APPLICABILITY OF BOGOTÁ’S TRANSMILENIO BRT SYSTEM TO THE UNITED STATES

8/6/2019 APPLICABILITY OF BOGOTS TRANSMILENIO BRT SYSTEM TO THE UNITED STATES

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For Submission to the Transportation Research Boards 86th Annual Meeting, January 2007,Washington D.C.

PAPER 07-1538:

APPLICABILITY OF BOGOTS TRANSMILENIO BRT SYSTEM TO THE UNITED STATES

By:

Alasdair Cain

Senior Research Associate

National Bus Rapid Transit Institute (NBRTI)

Center for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR)

University of South Florida

4202 E. Fowler Ave, CUT 100

Tampa, FL 33620 - 5375

Phone: (813) 974 5036

Fax: (813) 974 5168

Email: [email protected]

Georges Darido, Senior Research Associate, NBRTI

Michael R. Baltes, ITS Program Manager, Federal Transit Administration

Pilar Rodriguez, Transportation Planner, TranSystems Corp

Johan C. Barrios, Graduate Research Assistant, NBRTI

November 2006

WORD COUNT: 6,137TABLES AND FIGURES: (10*250) 2,500TOTAL: 8,637


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Cain, Darido, Baltes, Rodriguez, Barrios 1

ABSTRACT

Bogots TransMilenio is the highest capacity BRT system in the world and one of the worldsbest examples of a high level BRT system. As such, it demonstrates what can be achievedwith BRT if certain high capacity design features and operating characteristics are adhered to.This paper has attempted to highlight the different capabilities of BRT that are demonstrated by

the TransMilenio, taking into account the variety of differences between the city of Bogot andtypical U.S cities. A series of observations are made in relation to the topics of passengercapacity, capital cost effectiveness, achieving modal shift objectives, urban renewal, businessmodels, and politics. The paper concludes by discussing the various issues relating to thereplication of the Bogot Model in the U.S.

Overall, TransMilenios great strength is the fact that it is a true rapid transit network.Constructing such a network, in a relatively short time period, has given the system an economyof scale that has maximized operating efficiency and yielded city-wide mobility and urbanrenewal benefits. The relatively low capital costs associated with BRT also provides U.S citieswith the opportunity to implement rapid transit networks capable of addressing city-wide

mobility objectives.


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INTRODUCTION

Serving the city of Bogot, Colombia, the TransMilenio is one of the worlds premierBus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems. The system carries almost 1.3 million passengers on a 50 milenetwork of high capacity trunk corridors, supported by feeder services that extend systemcoverage to peripheral areas of the city (1). It is the highest capacity BRT system in the world,carrying up to 41,000 passengers per hour per direction on its busiest sections, comparable to thepassenger volumes normally associated with heavy rail. TransMilenio is also the centerpiece of along-term urban renewal and sustainable mobility strategy that has yielded large scale publicspace improvements, extensive walking and cycling networks, in parallel to a variety ofdisincentives to private vehicle use. Encouraged by the success of the TransMilenio, theColombian government is now financing the construction of similar systems, on a smaller scale,in cities throughout the country.

The great success of the TransMilenio has made it the poster child for BRT proponentsacross the world. However, some have rightly questioned the extent to which its achievementscan be replicated in a developed world context. This paper aims to compare the context in whichthe TransMilenio operates with that in typical U.S cities, in order to assess its applicability totransit in the U.S. This paper is based on a report (of the same name) published by the NationalBus Rapid Transit Institute (NBRTI) in May 2006. This report is available at www.nbrti.org.

A BREIF OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSMILENIO

Construction of TransMilenio Phase I began in 1998, with initial sections opened in2000. The full 41km (25.6 miles) were completed by early 2002, and the system was sooncarrying approximately 800,000 passengers per day. Construction of Phase II, which alsoconsists of three trunk corridors totaling 25.6 miles in length, began in 2000. Phase II has

recently been completed and ridership is now just under 1.3 million riders per day (1). Figure 1shows the alignment of the main trunk corridors and the supporting feeder routes, while Figure 2shows a typical trunk-line station. The current system provides one of the best examples of whatis referred to by Wright (2) as Full BRT, characterized by exclusive busways on trunkcorridors, off-board fare collection and verification, fare free integration between feeder servicesand trunk services, and high quality rail like stations.

Planning of Phase III is currently underway. Once completed, this phase will providemore extensive system coverage within the city, and extend the service to the western suburb ofSoacha. The TransMilenio masterplan consists of 388km (241 miles) of dedicated trunkcorridors to be constructed over a total of eight separate phases. This is expected to take several

decades, and will depend on funding availability (3).

The TransMilenio system is managed by TRANSMILENIO S.A, a public sector agencycreated in 1999 to manage system planning and daily service supervision. Private contractors areresponsible for fare collection and operations (including vehicle costs), through concessioncontract agreements. Contractors are selected through a formal tendering process and paid perservice kilometer. The TransMilenio service design is based on a closed system (also known asFeeder-Trunk service), where high-capacity articulated buses operate on the trunk corridors, and


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lower capacity feeder buses are used to connect the trunk corridors with peripheral areas.

The TransMilenio has significantly improved mobility in Bogot, reducing transit user traveltimes by an average of 32 percent. The TransMilenio has also been successful in attractingchoice riders, reducing the proportion of private vehicle trips from 18 percent to 11 percent.

Localized improvements in environmental quality have also been observed. A much moredetailed description of TransMilenio, the plans for its future expansion, and its impacts, areprovided in the report on which this paper is based (3).

