Applying FMEA & RCFA to Asset Management in the … FMEA & RCFA to Asset Management in the 21st...

Applying FMEA & RCFA to Asset Management in the 21st

CenturyUnderstanding the Tools and Techniques Needed to Reduce, Eliminate, or Accept Asset and Facility Risk

Michael B. CowleyPresidentCE Maintenance Solutions, LLC

PRESENTERS:

Steven D. SchneiderAsset Reliability ManagerNE Ohio Regional Sewer District

Scott A. McBrayer, PEProject EngineerDonahue IDEAS, LLC

Course Outline

Understand Basic Risk Management

Become Familiar with Risk Management Tools

What is Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA)?

RCFA Tools and Examples

What is Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)?

FMEA Tools and Processes

FMEA Examples and Exercises

2

NEORSD Asset Initiative

NEORSD Asset Management – Phase 2Asset codes analysis and facilitation

WAM database analysis for Renewable Energy Facility (REF) assets

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)Facilitating 6 Pilot Projects (4 O&M FMEAs and 2 Design FMEAs)

Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA)Facilitating 4 Pilot Projects

Equipment Condition Assessments• As-Needed at District discretion

3

Why Do You Need Risk Management?

What Keeps You Awake at Night?

Three (3) Risk Management Priorities1. Safety – Keeping Employees and Customers Safe

2. Ensuring You Don’t Go to Jail

3. Making Sure You Sleep All Night

4

What is Risk Management ?

Unacceptable RiskRisk assessment is the determination of quantitative or qualitative value of risk related to a concrete situation and a recognized hazard.

Quantitative risk assessment requires calculations of two components of risk: the magnitude of the potential loss, and the probability the loss will occur.

5

What is Risk Management ?

Acceptable RiskIs a risk that is understood and tolerated usually because the cost or difficulty of implementing an effective countermeasure for the associated vulnerability exceeds the expectation of loss.

6

What Does it Take to Develop a Risk Management Program?

Management Culture of Continuous Improvement

Leading Class Equipment and Asset Management System

Complete and Detailed Understanding of Your Operating System and Process

Mature Maintenance Management System and Process

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Risk Management

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Risk Types

UncertaintyAssociated with unknown and unexpected events, generally catastrophic

TraitsUnknown or difficult to quantify

Catastrophic or disastrous

Can be costly

Outside the organization’s sphere of control

Examples Include:Building damage by flash flooding, arson or sabotage

Hurricanes, tornados or blizzards

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Source: Facility Management Association of Australia, Ltd, Facility Management Guidelines to Managing Risk 2004

Risk Types

HazardAssociated with a source of potential harm or a situation with the potential to cause harm

TraitsUsually known

Readily quantifiable, tangible

Impact predominantly on safety

Examples Include:Catastrophic Equipment Failure

Management and use of hazardous chemicals

Confined space entries

10

Source: Facility Management Association of Australia, Ltd, Facility Management Guidelines to Managing Risk 2004

RCFA –What is it?

Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA)Problem solving method

Reactive process

Eliminates recurring problems

Manages the consequences of failure

Not a tool but a process

RCFA is a Reactive Process Initiated After the Failure has Occurred

11

What is the Objective of a RCFA ?

Analysis is Performed in Order to Identify:What behaviors

Actions

Inactions

Conditions

Led to a failure

Success is defined as the near certain prevention of recurrence

12

RCFA – Failure Classifications

ChronicEvents that have happened in the past, but may have significant cumulative losses over time

Events that happen more than once should be classified as chronic

SporadicOnetime events that involve significant, unexpected and severe consequences

13

What is a Root Cause?

The Root Cause is the Most Basic Reason for the Problem Occurring

There are three types of root causes:

Physical,

Human, and

Latent

A failure results from one or more root causes

14

What is a Root Cause?

