. Decoupled income support (a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base period. (b) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base period. (c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or

Footnote: 'governmental stockholding programmes for food security purposes in developing countries whose operation is transparent and conducted in accordance with officially published objective criteria or guidelines shall be considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph.' Footnote: 'For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Annex, the provision of foodstuffs at subsidized prices with the objective of meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor in developing countries on a regular basis at reasonable prices shall be considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph.'

'Decoupled' means that support has no relation to production. This innovation should provide governments the flexibility to ease the process of adjustment in agriculture as farmers continue to exit the sector.

190 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period. (d) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. (e) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments. 7. Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programmes [...] 8. Payments (made either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop insurance schemes) for relief from natural disasters [...] 9. Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement programmes. 10. Structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programmes. 11. Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids (for restructuring). 12 Payments under environmental programmes. 13. Payments under regional assistance programmes.

ANNEX 3 DOMESTIC SUPPORT: CALCULATION OF AGGREGATE MEASUREMENT OF SUPPORT

Excerpts Commentary

1. Subject to the provisions of Definition of the Amber Box. Article 6, an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) shall be calculated on a product-specific basis for each basic agricultural product receiving market price support, non-exempt direct payments, or any other subsidy not exempted from the reduction

Excerpts

The Agreement on Agriculture

Commentary

commitment ('other non-exempt policies'). Support which is non-product specific shall be totalled into one non-product-specific AMS in total monetary terms. 2. Subsidies under paragraph 1 shall include both budgetary outlays and revenue foregone by governments or their agents. 3. Support at both the national and sub-national level shall be included. 4. Specific agricultural levies or fees paid by producers shall be deducted from the AMS. 5. The AMS calculated as outlined below for the base period shall constitute the base level for the implementation of the reduction commitment on domestic support. 6. For each basic agricultural product, a specific AMS shall be established, expressed in total monetary value terms. 7. The AMS shall be calculated as close as practicable to the point of first sale of the basic agricultural product concerned. Measures directed at agricultural processors shall be included to the extent that such measures benefit the producers of the basic agricultural products. 8. Market price support: market price support shall be calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price. Budgetary payments made to maintain this gap, such as buying-in or storage costs, shall not be included in the AMS. 9. The fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 and shall generally be the average f.o.b. unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a

This provision was important for the EU. By calculating in domestic currency with reference to a fixed past price, fluctuations in exchange rates and world prices will not affect producer expectations.

This is the base period.

192 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

net exporting country and the average c.i.f. unit value for the basic agricultural product concerned in a net importing country in the base period. The fixed reference price may be adjusted for quality differences as necessary. 10. Non-exempt direct payments: non-exempt direct payments which are dependent on a price gap shall be calculated either using the gap between the fixed reference price and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the administered price, or using budgetary outlays. 11. The fixed reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 and shall generally be the actual price used for determining payment rates. 12. Non-exempt direct payments which are based on factors other than price shall be measured using budgetary outlays. 13. Other non-exempt measures, including input subsidies and other measures such as marketing-cost reduction measures: the value of such measures shall be measured using government budgetary outlays or, where the use of budgetary outlays does not reflect the full extent of the subsidy concerned, the basis for calculating the subsidy shall be the gap between the price of the subsidized good or service and a representative market price for a similar good or service multiplied by the quantity of the good or service.

ANNEX 4 DOMESTIC SUPPORT: CALCULATION OF EQUIVALENT MEASUREMENT OF SUPPORT

[text of this annex deleted]


ANNEX 5 SPECIAL TREATMENT WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 4

Excerpts Commentary

Section A 1. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 shall not apply with effect from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement to any primary agricultural product and its worked and/or prepared products ('designated products') in respect of which the following conditions are complied with (herein after referred to as 'special treatment'): (a) imports of the designated products comprised less than 3 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period 1986-1988 ('the base period'); (b) no export subsidies have been provided since the beginning of the base period for the designated products; (c) effective production-restricting measures are applied to the primary agricultural product; (d) such products are designated with the symbol 'ST-Annex 5' in Section I-B of Part I of a Member's Schedule annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, as being subject to special treatment reflecting factors of non-trade concerns, such as food security and environmental protection; and (e) minimum access opportunities in respect of the designated products correspond, as specified in Section I-B of Part 1 of the Schedule of the Member concerned, to 4 per cent of base period domestic consumption of the designated products from the beginning of the first year of the implementation period and, thereafter, are increased by 0.8 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period per year for the remainder of the implementation period.

Japan's 'rice clause' allows a delay in the impact of the agreement as it affects the domestic rice market. It contains detailed provisions providing for the snap-back to the reform programme later on.

Rice imports had been effectively banned -

and Japan had not been an exporter under any terms.

'Food security' is the standard justification for farm support policies.

The minimum market access required in Article 4 varies from 3 per cent to 5 per cent. This provision requires 4 per cent for Japan, but it also implies a considerable increase in market access every year. Note that if Japan agrees to tariffy under paragraph 6 below, paragraph 2 below allows this annual increase in market access to be cut in half, providing some inducement to conform to the new rules.

194 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

2. At the beginning of any year of the implementation period a Member may-cease to apply special treatment in respect of the designated products by complying with the provisions of paragraph 6. In such a case, the Member concerned shall maintain the minimum access opportunities already in effect at such time and increase the minimum access opportunities by 0.4 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period per year for the remainder of the implementation period.[...] 3. Any negotiation on the question of whether there can be a continuation of the special treatment as set out in paragraph 1 after the end of the implementation period shall be completed within the time-frame of the implementation period itself as a part of the negotiations set out in Article 20 of this Agreement, taking into account the factors of non-trade concerns. 4. If it is agreed as a result of the negotiation referred to in paragraph 3 that a Member may continue to apply the special treatment, such Member shall confer additional and acceptable concessions as determined in that negotiation. 5. [deleted] 6. Border measures other than ordinary customs duties maintained in respect of the designated products shall become subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 with effect from the beginning of the year in which the special treatment ceases to apply. Such products shall be subject to ordinary customs duties, which shall be bound in the Schedule of the Member concerned and applied, from the beginning of the year in which special treatment ceases and thereafter, at such rates as would have been

The Rice Clause is linked to the continuation clause.

There is evidently a price to be paid for continued failure to play by the same rules as everybody else.

Provisions for tariffication and snap-back.


Excerpts Commentary

applicable had a reduction of at least 15 per cent been implemented over the implementation period in equal annual installments. These duties shall be established on the basis of tariff equivalents to be calculated in accordance with the guidelines prescribed in the attachment hereto. Section B 7. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 4 shall also not apply with effect from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement to a primary agricultural product that is the predominant staple in the traditional diet of a developing country Member and in respect of which the following conditions, in addition to those specified in paragraph 1(a) through 1 (d), as they apply to the products concerned, are complied with: (a) [deleted! (b) appropriate market access opportunities have been provided for in other products under this Agreement. 8. [deleted] 9. If it is agreed as a result of the negotiation referred to in paragraph 8 that a Member may continue to apply the special treatment, such Member shall confer additional and acceptable concessions as determined in that negotiation. 10. In the event that special treatment under paragraph 7 is not to be continued beyond the 10th year following the beginning of the implementation period, the products concerned shall be subject to ordinary customs duties, established on the basis of a tariff equivalent to be calculated in accordance with the guidelines prescribed in the attachment hereto, which shall be bound in the Schedule of the Member concerned. In other respects, the provisions of paragraph 6 shall apply as modified by

Korea's 'rice clause' allows a delay in the impact of the agreement as it affects the domestic rice market. It contains detailed provisions providing for the snap-back to the reform program later on. In comparison to Japan, this provision allows a longer period and follows slightly different principles. There will be a continuing increase in minimal access to the domestic rice market.

Korea must otherwise be playing by the rules.

There is evidently a price to be paid for continued failure to play by the same rules as everybody else.

When the snap-back happens, there will be a special effort to ensure that there will be no water in the new tariffs, which implies that tariffication for Japan and Korea when it eventually happens might be more painful than if they had simply accepted the Agreement at the outset.

196 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

the relevant special and differential treatment accorded to developing country Members under this Agreement.

Attachment to Annex 5 Guidelines for the Calculation of Tariff Equivalents for the Specific Purpose Specified in Paragraphs 6 and 10 of this Annex

[deleted]

Ministerial Decisions and Declarations

Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed And Net Food-Importing Developing Countries

Excerpts

1. Ministers recognize that the progressive implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round as a whole will generate increasing opportunities for trade expansion and economic growth to the benefit of all participants. 2. Ministers recognize that during the reform programme leading to greater liberalization of trade in agriculture least-developed and net food-importing developing countries may experience negative effects in terms of the availability of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions, including short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs. 3. Ministers accordingly agree to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round on trade in agriculture does not adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food

Commentary

The 'Ministers' in this case are from food importers, who recognize the view of OECD countries that everyone will be better off after the implementation of the reform programme.

The 'Ministers' in this case are from food exporters, who recognize the worries of food importers that the full application of trade principles could hurt traditional recipients of food aid.

The main undertaking is to keep these issues under review, but the principles of Article 10:4 will apply. The intent of the Decision seems to be to butress the FAO and other development oriented organizations.


Excerpts Commentary

needs of developing countries, especially least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. To this end Ministers agree: (i) to review the level of food aid established periodically by the Committee on Food Aid under the Food Aid Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform programme; (ii) to adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986; (iii) to give full consideration in the context of their aid programmes to requests for the provision of technical and financial assistance to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries to improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure. 4. Ministers further agree to ensure that any agreement relating to agricultural export credits makes appropriate provision for differential treatment in favour of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. 5. Ministers recognize that as a result of the Uruguay Round certain developing countries may experience short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports and that these countries may be eligible to draw on the resources of international financial institutions under existing facilities,

The intent of this provision appears to be to ensure the use of the procedures available to decide what level of food aid is necessary, which means non-trade distorting.

198 Appendix

Excerpts Commentary

or such facilities as may be established, in the context of adjustment programmes, in order to address such financing difficulties. In this regard Ministers take note of paragraph 37 of the report of the Director-General to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 on his consultations with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank (MTN. GNG/NG14/W/35). 6. The provisions of this Decision will be subject to regular review by the Ministerial Conference, and the follow-up to this Decision shall be monitored, as appropriate, by the Committee on Agriculture.

When Ministers come to review this provision, they may discover that the availability of food aid has been adversely affected by market developments, but not by the Agreement, precisely because the Agreement delivered less liberalization than expected.

Notes

1 It could be argued that agriculture has become so industrialized that it makes no sense to consider it as a separate sector. If that argument were accepted, it might limit potential explanations of why agriculture and industry appeared to have been treated separately in the GATT to a consideration of differential patterns of interest group representation, which is not the approach adopted in this book. The counter argument, which I adopt, is that the organization of farming, especially the social organization, differs from other sectors, as do the relations of farmers with the rest of society and the state,

2. The connections to the burgeoning literature on the relation between trade and war are obvious, but also too complex to detain us here. I discuss the question in Wolfe, forthcoming.

3. Polanyi was a central European Christian socialist (Polanyi-Levitt, 1990) and economic sociologist, one of the seminal contributors to this literature concerned with the historical trajectory of the capitalist system (Piore, 1996; Kindleberger, 1974). His work on anthropology, notably his analysis of the economy as an instituted process (Polanyi, 1957), is still widely influential. His critical analysis of the dehumanizing consequences of market liberalism has been taken up by the New Left, but his organic conception of society can also be seen as deeply conservative (Ruggie, 1995, p. 507), and his ideas still have appeal for Christian ethicists (Baum, 1996). He was arguably a theorist of international stability, though I use his work in a way that is unusual in the Polanyi literature (see, for example, Mendell and Salee, 1991). Other than Ruggie (1983), only Wallerstein, in his work on world systems theory, has considered Polanyi's normative interest in the basis for international order (Block and Somers, 1984, p. 73) or modern world history, although some aspects of his work have been used by other scholars in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) (for examples, seeHettne, 1995).

4. I owe the graphic vector imagery to Charles Pentland, who had in mind both the neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas (e.g. The Uniting of Europe, 1958), and earlier pluralists, beginning with Arthur F. Bentley (e.g. The Process of Government, 1908).