ISSUES AFFECTING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TRANSMILENIO TO THE U.S

TransMilenios applicability to the U.S is a complex issue. The sheer size of Bogot, witha population of around eight million, makes it comparable to only a small number of U.S cities(only Los Angeles, New York and Chicago have comparable urbanized area populations, whileno other urbanized area has a population significantly greater than five million (3)). Populationdensity has a significant impact on the demand for transit within any given urban area. Bogot ischaracterized by an extremely high average population density of 210 people per hectare (3),high even by Latin American standards, compared to the low average population densities ofaround 10 people per hectare observed in modern U.S cities (4). U.S downtowns also tend to berelatively small with the majority of Americans now living and working in the suburbs, whileBogot still retains the traditional CBD focused activity center. Also, the geographical dispersionof income groups is different; in the U.S the lower income areas tend to exist in the urban cores,while in Bogot the lowest income areas are located in the city periphery. In the low-densityurban environments observed in the U.S, environments trip origins and destinations tend to behighly dispersed, severely limiting transits ability to compete with the private auto. In summary,Bogot provides ideal circumstances for transit and non-motorized modes, while modern U.Scities provide the opposite. It is no surprise then that while 80 percent of Bogots populationdoes not have access to a car (3), over 85 percent of all trips in the U.S are made by car (5).

The TransMilenio replaced dozens of traditional microbus routes and consists ofnumerous service routes on the same right-of-way (e.g., local, express, super-express, etc.).Banning traditional buses from the TransMilenio corridors guaranteed high levels of systemdemand. TransMilenio can therefore be seen as a comprehensive reorganization andenhancement of road-based public transportation services from a multi-point to a feeder-trunksystem. This highly integrated approach is different from that of most U.S New Start projects,which plan a new transit service to try to create new, or reinforce weak, travel patterns becauseof the availability of right-of-way or stations but do not necessarily serve existing travel patterns.In addition, New Start projects are usually corridor-focused instead of considering city-widenetworks.

The political contexts of the two countries are also very different. Like most cities in thedeveloping world, Bogot is located in a political environment characterized by a strongexecutive. A powerful executive figure, such as a president at the national level or a mayor at thelocal level, wields much more power and influence than their counterparts in typical developedworld democracies, and plays a much more important role in policy initiation. This type ofpolitical system, also featuring fewer environmental controls and much less stringentbureaucratic review, also permits much faster policy implementation.


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Although the public sector was largely responsible for TransMilenios infrastructure costs(similar to the way in which the federal government contributes to the capital cost of transitprojects in the U.S), farebox revenue from the TransMilenio system covers operating costs andactually generates profit (reportedly as high as 30 percent according to TransMilenio managers),allowing the Colombian government to turn system operation over to the private sector, using a

tendering process to maximize operating efficiency. In the U.S, transit systems operate at a loss,imposing greater limitations on private sector involvement. Although there are examples ofprivate sector involvement in transit service provision, in most cases the public sector continuesto be fiscally responsible for the system, either through providing subsidies to the privatecompanies who run the system or running the system directly.

Table 1 provides a summary of the demographics and mode use characteristics in Bogotversus typical modern American cities. Such differences limit the extent to which Bogotsexperience of BRT can be applied in the U.S. Indeed, most of the interest in TransMilenio hascome from other developing countries in East Asia and South America, where more similareconomic, socio-political and urban form conditions exist. Some express the view that what

happened in Bogot cannot be replicated because it is the result of a unique set of circumstancesrelated to the extraordinary administrations of Enrique Pealosa and Antanas Mockus (Mayor ofBogot before and after Pealosa). There are even doubts about whether the trend towardsustainable transport in Bogot can be maintained if the political agenda shifts towards otherpriorities (6).

However, there are some similarities that should also be acknowledged. In both locations,the public sector is responsible for the capital cost of highway and transit infrastructure. In bothlocations, the over-utilization of transportation infrastructure by private vehicles has resulted insevere negative economic, environmental, and social impacts. Similarly, transit is looked upon inBogot and in the U.S as a way to improve aggregate mobility through the more efficient use ofroad space, thus reducing traffic congestion. While limited in its direct applicability to the U.S,the TransMilenio does illustrate a number of important issues regarding the applicability of BRTtreatments in the U.S, as well as in other developed world environments. The following sectionsdiscuss these issues, commenting on the different lessons that may be learned.

PASSENGER CAPACITY

Carrying up to 41,000 passengers per hour per direction (pphpd), actual system capacity isestimated at 45,000 pphpd. This makes the TransMilenio the highest capacity BRT system in theworld. The accommodation of such high passenger volumes is made possible by a variety ofdifferent system design features:

High capacity articulated vehicles (160 passengers) with multiple doors

High average bus occupancies (occupancy levels on TransMilenio buses average 80 percentin peak periods and 70 percent in off-peak periods) (2)

Exclusive running ways that guarantee high commercial speeds at all times of day and allowthe co-existence of local, limited stop, and express services

High capacity rail like stations that feature level boarding and off-board fare payment


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Centralized control of bus operations, which reduces bunching and improves reliability

High service frequency (280 buses per hour per direction on busy trunk sections, resulting ina combined headway 13 seconds at busy stations)

TransMilenios high capacity is also the result of high in-vehicle passenger loading. While

the TransMilenio system was designed to carry seven standing passengers per square meter (7),capacity calculations in the U.S assume much lower standing passenger loads. This explains whythe assumed capacities of different transit modes in the U.S context (10,000 to 12,000 for bus-based transit, 26,000 for LRT and 50,000 for HRT) (8) are lower than the theoretical capacitiesof different transit modes presented by Vuchic (9) (15,000 pphpd for bus-based transit, 30,000pphpd for LRT, and 72,000 for HRT).

Applying standard U.S passenger loadings, as prescribed in the Transit Capacity and Qualityof Service Manual (100 passengers per bus, 48 seated, 52 standing) (8), to the TransMileniocase, results in a busway capacity of approximately 28,000 pphpd. While significantly lower thanthe 41,000 pphpd carried by the TransMilenio, this figure is still much higher than the 10,000 to

12,000 pphpd maximum capacity figure assumed in the U.S. Why such a discrepancy?According to Samuel (10), calculation of BRT system capacity in the U.S is based on headwaysof 40 to 60 seconds. Such headways are relevant to the situation where no special bus terminalsare provided and there is only limited passing availability at stops. If high capacityTransMilenio-style infrastructure is provided, Samuel states that it is possible to run buses at sixto eight second headways (450 to 600 buses per hour per lane), equating to a seated capacity of27,000 to 36,000 passengers per hour (10). The TransMilenio proves the validity of thesecalculations.