PhysicalA component or material failed (such as a shaft breaking)

HumanActions or decisions lead to failure (an operator made a mistake)

LatentReasons causing human decisions to be made incorrectly

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RCFA Problem Solving Steps

1. Define the Problem

2. Define the Team

3. Contain the Symptoms

4. Root Cause Analysis

5. Corrective Actions

6. Preventive Actions

7. Evidence of Effectiveness

8. Team Sign-Off

16

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Asset # Southerly ID Fan Pillow Block Bearing Work Order #

Why did the bearings fail? The bearings failed because of lack of grease.

Name: Paul Crum / RCFA team

Date: 2/27/2015

Upper maintenance management.

Why did the maintenance employee not know

which hole was the proper one for the

connection?

The maintenance employee didn't investigate / study

how to properly install the grease line.

Step 3: Corrective Actions (What should be done to f ix the problem?)

Re-pipe all grease lines to the proper grease port in the bearing housing.

Step 4: Preventive Actions (What should be done to prevent the problem from happening again?)

1. Use color indicators around the correct grease port. 2. Any time the pillow block is replaced, visually

inspect the bearing to ensure proper grease line installation. 3. Make sure all employees are trained to

review installation diagrams prior to installation.

Why was it the grease line hooked to the

wrong location?

There were multiple holes available for the connection.

(Only one hole is shown on the diagram.) The

mechanical maintenance employee did not know which

hole was the proper one.

Why????? Because:

Step 5: Communications (Who needs to be informed?) Step 6: Completed By

Why??? Because:

How was the Memo Lube Installed

improperly? (assume at this point the Memo

Lube was installed in-house)

The grease line was hooked to the wrong location.

Why???? Because:

Why? Because:

Because of improper (Memo Lube) manufacturer

installation.

Why?? Because:

Why was there a lack of grease?

Step 2: 5-Why Analysis (Ask w hy the condition occurred until you obtain the root cause)

NEORSD - Root Cause Failure Analysis 5 Why Form

Step 1: Define the Problem (What, Where, How Many?)

Premature failure on the in-board and out-board fan pillow block bearings.

FMEA –What Is It?

Failure Mode and Effect AnalysisFMEA is a systematic method of identifying and preventing product and process problems before they occur

Potential problem analysis

Anticipate problems before they occur

Crystal ball method of maintenance

What if this happens????

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The FMEA process entails asking eight basic questions about the asset or system under review.

1. What is the function and associated performance standards of the overall asset in its present operating context? Why did you buy it and what do you expect from it (e.g. to pump 300 gal/hr.)?

2. In what ways does it fail to fulfill its functions? e.g. Unable to pump at all or unable to pump 300 gal/hr.

3. What causes each functional failure? What are the failure modes, what is the root cause of the failure for the asset, e.g. Pump bearing fatigued.

4. What is the Consequence of Failure?In regards to Safety, Regulatory Compliance and Fiscal Impact, e.g. Failure may violate EPA permit.

19

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The FMEA process entails asking eight basic questions about the asset or system under review.

5. What happens when each failure occurs? What happens when the failure occurs, e.g. Bearing seizes, alarm notifies operator, etc.

6. What is the likelihood of Occurrence? How likely is that failure to occur?

7. What is currently done to prevent or detect each failure? What Proactive Maintenance Policy or Task is currently being done.

8. What Proactive Maintenance Task can be done to prevent or detect the failure? What action can be taken, including Standard Operating Procedures and Redesigns.

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3 Key Factors to FMEAs

Risk Rating ScalesRequires the analysis team to use past experience and engineering judgment to rate each potential risk according to three rating scales

Severity (Criticality)The consequence of the failure should it occur

OccurrenceThe probability of frequency of the failure occurring

DetectionThe probability of the failure being detected before the impact of the effect is realized

2121

Risk Priority NumberRPN = Criticality Score x Occurrence Score x Detection Score

RPN Number Will Range From 3 to 225

Highest Numbers Should be Attended to First

Any RPN’s with High Criticality Scores of Between 5 and 9 in Any of the Categories Should be Addressed Regardless of the RPN

