Appetite for Destruction New Zealand’s war on Methamphetamine

through a military lens

Josh Wineera August 2009

At a recent charity dinner for the Fight against P [methamphetamine], Justice Minister Simon Power spoke about seeing the issue through a ‘Justice lens’.1 Justice has a view on P, as does Police and Customs; in fact a host of government departments and interested community groups have a view on the impact of P on New Zealand society. Prime Minster John Key has already called for a ‘war on terror‘ against methamphetamine [P] and the gangsters behind the deadly drug.2 It has even been elevated to a ‘holy war’, with the Anglican Bishop of Auckland, Right Reverend John Preston calling for parents, communities, and the church to raise their voices to protect children against the scourge of methamphetamine.3 These are powerful statements, reflecting the growing concern of this drug epidemic. By drawing an analogy however, with terrorism and invoking a religious theme the media reporting these comments could be accused of inciting a ‘moral panic’.4 The issue of a war, even as a conceptual metaphor5 against a drug, raises the question of how this would be viewed by an organisation that has ‘war’; warfare as part of its job description. The New Zealand Defence Force is charged with the defence of the country, and understanding the nature and character of war is central to its modus operandi.6 Additionally, as an extension of politics by other means,7 those that hold a war fighting philosophy are naturally expected to provide useful insights of potential strategies to defeat an adversary. Given the many views and

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perspectives already taken on P it may be a little surprising to note that a military view has not been previously considered. It may be even more surprising to reveal that there are parallels between the irregular nature of warfare that is being waged in the contemporary military environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan, with the nature of the ‘war’ in New Zealand’s methamphetamine environment. Perhaps this is a long bow to draw, a flimsy correlation? Actually it is not. Not so when the fundamental prize, the key objective relates to the security and influence of a society (known as human terrain or a population-centric approach in military terms), while defeat of the offenders (or irregular groups in military terms) may at times be the secondary objective. The aim of this article is to provide a military perspective on New Zealand’s war on P. It is acknowledged that New Zealand society is affected by many other types of illegal and legal substances; however the focus of this article is P, and its wider effects. The article proposes a parallel-thinking methodology8 through a military lens. A comparison of the irregular threats that exist in today’s contemporary military environment will be made with the ‘irregular P threats’ that exist in New Zealand. The article does not seek a military solution but rather it explores how a military approach would ‘think’ about organising national power to disrupt and contain the devastating effects of P. The article considers the threat manifested by P as being a hybrid threat.9 Most importantly the article is not a criticism of any organisation that is engaged in the fight against P. On the contrary, it seeks to offer new dialogue and considerations which may support and add potency to the fight for New Zealand society. Irregular warfare and P: Similarities and parallel trends Irregular warfare is now recognised by the military as on an equal footing as conventional, traditional combat.10 After more than five years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the US (and its allies) has concluded that superiority in conventional warfighting has driven its adversaries to avoid direct military confrontation.11 Furthermore, the New Zealand Army has recognised that countering irregular activity will be the most likely form of conflict for the next decade.12 Irregular warfare is now regular. The catalyst for accepting ‘irregular warfare as regular’ has, as often is the case, been the emergence of an adversary(ies) that has adapted to avoid its opponents’ strengths. In more common terms this is considered an asymmetric approach and one that allows a smaller force to defeat a larger force. The irony of course is the fact that (Western) military forces are presently subjected to this approach by numerically and technologically inferior adversaries. In the complex operational environments of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, these adversaries can include disparate groups such as guerrillas, insurgents, criminals, militia, sectarian, rebel groups and others. These groups have always existed in some form or another throughout history, but the predominant type that has pervaded this decade has been insurgents. Insurgency has at its core a political focus,13 though violent and armed means is often employed. An insurgency war though is rarely fought as large set-piece battles or orthodox, linear engagements. Unlike conventional war, time and tempo can become irrelevant; it is about endurance and patience. Insurgencies are fought within the ‘human-terrain’, or as General Sir Rupert Smith termed of modern wars “amongst the people.”14 The people, the society, therefore become both the battlefield and the

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prize. As Mao Tse-Tung is quoted as saying ”one [insurgent] must move through the people as a fish swims in the sea.”

