APPLIED POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF USAID PRIORITY ...

APPLIED POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF USAID PRIORITY PROVINCES IN INDONESIA

DKI Jakarta September–October 2020

APPLIED POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF USAID PRIORITY PROVINCES IN INDONESIA

DKI Jakarta

Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Support to USAID/Indonesia

Mechanism Number: AID–486–I–14-00001 (IDIQ); Task Order 72049719F00001

Prepared for: Elizabeth Mendenhall, Contracting Officer’s Representative USAID/Indonesia

American Embassy Jl. Medan Merdeka Selatan, No. 3-5, Gambir, Kecamatan Gambir, Kota Jakarta Pusat, Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 10110 Indonesia Prepared by: Social Impact, Inc. Contact: Valentine J. Gandhi, Chief of Party

2300 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1000 Arlington, VA 22201 This report was prepared by Ridza M. M. Aziz (Social Impact); Basab Dasgupta (Social Impact), Christine E. Thomas (Social Impact), Valentine J Gandhi(Social Impact), Trigeany Linggoatmodjo (USAID, Study Team Leader); Francisca Soesanto (USAID); Johanna Gardjito (USAID), Rosyidah Handayani (USAID); Yahya Luping (USAID)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The team would like to thank the following for their contributions to the report:

PEA Field Work Team Trigeany Linggoatmodjo – USAIDTeam Leader

Ridza M. M. Aziz – SI Researcher Francisca Soesanto – USAID Researcher Johanna Gardjito – USAID Researcher

Rosyidah Handayani – USAID Researcher Yahya Luping – USAID Researcher

PEA Management, Analysis and Reporting Team Basab Dasgupta – Team Leader

Valentine Gandhi – MEL COP and Project Director and Reviewer Ridza M. M. Aziz – SI Researcher

Christine E. Thomas – Project Manager Leslie Hodel – MEL TFP and Reviewer

Alexandra McMullin – Copy Editor Fina Hastuti – Contracts and Financial Support

Lucia Monalisa – Procurement Support

USAID Program Office Management Support Elizabeth Mendenhall – COR, and Director Program Office

Marunga Manda – PEA Co Lead, M&E Advisor Fitria Wahid – ACOR, GIS Specialist

Yasmeen Thomason – ACOR, Deputy Director, Programs Office

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iv

INTRODUCTION 1

PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE 1

SUMMARY OF DESK REVIEW FINDINGS 2

PEA THEMES 2

METHODOLOGY 4

DATA SOURCES AND SELECTION 4

ANALYSIS 5

LIMITATIONS 5

FINDINGS 6

THEME 1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP 6

THEME 2: GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 7

THEME 3: URBAN RESILIENCE AND SERVICE DELIVERIES 8

THEME 4: INCLUSIVE MARKET-DRIVEN GROWTH 11

THEME 5: DONOR COORDINATION 14

CONCLUSIONS 15

THEME 1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP 15

THEME 2: GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 16

THEME 3: URBAN RESILIENCE AND SERVICE DELIVERIES 16

THEME 4: INCLUSIVE MARKET-DRIVEN GROWTH 17

THEME 5: DONOR COORDINATION 18

RECOMMENDATIONS 19

REFERENCES 20

ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND FOR EACH THEME, BASED ON DESK REVIEW 22

ANNEX 2: CORE AND SUPPORTING PEA QUESTIONS 23

ANNEX 3: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX 25

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ACRONYMS

AKB Adoption of New Habits (Phase During the COVID-19 Pandemic) APBD Provincial Revenues and Expenditures Budget APINDO Employers Association of Indonesia (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia) B40 Bottom 40% of the Population Bappeda Provincial Development Planning Agency Bappenas National Development Planning Agency BDCF Bilateral Development Cooperation Framework BKPM Investment Coordination Agency BPBD Provincial Disaster Management Agency BPK Financial Audit Board CDCS Country Development and Cooperation Strategy CHS Complaint Handling System CSO Civil Society Organization Dinas Provincial Sectoral Services Office Dinkes Provincial Health Services Office DO Development Objective DPRD Provincial House of Representatives DPRKP Provincial Services Office for Housings and Residential Area Affairs DSDA Provincial Water Resource Services Office FGD Focus Group Discussion GOI Government of Indonesia IDR Indonesia Rupiah ITF Intermediate Treatment Facility JDCN Jakarta Development Collaboration Network JIC Jakarta Investment Center JKN National Health Security Program KII Key Informant Interview KLJ Jakarta Elderly Card KOTAKU City without Slums Program KPBU Partnership between the Government and Its Enterprise KSD Provincial Strategic Activities MCH Maternal and Child Health MEL Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forestry MoF Ministry of Finance MoH Ministry of Health MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs MoU Memorandum of Understanding MSMEs Micro, Small, and Medium-Scale Enterprises Musrenbang Annual Participatory Development Planning Deliberations OCE One Center of Entrepreneurship PEA Political Economy Analysis PEN National Economic Recovery PERPRES Presidential Decree PPD Local Development Award PPKD Provincial Work Training Center

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PPP Public-Private Partnership PSBB Large-Scale Social Distancing (Phase During the COVID-19 Pandemic) Puskesmas Community Health Center PwD People with Disabilities RPJMD Provincial Medium-Term Development Plan RPJMN National Medium-Term Development Plan RSUD Local Government’s General Hospital SDG Sustainable Development Goal Setda Secretariat of the Provincial Government SI Social Impact SKPD Provincial Government Work Unit TGUPP DKI Jakarta Governor’s Team for Accelerated Development UN United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollar

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Government of Indonesia (GOI), represented by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), signed the Bilateral Development Cooperation Framework for the period of July 23, 2020, to September 30, 2025, to implement USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). This political economy analysis (PEA) is intended to inform project/activity design by better understanding the local dynamics, potential implementation challenges, and opportunities associated with working in the Special Capital Region of (DKI) Jakarta. The process started with a desk review to provide overview of political economy and sectoral information of the province. During the second PEA stage, core and supporting questions were identified to complement desk review results with key informant interviews (KIIs).

METHODOLOGY The study uses the PEA framework as a structured approach for examining why things work the way they do. It examines the power dynamics, economic forces, and social forces that influence development effectiveness and analyzes findings according to four pillars: Foundational Factors, Rules of the Game, Here and Now, and Dynamics. To respond and adapt to these realities, the approach guides stakeholders in understanding the inherent challenges for operationalizing the process of political thinking and rigorous collaborating, learning, and adapting. This study uses a combination of contextual review, desk review, and fieldwork (structured stakeholder interviews) for the analysis. The contextual and desk reviews, previously submitted as standalone pieces, assisted in identifying relevant questions for fieldwork and fed into the analysis as a background document.

FINDINGS To fill out the gaps identified in the desk review, the team took a deeper dive to address a set of PEA questions under five themes—intergovernmental relationship, governance and accountability, urban resilience and service delivery, inclusive economic growth, and donor coordination. The following section highlights the key findings from the stakeholder discussions.

THEME 1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP

Despite turbulent gubernatorial and presidential elections in the beginning, the relations between the central and provincial governments have improved over time. The central government and DKI Jakarta, for example, have worked together in the implementation of several national strategic projects that may support the province in improving its urban resilience. As the state capital, DKI Jakarta also has the discretion to innovate in delivering public services that has driven the province to collaborate further with the central government. In addition, DKI Jakarta’s e-planning and e-budgeting systems have complemented the central government’s musrenbang1 mechanism. Harmonized relations between the central and provincial governments are also indicated through the synchronized efforts to improve the certainty and ease of doing business for the last six years. However, outside the government, most people view the DKI Jakarta’s regionalization approach as important for strong coordination between DKI Jakarta and adjacent regions, with the intermediacy of the center.

1 Musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan (musrenbang) is the standard annual participatory development planning deliberations set by Bappenas. The process is tiered from the kelurahan level, at which decisions are brought up to the next deliberative levels (sub district, city, provincial, and national levels). The musrenbang decisions are the basis for stipulating the annual provincial budget.

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THEME 2: GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Compared with other regions, the bureaucracy of DKI Jakarta is considered competent and efficient. The province also has the advantage of being supported by e-governance various platforms developed since the previous tenure, whereas public monitoring is considered to be relatively strong because of the musrenbang mechanism, the presence of civil society organizations (CSOs), and the mass media. The Financial Audit Board (BPK) has acknowledged DKI Jakarta’s good governance and accountability in the financial aspect. In spite of this, the media have identified several alleged corruption cases mostly brought up first by the national CSOs based in Jakarta. The e-governance platforms also have been viewed as becoming underused. In addition, proposals submitted through the musrenbang process are now filtered according to provincial strategic activities (KSDs) on a tiered basis at the city/district and provincial levels, unable to accommodate all of the interests of the heterogeneous groups in Jakarta. Most informants view the approach to e-governance is on track as long as there is adequate capacity-building of the operating personnel in line with technological upgrading. Outside the national CSOs, other CSOs also require capacity-building because they have faced issues regarding technical capacity and institutional sustainability.

THEME 3: URBAN RESILIENCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY

The secretariat for Jakarta Berketahanan (Resilient Jakarta) has developed a strategic document (Strategi Ketahanan Kota Jakarta) based on existing strategies and programs within all DKI Jakarta’s planning documents. KSDs include: intermediate treatment facilities (ITFs) for solid waste management, with a solid waste database being critical for DKI Jakarta’s immediate preparation; air pollution control, an electric vehicle project currently being piloted; improved interregional connectivity of mass transportation systems between Jakarta and the neighboring regions; the giant seawall project; development of quality green space; building of affordable flats, with a current goal of 1,000 affordable flats based upon a substantive share received by DKI Jakarta from the national strategic project; and improvements upon the Jakarta Sewerage Masterplan, with plans for design of groundwater in the buffering regions. It is important to note that many of these strategies and programs have not been realized due to the constraint of land or conflicting priorities between the central and provincial governments, lack of immediate funding, or pending partnerships with implementing partners (IPs) and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In the health service delivery, the provincial government is currently upgrading the existing kecamatan-level community health centers (puskesmas) into local government’s general hospitals (RSUDs), financed by Provincial Revenues and Expenditures Budget (APBD) allocation. DKI Jakarta provides the bottom 40 percent of the population (B40) with the National Health Security (JKN) and Jakarta elderly card (KLJ) programs, both KSDs. Currently, HIV tests are available to Jakarta residents through puskesmas or private clinics, with government program policy and regulation compliance oversight by DKI Jakarta for private entities. The Provincial Health Service Office (Dinkes) has partnered with CSOs in tracing HIV-positive people through the SEHATI program. Each implementing unit has an HIV program team with an appointed recording and reporting officer, whereas tuberculosis program teams have not included such officers, which leave a gap in program services.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has further magnified vulnerable groups lacking health services, with HIV tests limited to 2–5 people during large-scale social distancing (PSBB) and increased only to 8–10 people since adoption of new habits (AKB). Courier services for condom distribution and antiretroviral are only limited to Jakarta-based, HIV-positive patients and sex workers. Additionally, unemployed laborers have lost work-sponsored JKN access, while waste pickers have become more exposed to an uptick of infectious waste discarded.

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THEME 4: INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Despite having a high percentage of educated workforce and high economic growth, Jakarta has a relatively higher income inequality, lower rate of women’s labor force participation, and youth unemployment. Job opportunities are relatively low because the manufacturing sector only absorbs 17.18 percent. Youth unemployment dominates in Jakarta, particularly for senior secondary or vocational school graduates and mostly in North Jakarta. Main reasons for the high unemployment rate in Jakarta are: (1) the high migration rate; persons from other regions might lack compatibility with the existing labor market demand, which ultimately forces them to join the informal sector; and (2) problems of link-and-match to meet the current service sector demands.

Skill Gap: DKI Jakarta has provided vocational schools and polytechnics, as well as relevant KSD scholarships targeting the vulnerable population from elementary to higher education (the Jakarta Smart Card scholarship program, for children from poor families, and Jakarta Excelled University Student Card scholarship program) and vocational school revitalization. However, public-private partnerships (PPPs) on vocational training and quality apprenticeship programs are still limited. Several dinas provide training events through partnerships with CSOs, whereas one Provincial Work Training Center (PPKD) is established in each city. Supporting micro, small, and medium-scale enterprises (MSMEs) is an option for job creation, but the existing programs have not exhaustively addressed basic problems such as access to capital and license requirements.

Pandemic, Economy, and Social Assistance: Following the pandemic, the annual economic growth of Jakarta for the second quarter of 2020 contracted by -8.22 percent, impacting mostly the manufacturing, trading, and hospitality sectors. The Provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) predicts the growth rate will be 2.8 to 3.2 percent in 2020 while the open unemployment rate will reach 8.52 percent in 2020. Social assistance programs so far have helped both households and micro-scale businesses, but the national Pre-Employment Card (Kartu Prakerja) program is considered problematic. As the private sector is under pressure, and new MSMEs have continued growing, the most recent National Economic Recovery (PEN) program has targeted them for receiving interest rate subsidies and bank loans. However, budget realization has remained low. The Ministry of Cooperatives and MSMEs’ one-gate policy also has not reached the grassroots level. One of the major issues in delivering programs to the MSMEs is the lack of the database on actual MSMEs. In line with national policy, Bappeda has adjusted the 2017–2022 Provincial Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), by (1) supporting economic recovery activities; (2) adapting improvement of basic services as a form of a social safety net; (3) developing alternative partnership schemes and large-scale social collaborations; (4) supporting sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the principles of urban resilience; and (5) enhancing the access to digital infrastructures. Bappeda has also mapped several financial sources for the recovery aside from APBD. DKI Jakarta has the effective kelurahan-basis development program that is viewed as effective to be involved in implementing the recovery activities.

THEME 5: DONOR COORDINATION

Two entryways into DKI Jakarta are Bappeda as the planning agency and the relevant Dinas as the implementing partner. On investments, Jakarta Investment Center (JIC) has an information and promotion unit that provides potential investors information on the Investment Coordination Agency (BKPM) and JAKEVO procedures and other required licenses and permits. It does promotions on the existing projects or introduces investors to matching private companies in Jakarta. JIC’s market intelligence unit provides data on foreign investments by sector and subsector. Non-government actors can bridge collaborations with and between the central and local governments but need to identify the right key champions. Jakarta Development Collaboration Network (JDCN) is DKI Jakarta’s network for collaborations with local and international development partners, either through government-to-government, government-to-business, or government-to-citizen schemes. A provincial

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regulation on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is being drafted to support this purpose. The secretariat of JDCN is at Biro KSD under the Secretariat of the Provincial Government (Setda) and the day-to-day manager is the head of Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). The possibility of streamlining the JDCN and Bappeda budgeting mechanism in the future will be the authority of Setda.

CONCLUSIONS

Urban resilience and social economic inclusivity have been the main issues for Jakarta. They are driven by Jakarta’s high economic growth that constantly attracts migrants despite that the province is already overly dense. The provincial government has made efforts to overcome these problems, collaborating with the central government, the private sector, and the civil society, and to coordinate with neighboring regions that constitute the Greater Jakarta area. Because of the impact of the elections, the last transition of leadership in Jakarta is also perceived to have brought on tensions between DKI Jakarta and the central government, affecting the province as a whole. With the transition, the current leadership has also introduced new actors and approaches that have not always received welcoming responses from the public. However, DKI Jakarta and the central government are now seen to have proceeded to improve communications as they remain dependent on each other and work together to deal with the state capital’s major problems. Moreover, the pandemic is viewed to have driven DKI Jakarta to make more efforts to bridge communications and reach out to all of their stakeholders and ensure recovery.