As well as showing that BRT has a similar passenger capacity to Light Rail, theTransMilenio also demonstrates the extremely wide range of passenger volumes that can be

accommodated by BRT. Wright states that BRT can cost-effectively accommodate volumes of4,000 to 40,000 pphpd (2).

In summary, BRTs passenger carrying capacity appears to be grossly underestimated in theU.S, often leading to its early rejection in favor of LRT in the alternatives analysis process.TransMilenio demonstrates that BRT systems are capable of carrying the passenger volumescommonly associated with rail-based transit, even assuming U.S passenger loading standards.Thus, BRT should not be ruled out of alternatives analysis in favor of LRT on the grounds ofinsufficient passenger capacity.

CAPITAL COST EFFECTIVENESSThe history of transit planning in Bogot provides a useful illustration of the comparative

capital cost of BRT versus Heavy Rail Transit (HRT). For many years, heavy rail was thepreferred transit improvement option in Bogot, and between 1947 and 1997 there were a total of10 attempts to implement such a system. The primary reason for the failure of each attempt wasthe high capital expenditures involved. Table 2 compares the capital costs and predicted ridershipassociated with the 1997 heavy rail proposal with the first two phases of the TransMilenio, and


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the TransMilenio masterplan. The table shows that the heavy rail proposal would have providedone 18 miles metro line for a total cost of US$3,041M, equating to a cost of US$169M per mile.In return, it was predicted that the heavy rail line would have carried an estimated 795,000passengers per day, equating to 16 percent of the citys total transit trips. In comparison,TransMilenio Phase I provided more trunk corridor (25.6 miles versus 18.0 miles) and similar

ridership levels, for a total capital cost of US$340M, almost one tenth of the cost of the heavyrail option. Analysis of Phase II costs showed that only 37 percent of the costs are specificallyfor TransMilenio infrastructure (exclusive lanes, stations, terminals, pedestrian overpasses, andstudies and designs). Of the remaining 63 percent, 40 percent is for general traffic lanes, non-grade intersections, sidewalks and utilities; 11 percent is for right of way acquisition; and 12percent is for environmental and social mitigation, traffic management, detours, andmaintenance. Thus, the TransMilenio portion of Phase II costed US$207M, equating toapproximately $5M per km.

Table 2 also shows the predicted capital cost of the complete eight phase TransMileniomasterplan. The capital cost of the system, featuring a 241 mile network of exclusive busways

capable of accommodating 85 percent of the cities transit trips, is estimated at US$2,300M notincluding vehicle and fare collection costs (11), and approximately US$3,320M (USD) includingvehicle and fare collection costs (12). Comparing this figure to the capital cost of the 1997 heavyrail proposal (US$3,041M), it can be concluded that TransMilenio offered Bogot a city-widerapid transit solution for similar capital expenditure as one rail corridor.

Table 3 compares the capital costs, trunk corridor lengths, and ridership associated withthe TransMilenio in relation to a range of different rapid transit projects in the U.S. First of all, itcan be seen that rapid transit capital costs are highly variable, ranging in this case from $3.2Mfor the San Pablo Rapid in Oakland, CA, versus over $16 billion for the complete Metrorailsystem in Washington D.C. Even accounting for system size by considering capital cost per mile,the variation in capital cost is huge (0.23M per mile for the San Pablo Rapid versus $340M permile for the Red Line in Los Angeles, CA). Next, it can be seen that some of the variationappears to be related to mode, with BRT being the cheapest on average and heavy rail being themost expensive on average. However, even within each mode the variation is quite large. This isparticularly true for BRT, where cost per mile for the small range of projects mentioned hereranges from $0.23M to $25M per mile. This can at least partly be explained by the fact that theterm BRT has been used to refer to a wide range of different bus-based service improvements,from inexpensive improvements such as adding Traffic Signal Priority to express bus servicesthat run in mixed traffic, through to high quality services featuring dedicated runningways andrail like stations. Such services, like the TransMilenio in Bogot and the Orange Line in LosAngeles, represent the high-end of the BRT capital cost range, which appears to be similar tothe low-end of the range of LRT costs. Indeed, a recent paper examining BRT capital costsdivided the BRT genre into three categories; arterial streets (average capital cost $0.22M),running in HOV lanes (average capital cost $5.83M), and dedicated busways (average capitalcost $13.41M) (13). However, even consideration of both mode type and runningway type doesnot account for the full variation in the capital costs associated with different rapid transit modes.The issue of context, such as the land costs associated with Right Of Way acquisition andwhether expensive tunneling is required, plays a crucial role in determining overall capital cost(13), making it difficult (and unwise) to attempt to make universal inferences by comparing the


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cost of rapid transit projects in different places. This is illustrated by the TransMilenio where,even within the same city, the capital cost per mile of Phase II was twice that of Phase I due tothe more extensive public space improvements associated with the latter phase. This suggeststhat an accurate capital cost comparison across different rapid transit modes must be conductedin the same corridor during the same time period.

Using average weekday ridership per mile as a measure of system performance, Table 3shows that TransMilenio Phases I and II outperformed the U.S heavy rail systems by at least 3times, U.S LRT by at least 12 times, and U.S BRT by at least 4 times. This result, however, ismoderated by the fact that a transit trip in Bogot is not directly comparable to a transit trip in theU.S because of significant differences in the transit mode share, costs, levels and expectations ofservice, ride quality, and comfort, among other factors. In essence, one transit trip in the U.S. isequivalent to many trips in Bogot because transit does not have as many competitive advantagesin terms of cost, utility, convenience, etc. Unfortunately, the demand function is not understoodwell enough to make such adjustments, but it can be said that the capital cost effectiveness ofTransMilenio is likely to be superior to most transit investments of any mode in the U.S.