5. Most scholars attribute the idea of issue-areas not to Haas but to Rosenau (Keohane, 1986b, p. 188; Pentland, 1973, pp. 220-4). Rosenau, who never contributed to the regime literature, was grappling with the interrelations of national and international 'political systems.' He argued that 4the boundaries of political systems ought to be drawn vertically in terms of issue-areas as well as horizontally in terms of geographic areas' (Rosenau, 1966, p. 74).

6. My evidence pertains only to the governance of the global trading system. The extent to which embedded liberalism characterized the governance of the monetary system is a separate issue (Helleiner, 1994; Cerny, 1994).

199

Notes

EU refers to the European Union, created in 1992. Nevertheless, for simplicity I use this term throughout, even when at the time, as in this instance, EC, referring to the European Community, would be more appropriate. This section was completed before the publication of Josling, Tangermann and Warley (1996). 'Distortion' when applied to trade means that the pattern of transaction flows will differ from one determined only in the market. It is in this sense that it is used in the 'domestic distortions' context. The term carries the implication that government interventions are inappropriate by definition. I use the term uncritically because it was used by the negotiators - see, for example, the first paragraph of the agricultural section of the Punta Declaration. I argue that the issue-area had become trade, making the trade regime the relevant focus for analysis, but few attempts have been made to use regime analysis on this set of issues, however they are aggregated. Hopkins has long argued for a food or a food aid regime (Hopkins and Puchala, 1978; Hopkins, 1992; Puchala and Hopkins, 1983). Cohn's knowledgeable survey of the issues at stake in the history of farm trade uses an explicitly theoretical regimes framework in which to compare the benefits to Canada of pursuing unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral approaches (Cohn, 1992). Marlin-Bennett shows how in the 1978-83 period considerable sectoral conflict led actors in a single food dispute to think themselves governed by different regimes (Marlin-Bennett, 1993, especially Chapter 6). Zacher refers to a 'commodity regime' (Zacher, 1987). Although McLin refers to a 'wheat regime' operating during the 1950s and 1960s, in my terms what he means is that the US/Canadian duopoly was a surrogate for a genuine multilateral regime - in the postwar period the FAO Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSD) played an important stabilization role in the absence of wheat agreements (McLin, 1979). Uvin tries to focus on hunger, but he finds himself having to analyze a shifting pattern of 'issue-areas' within the 'international food regime' or the development regime. He finds four at least: international assistance to family planning, structural adjustment, international food flows, and food trade/food aid. The trade regime dominates food flows, and there is no evidence that concerns for food security or hunger have had any influence on the evolution of the regime (Uvin, 1992; Uvin, 1994, pp. 59-60, 119). Lumsdaine does not seem to spend much time on definitional issues, but he clearly thinks there is a foreign aid issue-area and that a foreign aid regime developed after World War II based on principles and values - a shared 'moral vision' of necessary and appropriate action. Lumsdaine has no index entry for food or food aid. In his view, evidently, it was not part of the developmentally oriented regime (Lumsdaine, 1993). An alternative to the regime concept in the domain of interest in this paper might be the idea of a 'food order'. From the standpoint of the regulation school, the issue is generally food, not the relations among states (Tubiana, 1989). The issue can also be the relations between agriculture and other sectors under a globalizing regime of capitalist accumulation (Le Heron, 1993; Whatmore, 1994). Friedmann develops what she explicitly sees as an alternative formulation to that of issue-area when she argues that 'Analysis may be simplified in a more useful way than

Notes 201

usual if we can understand the price of one commodity in relation to the international specialization, trade, and productive relations of that same commodity, including class politics affecting its production and consumption in various countries' (Friedmann, 1982, p. s254; see also Friedmann, 1995). Friedmann's food order might well simplify analysis, but it does so at the expense of including the participants' intersubjective understandings of the issue-area. Similarly, Murphy's use of an analogous concept, 'political economy issue areas,' offers considerable analytic insight, but only by sacrificing a focus on states in order to consider social conflict and the governance of a capitalist industrial economy as it grows across territories and societies. One of the conflicts to be managed is between industry and agriculture (Murphy, 1994).

11. 1 owe this insight to John Curtis. 12. Legal centralism argues that only lawyers and judges know what 'law' is

and that only they are competent to know when something is 'fair' (see Arthurs, 1985). Arthurs traces the origins of this view to Dicey, but it is of course common in the American public choice view of government - politicians and bureaucrats being self-serving at best, 'administrative review' is needed to ensure that Leviathan does not get out of control.

13. Quotations are from the Chairman's texts as provided to the Press by Canada's Department of External Affairs on 8 April 1989. They were later incorporated in MTN.TNC/11 of 21 April 1989. Comparisons are to the text drafted before the Ministerial by the chair, Art de Zeuw of the Netherlands, Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture MTN.GNG/16, 30 November 1988.

14. Article XII (Roman numeral) is a reference either to the GATT 1947 or to the GATT 1994, while Article 12 (Arabic numeral) is a reference to the Agreement on Agriculture.

15. It was not possible to evaluate the Singapore Ministerial Conference of December 1996 before completion of this manuscript.

Bibliography

ALEXANDRATOS, NIKOS, ed. (1995) World Agriculture Towards 2010: An FAO Study (Chichester: FAO and John Wiley).

ALLEN, KRISTEN and KATIE MACMILLAN, eds (1988) US-Canadian Agricultural Trade Challenges: Developing Common Approaches (Washington: Resources for the Future).

ANANIA, GIOVANNI, COLIN A. CARTER and ALEX F. MCCALLA, eds (1994) Agricultural Trade Conflicts and GATT: New Dimensions in US-European Agricultural Trade Relations (Boulder: Westview Press).

ANDERSON, KYM (1992a) 'Agricultural Trade Liberalisation and the Environment: A Global Perspective,' The World Economy 15:1 (January 1992), 153-71.

ANDERSON, KYM (1992b) 'Analytical Issues in the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Agriculture,' European Economic Review 36:2-3 (April 1992), 519-26.

ANDERSON, KYM (1994a) 'Implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture,' in OECD, 1994d, 153-62.

ANDERSON, KYM (1994b) 'Trade Negotiations and Farm Policy,' Economic Policy 18: (April 1994), 14-43.

ANDERSON, KYM and YUJIRO HAY AMI (1986) The Political Economy of Agricultural Protectionism: East Asia in International Perspective (London: Allen & Unwin).

ARNDT, SVEN and CHRIS MILNER, eds (1995) The World Economy: Global Trade Policy 1995 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers).

ARTHURS, HARRY W. (1985) 'Without the Law': Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

BALDWIN, DAVID A. (1980) interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,' International Organization 34:4 (Autumn 1980), 471-506.

BALDWIN, DAVID A. (1985) Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

BALDWIN, DAVID A., ed. (1993) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press).

BALDWIN, ROBERT E. (1995) 'An Economic Evaluation of the Uruguay Round Agreements,' in Arndt and Milner, 1995, 153-72.

BALLENGER, NICOLE et al (1989) 'Potential Use of an Aggregate Measure of Support,' International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Commissioned Paper Number, 5, 1989.

BATES, ROBERT (1988) 'Lessons from History, or the Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France,' World Politics XL:4 (July 1988), 499-516.

BAUM, GREGORY (1996) Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press).

BERGER, SUZANNE and RONALD DORE, eds (1996) National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

BHAGWATI, JAGDISH (1988) Protectionism (Cambridge: MIT Press).

202

Bibliography 203

BHAGWATI, JAGDISH (1994) 'Free Trade: Old and New Challenges,' The Economic Journal 104: (March 1994), 231-46.

BLACKHURST, RICHARD (1988) 'Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies,' in Hi If, Meinhard and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds, The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal and Economic Aspects (Deventer: KluwerLaw and Taxation Publishers), 123-55.

BLACKHURST, RICHARD, ALICE ENDERS and JOSEPH F. FRANCOIS (1995) 'The Uruguay Round and Market Access: Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Countries,' in Martin and Winters, 1995, 97-115.

BLANDFORD, DAVID (1990) 'The Costs of Agricultural Protection and the Difference Free Trade Would Make,' in Sanderson, 1990, 398-432.

BLOCK, FRED and MARGARET R. SOMERS (1984) 'Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi,' in Skocpol, Theda, ed., Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 47-84.

BON ANNO, ALESSANDRO et al, eds (1994) From Colombus to Conagra: The Globalization of Agriculture and Food (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas).

BOOTH, WILLIAM JAMES (1994) 'On the Idea of the Moral Economy,' American Political Science Review 88:3 (September 1994), 653-67.

BORENSZTEIN, EDUARDO et al (1994) The Behavior of Non-Oil Commodity Prices Occasional Paper 112, August 1994 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

BREDAHL, MAURY E. et al (1988) 'Negotiating a Framework for Action,' International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Commissioned Paper Number 3.

BREDAHL, MAURY E. et al (1989) Tariffication and Rebalancing,' International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Commissioned Paper Number 4.

BRIERLY, JOHN E. C. and RODERICK A. MACDONALD, eds (1993) Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec Private Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited).

BRINKMAN, GEORGE L. (1990) 'Structural Change in Canadian, United States, and European Agriculture,' in Michelmann, Hans J., Jack C. Stabler and Gary G. Storey, eds, The Political Economy of Agricultural Trade and Policy: Toward a New Order for Europe and North America (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press), 95-127.

BROOKS, JONATHAN C. and COLIN A. CARTER (1994) The Political Economy of US Agriculture ABARE Research Report 94.8 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics).

BROWN, MARTIN and IAN GOLDIN (1992) The Future of Agriculture: Developing Country Implications (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development).

BURLEY, ANNE-MARIE (1993) 'Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State,' in Ruggie, 1993a, 125-56.

BUZAN, BARRY (1993) 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,' International Organization 47:3 (Summer 1993), 327-52.

204 Bibliography

CABLE, VINCENT (1987) 'Tropical Products,' in Finger, J. Michael and Andrzej Olechowski, eds, The Uruguay Round: A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Washington: The World Bank), 171-9.

CAHILL, CARMEL and WILFRID LEGG (1990) 'Estimation of Agricultural Assistance Using Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Theory and Practice,' in OECD, 1990b, 13-43.

CAPORASO, JAMES A. (1993) international Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,' in Ruggie, 1993a, 51-90.

CAPORASO, JAMES A. and DAVID P. LEVINE (1992) Theories of Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

CARLSON, JONATHAN (1985) 'Hunger, Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Political Problem,' Iowa Law Review 70: (1985), 1187-277.

CARLYLE, WILLIAM J. (1991) 'Rural Change in the Prairies,' in Robinson, Guy M., ed., A Social Geography of Canada (Toronto and Oxford: Dundurn Press), 330-58.

CARR, E. H. (1939) The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan).

CERNY, PHILIP G. (1994) 'The Infrastructure of the Infrastructure? Toward "Embedded Financial Orthodoxy" in the International Political Economy,' in Palan, Ronen and Barry Gills, eds, Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 223-49.

CERNY, PHILIP G. (1995) 'Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,' International Organization 49:4 (Autumn 1995), 595-625,

CHAR VET, JEAN-PAUL (1991) 'Les Geostrategies des Etats-Unis sur le Marche Mondial du Ble: P.L. 480 et E.E.P.,' in Chominot, Albert, ed. Uagriculteur, Le marche et I'etat (Paris: Economica), 121-30.

CLINE, WILLIAM R. (1995) 'Evaluating the Uruguay Round,' The World Economy 18:1 (January 1995), 1-23.

COHN, THEODORE H. (1992) 'Canada and the Ongoing Impasse over Agricultural Protectionism,' in Cutler, A. Claire and Mark W. Zacher, eds, Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press), 62-109.

COHN, THEODORE H. (1993) 'The Changing Role of the United States in the Global Agricultural Trade Regime,' in Avery, William P., ed., World Agriculture and the GATT (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), 17-38.

COLLINS, SUSAN M. and BARRY P. BOS WORTH, eds (1994) The New GATT: Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution).

COMMISSION (1995) 'Final Report Volume 1,' Canada-United States Joint Commission on Grains: October.

CONYBEARE, JOHN (1987) Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press).

COOPER, ANDREW FENTON (1990) 'Exporters Versus Importers: LDCs, Agricultural Trade and the Uruguay Round,' Inter economics (January-February), 13-7.