Fig 1. General Sir Rupert Smith Fig 2. Mao Tse-tung “Wars fought amongst the people”. “One must move through the people as fish move through the sea”. So what then are the similarities between irregular warfare and the P environment? Perhaps a start point would be to propose that there is nothing ‘regular’ about today’s war on P. In fact the entire P environment looks nothing like it did a decade ago. According to Crown Solicitor Simon Moore, when asked if P had changed the face of crime in the last 10 years, he replied “absolutely”. Moore has gone on to say that “there's no doubt at all that methamphetamine has had a profound effect on elevating violent crime and in some instances very serious violent crime. It's just something that we never saw in the 80’s and 90’s.”15 Further judicial confirmation could be the admission by New Zealand’s Chief High Court Judge, Justice Tony Randerson, that P cases are swamping the courts. The flood of P related cases now accounts for half of all high court cases.16 In May the New Zealand Herald ran a six-part series on the damage methamphetamine is doing to New Zealand. It examined how the drug got in to the country, its devastating effect on society and what could be done to fix the problem. The sheer volume of perspectives, comments and views by all facets of New Zealand society no doubt demonstrated to the editors of the Herald that the nation was under attack. Just three years ago however, Carla-Louise Wallace completed a comprehensive study, Menace or Moral Panic,17 which concluded that media sensationalism of P was culpable for inciting a moral panic. Compelling as it was, (and still is) Wallace’s study results from 2006 may in fact have been overtaken by more recent events, with clearly more societal indicators emerging to confirm a picture of real menace. A further view could be the similarities between modern insurgents and those that form the illegal bodies within the P chain. In a typical sense most New Zealanders would consider two types of offenders within the P chain; these being the importation, drug-lord level offenders (for example Ri Tong Zhou18) and the localised distribution level through the more visible, gangs.19 It should be noted that while many gangs appear to have agreed to co-exist or even partner in the P chain occasional public tensions do occur. In the main though, the more astute gangs prefer that their operations remain covert. This is understandable, especially when the illegal business is estimated to be worth $1.5 billion a year, or about the same size as New Zealand’s wine industry.20 There are of course others in the P chain that could be

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considered part of the system, such as external exporters, internal courier ‘mules’ and of course the users. There is probably one other key offender group that a military eye would consider worthy of further analysis - international gangs. Somewhere in the last twenty years, perhaps even further back, US–based gangs, such as the Hells Angels chapter in California, transferred to New Zealand gangs not weapons or money, not man-power or muscle but instead transferred an idea. A business idea to be exact.21 The transference of ideas of how to design, implement and execute internationally proven criminal business models and practices has surely been the back-bone of the whole system.22 This type of criminal franchise-model is the real sophistication rather than the deceptive methods of importation.

Fig 3. A nexus of transnational crime. Hells Angel’s business model, meets Chinese drug-lord (Ri Tong Zhou), meets New Zealand gangs.

The power of a transnational idea, of an ideology, is well known to military practitioners. A short scan of Charles Allen’s book God’s Terrorists would reveal the power of an ideology (wahhabi) and how even a local, nationalised version (as in the Taliban) can become crossed with a more deadly, globalised version (Al Qaeda) to create an exponential effect that has every nation frantically searching within its own borders. Globalisation and the advances in technology have allowed Al Qaeda to super-empower those in its chain.23 While hopefully not in an international movement to the degree of Al Qaeda, when considering New Zealand gangs a parallel can be drawn between the super-empowerment they now enjoy compared to their practices and business behaviour a decade ago. Some military experts have termed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as 4th Generation warfare. Thomas Hammes and William Lind for example contend that there is a blurring of the lines between war and politics, between the soldier and civilian and the rise of non-state actors and attacks on enemies cultures.24 Like General Smith they see modern war as being amongst the people, a clash of societies and ideologies. What is most important in today’s military wars is the reinforcing principle of war not being just about (a governments) military power. Rather, the military component remains just one instrument of national power. To win wars in the modern era there needs to be a whole of society approach,25 not just a whole of government approach.