Jakarta is at an advantage as the center of government and economic growth since pre-independence, and further advantaged by decentralization. However, environmental and social economic issues have driven the province to become more dependent on neighboring autonomous regions to find solutions. [Foundational Factors] The current leadership has introduced new actors and approaches that have not always been received well by the public. Jakarta’s provincial government status in one hand, and its restricted performance regulated by the relation with the central government, has fueled the tension. [Rules of Game/Here and Now] In spite of this, interdependency has so far led all sides to continue their collaborations. [Dynamics]


Jakarta has the advantage of relatively competent and efficient bureaucracy, budgetary space and infrastructure to support its vertical structure, and strong public monitoring, although red tape practices still occur. [Foundational Factors] The e-budgeting systems have complemented the standard musrenbang process and DKI Jakarta has performed bureaucratic reforms and digitization of service platforms. The current TGUPP safeguards KSDs as quick wins in the regional development. [Rules of Game/Here and Now] Despite meeting BPK’s audit standards, DKI Jakarta is alleged of several corruption cases brought up by the media and national CSOs. Although e-budgeting systems are still in use and e-governance platforms are seen on track, there appears to be a lack in upgrading the system operating personnel. [Dynamics]

THEME 3: URBAN RESILIENCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Given the high population pressure, Jakarta’s resilience primarily depends on coordination with neighboring regions regarding various environmental issues. [Foundational Factors] Both the recent Strategi Ketahanan Kota Jakarta and Presidential Regulation 60/2020 provide better grounds for addressing such issues. Adjustments to RPJMD 2017-2022 following the pandemic lead to focusing on

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solid waste management, wastewater management, air pollution control, traffic congestion and mass transportation systems, flood control, and health service delivery. [Rules of Game/Here and Now] Each Dinas applies one or more partnership schemes for flexibility, such as the co-financing scheme with the central government, or developer obligation schemes with the private sector. [Dynamics]

THEME 4: MARKET-DRIVEN INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Despite its relatively high economic growth, Jakarta has a higher income inequality, a lower rate of women’s labor force participation, and faces issues on youth unemployment. [Foundational Factors] The pandemic has aggravated the unemployment rate. While the manufacturing sector is unable to absorb the workforce, the informal sector has been flourishing. [Here and Now] DKI Jakarta has issued a number of regulations and has made adjustments to the 2017–2022 RPJMD, in line with the national policies on state and local budget allocations. [Rules of Game] Better job-related training and more basic support, such as business formalization to be able to access loans, are needed during the recovery. Both households and MSMEs have been supported by social assistance programs but they will also need long-term social protection programs. The kelurahan-basis development program is viewed effective to be involved in recovery programs. [Dynamics]


Two key entry points in DKI Jakarta are Bappeda as the planning agency and the relevant Dinas as the implementing partner. Implementation monitoring and evaluation is the responsibility of Biro PLH. [Rules of Game] For investments, the key partner can be JIC. NGOs can also facilitate collaborations with and between the central and local governments but need to identify the right key partners. DKI Jakarta has developed JDCN and is preparing the required regulations to support the networking for recovery efforts. [Here and Now/Dynamics]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on findings and conclusions, following are several recommendations:

● Support the resilience of Jakarta’s heterogenous civil society, by identifying stakeholders and forums operating as discourse makers (e.g. local politicians, the mass media, CSOs) and by identifying key champions who might support activities in filling capacity gaps (technical, advocacy, financial management) of Jakarta-focused, non-national CSOs.

● With regard to urban resilience and service delivery, to work with Bappeda and the relevant Dinas in identifying potential partnerships among the priority sectors (health service delivery, solid waste management, wastewater management, air pollution control, traffic congestion and mass transportation systems, and flood control) in accordance with the respective existing partnership schemes.

● With regard to inclusive economic growth, to work with Bappeda and the relevant Dinas in investigating the root problem of youth unemployment, low female labor force participation, constant in-migration and design appropriate programming.

● Furthermore, identify how education or training and apprenticeship can improve the linkage between workers’ skills and industrial needs and support relevant activities (e.g. bridging gaps in promotions on the 200 percent super tax deduction; short-term training program partnerships for updating local occupational standards; capacity building of training instructors; and provision of labor market information).

● Particularly as part of recovery activities following the COVID-19 pandemic, support job creation activities, e.g. relating to digital literacy and financial literacy for MSMEs, as well as social guarantee or extended conditional cash transfer programs.

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INTRODUCTION

Politics and the political economy affect whether and how reforms happen in developing as well as in developed countries (The World Bank, 2009). PEA is an analytical approach to indicate how political thinking can be applied more systematically to “understand the underlying reasons why things work the way they do and identify the incentives and constraints impacting the behavior of actors in a relevant system” (Menocal, 2018). Armed with a clear understanding of these complex dynamics, USAID/Indonesia will be better equipped to identify appropriate, sustainable solutions that enhance self-reliance.

This PEA study is intended to produce operationally relevant findings and implications to inform project/activity design for the upcoming CDCS by better understanding the local dynamics, potential implementation challenges, and opportunities associated with working in the eight provinces. USAID and the GOI, represented by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), signed the Bilateral Development Cooperation Framework (BDCF) for the period of July 23, 2020, to September 30, 2025, to implement USAID’s CDCS goal: “Indonesia is an advanced, just, prosperous, and self-reliant Indo-Pacific partner.” Aligning it with the GOI’s 2020–2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) goal, USAID as a donor will concentrate and integrate at least two-thirds of CDCS funding for national-level policy work in eight priority provinces, including DKI Jakarta. To advance its self-reliance goal, the GOI has identified four priority areas for USAID support: government effectiveness, human capital development, inclusive economic growth, and environmental sustainability. Under the new CDCS, USAID/Indonesia will contribute to GOI priorities through the following CDCS development objectives (DOs): DO 1: Effective, Democratic Governance Strengthened, DO 2: Inclusive Market-Driven Economic Growth Increased, DO 3: Environmental Sustainability Improved, and DO 4: Priority Health Outcomes Improved.

To feed into its CDCS programming, USAID undertook a “deep dive” for the eight priority provinces through a PEA initiative that will allow the DO teams to gain a better understanding of the local context resulting in more tailored project activity designs. The advantage of using PEA in this regard is that it fits more systematically into this particular operational work to better address risks and respond to demands for an appropriate approach that is tailored to specific situations in the target areas to enhance development effectiveness.

PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE

The monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) support team is tasked by the Mission to provide support to each provincial team from USAID’s eight target provinces and guide them to complete each phase of the study—contextual and desk review phase, data collection tool and protocol development phase, interview phase, and analysis and report writing phase. The purpose of this study is to utilize USAID’s applied PEA methodology to better understand the local dynamics, potential implementation challenges, and opportunities associated with working in all eight provinces chosen by USAID/Indonesia as priority focus provinces under the Mission’s new CDCS.

The two key objectives of the PEA are to:

1. Help the Mission better understand the provincial-level context and the likelihood for change in priority development sectors.

2. Inform activity design in support of CDCS implementation, including suggestions of programmatic approaches to address key findings specific to each province.

Additionally, the PEAs should support Mission staff in gaining a greater understanding of the elements at the local level required to support Indonesia on its journey to self-reliance.


SUMMARY OF DESK REVIEW FINDINGS

A desk review exercise provided a preliminary basis for understanding the situation in DKI Jakarta and for designing subsequent PEA data collection activities. Desk review findings are summarized here. An additional summary according to adopted PEA themes is also available in Annex 1.

Jakarta is the most urbanized region in Indonesia bordering Banten and West Java Provinces. Together they make up the Mega Urban Region. DKI Jakarta has a highly heterogeneous population. DKI Jakarta’s special status highlights the complexity that it faces in addressing cross-regional issues that require coordination across different layers of governments and with local communities that involve dynamic political interests and incentives that the provincial government must navigate. Ethnicity and religion are important influencing factors both in local and national politics within the capital territory.

The desk review found that there is a significant disconnect between national and subnational governments or bureaucrats in terms of policy deliberation and implementation. National policies are unsynchronized with the needs and challenges at the subnational level. There is also a noticeable capacity gap among civil servants within government institutions. In the context of governance and accountability, DKI Jakarta’s governance is characterized by a relatively strong liberal democracy and moderate social group equality, marred by relatively poorly implemented elections and low citizen transparency. The Provincial Roadmaps reports that DKI Jakarta has a moderate commitment to “open and accountable governance.”

In the context of urban resilience and service delivery, DKI Jakarta faces substantial challenges to improve poor environmental conditions that both contribute to and are exacerbated by climate change, namely flooding and pollution. Through the Rockefeller Foundation–funded 100 Resilient Cities network, DKI Jakarta developed a strategy for urban resilience in three stages: Ready, Healthy, Connected.

In terms of inclusive economic growth, DKI Jakarta is the country’s financial capital with high foreign investment and gross domestic product (GDP). Jakarta’s economy primarily depends on wholesale and retail small businesses. Jakarta has a high population of youth, indicating a solid workforce. However, a higher official unemployment rate in DKI Jakarta than the national average indicates that there may be either less opportunities for youth, or there is a skill gap between what the industries demand and the young people possess. There is also a substantial gender gap in employment.

Donor coordination at the subnational level is weak. In terms of developmental challenges, most of foreign development assistance has to go through the national government (Bappenas) before implementation.

PEA THEMES

The desk review results summarized above presented a high-level overview of DKI Jakarta-specific PEA pillars (Foundational Factors, Rules of the Game, Here and Now, and Dynamics) as well as sectoral information based on a review of the relevant literature. During the second PEA stage, core and supporting questions were identified to complement the desk review overview with key information from interviews (see Annex 2). These questions are organized into themes.

Theme 1 focuses on the intergovernmental interaction in terms of policy deliberation and implementation, while theme 2 looks into the current level of commitment to open and accountable governance. Theme 3 comprises two main topics: the government’s policies and strategies for urban resilience, and the current partnership between the public and private sectors for service delivery. Theme 4 also consists of three main topics, namely the relatively high unemployment, efforts to absorb


the young job seekers, and the economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic. Lastly, theme 5 delves into the most effective way for engaging with regional development programs.


METHODOLOGY

This study uses a combination of contextual review, desk review, and fieldwork for its PEA analysis. The contextual and desk review, previously submitted as standalone pieces, assist in identifying relevant questions for fieldwork, and hence feed into the analysis as a background document identifying drivers of inclusive economic growth, better governance and accountability, and sustainable development of the priority sectors such as environment and health. The study uses the PEA framework as described by USAID (Menocal 2018), a structured approach for examining power dynamics, economic forces, and social forces that influence development effectiveness. To respond and adapt to these realities, the approach guides stakeholders in understanding the inherent challenges for operationalizing the process of political thinking and rigorous collaborating, learning, and adapting (CLA).

Following the PEA framework, the study identifies and breaks down the contributing factors to development (or lack of it) by examining four areas into which most constraints fit: (i) Foundational Factors: deeply embedded, longer-term socioeconomic structural factors, that shape the nature and quality of a given political system, sector, or problem, and inform why it works or looks the way it does; (ii) Rules of the Game: formal and informal institutions, such as, rules and norms, that shape the quality of governance and influence actors’ behavior and their incentives, relationships, power dynamics, capacity for collective action, and the extent to which public and private actors behave and interact in ways that are widely known and accepted; (iii) Here and Now: how current events and circumstances influence the objectives and behavior of key actors or stakeholders, and how they respond to opportunities and impediments to change; and (iv) Dynamics: ways in which the analytical components of the framework interact, addressing how they affect each other, and how they influence/shape prospects for change.

DATA SOURCES AND SELECTION

In accordance with the PEA framework, the DKI Jakarta team held 21 interview and focus group discussion (FGD) sessions with key informants, , involving 23 men and 30 women. Key informants came from various backgrounds, ranging from academia, CSOs, provincial government offices, donor-based projects or donors , and a UN agency.

The PEA fieldwork was composed of four activity phases: introduction to and review of tools, fieldwork training, interview scheduling, and conducting interviews. The introduction to PEA, developing and reviewing tools was launched between July 17 and July 22. Fieldwork training and scheduling interviews were conducted between July 23 and August 25. While training was concurrent for all provinces, KIIs were staggered in scheduling. The entire process took a participatory approach by involving the provincial USAID team and the MEL team.

As interviews were all conducted in Indonesian, the SI researcher prepared the full interview transcriptions in Indonesian and their summaries in English. The DKI Jakarta team then reviewed the interview summaries. Based on these reviewed summaries, the SI researcher mapped and coded all of the summaries in the process of drawing up a matrix of compiled findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This matrix then becomes the basis for writing the draft report.


ANALYSIS

The DKI Jakarta provincial team began analysis following data collection at the end of August 2020. It utilized the framework published by the Learning Lab for assistance in initial KII and FGD summary translation and review in preparation for the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (FCR) Matrix (see Annex 5). As the first step of analysis, the team summarized each interview based on the information provided by the interviewee, followed by a team discussion. Once all interviews were summarized individually, a qualitative tally, (see Annex 6) was prepared to assist in coding overall themes and frequency of interviewee responses for the PEA pillars. Finally, from this tally, the provincial team leaders summarized the overarching findings in the FCR matrix in preparation. The reason for developing the tally sheet was to identify the number of interviewees from government, civil society, academics, and the private sector; and their sex and the number of questions they responded to.

As a next step, the researcher prepared a summary of all interviews in the findings, conclusions, and recommendations matrix and disseminated with other team members for their review. This participatory approach involved each member of the team in the process to contribute based on their own views. It not only ensured quality assurance but also created a sense of team ownership of the product by bringing all members on the same page. The same approach was followed during the drafting phase of the report. A standardized PEA report template is used to organize this report.

LIMITATIONS

Dealing with sensitive questions. Governance and accountability become a sensitive issue particularly when an external team (including donors) discusses levels of corruption or intergovernmental relationship with government officials. To make PEA questions as apolitical as possible, the team needed to work with the language of economics more than the language of politics. This is not an uncommon issue for PEA analysis. Hudson and Leftwich (2014) note that because handling such issues is difficult, most PEAs rely too much on economic assumptions and make it more of an “economics of politics” than a political economy analysis.

Logistical challenges. The DKI Jakarta team was not able to secure an interview with local business associations (Association of Indonesian Entrepreneurs, Apindo, in particular) and did not follow up a session with AmCham. However, the DKI Jakarta team considers that, within the limited time, the collected data was sufficient. At least three key informants work closely with MSMEs at the grassroots level, two others have business backgrounds, while three government offices provide adequate information relating to large-scale business entities.


FINDINGS


INTERGOVERNMENTAL INTERACTION IN TERMS OF POLICY DELIBERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Jakarta is the state capital and country’s center of economy and commerce. Thus, the criteria for evaluating relations between DKI Jakarta and the central government, or other local governments, can be viewed through the lens of functional and collaborative aspects. From the functional aspect, Act 23/2014 defines the authority of DKI Jakarta as a provincial government which is limited to concurrent affairs. The Act also regulates relations between different levels of governments. From the collaborative aspect, the criterion is whether the division of affairs can be executed and communicated effectively.

Bappenas and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) stipulate the standard bottom-up approach for the annual participatory development planning deliberations (musrenbang) that tiers from the grassroots to the national level. Throughout the planning stages, DKI Jakarta always consults with Bappenas, MoHA, and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to comply with the procedures. Thus, from a regulatory aspect, there is no room for improvisations for the regions, especially now as MoHA Regulation 90/2019 rigidly regulates the budgeting nomenclature and MoHA Regulation 10/2020 stipulates the de-concentration fund.

