April R. RIceSCE&G New Nuclear Deployment P. O. Box 88 MC 846 Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065...

SCE&G New Nuclear Deployment ● P. O. Box 88 ● MC 846 ● Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065 ● www.sceg.com

April R. RIce Manager

New Nuclear Licensing

May 16, 2017

NND-17-0263 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 52.63

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 Combined License Nos. NPF-93 and NPF-94 Docket Nos. 52-027 & 52-028 Subject: VCSNS Units 2 & 3 LAR 17-12: Request for License Amendment and

Exemption: Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation

Reference 1: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Request for License

Amendment and Exemption: Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation (LAR-17-006), dated March 2, 2017

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.98(c), and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G), acting on behalf of itself and the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper), requests an amendment to the combined license (COL) for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 (License Numbers NPF-93 and NPF-94, respectively). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 52.63(b), an exemption from elements of the design as certified in the 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, design certification rule is also requested for the plant-specific Design Control Document (DCD) Tier 1 materials departure. Since the proposed change impacts Tier 1 of the plant-specific DCD, this activity has been determined to require prior NRC approval. The requested amendment proposes changes to COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) to consolidate a number of ITAAC to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. Enclosure 1 provides the description, technical evaluation, regulatory evaluation (including the Significant Hazards Consideration Determination), and environmental considerations for the proposed changes in the License Amendment Request (LAR).

Enclosure 2 provides the background and supporting basis for the requested exemption.

Enclosure 3 provides markups depicting the requested changes to COL Appendix C and corresponding changes to plant-specific Tier 1.

Document Control Desk NND-17-0263 Page 2 of 4 Enclosure 4 provides a roadmap of all ITAAC that are proposed to be consolidated by this LAR.

Enclosure 5 provides an assessment of Reference ITAAC describing how each of the Reference ITAAC are bounded by the Referenced ITAAC.

Enclosure 6 provides a reviewer’s aid of clean COL Appendix C pages (i.e., mark-ups incorporated) of the proposed changes.

This LAR is identical in technical content with Reference 1. SCE&G requests staff approval of the license amendment by September 15, 2017 to achieve the benefits gained from consolidation proposed by this LAR. SCE&G expects to implement the proposed amendment (through incorporation into the licensing basis documents) within thirty days of approval of the requested changes. In Reference 1, Southern Nuclear Company (SNC) has stated their requested approval date is May 31, 2017. Expedited NRC reviews are requested based on the following:

• Approximately 100 ITAAC Closure Notifications (ICNs) are scheduled for 2017 – the requested review time and subsequent implementation, should NRC approve the LAR, provides the Licensee sufficient time to organize the ITAAC closure approach to incorporate the consolidated methodology.

• The proposed changes in this LAR could impact the development and review of future LARs that impact the same ITAAC within this LAR that are being proposed for consolidation into other ITAAC.

• The earlier the changes proposed by this LAR are approved, the sooner the ITAAC closure process efficiencies will be realized for all stakeholders.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, SCE&G is notifying the State of South Carolina of this LAR by transmitting a copy of this letter and publicly-available enclosures to the designated State Official. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Nick R. Kellenberger by telephone at (803) 941-9834, or by email at [email protected]. This letter contains no regulatory commitments.

Document Control Desk NND-17-0263 Page 3of4

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

\~ Executed on this 1£ day of M '\,d , 2016.

PSF/ARR/psf

Sincerely,

April R. Rice Manger New Nuclear Licensing

Enclosures: 1) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 - Request for License Amendment: Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (IT AAC) Consolidation (LAR-17-12)

2) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 - Exemption Request: Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (IT AAC) Consolidation (LAR-17-12)

3) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 - Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-17-12)

4) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 - Roadmap of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-17-12)

5) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 -Assessment of Reference ITAAC (LAR-17-12)

6) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3 - Reviewer's Aid: Clean Pages of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-17-12)

Document Control Desk NND-17-0263 Page 4 of 4 Copy with all Enclosures: Billy Gleaves Ruth Reyes Chandu Patel Paul Kallan Tom Fredette Tomy Nazario Jennifer Uhle Cathy Haney Jim Reece Stephen A. Byrne Jeffrey B. Archie Ronald A. Jones Alvis J. Bynum Kathryn M. Sutton April Rice Nick Kellenberger Matt Kunkle Mory Diané Bryan Barwick Dean Kersey Neil Haggerty Cynthia Lanier Lisa Spears Frederick Willis

Carl Churchman Pat Young

Zach Harper Brian McIntyre Brian Bedford Joseph Cole Chuck Baucom Lisa Alberghini Curt Castell Jeff Hawkins Susan E. Jenkins William M. Cherry Rhonda O’Banion [email protected] vcsummer2&[email protected] [email protected]

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3

NND-17-0263

Enclosure 1

Request for License Amendment:

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation

(LAR 17-12)

(This Enclosure consists of 37 pages, including this cover page.)

NND-17-0263 Enclosure 1 Request for License Amendment: Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation (LAR-17-12)

Page 2 of 37

Table of Contents

1. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3. TECHNICAL EVALUATION (Included in Section 2)

4. REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1. Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

4.2. Precedent

4.3. Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

4.4. Conclusions

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6. REFERENCES


Page 3 of 37

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.98(c) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G), on behalf of itself and the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper), the licensee for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3, requests an amendment to Combined License (COL) Numbers NPF-93 and NPF-94, for VCSNS Units 2 and 3, respectively.

1. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

The proposed changes would make non-technical changes to COL Appendix C (and corresponding plant-specific Tier 1) information. The changes consolidate Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC), by combining the associated Design Commitment, Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC). The proposed changes consolidate ITAAC within the following six ITAAC categories:

• “Reference” ITAAC, which provide a reference to another location, such as a section, subsection, or ITAAC table entry.

• American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Component and Piping ITAAC, which verify the completion of design and construction activities in accordance with ASME Code requirements and the AP1000 licensing basis.

• “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC, which verify the seismic Category I equipment or components are located on the seismic Category I Nuclear Island.

• Equipment Qualification ITAAC, which demonstrate the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function and the Class 1E equipment identified as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions without loss of safety function.

• Valve Qualification ITAAC, which demonstrate the capability of motor-operated and check valves to operate under their design conditions.

• Instrumentation and Control (I&C) and Electrical Functional Arrangement ITAAC, which perform inspections of as-built systems to verify the as-built system conforms with the functional arrangement, as described in the system-based Design Description.

The requested amendment proposes changes to COL Appendix C information, with corresponding changes to plant-specific DCD Tier 1 information, as appropriate. This enclosure requests approval of the license amendment necessary to implement the COL Appendix C changes described below. Enclosure 2 requests the exemption necessary to implement the changes to the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 information.

The purpose of the proposed changes being requested is to:

• Reduce the forthcoming surge in ITAAC closures without compromising completion of the approved design, resulting in levelization of both Licensee and Regulator resources.


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• Reduce the number of ITAAC Closure Notification (ICNs) and regulatory burden for WEC, SCE&G, and the NRC.

• Obtain formal upfront NRC review and approval to consolidate related ITAAC that rely on the same closure documentation.

Consolidation will not result in removal of any quality activity/design attribute or safety margin.

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Tier 2 design descriptions are derived from plant design documents. 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section II.D, states that Tier 1 design information is “derived from Tier 2 information.” However, certain examples have been identified in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) to contain redundant ITAAC requirements or require completion of duplicative activities that may be completed at the same time. For each of the proposed changes described and evaluated below, COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) changes are proposed to consolidate two or more ITAAC. For each of the ITAAC proposed for consolidation, the associated UFSAR design information is consistent with the current plant design, so no structure, system, or component (SSC), design function, or analysis, as described in the UFSAR, is affected by the proposed changes.

For each Category below, multiple ITAAC are proposed for consolidation to allow a single completion package and ICN for each consolidated ITAAC.

Category 1 – “Reference” ITAAC

Multiple ITAAC, referred to as “Reference” ITAAC, only provide a reference to other licensing basis document locations, such as an ITAAC section, subsection, or table entry.

COL Appendix C (and plant-specific DCD Tier 1) Subsection 1.2 “General Provisions” states that reference to another ITAAC is an indication that the ITA and AC for that design commitment are satisfied when the referenced ITA are completed and the AC for the referenced sections, subsections, or table entries are satisfied. If a complete section is referenced, this indicates that all the ITA and AC in that section must be met before the referencing design commitment is satisfied.

SCE&G has identified Reference ITAAC which align with the ITAAC deemed as reference by the NRC in “AP1000, Revision 19 ITAAC Matrix” (ML12094A075), dated February 22, 2012, that categorizes the AP1000 ITAAC families.

NEI 08-01 (Reference 2), Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.215 (Reference 1), Guidance for ITAAC Closure Under 10 CFR Part 52, Section 10.6, provides the following discussion of Reference ITAAC:


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Some design control documents contain “Reference ITAAC,” which are ITAAC that have an entry in the “Design Commitment” column in the DCD, but the “Inspections, Tests, Analyses” and “Acceptance Criteria” fields contain only a reference to another ITAAC. Completion of these Reference ITAAC is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC are completed. When referenced ITAAC are completed and the Reference ITAAC is ready to be closed, the licensee should submit an ITAAC Closure Notification that briefly describes the referenced ITAAC, and lists their ITAAC Closure Notification(s) as references.

Based on the above discussions, Reference ITAAC do not require additional ITA to be performed, because the ITA are performed by the referenced ITAAC; however, the process of closing each ITAAC does require the submittal of documentation by the Licensee submitting an ICN to inform the NRC that the referenced ITAAC has been closed. Additional NRC Staff resources are also required to verify closure of the Reference ITAAC by confirming the referenced ITAAC are closed, thereby increasing regulatory burden with no commensurate benefit to public health and safety.

Reference ITAAC have been in existence since the 1990’s when they were originally developed for the AP600 Design Certification. Subsequently, the AP600 Reference ITAAC were carried over to the AP1000 Design Certification. The process for closing ITAAC was only defined and finalized in recent years through industry and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) initiatives and regulator’s endorsement. Recent application of these processes has identified additional administrative burden associated with ITAAC closure and potential efficiencies to minimize this administrative burden. The ICN for a Reference ITAAC is expected to merely state that other ITAAC (i.e., the referenced ITAAC) have been closed; as such, it is a redundant ICN with no additional ITA performed or verified. Therefore, while elimination of additional ICNs reduces administrative burden on the Licensee and the regulator, this action:

• Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed by the ITAAC,

• Does not eliminate the need to perform the required ITA for each impacted system, and

• Does not impact the scope of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding to be made by the Commission, indicating that the AC in COL Appendix C are met.

COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.3.10.06b (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, ITAAC No. 6.b) provides the following example of a Reference ITAAC:

Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

6.b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.

Refer to item 9 in this table. Refer to item 9 in this table.


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The referenced ITAAC (Table 2.3.10-4, item 9) is shown below:



9. The check valves identified in Table 2.3.10-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety functions identified in Table 2.3.10-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and flow conditions.

Each check valve changes position as indicated on Table 2.3.10-1.

In the above excerpt from COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.3.10.06b (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, ITAAC No. 6.b) both the ITA and AC refer to another ITAAC by stating, “Refer to item 9 in this table.” No additional ITA are required by this Reference ITAAC. Inspections performed by, and the completion and closure of, ITAAC 2.3.10.09 satisfy this ITAAC. Therefore, ITAAC 2.3.10.06b can be removed from Table 2.3.10-4 and the scope of the ICN submittal because the scope of this Reference ITAAC (2.3.10.06b) is already consolidated into the referenced ITAAC (2.3.10.09).