As if to emphasis the crisis in New Zealand society Manukau City councillor Alf Filipaina, who is also the Counties Manukau police Pacific liaison officer, said P was at epidemic levels across the country and it was “killing communities” and "destroying our families.”26 The hundreds of respondents to the New Zealand Herald six-part series further underscore the high emotion and discontent throughout the country. While people clearly feel that their community is under attack from P, many fail to see they are also the prize. They are a prize to be exploited by the P-chain insurgents as a source of capital, both in human and financial terms. It is for this reason that the

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response should be more than just a whole of government approach,27 it must be, and can only be successful if it is a whole of society approach.28

Like a counterinsurgency plan, combating P will require a long term commitment. Detective Senior Sergeant Chris Cahill, head of Auckland drug investigations, has said “organised crime inquiries were lengthy and electronic monitoring was expensive. Some of these gangs are extremely well-organised and entrenched. Targeting high-end manufacturers and distributors requires a long-term commitment.”29 The warning here is that for both the government and the community there will not be any quick fixes. In fact some hard won gains could be reversed. Like the ‘long war’ that military forces are fighting today,30 New Zealand society will need to prepare itself for its own version of a ‘long war on P’.

Fig 4. The long war; military environments in Iraq and Afghanistan,

P environment in New Zealand. Current strategies on fighting P: How would these be viewed through a military lens? The national policy for P can be found in the Methamphetamine Action Plan. This plan was commissioned for the Ministerial Action Group on Drugs in 2003. The plan has four proposed actions and recommendations. They are (1) controlling supply (2) reducing demand (3) limiting problems (4) research.31 The New Zealand Police has a three-pronged strategy to improve its ability to reduce and prevent drug related harm. It consists of (1) reducing supply (2) reducing demand (3) reducing harm.32 This strategy is mirrored by the Department of Corrections,33 and not surprisingly with many other government agencies. A look at US policy reveals three strategies as being (1) prevention (2) enforcement (3) treatment.34 Leading P expert, Mike Sabin, considers the collective drug policies adopting a principle of ‘harm minimisation’.35 He argues that ‘harm minimisation’ should be ceased in favour of a focus on ‘harm elimination’. In his 2008 study, Sabin goes on to identify the period between the late 1990’s and 2003 as a time when “organised crime was quick to seize on the ineffective response of a distracted Police force and government that was slow to react to the growing methamphetamine problem.”36 Clearly New Zealand at that time was neither prepared for nor aware of the nature of the exponential rise of P, and its associated effects on society. In some ways this period could be comparable to that faced by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) in Iraq from late 2003. At that time a relative hiatus in military operations gave rise to a growing insurgency by discontent Iraqi’s.37 It took the CPA and the US-led coalition many years to recognise the building of the insurgency threat and even more years (and many coalition and Iraqi deaths) to commence effective counter strategies, primarily counterinsurgency strategies. The recent report in Trends in illegal drug use in New Zealand, by Dr Chris Wilkins, suggests that P use appears to be levelling out.38 If this is indeed the case then potentially a high-tide mark of sorts may have been reached. Clearly though other indicators and their causal relationships39 across the full spectrum of P

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activity will be needed to give more action-able meaning to this latest evidence. To further expand on the Iraq theme, or more pointedly the second Gulf War of 2003, an interesting paradigm shift in military operations should be highlighted. In broad terms there are three military operations within the context of the battlefield framework, they are (1) shaping (2) decisive (3) sustaining.40 For many practitioners the short conventional, warfighting period was naturally assumed to be the decisive operation, with the aftermath considered to be the less arduous post-conflict, operation. As history has vividly shown the decisive operation has actually shifted to the long and deadly period after the ‘main war’.41 This brings about the paradigm shift, the realisation that the direct attack, the conventional ‘industrial-age’ high tempo phase may in fact be only the shaping component. The decisive operation therefore being the preceding (potentially) more difficult, lengthy and enduring stabilising period.42 An important point however, must be made regarding conflict categorisation. Whether it is conventional or irregular threats both situations are likely to have a high degree of lethality and intensity. So how does this relate to the P strategies and framework, if they were to be set within a military context? The table below re-lists the policies and strategies previously discussed. A military column is added, with a cross-section of the policies and strategies rearranged in to military lines of operations, as well as directing the effort of each towards the centre of gravity.43 Additionally, a number of military tactical tasks and effects are tabled. These tactical tasks relate to various components in the P chain. Finally, the strategies are considered in the context of the military shaping, decisive and sustaining operations framework. NZ National

Strategy NZ Police Strategy

US Strategy Arranged as Military Lines of Operations

Centre of Gravity (tactical tasks and

effects to include fix, disrupt, isolate, secure, turn, destroy, block, and

contain)

Military Operations

Controlling supply

Reduce supply

Prevention Prevention Shaping

Reducing demand

Reduce demand

Enforcement Enforcement Shaping

Limiting problems

Reduce harm

Treatment Treatment Decisive

Research Research

Society

Sustaining

Fig 5. Strategies reconfigured in to a military methodology.