DKI Jakarta’s unique position as the state capital is acknowledged and further supported by Act 29/2007, enabling collaborations between the provincial and central government. The status has given DKI Jakarta the discretion to innovate in providing better public services and, furthermore, become a model for other regions. Though the state capital is planned to shift from Jakarta to East Kalimantan, this will not lessen the significance of Jakarta as demonstrated in other country examples. The question remains of whether DKI Jakarta will still retain its vertical organizational structure.

For the last six years, the focus of both the central government and DKI Jakarta has shifted to ensure certainty and ease of doing business. In accordance with the central government’s bureaucratic reforms and the digitization of service platforms, DKI Jakarta, since 2014, has reformed the Provincial Office for Investment and One Stop Integrated Services (DPM-PTSP) and developed the online JAKEVO platform, which has been integrated into the national online single submission platform.2 The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 noted that DKI Jakarta’s very high score has helped boost the national score (to 78 percent). The same report noted that trading business license processing now only takes just a day from previously one week.3

Jakarta is viewed as the center of the country’s economy. As of July 2020, Jakarta has 285 million bank accounts4 and a regional revenue totaling IDR 45.701,57 billion in 2019.5 Despite its sizable fiscal capacity, the central government has stipulated a large number of national strategic projects for the province through Presidential Regulation 58/2017. Co-financing projects such as the mass rapid transit

2 Robert Endi Lawang et al., Evaluasi Setahun OSS: Studi Pelaksanaan PP, No. 24 Tahun 2018 di Daerah. Jakarta: KPPOD, 2019, 54–56. 3 World Bank. 2020. Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies. Economy Profile Indonesia. https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/i/indonesia/IDN.pdf 4 LPS. 2020. “Distribusi Simpanan Bank Umum Juli 2020.” https://www.lps.go.id/documents/10157/ 197446/07B.+Distribusi+Simpanan+Bank+Umum+-+Juli+2020.pdf/51b1b1c9-8231-46f9-bf60-b4e60eb76015. 5 Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. 2020. Provinsi DKI Jakarta: Dalam Angka 2020. https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/ 2020/02/28/75c2aa351fc1acb44fcea04f/provinsi-dki-jakarta-dalam-angka-2020--penyediaan-data-untuk-perencanaan-pembangunan.html.

https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/i/indonesia/IDN.pdf

https://www.lps.go.id/documents/10157/197446/07B.+Distribusi+Simpanan+Bank+Umum+-+Juli+2020.pdf/51b1b1c9-8231-46f9-bf60-b4e60eb76015


https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2020/02/28/75c2aa351fc1acb44fcea04f/provinsi-dki-jakarta-dalam-angka-2020--penyediaan-data-untuk-perencanaan-pembangunan.html



development, the construction of affordable flats in Pasar Minggu and Pasar Rumput, and the Jakarta Sewerage System project are all developed as national strategic projects under the presidential regulation.

Some key informants think that DKI Jakarta’s relation with the current government at the center somehow took unfavorable turns since the transition of previous leadership in DKI Jakarta. The disharmony reflects less effective communication patterns that have deeply influenced policy implementation and, in the end, only harmed the public interests. Many view this discord as the upshot of political differences. However, communications have become better as both sides rely on each other.

Most non-governmental informants view regionalization as important for DKI Jakarta, though it implies the need for strong coordination between the autonomous regions. As friction frequently arises between DKI Jakarta and adjacent regions from different interests, the regionalization approach will need the intermediacy of the central government for effective collaborative relations.


CURRENT LEVEL OF COMMITMENT TO OPEN AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

CORRUPTION

While some informants admit DKI Jakarta’s personnel are qualified and efficient in general, they still need to improve their professionalism. The Financial Audit Board (BPK) formally acknowledges that DKI Jakarta is accountable from the financial aspect. However, there are major corruption cases that have attracted public scrutiny. Media reports have identified several alleged corruption cases relating to the reclamations, the Provincial Revenues and Expenditures Budget (APBD) allocation, or expenditures. In addition, DKI Jakarta’s bureaucratic red tapes and openness also remain an issue for several social groups. Labor unions, for example, are often compelled to hold protests to speed up the process of report handling. As a result, from the past elections, the bureaucracy has been considered to be no longer neutral.

RED TAPISM

For efficient handling of cases, DKI Jakarta Governor’s Team for Accelerated Development (TGUPP) is formed. With 50 members, TGUPP is, however, seen to have slowed down the bureaucracy by extending the chain of command. They are alleged to receive large and costly honorariums. In its 2019 report, TGUPP admitted that they did not have a smooth start, but over time communication with other Provincial Government Work Unit (SKPDs) became more effective. Furthermore, due to the pandemic, these honorariums have been rationalized and their payments have been postponed based on Governor’s Decision 514/2020.

ACCOUNTABILITY

DKI Jakarta’s Personnel Agency has provided an online personnel system that enables the public to look for information on the entire organizational structure in detail. Quick Response to the Public (CRM), another mobile Complaint Handling System (CHS) application under Smart City, links complaint responses with a performance-based incentive for the provincial civil servants. Smart City and CRM are both DKI Jakarta’s strategic activities (KSDs)6 in the governance sector. Other digital platforms, the e-planning and e-budgeting systems, have been developed since the previous term to

6 Governor’s Decision 1042/2018 on List of Provincial Strategic Activities; TGUPP, Laporan Tahunan TGUPP 2019: Memacu Semangat Memajukan Jakarta. Jakarta: Pemprov DKI Jakarta. 2020. https://jakarta.go.id/profil-tgupp#laporan.


complement the national musrenbang mechanism. DKI Jakarta has also made budget deliberations open and live for the public. The Qlue application is used as both—a CHS instrument and for evidence-based development planning. These digital systems have continued to be applied despite being underused and less accessible. In principle, the public can still access budgeting information although more limitedly.

Public monitoring in Jakarta is perceived as relatively strong due to the growing e-governance, the musrenbang mechanism, the presence of CSOs, and the mass media. The musrenbang process has been well implemented since the previous tenure, and the developed e-budgeting platform remains accessible. Jakarta is home to a number of CSOs, though many are not focused on Jakarta issues. Major public issues in the last five years were mostly raised by national-scale CSOs, with regional CSOs based in Jakarta because of donor accessibility. That said, these are all outside of the governmental system and, therefore, need the institutional support from inside the government itself, particularly a strong Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD). Some key informants pointed out that the implementation of these systems will now depend much on the leadership and bureaucratic capacity. The mass media is seen as part of the check-and-balance system and hence needs to be maintained. Therefore, when mass media data is inaccurate, DKI Jakarta needs to clarify it immediately.

Most informants view the approach to e-governance positively, with technology being seen as a tool to cut the distance between the citizens and the government, particularly in accessing information and providing feedback. Despite DKI Jakarta being on track regarding the digitization process, it still needs to build the capacity of the operating personnel in line with technological upgrading. With a strong fiscal independence, DKI Jakarta actually has the needed resources in hand to improve its technology-based governance. This is supported by the increased information and communication technology literacy of the public in Jakarta compared to other regions.

THEME 3: URBAN RESILIENCE AND SERVICE DELIVERIES

Jakarta has a highly heterogeneous population of 10.6 million people (2010 Population Census) with a density of 15,900 people per square kilometer. Given this high population pressure, the urban resilience will depend on management of several environmental matters, which depends primarily on DKI Jakarta’s coordination with neighboring regions. Most non-governmental informants agree that the development of Jakarta will need a regionalization approach to improve the urban resilience. The Presidential Regulation 60/2020 is a beginning to facilitate collaboration between the regions in the Greater Jakarta area, while the institutional arrangement still needs formalization.

THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES, STRATEGIES, AND PARTNERSHIPS

DKI Jakarta has established the secretariat for Jakarta Berketahanan after the province joined the 100 Resilient Cities network in 2016. As a framework, the secretariat developed a strategic document and established a network solid enough to enable the province to accomplish the resilient Jakarta vision. The strategic document comprises five pillars based on a range of existing strategies and programs within all DKI Jakarta’s planning documents, and refers to RAN-API and RAD-API. Although the strategies are legally bound, they still need to be stipulated through a governor’s regulation or a provincial regulation for its full enforcement.

During the next five years, the provincial strategic activities under TGUPP (2019 report), will focus on four sectors for its PPP endeavors: (1) environmental-related subsectors, (2) transportation systems, (3) the health sector, and (4) economic development that focuses on MSMEs. The priority main sub sectors within the environmental sector are successively: (1) solid waste management, (2) wastewater management, (3) air pollution control, (4) traffic congestion, and (5) flood control. A priority spatial management sub sector relates to green space.


Solid waste management is now the top priority of DKI Jakarta as it will otherwise worsen the flood problems. ITFs have become crucial for DKI Jakarta, but they have been difficult to be realized because of the availability of land. Since 2008, DKI Jakarta has begun the development of four ITFs through the PPP scheme, but only the ITF in Sunter is showing progress because its construction is on DKI Jakarta’s land asset. The Provincial Environment Services Office is still in the process of finding investors for three ITFs (in North Jakarta, East Jakarta, and West Jakarta).

For traffic congestion control and mass transportation systems, there are many relevant KSDs, such as the transit-oriented-development project and integrated transportation services through Jak Lingko, national strategic projects, and others that comprise several toll roads, railways, and mass rapid transit and light rail transit developments. Intracity connectivity is seen to have improved with the available mass rapid transit line, its connection with Transjakarta and Jak Lingko. In the long term, improved interregional connectivity between Jakarta and the neighboring regions is viewed to bring mutual benefits and help lift some burden from Jakarta.

The current pilot project on electric vehicles to reduce air pollution will also depend on the policies of the central government and partnership with the private sector. At this moment, the existing regulations encompass Government Regulation 73/2019, Presidential Regulation 55/2019, and Governor’s Regulation 3/2020, which all regulate the incentives for electric vehicles. The regulation of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource regarding the electric vehicle battery charging stations and their tariffs is still under discussion.7 Soon Transjakarta will replace its regular bus fleet with electric buses. Meanwhile, Tesla, Volkswagen, Mercedes, and BMW have been invited to invest in lithium batteries in Indonesia.8 Hyundai is reportedly already investing in the production of electric vehicles in Cikarang.9

Flood control is another of the persisting problems in Jakarta, mostly because of the population growth and their related activity being faster than the flood control efforts. DKI Jakarta has struggled with land acquisitions for these related projects. Moreover, the central and provincial governments have not shared the same perspective on the approach between naturalization and normalization. The giant seawall project is still on the list of national strategic projects, and related KSDs remain to be the flood control through naturalization project, the reservoir and seawall development project, and the activity relating to mitigation and adaptation to climate disasters.

Though Act 26/2007 stipulates that 30 percent of the regional land area must be designated for green space, DKI Jakarta struggles to meet the demand for feasible housing. Applicable technologies are able to support the development of quality green space in limited areas. Related PPPs are seen to not have provided open access for the public, such as in the cases of Monas Park or Ancol.

AFFORDABLE HOUSING

The central government has a national strategic project for building 1,000 housing units, including affordable flats in Jakarta. DKI Jakarta has been given a large share, considering its adequately large APBD and its increased chance of partnership with the private sector. To achieve its annual target for affordable housing until 2022, in addition to the use of its routine APBD allocation, Provincial Services Office for Housings and Residential Area Affairs (DPRKP) applies different schemes with the private

7 https://otomotif.bisnis.com/read/20200210/275/1199639/dampak-regulasi-mobil-listrik-diprediksi-baru-terasa-pada-2021. 8 CNN Indonesia, “Luhut Minta Tesla Investasi Baterai Lithium di Indonesia.” https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ ekonomi/20191106195639-92-446171/luhut-minta-tesla-investasi-baterai-lithium-di-indonesia. 9 Liputan6, “Hyundai Teken Investasi Mobil Listrik Senilai Rp 21 Triliun di Indonesia.” https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4120167/hyundai-teken-investasi-mobil-listrik-senilai-rp-21-triliun-di-indonesia.


sector and the central government. Within the private sector, DPRKP uses the developer obligation schemes, through the License for Appointed Land Use (SIPPT) or the Approval of the Principle for Land Relinquishment (SP3L). Within the central government, DKI Jakarta is usually assigned to execute land acquisitions or use its land properties at Provincial Government-Owned Enterprises. Two schemes not used yet with the central government are the Partnership between the Government and Its Enterprise (KPBU) and vertical land consolidation schemes.

WATER AND SANITATION MANAGEMENT

The water and sanitation program coverage in DKI Jakarta is relatively low and in less accessible locations relative to densely populated slum areas. DKI Jakarta’s sewerage coverage is only 3 percent of the provincial area. DKI Jakarta already has the Jakarta Sewerage Master Plan but is still struggling to realize it. However, the current leadership has shown a larger commitment to the sanitation program as reflected in the significant increase in APBD allocation for the Provincial Water Resource Services Office (DSDA) relating to the domestic wastewater treatment system projects. In addition, DSDA has recently considered the idea of building biopores in government office complexes. The Jakarta Sewerage System project is a national strategic project, covering at least 14 zones, with Japan supporting the zone 1 development through a state revenues and expenditures budget loan. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia’s (DFAT) Indonesia-Australia Infrastructure Partnership (KIAT) is supporting zone 2 and zone 5. DKI Jakarta also plans to formalize a grand design for groundwater management in the buffering regions. Meanwhile, the DPRKP prioritizes quality improvement of the residential areas and partners with the wastewater service operator owned by the provincial government (PD PAL Jaya), the drinking water service operator owned by the provincial government (PAM Jaya), and USAID’s Indonesia Urban Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Penyehatan Lingkungan untuk Semua (IUWASH Plus) project to implement the City without Slums (KOTAKU) program and the program for 21 priority kampungs. DPRKP also has the Community Action Plan and Collaborative Implementation Plan programs. The Jimly Institute is interested in supporting programs for processing river water into drinking water for the community and a school-based program to use applicable technologies for processing the pipeline water at public schools.

HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY, GENERAL

DKI Jakarta delivers improved health services, has better health security coverage, and higher completion rates of immunization than other regions. Jakarta’s trend on health services indicators, reported in Bappenas’ Inclusive Economic Development Index 2011–2019, however, contradicts the national progressive trend. The current policy of DKI Jakarta emphasizes on upgrading existing kecamatan-level community health centers (puskesmas) with inpatient care into kecamatan-level local government’s general hospitals (RSUDs). Provincial Health Services Office (Dinkes) is financing the development through APBD funds and still has no plan to use the KPBU scheme. The bottom 40 percent of the population (B40) in DKI Jakarta are entitled to be fully subsidized beneficiaries under the National Health Security (JKN) program. The Provincial Social Services Office has the Jakarta Elderly Card (KLJ) program. Both programs are included as KSDs. The Provincial Social Services Office and the Social Security Implementing Agency for Health have worked with CSOs to ensure B40 members can obtain JKN cards or replace old ones. These agencies have also supported CSOs that have started to form elderly care centers at cooperatives in East Jakarta and South Jakarta.

TUBERCULOSIS, HIV, AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS

Jakarta residents can access HIV tests by visiting any puskesmas or participating private clinic. The incidence of HIV-positive persons in Jakarta is higher among pregnant housewives, children, and youths compared with the key population groups. Interventions for these groups, however, are still limited.


There is a clear line of coordination between health-related organizations in DKI Jakarta both for HIV and maternal and child health (MCH) programs. DKI Jakarta works with private entities through the public-private-mix partnerships developed to work together to deliver tuberculosis and HIV services at the respective health facilities.

THE HANDLING OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

DKI Jakarta has implemented large-scale social distancing (PSBB-2) since September 14, 2020. The decision was made based on the case fatality rate and the bed occupancy rate as the main indicators.10 Dinkes provides data and information on the availability of referral RSUD hospitals for reference.11 Meanwhile, DKI Jakarta has made other COVID-related data and information available. DKI Jakarta has coordinated with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and hence been able to have its own laboratories set up and operating, supporting its current high level of RT-PCR testing. As the majority of health workers have focused on the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dinkes minimizes visits to health facilities for other health services.