Enclosure 5 of this submittal provides a detailed assessment of each of the Reference ITAAC identified below. It also describes how each of the Reference ITAAC are bounded by the associated Referenced ITAAC.

Licensing Basis Change Descriptions

The Reference ITAAC listed below are proposed to be removed from the associated ITAAC table.

Reference ITAAC Index

Number

Reference ITAAC Number ITAAC Items Referenced in ITA and AC

3 2.1.01.03 Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

27 2.1.02.07c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

58 2.1.02.12a.vi Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.i

59 2.1.02.12a.vii Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.ii

84 2.1.03.09c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

104 2.2.01.06c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

134 2.2.02.06c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

143 2.2.02.07e.i Table 2.2.2-3, item 1

149 2.2.02.08c Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 and 2

173 2.2.03.07c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d


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Number


174 2.2.03.08a Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

234 2.2.04.07c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

237 2.2.04.08b.i Table 2.2.4-4, item 11

239 2.2.04.08c Table 2.2.1-3, item 7

242 2.2.04.09b.i Table 2.4.1-2, item 2

264 2.2.05.06b Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

279 2.3.01.02 Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

297 2.3.02.06c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

298 2.3.02.07a Table 2.2.1-3, item 7

299 2.3.02.07b Table 2.3.2-4, item 10b

300 2.3.02.07c Table 2.3.2-4, item 10b

329 2.3.04.03 Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

369 2.3.06.07c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

370 2.3.06.08a Table 2.2.1-3, item 7

371 2.3.06.08b Table 2.3.6-4, item 1

400 2.3.07.06b Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

401 2.3.07.07a Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

404 2.3.07.07b.iii Table 2.3.7-4, item 1

405 2.3.07.07b.iv Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f

406 2.3.07.07b.v Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f

407 2.3.07.07b.vi Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b

441 2.3.10.06a Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

442 2.3.10.06b Table 2.3.10-4, item 9

468 2.3.13.06c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

469 2.3.13.07 Table 2.2.1-3, item 7

478 2.3.14.02 Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

482 2.3.15.02 Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

520 2.5.01.05 Table 3.2-1, item 1

528 2.5.02.05b Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e

571 2.5.05.03c Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

583 2.6.01.03b Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

585 2.6.01.04b Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a


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Number


600 2.6.03.03 Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

632 2.6.05.04 Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

641 2.6.09.01 Table 3.3-6, item 14

642 2.6.09.03 Table 3.3-6, item 16

643 2.6.09.04 Table 3.3-6, item 17

688 2.7.01.06b Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

689 2.7.01.07 Table 2.7.1-4, item 10.b

690 2.7.01.08a Table 2.7.1-4, item 12

691 2.7.01.08b Table 2.7.1-4, item 12

692 2.7.01.08c Table 2.7.1-4, item 12

702 2.7.02.02 Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

708 2.7.03.02a Table 2.7.3-2, item 3

709 2.7.03.02b Table 2.7.3-2, item 3

713 2.7.04.02a Table 2.7.4-2, item 3

714 2.7.04.02b Table 2.7.4-2, item 3

715 2.7.04.02c Table 2.7.4-2, item 3

724 2.7.06.02.i Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7

738 3.1.00.06 Table 2.7.1-4, items 1, 8.a, 8.c, 12, and 13

746 3.2.00.03.i Subsection 2.7.1

747 3.2.00.03.ii Subsection 2.2.5

748 3.2.00.03.iii Subsection 2.6.3

749 3.2.00.03.iv Subsection 2.6.5

750 3.2.00.03.v Subsection 2.3.19

753 3.2.00.06.i Subsection 2.7.1

754 3.2.00.06.ii Subsection 2.6.5

755 3.2.00.06.iii Subsection 2.3.19

771 3.3.00.02c Table 2.2.1-3, items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b

772 3.3.00.02d Table 2.2.1-3, items 4.a and 4.b

773 3.3.00.02e Table 2.2.1-3, items 4.a, 4.b, and 7

828 3.5.00.03 Table 3.3-6, item 7.d

834 3.6.00.01.i Table 2.3.10-4, item 7.a

835 3.6.00.01.ii Table 3.5-6, item 1


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Number


836 3.6.00.01.iii Table 2.1.2-4, items 5.a, 7.a, and 10

837 3.6.00.01.iv Table 2.1.2-4, items 5.a and 7.a

838 3.6.00.01.v Table 2.1.2-4, items 5.a, 7.a, and 10

839 3.6.00.01.vi Table 2.3.2-4, item 13

840 3.6.00.01.vii Table 2.3.10-4, item 10

Category 2 – ITAAC Related to ASME Activities

Several ITAAC verify the completion of design and construction activities in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements, as well as additional AP1000 requirements. These ITAAC (hereafter referred to collectively as “ASME” ITAAC in Category 2 of this Enclosure) require completion of the same or similar processes (e.g., ASME Code Section III Design Reports, ASME Code Section III Data Reports) in order to close each individual ASME ITAAC. The ASME ITAAC are related to some or all of the following:

• Components identified as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

• Piping identified as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

• Pressure boundary welds in components identified as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

• Pressure boundary welds in piping identified as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

• Components identified as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

• Piping identified as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

• Piping for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of functional capability.

• As-built piping designed for Leak Before Break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the piping.


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Consolidation of these ASME ITAAC reduces administrative and regulatory burden on the licensee and the regulator by combining multiple closure notifications into a single closure notification that more closely aligns to the technical processes and documentation required by the VCSNS Units 2 and 3 COLs for performing ASME code and licensing basis activities and generating the documentation needed to complete and close these ITAAC.

These ITAAC can be consolidated because the supporting documentation is the same for these ITAAC and the scope of inspections, tests and analyses required for each system will not change. Therefore, consolidation of ASME ITAAC in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1):

• Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed by the ASME ITAAC,



COL Appendix C Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC Nos 2.1.02.02a, 2.1.02.02b, 2.1.02.03a, 2.1.02.03b, 2.1.02.04a, 2.1.02.04b, 2.1.02.05b, and 2.1.02.06 (and plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC Nos. 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b, and 6), provides an example to illustrate the consolidation of several ASME ITAAC into a single ASME ITAAC.

The current COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Table 2.1.2-4 reads as follows:



2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.

2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.


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3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.


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6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.

In this example, the ASME ITAAC are proposed to be consolidated as follows:


Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses

Acceptance Criteria

2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III.


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Acceptance Criteria

3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME requirements.

3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME requirements.




4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain its pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability







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The ITAAC listed below are ASME ITAAC (required by ASME code or the testing/inspection required by the licensing basis for functional capability ITAAC and LBB ITAAC and included in the same documentation) and are proposed for consolidation.

ITAAC Index

Number ITAAC Number Consolidate With ITAAC Number (Index Number)

14 2.1.02.02b

2.1.02.02a (13)

15 2.1.02.03a

16 2.1.02.03b

17 2.1.02.04a

18 2.1.02.04b

22 2.1.02.05b

23 2.1.02.06

73 2.1.03.04 2.1.03.03 (72)

74 2.1.03.05

92 2.2.01.02b

2.2.01.02a (91)

93 2.2.01.03a

94 2.2.01.03b

95 2.2.01.04a.i

97 2.2.01.04b

121 2.2.02.02b

2.2.02.02a (120)

122 2.2.02.03a

123 2.2.02.03b

124 2.2.02.04a

125 2.2.02.04b

129 2.2.02.05b

160 2.2.03.02b

2.2.03.02a (159)

161 2.2.03.03a

162 2.2.03.03b

163 2.2.03.04a

164 2.2.03.04b

168 2.2.03.05b

169 2.2.03.06


Page 15 of 37

ITAAC Index


221 2.2.04.02b

2.2.04.02a (220)

222 2.2.04.03a

223 2.2.04.03b

224 2.2.04.04a

225 2.2.04.04b

229 2.2.04.05b

230 2.2.04.06

254 2.2.05.02b

2.2.05.02a (253)

255 2.2.05.03a

256 2.2.05.03b

257 2.2.05.04a

258 2.2.05.04b

262 2.2.05.05b

286 2.3.02.02b

2.3.02.02a (285)

287 2.3.02.03a

288 2.3.02.03b

289 2.3.02.04a

290 2.3.02.04b

356 2.3.06.02b

2.3.06.02a (355)

357 2.3.06.03a

358 2.3.06.03b

359 2.3.06.04a

360 2.3.06.04b 364 2.3.06.05b 365 2.3.06.06

393 2.3.07.02b

2.3.07.02a (392) 394 2.3.07.03 395 2.3.07.04


Page 16 of 37

ITAAC Index


432 2.3.10.02b

2.3.10.02a (431)

433 2.3.10.03a 434 2.3.10.03b 435 2.3.10.04a 436 2.3.10.04b 440 2.3.10.05b

460 2.3.13.03

2.3.13.02 (459) 461 2.3.13.04

679 2.7.01.02b

2.7.01.02a (678) 680 2.7.01.03a 681 2.7.01.03b 682 2.7.01.04a 683 2.7.01.04b

Category 3 – “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC

Multiple ITAAC are performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. Generally, these include ITAAC for (1) verifying the seismic Category I equipment or components are located on the Nuclear Island, which is a seismic Category I structure, (2) demonstrating the ability of the equipment or components to withstand seismic loads by type testing and/or analysis, and (3) verifying the seismic qualification of equipment at its final location is bounded by previous type testing/analysis. Completion of the third type of ITAAC includes an inspection of the equipment at its final location.

The ITAAC Determination Basis described in NEI 08-01 Example D-43 for closure of ITAAC located on the Nuclear Island (referred to as “located-on” ITAAC) is based on performing an inspection to verify equipment location. The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number and verification of the equipment location (Building, Elevation, Room). The inspection to verify installed component locations is documented in the Equipment Qualification (EQ) As-Built Reconciliation Report.

The companion ITAAC to the “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC is NEI 08-01 Example D-45, which confirms that a “report exists and concludes that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.” These ITAAC are closed by performing an inspection to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified components. The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number; verification of as-designed equipment mounting orientation, anchorage and clearances; and verification of electrical and other interfaces. The documentation of installed configuration of seismically qualified components includes


Page 17 of 37

photographs and/or sketches of equipment/mounting/interfaces. The verification of installed seismically qualified component configuration is also documented in the Equipment Qualification (EQ) As-built Reconciliation Report.

Instead of closing these ITAAC based on separate walkdowns or early on based on design documentation and the “Released for Construction” drawings (which finalize equipment locations and release the associated documents for installation/construction) and submittal of separate ITAAC Completion Packages, these ITAAC are consolidated with subsequent ITAAC and the required ITA is performed at that time. Therefore, consolidation of the “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC with subsequent ITAAC:

• Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC ,



COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.1.02.05a.i (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, item 5.a) provides an example of a “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC:



Acceptance Criteria

5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

See Category 4 below for an example of a consolidated ITAAC.


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The “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC listed below are consolidated with Equipment Qualification ITAAC, described in Category 4.

ITAAC Index

Number ITAAC Number

ITAAC Index

NumberITAAC Number

19 2.1.02.05a.i 396 * 2.3.07.05.i *

75 2.1.03.06.i 437 * 2.3.10.05a.i *

98 2.2.01.05.i 450 * 2.3.11.02.i *

126 2.2.02.05a.i 462 2.3.13.05.i

165 2.2.03.05a.i 522 2.5.02.02.i

226 2.2.04.05a.i 565 2.5.05.02.i

259 * 2.2.05.05a.i * 579 * 2.6.01.02.i *

291 2.3.02.05.i 597 * 2.6.03.02.i *

340 * 2.3.05.02.i * 684 * 2.7.01.05.i *

361 2.3.06.05a.i 823 3.5.00.01.i

The following “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC are consolidated into one ITAAC since the scope of ITAAC 631 also confirms the location of light fixtures:

ITAAC Index

Number ITAAC Number Consolidate With ITAAC Number

(Index Number)

631 * 2.6.05.03.ii * 2.6.05.03.i (630) *

* Note: In the Licensing Basis Change Descriptions Table above, changes to any ITAAC that contain an asterisk (*) are only applicable to COL Appendix C. No change to plant-specific Tier 1 is needed because these ITAAC are currently consolidated in the plant-specific Tier 1 ITAAC Tables.