Finally, it should be noted that overall system cost includes both capital and operatingcosts over the life of the project. While operating costs are less of an issue in Bogot, due to thefact that the TransMilenio is operated for profit by the private sector, the contribution ofoperating costs to overall system cost are much more of an issue in the U.S, where such costsrequire to be subsidized for the duration of the projects existence. Operating cost efficiency is anarea where BRT has been criticized, due to the fact that high frequency service requires a largenumber of vehicle operators. Hidalgo (14) conducted an analysis comparing the total costs(capital plus operating) of different rapid transit modes over a 20 year period on a hypothetical20km corridor carrying 35,000 pphpd. The analysis found that although the BRT option didindeed have higher operating costs than the LRT and HRT options, the much higher capitalexpenditures (infrastructure and vehicles) associated with these rail-based options meant that theBRT option was cheaper overall. However, the extent to which this analysis applies to thedeveloped world it is not clear. While labor costs are not a significant proportion of overalloperating costs in the developing world (typically less than 20 percent (2)), they are a much moresignificant factor in the developed world (30 to 75 percent of operating costs (2)). LRT, withhigher capacity individual vehicles, requires less vehicle operators to carry the same number ofpassengers, and thus holds an advantage in this case. Wright states that this is a major reasonwhy LRT is often preferred to BRT in the developed world (2). This also possibly relates to thefact that U.S federal transit funding mechanisms tend to favor capital investments over operatingcost assistance (13), thus favoring LRT.

ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION OBJECTIVES THROUGH ANINTEGRATED MOBILITY STRATEGY

Mayor Pealosa believes that quality of life is related to a living environment as free ofmotor vehicles as possible (15) and that transportation investment should be prioritized ininverse proportion to travel speed i.e. pedestrians first, then bicycle facilities, then public transit,and finally private vehicles (15). Thus, the TransMilenio was designed as the centerpiece of a


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city-wide sustainable mobility strategy that provided a network of non-motorized transportationinfrastructure such as bicycle lanes, pedestrian walkways, and overpasses. The mobility strategyalso actively discourages private vehicles use by banning 40 percent of the citys registeredprivate vehicles from using the roads in the peak periods (7:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 7:00p.m.) regulated by the last number of the license plate (16). The city also regularly imposes car

free days on weekends and public holidays, whereby private vehicle use on major arterials isprohibited, and the roads are opened up to pedestrians and cyclists only. Figure 3 shows theimpact that this mobility strategy has had on mode split within the city of Bogot.

Figure 3 shows that the mobility strategy has increased transit usage (the sum of Bus-Buseta-Colectivo and TransMilenio) from 64 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2005.However, it should be noted that TransMilenio currently accounts for only around 27 percent ofthe citys total transit trips. The figure also shows that the proportion of non-motorized trips hasincreased from around 8 percent in 1999 to around 15 percent in 2005, while during the sameperiod the proportion of vehicle trips has reduced from 18 percent to 11 percent. Overall, thissuggests that the mobility strategy has induced some additional corridor transit ridership, and has

succeeded in initiating a shift towards more sustainable modes. Mode shift has also been verifiedby recent survey data. Nine percent of surveyed riders stated that before TransMilenio they madethe same trip by private car. However, it has also been reported that overcrowding and serviceinterruptions caused by pavement failure problems has caused many middle-class choice ridersto stop using TransMilenio (15).

There are several different issues, with applicability to the U.S, that are raised by thesuccess of Bogots mobility strategy. First, it illustrates clearly the benefits obtained fromimplementing BRT as part of wider package of measures that support sustainable transportation.In modern U.S cities, where the urban environment is often particularly hostile to non-motorizedmodes, even a high quality BRT system may not be successful in attracting ridership if the linkbetween the system and users ultimate origins and destinations is not considered. Providing highquality access to a BRT system via non-motorized modes takes into account the complete door-to-door trip that transit users make. Experience in Bogot also shows that implementingconcurrent restrictions on the private automobile may also enhances the likelihood of mode-shiftto transit, though it is unlikely that such restrictions would be politically feasible in the U.S.

Secondly, the TransMilenio also illustrates the importance of high quality transitinfrastructure to the ability of transit to compete with the private auto. Hidalgo and Hermannargue that, for BRT to accommodate large passenger volumes at high levels of service, busesmust be given at least one dedicated lane in each direction (16). Exclusive runningways, with atleast one dedicated lane in each direction and passing lanes at stations, are desirable for multiplereasons:

Guarantees that service conditions are maintained throughout the day, even during peaktravel periods when surrounding general purpose lanes are congested.

Guarantees that service conditions are maintained over time, as traffic volumes continue torise in growing urban areas.


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Allows local, limited stop, and express trunk services to operate efficiently on the samefacility (a major advantage over rail-based trunk services), providing high combined corridorservice frequencies.

As illustrated in Figure 4, such features offer the potential for a competitive advantage over

the private auto, in terms of travel time, in congested urban areas. This is important in relation tothe U.S, where transit is increasingly viewed as a means of mitigating congestion in urban areas.However, transits usefulness as a congestion reduction tool (and thus its ability to attract federalfunding for such initiatives) rests on its ability to attract choice riders. With bus-based transitin the U.S typically viewed as the mode of the low-income, transit dependent traveler, railbased transit is often preferred due to its perceived ability to attract such choice riders.However, the prohibitive cost of rail, as discussed in the previous section, has lead to the currentinterest in BRT, characterized as a rapid transit mode capable of attracting choice riders at amore affordable cost. The recently published National Strategy to Reduce Congestion on Americas Transportation Network (USDOT, 2006) states that the creation or expansion ofexpress bus services that benefit from free-flow traffic conditions is an important aspect of the

goals of reducing urban congestion. Evidence from the recently implemented Orange Line BRTproject in Los Angeles suggests that BRT can attract choice riders and have an impact oncongestion. A study by UC Berkeley found that 18 percent of riders had previously made the tripby car, and that on parallel highways that average morning travel speeds had increased from 43to 46 mph, that time spent in congested conditions (below 35mph) had decreased by 14 percent,and that the morning peak period now begins 11 minutes later (17).