COOPER, RICHARD N. (1972) 'Trade Policy is Foreign Policy,' Foreign Policy 9: (Winter 1972-73), 18-36.

Bibliography 205

COOPER, RICHARD N. (1987) international Economic Co-Operation: Overview and a Glimpse of the Future,' Interdependence and Co-Operation in Tomorrow's World: A Symposium Marking the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the OECD (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 180-94.

CORDEN, W. M. (1974) Trade Policy and Economic Welfare (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

CORDEN, W. MAX (1987a) 'On Making Rules for the International Trading System,' in Stern, Robert M., ed., US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 413-26.

CORDEN, W. MAX (1987b) 'Why Trade Is Not Free: Is There a Clash Between Theory and Practice?,' in Giersch, Herbert, ed., Free Trade in the World Economy: Towards an Opening of Markets (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]), 1-19.

COX, ROBERT W. (1992) Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,' in Rosenau, James N. and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 132-59.

COX, ROBERT W. (1996) with Sinclair, Timothy J., Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

CROOME, JOHN (1995) Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (Geneva: World Trade Organization).

CURRY, DAVID (1982) The Food War: The European Community and the Battle for World Food Markets (London: European Democratic Group).

CURTIS, JOHN M. and ROBERT WOLFE (1994) 'Nothing is Agreed Until Everything is Agreed: First Thoughts on the Implications of the Uruguay Round,' in Molot, Maureen Appel and Harald Von Riekoff, eds, A Part of the Peace: Canada Among Nations, 1994 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press), 101—28.

CURZON, GERARD (1965) Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (London: Michael Joseph).

CURZON, GERARD and VICTORIA (1976) The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT,' in Shonfield, 1976.

DEAN, JUDITH M. (1995) The Trade Policy Revolution in Developing Countries,' in Arndt and Milner, 1995, 173-89.

DEROSA, DEAN A. (1992) 'Concluding the Uruguay Round: The Dunkel Draft Agreement on Agriculture,' The World Economy 15:6 (November 1992), 755-60.

DILLON, PATRICA, JAMES LEHMAN and THOMAS D. WILLETT (1990) 'Assessing the Usefulness of International Trade Theory for Policy Analysis,' in Odell and Willett, 1990, 21-54.

DRAKE, WILLIAM J. and KALYPSO NICOLOAIDIS (1992) ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: "Trade in Services" and the Uruguay Round,' International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), 37-100.

DRYDEN, STEVE (1995) Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

DUNCAN, COLIN A. M. (1996a) The Centrality of Agriculture: Between Humankind and the Rest of Nature (Kingston; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press).

DUNCAN, COLIN A. M. (1996b) personal communication. ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA (1988) Handling the Risks: A Report on

the Prairie Grain Economy (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada).

206 Bibliography

EICHENGREEN, BARRY (1984) 'Keynes and Protection,' Journal of Economic History 44:2 (June 1984), 363-73.

EICHENGREEN, BARRY (1989) 'Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,' in Cooper, Richard N. et al, eds, Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution), 255-98.

ERDMANN-KEEFER, VERA (1990) The "Corn War": A Euro-American Trade Dispute,' in Rummel, Reinhardt, ed., The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 241-67.

FAO (1994) The State of Food and Agriculture 1994 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations).

FAO (1995) 'Update,' FoodOutlookl: (July 1995), 1-11. FAO (1996) 'Food and International Trade,' Food and Agriculture Organisation

of the United Nations'. WFS 96/Tech/8 Provisional Version, April. FERGUSON, YALE H. and RICHARD W. MANSBACH (1989) The State,

Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

FINGER, J. MICHAEL (1989) 'Development Economics and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,' in Melo, Jaime De and Andre Sapir, eds, Trade Theory and Economic Reform - North, South, and East: Essays in Honor ofBela Balassa (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell), 203-23.

FINLAYSON, JOCK A. and MARK W. ZACHER (1981) international Trade Institutions and the North/South Dialogue,' International Journal Xxxvi:4 (Autumn 1981), 732-65.

FINLAYSON, JOCK A. and MARK W. ZACHER (1983) The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions,' in Krasner, 1983a, 273-314.

FINNEMORE, MARTHA (1993) international Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,' International Organization 41:4 (Autumn 1993), 565-98.

FINNEMORE, MARTHA (1996) 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights From Sociology's Institutional! sm,' International Organization 50:2 (Spring 1996), 325-34.

FOLMER, C. et al (1995) The Common Agricultural Policy Beyond the MacSharry Reform (Amsterdam; New York: Elsevier).

FOWKE, VERNON C. (1946) Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

FOWKE, VERNON C. (1957) The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

FRAENKEL, RICHARD M., DON F. HADWIGER and WILLIAM P. BROWNE, eds (1979) The Role of U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers).

FRANKLIN, MICHAEL (1988) Rich Man's Farming: The Crisis in Agriculture (London: Routledge).

FRESHWATER, DAVID (1993) 'American Agriculture and the Debt Crisis,' in Riley, Stephen P., ed., The Politics of Global Debt (London: Macmillan), 136-50.

FRIEDMANN, HARRIET (1982) The Political Economy of Food: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food Order,' in Burawoy, Michael and Theda Skocpol, eds, Marxist Inquiries: Studies of Labor, Class, and States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), S248-86.

Bibliography 207

FRIEDMANN, HARRIET (1995) 'Food Politics: New Dangers, New Possibilities,' in McMichael, Philip, ed., Food and Agrarian Orders in the World Economy (Westport: Praeger), 15-33.

FULLER, LON L. (1946) 'Reason and Fiat in Case Law,' Harvard Law Review 59: (1946), 376-95.

FULLER, LON L. (1981a) 'Means and Ends,' in Fuller, 1981c, 47-64. FULLER, LON L. (1981b) Two Principles of Human Association,' in Fuller,

1981c, 67-85. FULLER, LON L. (1981c) The Principles of Social Order, edited by Kenneth

Winston (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press). GAISFORD, J. D. and WILLIAM A. KERR (1992) 'Which Country Loses the

Least in a Trade War?,' Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 36:3 (December 1992), 249-74.

GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH (1987) Economics in Perspective: A Critical History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

GARDNER, RICHARD N. (1969) Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order, new, expanded edition (New York: McGraw-Hill).

GATT (1958) Trends in International Trade: Report by a Panel of Experts (Geneva: The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1979) The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Report by the Director-General of GATT (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1982) 'Agriculture in the GATT,' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Note by the Secretariat CG.18/W/59/Rev.l, January 20.

GATT (1985) The Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1988a) International Trade 87-88 Volume I (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1988b) International Trade 87-88 Volume II (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1991a) The Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,' MTN.TNC/W/FA 20 December 1991.

GATT (1991b) International Trade 90-91 Volume 1 (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1993a) 'An Analysis of the Proposed Uruguay Round Agreement, with Particular Emphasis on Aspects of Interest to Developing Countries,' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: MTN.TNC/W/122, 29 November.

GATT (1993b) The Quad's Initial Market Access Package,' Focus - GATT Newsletter 101: (August-September 1993), 3.

GATT (1994a) Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index 6th edn (Geneva: Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1994b) Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

GATT (1994c) The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Market Access for Goods and Services: Overview of the Results,' (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, November).

GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, NICHOLAS (1971) The Entropy Law and Economic Process (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

208 Bibliography

GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).

GIFFORD, M. N. (1990) 'A Status Report: The Comprehensive Proposals,' Agriculture in the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations: The Final Stages, Proceedings of a Conference in May 1990 (Guelph: Department of Agricultural Economics and Business, University of Guelph), 9-15.

GILL, STEPHEN, ed. (1993) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

GILPIN, ROBERT (1981) War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

GILSON, J. C. (1988) 'The GATT Midterm Review and Agriculture: Prospects for Trade Reform in the Uruguay Round,' C.D.Howe Institute Trade Monitor: No. 9, November 1988.

GOLDIN, IAN and ODIN KNUDSEN, eds (1990) Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Implications for Developing Countries (Paris; Washington: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; The World Bank).

GOLDIN, IAN and DOMINIQUE VAN DER MENSBRUGGE (1992) Trade Liberalisation: What's at Stake?,' OECD Development Centre: Policy Brief No. 5.

GOLDIN, IAN and L. ALAN WINTERS, eds (1992) Open Economies: Structural Adjustment in Agriculture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

GOLDSTEIN, JUDITH (1989) The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of US Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies,' International Organization 43:1 (Winter), 30-71.

GOLDSTEIN, JUDITH (1993) 'Creating the GATT Rules: Politics, Institutions and American Policy,' in Ruggie, 1993a, 201-32.

GOUREVITCH, PETER ALEXIS (1977) international Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896,' Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8:2 (Autumn 1977), 281-313.

GRAMPP, WILLIAM D. (1952) The Liberal Elements in English Mercantilism,' Quarterly Journal of Economics 66:4 (November 1952), 465-501.

GRANT, RICHARD J., MARIA C. PAPADAKIS and J. DAVID RICHARDSON (1993) 'Global Trade Flows: Old Structures, New Issues, Empirical Evidence,' in Bergsten, C. Fred and Marcus Noland, eds, Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System (Washington, DC: The Institute for International Economics), 17-63.

GRIECO, JOSEPH M. (1990) Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

GRILLI, ENZO R. and MAW CHENG YANG (1990) internationally Traded Good Prices, World Money, and Economic Activity: 1900-83,' Journal of International Money and Finance 9:2 (June 1990), 159-81.

GROSSMAN, GENE M. and ELHANAN HELPMAN (1995) Trade Wars and Trade Talks,' Journal of Political Economy 103:4 (1995), 675-708.

GRUNBERG, ISABELLE (1990) 'Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability,' International Organization 44:4 (Autumn 1990), 431-77.

GUITIAN, MANUEL (1992) Rules and Discretion in International Economic Policy IMF Occasional Paper No. 97 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

HAAS, ERNST B. (1980) 'Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,' World Politics 32:3 (April 1980), 357-405.

Bibliography 209

HAAS, ERNST B. (1990) When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press).

HAAS, PETER M. (1992) introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,' International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), 1-35.

HAGGARD, STEPHAN and BETH A. SIMMONS (1987) Theories of International Regimes,' International Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987), 491-517.

HALEY, STEPHEN L. and JERRY SHARPLES (1990) 'Summary,' in Carter, Colin A., Alex F. McCalla and Jerry A. Sharpies, eds, Imperfect Competition and Political Economy: The New Trade Theory in Agricultural Trade Research (Boulder: Westview Press), 245-56.

HAMILTON, COLLEEN and JOHN WHALLEY (1989) 'Coalitions in the Uruguay Round,' Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 125:3 (Winter 1989), 547-62.

HAMILTON, COLLEEN and JOHN WHALLEY (1995) 'Evaluating the Impact of the Uruguay Round Results on Developing Countries,' The World Economy 18:1 (January 1995), 31-49.

HANSENCLEVER, ANDREAS, PETER MAYER and VOLKER RITTBERGER (1996) interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes,' Mershon International Studies Review 40:S2 (October 1996), 177-228.

HARRISON, GLENN W., E. E. RUTSTROM and RANDALL WIGLE (1989) 'Costs of Agricultural Trade Wars,' in Stoeckel, Andrew B., David Vincent and Sandy Cuthbertson, eds, Macroeconomic Consequences of Farm Support Policies (Durham: Duke University Press), 330-67.

HARROD, R. F. (1951) The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan). HATHAWAY, DALE E. (1987) Agriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the Rules,

Policy Analyses in International Economics 20 (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).

HATHAWAY, DALE E. (1994) 'New World Order in Agricultural Trade,' in OECD, 1994d, 167-9.

HATHAWAY, DALE E. and MELINDA D. INGCO (1995) 'Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay Round,' in Martin and Winters, 1995, 1-24.

HELD, DAVID and ANTHONY MCGREW (1993) 'Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State,' Government and Opposition 28:2 (Spring 1993), 261-88.

HELLEINER, ERIC (1994) States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

HERLIHY, MICHAEL T., JOSEPH W. GLAUBER and JAMES G. VERTREES (1993) The US-EC Blair House Agreement,' USDA International Agriculture and Trade Reports: Europe Rs-93-5: (September 1993), 45-51.

HETTNE, BJORNE, ed. (1995) International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder (Halifax, NS: Fernwood Publishing).