During the adoption of new habits (AKB) phase, government facilities (puskesmas and RSUDs) started providing MCH and Planned Parenthood services, although still very limited. Dental and related services remained unavailable. The pandemic has forced Dinkes to partner with other parties in making new strategies. During PSBB-1, HIV tests increased from 2–5 to 8–10 people per service unit per day. Counseling on youth health care services at puskesmas and HIV counseling with doctors became available remotely. Tuberculosis patients can now get their medication for one month as compared to two-week dosage permitted earlier. For the multidrug resistant facility, tuberculosis patients were usually required to visit every day, but now are permitted to obtain medicine for up to eight days. Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association (PKBI) ensures that clients from the sex worker group still maintain access to condoms for work through the use of courier services. Yappika has been working within the gender minority group who mostly live in Bekasi and Depok but work in Jakarta. HIV-positive patients cannot get antiretroviral at health facilities in Jakarta but have to visit the RSUD in their own areas. In advocating for them, Yappika has usually taken the shortcut to contact MoH directly.

Other vulnerable groups in Jakarta include laborers who do not belong to the fully subsidized beneficiaries under the JKN program and have been laid off. Following three months of not paying into the system, the membership ends automatically. Similarly, underpaid waste pickers are vulnerable as they do daily rounds in the neighborhoods. Another concern relates to the handling of infectious waste (personal protective equipment, masks, syringes, etc.) produced during the pandemic. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) controls the transport and incineration of infectious waste because of its hazardous nature. However, the health facilities have limited capacity, and DKI Jakarta does not have the operational license from the MoEF to operate their own vehicles and warehouses.

THEME 4: INCLUSIVE MARKET-DRIVEN GROWTH

UNEMPLOYMENT

Contrary to Jakarta’s high percentage of educated workforce resulting from the high economic growth, Jakarta’s job opportunity level is relatively low. The labor force consists of 4.8 million people with the majority of opportunities absorbed by the services sector (82.35 percent), and the manufacturing

10 Satgas Penanganan COVID-19. “Kebijakan Rem Darurat, Pemprov DKI Jakarta Tetapkan Kembali Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar.” https://covid19.go.id/p/berita/kebijakan-rem-darurat-pemprov-dki-jakarta-tetapkan-kembali-pembatasan-sosial-berskala-besar. 11 http://eis.dinkes.jakarta.go.id/dashboard.php; https://corona.jakarta.go.id/.


sector absorbing only 17.18 percent.12 During the previous term, a labor-intensive policy was instituted that led to the opening of 181 companies in the Nusantara Bonded Zone of Cakung and East Jakarta (Nusantara bonded zone), mostly in the garment and food production industries. However, garment industries have started relocating mostly to Central Java and West Java beginning in 2013. Approximately 10,000 laborers of six garment companies have been laid off following the relocations.

Youth unemployment is high in Jakarta, particularly for senior secondary and vocational school graduates and, by area, in North Jakarta. Three reasons for this increased rate are: (1) the high migration rate, persons from other regions who might not be compatible with the existing labor market demand, eventually enter the informal sector and are recorded as unemployed by Badan Pusat Statistik; (2) the link-and-match problem faced by those who might be compatible for manufacturing industries but cannot meet the current demands in the services sector; and (3) despite having a relatively high level of education, they have less access to job opportunities than those with either higher or lower educational levels.

GOVERNMENT REFORMS TO BRIDGE SKILL GAP

Overall, DKI Jakarta has carried out capacity development programs for job seekers. It provides semi formal training in the formal learning system, such as vocational schools and polytechnics. DKI Jakarta also has relevant KSDs, namely scholarships targeting the poor and vulnerable groups, for elementary through higher education (the Jakarta Smart Card scholarship program and Jakarta Excelled University Student Card scholarship program), and vocational school revitalization.

Despite these changes, PPPs on vocational training and quality apprenticeship programs are still limited in Jakarta. Youths crucially need quality apprenticeship programs that have contracts and provide coaching on competency standards. Regarding skill training, each administrative city only has one Provincial Work Training Center (PPKD) and not all are active. In addition to PPKD’s training, other Dinas provide training events through partnerships with CSOs. Dinas has the relevant MoU with the industries, but a report of Provincial Services Office for Trade, Industry, Cooperatives, and MSMEs indicates that companies remain reluctant to provide workers with training as needed by the industries. Labor unions have expected government support in the form of reskilling and upskilling activities for its members, particularly those who have become unemployed. As this has not been met, the labor unions have made the initiative to facilitate its members in organizing their own entrepreneurship training. Promotions on the 200 percent super tax deduction remains limited despite this may encourage better involvement of the private sector in providing training programs.

DKI Jakarta has not provided labor market information that can serve as the database on the local labor force market. PPKD activities need to refer to competency standards, with competencies linked to existing industries. The majority of Indonesian National Work Competency Standards at the national level were developed in 2006 and have not been updated. Instructors also need to have the respective industrial experience.

MSMEs can be an option for the youth labor force, though this has not been exhaustively explored. Youths and other marginalized groups still face troubles opening a business, with such problems as capital access and numerous license requirements. DKI Jakarta has some programs for opening new jobs, but they have not been very successful, such as the One Center of Entrepreneurship (OCE) program that targeted youths and marginalized groups but has discontinued. Some informants suggest

12 Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. 2020. Ringkasan Eksekutif Profil Penduduk Bekerja di DKI Jakarta Tahun 2019. https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2020/07/10/5cb350681a6af3035f192655/ringkasan-eksekutif-profil-penduduk-bekerja-di-dki-jakarta-tahun-2019.html.


optional programs, such as other social guarantee programs, or green programs such as urban agriculture on narrow lands.

The government has made several affirmative policies for people with disabilities (PwDs), including the issuance of Act 8/2016 that requires one percent of workers at private companies are PwDs. There needs to be incentives to support its enforcement. PwDs and other social minorities may significantly contribute to the economy and culture, but discrimination has never been systematically overcome in the society. Most of the youth PwDs, for example, are self-employed with very limited capital and support.

COVID-19, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, AND RECOVERY POLICY

Jakarta being a service-based city, has been significantly affected by the pandemic. The pandemic has mostly impacted the manufacturing, trade, and hospitality sectors, respectively.13 Bappenda predicts the growth rate will be around 2.8 to 3.2 percent, with a poverty rate around 3.68 percent.14 Bappeda predicts the open unemployment rate of Jakarta will reach 8.52 percent. Other informants confirm the declining situation. Most of the female labor union members in Penjaringan, North Jakarta are manufacturer laborers who have been laid off, either permanently or temporarily, affecting their household earnings. A labor union confederation estimates around 198,000 members from all 99 unions have been laid off.

For social assistance distribution during the pandemic, DKI Jakarta already completed verification of Integrated Data on Social Welfare (DTKS). Along with households, the social assistance programs in DKI Jakarta helped micro-scale businesses. The amount of assistance was, however, less than normal daily earnings. Informants believe DKI Jakarta must mitigate potential damage caused by uncertainty, consider the resilience of the poor and MSMEs, and set aside a buffering budget for them. Without publicly available information, various social safety net programs will not be accessible for most affected social groups. Unfortunately, the national Kartu Prakerja program is considered unsuccessful because the card was also used for channeling social assistance benefits.

The central government has several economic recovery policies and programs, but most are viewed as targeting large-scale businesses through stimuli in the forms of tax relief and access to bank loans. The most recent PEN program provides assistance for all MSMEs throughout the regions. The National Economic Recovery program provides interest rate subsidies, easy access to micro business loans, non-business loans for MSMEs, and loans for cooperatives through the Institution for Revolving Fund Management (LPDB). Budget realization, however, has remained low. The Ministry of Cooperatives and MSMEs has also recently launched a one-gate policy to provide MSMEs with open access to financing, education, and digitalization. However, the programs are seen to have not reached the grassroots level.

In line with the revised national policy, Bappeda has adjusted the 2017–2022 Provincial Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD) with community empowerment to be the backbone of recovery efforts. The main post-pandemic development strategies are to: (1) support economic recovery efforts; (2) improve basic services as a form of social safety net; (3) develop alternative partnership schemes and large-scale social collaborations; (4) support sustainable development goals and the principles of urban resilience; and (5) enhance the access to digital infrastructures. Bappeda has identified several financial sources for Jakarta’s development recovery aside from APBD.

13 Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. “Perekonomian Jakarta Terhempas ke Titik Terendah.” Pertumbuhan Ekonomi DKI Jakarta, No. 34/08/31/Th. XXII, August 5, 2020. https://jakarta.bps.go.id/pressrelease/ 2020/08/05/490/perekonomian-jakarta-terhempas-ke-titikterendah.html. 14 Bappeda Pemprov DKI Jakarta. “Rancangan Awal Perubahan RPJMD 2017–2022.” Presentation material.


DKI Jakarta has the kelurahan-based development program that can be involved in the recovery programs. Community, large-scale enterprises, MSMEs, cooperatives, workers/laborers, and CSOs are all potential beneficiaries in the economic recovery in Jakarta. The main problem, however, is that the local government does not have a proper database for MSMEs. Currently, the government is targeting 60 million MSME units, with one strategy being business digitalization to support survivability. This strategy, however, needs to train MSME owners through remote learning methods. Several CSOs have worked with Google in launching a digital education program that has now included housewives. For them, training is still difficult to follow since it is difficult to find spare time for the training from their work hours. Ideally, MSMEs need financial literacy and formalization. This can be addressed through, among others, extending the existing conditional cash transfer programs to link program conditionals with training.


EFFECTIVE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENTS

For development partners, there are two entryways in the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta, namely Bappeda and Dinas. Bappeda is the formally recognized institution in the macro context of planning, whereas Dinas is the relevant institution in the micro context of technical implementation. Dinas traditionally supports the submission of a project proposal until it is accepted by Bappeda. TGUPP is seen as the complementary third entryway since it currently serves as the filter of Bappeda’s plans and identifies whether a proposal corresponds with any of the 73 KSDs and advances any such proposal to the highest-level policy maker.

DKI Jakarta has recently developed the Jakarta Development Collaboration Network (JDCN), a network for collaborations with local and international development partners, either through government-to-government, government-to-business entity, or government-to-community schemes. Consistent with this development, Bappeda is drafting a provincial regulation on corporate social responsibility. JDCN was initially established to handle matters relating to the COVID-19 pandemic only. However, with the formation of UPT Inovasi, a unit under Bappeda to accommodate development breakthroughs, JDCN has expanded to accommodate urban development collaborations overall. The governor would like to see partner collaborations with the community that can bring substantial impacts on the people.

The possibility of streamlining JDCN and Bappeda budgeting mechanisms in the future will be the authority of the Secretariat of the Provincial Government (Setda). Many partners have joined the JDCN platform, mostly from local prominent CSOs but also several international development partners. Mirroring the “shopping list” of Bappeda, JDCN has a “menu” offered to the public. This menu lists the activities that can be financed by potential partners, with pandemic-related items such as personal protective equipment, masks, and health equipment that are distributed according to the needs of each unit. The secretariat of JDCN itself is at the Bureau for Regional Cooperation Affairs (Biro KSD) under Setda. Other major JDCN stakeholders at Balai Kota are the Bureau for Heads of Regions and Overseas Cooperation Affairs and the Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). Since JDCN still relates to the handling of the pandemic, its day-to-day manager is the head of BPBD.


CONCLUSIONS

Urban resilience and social economic inclusivity have been the main issues for Jakarta. They are driven by Jakarta’s high economic growth that constantly attracts migrants despite that the province is already overly dense. DKI Jakarta has continued to coordinate with neighboring regions that constitute the Greater Jakarta area despite that friction continues to occur from time to time because of conflicting interests.

The central government has supported and collaborated with DKI Jakarta in dealing with these problems, as perceived from the national strategic projects in the province. Act 29/2007 on the State Capital and the recent Presidential Regulation 60/2020 on Urban Spatial Planning for the Greater Jakarta Area are seen as a start to accommodate the regionalization approach to development planning and implementation. From a different perspective, the plan to move the state capital from Jakarta may also serve as a way out.

In the last six years, the focus of both the central government and DKI Jakarta has shifted to ensure certainty and ease of doing business. This is in line with the trend of Jakarta that has shifted to rely more on the services sector.

Because of the impact of the elections, the last transition of leadership in Jakarta is also perceived to have brought on tensions between DKI Jakarta and the central government. With the transition, the current leadership has also introduced new actors and approaches that have not always received welcoming responses from the public. The situation, for some, has led Jakarta to come to stagnancy in dealing with its main issues because past initiatives are perceived not being better maintained. For others, DKI Jakarta and the central government have proceeded to improve communications because they remain dependent on each other and work together to deal with the state capital’s major problems. Moreover, the pandemic is viewed to have driven DKI Jakarta to make more efforts to bridge communications and reach out to all of their stakeholders and ensure recovery.


Foundational Factors: Jakarta has always been the center of government and economic growth since before the independence of Indonesia. As the state capital, the provincial government accommodates the central government to execute its power for national interests. With the country’s transition to decentralization, Jakarta has also thrived for greater local autonomy within the corridors of the unitary state. However, Jakarta also has major environmental and social economic issues that have driven the province to be dependent on surrounding autonomous regions in finding solutions.

Rules of the Game: Act 23/2014 on Local Governance limits DKI Jakarta’s role to concurrent affairs as a provincial government. It also regulates relations between different levels of governments. The central government stipulates the standard bottom-up approach for the musrenbang process with the aim to accommodate public voice and minimize potential disputes between the central and local governments. Act 29/2007 on the State Capital provides discretion to the state capital to innovate to provide better public services. In making the innovations, the act has enabled DKI Jakarta to further work with ministries in drawing up several relevant legislation products. Meanwhile, political differences in the elections have stiffened the relations between the current leadership and the central government.

Here and Now: The latest transition of leadership has introduced new actors and approaches to the province. DKI Jakarta has continued past initiatives focusing on improving the business climate in the state capital. However, it has not given the same attention to all other past initiatives, particularly regarding public participation in development planning, implementation, and evaluation. All of these


issues have now become aggravated since the greater Jakarta area is the COVID-19 epicenter in the country.

Dynamics: While the recent leadership of DKI Jakarta and the central government at first showed conflicting policies and standpoints regarding several affairs, both sides have continued to work together particularly in the national strategic projects DKI Jakarta has continued to comply with the musrenbang processes, from a regulatory aspect, there is no room for improvisations for the regions.


Foundational Factors: Compared to other regions in the country, the bureaucracy of DKI Jakarta is considered competent and efficient. Jakarta has the modalities, from the provincial government’s budget capacity and relatively competent bureaucracy. It also has a heterogenous civil society that comprises actors from within the local community, CSOs, academia, mass media, and the international community. They are perceived to have a considerable role in influencing the relationship between the central and provincial governments, and that role is to be critical against the policies of both sides. This role is, however, viewed to have declined following the latest governor and president election processes.

Rules of the Game: BPK provided satisfactory audit results, acknowledging DKI’s good governance and accountability in the financial aspect. BPK sets the auditing standards for institutions in the country, whereas Bappenas stipulates the musrenbang mechanism for ensuring public participation in the development planning process. DKI Jakarta has followed the national policy on bureaucratic reforms and digitization of service platforms. The province reformed the Provincial Office for Investment and One Stop Integrated Services and integrated the JAKEVO platform into the online single submission system. DKI Jakarta has gone a step further by initiating the development of e-governance platforms to facilitate better public participation in regional development.