A complex adaptive system, an ecosystem view A military view of the ’chaos and fluidity’ that exists in the P environment could consider it to be a complex adaptive system. A complex adaptive system is what Anne Marie Grisogono describes as “having constant interplay between multiple diverse actors, all competing to influence the allegiances and behaviours of societies, comprising of many other complex adaptive systems, each in there own way constantly evolving.”44 Furthermore, the conflict ecosystem presented by leading counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen is another helpful tool for seeing the many independent but interlinked ‘actors’.45 Kilcullen’s conflict ecosystem is a pictorial illustration that consists of a multitude of diverse external and internal actors such as; foreign recruits, insurgents, smugglers, media, terrorist cells, national police, tribes,

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militia, coalition forces, non-government agencies, businesses and refugees. In applying a conflict ecosystem approach to the P environment the actors could include; community groups, customs, national gangs, police, international gangs, health agencies, other government departments, media, society and many others.

Fig 6. The methamphetamine ecosystem.

The New Zealand Army is currently developing a strategy model that is designed to aid understanding of the complex contemporary operational environment. The Inter-Bella model uses a solar system analogy46 to represent the macro and micro interrelationships between entities. The current method of using two-dimensional representations to map [human] terrain is proving difficult, especially when trying to account for the dynamic socio-cultural conditions.47 Inter-Bella uses a three-dimensional animated format and in doing so aims to give better comprehension, providing visualisation of the ecosystem interrelationships and interdependencies. Inter-Bella is a cognition aid; primarily a technique for use at the small team level but a working example of its potential utility at higher levels has been demonstrated against the complex Iraq geo-political environment in 2008.48 Even in its

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development phase Inter-Bella could be a useful tool to help visualise the complex P environment.

Fig 7. Comprehending the complexity of Iraq using the

Inter-Bella model.

Hybrid enemy, hybrid criminal: Is it time for a hybrid enforcement agency? Whilst the fundamental nature of warfare remains enduring, it’s character–ever evolving, reflects the unique conditions of its era.49 The last decade has seen a diversity of actors, many not bound by internationally recognised norms of behaviour and resistant to traditional means of deterrence. As US Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey has said “[these] hybrid threats—diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities—will make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of national power.”50 A fellow senior US officer, General James Mattis, has reinforced General Casey’s hybrid theme. General Mattis has said “We are not superior in irregular warfare…and that’s what we’ve got to be.” Mattis discussed the need for the U.S. military to transform to a ‘hybrid’ force that expands its non-conventional means without sacrificing classic warfighting competence.51 A hypothesise view can be taken that gangs and other criminals involved in the P-chain are now a hybrid (threat) group. Like the military response to irregular threats, maybe a correlation to form a hybrid response organisation is justified? The question begs as to whether the war on P deserves to have a specialist, dedicated response force, or maybe the requirement is to only transform existing forces. A thorough investigation of the pros and cons of each has no doubt been tabled at the governmental, inter-agency level. But has the rest of society been given a chance to contribute? To be effective, all factors in the (military) lines of operations, all components in the strategies and policies would surely need to be integrated. In totality they comprise true national power. In considering networks, insurgents have a preference for (tribal) social networks over technical networks (as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan). Social networks