BRT AND URBAN RENEWAL

As well as being the centerpiece of a city-wide mobility strategy, the TransMilenio also acts

as the anchor for a city-wide urban renewal strategy that aims to stimulate urban renewal throughpublic space improvements that center around the provision of major new station buildings, there-development of public space around these stations, and corridor enhancements such as newmedians and non-motorized mode infrastructure. Such large-scale improvements have succeededin improving the aethetics of the city, and research suggests that there are initial signs ofquantifiable improvements in land value in the vicinity of TransMileno corridors (18), (19).Figure 5 illustrates the changes to Bogots urban form that have been made in recent years. Thestrategys success demonstrates that:

BRT systems are capable of anchoring public sector-led urban renewal programs. This issignificant because bus-based transit is typically not viewed as being able to influence land

use and stimulate economic development. However, it should be noted that Bogots urbanrenewal is financed by the public sector, and it is still unclear whether this will in turn lead tosignificant private sector-based changes in land use.

BRT systems are capable of generating civic pride and making a positive impact on thesocial capital of a city. TransMilenio now is widely recognized by its population as one ofBogots defining cultural icons, similar to the way in which the subway systems in Londonand New York help to define those places.


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BRT systems can be used to achieve social inclusion objectives. TransMilenio has raised thelevel of access between the citys centrally-located employment centers and the deprived,peripheral areas of Bogot.

THE TRANSMILENIO BUSINESS MODELOne of the greatest achievements of the TransMilenio system was the successful

implementation of a concession contract-based system for regulating service operations.Requiring prospective operators to bid for exclusive rights to specific service routes, and payingthem on a per-kilometer basis as opposed to a per-passenger basis, facilitated healthycompetition for the market as opposed to the unhealthy competition in the market thatcharacterized the previous traditional system. Allocating system operation to the private sectorand system regulation and management to the public sector has allowed the respective strengthsof each sector to be utilized. Operating efficiency has undoubtedly been enhanced, whilereducing the fiscal risk imposed on Bogots city government.

In contrast, the U.S transit industry is typically regulated and operated by the publicsector as a Single Public Monopoly, and has been criticized for permitting too little private sectorcompetition. Thus, Bogots traditional system and the U.S approach to transit provisionrepresent two inefficient extremes in the spectrum of private sector involvement, suffering fromeither too much or two little private sector competition, while the new TransMilenio businessmodel is more representative of the correct optimal balance of public sector involvement. Ifsome form of regulated competition offers the greatest potential for efficient service provision,how can this be introduced in a country where fare box recovery ratios are well below 1.0?Experience in London suggests that the concession contract approach employed in Bogot mayalso be employed in locations where farebox recovery ratios are less than 1.0. In London, the

government defines the bus routes, service characteristics, and fare levels, and then invitesprivate contractors to submit bids that state the fixed annual subsidy that they would require toprovide service. The winning bidder makes a profit by keeping costs below the fixed price paidby the government (20). Thus, a Win-Win situation is achieved by removing fare box returnsfrom the profitability equation, offering the potential for private companies to make a profit,while still reducing the subsidy required from the public sector (due to the efficiency gainsafforded by competitive private sector involvement).

While relatively rare, such arrangements do exist in the United States. Foothill Transit inLos Angeles is a private company providing transit service in east Los Angeles under aconcession contract arrangement with Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation

Authority. Barriers to more widespread use of this approach in the U.S include the problem oflow farebox recovery and cross-subsidy, the difficulty in providing socially desirable transitservices in a non-self-sustaining economic context, and opposition from transit industryemployee unions.


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POLITICS

Historically, most Colombian presidents and Bogot mayors, including Mayor Pealosa,were pro-metro. Hidalgo (14) cites a number of reasons for political support of heavy rail transitproposals. Table 4 lists these reasons and, in each case, comments on their applicability in the

context of the U.S transit industry.

In summary, bus-based rapid transit projects in the U.S do not currently capture popularimagination to the same degree as rail-based projects and are not assumed to be capable ofgenerating or directing economic development. To a large degree, it appears that many people,and their political representatives, are not even aware that BRT alternatives exist while manyAmericans have experienced extensive metro networks in World Cities like New York, London,and Paris, relatively few by comparison have visited Curitiba or Bogot. While this problem maybe beginning to be addressed by the emergence of high-profile BRT projects in U.S cities such asBoston, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas, it is likely that lack of political awareness will continue tobe a barrier to the more widespread implementation of BRT systems. Other political issues raised

by TransMilenios implementation in Bogot include:

Decision-makers need to be encouraged to make public transit planning decisions basedfirst on service requirements, and not by simply by promoting their preferred mode.

It is important to identify a high-profile political figurehead to champion BRT projects.Such figures need to have the political power, courage, and commitment displayed byMayor Pealosa to carry BRT projects through to successful implementation.

The first section of Phase I opened in December 2000, less than three years after thesystem was conceived, and 12 days before the end of Mayor Pealosas term of office.

Wright estimates that BRT projects typically take 1 to 2 years in design and 1 to 2 years Iconstruction, while rail based projects typically require 3 to 5 years in planning and 3 to 5years in construction (2). Thus, while rail-based projects tend to require support overseveral consecutive administrations, it is possible to implement a BRT project within oneterm of office, offering a distinct political advantage (assuming the project is regarded as asuccess!).

TransMilenio could not have been implemented with out national government support.Similarly, in the U.S, federal government funding is essential to the high level BRTsystems capable of attracting choice riders. The success of the TransMilenio system hasresulted in a paradigm shift in governmental attitudes towards BRT, and the government is

now backing the implementation of similar BRT systems across Colombia.

REPLICATING THE BOGOT MODEL

TransMilenio provides insight into what BRT systems are capable of achieving in termsof passenger capacity, capital cost effectiveness, and urban renewal. While TransMilenioundoubtedly provides an excellent example of what can be achieved in a developing world urban


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area, there is still the issue of whether these achievements can be replicated in developed worldcountries such as the United States. It is appropriate then that the paper should close with adiscussion of the issues associated with replication of the Bogot Model. This is provided inTable 5, based on Hidalgos commentary on the applicability of the Bogot Model to otherdeveloping world countries (16).