Here and Now: The current leadership has formed the TGUPP as the organization responsible for safeguarding the accomplishments of KSDs as quick wins in regional development. DKI Jakarta has currently continued the use of e-governance platforms to complement the musrenbang process and for CHS systems.

Dynamics: Although DKI Jakarta has met BPK’s audit standards, the media have identified several alleged corruption cases mostly brought up first by the national-scale CSOs based in Jakarta. In the 2017 PPD of Bappenas, DKI Jakarta lost its top position, indicating a setback experienced from public participation. DKI Jakarta has been viewed to be on track regarding e-governance development. Nevertheless, e-governance platforms have become underused and less open. In addition, proposals submitted through the musrenbang process are now filtered according to KSDs on a tiered basis at the city/district and provincial levels. Thus, not all of the proposals coming from Jakarta’s heterogenous community groups have been able to be accommodated by the provincial government.


Foundational Factors: High population pressure, in a sense, forced Jakarta to coordinate with neighboring provinces to take care of various environmental matters, such as the source of drinking water, solid waste management, and sewage management.

Rules of the Game: A strategic document, developed by the secretariat for Jakarta Berketahanan, established a network to achieve its resilient Jakarta vision. Standing on five pillars composed of a range of existing strategies and programs within its planning documents, the strategy emphasized on PPPs within the environmental sector to improve solid waste management, wastewater management, air


pollution control, traffic congestion, flood control, and a priority spatial management sub sector relating to green space.

Here and Now: As the strategic document comprises existing strategies and programs, they are being implemented simultaneously for the three pillars. According to the 2017–2022 RPJMD and the adjustment following the pandemic, DKI Jakarta will focus on the following sectors for its PPP endeavors: (1) solid waste management, (2) wastewater management, (3) air pollution control, (4) traffic congestion and mass transportation systems, (5) flood control, and (6) the health sector.

Dynamics: The PPPs comprise Dinas-planned annual activities, part of the national strategic projects, or KSDs. Each Dinas applies one or more PPP schemes for their activities for flexibility, such as the co-financing scheme with the central government, or developer obligation schemes with private companies.

THEME 4: INCLUSIVE MARKET-DRIVEN GROWTH

Foundational Factors: Jakarta has a higher economic growth compared with other regions, but it has higher income inequality, a lower rate of women’s labor force participation, and constant in-migration created a relatively higher youth unemployment rate. As mentioned in the findings, despite Jakarta’s high percentage of educated workforce resulting in high economic growth, Jakarta’s job opportunity level is relatively low. The only district in DKI Jakarta that lags behind in terms of economic development is Kepulauan Seribu. It has great tourism potential, but the inherent challenges that came in the way of development are basic infrastructure and some serious environmental issues relating to its offshore oil drilling activities.

Rules of the Game: There is a scope of legislation regarding the tripartite system of industrial relations that regulates the relations and partnership between the government, the private sector, and worker unions, including Act 21/2000 on labor unions and Act 8/2016 on PwD. Regarding economic recovery during the pandemic, DKI Jakarta has issued a number of regulations on the PSBB-2 and has made adjustments to the 2017–2022 RPJMD, in line with the national policies for refocusing state and local budget allocations.

Here and Now: DKI has supporting programs for the formal and nonformal education systems, such as the Jakarta Smart Card program and Jakarta Excelled University Student Card program scholarships as well as vocational school revitalization. Routine training programs are provided by PPKDs, whereas other Dinas also provide training events for their own sector. Programs for MSMEs include the OCE program, and yet this has not been successful. Regarding the recovery following the pandemic, the central government provides social assistance programs for the vulnerable families and the National Economic Recovery programs for the MSMEs, including the one-gate policy under the Ministry of Cooperatives and MSMEs.

Dynamics: The high rate of youth unemployment in Jakarta is because: (1) there is a high rate of migration, and people from other regions who might not be compatible with the existing labor market demand eventually enter the informal sector but are not captured by Badan Pusat Statistik as part of the labor force; (2) the link-and-match problem faced by those who might be compatible for manufacturing industries but cannot meet the demands of Jakarta’s current service industries (such as financial and hospitality sectors); and (3) despite having a relatively high level of education, they have less access to job opportunities than those with either higher or lower educational levels. PPPs for training and particularly apprenticeships are still limited. Although there are memorandums of understanding between Dinas and the private sector, companies are reported to have remained reluctant to bridge or provide workers with the needed training. Workers, on the other hand, consider they need reskilling and upskilling training in particular because many have been laid off following the pandemic. As MSMEs have grown widely during the pandemic, they have become the


main targets for receiving support programs. As the database is still unavailable, budget realization for supporting MSMEs has remained low. In line with Bappeda’s adjustment to the current RPJMD, Bappeda has mapped several non-APBD financial sources.


Foundational Factors/Rules of the Game: Act 29/2007 on the state capital generally defines the vertical structure of DKI Jakarta’s bureaucracy. However, as other local governments, DKI Jakarta has regulations that formally define the work relations among the SKPDs or Dinas.

Here and Now: For development partners, there are two entryways in the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta, namely Bappeda in the macro context of planning and the relevant Dinas regarding technical implementation. The relevant Dinas will usually back a submitted project proposal until it is accepted by Bappeda. Meanwhile, TGUPP, now playing a significant role in determining activity priorities, is seen as another entryway for partnerships. The Bureau for Development and Environment is responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of implementation. For investments, there is the Provincial Office for Investment and One Stop Integrated Services that has currently been under reform. In addition to the information and promotion unit, it has a market intelligence unit that conducts analyses for the policy makers.

Dynamics: Because of the pandemic, DKI Jakarta is viewed to become more open to other potential partners for planning and implementing recovery activities. Bappeda has UPT Inovasi to accommodate development breakthroughs, The JDCN, under Setda, was initiated first for the pandemic but has been developed further for accommodating other partnerships in general. However, Bappeda has mapped several other financial sources or schemes for Jakarta’s development recovery, namely state revenues and expenditures budget loans, KPBU, spatial use disincentives, regional loans (regional obligations and the early response and recovery component), the community’s voluntary involvement, and an institution for financing provincial development. Each source will finance a different group of development activities.


RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on findings and conclusions noted above, it is recommended that USAID take the following actions and approaches:

● With regard to inclusive economic growth, work with Bappeda and relevant Dinas to: o Investigate the root problem of priority issues, (i.e., unemployment, youth unemployment,

low female labor force participation, and constant in-migration) and utilize this information to design appropriate programming.

o Identify how education or training can improve the linkage between workers’ skills and industrial needs.

o Expand PPPs for training and apprenticeships for better outcomes. o Bridge gaps in promotions on the 200 percent super tax deduction; short-term training

program partnerships for updating local occupational standards; capacity of training instructors; provision of the labor market information that can serve as the database on the local labor force market.

o Support job creation activities relating to digital literacy and financial literacy for MSMEs; as well as social guarantee or extended CCT programs, particularly as part of recovery activities following the COVID-19 pandemic.

● With regard to urban resilience and service delivery, to work with Bappeda and relevant Dinas to:

o Identify potential PPPs among priority sectors (health service delivery; solid waste management; wastewater management; air pollution control; traffic congestion and mass transportation systems; and flood control) in accordance with the respective existing PPP schemes.

● The wide range of possible partnerships with DKI Jakarta requires identifying figures in the bureaucracy who are supportive and cooperate well with donors. These may include the Bappeda Head, Regional Secretary, or Dinas Heads.

● To support the resilience of Jakarta’s heterogenous civil society:

o Identify stakeholders and forums operating as discourse makers and champions, such as local politicians, the mass media, and CSOs (including religious community groups).

o Identify key champions in DKI Jakarta who might support activities in filling capacity gaps of Jakarta-focused, non-national CSOs, including technical, advocacy, and financial management capacities.


REFERENCES

Act 26/2007 on Spatial Planning.

Act 29/2007 on the State Capital.

Act 21/2000 on Labor Unions.

Act 23/2014 on the Local Governance.

Act 8/2016 on People with Disabilities.

Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. 2020, August 5. “Perekonomian Jakarta Terhempas ke Titik Terendah.” Pertumbuhan Ekonomi DKI Jakarta, No. 34/08/31/Th. XXII. https://jakarta.bps.go.id/pressrelease/ 2020/08/05/490/perekonomian-jakarta-terhempas-ke-titikterendah.html.

Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. 2020. “Provinsi DKI Jakarta: Dalam Angka 2020.” https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/ 2020/02/28/75c2aa351fc1acb44fcea04f/provinsi-dki-jakarta-dalam-angka-2020--penyediaan-data-untuk-perencanaan-pembangunan.html

Badan Pusat Statistik DKI Jakarta. 2020. “Ringkasan Eksekutif Profil Penduduk Bekerja di DKI Jakarta Tahun 2019.” https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2020/07/10/5cb350681a6af3035f192655/ringkasan-eksekutif-profil-penduduk-bekerja-di-dki-jakarta-tahun-2019.html

Bappeda Pemprov DKI Jakarta. “Rancangan Awal Perubahan RPJMD 2017–2022.” Presentation material.

Bisnis Otomotif. “Dampak Regulasi Mobil Listrik Diprediksi Baru Terasa pada 2021.” https://otomotif.bisnis.com/read/20200210/275/1199639/dampak-regulasi-mobil-listrik-diprediksi-baru-terasa-pada-2021

CNN Indonesia. “Luhut Minta Tesla Investasi Baterai Lithium di Indonesia.” https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20191106195639-92-446171/luhut-minta-tesla-investasi-baterai-lithium-di-indonesia

Governor’s Decision 1042/2018 on List of Provincial Strategic Activities.

Governor’s Decision 3/2020 on Tax Incentives for Transferring the Ownership of the Battery Electric Vehicle for Road Transportation.

Governor’s Decision 514/2020 on Rationalization and Payment Postponement for TGUPP Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Government Regulation 73/2019 on Taxable Luxury Goods in the Form of Automotive Vehicles Subject to Luxury Sales Tax.

Lawang, Robert Endi., et al. 2019. Evaluasi Setahun OSS: Studi Pelaksanaan PP, No. 24 Tahun 2018 di Daerah. Jakarta: KPPOD.

Liputan6. “Hyundai Teken Investasi Mobil Listrik Senilai Rp 21 Triliun di Indonesia.” https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4120167/hyundai-teken-investasi-mobil-listrik-senilai-rp-21-triliun-di-indonesia

LPS. 2020. “Distribusi Simpanan Bank Umum Juli 2020.” https://www.lps.go.id/documents/ 10157/197446/07B.+Distribusi+Simpanan+Bank+Umum+-+Juli+2020.pdf/51b1b1c9-8231-46f9-bf60-b4e60eb76015

https://jakarta.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2020/08/05/490/perekonomian-jakarta-terhempas-ke-titik-terendah.html

https://jakarta.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2020/08/05/490/perekonomian-jakarta-terhempas-ke-titik-terendah.html



https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2020/07/10/5cb350681a6af3035f192655/ringkasan-eksekutif-profil-penduduk-bekerja-di-dki-jakarta-tahun-2019.html

https://jakarta.bps.go.id/publication/2020/07/10/5cb350681a6af3035f192655/ringkasan-eksekutif-profil-penduduk-bekerja-di-dki-jakarta-tahun-2019.html

https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20191106195639-92-446171/luhut-minta-tesla-investasi-baterai-lithium-di-indonesia

https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20191106195639-92-446171/luhut-minta-tesla-investasi-baterai-lithium-di-indonesia

https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4120167/hyundai-teken-investasi-mobil-listrik-senilai-rp-21-triliun-di-indonesia

https://www.liputan6.com/bisnis/read/4120167/hyundai-teken-investasi-mobil-listrik-senilai-rp-21-triliun-di-indonesia





Menocal, Alina Rocha, et al. “Thinking and Working Politically Through Applied Political Economy Analysis: A Guide for Practitioners.” USAID. 2018. https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource /files/pea_guide_final.pdf

Presidential Regulation 58/2017 on Adjustment to President Regulation 3/2016 on Acceleration of the National Strategic Project Implementation.

Presidential Regulation 55/2019 on Acceleration of the Battery Electric Vehicle Program.

Presidential Regulation 60/2020 on Urban Spatial Planning for the Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, Puncak, and Cianjur Area.

Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs 90/2019 on Classification, Codification, and Nomenclature of Local Development and Financial Planning.

Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs 10/2020 on Handover and Assignment of Government Affairs under MOHA FY 2020.

Satgas Penanganan COVID-19. “Kebijakan Rem Darurat, Pemprov DKI Jakarta Tetapkan Kembali Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar.” https://covid19.go.i,d/p/berita/kebijakan-rem-darurat-pemprov-dki-jakarta-tetapkan-kembali-pembatasan-sosial-berskala-besar

TGUPP. 2020. Laporan Tahunan TGUPP 2019: Memacu Semangat Memajukan Jakarta. Jakarta: Pemprov DKI Jakarta. https://jakarta.go.id/profil-tgupp#laporan.

World Bank. 2020. Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies. Economy Profile Indonesia. https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/i/indonesia/IDN.pdf

https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/pea_guide_final.pdf

about:blank

about:blank

https://jakarta.go.id/profil-tgupp#laporan

https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/i/indonesia/IDN.pdf


ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND FOR EACH THEME, BASED ON DESK REVIEW

BACKGROUND FOR INTERVIEWER

THEME 1: POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROVINCIAL AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Background: The desk review shows there is a significant disconnect between national and subnational governments or bureaucrats in terms of policy deliberation and implementation. National policies are unsynchronized with the needs and challenges at the subnational level. There is also a noticeable capacity gap among civil servants within government institutions let alone a significant gap between government and non-government institutions.

THEME 2: ACCOUNTABILITY

Background: The desk review indicates that DKI Jakarta’s governance is characterized by a relatively strong liberal democracy and moderate social group equality, marred by relatively poorly implemented elections and low citizen transparency. The Provincial Roadmaps reports that DKI Jakarta has a moderate commitment to ‘open and accountable governance’.


Background: DKI Jakarta faces substantial challenges to improve poor environmental conditions that both contribute to and are exacerbated by climate change, namely flooding and pollution etc. Through the Rockefeller Foundation-funded 100 Resilient Cities network, DKI Jakarta developed a strategy for urban resilience in three stages: Ready, Healthy, Connected.

THEME 4: INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Background: Jakarta has a high population of youth, indicating a solid workforce. However, higher official unemployment rate in DKI Jakarta than the national average indicates that there may be either less opportunities for this youth, or there is a skill gap between what the industries demand and the young people possess. There is also a substantial gender gap in employment.

DKI Jakarta is the country’s financial capital with high foreign investment and gross domestic product. Jakarta’s economy primarily depends on wholesale and retail small businesses. Unfortunately, however, due to the external shocks from COVID-19 and sharply declining oil prices, businesses such as, hotels, restaurants and the recreation sector may be hurt significantly, while the informal sector may flourish.


Background: In terms of developmental challenges, most of foreign development assistance has to go through the national government (BAPPENAS) before implementation.


ANNEX 2: CORE AND SUPPORTING PEA QUESTIONS

THEME 1: POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROVINCIAL AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. Could you describe the interaction between national and subnational governments or bureaucrats in terms of policy deliberation and implementation?

a. What is the nature of policy-making processes between provincial and national levels to support policy and program implementation?

b. What are the main drivers and challenges do you think exist to provide accountable and transparent public information to support decision-making processes?

c. Does civil society have provision to participate in public policy deliberations or tools available to them to hold the government accountable and measure their responsiveness?