HIGGOTT, RICHARD A. and ANDREW FENTON COOPER (1990) 'Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,' International Organization 44:4 (Autumn 1990), 589-632.

HILLMAN, JIMMYE S. (1978) Nontariff Agricultural Trade Barriers (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press).

HOBSON, ASHER (1931) The International Institute of Agriculture (Berkeley: University of California Press).

210 Bibliography

HOEKMAN, BERNARD M. (1989) 'Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations,' International Organization 43:4 (Autumn 1989), 693-714.

HOEKMAN, BERNARD M. (1995) 'Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services,' in Martin and Winters, 1995, 326-64.

HOEKMAN, BERNARD M. and MICHAEL KOSTECKI (1995) The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATE to WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

HOLSTI, K. J. (1992) 'Governance Without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century European International Politics,' in Rosenau, James N. and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 30-57.

HOPKINS, RAYMOND and DONALD J. PUCHALA (1978) 'Perspectives on the International Relations of Food,' International Organization 32:3 (Summer 1978), 581-616.

HOPKINS, RAYMOND F. (1991) 'Notes on Agriculture and the State,' in Timmer, 1991a, 275-87.

HOPKINS, RAYMOND F. (1992) 'Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of Consensual Knowledge,' International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), 225-64.

HOUCK, JAMES P. (1980) 'US Agricultural Trade and the Tokyo Round,' Law and Policy in International Business 12:1, 265-95.

HUDEC, ROBERT E. (1988a) 'Dispute Settlement in Agricultural Trade Matters: The Lessons of the GATT Experience,' in Allen and Macmillan, 1988, 145-54.

HUDEC, ROBERT E. (1988b) 'Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960-1985,' in Baldwin, Robert E., Carl B. Hamilton and Andre Sapir, eds, Issues in US-EC Trade Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 17-58.

IKENBERRY, G. JOHN (1992) 'A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,' International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), 289-321.

IMF (1994) World Economic Outlook October 1994 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

IMF (1995) World Economic Outlook October 1995 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

INGCO, MERLINDA D. (1995) 'Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step Forward, One Step Back?,' World Bank: Working Paper No. 1500, August 1995.

INGCO, MERLINDA D. (1996) Tariffication in the Uruguay Round: How Much Liberalisation?,' The World Economy 19:4 (July 1996), 425-46.

INGERSENT, K. A., A. J. RAYNER and R.C. HINE (1995) 'Ex-Post Evaluation of the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement,' The World Economy 18:5 (September 1995), 707-27.

IRWIN, DOUGLAS A. (1989) 'Political Economy and Peel's Repeal of the Corn Laws,' Economics and Politics 1:1 (Spring 1989), 41-60.

JACKSON, JOHN H. (1989) The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press).

JACKSON, JOHN H. (1990) Restructuring the GATT System (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Bibliography 211

JACKSON, JOHN H. (1995) The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation or Cautious Small Step Forward?,' in Arndt and Milner, 1995, 11-31.

JAMES, ALAN (1993) 'System or Society?,' Review of International Studies 19:3 (July 1993), 269-88.

JOHNSON, D. GALE (1991) World Agriculture in Disarray, second edition (London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre).

JOHNSON, D. GALE, KENZO HEMMI and PIERRE LARDINOIS (1985) Agricultural Policy and Trade: Adjusting Domestic Programs in an International Framework, a Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press).

JOHNSON, HARRY G. (1974) 'Mercantilism: Past, Present and Future,' in Johnson, Harry G., ed., The New Mercantilism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell),

JOHNSON, HARRY G. (1976) Trade Negotiations and the New International Monetary System (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies).

JOSLING, TIM (1994) The Reformed CAP and the Industrial World,' European Review of Agricultural Economics 21:3-4 , 513-27.

JOSLING, TIM et al (1994) The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: An Evaluation,' International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Commissioned Paper Number 9.

JOSLING, TIMOTHY E., FRED H. SANDERSON and T.K. WARLEY (1990) The Future of International Agricultural Relations: Issues in the GATT Negotiations,' in Sanderson, 1990, 433-64.

JOSLING, T. E., S. TANGERMANN and T. K. WARLEY (1996) Agriculture in the GATT (London: Macmillan).

KAHLER, MILES (1993) 'Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,' in Ruggie, 1993a, 295-326.

KATZENSTEIN, PETER J., ed. (1978) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press).

KEGLEY, CHARLES W., Jr, ed. (1995) Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's).

KELLY, MARGARET et al. (1988) Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy Occasional Paper 63 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

KELLY, MARAGARET and ANNE KENNY MCGUIRK (1992) Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy August (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

KENNEDY, DAVID (1995) The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law,' The American University Journal of International Law and Policy 10:2 (Winter 1995), 671-716.

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

KEOHANE, ROBERT O., ed. (1986a) Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press).

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (1986b) Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,' in Keohane, 1986a, 158-203.

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (1989a) 'Reciprocity in International Relations,' in International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press), 132-57.

212 Bibliography

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (1989b) The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977,' in International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press), 79-100

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (1990) international Liberalism Reconsidered,' in Dunn, John, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 165-94.

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. and Joseph S. Nye, (1989) Power and Interdependence (2nd Edition) (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Company).

KILE, O. M. (1927) 'Crops and Candidates,' Woman Citizen 12: (June 1927), reprinted as 'Why Does the Farmer Need Relief?' in Julia E. Johnsen, Compiler, Agriculture and the Tariff (New York: H. W. Wilson).

KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. (1951) 'Group Behaviour and International Trade,' Journal of Political Economy 59:1 (February 1951), 30-46.

KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. (1974) 'The Great Transformation by Karl Polanyi,' Daedalus 103:1 (Winter 1974), 45-52.

KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. (1986a) international Public Goods Without International Government,' American Economic Review 76:1 (March 1986), 1-13.

KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. (1986b) The World in Depression, 1929-1939, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press).

KING, GARY, ROBERT O. KEOHANE and SIDNEY VERBA (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

KIRMANI, NAHEED et al (1994) International Trade Policies: The Uruguay Round and Beyond 2 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

KLUM, ANDERS (1994) issues for Agriculture after the Round,' in OECD, 1994d, 163-9.

KONING, NIEK (1994) The Failure of Agrarian Capitalism: Agrarian Politics in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, 1846-1919 (London and New York: Routledge).

KRASNER, STEPHEN D. (1979) 'The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System,' International Studies Quarterly 23:4 (December 1979), 491-531.

KRASNER, STEPHEN D., ed. (1983a) International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

KRASNER, STEPHEN D., (1983b) 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables,' in Krasner, 1983a, 1-21.

KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH V., (1989) Rules, Norms and Decisions: on the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH, (1993) 'Norms Versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions—a Unilateral Plea for Communicative Rationality,' in Ruggie, 1993a, 443-74.

KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH and JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, (1986) international Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State,' International Organization 40:4 (Autumn 1986), 753-75.

KRUEGER, ANNE O., (1995) Trade Policies and Developing Nations (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution).

KRUEGER, ANNE O., MAURICE SCHIFF and ALBERTO VALDES, (1992) 'Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries: Measuring the Effect of

Bibliography 213

Sectoral and Economy wide Policies,' in Fletcher, Lehman B., ed. World Food, Trade, Food Security, and Aid in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press), 172-209.

KRUGMAN, PAUL R. (1987) i s Free Trade Passe?,' Economic Perspectives 1:2 (Fall 1987), 131-44.

KRUGMAN, PAUL R. (1993) The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade,' American Economic Review 83:2 (May 1993), 362-5.

KRUGMAN, PAUL (1996) Pop Internationalism (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press). LAKE, DAVID A. (1993) 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International

Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?,' International Studies Quarterly 37:4 (December 1993), 459-89.

LAUSSEL, DIDIER and CHRISTIAN MONTET, (1995) 'La Dynamique des Guerres Commerciales,' Revue Economique 46:3 (May 1995), 911-19.

LE HERON, RICHARD (1993) Globalized Agriculture: Political Choice (Oxford: Pergamon Press).

LEGG, WILFRID (1991) 'Direct Income Support,' OECD Observer 168 (February-March 1991), 31-3.

LEGRAS, GUY (1993) 'L'Uruguay Round et la Reforme du PAC,' Politique Etrangere 58: (fee* 1993), 325-31.

LINDERT, PETER H. (1991) 'Historical Patterns of Agricultural Policy,' in Timmer, 1991a, 29-83.

LIPSON, CHARLES (1983) The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change,' in Krasner, 1983a, 233-71.

LIPSON, CHARLES (1991) 'Why are Some International Agreements Informal?,' International Organization 45:4 (Autumn 1991), 495-538.

LOWENFELD, ANDREAS F. (1994) 'Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT,' American Journal of International Law 88:3 (July 1994), 477-88.

LOWI, THEODORE J. (1979) The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton).

LUMSDAINE, DAVID HALLORAN (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

LYNN, JONATHAN and ANTONY JAY, eds (1988) Yes Prime Minister: The Diaries of the Right Hon. James Hacker (Boston: Salem House Publishers).

MACDONALD, RODERICK A. (1994) 'Old Guards,' CIAR Program in Law and the Determinants of Social Ordering: Working Paper No. 3, May 1994.

MACDONALD, RODERICK A. (1996) Private Communication MACDONALD, RODERICK A. (forthcoming) 'Pluralism in Law and Regime

Theory,' in Wolfe, Robert, ed. Transatlantic Identity? Canada, the United Kingdom, and International Order The 1996 Canada-UK Colloquium (Kingston, Ont: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University).

MAGIERA, STEPHEN L. et al (1990) 'Reinstrumentation of Agricultural Policies,' International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Commissioned Paper Number 6.

MAHE, LOUIS, CHRISTOPHE TAVERA and THIERRY TROCHET (1987) 'Simulations de Guerre Commerciale Agricole entre les USA et la CEE: Conflits et Compromis,' in Bourrinet, Jacques, ed. Les Relations Communaute Europeenne Etats Unis (Paris: Economica), 279-99.

214 Bibliography

MAIER, CHARLES S. (1978) 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy After World War II,' in Katzenstein, 1978a, 23-50.

MAIER, CHARLES S. (1987) "Fictitious Bonds ... of Wealth and Law': On the Theory and Practice of Interest Representation,' in In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 225-60.

MALMGREN, HARALD B. (1970) Trade Wars or Trade Negotiations? Nontariff Barriers and Economic Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States).

MANSFIELD, EDWARD D. and MARC L. BUSCH (1995) The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis,' International Organization 49:4 (Autumn 1995), 723-49.

MARLIN-BENNETT, RENEE (1993) Food Fights: International Regimes and the Politics of Agricultural Trade Disputes (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach).

MARTIN, JOHN P. et al (1990) 'Economy-Wide Effects of Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Simulation Results with WALRAS,' in OECD, 1990b

MARTIN, WILL and L. ALAN WINTERS, eds (1995) The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries (Washington, DC: The World Bank).

MCCALLA, ALEX F. (1969) 'Protectionism in International Agricultural Trade, 1850-1968,' Agricultural History XLIIF3 (July 1969), 329-44.

MCCONNELL, GRANT (1969) The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (New York: Atheneum).

MCDONALD, BRADLEY J. (1990) 'Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round,' The World Economy 13:3 (September 1990), 299-327.

MCLIN, JON (1979) 'Surrogate International Organization and the Case of World Food Security, 1949-1969,' International Organization 33:1 (Winter 1979), 35-55.

MCMICHAEL, PHILLIP (1993) 'World Food System Restructuring Under a GATT Regime,' Political Geography 12:3 (May 1993), 198-214.

MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1995) 'A Realist Reply,' International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995), 82-93.

MEILKE, KARL D. (1990) 'Overview and Conclusions,' Agriculture in the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations: The Final Stages Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the University of Guelph and the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food, May 1990, 67-76.

MENDELL, MARGUERITE and DANIEL SALEE, eds (1991) The Legacy of Karl Polanyi: Market, State and Society at the End of the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press).

MESSERLIN, PATRICK A. (1996) 'France and Trade Policy: Is the 'French Exception' Passei; International Affairs 72:2 (April 1996), 293-310.

MILLER, GEOFF (1986) The Political Economy of International Agricultural Policy Reform (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service).

MILNER, HELEN (1992) international Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,' World Politics 44:3 (April 1992), 466-96.