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Category 4 – Equipment Qualification ITAAC

Multiple ITAAC (referred to as Equipment Qualification ITAAC) are performed for equipment qualification to demonstrate the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function and the Class 1E equipment being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions without loss of safety function. In general, these include (1) an ITAAC for verifying the location to be on Nuclear Island (see scope of Category 3), (2) an ITAAC for performance of the type of seismic and harsh environment testing and/or analysis, and (3) a subsequent ITAAC for verifying the qualification of equipment at its final location is bounded by previous type testing/analysis. Completion of the third type of ITAAC includes inspection of the equipment at its final location and verification that the qualification is bounded by the as-built location and conditions.

NEI 08-01 Example D44 provides the general format for the ICN associated equipment qualification type testing. The principal closure documents used to document completion of these Equipment Qualification ITAAC are Equipment Qualification Data Packages (EQDPs) and Equipment Qualification Summary Reports (EQSRs) for each seismic Category 1 component.

NEI 08-01 Example D45 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the as-built condition of the seismic Category I components are bounded by the qualification. These ITAAC also depend on the same documentation (EQDPs/EQSRs) and include the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report confirming the as-built is bounded by the qualification at the final location.

There is no specific example in NEI 08-01 related to closure of harsh environment type testing and/or analysis ITAAC; however, the same set of principal closure documents (EQDPs/EQSRs) are used.

NEI 08-01 Example D32 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the as-built condition of the Class 1E equipment qualified for harsh environment are bounded by the qualification. These ITAAC also depend on the same documentation (EQDPs/EQSRs) and include the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report confirming the as-built is bounded by the qualification.

The Equipment Qualification ITAAC can be consolidated because they depend on the same set of documents (i.e., EQDPs/EQSRs) for closure plus the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report.

Consolidation will minimize the number of ITAAC without eliminating or reducing scope of ITAAC; therefore, consolidation of these Equipment Qualification ITAAC:

• Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the Equipment Qualification ITAAC,



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COL Appendix C ITAAC 2.1.02.05a and 2.1.02.07.a (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC items 5.a and 7.a) provide an example of an Equipment Qualification ITAAC:


Design Commitment Inspections, Tests,

Analyses Acceptance Criteria





ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.


iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are


Page 21 of 37




accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

In this example, the proposed consolidated Equipment Qualification ITAAC (2.1.02.05.a) would read as follows (this consolidation also shows the “Located on the Nuclear Island” consolidated example).












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ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.


The Equipment Qualification ITAAC identified below are proposed to be consolidated. This list also includes the “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC identified for consolidation in Category 3 above.

ITAAC Index

NumberITAAC Number Consolidate With ITAAC

Number (Index Number)

20 2.1.02.05a.ii

2.1.02.05a.i (19) 21 2.1.02.05a.iii

24 2.1.02.07a.i

25 2.1.02.07a.ii

76 2.1.03.06.ii

2.1.03.06.i (75) 77 2.1.03.06.iii

81 2.1.03.09a.i

82 2.1.03.09a.ii


Page 23 of 37

ITAAC Index



99 2.2.01.05.ii

2.2.01.05.i (98)

100 2.2.01.05.iii

101 2.2.01.06a.i

102 2.2.01.06a.ii

105 2.2.01.06d.i

106 2.2.01.06d.i

127 2.2.02.05a.ii

2.2.02.05a.i (126) 128 2.2.02.05a.iii

131 2.2.02.06a.i

132 2.2.02.06a.ii

166 2.2.03.05a.ii

2.2.03.05a.i (165) 167 2.2.03.05a.iii

170 2.2.03.07a.i

171 2.2.03.07a.ii

227 2.2.04.05a.ii

2.2.04.05a.i (226) 228 2.2.04.05a.iii

231 2.2.04.07a.i

232 2.2.04.07a.ii

260 * 2.2.05.05a.ii * 2.2.05.05a.i (259) *

261 * 2.2.05.05a.iii *

292 2.3.02.05.ii

2.3.02.05.i (291) 293 2.3.02.05.iii

294 2.3.02.06a.i

295 2.3.02.06a.ii

341 * 2.3.05.02.ii * 2.3.05.02.i (340) *

342 * 2.3.05.02.iii *

362 2.3.06.05a.ii

2.3.06.05a.i (361) 363 2.3.06.05a.iii

366 2.3.06.07a.i


Page 24 of 37

ITAAC Index



367 2.3.06.07a.ii

397 * 2.3.07.05.ii * 2.3.07.05.i (396) *

398 * 2.3.07.05.iii *

438 * 2.3.10.05a.ii * 2.3.10.05a.i (437) *

439 * 2.3.10.05a.iii *

451 * 2.3.11.02.ii * 2.3.11.02.i (450) *

452 * 2.3.11.02.iii *

463 2.3.13.05.ii

2.3.13.05.i (462) 464 2.3.13.05.iii

465 2.3.13.06a.i

466 2.3.13.06a.ii

523 2.5.02.02.ii

2.5.02.02.i (522) 524 2.5.02.02.iii

525 2.5.02.03

526 2.5.02.04

566 2.5.05.02.ii

2.5.05.02.i (565) 567 2.5.05.02.iii

568 2.5.05.03a.i

569 2.5.05.03a.ii

580 * 2.6.01.02.ii * 2.6.01.02.i (579) *

581 * 2.6.01.02.iii *

598 * 2.6.03.02.ii * 2.6.03.02.i (597) *

599 * 2.6.03.02.iii *

685 * 2.7.01.05.ii * 2.7.01.05.i (684) *

686 * 2.7.01.05.iii *

824 3.5.00.01.ii 3.5.00.01.i (823) 825 3.5.00.01.iii


Page 25 of 37

ITAAC Index



826 3.5.00.02.i

827 3.5.00.02.ii


Category 5 – Valve Qualification ITAAC

Several ITAAC (referred to as Valve Qualification ITAAC) are performed for valve qualification to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions. These ITAAC require inspection to show that the as-built valves are bounded by the tested conditions and each valve changes position under design conditions.

Similar to the Equipment Qualification ITAAC (Category 4), in order to close these ITAAC, an Equipment Qualification Data Package (EQDP) and an Equipment Qualification Summary Report (EQSR) are generated along with a report demonstrating that as-built conditions are bounded by the testing.

NEI 08-01 Example D47 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the valve capability type testing. The principal closure documents used to document completion of the valve type testing ITAAC are EQDPs and EQSRs for each valve listed in the impacted table.

NEI 08-01 Example D48 provides the general format for the ICNs associated with verifying the as-built condition of the valves are bounded by the qualification. Closure of these ITAAC depend on the same documentation (EQDPs/EQSRs) and include the Equipment Qualification As-built Reconciliation Report confirming the as-built is bounded by the qualification at the final location.

The Valve Qualification ITAAC can be consolidated into one ITAAC since they depend on the same set of documents (i.e., EQDPs/EQSRs) for closure and any needed as-built verification.

Consolidation will minimize the number of ITAAC without eliminating or reducing scope of ITAAC; therefore, consolidation of the Valve Qualification ITAAC from COL Appendix C:

• Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the Valve Qualification ITAAC,



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COL Appendix C Table 2.2.1-3, ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.i and ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.ii (plant-specific Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, ITAAC item 11.a) provides an example of a Valve Qualification ITAAC:



Acceptance Criteria

*** *** ***

11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of each valve to operate under design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions.


ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

*** *** ***


Page 27 of 37

In this example, the proposed consolidated Valve Qualification ITAAC (2.2.01.11a.i) would read as follows:



Acceptance Criteria

*** *** ***



i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions.



*** *** ***

In the above example, completion of the ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.ii would use the same EQDP/EQSR used for ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.i in order to demonstrate the as-built is bounded.


ITAAC listed below are considered Valve Qualification ITAAC and proposed to be consolidated:

ITAAC Index

Number ITAAC Number Consolidated ITAAC Number

(Index Number)

54 * 2.1.02.12a.ii * 2.1.02.12a.i (53) * 57 * 2.1.02.12a.v * 2.1.02.12a.iv (56) *

115 * 2.2.01.11a.ii * 2.2.01.11a.i (114) * 155 * 2.2.02.11a.ii * 2.2.02.11a.i (154) * 215 * 2.2.03.12a.ii * 2.2.03.12a.i (214) * 249 * 2.2.04.12a.ii * 2.2.04.12a.i (248) * 310 * 2.3.02.11a.ii * 2.3.02.11a.i (309) * 385 * 2.3.06.12a.ii * 2.3.06.12a.i (384) *


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Category 6 - I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement

Several ITAAC (referred to as “Functional Arrangement” ITAAC) require the performance of inspections of the as-built system to verify the as-built system conforms with the functional arrangement, as described in the Design Description. The Design Description, in general, includes a simplistic figure and/or a table of components. The inspection will demonstrate that the components exist with no demonstration of functionality. These systems also include other ITAAC that demonstrate functionality of the system (generally through testing), including the same components identified in the figures and/or tables referenced in the ITAAC. Testing of components and interfaces through functional testing confirms existence of the components. As such, the scope of Functional Arrangement ITAAC is bounded by the ITAAC demonstrating the functionality. This change affects certain I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement ITAAC. Only the I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement ITAAC that have associated functional testing ITAAC have been included in the scope of this change.

The functional testing ITAAC continue to verify functional arrangement of several I&C and Electrical systems; therefore, reliance on the subsequent ITAAC:

• Does not reduce the scope of ITA that are required to be performed for the Functional Arrangement ITAAC,




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COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Table 2.5.1-4, ITAAC No. 505 (ITAAC 2.5.01.01), provides an example of a Functional Arrangement ITAAC:



Acceptance Criteria

1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.

The as-built DAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

The above Functional Arrangement ITAAC Design Description does not include a figure showing the functional arrangement of the system. The table which is referenced in the Design Description provides the component names and locations. The functionality is demonstrated by testing of other ITAAC within the same system. The testing verifies that each panel performs its intended function including generating the required indications and actuations based on the inputs. Functional testing demonstrates that the required components exist and they are connected in a manner needed to perform the intended function. See below for a list of the ITAAC that demonstrate functional testing of the Functional Arrangement ITAAC discussed above (ITAAC 2.5.01.01).



Acceptance Criteria

2.a) The DAS provides an automatic reactor trip on low wide-range steam generator water level, or on low pressurizer water level, or on high hot leg temperature, separate from the PMS.

Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.

The generator field control relays (contained in the control cabinets for the rod drive motor-generator sets) open after the test signal reaches the specified limit.

2.b) The DAS provides automatic actuation of selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-1, separate from the PMS.

Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.

Appropriate DAS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit.


Page 30 of 37



Acceptance Criteria

2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.

i) Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled. While in this configuration, an operational test of the as-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.

i) The generator field control relays (contained in the control cabinets for the rod drive motor-generator sets) open after reactor and turbine trip manual initiation controls are actuated.

2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.

ii) Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled. While in this configuration, an operational test of the as-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.

ii) DAS output signals are generated for the selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, after manual initiation controls are actuated.