THEME 2: ACCOUNTABILITY

2. In your opinion, how is DKI Jakarta’s current level of commitment to open and accountable governance? Why?

a. Is corruption still a significant issue in the regional government’s accountability? If it is, what kind of corruption is most pervasive and why? How did it play a role in unifying or dividing people or groups (viz. ethnic groups, political groups, business elites etc.?

b. How functional is the provincial bureaucracy? Could you describe the adequacy of capacity and resources for the provincial bureaucracy?

c. What type of oversight/accountability mechanisms exist both within the State (i.e. TSC, internal controls) as well media, CSOs watchdog groups, etc.?

d. What oversight mechanisms do you think would need to be in place to ensure a fully accountable provincial bureaucracy? Which of these mechanisms seems feasible? Who would play a more crucial role in ensuring oversight/accountability?


3. What are the government’s policies and strategies related to urban resilience? Who are the partners (Donor, CSO, Private Sector) active in this area and how do you think this partnership is working?

a. What are the incentives and barriers to achieve the targeted development results in terms of the state of the bureaucracy, capacity and resource issues, level of corruption, or ‘oversight and accountability’ mechanism?

b. In the light of above incentives and barriers, what do you think about the government's move towards electrical vehicles as a solution to control air pollution?

c. What are the development opportunities to develop Thousand Island district? d. What is the progress and its challenge to provide solutions to the potential sinking of

Jakarta, especially in the northern part of the city? e. Through the Rockefeller Foundation-funded 100 Resilient Cities network, DKI Jakarta

developed a strategy for urban resilience in three stages: Ready, Healthy, Connected. In which stage is DKI Jakarta now? What are the policies and strategies related to urban resilience?

4. Service deliveries a. In your own sector, what is the current partnership between the public and private

sector in managing and delivering the services?


b. In your opinion, what are the challenges in Public Private Partnership (PPP) and how those can be resolved?

c. What is the nature of policy-making processes? How transparent are they? What is the mechanism if citizens want to lodge complaints?

d. Are there lessons learned from other countries in the region that could help us?

THEME 4: INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

5. In your opinion, what are the key challenges that drive the high unemployment rate in DKI Jakarta?

a. Is it the state of the bureaucracy, capacity and resource issues, level of corruption, or ‘oversight and accountability’ mechanism?

b. How effective is the legal framework on anti-corruption, transparency, oversight, and merit-based hiring practices in public administration?

6. What is the government currently doing and its plans to narrow the skill gap or increase the opportunities in order to absorb the young jobseekers?

a. What is the role of CSOs, private sector, media, the religious groups, and other groups in reform? [D]

b. Is the provincial government working with them to resolve the problem? If so, do you think it is working?

7. Relating to the regional economy affected by external shocks from COVID-19, what current government initiatives are working/not working and how can we effectively build on them to move it forward?

a. What is the role of CSOs, private sector, media, the religious groups, and other groups in reform?


c. How do you think the state of the bureaucracy, capacity and resource issues, level of corruption, or ‘oversight and accountability’ mechanism may create hindrance in recovery?


8. What is the most effective way for the donor community to engage with the provincial government to implement a program that also supports provincial goals and objectives?

a. What do you think should be the role of the civil society to facilitate the process? b. What are the existing Incentives and constraints around improving public participation

in this process? c. If there are multiple donors in your sector, what do you think is the best way to

engage them?


ANNEX 3: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

QUESTION FINDINGS

Theme 1: Political relationship between the provincial and the national government

1. Could you describe the interaction between national and subnational governments in terms of policy deliberation and implementation?

- Conducive relations between CG and DKI:

▪ Examples: JAKEVO and DPMPTSP reform in line with the CG’s business environment policy [09], JAKEVO-online single submission integration [09] [04], clear coordination in the health sector [16], the use of the national health database [05], proximity helps DKI set its own laboratories for PCR tests [03], mass rapid transit co-financing, [10] affordable flats [02]. [HN]

▪ Reasons: even if unsmooth at start, both need each other [10]. [RG]

Bappenas sees DKI’s importance as the face of and gate to Indonesia [09] [10], The second largest city does not come close [21]. DKI is the center of the economy, and influences the national economy. [9] [15] [21] [FF]

DKI also still needs the CG on financing large projects. Jakarta Sewerage System, JEDI. [21] [RG]

▪ Effects: DKI boosts the national score on the easiness of doing business [04], Jakarta receives benefits from development projects as well. [D]

- Inharmonious relations between CG and DKI:

▪ Examples: passive resistance regarding flood control, street and market normalization [07] [14], different policies on sanitation and transportation programs [09] [15], the handling of the pandemic [07] [09] [12], becak re-operations [14], parking ticket system [07], MoHA visited the governor [15]. [HN]

▪ Reasons: DKI’s fiscal independence [02] [15], [FF] ineffective communication pattern [07] [12], [RG] political differences [07] [09]. [FF]

▪ Effects: ineffective communication leads to not solving problems and harming the public interest [07] [12]. [D]

a. What is the nature of policy-making processes between provincial and national levels to support policy and program implementation?

- As province: UU 23/2014 defines the boundaries and the relationship patterns between LGs and the CG based on the divide of power [09] [15]. [RG]

▪ The CG (Bappenas, MOHA, Ministry of Finance) stipulate the governance mechanism, including the musrenbang mechanism. [10] [RG] Jakarta always consults with them through the processes. [10] [RG] Actually, there no longer is any space for improvisations for the LGs (Permendagri 90/2019 and 10/2020) [10]. [RG]

- As state capital: UU 29/2007 gives DKI the discretion to make innovations for delivering services and working closer with the CG. [RG]

▪ DKI will stay strategic after the capital moves: it will still be the center of economy and commerce. [10] [FF] Examples of other countries. [11] [21] If the capital moves, will Jakarta keep its vertical structure or comprise several autonomous regions? [21] [RG]

b. What are the main drivers and challenges do you think that exist to provide accountable and transparent public information to support decision-making processes?

- As province: e-planning, e-budgeting, live meetings are positive. [09] [10] [14] [15] [HN] Conflicting statements/policies, such as in the handling of the pandemic. [07] [09] [12] [D]

- As part of Greater Jakarta: problems like drinking water resources, floods, solid waste management cannot be solved alone. [FF] Transportation systems for better mobility and new economic hubs in the suburbs. [HN] It implies the need for coordination with other districts/cities in 2 other provinces. DKI has given large grants/compensations. Friction is common between the regions. [RG] The CG needs to facilitate this, [RG] [06] [07] [08] [10] [11] [12] [14] [15] [21] Example of Citarum Harum project. [08] [HN] Perpres 60/2020 as a good start [10] [20], but ad hoc for collaborations. [10] [RG]

c. Does civil society have provision to participate in

- Large APBD gives opportunity for public participation [20] [FF] and the CG’s participatory musrenbang still proceeds annually. [RG] But Bappenas’ PPD awards indicate the setback on


QUESTION FINDINGS

public policy deliberations or tools available to them to hold the government accountable and measure their responsiveness?

public participation. [9] [HN] Mechanisms developed during previous tenure not used as active and open as before. [09] [14] [15] [HN] With less channels and openness, the public turns to the mass media for information, but access to resources of public information has lessened. The mass media will stay critical and prevent the spread of mistrust. [09] [D]

- The civil society has a big role in criticizing both the CG and DKI. [12] [RG] However, people have become more polarized [07] [15] since the last elections, [07] [HN] Identity politics spread cancerous effects, [07] leading to apathy [15] and stagnancy. [07] People need reconciliation but no effective mediator is left. Even bureaucracy is no longer neutral, academia partisan. [07]

Conclusion:

As province:

● FF: Jakarta’s dominant economy that supports the national economy.

● RG: Dependency on each other. UU 23/2014. Standard musrenbang process, Permendagri 90/2019 and 10/2020 [HN], communication patterns, political differences.

● HN: Examples of collaborations (mostly during previous terms, though) vs. disconnects. E-budgeting. Last elections. Leadership transition.

● D: Collaborations benefit both sides vs. disconnects harming the public interest.

As state capital:

● FF: Jakarta’s dominant economy that supports the national economy.

● RG: UU 29/2007. Political differences. Civil society’s important role.

● HN: Innovations for service delivery. Further collaborations with the CG. Disconnects (MoHA’s visit). Less used e-budgeting.

● D: Moving the center of government, but seen not to affect DKI’s significance. Civil society divided and stagnant following elections.

As part of Greater Jakarta:

● FF: Jakarta’s dependency on surrounding regions, vice versa.

● RG: Dependency among regions. UU 23/2014. Perpres 60/2020 still new and ad hoc in its approach.

● HN: Connectivity, Example of the CG’s involvement,

● D: Friction between regions, pro contra on the CG’s involvement.

Recommendation:

Gaps identified by informants: the lack of effective mediators for reconciliation.

Theme 2: Accountability

2. In your opinion, how is DKI Jakarta’s current level of commitment to open and accountable governance? Why?

- Formally, accountable by the audit standards of BPK. [10] [RG]

- Vs. cases under public spotlights: APBD allocation for glue, reclamations, art installments, downtown walkways. [09] [14] [15] [18] [HN]

a. Is corruption still a significant issue in the regional government’s accountability? If it is, what kind of corruption is most pervasive and why? How did it play a role in unifying or dividing people or groups (viz. ethnic

- Labor unions remain difficult to process reports. Old practices: Dinas and company individuals collect illegal levies and discourage the formation of unions. [FF]

- Reported cases: APBD allocation for glue, reclamations, art installments. [09] [14] [15] [18] [HN]

- In musrenbang, deciding development activities has become less open. Different approach and style of current leadership. [12] [15] [21Proposals filtered by TGUPP and Bappeda. based on KSDs. [02] [10] [20] People see results from certain channels. Not all of Jakarta’s heterogeneous groups are accommodated. [10] [09] [02] E.g. development of downtown


QUESTION FINDINGS

groups, political groups, business elites etc.?

walkways (KSD). [09] Implementation also not always as planned. [10] [D] It shows that participation is needed in implementation and evaluation. [10]

b. How functional is the provincial bureaucracy? Could you describe the adequacy of capacity and resources for the provincial government?

- Professionalism is high compared to other regions. [15] [21] [FF] Dinas and TGUPP competent and efficient [21]. DKI already supports with online personnel system. [09] Quick Response to the Public mobile application (under Smart City) as CHS channel linked to incentive system for SKPD. [05] [HN] Bureaucracy no longer neutral post elections. [07] Professionalism can still be improved. [10] [D]

- Current organizational structure instead adds chain of command through TGUPP à ad hoc, obese structure, high salaries, accommodating those from past elections, filtering during musrenbang (less openness, red tapes). [07] [09] [14] [15] TGUPP’s committee for corruption alleviation also not proven effective [15]. [HN] [RG]

c. What type of oversight/accountability mechanisms exist both within the State (i.e. TSC, internal controls) as well media, CSOs watchdog groups, etc.?

- Public monitoring relatively strong à civil society vibrant (hub of the best people) [12], [FF] The community still follows musrenbang, can still access e-budgeting, [RG] but less open.[09] [15] [D]

- National-scale CSOs raised issues in the last 5 years: reclamation by ICW, glue budget by PSE before DPRD members. Online PDBB different: teachers’ or parents’ association. [18] [HN] Most Jakarta-based CSOs work in other regions or at national scale. [09] [15] [18] CSOs may lack capacity on regulations and budgeting processes [09]. Certain CSOs receiving APBD grants à patron-client relations. [15] DKI interested in Perpres 16/2018, especially on CSOs involved as third-party self-managing contractors. [18] [RG] A need to build the capacity of CSOs to be financially resilient. [HN]

- The mass media is part of check and balance, and needs to be maintained. Diiskominfo holds talk shows for public communication, clarification. News on APBD cases shows that people can actually access information. [HN] Corrective moves by SKPDs show they cannot keep old practice. [10] [D] DKI only needs to give clarification if data is incorrect. [10] Journalists à consensus on keeping the public informed despite less openness. [09] [D]

- All these are out of the government system and need stronger DPRD, but design of DPRD drives it to take side with DKI instead of the public. [09] [RG]

- CHS in previous term: Qlue, all-year-round planning + budget for CHS [15] and meet governor in person at Balai Kota [09]. [RG]

- E-governance, but setback: ‘Smart City’ [09] [12], data generated by the ‘Qlue’ CHS platform in the past also used for development planning [12] [15], Online tax the best in the past [15]. DJPK: DKI one of the bests on e-governance. [10] No continuous usage [12] [15]. DKI tends to replace with new ones, not always better. People tend to be reluctant with the change. [09] [D]

d. What oversight mechanisms do you think would need to be in place to ensure a fully accountable provincial bureaucracy? Which of these mechanisms seems feasible? Who would play a more crucial role in ensuring oversight/accountability?

- Regarding technology for e-governance, DKI is on track, shortening distance for accessing info and feedback. [09] [15] Offline may still be needed as complementary. [15] Initiatives already exist, only need upgrading of personnel as tech changes. [09] E.g. SIKM. [09] [HN] DKI has the fund and IT literate public. [15] [FF] DPRD can be more responsive with application (DPRnew). [12]

Conclusion:

FF: Relatively high professionalism (bureaucracy); old practices of red tape; large modalities (funds, resources, vibrant civil society, IT literate).

RG: DKI meets BPK’s audit benchmarks; musrenbang and e-budgeting still accessible for the public.; channels for CHS in the past.

HN: Leadership transition; formation of TGUPP; reported cases; e-governance (CHS, reform) initiatives since the previous term.


QUESTION FINDINGS

D: Decreased use of (past) existing initiatives, substitutes not always welcomed, additional TGUPP changing the rules of game and leading to public dissatisfaction.

Recommendation:

Gaps identified by informants: More capacity building of DKI personnel (especially those operating the e-governance systems), capacity building for CSOs, higher community’s participation in development implementation and evaluation; support to better the e-governance.

Theme 3: Urban resilience and service deliveries

3. URBAN RESILIENCE

Jakarta Berketahanan

a. In which stage is DKI Jakarta now? What are the policies and strategies related to urban resilience?

- Resilient Jakarta has three main pillars (prepared, healthy, connected) plus two pillars (good governance and social cohesion). [03] All plans from DKI’s existing strategies and programs, implemented simultaneously for three pillars. [03] The strategic document extracts all existing programs and strategies in Provincial Long-Term Development Plan 2005–2025, RPJMD, State or Provincial Spatial Planning 2030, referring to RAN-API, RAD-API à each plan legally binding SKPDs. [RG]

- Pandemic indicates urban resilience relates to the social capital à Jakartans more heterogeneous, lower social capital. [06] [RG] Continuity from past developments: shelters for street children who live on river banks, because houses near dump sites. [07] [HN]

- Regionalization approach: most non-government informants agree. [06] [07] [08] [10] [11] [12] [14] [15] [20] [21] If capital moves, Jakarta can focus on business city, research city, service city. [10] Perpres 60/2020 a good start [10] [20], but ad hoc, incidental approach. Formalization via functionalist approach, not administrative or perceptive approach [10] [RG] The inclusivity of Greater Jakarta depends on the linkages between the urban carrying capacity and the urban development and the spatial planning. [06]

- Four priority sectors for PPP schemes in 5 years: (1) environmental-related sub sectors; (2) transportation systems; (3) the health sector; (4) economic development that focuses on MSMEs. [HN]

- The priorities in the environmental sector: (1) solid waste management; (2) wastewater management; (3) air pollution control; (4) traffic congestion; and (5) flood control. Plus green space (spatial issue). [03] [04] Potentials still high after the pandemic, as all are basic public services. [04] [HN]

b. Who are the partners (donor, CSO, PS) active in this area and how do you think this partnership is working?