MINER, WILLIAM M. AND DALE E. HATHAWAY, eds (1988) World Agricultural Trade: Building a Consensus (Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy with the Institute for International Economics).

Bibliography 215

MITCHELL, RONALD B. (1994) 'Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,' International Organization 48:3 (Summer 1994), 425-58.

MITRANY, DAVID (1943) A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).

MONTANA-MORA, MIGUEL (1993) international Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/International Relations Perspective on the U.S./EC Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute,' The North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 19 (Fall 1993), 1-60.

MORAVCSIK, ANDREW M. (1989) 'Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement,' International Organization 43:1 (Winter 1989), 173-205.

MORGAN, DAN (1980) Merchants of Grain: The Power and Profits of the Five Giant Companies at the Center of the World's Food Supply (New York: Penguin).

MUELLER, DENNIS C. (1989) Public Choice II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

MURPHY, CRAIG N. (1994) International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850 (Cambridge: Polity Press).

OCKENDEN, JONATHAN and MICHAEL FRANKLIN (1995) European Agriculture: Making the CAP Fit the Future Chatham House Papers; Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Pinter Publishers).

ODELL, JOHN and MARGIT MATZINGER-TCHAKERIAN (1993) 'European Community Enlargement and the United States,' in Walters, Robert S., ed. Talking Trade: U.S. Policy in International Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 135-58.

ODELL, JOHN S. (1982) U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

ODELL, JOHN S. (1990) 'Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis,' WorlaI Politics 43:1 (October 1990), 139-67.

ODELL, JOHN S. (1993) international Threats and Internal Politics: Brazil, the European Community and the United States, 1985-1987,' in Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press), 233-64.

ODELL, JOHN S. and THOMAS D WILLETT, eds (1990) International Trade Policies: Gains From Exchange Between Economics and Political Science (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press).

OECD (1984) Agricultural Trade with Developing Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1987a) National Policies and Agricultural Trade (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1987b) National Policies and Agricultural Trade: Country Study-Japan (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1987c) National Policies and Agricultural Trade: Study on the European Economic Community (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

216 Bibliography

OECD (1988) Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook 1988 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1990a) Reforming Agricultural Policies: Quantitative Restrictions on Production; Direct Income Support (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1990b) Modelling the Effects of Agricultural Policies OECD Economic Studies No. 13/ Winter 1989-1990 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1991) Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook 1991 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1993a) Assessing the Effects of the Uruguay Round Trade Policy Issues 2 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1993b) What Future for Our Countryside? A Rural Development Policy (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1993c) World Cereal Trade: What Role for the Developing Countries? (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1994a) Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook 1994 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1994b) Agricultural Policy Reform: New Approaches—The Role of Direct Income Payments (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1994c) Farm Employment and Economic Adjustment in OECD Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1994d) New World Trading System: Readings (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1994e) The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanations Part I — Labour Market Trends and Underlying Forces of Change Unemployment in the OECD Area, 1950-1995 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1995a) The Agricultural Outlook 1995-2000 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1995b) Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Outlook 1995 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1995c) Economic Accounts for Agriculture 1979-1992 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1995d) Technological Change and Structural Adjustment in OECD Agriculture (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OECD (1995e) The Uruguay Round: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Impacts of the Agreement on Agriculture in the OECD Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OPPENHEIM, PHILLIP (1992) Trade Wars: Japan vs. the West (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).

ORDOVER, JANUSZ and LINDA GOLDBERG (1993) Obstacles to Trade and Competition (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

OSTRY, SYLVIA and GILBERT R. WINHAM (1995) The Post-Uruguay Round Trade Agenda,' in Ostry, Sylvia and Gilbert R. Winham, eds, The

Bibliography 111

Halifax G-7 Summit: Issues on the Table (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University), 59-84.

PAARLBERG, ROBERT L. (1988) Fixing Farm Trade: Policy Options for the United States (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.).

PAARLBERG, ROBERT L. (1996) Private Communication PAGE, SHEILA (1994) How Developing Countries Trade: The Institutional

Constraints (London; New York: Routledge). PATTERSON, GARDNER (1986) The GATT and the Negotiation of

International Trade Rules,' in Hendrikson, Alan K., ed. Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc), 181-97.

PATTERSON, PAUL M. and PHILIP C. ABBOTT (1994) 'Further Evidence on Competition in the US Grain Export Trade,' Journal of Industrial Economics 42:4 (December 1994), 429-37.

PENTLAND, CHARLES (1973) International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber).

PETERSMANN, ERNST-ULRICH (1993) international Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System,' Journal of World Trade 27:6 (December 1993), 35-86.

PETERSON, MARTIN (1979) International Interest Organizations and the Transmutation of Postwar Society (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International).

PETIT, MICHEL (1985) Determinants of Agricultural Policies in the United States and the European Community (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute).

PHILLIPS, PETER P. W. (1990) Wheat, Europe and the GATT: A Political Economy Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press).

PIORE, MICHAEL J. (1996) 'Review of The Handbook of Economic Sociology; Journal of Economic Literature XXXIV:2 (June 1996), 741-54.

POLANYI, KARL (1944) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press).

POLANYI, KARL (1957) The Economy As Instituted Process,' in Polanyi, Karl, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson, eds, Trade and Market in Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press), 243-70.

POLANYI-LEVITT, KARI, ed. (1990) The Life and Work of Karl Polanyi (Montreal/New York: Black Rose Books).

POWELL, ROBERT (1994) 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,' International Organization 48:2 (Spring 1994), 313-44.

PRIMO BRAGA, CARLOS ALBERTO and GERALDO M. VASCONCELLOS (1991) 'Agricultural Trade, The GATT and LDCs,' in Greenaway, David, et al., eds, Global Protectionism (London: Macmillan), 256-78.

PUCHALA, DONALD J. and RAYMOND F. HOPKINS (1983) international Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis,' in Krasner, 1983a, 61-91.

PUTNAM, ROBERT D. and NICHOLAS BAYNE (1987) Hanging Together: Cooperation and Discord in the Seven-Power Summits (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).

RHODES, CAROLYN (1989) 'Reciprocity in Trade: The Utility of a Bargaining Strategy,' International Organization 43:2 (Spring 1989), 273-300.

218 Bibliography

RICARDO, DAVID (1817) The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation E.C.K. Gonner, ed. (London, 1891: George Bell & Sons).

RICHARDSON, J. DAVID (1990) international Trade, National Welfare, and the Workability of Competition: A Survey of Empirical Estimates,' in Carter, Colin A., Alex F. McCalla and Jerry A. Sharpies, eds, Imperfect Competition and Political Economy: The New Trade Theory in Agricultural Trade Research (Boulder: Westview Press), 43-85.

RICUPERO, RUBENS (1991) 'Statement by Ambassador Rubens Ricupero (Brazil) to The Trade Negotiations Committee on Behalf of the Developing Countries, July 30, 1991,' (Geneva: Mimeo).

RISSE-KAPPEN, THOMAS, ed. (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (London: Cambridge University Press).

RODRIK, DANI (1994) 'What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Need to Know?,' Centre for Economic Policy Research: Discussion Paper No. 1039, October 1994.

ROESSLER, FRIEDER (1991) The Relationship Between the World Trade Order and the International Monetary System,' in Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich and Meinhard Hi If, eds, The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal and Economic Problems Second Updated Edition (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers), 363-85.

ROGOWSKI, RONALD (1989) Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

ROSENAU, JAMES N. (1966) 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,' in Farrell, R. Barry, ed. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 27-96.

ROSENBLATT, JULIUS et al. (1988) The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community: Principles and Consequences Occasional Paper No. 62 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1975) international Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,' International Organization 29:3 (Summer 1975), 557-83.

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1983) international Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,' in Krasner, 1983a, 195-231.

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1986) 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis,' in Keohane, Robert O., ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press), 131-57.

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD, ed. (1993a) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press).

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1993b) 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,' in Ruggie, 1993a, 3-47.

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1993c) Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,' International Organization 47:1 (Winter 1993), 139-74.

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1995) 'At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy,' Millennium 24:3 (Winter 1995), 507-26.

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD (1996) Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press).

Bibliography 219

RUGGIERO, RENATO (1995) 'Overview of WTO's First Year,' WTO Focus 1: (December 1995), 5-17.

RUNGE, C. FORD (1994) The Environmental Effects of Trade in the Agricultural Sector,' The Environmental Effects of Trade (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 19-54.

RUSSETT, BRUCE (1985) The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?,' International Organization 39:2 (Spring 1985), 208-31.

SANDERSON, FRED H., ed. (1990) Agricultural Protectionism in the Industrialized World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, Washington, DC).

SAPSFORD, DAVID and V. N. BALASUBRAMANYAM (1994) The Long-Run Behavior of the Relative Price of Primary Commodities: Statistical Evidence and Policy Implications,' World Development 22:11 (November 1994), 1737-45.

SARRIS, ALEXANDER H. (1989) 'Food Security and International Security,' Centre for Economic Policy Research: Discussion Paper No. 301, May 1989.

SCANDIZZO, PASQUALE LUCIO (1989) Measures of Protection: Methodology, Economic Interpretation and Policy Relevance FAO Economic and Social Development Paper 84 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).

SCHELLING, THOMAS C. (1960/1980) The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

SCHOTT, JEFFREY J. (1994) with Buurman, Johanna W., The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).

SCHWENGER, ROBERT B. (1958) 'Synthesis of Trade and Agriculture Policy in the GATT,' Journal of Farm Economics XL:2 (May 1958), 238-^8.

SHELL, G. RICHARD (1995) Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,' Duke Law Journal 44: (March 1995), 829-927.

SHONFIELD, ANDREW, ed. (1976) International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971; Volume 1: Politics and Trade (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs).

SKOGSTAD, GRACE (1987) The Politics of Agricultural Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

SKOGSTAD, GRACE and ANDREW FENTON COOPER, eds (1990) Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions (Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy).

SMIL, VACLAV (1996) i s There Enough Chinese Food?,' New York Review of Books XLIIF2 (February 1, 1996), 32-4.

SNIDAL, DUNCAN (1985) 'Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,' International Organization 39:4 (Autumn 1985), 579-614.

SPIEGEL, HENRY WILLIAM (1991) The Growth of Economic Thought Third Edition (Durham and London: Duke University Press).

STEGEMANN, KLAUS (1989) 'Policy Rivalry Among Industrial States: What Can We Learn From Models of Strategic Trade Policy?,' International Organization 43:1 (Winter 1989), 73-101.

STEGER, DEBRA P. (1995) The Significance of the World Trade Organization for the Future of the Trading System,' American Society of International Law— Proceedings of the 88th Annual Meeting (1995), 125-31.

220 Bibliography

STEIN, ARTHUR A. (1983) 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,' in Krasner, 1983a, 115-40.

STEIN, ARTHUR A. (1984) The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,' International Organization 38:2 (Spring 1984), 355-86.

STEWART, TERENCE P. (1993) The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992) Vols 1-2: Commentary; Vol 3: Documents (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers).

STRANG, DAVID and PATRICIA MEI YIN CHANG (1993) 'The International Labor Organization and the Welfate State: Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960-80,' International Organization 47:2 (Spring 1993), 235-62.

STRANGE, SUSAN (1988) States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers). STREETEN, PAUL (1996) 'Free and Managed Trade,' in Berger, Suzanne and

Ronald Dore, eds, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 353-65.

SUBRAMANIAN, SHANKAR (1993) Agricultural Trade Liberalisation and India Development Centre Studies (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

SWINNEN, JOHAN F. M. (1994) 'A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection,' American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76:1 (1994), 1-14.

TANGERMANN, STEFAN (1989) 'Progress and Issues in the GATT Negotiations: An EC Perspective,' Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 37:4 (Part II) (December 1989), 863-74.

TANGERMANN, STEFAN (1991) 'Proposals for a 'Rule-Oriented' Liberalization of International Agricultural Trade,' in Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich and Meinhard Hilf, eds, The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal and Economic Problems Second Updated Edition (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers), 243-64.

TANGERMANN, STEFAN (1994a) 'An Assessment of the Agreement on Agriculture,' in OECD, 1994d, 143-51.

TANGERMANN, STEFAN (1994b) 'An Assessment of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture,' Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: COM/AGR/APM/TD/WP(94)73, October 19, 1994.