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are harder to disrupt. This places far greater emphasis on the human domain for intelligence rather than an over-reliance on technology driven intelligence. This is an important issue when considering resources and funding for counter strategies. US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, has signalled this very point with his $533 billion budget for 2010. Gates has cut some of the major conventional high-tech programmes in favour of more funds for counterinsurgency related projects.52 This not only emphasised the rise of irregular warfare and hybrid threats in the foreseeable future, it further underlined the ‘war amongst the people’, and the human terrain that must be understood, secured and won. As for the illegal bodies in the P chain, particularly within the gangs, a preference for close-knit social networks over technical networks is obvious. Social networks are their powerbase. Like the military, enforcement counter strategies to infiltrate and then disrupt the gang social networks would require significant investment in human intelligence. Enforcement though is of course just one of the national strategies to address P. Dislocating and isolating the social networks, even creating disruption effects within the prevention and treatment strategies should be explored. The aim would be to create simultaneity;53 that is to bring about multiple and concurrent actions to overwhelm the illegal bodies social fabric. Is now the right time for an outside view? A final point to contemplate is the role of a nationally recognised expert, or rather a credible proponent of clear strategies and observations. For the past four years one of the most influential counterinsurgency experts in the US has been former Australian army officer David Kilcullen. Kilkullen completed a doctorate in politics, focussing on guerrilla warfare. He joined a group of civilian specialists to advise US General David Petraeus on Iraq. General Petraeus has been credited with the success of the ‘surge’. Kilkullen has gone on to advise the State Department on counterinsurgency. His appeal to the US government has been both a sound grounding in academia as well as time as a military ‘practitioner’. As an (outside) advisor he has also been able to question the status quo and challenge traditional methods. So who would be the New Zealand P equivalent of Kilcullen? The most likely candidate would be former police detective, Mike Sabin. Sabin is now one of the most recognisable faces of the fight against P. He has formed his own P education company called Methcon54 and is a regular keynote and conference speaker. Sabin certainly has the ear of the community55 and as a former detective no doubt remains connected with the key enforcement agencies. Perhaps like Kilcullen, Sabin could be used in a national role, being able to question the status quo and offer new strategies and tactics.

Fig 8. Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, Fig 9. New Zealand ‘P’ expert, Mike former Army Officer. Sabin, former Police Detective.

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So what now? Having compared the irregular threats faced by today’s military with those threats faced by New Zealand society there does appear to be a correlation between the contemporary military environment and the P environment. There are likely to be things that do not correlate but the key is to broaden the lens and widen the thinking. The population is both the battlefield and the prize, and one that must be secured and isolated, away from the insurgent or offender. Whilst the (Western) militaries have finally come to understand the character of the evolving insurgencies (and other types of conflict) it has been a tough battle. The period of realisation has cost many lives and billions of dollars, and yet this type of conflict is predicted to remain for at least the next decade. It is a long war, it is about endurance, and it is about patience. The thought that conventional, traditional, orthodox methods can prevail alone in a complex adaptive environment have been proven wrong. A hybrid type of threat is bringing forward a hybrid type of response. These responses have generated many capability initiatives as well as ‘thinking’ methodologies and strategies; such as conflict ecosystems and Inter-Bella. So can a military lens, a military perspective help in the war against P? By introducing a small number of military methodologies it is hoped that the wider community, both fellow government agencies and the general public can note a warfighting organisations way of thinking, and how it might organise national power and resources to disrupt and contain the devastating effects of P. This article is but one military opinion, but it would be interesting to see what kind of parallel outline plan could be formed if a group of military practitioners were invited to contribute their intellectual talents to the ‘war’ – locked away with expert advisers for a few months. One could anticipate that some of their ideas and strategies would have already been thought of, but if just one action-able initiative was produced then that would surely be beneficial, and add potency to the fight for New Zealand society. What has New Zealand got to lose – except the war?

_______________________ About the Author: Major Josh Wineera is a New Zealand Army Officer who served in Iraq during the first half of 2008. He has previously served in East Timor, Bougainville and Bosnia. He is a graduate of the NZDF Command and Staff College and is a former tactics instructor at the Australian Land Warfare Centre. He is a guest lecturer at the New Zealand Defence College and Massey University. He is currently engaged in doctrine research on the contemporary military operational environment. Major Wineera is an extramural Masters student, completing a post-graduate dissertation at the Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University. To contact the author or for more information about this article