- JakBer since 2016 part of 100RC network. [03] [10] Network and strategic document available à ready for collaborations. [10] [HN]

- KLIK program for legal identity documents [13], past project: public literacy on public services (legal identity program) [15]. [HN]

c. What are the incentives and barriers to achieve the targeted development results in terms of the state of the bureaucracy, capacity and resource issues, level of corruption, or ‘oversight and accountability’ mechanism?

- For full enforcement à the strategic document needs to be Pergub or Perda. [03] It recognizes KSDs as quick wins. [03] [RG]

- E-governance supports service deliveries. [15] Smart City concept: smart government, smart people, smart living. Indicators: (1) regional financial capacity; (2) green city index; (3) government performance index; and (4) urban sustainability index. [09] [HN]

Development of Kepulauan Seribu

a. What are the development opportunities to develop Thousand Islands District?

- Policy: National State or Provincial Spatial Planning [03] for tourism and fishery [03], special economic zone for tourism [03] [14]. [RG]

- Around 20 thousand people concentrated on 11 small islands. [03] [FF]

- Weakness: Provincial Research Council 2018 study: lags behind the cities, even North Jakarta. [10] [03] [11] High poverty rate, human resources problems. [10] [16] [21a] Vaster than the mainland area à range of control extensive, [03] lacks the attention from DKI (coordination, monitoring, follow-ups) [21]. Archipelagic character à limited infrastructures


QUESTION FINDINGS

[10] [11] [16]. Identified basic problems: (1) clean water and drinking water à supplies from mainland; (2) telephone networks; (3) electric power. [10] [12] [HN]

- Existing/past efforts: SIAK-1 in the past [21], reproductive health training [16], plan for solar power to process seawater/rainwater into drinking water [12], developing strategy for rainwater catchment [10], limited promotions for resort developments [04]. [HN]

- Opportunities: integrated environmental development [21], biodiversity tourism area [10], model for solid waste management on small islands [08]. [D]

- Challenges: (1) need infrastructural development [10]; (2) tourism development needs to adhere to environmental principles, but control mostly remote; [03] [04 [21] (3) still unclear divide of authorities between the CG and DKI (national park under MoEF, bill on amendment to Act 27/2007) [03] [04]; and (4) serious environmental issues due to offshore oil drilling activities. [03] [D]

Conclusion:

Jakarta Berketahanan

- FF: Jakarta’s large and dense population, limited land area, accompanied by reliance on other regions.

- RG: The strategic document for Jakarta Berketahanan comprising relevant strategies and programs in all DKI’s planning documents. The recent Perpres 60/2020 supports a regionalization approach.

- HN: As the strategic document comprises existing strategies and programs, they are being implemented simultaneously for the three pillars.

- D: The Secretariat has built networking through the 100RC and with Jakarta stakeholders. For full enforcement, the strategic document will still need to be stipulated as a Pergub or Perda.

Kepulauan Seribu

- FF: The archipelagic district lags behind the five administrative cities, regarding infrastructures.

- RG: Legislation at the national level drives the development toward tourism and fishery. [KSD for ecological conservation.] The district needs closer coordination with and monitoring from DKI. The authorities of the CG and DKI still have to be clearly defined.

- HN: Some programs carried out or planned or ideas by the informants, outside the national park and hotel resort areas.

- D: Challenges during activity implementation, but Kepulauan Seribu is still considered potential.

Recommendation:

- There are a number of ideas or existing initiatives of which gaps have been identified by informants.

4. SERVICE DELIVERIES

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

a. In your own sector, what is the current partnership between the public and private sector in managing and delivering the services?


c. What is the nature of policy-making processes? How transparent are they? What is the

- Policy: Top priority among environmental-related PPPs in the next 5 years. [03] [04] [RG]

- Reasons: Solid waste is produced by both the industries and the households. [08] If not handled, it will worsen the flood problems. [12] Constraints of land area. [03] [04] [08] [21] [FF]

- Strengths/Weaknesses: Different quality of solid waste services between cities, according to gross domestic product. Complaints only in their own neighborhood. [08] The cities cannot handle the volume and only collect retributions from the commercial lines.[08] [21] Reliance on the Bantargebang landfill, while maximum capacity in 2021. [03] [04] [08] [12] [21] [HN]

- Existing/past efforts: Continuous effort to reduce the volume before transporting to Bantargebang (3R campaign and waste banks). [03] [08] Development of 4 ITFs. [03] [04] [08] [21] KIAT involved in one unit. [21] Waste-to-thermal energy technology. [08] Jimly à pilot on solid waste processing centers at several markets in Jakarta. [12] KIAT à study on outsourcing the solid waste collection in several locations in Jakarta. [21] [HN]

- Challenges: Routine efforts not reducing volume, infrastructures not made available yet by the government. [12] ITF is difficult to build due to land acquisition, only ITF Sunter is proceeding. [03] [04] [08] [21] The Provincial Environment Services Office is still finding investors for the other three ITFs. [04] Database not available, whereas funding for action research activities is still lacking. [08] Waste-to-thermal energy should be the last choice of technology. [08] Adopted technologies from advanced countries not always suitable for the


QUESTION FINDINGS

mechanism if citizens want to lodge complaints?

local context. [08] During the pandemic, an increased volume of plastic waste due to online transactions and of health-related infectious materials. [08] [D]

WATER AND SANITATION MANAGEMENT




- Policy: Second priority among environmental-related PPPs in the next 5 years. [03] [04] [RG]

- Reasons: Groundwater is the most critical issue à large population [FF] uses groundwater, produces excessive sewage, resulting in high level of groundwater pollution (especially non consumable in North Jakarta). [20]

- Strengths/Weaknesses: Inclusive Economic Development Index national scores show a progressive trend, DKI Jakarta’s figures tend to be stagnant and eventually regressive for access to clean water and sanitation.[06] Watsan program coverage small but in difficult locations à PAM Jaya pipelines only used for bathing and washing by the households, extra money to buy drinking water. [20] [12] At least 800,000 people still practice open defecation. The private sector produces large, unmanageable fecal volume. Near satellite cities contribute to sludge disposal. Improved water programs and sanitation programs are inseparable [20] Sewage pipeline service covers 3% of the provincial area: no integrated system. DKI already has a Jakarta Sewerage Masterplan, but is still struggling to realize it. Previous RPJMD focused on clean water access, now on sanitation programs. Significant increase in APBD allocation for DSDA: 10 desludging units in 2017-2018, now 20 desludging units and 10 interceptors. Target of the septic revitalization program is 36,000 units. The sanitation condition has decreased 9-11% [20]. JICA’s study: 70% of Jakartans with pipelines by 2050. [20] The recent Pergub 9/2020. [20] [HN]

- Existing efforts: Wastewater management projects at the national and domestic wastewater treatment system levels. Jakarta Sewerage System, a national strategic project, state revenues and expenditures budget loan, PD PAL Jaya as operator, DSDA as implementer. [20] [21] KIAT supporting zone 2 and 5 that will involve small-scale businesses [21] and supporting PD PAL Jaya to review their institutional status. Domestic wastewater treatment system projects, APBD allocation for DSDA. [20] [21] DPRKP focuses on quality improvement of the residential areas à working with PD PAL Jaya, PAM Jaya, and IUWASH Plus in the national KOTAKU program, and 21 priority kampungs, and Rujak Center in its own Community Action Plan program and Collaborative Implementation Plan (consultants since 2018). [02] Community Action Plan considered better than the usual musrenbang mechanism. [02] IUWASH Plus worked with Bappeda on the planning for the KOTAKU program, with DSDA in designing the communal wastewater treatment, with communities in achieving 1,000 septic tank units, with Sinarmas in corporate social responsibility for Pademangan Barat and Tebet Timur, with YPCI (CSO) for supported behavioral change promotions. [20] [HN]

- Opportunities: DSDA to build biopores in government office complexes to lessen dependence on PAM Jaya’s water service (still 60% pipe leak). IUWASH Plus à LSIC program to study the harmonization of sludge management in DKI Jakarta and surrounding regions, from the regulatory aspect, tariffs, and the capacity of desludging installations. [20] KIAT à proposal on sewage grants for 500 household lines. [21] Jimly à interested in supporting programs for processing river water into drinking water and a program to use applicable technologies for processing pipeline water at public schools. [12] [D]

- Challenges: Only one domestic wastewater and desludging operator (PD PAL Jaya), operating not on a routine basis, and rarely for individuals. Household database on septic tank users unavailable.[20] DPRKP’s target of 0% slum areas and 100% improved water services in all residential areas by 2019. [02] The septic tank revitalization program still needs reinforcement from local leadership à IUWASH Plus needs to increase social awareness campaigns. [20] In the LSIC, most small-scale operators face business and route licenses, but the LGs are not prepared for the online single submission system. [20] [D]

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL (ELECTRIC VEHICLES)

a. In your own sector, what is the current partnership between the public and private sector in managing

- Policy: Third priority among environmental-related PPPs in the next 5 years. [03] [04] [RG]

- Reasons: based on Smart City’s green city index [09]. [HN]

- Existing efforts: TransJakarta: renew bus fleets through usual tenders. [04] Hyundai in Cikarang. [News] [HN]

- Opportunities: Tesla, Volkswagen, Mercedes, BMW invited to invest in lithium batteries. [News] [D]


QUESTION FINDINGS

and delivering the services?



- Challenges: Related to traffic congestion and mass transportation [03] [09]. Air pollution information blown up. [10] The pilot project depends on the CG’s policies. [03] Now existing: PP 73/2019, Perpres 55/2019, Pergub 3/2020 à incentives for electric vehicles. Not yet: Regulation of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource electric vehicle battery charging stations and tariffs. [D]

TRAFFIC CONGESTION CONTROL AND MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS




- Policy: Fourth priority among environmental-related PPPs in the next 5 years. [03] [04] [RG]

- Reasons: traffic congestions closely relate to air pollution in Jakarta. [03] [FF]

- Existing efforts: Transit-oriented-development project [03], Jak-Lingko, Transjakarta [11], mass rapid transit [11] [10] ß among those mentioned by informants. [HN]

- Challenges: continuity of the projects for mobility and connectivity in Greater Jakarta that can drive new local centers of economic activities. [11] [14] In the city, counterproductive policy to open the Tanah Abang street areas for street vendors. [11] [D]

FLOOD CONTROL




- Policy: Fifth priority sector among environmental-related PPPs in the next 5 years. [03] [04] [RG]

- Reasons: lowlands, inadequate waterways, population growth and activity faster than efforts (large solid waste volume, issue on land acquisition). [03] [12] [14] [FF]

- Strengths/weaknesses: Flood management planned and revised since Dutch, but face land acquisition problem. [03] Now: naturalization vs. normalization à no integrated and concrete measures. [07] [12] [14] [HN]

- Past and existing efforts: BKT indicates fast land acquisition [03], now needs follow ups. Identification of levels of drinking water vulnerability in Bogor regions (need DKI’s support in conservation efforts in Bogor’s catchment area). [20] [HN]

- Opportunities: DKI to draw up a grand design for ground water in the buffering regions, DSDA plans biopores in government office complexes to anticipate the wet season [20], follow-ups on BKT [03]. [D]

- Challenges: land acquisition [03] [21], collaborations with other regions. [06] [20] [D]

GREEN SPACE

a. In your own sector, what is the current partnership

- Policy: Additional (urban spatial) priority for PPPs in the next 5 years. [03] [RG]


QUESTION FINDINGS

between the public and private sector in managing and delivering the services?



- Reasons: Act 26/2007 (30% area for green space) vs. population growth (feasible housing). [03] [FF]

- Opportunities: applicable technologies for quality green in limited land area. [03] [D]

- Challenges: existing green spaces, such as Monas Park and Ancol beach, as privatizations and do not give open access to the public. [11] [D]

HEALTH SERVICES – IN GENERAL




- Policy: Health-related investments one of priority PPPs in the next 5 years. [04] [RG]

- Reasons: Basic services, and the pandemic has advanced the technology and public awareness. [04] [HN]

- Strengths and weaknesses: Compared with other regions, better health services, completion rate of immunization, [06] [15] but DKI’s trend contradicts the national progressive trend. [06] [HN]

- Existing efforts: Dinkes upgrading kecamatan-level puskemas with inpatient care into kecamatan-level RSUDs, using APBD allocations, no plans for KPBU scheme. [03] [04] B40 targeted for fully subsidized beneficiaries-JKN and KJP programs (elderly), female CSOs ensuring B40 members obtain Healthy Indonesia Cards (JKN cards), starting Balai Peduli Lansia (elderly care centers) at cooperatives in East Jakarta and South Jakarta. [13] [HN]

- Challenges: Fully subsidized beneficiaries-JKN often on the waiting list for hospitalization; not many specific care services (JKN only general health cares) for the elderly group, KLJ program only targets the underserved elderly group living at government’s nursing homes. [13] [D]

HEALTH SERVICES – TB, HIV, MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH




- Policy: Database and reporting important, number of new cases as main indicator. [05] Now using national database e-TB Manager, for HIV: HIV/AIDS Information System and Cohort Recapitulation Application. [05] [RG]

- Reasons: Performance can only be measured through data. [05] [RG]

- Strengths/weaknesses: Clear line of coordination from national to local levels. [16] [05] CSOs must report to the Branch Health Services Office at Administrative City/District Level. [16] Maternal and child health network under Bappenas. [16] HIV tests available at puskesmas / private facilities. [15] [16] Many CSOs for HIV, with funds also available from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and Linkages, and APBD (2019). [16] Cohort Recapitulation Application supported by competent personnel, adequate personnel at units, adequate training, adequate regulations and monitoring, additional time-bound personnel (Branch Health Services Office at Administrative City/District Level) from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and USAID. [05] [HN]

- Existing efforts: Public-private-mix with private health facilities à partners complying with government regulations. [05] SEHATI program for HIV tracing: health service units working formally with CSOs. [05] Cohort Recapitulation Application development. [05] CSOs work with other CSOs, the private sector, and have their own community development programs. [16] PPPs on HIV awareness at working places. [16] [HN]

- Challenges: No data/reporting personnel for TB team [05], HIV plus patients prefer to be traced by doctors or health workers [05], still high stigma [16], partnerships between CSOs and the private sector is more incidental/product marketing with conflicting perspectives [16], community initiatives still limited, government training often not continued with field applications [16], higher number of new cases among (pregnant) housewives, children, and


QUESTION FINDINGS

youths but interventions still limited [16]. Commuters cannot get antiretroviral at health facilities in Jakarta. [15] [D]

HEALTH SERVICES – COVID-19




- Policy: PSBB-2. Limitation to services of health units as high-risk locations, [03] [05] [16] especially for dental and mouth. [16] [RG]

- Reasons: high case fatality rate and low bed occupancy rate. [NEWS] [HN]

- Strengths/weaknesses: proximity with MoH leads to independent labs and high RT-PCR testing rate. [03] Limited number of health workers. [NEWS] [HN]

- Existing efforts: data on referral RSUD hospitals (http://eis.dinkes.jakarta.go.id/dashboard.php), other data and information (https://corona.jakarta.go.id/). Recruitment of health workers [News]. Adaptation to service delivery: gradually increasing HIV tests to normal, youth care and HIV consultations go online, by call, WA. TB medication 2 weeks to 1 month, multidrug resistant 1 day to 8 days. Cohort Recapitulation Application 1 month to 2 months. Work with CSOs so Cohort Recapitulation Application and condoms can be sent via courier services. Linkages support for courier payment, but usually not used. [05] [16] [HN]

- Challenges: Need to make adaptations and work with other partners. [05] [16] Other vulnerable groups: lower-middle workers laid off and lose JKN membership, [17] underpaid waste pickers making daily rounds in the neighborhood with their family. [08]. Increased volume of infectious wastes (part of hazardous materials), but management under full control of MoEF. [03] [D]

HOUSING (AFFORDABLE FLATS)




- Policy: The national strategic project on building 1,000 housings. [02] [RG]

- Reasons: Jakarta’s relatively large APBD and more opportunities to work with the private sector. [02] [FF]

- Existing efforts: Partnership schemes with the private sector through developer obligations (SIPPT and SP3L). Partnership schemes with the CG: DKI to do land acquisition or use land assets at Provincial Government-Owned Enterprises. [02]

- Challenges: Partnership with the CG is not as easy as with the private sector � involving state asset management. Not yet used à KPBU and vertical land consolidation schemes. [02]

Conclusion:

- FF: Jakarta’s large and dense population, limited land area, accompanied by reliance on other regions.