TAYLOR, CHARLES (1985) interpretation and the Sciences of Man,' in Taylor, Charles, ed. Philosophy and the Human Sciences Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 15-57.

TIMMER, C. PETER, ed. (1991a) Agriculture and the State: Growth, Employment, and Poverty in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

TIMMER, C. PETER (1991b) The Role of the State in Agricultural Development,' in Timmer, 1991a, 1-28.

TRACY, MICHAEL (1989) Government and Agriculture in Western Europe 1880-1988 Third Edition (New York, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).

TUBIANA, LAURENCE (1989) 'World Trade in Agricultural Products: From Global Regulation to Market Fragementation,' in Goodman, David and Michael Redclift, eds, The International Farm Crisis (London: Macmillan), 23-45.

TUSSIE, DIANA (1993) 'Holding the Balance: The Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round,' in Tussie and Glover, 1993, 181-203.

Bibliography 221

TUSSIE, DIANA and DAVID GLOVER, eds (1993) The Developing Countries in World Trade: Policies and Bargaining Strategies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers with the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa).

TWEETEN, LUTHER G. (1992) Agricultural Trade: Principles and Policies (Boulder and London: Westview Press and IT Publications).

TYERS, ROD and KYM ANDERSON (1992) Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

UNCTC (1987) Transnational Corporations and Non-Fuel Primary Commodities in Developing Countries (New York and Geneva: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations).

UVIN, PETER (1992) 'Regime, Surplus, and Self-Interest: The International Politics of Food Aid,' International Studies Quarterly 36:3 (September 1992), 293-312.

UVIN, PETER (1994) The International Organization of Hunger (London and New York: Kegan Paul International).

VANZETTI, DAVID (1991) 'A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Agricultural Trade Policy,' Economic Record (1991 Supplement), 60-72.

VINER, JACOB (1947) 'Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter,' Foreign Affairs 25: (July 1947), 612-28.

VINER, JACOB (1951) International Economics (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press).

WALTZ, KENNETH N. (1959) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press).

WARLEY, T.K. (1976) 'Western Trade in Agricultural Products,' in Shonfield, 1976.

WARLEY, T.K. (1988) 'Linkages Between Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations in Agriculture,' in Allen and Macmillan, 1988, 169-78.

WARLEY, T.K. and 25 Others (1988) 'Mutual Disarmament in World Agriculture: A Declaration on Agricultural Trade by Twenty-Six Agricultural Trade Policy Experts From Eight Countries and Two International Organizations,' Issued by National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1988.

WATKINS, KEVIN and MICHAEL WINDFUHR (1995) 'Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: Implications for Sustainable Development in Developing Countries,' WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature, Gland, Switzerland: A WWF International Discussion Paper January 1995.

WENDT, ALEXANDER (1992) 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,' International Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992), 391-425.

WENDT, ALEXANDER (1994) 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State,' American Political Science Review 88:2 (June 1994), 384-96.

WENDT, ALEXANDER (1995) 'Constructing International Politics,' International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995), 71-81.

WHALLEY, JOHN, ed. (1989a) Developing Countries and the Global Trading System 2 Vols. (Ann Arbor, Mi: University of Michigan Press).

WHALLEY, JOHN, ed. (1989b) The Uruguay Round and Beyond: The Final Report From the Ford Foundation Supported Project on Developing Countries and the Global Trading System (London: Macmillan).

222 Bibliography

WHALLEY, JOHN (1995) 'Developing Countries and System Strengthening in the Uruguay Round,' in Martin and Winters, 1995, 303-26.

WHALLEY, JOHN and COLLEEN HAMILTON (1996) The Trading System After the Uruguay Round (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).

WHATMORE, SARAH (1994) 'Global Agro-Food Complexes and the Refashioning of Rural Europe,' in Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift, eds, Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 46-67.

WILLETTS, PETER (1990) Transactions, Networks and Systems,' in Groom, A.J.R. and Paul Taylor, eds, Frameworks for International Cooperation (London: Pinter Publishers), 255-84.

WINHAM, GILBERT R. (1986) International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

WINHAM, GILBERT R. (1990) 'GATT and the International Trade Regime,' International Journal XLV:4 (Autumn 1990), 796-822.

WINHAM, GILBERT R. (1992) The Evolution of International Trade Agreements (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

WINTERS, L. ALAN (1989) 'Patterns of World Trade in Manufactures: Does Trade Policy Matter?,' in Black, John and Alasdair I. Macbean, eds, Causes of Changes in the Structure of International Trade, 1960-85 (London: Macmillan),

WINTERS, L. ALAN (1990a) 'Digging for Victory: Agricultural Policy and National Security,' The World Economy 13:3 (June 1990), 170-90.

WINTERS, L. ALAN (1990b) The So-Called "Non-Economic" Objectives of Agricultural Support,' in OECD, 1990b, 237-66.

WOLFE, ROBERT (1993a) The Making of the Peace, 1993: A Review of Canadian Economic Diplomacy at the OECD,' Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Economic and Trade Policy Branch Working Paper October 1993.

WOLFE, ROBERT (1993b) The World in a Grain of Wheat: Farm Wars and European Security,' in Haglund, David G., ed. From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 279-304.

WOLFE, ROBERT (1995) 'Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the Uruguay Round' (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Queen's University).

WOLFE, ROBERT (1996a) 'Governing a Global Trading System As a Single Undertaking: The Need for Ministerial Engagement in the WTO,' International Journal LI:4 (Autumn 1996),

WOLFE, ROBERT (1996b) 'Vers l'ALETA? Le Libre-Echange Transatlantique et la Politique Etrangere Canadienne,' Etudes Internationales XXVIF2 (Juin 1996), 353-80.

WOLFE, ROBERT (forthcoming) 'From Farm War to Working Peace: The Functional Approach to the Management of Trade Conflict,' in Ashworth, Lucian M. and David Long, eds, Working for Peace: David Mitrany, the Functional Approach and International Conflict Management (London: Macmillan)

WOOLCOCK, STEPHEN (1991) Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations: Trading Partners or Trading Blows? Chatham House Papers (London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Bibliography 223

WORLD BANK (1986) World Development Report, 1986 (New York: Oxford University Press for The World Bank).

WORLD BANK (1994) Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead (New York: Oxford University Press for The World Bank).

WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1987) Our Common Future (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).

WTO (1995a) International Trade: Trends and Statistics (Geneva: World Trade Organization).

WTO (1995b) The WTO and the Developing Countries,' WTO Focus 1: (January-February 1995), 7-10.

WTO (1996) 'Overview of World Trade in 1995 and Outlook for 1996,' WTO Focus 10: (May 1996), 2-8.

YOUNG, ORAN R. (1989) The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment,' International Organization 43:3 (Summer 1989), 349-75.

YOUNG, T. and M.P. BURTON (1992) Agricultural Sustainability: Definition and Implications for Agricultural Trade Policy FAO Economic and Social Development Paper 110 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization).

ZACHER, MARK (1987) Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps: Regime Analysis and International Commodity Trade Regulation,' International Organization 41:2 (Spring 1987), 173-202.

ZACHER, MARK W. (1997) The Global Economy and the International Political Order: Some Diverse and Paradoxical Relationships,' in Courchene, Thomas J., ed. The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges (Kingston, Ont: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy)

ZACHER, MARK W. and RICHARD A. MATHEW (1995) 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,' in Kegley Jr, Charles W., ed. Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's), 107-50.

ZAMORA, STEPHEN (1980) 'Voting in International Economic Organizations,' American Journal of International Law 74: (1980), 566-604.

Index abacu 169 actors 28, 32, 40, 73-7 adjustment 11, 15, 18,40,53, 108,

113, 127, 135, 147, 149, 151, 152, 154

administrative review 201 advertising 144 Africa 99, 141, 153 Aggregate Measurement of Support

(AMS) 108, 118ff, 127-9, 136, 137, 145-6, 151, 158, 160, 167, 168, 173, 184

see also OECD PSE/CSE agribusiness see multinationals agricultural economists 112, 130 agriculturalism 43-4 Agriculture Agreement see Final

Act, Agreement on Agriculture agriculture

capital use 155 definitions 57, 167-9, 187 development and 46-7, 76, 77 employment 38, 49-50, 73-4, 77,

155 history 53ff, 158, 160 international organization 50ff political economy of 43ff, 154 productivity 43, 47, 49, 78, 147 trade 54, 56, 64-6, 75, 76, 79,

108-9, 137 see also farm policy, General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round

allocative efficiency 37-8,130 Amber Box 107,129, 138, 139, 151,

174, 181 see also the Appendix

AMS, see Aggregate Measurement of Support

see also the Appendix analytic framework 7,44-6,106-8 anarchy 25 Anderson, Kym 70, 74 animal health 109 animal spirits 99

anthropology 199 Argentina 75,87

see also Cairns Group Arthurs, Harry 201 Asia 153, 162 assessments 97ff, 141, 144, 153ff,

163 Atlantic relations 3, 4, 60-1, 76, 85,

88,100, 149,150 Australia 71,73,75,90, 126

see also Cairns Group autarchy 18

balance of payments 58, 94, 122, 135,171

balance of power 16 bargaining 3, 30, 35, 38, 83, 88, 91,

107, 144, 145 base period 171, 177, 178, 192, 167,

175 Belgium see European Union Bentham, Jeremy 39 bilateralism 89,93

see also Blair House, European Union conflict with USA

binding, (of tariffs, or commitments) 13,57,86,87,99,109, 136,140, 153, 160, 166, 170-1

Blair House Accord xiv, 66, 91, 117, 129, 132, 139, 151,168, 174, 177, 178

Blue Box 107, 117,129,138,139, 151,156, 174,181

see also the Appendix border measures 3, 84, 109, 111,

113,115, 116,119,124,128,171 bovine meat 58 boxes see Red, Green, Amber and

Blue boxes; and see traffic lights

Brazil 86,93, 157,184 see also Cairns Group

Bretton Woods 21, 55, 62, 79 Britain 60,67, 111, 123

see also European Union

224

Index 225

Brussels Ministerial, see Uruguay Round

bureaucratic politics 7 bureaucrats 150 butter 126-7

Cairns Group xiv, 73, 75, 76, 77, 82,90-1,96, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 126, 132, 140, 149, 161, 180

California 153 Canada 1, 8, 49, 55-6, 58, 66, 67,

72,73,75,80,89, 111, 117, 125, 126, 130, 143, 145, 154, 156, 170, 177,200

see also Cairns Group CAP see Common Agricultural

Policy capitalist expansion 157 Carr,E. H. 18 ceasefire 68,81,109, 117, 118,131,

133, 139, 140, 14, 157, 158, 159, 161,175

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models 59, 111-12, 141,154, 157

Chairman's texts 114-15, 201 change, sources of 40, 78, 150, 156,

157 characterization 33 chemical industry 142 Chicken War xviii, 60 Chile see Cairns Group China 65,63 Chretien, Jean 1 Christian Aid 143 Christian ethics 199 circumvention 132-3, 178 Civil Law 33 class 18,20,201 Clausewitz, Carl von 2 cleavages 32 coalitions 38, 39, 89-91

see also Cairns Group, de la Paix Group, G-77, Quad, Rio Group, Summit

Cohn, T. 200 coin 169 Cold War 82, 88

collaboration 36,38,163 Columbia see Cairns Group commodity prices 68, 85, 153,

159 commodity traders see multinationals Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

58,60,62,66,77,116,117,125, 129,132,138,139, 142,145, 150, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 174,181

common ends 36, 38 Commonwealth 87 community 16 comparative advantage 54,142 competition policy 31,135 compliance 29, 31, 37-8, 99, 107,

137, 159 conflict (inch trade) 2-3, 34, 36, 84,

109, 133-4, 145, 147, 149, 158, 159,160,201

distributive 37-9,80 Congress of Vienna 16 consensual knowledge 29,150 consensual organizations 37 conservatism 199 constructivist 11, 25-6, 29, 39, 102,

146, 160 Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE)

see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

continuation clause 139,140,185, 194

see also Final Act, Agreement on Agriculture, Article 20

contract curve 37 Contracting Parties xiv, 27 Conybeare, John 3 cooperation 23, 25, 26, 35ff coordination 2, 36, 38, 88 Corn Laws xviii, 53, 78-9, 123 countervail 9, 138 Cox, Robert 162 Crimea 54 criteria 175-6,188-90 Crow rate 73, 125, 130, 145, 177 CSE see Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development cultural context 146 Curzon, Gerard and Victoria 27