CONCLUSION

Bogots TransMilenio is the highest capacity BRT system in the world and is one of the worldsbest examples of a high level BRT system. As such, it demonstrates what can be achieved withBRT if certain high capacity design features and operating characteristics are adhered to. Thispaper has attempted to highlight the different capabilities of BRT that are demonstrated by theTransMilenio, taking into account the variety of differences between the city of Bogot andtypical U.S cities. The following list is a summary of the main observations that have been made:

- The TransMilenio carries as much as 41,000 pphpd on its busiest sections, which equates to28,000 pphpd under North American passenger loading conditions. This figure is similar tothe assumed capacity of LRT systems in the U.S, proving that BRT should not be rejected infavor of LRT on the grounds of insufficient capacity.

- The TransMilenio demonstrates the wide cost effective capacity range of BRT, estimated at4,000 to 40,000 pphpd

- The TransMilenio demonstrates the vast difference in capital cost between Bus RapidTransit and Heavy Rail Transit. The experience in Bogot suggests that BRT offers a city-wide rapid transit solution for a similar capital cost to one heavy rail corridor

- TransMilenios capital cost is similar to other high level BRT projects in the U.S thatfeature dedicated runningways, which represent the upper end of the BRT capital cost range

- TransMilenio demonstrates the importance of using an integrated mobility strategy toachieve modal shift objectives. This is particularly important in the U.S, where BRT ispromoted as an affordable rapid transit mode that is capable of attracting choice riders andthus addressing urban congestion problems.

- BRT systems are capable of anchoring public sector-led urban renewal programs.- BRT systems are capable of generating civic pride and making a positive impact on the

social capital of a city.- The TransMilenio demonstrates the benefits that can be obtained by achieving the correct

level of public sector involvement in service operation. Too little as well as too much publicsector involvement can be detrimental to operating efficiency.

- While rail-based projects tend to require support over several consecutive administrations, aBRT project may be initiated and completed within one term of office, offering a distinctpolitical advantage.

Overall, TransMilenios great strength is the fact that it is a true rapid transit network.Constructing such a network, in a relatively short time period, has given the TransMilenio aneconomy of scale that has maximized operating efficiency and yielded city-wide improvementsin mobility and urban renewal. The relatively low capital costs associated with BRT alsoprovides U.S cities with the opportunity to implement rapid transit networks capable ofaddressing city-wide mobility objectives.


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REFERENCES

1. TRANSMILENIO, S.A. http://www.transmilenio.gov.co. Accessed June 15, 2006.

2. Wright, L. Module 3b: Bus Rapid Transit. Sustainable Transport: A Sourcebook forPolicymakers in Developing Cities. Institute of Transportation and Development Policy.2004.

3. Cain, A., G. Darido, M.R. Baltes, P. Rodriguez, and J.C. Barrios. Applicability of Bogots TransMilenio BRT System to the United States. National Bus Rapid TransitInstitute (NBRTI), University of South Florida, FL-26-7104-01, Tampa, FL, 2006.

4. Bertaud, A. A Web Page Dedicated to the Study of Urban Spatial Structures.http://alain-bertaud.com. Accessed October 20, 2006.

5. Cain, A., Hamer, P., & Sibley-Perone, J. Teenage Attitudes and Perceptions RegardingTransit Use. Final Report. National Center for Transit Research, University of SouthFlorida, Tampa, Florida. 2005. http://www.nctr.usf.edu/pdf/576-14.pdf.

6. Hidalgo, D. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): A Technical and Institutional Instrument forUrban Transport Improvement. The Case of Bogots TransMilenio. Infrastructure andFinancial Markets Review. Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable DevelopmentDepartment, Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division. 2004

7. Steer Davies Gleave (SDG). (2000). Diseo Operacional del Sistema TransMilenio.Proyecto de Transporte Urbano para Santa Fe de Bogot, BIRF 4021-FONDATT-10,Bogot D.C.

8. TCRP Report 100. The Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual. TransportationResearch Board. Washington, D.C. 2003

9. Vuchic, V.R. Public Transportation. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1992

10. Samuel, P. Busway vs. Rail Capacity: Separating Myth from Fact. Policy Update 16.Reason Public Policy Institute. 2002

11. Hidalgo D. TransMilenio: A High Capacity Low Cost Bus Rapid Transit Systemdeveloped for Bogot, Colombia. In Proceedings of the Tenth International CODATUConference, Lome Togo, 12-15 November 2002.

12. Hidalgo, D. Personal Communication. November December 2005.

13. Hess, D.B., Taylor, B.D., & Yoh, A.C. Light Rail Lite or Cost-Effective Improvements toBus Service? Evaluating Costs of Implementing Bus Rapid Transit. TransportationResearch Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board No. 1927. Washington,D.C. pp 22-30. 2005.


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14. Hidalgo, D. Comparing Transit Alternatives After Recent Developments in BRT in LatinAmerica. Presented at the 85th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,Washington, D.C. January 2006.

15. Cervero, R. Progressive Transport and the Poor: Bogots Bold Steps Forward. Access

Journal of Transportation Research, at UC Berkeley, CA. No 27, Fall 2005.

16. Hidalgo, D. & Hermann, G. The Bogot Model for Sustainable Transportation; inspiringdeveloping cities throughout the world in: TRIALOG - Zeitschrift fr das Planen undBauen in der Dritten Welt /A Journal for Planning and Building in the Third World, 82 /3-2004. 2004

17. Liu, C. Orange Line Eases A.M. Rush on 101 Freeway. Los Angeles Times. December30, 2005.

18. Targa, F. Examining Accessibility and Proximity-Related Effects of Bogots Bus RapidSystem Using Spatial Hedonic Price Models, Department of City and Regional Planning,

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2003.

19. Barrios, V.P. Influye La Accesibilidad en la Renta Inmobiliaria? - Estudio Del Caso DelSistema De Transporte Masivo TransMilenio Bogot. Masters Thesis. EconomicsDepartment. Universidad de los Andes. 2002.