Once Remediation has Taken Place the RPN Should be Recalculated (Revised RPN)

Once RPN is Within the Acceptable Range it Should Only be Reviewed if Process, Conditions, Outside Factors Change

22

Severity and Consequence of Failure/Criticality

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Consequence of Failure/Criticality

Weighing Score Scoring Description

1 Poses no threat

Employee/Public Safety 33% 2Poses some threat/exposes public or employees to potential injury

3Poses significant threat/exposes public or employees to potential serious injury

1No violation likely to result if remedial action undertaken is planned

Regulatory Compliance/Public Impact

33% 2Violation might occur even if remedial action is undertaken as planned and potential media exposure

3 Violation is likely with extensive media exposure likely

1 Remediation can be done at minimal cost < $100K

Fiscal Impact 33% 2 Results in costly remediation $100K< and <$1M

3 Remediation would be a major staff burden or cost >$1M

Occurrence Description

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Score

Occurrence

Description

5 Very Likely

4 Likely

3 Possible

2 Unlikely

1 Very Unlikely

Detection Description

25

Score Detection Description

5 not detectable

4 requires invasive inspection

3detected through preventive or

predictive inspections or rounds

2detected using human senses

during operator rounds

1automatically detected and

acknowledged

The FMEA Team

Team LeaderBest leader is non expert

Process or Equipment ExpertMust know all aspects and details of equipment and process

4-6 MembersOperators, Mechanics, Electricians

No management presence is preferred

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10 Keys to Successful FMEA

1. Review the Process or EquipmentReview drawings and process flow diagrams

Tour the location or equipment

Have process or operations expert present

2. Brainstorm Possible Failure ModesBegin the brainstorming process

Each member of team should be responsible for numerous ideas

Remember it’s brainstorming, listen to all thoughts even the unusual

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3. List Potential Effects of Each Failure ModeList all effects of each potential failure mode

Some may have several potential effects

4. Assign Severity Ranking for Each EffectHow severe is the effect if it happens?

What are the consequences of the failure?

The ranking is 1-3 in each category

28


5. Assign an Occurrence Ranking for Each FailureUse actual data if available

Obtained from CMMS history or event logs from operators

The ranking is 1-5

6. Assign a Detection Ranking for Each Failure Mode and/or Effect

How likely will you be able to detect the failure?

If difficult or impossible to detect then it warrantsa high score

Detection rankings are 1-529


7. Calculate the Risk Priority Number for Each Failure Mode

RPN = Severity X Occurrence X Detection

8. Prioritize the Failure Modes for ActionThe highest RPN possible is 225

Pareto 80/20 rule will tell you that you only need to work on the highest 20%

With experience you will develop a range where anything above that number gets attention

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9. Take Action to Eliminate or Reduce the High-Risk Failure Modes

Take action to eliminate the failure

If not possible, take actions to reduce the RPN to an acceptable level

Always strive to reduce the RPN even further

10. Calculate the Resulting RPN as the Failure Modes are Reduced or Eliminated

Recalculate the RPN

Resulting RPN’s should be significantly lower than the original calculation

31

NEORSD FMEA

NEORSD - Southerly WWTP - ID Fans - Illinois Blower FMEA Key: Safety Score + Regulatory Score + Fiscal Score = Criticality Score

Steve S, Sam S, Josh M, Bob H, Paul C, Fred D, Mike P, Chris D, Rich W, Dan H, John Z, Chris P Criticality Score x Occurrence Score x Detection Score = Risk Priority Number (RPN)

Mike Cowley, CE Maintenance

Operating Context: Functional failure defined as failing to perform the following Function:The primary function of the ID fan (1 of 3 systems) is to remove the products of combustion, pulling them out of the incinerator, through the primary heat exchanger (maintaining a + 5" to -5" water column range),

waste heat boiler, economizer, scrubber and then discharging through the secondary heat exchanger into the atmosphere via the stack.