226 Index

dairy 1,8,9,58,59, 126, 154 de la Paix Group 87 de minimis provisions 174,181 deZeuw, Aart 114 debt 69 decision-making procedures 27, 28,

29,38, 104 decoupled support 129,130,146,

151,154,175, 188 deficiency payments 129,174 democracy and war 2 democratic accountability 161 Denmark see European Union Depression of 1930s xviii, 22, 55, 78 developing countries 59,76,78,83,

85,86,89,94,99, 114, 121-3, 149, 152, 153, 166, 167, 173, 174, 175, 182, 183

impact of Round 140-2 trade policy 85-7

development economics 46 DFA see Dunkel Text Dicey, A. V. 201 dilemmas of common aversions, and

common interests 38 Dillon, Douglas 60 diplomacy 138 direct payments 129, 130, 146, 155,

174, 189 disarmament 2 discretion 134 dispute settlement 37-8, 57, 92,

100-3, 106, 107, 124, 136, 138, 137, 159, 160, 185

distribution 38, 130, 152 division of labour 5, 19, 103, 162 domestic autonomy 24,40,124,

162, 163 domestic distortions 12, 23, 112 domestic policy 116,145 domestic support 109,115,117,

123,127-31, 136, 139, 146, 166, 169, 173, 174

double movement 4, 5, 7, 10, 16-20, 17, 28, 40, 44-5, 49, 56, 67, 78, 79,84,86-7, 103-4, 107, 111, 135, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 162, 163

see also Polanyi, Karl

dumping 31,97 Dunkel, Arthur 83, 116, 117 Dunkel Text see Final Act, Draft duty 36,38

economic peacekeeping 62 EEC see European Union effects test 110, 111,124, 130, 131,

134-6,137, 160, 185 Egypt 63 elite theory 33, 96 embedded liberalism 7, 9, 10, 23-4,

30, 40, 56, 86, 95, 104, 145, 146, 152, 149, 153, 159, 161, 162,199

as a transformation curve 23, 151 see also Ruggie, John

embeddedness 17, 19, 146, 162 employment 19,53 Enabling Clause xvi enclosure movement 53 enforcement 159 Engel'sLaw 47 England 55 entitlement 36,38 environmental groups 85 environmental protection 44,122,

155,167 epistemic communities 112 Equivalent tariff 118 EU see European Union European Community see European

Union European Free Trade Association 60 European Recovery Program 150 European Union xiv, 53, 60, 64-5,

66,67,89,90,91,96, 107,111, 114,115,116,117,118,125, 126, 127, 129, 131,132, 138, 145,149,174,200,150,153, 155,156,159, 161,169,171, 191

conflict with USA 60, 62, 66, 100, 150

evidence 6-7 exchange rates 94, 120 expectations 26, 28, 30, 104, 156,

160 explanation 5, 7, 83, 150, 152 explicit 38-9,160 export competition 165,166,175

Index 227

export credits 178, 197 export prohibitions 180 export subsidies 57, 73, 78, 109,

111, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 123,125,128, 131ff, 136, 130, 139, 142, 144, 149, 150, 158, 167, 175, 178, 182

externalization 108, 149

fair trade 143 famine 43 Farm War xviii, 1,2-3, 63-77,

77-80,81, 103, 106, 108,110, 117, 131, 133, 134, 140, 144, 146, 149, 152, 153,157, 158, 159, 161, 166, 175

farm (agriculture) policy 5-6, 9, 44, 48,54,55,56,75,77,79, 108, 110, 113, 121, 124, 133, 141, 144, 145, 147, 149, 152, 153, 157, 161, 162, 163, 169

farmers 43-4, 144, 147,154-5, 161, 199

corporate farms 144 family farm 2, 8,9, 40, 44, 50,

144 farm assets 69, 130, 154 farm community 154 farm income 47, 77, 78, 130, 147,

154, 155 farm size 49, 78 farm organizations 1, 54, 79, 107,

132, 156, 199 grain 15,55 population 49,79 see also agriculture

federalism 39 Federation of American Farm Bureaus

132 feudalism 55 Final Act of the Uruguay Round xv,

83-4, 92, 97-103, 106, 156, 164 ratification 82-3,96-7 Draft Final Act ('Dunkel text')

xiv, xiv, 82, 107, 117, 131, 150, 151, 168, 178

GATT 1994 see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Articles

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 92, 99-103

Agreement on Agriculture, 4, 5, 57, 123, 124, 106, 144-6,151, 152,153-6, 160, 163, 164

Preamble 108, 110-23, 187 Article 1 127,167 Article 2 169 Article 3 123, 169, 175 Article 4 123, 125, 156, 170,

176,182 Article 5 124, 127, 171, 172 Article 6 129, 151, 167, 169,

173,181, 182 Article 7 130,151,174 Article 8 131,175 Article 9 131,139, 143, 170,

175, 182, 183 Article 10 132-3,178 Article 11 180 Article 12 167, 180 Article 13 109, 117, 124, 139,

140, 151, 168, 174, 176, 180,185

Article 14 182 Article 15 140, 167, 173,182 Article 16 141, 167, 183 Article 17 137, 183 Article 18 137,184 Article 19 124, 138, 185,181 Article 20 109, 137,139,167,

168, 180, 185 Article 21 124, 168, 186 Annex 1 187 Annex 2 181,188 Annex 3 127,129, 168, 190 Annex 4 192 Annex 5 125,156, 171, 193

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 109J 166, 182

Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries 141, 167, 179, 196

228 Index

Final Act (cont.) Agreement on Subsidies and

Countervailing Measures 124, 128, 138, 139, 168, 175, 180, 181

General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 99

Schedules 126, 169, 173 Understanding on the

Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 143, 176

see also dispute settlement, Uruguay Round

Finland see European Union Finlayson, Jock 27 fiscal cost of the war 2, 5, 71-3, 153 Fish War 67 Flemish Cap 67 Food Aid Convention 133, 179, 197 Food and Agriculture Organization of

the UN (FAO) 51-2,76, 118, 133,141, 179, 196,200

Food Importers Group 140 food

aid 52, 66, 78, 123, 132-3, 140-1, 141-2, 179, 196ff

business see multinationals order 200 prices xviii, 48, 68-70, 108-9,

144, 153, 158, 161, 172 processing see multinationals security 5,44,51,52,122-3, 133,

140, 143, 149, 167, 180, 193, 200

self-sufficiency 123 surplus 43,49,68,71,77,80,

119, 129, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150, 157, 159, 161,165

as a weapon 2 see also regimes

foreign distortions 13 formulaic 38 Fowke, V. C. 55-6 framework approach see Uruguay

Round France 63,67,73,91,97, 111, 115,

117, 132

free trade 12, 22, 23, 54, 104, 111, 114,135, 150, 153, 161, 157

Friedmann, H. 200 Frontier Theory 44 Fuller, Lon 36 functionalism 102

G-7 Finance Ministers 89 G-7 see Summit G-77 89 Gable, Brian 80, 148 Galbraith, J. K. 56 game theory 3 General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT) xv, 10,27,39, 79,81,82,84,149

authority of GATT 31, 101 as international organization 31,

81, 100,157 transaction flows and GATT 13,

131,158 agriculture in the GATT 52-63,

124,157 waivers 59, 124, 150 provisional application 124 secretariat 98 Dillon Round 60 Kennedy Round xviii, 60-2, 66,

83, 118,121 Tokyo Round xviii, 5, 62-3, 66,

81,83,85-6,88,92,94, 110, 114, 121, 128, 136-7, 159, 183

Tokyo Round Codes 58, 86, 87, 95,100-1

agriculture disputes 53, 63, 110, 138

1982 Ministerial xviii, 79, 82, 110, 121, 138, 183

CG-18 56,79,82 Committee on Trade in Agriculture

(CTA) 110,115,137,183 see also dispute settlement, Final

Act, Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade 1947 and 1994 Article I 57,124 Article II 57,172, 181 Article III 57,124

Index 229

Article VI 57, 139, 176, 181, 182 Article XI 53,58,91, 126, 156,

171,180 Article XII 58 Article XIX 57, 124, 173 Article XVI 57-8, 137, 175, 181,

185 Article XVII 57 Article XX 58 Article XXII 57,124 Article XXIII 57, 124, 181, 182 Article XXV 57

General Agreement on Trade in Services see Final Act

General Agreement to Talk and Talk 82

generative grammar 34,121 Germany 55,60,132 Gerschenkron, Alexander 46 global economy 149 global negotiations 85 global trading system see trading

system global welfare 75 globalization 4, 24, 54, 64, 83-88,

92,103,105,144,161-2 Gold Standard 23 governance 4, 21, 31, 32, 35, 84, 87,

98, 104,201 grain, grain trade 68, 126, 142, 159 Gramsci, Antonio 21 Great Depression of 1870s, xviii,

51,54,55,78 Greece see European Union Green Box 106, 107, 129, 130-1,

138, 139, 146, 151, 155, 161, 174, 175, 177, 181

see also the Appendix grey area measures 171 growth 4,97,98, 163

Haas, Ernst 32, 149, 199 Haberler Report 59, 60, 69, 85, 118 Haberler, Gottfried 59 Harmonized System 57 Havana Charter 58, 85 hegemon, hegemonic stability theory

21-3,61,89, 104-5, 150 high tech 142

Hoover, Herbert 55 Hopkins, R. 200 Hot Springs Conference 51 Hungary see Cairns Group hunger 51,52, 133, 142,200 hyperliberalism 162

identity 26,39,40, 104 imperfect competition 143 implementation period 167-8,177,

178,180,185 implementation 137, 184-5 implicit 38, 160 import licensing 119 import-substitution 47,86 income transfer 120, 145 India 1,86,93,96,141,142, 157,

184 Indonesia see Cairns Group Industrial Revolution 53 industrialization 46,55 inferential 38 inflation 129, 132, 137, 157, 180,

184 injury test 181-2 institutions 20, 25, 39, 151, 160, 163 institutional lag 44 instruments 28, 29, 31, 38, 106, 120,

144, 159 integration 5, 19, 39, 85, 86 intellectual consensus 37, 112, 162 intellectual property 84, 87, 93, 94,

95, 100, 113, 114, 142,157 interdependence 26, 32, 33, 34, 36,

38,80,107, 149 interest groups 14-15,18,44,46,

55, 107, 152, 199 interests 17-18,20,32,39, 107 International Institute of Agriculture

51 International Labour Office (ILO)

155 International Monetary Fund (IMF)

21, 135, 183,198 International Trade Organization

(ITO) xv, 58, 85, 105 international agreements 33, 35-40,

98, 106, 139, 151 international economic policy 153

230 Index

international financial institutions 142, 198

international law 135 international order 19, 20, 21, 29,

88, 104, 144, 146, 160, 199 see also society of states

international organization 25, 39, 155

as fora 39 membership 39

international political economy 11, 16, 104, 157-8, 159, 199

international regimes see regime theory, regimes

international relations 20-1 international society see society of

states international system 2, 21, 23, 26,

146 see also international order

interpretation 133ff intersubjective communication 25,

28,30,33,34, 134, 137, 139, 160,201

investment 93, 94, 95, 113, 142, 157 Ireland see European Union Irish Box 67 Israel 126, 156, 171 issue-areas 28, 32-5, 36, 39, 78, 83,

91-2,95-6, 149, 199,200 Italy see European Union

Japan 64-5, 66, 73, 90, 96, 115, 117, 123, 125, 126, 152, 161, 171, 180, 193

Johnson, Harry 43-4, 152 Josling, Tim 118 jurisprudence 159 jute 169

Kennedy, David 135 Keohane, Robert 32, 62, 94 Keynes, J. M. 19,23,99 Kindleberger, Charles 21,22 knowledge 26, 104 Korea 1,96, 117, 123, 125, 126,