2.d) The DAS provides MCR displays of selected plant parameters, as identified in Table 2.5.1-3, separate from the PMS.

Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and inspection will be performed for retrievability of the selected plant parameters in the MCR.

The selected plant parameters can be retrieved in the MCR.


Page 31 of 37


The Functional Arrangement ITAAC are proposed to be removed from the associated ITAAC table:

ITAAC Index

Number

ITAAC Number ITAAC Demonstrating Functionality

505 2.5.01.01

506 2.5.01.02a

507 2.5.01.02b

508 2.5.01.02c.i

509 2.5.01.02c.ii

510 2.5.01.02d

521 2.5.02.01

527 2.5.02.05a

529 2.5.02.06a.i

530 2.5.02.06a.ii

531 2.5.02.06b

532 2.5.02.06c.i

533 2.5.02.06c.ii

539 2.5.02.08a.i

540 2.5.02.08a.ii

541 2.5.02.08a.iii

543 2.5.02.08b.ii

545 2.5.02.09a

546 2.5.02.09b

547 2.5.02.09c

548 2.5.02.09d

554 2.5.03.01 555 2.5.03.02

592 2.6.02.01

593 2.6.02.02a

594 2.6.02.02b

595 2.6.02.02c


Page 32 of 37

ITAAC Index

Number

ITAAC Number ITAAC Demonstrating Functionality

596 2.6.03.01

601 2.6.03.04a

603 2.6.03.04c

604 2.6.03.04d

605 2.6.03.04e

606 2.6.03.04f

607 2.6.03.04g

608 2.6.03.04h

609 2.6.03.04i

876 2.6.03.04j

610 2.6.03.05a

611 2.6.03.05b

612 2.6.03.05c

613 2.6.03.05d.i

614 2.6.03.05d.ii

627 2.6.05.01

628 2.6.05.02.i

633 2.6.05.05.i

634 2.6.05.05.ii

635 2.6.05.06.i

636 2.6.05.06.ii

Supporting Technical Details:

The ITAAC described above are being consolidated because the ITA and AC for these ITAAC are duplicative of other ITAAC (e.g., Reference ITAAC), the subject ITAAC could not be closed until completion of a subsequent ITAAC per NEI 08-01, and the NRC staff’s position shared in public meetings on timing of ITAAC completion submittals (e.g., ASME Design Reports and Functional Arrangement). In many cases, as described above, the ICNs would contain the same documentation. This was reinforced by the NRC staff during public meetings held regarding previously submitted ICNs and Uncompleted ITAAC Notifications (UINs) for VEGP Units 3 and 4. Submittal of ICNs based upon the current COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) information creates additional regulatory burden on the Licensee and the NRC staff. In addition, consolidation and elimination of redundant ITAAC reduces redundant documentation by reducing the number of ICNs and associated processing documentation in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980.

The proposed ITAAC consolidation continues to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix D and COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) design descriptions, tables and figures and 10 CFR 52.99 for ITAAC closure notification and completion. The ITAAC consolidation also does not make technical changes to the COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)


Page 33 of 37

design descriptions, tables, and figures, because no SSC design function or analysis described in the UFSAR is being affected, no defense-in-depth safety function is affected, and no plant-specific ITAAC is technically changed.

COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) information is comprised of the design information and functions subject to verification by the ITAAC closure process. The proposed changes neither affect the ability to meet design criteria or functions nor involve a decrease in the safety provided by the associated systems. COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) ITAAC information would continue to adequately validate their corresponding UFSAR (Tier 2) design commitments. The proposed changes do not impact an SSC, function or feature used in the prevention or mitigation of accidents or their safety/design analyses. The changes do not affect any SSC accident initiator or initiating sequence of events or involve any safety-related SSC or function used to mitigate an accident.

The proposed changes do not involve a change to a fission product barrier. The changes do not result in a new failure mode, malfunction or sequence of events that could affect safety. The changes would not allow for a new fission product release path, result in a new fission product barrier failure mode, or create a new sequence of events that would result in significant fuel cladding failures.

The proposed changes do not affect any safety-related equipment, design code limit, safety-related function, safety-related design analysis, safety analysis input or result, or design or safety margin. No safety analysis or design basis acceptance limit or criterion would be challenged or exceeded.

The proposed changes do not involve a technical (design, analysis, function or qualification) change, e.g., there is no change to an associated calculation, design parameter or design requirement. Therefore, the changes would not result in a decrease in plant safety. The proposed changes associated with this license amendment request do not affect the containment, control, channeling, monitoring, processing or releasing of radioactive and non-radioactive materials. No effluent release path is involved. The types and quantities of expected effluents are not changed; therefore, radioactive or non-radioactive material effluents should not be affected. Plant radiation zones (as described in UFSAR Section 12.3), controls under 10 CFR 20, and expected amounts and types of radioactive materials are not affected by the proposed changes. Therefore, individual and cumulative radiation exposures will not change.

UFSAR Chapter 14, Section 14.3, and NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 14.3, define and describe requirements for ITAAC. Specifically, they identify that the purpose of the ITAAC is to verify that an as-built facility conforms to the approved plant design and applicable regulations. UFSAR Subsection 14.3.2.1 describes the selection criteria for certified design descriptions and ITAAC. The changes proposed by this request do not lessen the degree of conformity nor reduce the scope of the ITAAC as required by the UFSAR or the SRP, because the consolidated ITAAC (ASME, Qualification, and “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC) and bounding ITAAC (Functional Arrangement and Reference ITAAC) continue to meet the ITAAC selection criteria and provide verification that the as-built facility conforms to the approved plant design and applicable regulations.


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Summary

The change consolidates a number of ITAAC in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Tables by relocating or removing multiple ITAAC entries in order to minimize the number of ITAAC completion packages and ICNs. The above-mentioned licensing basis changes will also result in a change to the COL Appendix C (and corresponding plant-specific Tier 1) table of contents. These changes are considered administrative in nature since no technical changes are being made, the required inspections, tests and analyses are still being performed and the margin of safety is not reduced. A standalone roadmap for the consolidation of each ITAAC identified in the LAR is included in Enclosure 4 of this submittal.

3. TECHNICAL EVALUATION (Included in Section 2)

4. REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

10 CFR 52.98(c) requires NRC approval for any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms and conditions of a COL. This activity involves a departure from COL Appendix C information, and a corresponding change to plant-specific Tier 1 information; therefore, this activity requires an amendment to the COL. Accordingly, NRC approval is required prior to making the plant-specific changes in this license amendment request.

4.2 Precedent

No precedent is identified.

4.3 Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

The proposed changes would require non-technical changes to COL Appendix C information. These changes consolidate and relocate Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) and subsume redundant Inspections, Tests and Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC) to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process.

An evaluation to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment was completed by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, “Issuance of amendment,” as discussed below:


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4.3.1 Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed non-technical change to COL Appendix C will consolidate, relocate and subsume redundant ITAAC in order to improve and create a more efficient process for the ITAAC Closure Notification submittals. No structure, system, or component (SSC) design or function is affected. No design or safety analysis is affected. The proposed changes do not affect any accident initiating event or component failure, thus the probabilities of the accidents previously evaluated are not affected. No function used to mitigate a radioactive material release and no radioactive material release source term is involved, thus the radiological releases in the accident analyses are not affected.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

4.3.2 Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed change to COL Appendix C does not affect the design or function of any SSC, but will consolidate, relocate and subsume redundant ITAAC in order to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. The proposed changes would not introduce a new failure mode, fault or sequence of events that could result in a radioactive material release.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

4.3.3 Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The proposed change to COL Appendix C to consolidate, relocate and subsume redundant ITAAC in order to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process is considered non-technical and would not affect any design parameter, function or analysis. There would be no change to an existing design basis, design function, regulatory criterion, or analysis. No safety analysis or design basis acceptance limit/criterion is involved.


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Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of “no significant hazards consideration” is justified.

4.4 Conclusions

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, the requested change does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration Determination.

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

The proposed changes would require non-technical changes to COL Appendix C information. The changes consolidate and relocate Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) and subsume redundant Inspections, Tests and Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC) to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process.

A review has determined that the anticipated construction and operational effects of the proposed amendment meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), in that:

(i) There is no significant hazards consideration.

As documented in Section 4.3, Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, of this license amendment request, an evaluation was completed to determine whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, “Issuance of amendment.” The Significant Hazards Consideration Determination determined that (1) the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; and (3) the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of “no significant hazards consideration” is justified.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

The proposed change to COL Appendix C is to consolidate, relocate and subsume redundant ITAAC in order to create a more efficient process for the ITAAC Closure Notification submittals. The proposed changes are unrelated to any aspect of plant


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construction or operation that would introduce any change to effluent types (e.g., effluents containing chemicals or biocides, sanitary system effluents, and other effluents), or affect any plant radiological or non-radiological effluent release quantities. Furthermore, the proposed changes do not affect any effluent release path or diminish the functionality of any design or operational features that are credited with controlling the release of effluents during plant operation. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed change to COL Appendix C is to consolidate, relocate and subsume redundant ITAAC in order to create a more efficient process for the ITAAC Closure Notification submittals. Plant radiation zones (addressed in UFSAR Section 12.3) are not affected, and controls under 10 CFR 20 preclude a significant increase in occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Based on the above review of the proposed amendment, it has been determined that anticipated construction and operational impacts of the proposed amendment do not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment of the proposed exemption is not required.

6. REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.215, Revision 2, “Guidance for ITAAC Closure under 10 CFR Part 52”

2. NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected “Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52”



NND-17-0263

Enclosure 2

Exemption Request:

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation

(LAR 17-12)


NND-17-0263 Enclosure 2 Exemption Request: Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Consolidation (LAR 17-12)

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Table of Contents

1.0 PURPOSE 2.0 BACKGROUND 3.0 TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION OF ACCEPTABILITY 4.0 JUSTIFICATION OF EXEMPTION 5.0 RISK ASSESSMENT 6.0 PRECEDENT 7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION 8.0 CONCLUSION 9.0 REFERENCES


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1.0 PURPOSE

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, the Licensee, requests a permanent exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, “Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design, Scope and Contents,” to allow a departure from elements of the certified information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD). The regulation, 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, requires an applicant or licensee referencing Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 to incorporate by reference and comply with the requirements of Appendix D, including certification information in DCD Tier 1. Tier 1 includes ITAAC that must be satisfactorily performed prior to fuel load. The design details to be verified by these ITAAC are specified in the text, tables, and figures that are referenced in each individual ITAAC. The generic Tier 1 information from which an exemption is requested includes the plant-specific Tier 1 information, described below, for each of six categories of changes:

Category 1, Reference ITAAC

The following plant-specific ITAAC items are proposed to be identified as “Not Used” in the identified plant-specific Tier 1 tables, as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter:

• Tier 1 Table 2.1.1-1, ITAAC Item 3 • Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, ITAAC Items 7.c and 12.a (ITA and AC vi and vii only) • Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, ITAAC Item 9.c • Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, ITAAC Item 6.c • Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, ITAAC Item 6.c • Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, ITAAC Items 7.e (ITA and AC i only) and 8.c • Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, ITAAC Items 7.c and 8.a • Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, ITAAC Items 7.c, 8.b (ITA and AC i), 8.c, 9.b (ITA

and AC i only) • Tier 1 Table 2.2.5-5, ITAAC Item 6.b • Tier 1 Table 2.3.1-2, ITAAC Item 2 • Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, ITAAC Items 6.c, 7.a, 7.b and 7.c • Tier 1 Table 2.3.4-2, ITAAC Item 3 • Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, ITAAC Items 7.c, 8.a and 8.b • Tier 1 Table 2.3.7-4, ITAAC Items 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b (ITA and AC iii, iv, v

and vi only) • Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, ITAAC Items 6.a and 6.b • Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, ITAAC Items 6.c and 7 • Tier 1 Table 2.3.14-2, ITAAC Item 2 • Tier 1 Table 2.3.15-2, ITAAC Item 2 • Tier 1 Table 2.5.1-4, ITAAC Item 5 • Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, ITAAC Item 5.b • Tier 1 Table 2.5.5-2, ITAAC Item 3.c • Tier 1 Table 2.6.1-4, ITAAC Items 3.b and 4.b • Tier 1 Table 2.6.3-3, ITAAC Item 3