20. Savas, E.S. & McMahon, E.J. Competitive Contracting of Bus Service: A Better Deal forRiders and Taxpayers. Civic Report 30. Center for Civic Innovation. Manhattan Institute.2002.


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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Phases I and II of the TransMilenio System 16

FIGURE 2: Typical Trunk Corridor Terminal Station 17

FIGURE 3: Mode Split from 1998 to 2005 in Bogot (Source: TransMilenio S.A) 18

FIGURE 4: The Importance of Dedicated Runningways to Achieving 19a Competitive Advantage Over the Private Auto

FIGURE 5: Urban Renewal in Bogot 20

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Comparing Bogot with U.S Cities 21

TABLE 2: Comparison of the 1997 Heavy Rail Proposal with 22TransMilenio Phases I and II

TABLE 3: Comparison of TransMilenio Capital Costs with 23Different Rapid Transit Projects in the U.S

TABLE 4: Reasons for Political Support of Rail Transit 24

TABLE 5: Replicating the Bogot Model - Issues to Consider 25


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FIGURE 1 Phases I and II of the TransMilenio System

Phase IPhase II:- Americas

- NQS (north)

- NQS (south)/Suba


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FIGURE 2 Typical Trunk Corridor Terminal Station


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FIGURE 3 Mode Split from 1998 to 2005 in Bogot (Source: TransMilenio S.A)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Bus-Buseta-Colectivo

TransMilenio

Non-Motorized

Private Vehicle-Motorcycle


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FIGURE 4 The Importance of Dedicated Runningways to Achieving a CompetitiveAdvantage Over the Private Auto


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Before TransMilenio After TransMilenio

FIGURE 5 Urban Renewal in Bogot


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TABLE 1 Comparing Bogot with U.S Cities

Bogot, Colombia: U.S Cities:

Population of about 8 million in greater Bogot: Higher density development CBD-focused urban form Lower income groups live on the city periphery

Only a handful of US cities >5 million population: Lower density development Decentralized activity centers Lower income groups live near the CBD

High demand for transit (>80% of mode share): Car travel is relatively expensive Majority do not own cars, many captive riders

Low demand for transit ( 1.0 Transit service operated by private sector,

regulated by public sector Private sector responsible for vehicle purchase

Fare box recovery ratio < 1.0 Transit service regulated and operated by public

sector Service operations are subsidized

Political structure characterized by a powerful executivebody

City executives and mayors in the U.S generally wieldless power and influence over policy implementation


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TABLE 2- Comparison of the 1997 Heavy Rail Proposal with TransMilenio Phases I and II

Heavy Rail(1997 Proposal)

TransMilenioPhase 1

TransMilenioPhase II

TransMilenioMaster Plan

Capital Cost(Infrastructure)

$2,350M $240M $545M $2,300M

Vehicles / farecollection

$691M $100M $80M $1,020

Total Capital Cost* $3,041M $340M $625M $3,320M

Length km(Length miles)

29km(18.0 miles)

41km(25.6 miles)

41km(25.6 miles)

388km(241 miles)

Cost per km(Cost per mile)

$105M / km($169M / mile)

$8.3M / km($13.3M / miles)

$15.2M / km*****($24.4M / mile)

$8.6M / km($13.8M / mile)

Weekday Ridership 795,000** 792,000 468,000*** 5,000,000

Coverage of CitysTotal Transit Trips

16 percent**** 16 percent 10 percent 85 percent

* The heavy rail costs are provided in 1997 prices while the TransMilenio costs are in 2003 prices. Accounting forinflation would slightly increase the cost the heavy rail option relative to the TransMilenio options.

** Estimated daily ridership without integration with TransMilenio system and traditional buses.*** In May 2006, shortly after Phase II completion, total system ridership was measured at 1,260,000. This figure is

continuing to rise and is expected to stabilize at around 1.4 million by the end of the year.**** As stated previously in this report, Ardila-Gomez (2004) stated that the metro proposal would account for only

eight percent of the citys total t ransit trips. A later analysis by Hidalgo (1999) estimated metro proposal coverageat 26 percent (1,325,000 daily trips) if fully integrated with the new TransMilenio system, and 16 percent (795,000daily trips) without integration. It is the view of the authors that the 16 percent figure is the most appropriate forcomparison purposes.

***** Further analysis of Phase II costs show that only 37 percent of the costs are specifically for TransMilenioinfrastructure (exclusive lanes, stations, terminals, pedestrian overpasses, and studies and designs). Of theremaining 63 percent, 40 percent is for general traffic lanes, non-grade intersections, sidewalks and utilities; 11percent is for right of way acquisition; and 12 percent is for environmental and social mitigation, trafficmanagement, detours, and maintenance. Thus, the TransMilenio portion of Phase II costs US$207M, equating to

approximately $5M per km.


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Table 3 Comparison of TransMilenio Capital Costs withDifferent Rapid Transit Projects in the U.S*

System / LocationMode

(runningway)

TrunkLength(Miles)

Capital Cost(2003 USD

$M)

Capital Costper Mile

(2003 USD$M / Mile)

AverageWeekdayRidership

AverageWeekday

Pass /Mile

San Pablo RapidOakland, CA

BRT(mixed traffic)

14 $.3.2 $0.23 6,100 436

Las Vegas MAXLas Vegas, NV

BRT(bus lane)

7.5 $20.3 $2.7 6,300 840

SilverLine Phase IBoston, MA

BRT(bus lane)

2.3 $27.3 $11.9 14,000 6,087

Metro Orange LineLos Angeles, CA

BRT(exclusive ROW)

14.0 $350 $25.0 21,000 1,500

TransMilenio (Phase 1)Bogot, Colombia

BRT(exclusive ROW)

25.6 $340.0 $13.3 792,000 30,907

TransMilenio (Phase 2)Bogot, Colombia

BRT(exclusive ROW)