- RG: Priorities set in the RPJMD and its adjustments.

- HN: Existing efforts.

- D: Challenges in the implementation of each (government or non-government) effort through different partnership schemes and different groups of actors. New opportunities from the interactions.

Recommendation:

- The identified gaps within each sector can be an opportunity and will need further discussions with the main stakeholders to define the entry points for the intervention and collaboration.

Theme 4: Inclusive Economic Development

http://eis.dinkes.jakarta.go.id/dashboard.php

https://corona.jakarta.go.id/


QUESTION FINDINGS

5. In your opinion, what are the key challenges that drive high unemployment rate in DKI Jakarta?

a. Is it the state of the bureaucracy, capacity and resource issues, level of corruption, or ‘oversight and accountability’ mechanism?

- Jakarta’s Inclusive Economic Development Index scores (2011-2019) à higher economic growth, but higher income inequality, lower rate of women’s labor force participation, and dominant youth workforce. [06] [10] [HN] Jakarta’s trend � stagnant or even regressive, contrary to the national progressive trend. [06] [HN]

- High percentage of educated workforce à high economic growth attracts competitive job seekers from other regions. [06] [12] [HN]

- Job opportunities relatively low: Jakarta has shifted to the services sector. High urbanization rate causes the services sector to become more diverse. [15] Manufacturing sector larger in adjacent regions (Bekasi and Tangerang). [07] [11] [12] [HN]

- Jakarta’s manufacturing sector: labor-intensive policy during previous tenure à garment and food companies (Nusantara bonded zone) à relocation since 2013 (Central Java and West Java). Garment laborers laid off, not moving out but difficult to find new jobs. [17] [HN]

- Youth unemployment dominates in Jakarta (senior secondary or vocational school graduates). [06] [10] Highest in North Jakarta. Youth unemployment is not unique for Jakarta, but a specific issue for Indonesia. [06] [HN]

- Three reasons for the high rate of youth unemployment: (1) large migration flow, and migrants not compatible with the services market à enter the informal sector and not recorded as employed; (2) the link-and-match problem (compatible for manufacturing industries, but not for the services sector (financial and hospitality sectors)); and (3) characteristic of educated unemployment à a relatively high level of education, less access to job opportunities than those with either higher or lower educational levels. [06] [10] [HN]

6. What is the government currently doing and its plans to narrow the skill gap or increase the opportunities in order to absorb the young jobseekers?

- The issue of youth unemployment is complicated by demographic bonus. WB raised the status of Indonesia to an upper middle-income country and it needs a solid middle class. Human resources will need education, training, and apprenticeship. [11] DKI has already improved the formal education system: free schools, semi-formal training through vocational schools and polytechnics. It has the required modalities. [07] [11] Yet, education needs to include entrepreneurship skills. [07] [HN]

- In the non-formal learning system: one PPKD in each city, and other Dinas working with CSOs in providing the training for industries and businesses. [17] [14] [HN]

- MSMEs: option for the youth group and other marginalized groups, but has not been explored. [06] [07] DKI had the Ok OCE program, but discontinued. [07] [14] Other options include urban farming in limited land areas. Taiwan, Thailand example. [07] [HN]

b. What is the role of CSOs, private sector, media, the religious groups, and other groups in reform?

- PPPs on training and apprenticeship are important. [11] Yet, Provincial Services Office for Trade, Industry, Cooperatives, and MSMEs’ report à companies reluctant to provide workers with training. [10] [RG]

- Labor unions à Union members need reskilling and upskilling activities, particularly when laid off. [17] Unions see it more as the responsibility of the government and try to bridge the communication [17]. [RG] Yet, the number of PPKD is limited and not always active. [17] With the lack of training, unions organize their own training for members and work with donors to provide work capital. [17] [D]

- CSOs: work with DKI in facilitating training for MSMEs [14] or support members in developing MSMEs. [13] [RG]

- Research centers have done relevant studies as input to policymakers. [RG] SMERU: inclusive digital economy. [06] ILO apprenticeship programs. [11]

c. Is the provincial government working with them to resolve the problem? If so, do you think it is working?

Training and apprenticeship [D]

- There are memorandums of understanding between LGs and the private sector on training but face barriers in implementations. [11] Partnership at national level relatively strong, but at local level, companies may make different policies and it depends on the level of trust between local stakeholders. [17]

- Not working because at national level work competency standards not updated [11]. In several countries à industries organize themselves in a sector-skill council to identify types of


QUESTION FINDINGS

skills that will emerge and prepare the competency standards, training materials and assessments, and apprenticeship. [11]

- Not working because database still unavailable [06] [11] à

- (1) labor market information (identify available job opportunities, link them to the job seekers). If no match, Dinas can identify the training needed. [06] [11]

- (2) assessment mechanism for the training graduates to identify link and match and feedback as a basis for identifying types of skills required by industries. [11]

- Options: (1) promotions on the 200% super tax deduction. (2) realistic short-term partnership: collaboration on updating occupational standards. (industries lend personnel to be PPKD instructors or lend their products to PPKD). PPKD can concentrate on soft skills (problem solving and managerial skills and languages). (3) PPKD ensures instructors gain industrial experience and career development. [11] (4) Kartu Kuning (Yellow Card) program as labor market information. But, can be improved. [11] (5) more crucial for the youth group is quality apprenticeship programs. Almost 80% of young apprentices are confident they will get a decent job and almost 90% of them joined an apprenticeship program based on their own initiatives. [11]

More inclusive job opportunities [D]

- Act 8/2016 (1% of workers at private companies are PwDs). There needs to be incentives to support enforcement. [11] PwDs and other social minorities significantly contribute to the economy and culture, but discrimination not systematically overcome. [07]

MSMEs [D]

- Youths and marginalized groups still face basic problems: capital and loan access. [06] [07] Bank credit ratio for MSMEs is very low compared with the national figure, despite Third-Party Funds the highest. [06] MSMEs need financial education and digital literacy. [06] DKI potential to organize large free forums for stakeholders to share ideas, including on training. [07]

Conclusion:

- FF: Jakarta has a higher economic growth compared with other regions, but higher income inequality, lower rate of women’s labor force participation, and dominant youth workforce.

- RG: The large companies, worker unions, CSOs (including cooperatives); the academia have different roles to support better efforts.

- HN: Efforts in the formal and non-formal education systems; in supporting MSMEs to grow; in giving other vulnerable groups more access to job opportunities.

- D: Challenges faced in carrying out each of the efforts.: training and apprentice, inclusive job opportunity and MSMEs.

Recommendation:

- Gaps identified by the informants can be the opportunity for pilot interventions with following up by suggestions based on key experts and/or best practices in other regions of similar characteristics.

7. Relating to the regional economy affected by external shocks from COVID-19, what are current government initiatives?

- Jakarta facing economic contraction [10] [11], open unemployment rate worsening [11] [12], as confirmed layoffs by unions. [13] [17] [HN]

- The CG has given more attention to Greater Jakarta on social assistance distributions. [14] The assistance not only helps households, but also MSMEs. [14]. DKI has better social assistance distributions à already verified 2019 Integrated Data on Social Welfare. [06] [HN]

- MSMEs need more protection programs than social assistance programs. [07] But long-term income generating programs involve multi interventions and holistic planning considering the limited modalities of MSMEs. [06] [07] The CG has the Kartu Prakerja program but problematic à cannot meet target to improve competency of recipient because launched during the pandemic à channeling social assistance benefits. [06] Online system is not suitable for skill training [06], and inaccessible for those not digital-literate or with time and money to access the internet. [13] [16] [HN]


QUESTION FINDINGS

- The CG has programs for the business community, but mostly for large-scale units (tax relief, access to banks). The National Economic Recovery program provides assistance for MSMEs, but budget realization is not large. [14] Ministry of Cooperatives has a one-gate policy but not reaching out the MSMEs. [19] [HN]

- Issues on the tendency of LGs to interpret the pandemic-related policies by themselves. [06] There have also been different policies made by the CG and DKI between AKB and PSBB. [06] 07] [09] [12] [14] The National Economic Recovery program formed at national level and refocusing budget, unprecedented and can cause ineffective budget use.[12] [Recently PSBB-2 based on the number of new cases and bed occupancy rate.] [RG]

- However, in line with national policy, Bappeda has adjusted the 2017-2022 RPJMD. [01] [10] Community empowerment will be the backbone of the recovery efforts. [01] Five priority post-pandemic development strategies. [01] [10]. Bappeda has mapped non-APBD fund resources. [01] [HN]

a. What is the role of CSOs, private sector, media, the religious groups, and other groups in reform?

- Private sector: although dominant, but now under pressure. [07] [12] [17] Only large companies can still provide corporate social responsibility funds. [17] The private sector will try to survive and recruit workers. [07] From the 1998 experience à need reorganization. [07] Issue for manufacturing sector: disturbed flows of foreign capitals and imported raw materials. [07] Even garment companies (domestic raw materials) cannot export products. [17] The government might need to take the lead in driving economic growth. [12] [HN]

- MSMEs: people try to keep the economy running. [12] [13] But the situation is different from crises in the past due to limited mobility. [06] [11] [12] [13] [19] Housewives, youths, and other vulnerable groups begin to do business in the informal sector. [07] [10] [12] [13] [14] MSEs have continued production but households are cutting back consumptions (laid off) à MSEs cutting their production in turn. [10] [12] [13] [14] [HN]

- Cooperatives: one of the financial institutions funding MSMEs. Members mostly MSME owners. Cooperatives also badly hit by pandemic. [13] [HN]

- CSOs: because of social distancing, facilitate digitalization of MSMEs. [13] [HN]

- Research centers: have carried out pandemic-related studies. [06] [11] SMERU study shows that six sectors are prone to impacts of the pandemic (hospitality, trading, transportation and warehouses; constructions; processing industries; other services. The sectors are dominated by middle class mostly high school graduates. The first four sectors comprise informal workers. [06] [HN]

- Labor unions: 99 unions in Jakarta, members affected temporarily or permanent layoffs. Unions have tried to mediate talks with DKI. [17] [HN]


c. How do you think the state of the bureaucracy, capacity and resource issues, level of corruption, or ‘oversight and accountability’ mechanism may create hindrance in recovery?

Bappeda [D]

- UPT Inovasi under Bappeda is now mapping potential collaborations with the private sector, donors, and the community. [01] UPT Inovasi is matching programs under RPJMD 2017-2022 and the CG’s programs (Permendagri 90/2019) with programs from other parties to identify gaps. [01]

Community [D]

- DKI can improve social assistance distribution with more extensive public information. [17] As the level of uncertainty is high, DKI needs to set aside a buffer budget for the poor and MSMEs. [06] The kelurahan-basis development program can be involved in the recovery implementations. [10]

MSMEs [D]

- Unavailable database: Government targeting 60 million MSME units to support, but only has projected data. [06] [11] CSOs and research centers now supporting Bappenas develop the database. [14]

- Digitization issues: Business digitalization is one of the CG’s strategies to support survivability. [11] Yet, with access to the virtual market, MSEs still have to face more established actors (abroad). [13] [11] Housewives need introduction to digital training and some have limited access to good internet connection, gadget, time, and money. [13] May need specific additional equipment for PwDs. [11] Yet, another practice à long distance


QUESTION FINDINGS

learning is less expensive, instructors can remotely engage with a large audience and give access to women and PwDs. [11]

- More basic problems à Most MSMEs do not own business licenses and bank accounts. [06] [07] [11] [13] [14] Besides entrepreneurial and innovation training, they mostly need formalization and financial literacy. [06] [11] [13] Formalization through social guarantees or conditional cash transfer programs. [11]

Cooperatives [D]

- Loans also available for cooperatives through the Institution for Revolving Fund Management, which has never been accessible before. [13]

Workers [D]

- AKB period: companies have started to recall their employees to work. Unions can bridge communication with the workers. [17] Unions have asked DKI to facilitate talks with the private sector to avoid expansive layoffs during the pandemic. Workers are willing to be temporarily laid off without payments. [17] To help the unemployed à best practices are the employment guarantee scheme and the unemployment benefit. [11]

Conclusion:

- FF: No FF. Relatively no precedence of the large-scale social distancing.

- RG: Policies of the LG and DKI on the pandemic handling phase (PSBB-2). Adjustment to RPJMD, in line with the national policies.

- HN: National programs for the regions and Greater Jakarta, new priorities of DKI. Efforts done by non-government actors.

- D: Challenges faced or identified by the different actors and the ensuing opportunities.

Recommendation:

- Gaps identified by informants to be filled in, which might include current or past practices from several countries as this has no precedence.

Theme 5: Donor coordination

8. What is the most effective way for the donor community to engage with the provincial government to implement a program that also supports provincial goals and objectives?

- Two champions or main entryways à Bappeda (macro planning) and the relevant Dinas (micro technical implementing). Dinas usually backs a proposal through the process at Bappeda. [10] [20] TGUPP may be the complementary third entryway. [10] [21]

- Key actors during the planning and implementation stages are different. [21] After the approval, the key actor is the Dinas. [20] [21] During coordination meetings for activity implementation, the relevant Dinas, Bappeda, and Bureau for Development and Environment (under Setda) are present. [21] Activity monitoring is carried out by Bureau for Development and Environment. [21] [02]

- On investments, there is JIC under the Provincial Office for Investment and One Stop Integrated Services. JIC has a market intelligence unit and an information and promotion unit. [04] The market intelligence unit has analyzed the foreign and domestic investment profiles during 2015-2019. [04]

a. What do you think should be the role of the civil society to facilitate the process?

- DKI expects that non government parties are able to be involved in collaborative development works, especially the community. [01] [02] [10] The governor expects such collaboration will bring out the best for the people. [01]

- Non government actors can bridge collaborations with and between the central and local governments and hence need to identify the right key champions. [12]

b. What are the existing incentives and constraints around improving public participation in this process?

- Suggestions to follow the recognized (formal) mechanism. [10] [09]


QUESTION FINDINGS

c. If there are multiple donors in your sector, what do you think is the best way to engage them?

- JDCN is DKI Jakarta’s network for collaborations with local and international development partners, either through government-to-government, government-to-business, or government-to-community schemes. [01] [02] [10] It was first developed for only handling the pandemic. [01] [02] [10] The Secretariat is under Setda. [02] Streamlining with Bappeda’s planning mechanism is the authority of Setda. [02]

Conclusion:

- FF/RG: Work relations among the Dinas.

- HN: The leadership transition, the pandemic, the Provincial Office for Investment and One Stop Integrated Services reform.

- D: The current situation has led to new potential champions/platforms for bridging partnerships that are expected to bring about the best for the community.

Recommendation:

- At current leadership, the planned collaboration with DKI Jakarta should refer to Dinas’s development needs which will enable engagement and support from TGUPP. The formal arrangement will be with Bappeda with further exploration of the use of JDCN for engagement with other development entities in DKI Jakarta.

Resource Persons marked as (1) through (21). Identities are removed due to Personal Identifying Information

U.S. Agency for International Development

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