Worst Case Scenario: Failure off shift, during a holiday; assuming a 30-hour light-up of the back-up unit; also assuming 30 to 40 ft. of inventory.

Scope of Evaluation: Ductwork (leaving the scrubber) through the ID fan to the secondary heat exchanger. Expansion joint to expansion joint.

Assumptions: 1. Maintenance personnel and operators can be around equipment while in operation.

Lin

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Functional FailureFailure Mode

Sa

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Re

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Fis

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Failure Effect

Occu

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Current

Controls,

Prevention

Current

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Detection De

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RP

N

Recommended Action Secondary Action

Responsibility

and Target

Completion

Date

Estimated

Cost Sa

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Fis

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Occu

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De

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vis

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RP

N Final decision / action

to be taken (Based on

review by

management)

1I.D. Fan system fails to

function.

Expansion joint fasteners

are loose.2 1 1 4

Over time, the expansion joint

fasteners loosen up, drop off,

and the expansion joint

connection seperates. The ID fan

speed will vary, and the fan will

use more energy. The feedback

from the pressure transmitter

will send a (true) signal that

5 None Current PMs 3 60Lock-tite and re-torque all fasteners

in the expansion joint.None PUMPs Up to $1,000 2 1 1 4 2 3 24


function.

The ID fan housing fasteners

loosen.1 1 1 3

Over time, any of the ID housing

fan fasteners loosen up, drop off,

and the joint connection

seperates, potentially vibrating.

The ID fan speed will vary, and

the fan will use more energy. The

feedback from the pressure

transmitter will send a (true)

5 None None 5 75Lock-tite and re-torque all fasteners.

Check on an annual PM.None PUMPs 2 days x 2 PUMPs 1 1 1 3 2 3 18


function.

Wrong gasket materials (or

size) are used.1 1 1 3

During installation, the wrong

gasket material (or size) is used.

Pre-mature failure allows the

fasteners to loosen, drop off,





2 None None 5 30 None None


function.The gasket deteriorates. 1 1 1 3

Over time, the gasket

deteriorates and weakens,

allowing the fasteners to

become loose, drop off, and the

joint connection seperates,

potentially vibrating. The ID fan





function.

Incorrect gasket

installation.1 1 1 3

During installation, the gasket is

installed incorrectly, allowing

the fasteners to become loose,

drop off, and the joint

connection seperates,






function.

Induction side differential

visual pressure gauge fails.1 1 1 3

No dominant failure mode.

Equipment is not currently used.



function.

Duct work thermocouple

near expansion joint fails.1 1 1 3

Equipment is used for

observation only.



function.

The spring-loaded isolation

dampeners (beneath the ID

fan base) fatigue.

1 1 2 4

Over time, the isolation

dampeners (1 of 16) fatigue,

crack and break. Eventually

enough of the dampeners break,

and there is more vibration

between the ID fan base and the

floor. The mortar in the concrete

base will break apart. This could

1 None None 5 20Visually inspect the isolation

dampeners for fatigue.None

Maintenance

Manager to

include in PM

1 1 1 3 1 3 9

Current State Remediation

Process or Equipment:

Team:

Facilitator:

Equipment / Process Function:

FMEA Example

32

NEORSD FMEA









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Responsibility

and Target

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Date

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Incorrect gasket












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observation only.



function.



fan base) fatigue.

1 1 2 4











Maintenance

Manager to

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1 1 1 3 1 3 9



Team:

Facilitator:


FMEA ExampleCont….

NEORSD FMEA









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33

NEORSDFMEA Case Studies

34

35

Pump Performance Requirements

1. Must pump 500 GPM on consistent basis

2. Must pump 24/7

3. Pump flow monitored in control room, but not an alarm function

4. Operator rounds conducted every 2-4 hours. Unless other problems are being handled

5. Pump leakage detected by observation only

6. Might take operator 24 hours to discover pump performance is sub-standard. Due to rise in sludge blanket in clarifiers

7. 2 pumps normally operate at one time

8. Pump speed and flow managed by VFDs36

Pump Performance FMEA Outcome

What was the Top Failure Mode?