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• Tier 1 Table 2.6.5-1, ITAAC Item 4 • Tier 1 Table 2.6.9-1, ITAAC Items 1, 3 and 4 • Tier 1 Table 2.7.1-4, ITAAC Items 6.b, 7, 8.a, 8.b and 8.c • Tier 1 Table 2.7.2-2, ITAAC Item 2 • Tier 1 Table 2.7.3-2, ITAAC Items 2.a and 2.b • Tier 1 Table 2.7.4-2, ITAAC Item 2.a, 2.b and 2.c • Tier 1 Table 2.7.6-2, ITAAC Item 2 (ITA and AC i only) • Tier 1 Table 3.1-1, ITAAC Item 6 • Tier 1 Table 3.2-1, ITAAC Items 3 and 6 • Tier 1 Table 3.3-6, ITAAC Items 2.c, 2.d and 2.e • Tier 1 Table 3.5-6, ITAAC Item 3 • Tier 1 Table 3.6-1, ITAAC Item 1 Category 2, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Component and Piping ITAAC

The plant-specific Tier 1 information is proposed to be revised by consolidating the Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for the following plant-specific ITAAC items, as described below and as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter.

The consolidation relocates and combines the following ITAAC into a single ITAAC. The Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria remain unchanged. • Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are

consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, Items 3, 4 and 5 are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a (ITA and AC i only), and

4.b are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.b are

consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are

consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are

consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.5-5, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.b are

consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, and 4.b are consolidated

in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.b and 6 are

consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.3.7-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3 and 4 are consolidated in one

ITAAC.


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• Tier 1 Table 2.3.10-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, and 5.b are consolidated in one ITAAC.

• Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, Items 2, 3 and 4 are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.7.1-4, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, and 4.b are consolidated

in one ITAAC. Category 3 – “Located on the Nuclear Island” ITAAC The plant-specific Tier 1 information is proposed to be revised by consolidating the Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for the following plant-specific ITAAC items, as described below and as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter. The consolidation combines the ITAAC listed below with the remainder of the Equipment Qualification ITAAC in the same ITAAC Table (see Category 4 list below). The Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria remain unchanged. • Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, Item 6 (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, Item 5 (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, Item 5 (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, Item 5.a (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, Item 5 (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, Item 2 (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 2.5.5-2, Item 2 (ITA and AC i) • Tier 1 Table 3.5-6, Item 1 (ITA and AC i) Category 4 – Equipment Qualification ITAAC

The plant-specific Tier 1 information is proposed to be revised by consolidating the Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for the following plant-specific ITAAC items, as described below and as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter.

The consolidation relocates and combines the following ITAAC into a single ITAAC. The Design Commitments, Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria remain unchanged.

The consolidation includes the Category 3 ITAAC shown above.

• Tier 1 Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC.


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• Tier 1 Table 2.1.3-2, Items 6 and 9.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.1-3, Items 5, 6.a, and 6.d are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.2-3, Items 5.a and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.3-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.2.4-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.3.2-4, Items 5 and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.3.6-4, Items 5.a and 7.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.3.13-3, Items 5 and 6.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, Items 2, 3 and 4 are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 2.5.5-2, Items 2 and 3.a are consolidated in one ITAAC. • Tier 1 Table 3.5-6, Items 1 and 2 are consolidated in one ITAAC.

Category 5 – Valve Qualification ITAAC An Exemption is not requested for Category 5 “Valve Qualification ITAAC” since Tier 1 already shows these as consolidated ITAAC. Category 6 - I&C and Electrical Functional Arrangement The following plant-specific ITAAC items are proposed to be identified as “Not Used” in the identified plant-specific Tier 1 tables, as shown in Enclosure 3 of this letter: • Tier 1 Table 2.5.1-4, ITAAC Item 1 • Tier 1 Table 2.5.2-8, ITAAC Item 1 • Tier 1 Table 2.5.3-2, ITAAC Item 1 • Tier 1 Table 2.6.2-1, ITAAC Item 1 • Tier 1 Table 2.6.3-3, ITAAC Item 1 • Tier 1 Table 2.6.5-1, ITAAC Item 1 This request for exemption provides the technical and regulatory basis to demonstrate that 10 CFR 52.63, §52.7, and §50.12 requirements are met and will apply the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4 to allow departures from generic Tier 1 information due to proposed consolidation, relocation and elimination of ITAAC.

2.0 Background

The Licensee is the holder of Combined License Nos. NPF-93 and NPF-94, which authorize construction and operation of two Westinghouse Electric Company AP1000 nuclear plants, named Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3, respectively. The proposed changes would consolidate and relocate ITAAC and subsume redundant Inspections, Tests and Analyses (ITA) and Acceptance Criteria (AC) throughout plant-specific Tier 1.


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During preparation and submittal of ITAAC Closure Notifications (ICNs), and through feedback by the Commission during review of the ICNs, SCE&G identified efficiencies to the ICN submittal process. Submittal of ICNs based upon the current plant-specific Tier 1 information creates additional regulatory burden on the Licensee and the NRC staff. The identified efficiencies would consolidate and relocate ITAAC and subsume redundant ITA and AC to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. This activity requests exemption from the Generic DCD Tier 1 tables which support the associated COL Appendix C ITAAC.

An exemption from elements of the AP1000 certified (Tier 1) design information is requested to allow plant-specific departures to be taken from the Tier 1 ITAAC Tables listed in Section 1.0 of this Enclosure.

3.0 Technical Justification of Acceptability

An exemption is requested to depart from AP1000 Generic DCD Tier 1 material in regard to the AP1000 by consolidating and relocating ITAAC and subsuming redundant ITA and AC. Consolidation, relocation and subsuming of redundant ITAAC reduces redundant documentation by reducing the number of ICNs because redundant documentation is not submitted. The proposed ITAAC consolidation continues to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix D and plant-specific Tier 1 design descriptions, tables and figures. The proposed exemption would allow a change to the plant-specific Tier 1 ITAAC information consistent with existing plant-specific DCD Tier 2 information. The proposed changes to the description information presented in plant-specific Tier 1 are at a level of detail that is consistent with the information currently provided therein.

The proposed changes neither adversely impact the ability to meet the design functions of the SSCs nor involve a significant decrease in the level of safety provided by the structures, systems, or components. Because the proposed consolidations are consistent with plant-specific DCD Tier 2 information and the design, the changes do not affect a structure, system or component. The proposed changes to information in plant-specific DCD Tier 1 continue to provide the detail necessary to implement the corresponding ITAAC.

Detailed technical justification supporting this request for exemption is provided in Section 2 of the associated License Amendment Request in Enclosure 1 of this letter.

4.0 Justification of Exemption

10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4, 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1), and 52.98(f) govern the issuance of exemptions from elements of the certified design information for AP1000 nuclear power plants. Since SCE&G has identified changes to the Tier 1 information related to the structures as a result of further design review activities, an exemption to the certified design information in Tier 1 is needed.

10 CFR 52, Appendix D, and 10 CFR 50.12, §52.7, and §52.63 state that the NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulations provided six conditions are met: 1) the exemption is authorized by law [§50.12(a)(1)]; 2) the exemption will not present an


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undue risk to the health and safety of the public [§50.12(a)(1)]; 3) the exemption is consistent with the common defense and security [§50.12(a)(1)]; 4) special circumstances are present [§50.12(a)(2)(ii)]; 5) the special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption [§52.63(b)(1)]; and 6) the design change will not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety [Part 52, App. D, VIII.A.4].

The requested exemption satisfies the criteria for granting specific exemptions, as described below.

1. This exemption is authorized by law

The NRC has authority under 10 CFR 52.63, §52.7, and §50.12 to grant exemptions from the requirements of NRC regulations. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.12 and §52.7 state that the NRC may grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52 upon a proper showing. No law exists that would preclude the changes covered by this exemption request. Additionally, granting of the proposed exemption does not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission’s regulations.

Accordingly, this requested exemption is “authorized by law,” as required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1).

2. This exemption will not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public

The proposed exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, would allow changes to elements of the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 to depart from the AP1000 certified (Tier 1) design information. The plant-specific DCD Tier 1 will continue to reflect the approved licensing basis for VCSNS Units 2 and 3 and will maintain a consistent level of detail with that which is currently provided elsewhere in Tier 1 of the DCD. Therefore, the affected plant-specific DCD Tier 1 ITAAC will continue to serve its required purpose.

These changes will not impact the ability of the SSCs to perform their design functions. Because the changes will not alter the operation of any plant equipment or systems, these changes do not present an undue risk to existing equipment or systems. These changes do not add any new equipment or system interfaces to the current plant design. The description changes do not introduce any new industrial, chemical, or radiological hazards that would represent a public health or safety risk, nor do they modify or remove any design or operational controls or safeguards that are intended to mitigate any existing on-site hazards. Furthermore, the proposed changes would not allow for a new fission product release path, result in a new fission product barrier failure mode, or create a new sequence of events that would result in significant fuel cladding failures. Accordingly, these changes do not present an undue risk from any new equipment or systems.

Therefore, the requested exemption from 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, would not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.


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3. The exemption is consistent with the common defense and security

The requested exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, would allow the Licensee to depart from elements of the plant-specific DCD Tier 1 design information. The requested exemption does not alter the design, function, or operation of any structure or plant equipment that is necessary to maintain a safe and secure status of the plant. The requested exemption has no impact on plant security or safeguards procedures.

Therefore, the requested exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

4. Special circumstances are present

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) lists six “special circumstances” for which an exemption may be granted. Pursuant to the regulation, it is necessary for one of these special circumstances to be present in order for the NRC to consider granting an exemption request. The requested exemption meets the special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). That subsection defines special circumstances as when “Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.”

The rule under consideration in this request for exemption is 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, which requires that a licensee referencing the AP1000 Design Certification Rule (10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D) shall incorporate by reference and comply with the requirements of Appendix D, including Tier 1 information. The VCSNS Units 2 and 3 COLs reference the AP1000 Design Certification Rule and incorporate by reference the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, including Tier 1 information. The underlying purpose of Appendix D, Section III.B, is to describe and define the scope and contents of the AP1000 design certification, and to require compliance with the design certification information in Appendix D.

The proposed changes to consolidate and relocate ITAAC and subsume redundant ITA and AC maintain the design functions of these systems. This change does not impact the ability of any SSCs to perform their functions or negatively impact safety. Accordingly, this exemption from the certification information will enable the licensee to safely construct and operate the AP1000 facility consistent with the design certified by the NRC in 10 CFR 52, Appendix D.

Therefore, special circumstances are present, because application of the current generic certified design information in Tier 1 as required by 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, in the particular circumstances discussed in this request is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

5. The special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption

Based on the nature of the changes to the plant-specific Tier 1 information in this area and the understanding that these changes are not related to system functions, these


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changes will not have a negative impact. Nevertheless, if other AP1000 licensees do not elect to request this exemption, the special circumstances continue to outweigh any decrease in safety from the reduction in standardization because the key design functions associated with this request will continue to be maintained. This exemption request and the associated marked-up table demonstrate that there is a minimal change from the generic AP1000 DCD, minimizing the reduction in standardization and, consequently, the safety impact from the reduction.