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please email the New Zealand Army Doctrine Branch at army-doctrine@nzdf.mil.nz . This article represents the personal views of the author only. Notes 1 NZ Herald 23 May 2009, “Government to make treatment of P addicts a priority”, and http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10574133. 2 NZ Sunday News 13 September 2008, “New Zealand’s War on P terror”, and http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/627018 3 ibid. 4 See British sociologist Stanley Cohen, Folks Devils and Moral Panics: Creation of the Mods of Rockers (London, Granada Publishing Ltd, 1972). 5 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and also Lakoff’s work in The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (1992). 6 New Zealand Defence Force, ‘Military Doctrine within New Zealand’s Strategic Environment’, Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine , NZDDP-D 2008, p.1-3. This paragraph introduces the changing strategic environment and the efforts to counter threats. 7 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976), edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 69, also Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II (Pantheon Books, New York, 2006), p. 498 8 Edward de Bono, Parallel Thinking: From Socratic to De Bono Thinking, (Victoria, Australia, Penguin Books, 1994), p. 36. For de Bono, parallel thinking simply means laying down ideas [or in this case a military perspective] alongside others. There is no clash, no dispute, no initial true/false judgement. There is instead a genuine exploration of the subject from which conclusions and decisions may then be derived through a design process. 9 For more on the military view of Hybrid threats, see GEN James N. Mattis, “U.S. Must Prepare for ‘Hybrid’ Warfare”, General Says” by John J. Kruzel, American Forces Press Service, 13 February 2009, and http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53089. 10 Washington Post 4 December 2008, “US to raise irregular war capabilities”, and http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/03/AR2008120303495.html. 11 Kenneth C.Coons, Jr., and Glen M. Harned, “Irregular Warfare is Warfare”, JFQ, Issue 52, (1st quarter 2009): p. 97. 12 NZ Army “Review of Contemporary Counter Insurgency (CIT) Doctrine”, Minute 19 December 2008. 13 For more reading on insurgency, particularly in Iraq, read Andrew Rathmell, “Planning Post-conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?” International Affairs, 81 (5), 2005, pp 1013-1038. 14 See GEN Sir Rupert Smith, Utility of Force, the Art of War in the Modern World, (New York, Knopf, 2007). 15 NZ Herald 16 May 2009, “P – drug tide swamping police and courts”, and http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10572667. 16 Otago Daily Times 31 May 2008, “Meths cases swamping High Courts”, and http://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/8022/meth-cases-swamping-high-courts. 17 See Carla-Louise Wallace, Menace or Moral Panic? Methamphetamine and the New Zealand Press, Auckland University of Technology 2006. 18 NZ Herald 14 March 2009, “Drug lord uses casino as office”, and http://www.nzherald.co.nz/gambling/news/article.cfm?c_id=215&objectid=10561613. Zhou typifies the Asian Organised Crime (AOC) groups. 19 Gangs, includes Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCG) and New Zealand Gangs (primarily ethic gangs). 20 NZ Herald 16 May 2009, “Waging War on P”, and http://www.nzherald.co.nz/p-epidemic/news/article.cfm?c_id=605&objectid=10572572. 21 See the NZ Herald article “Drug trade: Gangs divvy up drug trade’s spoils”, 15 April 2005. The article relates to Hells Angel ‘big-fish’ Andrew Sisson. “Operation Shovel was significant in that it provided direct evidence of Hells Angels involvement in making methamphetamine, something suspected since the early 1980s. Analysts believe the gang were among the first to manufacture it here, having been taught by brother Hells Angels in the United States”. Also see Dennis O’Reilly Blog “War and Peace”, May 2008, http://www.nzedge.com/features/ar-denis23.html 22 Nelson Bays police area commander Inspector Brian McGurk "They [Hells Angels] are active in things like methamphetamine, but our suggestion is they are probably a bit more cunning, and subtle, than just pushing drugs. ''They tend to get themselves involved in cash-based businesses. It's one way of doing money laundering - hiding sources of illegal income and asset protection.'' See the article in the Nelson Mail 18 April 2009, “Sympathy for the devils”, also http://www.stuff.co.nz/nelson-mail/features/weekend/2344367/Sympathy-for-the-devil. 23 For more on ‘super-empowered’ individuals or small groups see Thomas X. Hammes article “Fourth generation warfare evolves, fifth emerges”, Military Review (May-June 2007): pp 14-23. 24 See William Lind and Thomas Hammes, particularly Hammes’s Slingshot and the stone, (2006). 25 The New Zealand Defence Force also describes this as a ‘Comprehensive Approach’. See Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, NZDDP-D 2008, p. 34. 26 NZ Sunday News ibid. 27 See New Zealand Police, New Zealand Police Illicit Drug Strategy to 2010, p. 10 for a law-enforcement perspective of a ‘Whole of Government’ (approach) strategy. “This Strategy provides a multi-faceted approach to the problem of organised crime networks, gangs and groups. It builds on the work currently underway in many agencies and local communities to combat organised crime and is designed to ensure there is a robust process for identifying and addressing organised crime risks as they emerge”. 28 Clausewitz, ibid. Clausewitz considered the ‘trinity’ of the people, the government and the military. 29 NZ Herald 19 May 2009, “Police gaining greater powers to fight drug trade”, and http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10573093. 30 Douglas A Border, Mark T Berger, “All roads lead to and from Iraq: the Long War and the transformation of the nation state”, The Long War – insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states, (New York, Routledge, 2008), p. 262. 31 Methamphetamine Action Plan, Ministerial Action Group on Drugs, 22 May 2003.