152, 161, 171, 180, 195 Krasner, Stephen 88, 104-5 Krugman, Paul 2

labour market 48, 53 labour standards 155 laissez-faire 17,18,54 land 48,69,154 large country effect 67 Latin Americans 68, 74, 114, 116 law 34,40,106, 135, 159,201 leadership see hegemon League of Nations 51 learning 106-7, 111, 144 legal centralism 102,201 legal normativity 40,159 legal pluralism 11, 102 legalism 38, 101-3 legitimate social purpose see social

purpose legitimation 38 levels of analysis 34 liberal internationalism 51 liberalization 86, 99, 103, 112, 140,

144, 145, 152, 154, 157, 163, 166

Lindert, Peter 46 Lome Convention 170 Lowi, Theodore 44 Lubin, David 51

macroeconomics 68-9 Malaysia see Cairns Group Malthus, Thomas 43 managed trade 111, 132, 135, 152,

172 market see double movement,

Polanyi, self-regulating market market access 109, 118, 119, 123,

145, 153, 165, 166, 170 market failure 130,155 market power 109 marketing boards 9, 57 Marshall Plan 150 meats 126 medicare 8,9 Menem, Carlos 87 mercantilism 18,19,43,53 merchants of grain 143 methodology see Modalities Mexico 184 minilateral xv, 81, 89, 92, 93 minimum import price 119

Index 231

Ministerial Trade Mandate see OECD Mitrany, David 19, 102 Mitterrand, Francois 79 Modalities 109, 117, 125, 126, 131,

139, 151, 166, 167, 170, 173, 177, 182, 183

monetary system 22,199 montant de soutien 118 moral economy 19 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) xv,

93,94, 124 Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) see

textiles multilateral trade negotiations 8Iff,

160 multilateralism 19, 23, 26-7, 36, 40,

78,83,89,93, 104, 113, 130, 135, 151, 152

multinational enterprises 84, 142-4, 156

Murphy, Craig 51,201 mutual interest 38 mutual obligations 38

Napoleonic Wars 53 narcotic crops 167,173 National treatment xvi national autonomy see domestic

autonomy negotiations 37-8 negotiators 137, 156 neoliberai institutionalism 11, 29 neorealism 2, 11 net food-importing countries 122-3,

140, 167, 183 Netherlands 59

see also European Union New Deal 24 New Left 199 New Zealand 74,75, 170

see also Cairns Group new issues 81,95, 157, 158 new protectionism 81, 97, 135 non-economic objectives 12,16,

112 non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 97, 119,

125, 145, 160, 171 Nordic countries 115, 126 norm-governed change 29, 104

normative framework 28, 29, 31, 37, 105,122, 145, 146

norms 27, 28, 30, 38, 39, 51, 83, 95, 106, 158, 159, 160

GATT 27,29 North America 153 notification 137, 180, 184 nullification and impairment 138, 181 Nye, Joseph 32, 62

OECD see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

oil shock 68 oil tanker discharges 135 oilseeds dispute 66,156 ontology 146 openness 22, 63-4, 66, 84 order see international order Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) 38,39, 101, 159, 178

Ministerial communiques 38, 80, 112,118, 145

1982 Ministerial Trade Mandate (MTM) xviii, 79, 110, 112-13, 119

multi-country/multi-commodity 113,145

PSE/CSE 38, 71-2,118-21. 125, 130-1, 145

see also AMS Organization for European Economic

Cooperation 60, 112 Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) 65

Panopticon 38,39 Pareto frontier 37-8 parity 49-50,77, 130 paupers 53 peace clause see Final Act,

Agreement on Agriculture, Article 13

peace treaty 140 peace 4,40, 146, 158 Pentland, Charles 199 Philippines 171

see also Cairns Group

232 Index

Pickersgill, Peter 45 plant health 109 pluralism 30,32,96, 199 plurilateral 81 Polanyi, Karl 4, 16-20, 48, 54, 135,

146, 162, 163, 199 see also double movement,

self-regulating market policy analysis 4, 156 policy reform see reform process,

farm policy political economy (public choice)

models 4,13-15, 17,37,46,154 see also international political

economy, regime theory political parties 55 political will 82, 112 politicians 150 politics, high and low 103 Portugal see European Union poverty 133 power 21, 23, 29-30, 33, 34, 88, 95,

96, 103, 135, 150, 162 practice 26 Prebisch, Raul 46 preferences 38 price mechanism 147 price support 48,129 prices see food, prices principal supplier rule 93 principles 27, 28, 38 Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE),

see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

property rights 38 protectionism 10, 11, 13-4, 17, 18,

53,54,61,70,78, 118, 152, 153, 155,166

public choice see political economy public goods 130, 155 public international unions 51 Punta del Este see Uruguay Round

Quad xvi, 82, 89 qualitative research 152 Quantitative restrictions (QRs) xvi,

58 Quebec 153 quotas 31,59, 125

rational analysis 15, 29, 37, 146 realism 25-6,32

see also neorealism rebalancing 169 reciprocity 27, 30, 35, 36, 38, 94,

125,151 Red Box 131-2, 175, 177, 182

see also the Appendix reference price 137 reform process 110, 115, 118, 122,

130,137, 138, 140,141, 156-7, 164, 166, 167, 185

regimes 11,20,24,27,28,35,36, 38,94,103, 149

theory 26-35, 160 commodity regime 200 development or foreign aid regime

200 food regime 200 textile regime 32 trade regime 1, 4, 10, 20ff, 27, 29,

31-2, 35, 39,78,79, 8Iff, 95, 102, 104, 105, 106,127, 119, 139, 143,200, 118,130,142, 145, 146, 149, 158,160, 163; as social institution 26

regional assistance 146,130 regionalism 89 regulation 9, 11, 18, 27, 35, 36, 102,

134, 135, 144, 145, 149, 158, 161, 162, 163

regulation school 200 reinstrumentation 117,128,169 rent 31,47-8,154

rent-seeking 49 request and offer 125,170 Ricardo, David 48, 53-4 rice clause see the Appendix Rio Group 82, 89 Romer, Paul 86 Rosenau, James 199 rubber 169 Ruggie, John Gerard 5, 23, 29, 32,

135 see also embedded liberalism

rules 21, 27, 28, 38, 102, 104, 105, 107,108, 109, 111,127,134-5, 138,144, 145, 151,156, 159, 160,161,165, 168,169

Index 233

rules-based 101 rural community 40, 44, 130, 188

safeguards 57,91, 127, 172 Saskatchewan 153 Schelling, Thomas 30 Schwenger, Robert 56 science policy 26 Section 22 see Final Act,

Agricultural Adjustment Act security 32 seeds 142 selection bias 46 self-regulating market 16,17,19,

50, 104, 135, 162, 163 see also Polanyi

services 85,87,93,95, 100, 113, 142, 157

short-term elements 114,118 Singapore Ministerial 201 Single Undertaking xvi, 81, 83, 88,

91-7,99, 100, 105, 109, 128, 139, 151, 166, 182

sisal 169 Smoot-Hawley xviii, 55 social cohesion 5, 87, 103, 162 social construction 4

see also constructivist social groups 85 social objectives 144 social policy 9, 55, 147, 162 social purpose 4, 5, 29, 40, 29-30,

78, 103, 130, 144, 147, 151, 152, 159,162

social stability 2, 50 society of states 21, 32, 34, 149,

160, 163 society 16, 17 sovereignty 25, 26, 35, 96 Spain 67

see also European Union Special and Differential Treatment

xvi, 85, 86, 91, 122, 140, 167, 173, 174, 178, 182, 183

Speenhamland Law 53 spillovers 35,79,85, 131 stability 4, 19,22,40, 112, 134, 144,

152, 161, 162, 163, 199 stabilization 78, 166

standards 84, 104, 109 standstill 117 state 5, 24-5, 32, 54, 78, 84, 98,

104, 107, 130, 144, 147, 149, 152, 158, 160, 199

see also welfare state state-trading 57, 67, 119, 143, 171,

176 Structural Adjustment Programs

(SAP) 183 structural adjustment 97, 130, 146 structural change 5,21, 30, 84, 104,

151 structure 26 subsidies xvii, 57, 58, 78, 97, 108,

109,115, 114, 117, 131ff, 135-6, 138, 142, 147, 155, 158, 165, 168, 170, 173

suburban expansion 154 sugar 126 Summits, annual Economic 70,

79-80,89, 112, 113, 114, 116, 147

sunset clause 139, 140, 180 supply management 58, 111, 125,

126,146 surplus disposal 142, 149, 179, 200 surplus see food surplus surveillance 29, 37-9, 100, 101,

107, 109, 124, 136, 161, 184, 185 Sweden 116

see also European Union Switzerland 126 systemic war 19

tacit 39 Tangerman, S. 184 tariff quota 119, 170, 171 tariffication 109, 115, 117, 125-7,

128, 170, 145,158,152, 153, 160, 171, 193, 194; and see the Appendix

tariffs 13,97, 119, 121, 139, 153, 145

technological change 17, 147, 153 textiles 87,91,93,94,97,114 Thailand see Cairns Group Trade Policy Review Mechanism

(TPRM) 100, 101, 136

234 Index

trade and growth 13, 84 trade distortions 76, 108, 118, 128,

129,120, 130, 131,145, 188,200 trade negotiators 29 trade policy 11-16, 149,162

as foreign policy 15,62 trade theory 12-16, 142-3 trade war 2-3,61-2 trade-related domestic policy 113 trading system 4, 9, 13, 26, 83, 85,

87,88,99, 100, 110, 122, 135, 146, 149, 161

see also trade regime traffic lights, metaphor 109, 128,

129 transatlantic see Atlantic relations transition 125, 169, 173, 177 transparency 127 Treaty of Rome 60, 150 tropical products 77, 93, 94, 121,

140, 166-7,169 Turner, Frederick Jackson 44 Tyers, Rod 70, 74

Ukraine 54 UNCTAD 59,85 UNESCO 26 unilateralism 101 United Nations 18 Uruguay Round 40, 77, 81 ff

agenda 84 agriculture in 5, 80, 93, 149ff,

156, 157, 161, 166 negotiating framework for

agriculture 107, 109, 111-17, 118, 125ff, 166

implications 103-5 market access 89,90,91,99 negotiating techniques 89-90, 91,

92,95,116,121,139-40 rules negotiations 89, 90, 91 Punta del Este, Declaration xvi, 4,

81,82,91-2, 110, 115, 129, 165, 166, 182,200

Punta del Este, meeting xvi, xix, 4, 80, 82, 84

Montreal Ministerial (Mid-Term Review) xvi, xix, 82, 107, 114,115, 121, 166,167

Brussels Ministerial xiv, xix, 82, 90, 107, 116, 150, 166

Marrakesh ministerial 82, 84-4 see also Final Act, Single

Undertaking Uruguay 77,90

see also Cairns Group United States of America 59, 60,

64-5, 66, 67, 68, 72, 75, 89, 90, 91,96,104-5, 107,111, 114, 115,125, 126,128,131, 132, 138,142,149,150,153,156, 159,161,174, 180,200

Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) xviii, 55, 56, 155; Section 22,58-9, 111, 125,132

Congress 82,96-7, 132 Farm Bills 68,129,142,155 Federal Reserve Board 68 PL480 66 Section 301 101 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act

of 1934 55 Tariff Act of 1930 xviii, 55

USSR 65 Usual Marketing Requirements 179

variable levy 58, 125, 119, 127, 145, 171,172

Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) 31,97,171

Volcker, Paul 68 Voluntary Restraint Agreements

(VRA) 58,97 voting rules 38, 39, 93

Wallerstein, I. 199 war see Farm War, trade war water in tariffs see tariffication welfare losses 75,154 welfare state 9, 23, 55, 86, 153, 155,

161,162 Western Grain Stabilization Act see

Crow rate Wheat Board 67,73,143,176 wheat 54,66,149,200 Winham, Gilbert 62, 94 Wisconsin 153 World Bank 21,76,133,198

Index 235

World Food Conference xviii, 51, 69

World Food Programme (WFP) 179

World Trade Organization 83, 99-103, 104, 153

Committee on Agriculture 124, 137, 160, 183,184, 185

committee structure 100,101, 124

new negotiations 100,139-40, 151, 155, 157, 185

see also Final Act, Agreement on Agriculture, Article 20

World War I 16,68,70 World War II 16 world systems theory 199

Zacher, Mark 27, 200 zero option 114, 150

Date post:	18-Aug-2019
Category:	Documents
Upload:	vophuc
View:	217 times
Download:	0 times