Therefore, the special circumstances associated with the requested exemption outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption.

6. The design change will not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety

The proposed exemption would allow changes to consolidate and relocate ITAAC and subsume redundant ITA and AC in plant-specific Tier 1. The consolidation will not impact the functional capabilities of the components identified in the affected ITAAC. Because the consolidation of ITAAC associated with this exemption request will not modify the design or operation of any systems or equipment, there are no new failure modes introduced by these changes and the level of safety provided by the current structures, systems, and components will be unchanged.

Because the proposed changes to the structure, system, or component descriptions will not adversely affect the ability of the structures, systems or components to perform their design functions and the level of safety provided by the structures, systems, and components is unchanged, it is concluded that the description changes associated with proposed exemption will not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety.

5.0 RISK ASSESSMENT

A risk assessment was not determined to be applicable to address the acceptability of this proposal.

6.0 PRECEDENT

None.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The Licensee requests a departure from elements of the certified information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 DCD. The Licensee has determined that the proposed departure would require a permanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section III.B, Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design, Scope and Contents, with respect to installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, or which changes an inspection or a surveillance requirement; however, the Licensee evaluation of the proposed exemption has determined that the proposed exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).


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Based on the above review of the proposed exemption, the Licensee has determined that the proposed activity does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment of the proposed exemption is not required.

Specific details of the environmental considerations supporting this request for exemption are provided in Section 5 of the associated License Amendment Request provided in Enclosure 1 of this letter.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The proposed changes to Tier 1 are necessary to consolidate information in ITAAC Tables in plant-specific DCD Tier 1 to improve efficiency of the ITAAC completion and closure process. The exemption request meets the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63, “Finality of Design Certifications,” 10 CFR 52.7, “Specific Exemptions,” 10 CFR 50.12, “Specific Exemptions,” and 10 CFR 52 Appendix D, “Design Certification Rule for the AP1000.” Specifically, the exemption request meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1) in that the request is authorized by law, presents no undue risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. Furthermore, approval of this request does not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety, satisfies the underlying purpose of the AP1000 Design Certification Rule, and does not present a significant decrease in safety as a result of a reduction in standardization.

9.0 REFERENCES

None



NND-17-0263

Enclosure 3

Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents

(LAR 17-12)

Note: Added text is Blue Underline

Deleted text is Red Strikethrough * * * indicates omitted existing text that is not shown.

(Note that the sheet numbers and the total number of sheets for the marked-up Tables provided in this Enclosure may be changed by the incorporation of this and other

departures. These changes are considered editorial and do not require evaluation in this submittal.)


NND-17-0263 Enclosure 3 Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-17-12)

Page 2 of 108

The COL Appendix C changes presented in this enclosure will also require the COL Appendix C Table of Contents on pages C-1 through C-30 to be revised accordingly.

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.1, Fuel Handling and Refueling System, Table 2.1.1-1, as shown below:


No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

* * *

3 2.1.01.03 Not used. 3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.


* * *


Page 3 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.2, Reactor Coolant System, Table 2.1.2-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.1.02.12a.i, 2.1.02.12a.ii, 2.1.02.12a.iv and 2.1.02.12a.v in

Table 2.1.2-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i, 12a.ii, 12a.iv and 12a.v in Table 2.1.2-4 is needed.



* * *

13 2.1.02.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.









4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain its pressure boundary integrity at theirits design pressure.




Page 4 of 108









14 2.1.02.02b Not used. 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.



15 2.1.02.03a Not used. 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



16 2.1.02.03b Not used. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



17 2.1.02.04a Not used. 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in


Page 5 of 108



their design pressure. hydrostatically tested. Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

18 2.1.02.04b Not used. 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.



19 2.1.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.








Page 6 of 108








20 2.1.02.05a.ii Not used. 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



21 2.1.02.05a.iii Not used. 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



22 2.1.02.05b Not used. 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built

A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in


Page 7 of 108



withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

23 2.1.02.06 Not used. 6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.



24 2.1.02.07a.i Not used. 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



25 2.1.02.07a.ii Not used. 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.




Page 8 of 108



* * *

27 2.1.02.07c Not used. 7.c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d).


* * *

53 2.1.02.12a.i 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as -built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.


54 2.1.02.12a.ii Not used. 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Iinspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.


* * *

56 2.1.02.12a.iv 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

iv) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.


Page 9 of 108



v) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

v) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

57 2.1.02.12a.v Not used. 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.



58 2.1.02.12a.vi Not used. 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

vi) See item 8.d.i in this table.

vi) See item 8.d.i in this table. The ADS stage 1-3 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 1-3 path flow resistances.

59 2.1.02.12a.vii Not used. 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

vii) See item 8.d.ii in this table.

vii) See item 8.d.ii in this table. The ADS stage 4 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 4 path flow resistances.

* * *


Page 10 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.3, Reactor System, Table 2.1.3-2, as shown below:



* * *

72 2.1.03.03 3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.



4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of as-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds

.

5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components of the RXS required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

73 2.1.03.04 Not used. 4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



74 2.1.03.05 Not used. 5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.


A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies)


Page 11 of 108



conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

75 2.1.03.06.i 6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island

.







i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.



Page 12 of 108





76 2.1.03.06.ii Not used. 6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



77 2.1.03.06.iii Not used.6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



* * *





Page 13 of 108






* * *

84 2.1.03.09c Not used. 9.c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.


* * *


Page 14 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.1, Containment System, Table 2.2.1-3, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.01.06d.i, 2.2.01.06d.ii, 2.2.01.11a.i and 2.2.01.11a.ii in

Table 2.2.1-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 6d.i, 6d.ii, 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.1-3 is needed.



* * *










i) A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be tested.

i) A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.


Page 15 of 108




A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.



The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.







95 2.2.01.04a.i Not used. 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



* * *



A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform


Page 16 of 108



with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

98 2.2.01.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.




ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.


iii) The as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.





Page 17 of 108





6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

99 2.2.01.05.ii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.



100 2.2.01.05.iii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-

iii) The as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the


Page 18 of 108



without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

tested or analyzed conditions.







* * *

104 2.2.01.06c Not used. 6.c) Separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.




Page 19 of 108



105 2.2.01.06d.i Not used. 6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.



106 2.2.01.06d.ii Not used.6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.



* * *

114 2.2.01.11a.i 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.





115 2.2.01.11a.ii Not used. 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type


Page 20 of 108



type tests. tests.

* * *


Page 21 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.2, Passive Containment Cooling System, Table 2.2.2-3, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.02.11a.i and 2.2.02.11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3, shown below,

only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3 is needed.



* * *


2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.




3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.


A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.


Page 22 of 108




4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built pipelines meet the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as-built pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

121 2.2.02.02b Not used. 2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.






123 2.2.02.03b Not used. 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.




Page 23 of 108



124 2.2.02.04a Not used. 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



125 2.2.02.04b Not used. 4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.


126 2.2.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components and valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I components will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) The report exists and concludes that the as-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.


Page 24 of 108



6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E components located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

127 2.2.02.05a.ii Not used. 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



128 2.2.02.05a.iii Not used. 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



129 2.2.02.05b Not used. 5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.



* * *


Page 25 of 108



131 2.2.02.06a.i Not used. 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



132 2.2.02.06a.ii Not used. 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



* * *

134 2.2.02.06c Not used. 6.c) Separation is provided between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.

* * *

143 2.2.02.07e.i Not used. 7.e) The PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup to the PCCWST.

i) See item 1 in this table. i) See item 1 in this table.

* * *

149 2.2.02.08c Not used. 8.c) The PCCWST includes a water inventory for the fire protection system.



* * *


Page 26 of 108



154 2.2.02.11a.i 11.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.


ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the capability of the as-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.

155 2.2.02.11a.ii Not used. 11.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.



* * *


Page 27 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.3, Passive Core Cooling System, Table 2.2.3-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.03.12a.i and 2.2.03.12a.ii in Table 2.2.3-4, shown below,




* * *






3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements

.








Page 28 of 108




Inspection will be performed verifying that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.




An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built PXS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.











Page 29 of 108













ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the screens can withstand seismic dynamic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.


Page 30 of 108




iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the as-built screens including their anchorage are bounded by the seismic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.







Page 31 of 108









168 2.2.03.05b Not used. 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.




Page 32 of 108












* * *

173 2.2.03.07c Not used. 7.c) Separation is provided between PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.




Page 33 of 108



174 2.2.03.08a Not used. 8.a) The PXS provides containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment.



* * *

214 2.2.03.12a.i 12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design condition.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 under design conditions.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

215 2.2.03.12a.ii Not used.12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.



* * *


Page 34 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.4, Steam Generator System, Table 2.2.4-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.04.12a.i and 2.2.04.12a.ii in Table 2.2.4-4, shown below,


Table 2.2.4-4

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria


* * *










Page 35 of 108

Table 2.2.4-4








Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.



Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built SGS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.








Page 36 of 108

Table 2.2.4-4













i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.





Page 37 of 108

Table 2.2.4-4














Page 38 of 108

Table 2.2.4-4
















Page 39 of 108

Table 2.2.4-4






* * *

234 2.2.04.07c Not used. 7.c) Separation is provided between SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



* * *

237 2.2.04.08b.i Not used. 8.b) During design basis events, the SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm isolation of the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines. See item 11 in this table.

See item 11 in this table.

* * *

239 2.2.04.08c Not used. 8.c) The SGS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SGS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.


* * *

242 2.2.04.09b.i Not used. 9.b) During shutdown operations, the SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.

i) Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater to the steam generators.

i) See ITAAC Table 2.4.1-2, Item 2.

* * *


Page 40 of 108

Table 2.2.4-4








249 2.2.04.12a.ii Not used. 12.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.



* * *


Page 41 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.5, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System, Table 2.2.5-5, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.05.05a.i, 2.2.05.05a.ii and 2.2.05.05a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5,

shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 5a.i, 5a.ii and 5a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5 is needed.

Table 2.2.5-5



* * *














Page 42 of 108

Table 2.2.5-5






















Page 43 of 108

Table 2.2.5-5




















Page 44 of 108

Table 2.2.5-5



* * *

264 2.2.05.06b Not used. 6.b) Separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



* * *


Page 45 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.1, Component Cooling Water System, Table 2.3.1-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.1-2



* * *

279 2.3.01.02 Not used. 2. The CCS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment.



* * *


Page 46 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.2, Chemical and Volume Control System, Table 2.3.2-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.02.11a.i and 2.3.02.11a.ii in Table 2.3.2-4, shown below,


Table 2.3.2-4



* * *














Page 47 of 108

Table 2.3.2-4






















Page 48 of 108

Table 2.3.2-4




ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.









Page 49 of 108

Table 2.3.2-4






293 2.3.02.05.iii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.









* * *

297 2.3.02.06c Not used. 6.c) Separation is provided between CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.




Page 50 of 108

Table 2.3.2-4



298 2.3.02.07a Not used. 7.a) The CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS lines penetrating the containment.



299 2.3.02.07b Not used. 7.b) The CVS provides termination of an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS.

See item 10b in this table. See item 10b in this table.

300 2.3.02.07c Not used. 7.c) The CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS.

See item 10b in this table. See item 10b in this table.

* * *

309

2.3.02.11a.i




ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.


310 2.3.02.11a.ii Not used. 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.



* * *


Page 51 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.4, Fire Protection System, Table 2.3.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.4-2



* * *

329 2.3.04.03 Not used. 3. The FPS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.