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32 New Zealand Police, ibid p. 3. 33 See http://www.corrections.govt.nz/about-us/fact-sheets/managing-offenders/reducing-drug-and-alcohol-use.html. 34 Carlos Dobkin, Nancy Nicosia, “The War on Drugs: Methamphetamine, Public Health, and Crime”, American Economic Review, 2009, 99(1), pp. 324–49. 35 Mike Sabin, Solutions to the Methamphetamine Crisis in New Zealand: A study of supply and demand-side interventions and their efficacy, 2008, p. 35. 36 ibid pp. 38-39. 37 Timothy W. Luke, “The insurgency of global empire and counterinsurgency of local resistance: new world order in the era of civilian provincial authority”, The Long War – insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states, (New York, Routledge, 2008), pp. 223-238. 38 NZ Herald 11 Jun 2009, “P use appears to be levelling out”, and http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10577768. For the full report by C Walkins, R Griffiths and P Sweetsur see “Trends in illegal drug use in New Zealand, 2006-2008: Findings from the 2006, 2007 and 2008 Illicit Drug Monitoring System (IDMS)”, Centre for Social and Health Outcomes Research and Evaluation, Massey University (May 2009). 39 For more information on causal relationships see Kambiz E. Maani, Robert Y. Cavana, Introduction to Systems Thinking, (North Shore, Pearson Education New Zealand, 2009). 40 In military terms Shaping, Decisive and Sustaining operations provide the basis for a scheme of manoeuvre from the beginning to the end. It establishes a battlefield framework which allows for the allocation of main effort and supporting efforts. For more information see NZP86/2000 New Zealand Army Staff Officers Handbook, Vol 2, 2-2-6. 41 Time, 28 June 2007, Operation Last Chance, and http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1638128,00.html. 42 See LTC Conrad C. Crane, “U.S. Army, Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won”, Military Review (May-June 2005), pp. 27-36. 43 Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, LWD 1, 2008: pp.48-54. 44 See the work of Dr Anne Marie Grisogono, from the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation. Her theory and ongoing work is directly contributing to Adaptive Campaigning for the Australian Defence Force. 45 David Kilcullen,”Counterinsurgency Redux”, Survival 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07). 46 Keith. J. Holyoak & Robert. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 117-18. By coincidence Niels Bohr’s model of an atom made an analogy between an atom and the solar system. 47 Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmers-Eber, Operational Cultures for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications, (Quantico, Virginia, Marine Corps University Press, 2008), p. 34. 48 MAJ Josh Wineera “Inter-Bella: Understanding the Area of Operations Ecosystem”, Colloquium, US Army and USMC Counterinsurgency Centre, Vol 2, No. 2 (June 2009). 49 GEN George W. Casey Jr, US Army Chief of Staff, “America’s Army in an era of persistent conflict”, Army (October 2008), p. 24. 50 Casey, ibid. 51 Mattis, ibid. 52 Caitlin Harrington, Casandra Newell and Daniel Wasserbly, “Gates signals a dramatic shift in budget priorities”, Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 April 2009, pp 5-7. 53 Australian Army, ibid, p. 51. 54 See Methcon.co.nz for more details. 55 See stellartrust.co.nz for more details of Mike Sabin’s role with this Paul Holmes inspired community organisation. ____________________________________ Photo acknowledgments and credits: Title photo: Waikato Times Fig 1: Radio Liberty Fig 2: World Press Fig 3: Vancouver Sun, NZ Herald, Dean Purcell Fig 4: SSG Roland Mitchell, MC2(EXW) Paul Seeber; Carthew Neal, Scoop.co.nz Fig 5: Josh Wineera Fig 6: NZ Govt (Police, Customs, GCSB, MOH, IRD, SIS, OFCANZ), Methcon, Gangscene, NZ Herald, Unichem, Fight Against P, Stellar Trust, Rotary Club Auckland East, Massey University Fig 7: Josh Wineera Fig 8: From Charlie Rose interview Fig 9: Sir Peter Blake Trust