25.6 $625.0 $24.8 468,000 18,281

North South CorridorSalt Lake City, UT

LRT(surface) 15.0 $397.3 $26.5 20,000 1,333

Hiawatha CorridorMinneapolis, MN

LRT(surface + tunnel)

11.6 $612.6 $52.8 25,000 2,155

Red LineLos Angeles, CA

HRT (underground) 16.5 $5,557.3 $337.6 96,000 5,832

MetrorailWashington, D.C

HRT 112.0$16,300.0

(Estimated)$145.5 956,000 8,536

* Includes estimated cost of vehicles and fare collection costs.Sources: 2003 National Transit Database; APTA 2005 Heavy Rail Transit Ridership Report; FTA Heavy and Light Rail Capital Cost Studies

(2003 and 2004 updates) by Booz Allen Hamilton; FTA BRT evaluations in Boston and Las Vegas (2005) by Booz Allen Hamilton


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TABLE 4 Reasons for Political Support of Rail Transit

Hidalgo 2006* Comments on Applicability to U.S

Rail capital costs are usually funded with federal

assistance. Municipalities may prefer metros to

maximize disbursements to the local economy.

Yes, there is a perception that (dollar for dollar) railmaximizes benefits to the local economy.

BRT may requirereorganization of existing busroutes and operations. This is politically difficult, and

unpopular among local administrators. Most metros

are implemented without any, or minimum, nuisance

to existing private operators.

Reorganization of existing routes is not as significantan issue in U.S because transit tends to be publiclyoperated and managed.

Metros are viewed asmore modern than buses.Yes, the stigma associated with buses is perhaps evenmore significant in the U.S.

The rail industry activelypromotes the

implementation of Metros.

Yes, the BRT industry in the U.S is in a relativelynascent state.

BRT is not yetunderstoodby decision-makers.Yes, but this may change as programs and institutionscontinue to promote BRT and other bus solutions.

Decision-makers typically do not use transit, but may

find a Metro in a developed-world citycomfortable,

reliable and quiet.

Yes, local decision-makers of cities without rail transitmay view metros as a way to make their cities world

class.*Paraphrased from Hidalgo, D. (2006). Comparing Transit Alternatives After Recent Developments in LatinAmerica. Presented at TRB 2006.


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TABLE 5 - Replicating the Bogot Model - Issues to ConsiderIssues* Comments on Applicability to U.S.

Defining a vision of the transport system required for the city: Many localadministrators have no clear long-term vision for their cities, and therefore

continue existing plans that favor individual mobility or large-scale urban

rail projects. These type of projects have long maturation time that extends

beyond a given election cycle. If plans are changed in the next election,definitive solutions are often postponed for decades.

Yes, the political cycle in the US is typically4-5 years, which is enough time to implementBRT but perhaps not rail.

Getting resources for project preparation: BRT projects are complex andrequire technical, financial, and legal studies to guarantee successful

implementation. There is usually a lack of money set aside for such studies.

Some local administrations receive international cooperation or

multilateral lending, but only after many months of hard work.

In many ways, this is less of a problem in theU.S cities which in the past have preferredmore expensive rail solutions over bus. As wemove into a more financially constrainedenvironment for transit federal funding, thereseems to be growing support for lower costoptions.

Completing technical studies: project design itself is not difficult, since the

main engineering concepts for bus priority and operations are well known.

Nevertheless, large data collection and model calibration studies are

needed for successful demand forecasting, which is then used to define the

fleet size, required services, and potential system income. All of this takes

time, since data, such as origin-destination matrices and transit networks,

are seldom readily available.

This should be less of a problem in the U.Ssince many cities are required to regularlyupdate regional travel demand models.

Getting local transit providers to participate in the process (or at leastovercoming their opposition): in developing countries, individual vehicleowners usually provide public transportation services. These bus owners

and operatorsoften affiliated with trade unions or cooperativesmake

their profits by reducing or eliminating vehicle maintenance and forcing

drivers to work long hours without benefits. They tend to instinctively

oppose, through political influence and strikes, any effort to rationalize the

public transport sector out of fear that efforts to improve service will harm

them financially. Winning over the traditional transport sector is perhaps

the biggest challenge to the successful implementation of BRT systems in

developing cities.

This is less of an issue in US since providersand/or managers tend to be public agencies.

Making changes in law, regulations and institutional frameworks: this

may include the creation or modification of agencies that are responsiblefor system oversight, bidding and contracting. This requires political

bargaining within the elected bodies (city council, state legislature or

national congress).

Yes, this would include:

creation or modification of agencies that

are responsible for the systemsoversight, bidding and contracting in anefficient and transparent process

appropriate distribution of rights,responsibilities and risks

Creating adequate incentives for a sound economic scheme that remainsover time: designing appropriate distribution of rights, responsibilities and

risks is always difficult as long as there are conflicting interests between

maximizing profits and providing quality service. Neglecting this important

issue significantly reduces the chances of a successful BRT system.

Yes, this is probably more difficult in the U.Swithout profit as a motivator.Appropriate use of concession contracts maybe a way to achieve this in the U.S.

Securing financial resources for infrastructure: despite the relative lowcost of BRT as compared with rail-based alternatives, developing cities tend

not to have capital readily available. Many resort to new taxes (fuel, value

capture), which need approval by elected bodies, and grants from the

national government. Some also seek finance from multilateral lending

institutions, which takes time. Government-to-government concessionaryloans would help increase BRT projects, just as they helped propagate rail-

based alternatives in the past.

Funding programs such as FTA SmallStarts are becoming more accessible to BRTprojects.

Bidding service operations and infrastructure: Developing proposals andevaluating and awarding contracts in a transparent way is often difficult as

long as public agencies are subject of pressures from interest groups.

The current limited size of the outsourcedoperations market in the U.S. may not yet beable to support healthy competition.

Source: Hidalgo, D., & Hermann, G. (2004). The Bogot Model for Sustainable Transportation; Inspiring Developing CitiesThroughout the World.

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APPLICABILITY OF BOGOTÁ’S TRANSMILENIO BRT SYSTEM TO THE UNITED STATES

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