* * *


Page 52 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.5, Mechanical Handling System, Table 2.3.5-2, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.05.02.i, 2.3.05.02.ii and 2.3.05.02.iii in Table 2.3.5-2, shown

below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.5-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.5-2



* * *












Page 53 of 108

Table 2.3.5-2






* * *


Page 54 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.6, Normal Residual Heat Removal System, Table 2.3.6-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.06.12a.i and 2.3.06.12a.ii in Table 2.3.6-4, shown below,


Table 2.3.6-4



* * *










Page 55 of 108

Table 2.3.6-4












An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as-built RNS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.








Page 56 of 108

Table 2.3.6-4


















Page 57 of 108

Table 2.3.6-4





7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.









Page 58 of 108

Table 2.3.6-4












366 2.3.06.07a.i Not used. 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.




Page 59 of 108

Table 2.3.6-4



367 2.3.06.07a.ii Not used. 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



* * *

369 2.3.06.07c Not used. 7.c) Separation is provided between RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



370 2.3.06.08a Not used. 8.a) The RNS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment.



371 2.3.06.08b Not used. 8.b) The RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS.

See item 1 in this table. See item 1 in this table.

* * *





ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.


Page 60 of 108

Table 2.3.6-4



385 2.3.06.12a.ii 12.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.



* * *


Page 61 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.7, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System, Table 2.3.7-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.07.05.i, 2.3.07.05.ii and 2.3.07.05.iii in Table 2.3.7-4, shown


Table 2.3.7-4



* * *


2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the ASME as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.


3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping lines required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.


Page 62 of 108

Table 2.3.7-4



393 2.3.07.02b Not used. 2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping lines as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III.

394 2.3.07.03 Not used. 3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



395 2.3.07.04 Not used. 4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



396 2.3.07.05.i 5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.







Page 63 of 108

Table 2.3.7-4



397 2.3.07.05.ii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.



398 2.3.07.05.iii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.



* * *

400 2.3.07.06b Not used. 6.b) Separation is provided between SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



401 2.3.07.07a Not used. 7.a) The SFS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SFS lines penetrating the containment.



* * *

404 2.3.07.07b.iii Not used. 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.

iii) A safety-related flow path exists from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool.

iii) See item 1 of this table.

405 2.3.07.07b.iv Not used. 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the makeup water supply from the passive containment cooling system (PCS) water storage tank to the spent fuel pool.

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the makeup water supply from the PCS water storage tank to the spent fuel pool.


Page 64 of 108

Table 2.3.7-4



406 2.3.07.07b.v Not used. 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.

v) Inspection will be performed to verify that the passive containment cooling system water storage tank includes a sufficient volume of water.

v) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for the volume of the passive containment cooling system water storage tank.

407 2.3.07.07b.vi Not used. 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria to verify that the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank includes a sufficient volume of water.

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the volume of the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank.

* * *


Page 65 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.10, Liquid Radwaste System, Table 2.3.10-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.10.05a.i, 2.3.10.05a.ii and 2.3.10.05a.iii in Table 2.3.10-4,


Table 2.3.10-4



* * *




The ASME Code Section III design report exists for the as built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.10-1 and 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.






Page 66 of 108

Table 2.3.10-4




















Page 67 of 108

Table 2.3.10-4

















Page 68 of 108

Table 2.3.10-4












441 2.3.10.06a Not used. 6.a) The WLS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment.



442 2.3.10.06b Not used. 6.b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.

Refer to item 9 in this table. Refer to item 9 in this table.

* * *


Page 69 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.11, Gaseous Radwaste System, Table 2.3.11-2, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.11.02.i, 2.3.11.02.ii and 2.3.11.02.iii in Table 2.3.11-2,

shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.11-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.11-2



* * *

450 2.3.11.02.i 2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismically designed equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.



451 2.3.11.02.ii Not used. 2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.




Page 70 of 108

Table 2.3.11-2



452 2.3.11.02.iii Not used. 2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.



* * *

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.13, Primary Sampling System, Table 2.3.13-3, as shown below:

Table 2.3.13-3



* * *








Page 71 of 108

Table 2.3.13-3



4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



460 2.3.13.03 Not used. 3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



461 2.3.13.04 Not used. 4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



462 2.3.13.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.






Page 72 of 108

Table 2.3.13-3





6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.


i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



463 2.3.13.05.ii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.




Page 73 of 108

Table 2.3.13-3



464 2.3.13.05.iii Not used. 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.



465 2.3.13.06a.i Not used. 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.



466 2.3.13.06a.ii Not used. 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.



* * *

468 2.3.13.06c Not used. 6.c) Separation is provided between PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E divisions.



469 2.3.13.07 Not used. 7. The PSS provides the safety- related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.




Page 74 of 108

Table 2.3.13-3



* * *


Page 75 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.14, Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System, Table 2.3.14-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.14-2



* * *

478 2.3.14.02 Not used. 2. The DWS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.



* * *


Page 76 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.15, Compressed and Instrument Air System, Table 2.3.15-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.15-2



* * *

482 2.3.15.02 Not used. 2. The CAS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.



* * *


Page 77 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.1, Diverse Actuation System, Table 2.5.1-4, as shown below:

Table 2.5.1-4



505 2.5.01.01 Not used. 1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.


The as-built DAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

* * *

520 2.5.01.05 Not used. 5. The DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably.

See ITAAC Table 3.2-1, item 1. See ITAAC Table 3.2-1, item 1.


Page 78 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.2, Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Table 2.5.2-8, as shown below:

Table 2.5.2-8



521 2.5.02.01 Not used. 1. The functional arrangement of the PMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.


The as-built PMS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.

522 2.5.02.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.








Page 79 of 108

Table 2.5.2-8



3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.

A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1.

A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

523 2.5.02.02.ii Not used. 2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



524 2.5.02.02.iii Not used. 2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.




Page 80 of 108

Table 2.5.2-8



525 2.5.02.03 Not used. 3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



526 2.5.02.04 Not used. 4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



* * *

528 2.5.02.05b Not used. 5.b) Separation is provided between PMS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e.

* * *


Page 81 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.3, Plant Control System, Table 2.5.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.3-2



554 2.5.03.01 Not used. 1. The functional arrangement of the PLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3.


The as-built PLS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3.

* * *


Page 82 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.5, In-Core Instrumentation System, Table 2.5.5-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.5-2



* * *

565 2.5.05.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.








Page 83 of 108

Table 2.5.5-2



3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.


i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment. This equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



566 2.5.05.02.ii Not used. 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.



567 2.5.05.02.iii Not used. 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.




Page 84 of 108

Table 2.5.5-2



568 2.5.05.03a.i Not used. 3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.



569 2.5.05.03a.ii Not used. 3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.



* * *

571 2.5.05.03c Not used. 3.c) For cables other than those covered by 3.b, separation is provided between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



* * *


Page 85 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.1, Main ac Power System, Table 2.6.1-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.01.02.i, 2.6.01.02.ii and 2.6.01.02.iii in Table 2.6.1-4, shown


Table 2.6.1-4



* * *












Page 86 of 108

Table 2.6.1-4






* * *

583 2.6.01.03b Not used. 3.b) Separation is provided between ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



* * *

585 2.6.01.04b Not used. 4.b) The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power load system.

See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a.

See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a.

* * *


Page 87 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.2, Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.2-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.2-1



592 2.6.02.01 Not used. 1. The functional arrangement of the EDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.


The as-built EDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.

* * *


Page 88 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.3-3, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.03.02.i, 2.6.03.02.ii and 2.6.03.02.iii in Table 2.6.3-3, shown


Table 2.6.3-3



596 2.6.03.01 Not used. 1. The functional arrangement of the IDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.


The as-built IDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.












Page 89 of 108

Table 2.6.3-3






600 2.6.03.03 Not used. 3. Separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.



* * *


Page 90 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System, Table 2.6.5-1, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.05.03.i and 2.6.05.03.ii in Table 2.6.5-1, shown below, only

impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 3.i and 3.ii in Table 2.6.5-1 is needed.

Table 2.6.5-1



627 2.6.05.01 Not used. 1. The functional arrangement of the ELS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.


The as-built ELS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.

* * *

630 2.6.05.03.i 3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) Analysis of seismic supports will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.

631 2.6.05.03.ii Not used. 3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.



632 2.6.05.04 Not used. 4. The panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



* * *


Page 91 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.9, Plant Security System, Table 2.6.9-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.9-1



641 2.6.09.01 Not used. 1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.


* * *

642 2.6.09.03 Not used. 3. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within the vital area.


643 2.6.09.04 Not used. 4. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.


* * *


Page 92 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.1-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.7.01.05.i, 2.7.01.05.ii and 2.7.01.05.iii in Table 2.7.1-4, shown


Table 2.7.1-4



* * *




The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Table 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.







A pressure test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.


Page 93 of 108

Table 2.7.1-4













A pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.


A pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.






Page 94 of 108

Table 2.7.1-4













* * *

688 2.7.01.06b Not used. 6.b) Separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



689 2.7.01.07 Not used. 7. The VBS and SDS provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary.

See item 10.b in this table. See item 10.b in this table.

690 2.7.01.08a Not used. 8.a) The VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.



Page 95 of 108

Table 2.7.1-4



691 2.7.01.08b Not used. 8.b) The VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.


692 2.7.01.08c Not used. 8.c) The VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected.


* * *


Page 96 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.2, Central Chilled Water System, Table 2.7.2-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.2-2



* * *

702 2.7.02.02 Not used. 2. The applicable portions of the VWS provide the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.



* * *


Page 97 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.3, Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.3-2



* * *

708 2.7.03.02a Not used. 2.a) The VXS provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates and chilled water is available.


709 2.7.03.02b Not used. 2.b) The VXS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.


* * *


Page 98 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.4, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System, Table 2.7.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.4-2



* * *

713 2.7.04.02a Not used. 2.a) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating.


714 2.7.04.02b Not used. 2.b) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.


715 2.7.04.02c Not used. 2.c) The VZS provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.


* * *


Page 99 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.6, Containment Air Filtration System, Table 2.7.6-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.6-2



* * *

724 2.7.06.02.i Not used. 2. The VFS provides the safety-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel.

i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.

i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.

* * *


Page 100 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Table 3.1-1, as shown below:

Table 3.1-1



* * *

738 3.1.00.06 Not Used 6. The CSA provides a habitable workspace environment.

See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4,

items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13,

Nuclear Island Nonradioactive

Ventilation System.

See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4,

items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13,

Nuclear Island Nonradioactive

Ventilation System.

* * *


Page 101 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.2, Human Factors Engineering, Table 3.2.-1, as shown below:

Table 3.2.-1



* * *

746 3.2.00.03.i Not used. 3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.


747 3.2.00.03.ii Not used. 3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR Emergency Habitability System.

ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR Emergency Habitability System.

748 3.2.00.03.iii Not used. 3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and UPS System.

iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and UPS system.

749 3.2.00.03.iv Not used. 3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

iv) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.

iv) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.

750 3.2.00.03.v Not used. 3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

v) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.

v) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.

* * *

753 3.2.00.06.i Not used. 6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.



754 3.2.00.06.ii Not used. 6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

ii) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.

ii) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.

755 3.2.00.06.iii Not used. 6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

iii) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.

iii) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.


Page 102 of 108

Table 3.2.-1



* * *


Page 103 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.3, Buildings, Table 3.3-6, as shown below:

Table 3.3-6



* * *

771 3.3.00.02c Not used. 2.c) The containment and its penetrations are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.(1)

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b.

772 3.3.00.02d Not used. 2.d) The containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b.