What do You Think the RPN (Risk Priority Number) Was?

What do You Think Were the Most Critical Components of the System?

What Part of the System Needed the Most Attention to Ensure Consistent Operation and Pumping?

37

Pump Performance FMEA Outcome

Answer:

The Fractional horsepower motor on the VFD cabinet cooling Fan!!

and

Pump shaft packing problems

38

39

ID (Induced Draft) Fan Performance Requirements. Fluidized Bed Sludge Incinerator

1. Provide significant air flow to maintain negative pressure through collectors and scrubbers

2. Fan must perform to maintain incinerator function

3. Fan shuts down and system goes into emergency shut-down

4. After 48 hours of downtime, trucking of sludge to landfill commences and cost escalates dramatically

40

ID (Induced Draft) Fan Performance Requirements. Fluidized Bed Sludge Incinerator

1. 500 horse power motor

2. 60 inch fan impeller

3. 24 inch SS duct work

4. Numerous flanged connections

5. 4 inch shaft

6. Lubricated pillar block bearings

7. Predictive maintenance using:a) Thermography

b) Vibration analysis

41

ID Fan Performance FMEA Outcome

What was the Top Failure Mode?

What do You Think the RPN (Risk Priority Number) Was?

What do You Think Were the Most Critical Components of the System?

What Part of the System Needed the Most Attention to Ensure Consistent Operation and Pumping?

42

43

ID Fan FMEA Outcome

Answer:

The batteries powering the automatic bearing lubricators

and

Fasteners on flanges and motor base housing

44

Questions?

45

References Used in Developing Content:

The Basics of FMEA, 2nd editionRobin E. McDermott

Raymond J. Mikulak

Michael R. Beauregard

46

Michael Cowley, President, CE Maintenance Solutions, LLC

Michael CowleyPresident

Contact information

CE Maintenance Solutions, LLC

189 Peck Drive

Buffalo Junction, VA 24529

Mobile: +1-434-738-8484

Office: +1-434-734-0866

Email:[email protected]

Established CE Maintenance Solutions, LLC in 2004 to provide training, coaching and consulting services to facility and manufacturing organizations

30+ years of hands-on experience in production maintenance and facility engineering fields

My Mechanical Engineering education as well as my extensive experience gives me an unusual insight into how organizations work

My fundamental understanding and knowledge of the components and the culture needed helps me to properly structure, organize and maintain a World Class maintenance organization

47

Steven D. Schneider, Asset Reliability Manager, Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District

Steven D. SchneiderAsset Reliability Manager

Contact information

Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District

Westerly Wastewater Treatment Center

5800 Cleveland Memorial Shoreway

Cleveland, Ohio 44102-2192

Mobile: +1-216-280-3134

Office: +1-216-961-2187 x3228

Email: [email protected]

Bachelor’s of Mechanical Engineering - 1993

Class 1 Wastewater Operator License

RCMII Practitioner – Can Train, Teach and Coach RCMII Classes and facilitations

TPM Instructor – 5S, Cost Deployment, Autonomous Maintenance, etc.

10+ years of Reliability Engineering Experience in Steel Making and Wastewater

10+ years of Linear Motion Applications Experience

48

Scott A. McBrayer, P.E. Project Engineer, Donahue IDEAS, LLC

Scott A. McBrayer, P.E.Project Engineer

Contact information

Donahue IDEAS, LLC

2780 Airport Drive, Suite 333

Columbus, OH 43219

Mobile: +1-614-507-8231

Office: +1-614-532-6771

Email: [email protected]

B.S. Civil Engineering, Rose-Hulman - 1999

M.B.A., The Ohio State University - 2007

Professional Engineer

LEED GA + PACP/MACP/LACP Accredited

Over 15 years of civil and environmental engineering experience involving the management and improvement of water, wastewater and stormwater facilities.

3 years of experience in Asset Management

49

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