773 3.3.00.02e Not used. 2.e) The containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7.

* * *

1. Containment isolation devices are addressed in subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.


Page 104 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring, Table 3.5-6, as shown below:

Table 3.5-6



823 3.5.00.01.i 1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.





2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.


i) A report exists and concludes that Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being located in a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.


Page 105 of 108

Table 3.5-6




ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

824 3.5.00.01.ii Not used. 1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



825 3.5.00.01.iii Not used. 1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.



826 3.5.00.02.i Not used. 2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.




Page 106 of 108

Table 3.5-6



827 3.5.00.02.ii Not used. 2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



828 3.5.00.03 Not used. 3. Separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.



* * *


Page 107 of 108

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.6, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection, Table 3.6-1, as shown below:

Table 3.6-1



834 3.6.00.01.i Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a for the sump level measuring instruments WLS-034 and WLS-035.

See sections:

i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a for the sump level measuring instruments WLS-034 and WLS-035.

835 3.6.00.01.ii Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, Item 1 for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor PSS-RE027.

See ITAAC sections:

ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, Item 1 for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor PSS-RE027.

836 3.6.00.01.iii Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the pressurizer level measuring instruments RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D.

See sections:

iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the pressurizer level measuring instruments RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D.

837 3.6.00.01.iv Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a) and 7.a) for the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D.

See sections:

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a) and 7.a) for the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D.


Page 108 of 108

Table 3.6-1



838 3.6.00.01.v Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the RCS pressure instruments RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D.

See sections:

v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5.a), 7.a), and 10 for the RCS pressure instruments RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D.

839 3.6.00.01.vi Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, Item 13 for the letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 and CVS-025.

See sections:

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, Item 13 for the letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 and CVS-025.

840 3.6.00.01.vii Not used. 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002.

vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002.



NND-17-0263

Enclosure 4

Roadmap of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents

(LAR 17-12)


NND-17-0263 Enclosure 4 Roadmap of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-17-12)

Page 2 of 22

ITAAC Consolidation Roadmap

ITAAC Index Number ITAAC Number to be Removed

Consolidate With ITAAC Number ITAAC Index

Number ITAAC

Number

3 2.1.01.03 90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii 14 2.1.02.02b 13 2.1.02.02a 15 2.1.02.03a 13 2.1.02.02a 16 2.1.02.03b 13 2.1.02.02a 17 2.1.02.04a 13 2.1.02.02a 18 2.1.02.04b 13 2.1.02.02a 20 2.1.02.05a.ii 19 2.1.02.05a.i 21 2.1.02.05a.iii 19 2.1.02.05a.i 22 2.1.02.05b 13 2.1.02.02a 23 2.1.02.06 13 2.1.02.02a 24 2.1.02.07a.i 19 2.1.02.05a.i 25 2.1.02.07a.ii 19 2.1.02.05a.i

27 2.1.02.07c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c 54 2.1.02.12a.ii 53 2.1.02.12a.i 57 2.1.02.12a.v 56 2.1.02.12a.iv 58 2.1.02.12a.vi 32 2.1.02.08d.i 59 2.1.02.12a.vii 33 2.1.02.08d.ii 73 2.1.03.04 72 2.1.03.03 74 2.1.03.05 72 2.1.03.03 76 2.1.03.06.ii 75 2.1.03.06.i 77 2.1.03.06.iii 75 2.1.03.06.i 81 2.1.03.09a.i 75 2.1.03.06.i


Page 3 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number 82 2.1.03.09a.ii 75 2.1.03.06.i

84 2.1.03.09c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c 92 2.2.01.02b 91 2.2.01.02a 93 2.2.01.03a 91 2.2.01.02a 94 2.2.01.03b 91 2.2.01.02a 95 2.2.01.04a.i 91 2.2.01.02a 97 2.2.01.04b 91 2.2.01.02a 99 2.2.01.05.ii 98 2.2.01.05.i

100 2.2.01.05.iii 98 2.2.01.05.i 101 2.2.01.06a.i 98 2.2.01.05.i 102 2.2.01.06a.ii 98 2.2.01.05.i

104 2.2.01.06c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c 105 2.2.01.06d.i 98 2.2.01.05.i 106 2.2.01.06d.ii 98 2.2.01.05.i


Page 4 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number 115 2.2.01.11a.ii 114 2.2.01.11a.i 121 2.2.02.02b 120 2.2.02.02a 122 2.2.02.03a 120 2.2.02.02a 123 2.2.02.03b 120 2.2.02.02a 124 2.2.02.04a 120 2.2.02.02a 125 2.2.02.04b 120 2.2.02.02a 127 2.2.02.05a.ii 126 2.2.02.05a.i 128 2.2.02.05a.iii 126 2.2.02.05a.i 129 2.2.02.05b 120 2.2.02.02a 131 2.2.02.06a.i 126 2.2.02.05a.i 132 2.2.02.06a.ii 126 2.2.02.05a.i

134 2.2.02.06c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c 143 2.2.02.07e.i 119 2.2.02.01

149 2.2.02.08c 326 2.3.04.01

327 2.3.04.02.i

328 2.3.04.02.ii 155 2.2.02.11a.ii 154 2.2.02.11a.i 160 2.2.03.02b 159 2.2.03.02a 161 2.2.03.03a 159 2.2.03.02a 162 2.2.03.03b 159 2.2.03.02a 163 2.2.03.04a 159 2.2.03.02a 164 2.2.03.04b 159 2.2.03.02a 166 2.2.03.05a.ii 165 2.2.03.05a.i 167 2.2.03.05a.iii 165 2.2.03.05a.i 168 2.2.03.05b 159 2.2.03.02a 169 2.2.03.06 159 2.2.03.02a


Page 5 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number 170 2.2.03.07a.i 165 2.2.03.05a.i 171 2.2.03.07a.ii 165 2.2.03.05a.i

173 2.2.03.07c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

174 2.2.03.08a 90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii 215 2.2.03.12a.ii 214 2.2.03.12a.i 221 2.2.04.02b 220 2.2.04.02a 222 2.2.04.03a 220 2.2.04.02a 223 2.2.04.03b 220 2.2.04.02a 224 2.2.04.04a 220 2.2.04.02a 225 2.2.04.04b 220 2.2.04.02a 227 2.2.04.05a.ii 226 2.2.04.05a.i 228 2.2.04.05a.iii 226 2.2.04.05a.i 229 2.2.04.05b 220 2.2.04.02a 230 2.2.04.06 220 2.2.04.02a 231 2.2.04.07a.i 226 2.2.04.05a.i 232 2.2.04.07a.ii 226 2.2.04.05a.i


Page 6 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

234 2.2.04.07c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

237 2.2.04.08b.i 245 2.2.04.11a

246 2.2.04.11b.i

247 2.2.04.11b.ii

239 2.2.04.08c 107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii 242 2.2.04.09b.i 493 2.4.01.02 249 2.2.04.12a.ii 248 2.2.04.12a.i 254 2.2.05.02b 253 2.2.05.02a 255 2.2.05.03a 253 2.2.05.02a 256 2.2.05.03b 253 2.2.05.02a 257 2.2.05.04a 253 2.2.05.02a 258 2.2.05.04b 253 2.2.05.02a 260 2.2.05.05a.ii 259 2.2.05.05a.i 261 2.2.05.05a.iii 259 2.2.05.05a.i 262 2.2.05.05b 253 2.2.05.02a


Page 7 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

264 2.2.05.06b

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

279 2.3.01.02 90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii 286 2.3.02.02b 285 2.3.02.02a 287 2.3.02.03a 285 2.3.02.02a 288 2.3.02.03b 285 2.3.02.02a 289 2.3.02.04a 285 2.3.02.02a 290 2.3.02.04b 285 2.3.02.02a 292 2.3.02.05.ii 291 2.3.02.05.i 293 2.3.02.05.iii 291 2.3.02.05.i 294 2.3.02.06a.i 291 2.3.02.05.i 295 2.3.02.06a.ii 291 2.3.02.05.i


Page 8 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

297 2.3.02.06c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

298 2.3.02.07a 107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

299 2.3.02.07b 307 2.3.02.10b.i

308 2.3.02.10b.ii

300 2.3.02.07c 307 2.3.02.10b.i

308 2.3.02.10b.ii

310 2.3.02.11a.ii 309 2.3.02.11a.i

329 2.3.04.03

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

341 2.3.05.02.ii 340 2.3.05.02.i

342 2.3.05.02.iii 340 2.3.05.02.i

356 2.3.06.02b 355 2.3.06.02a

357 2.3.06.03a 355 2.3.06.02a

358 2.3.06.03b 355 2.3.06.02a

359 2.3.06.04a 355 2.3.06.02a

360 2.3.06.04b 355 2.3.06.02a

362 2.3.06.05a.ii 361 2.3.06.05a.i

363 2.3.06.05a.iii 361 2.3.06.05a.i

364 2.3.06.05b 355 2.3.06.02a

365 2.3.06.06 355 2.3.06.02a

366 2.3.06.07a.i 361 2.3.06.05a.i

367 2.3.06.07a.ii 361 2.3.06.05a.i


Page 9 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

369 2.3.06.07c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

370 2.3.06.08a 107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

371 2.3.06.08b 354 2.3.06.01

385 2.3.06.12a.ii 384 2.3.06.12a.i

393 2.3.07.02b 392 2.3.07.02a

394 2.3.07.03 392 2.3.07.02a

395 2.3.07.04 392 2.3.07.02a

397 2.3.07.05.ii 396 2.3.07.05.i

398 2.3.07.05.iii 396 2.3.07.05.i

400 2.3.07.06b

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

401 2.3.07.07a

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii


Page 10 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number 404 2.3.07.07b.iii 391 2.3.07.01

405 2.3.07.07b.iv 145 2.2.02.07f.i

146 2.2.02.07f.ii

406 2.3.07.07b.v 145 2.2.02.07f.i

146 2.2.02.07f.ii

407 2.3.07.07b.vi 147 2.2.02.08a

148 2.2.02.08b

432 2.3.10.02b 431 2.3.10.02a

433 2.3.10.03a 431 2.3.10.02a

434 2.3.10.03b 431 2.3.10.02a

435 2.3.10.04a 431 2.3.10.02a

436 2.3.10.04b 431 2.3.10.02a

438 2.3.10.05a.ii 437 2.3.10.05a.i

439 2.3.10.05a.iii 437 2.3.10.05a.i

440 2.3.10.05b 431 2.3.10.02a

441 2.3.10.06a

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

442 2.3.10.06b 447 2.3.10.09

451 2.3.11.02.ii 450 2.3.11.02.i

452 2.3.11.02.iii 450 2.3.11.02.i

460 2.3.13.03 459 2.3.13.02

461 2.3.13.04 459 2.3.13.02

463 2.3.13.05.ii 462 2.3.13.05.i

464 2.3.13.05.iii 462 2.3.13.05.i

465 2.3.13.06a.i 462 2.3.13.05.i

466 2.3.13.06a.ii 462 2.3.13.05.i


Page 11 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

468 2.3.13.06c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b 811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

469 2.3.13.07 107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

478 2.3.14.02

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

482 2.3.15.02

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

505 2.5.01.01

506 2.5.01.02a

507 2.5.01.02b

508 2.5.01.02c.i

509 2.5.01.02c.ii

510 2.5.01.02d

520 2.5.01.05

739 3.2.00.01a

740 3.2.00.01b

741 3.2.00.01c.i

742 3.2.00.01c.ii

743 3.2.00.01d

744 3.2.00.01e


Page 12 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

521 2.5.02.01

527 2.5.02.05a

529 2.5.02.06a.i

530 2.5.02.06a.ii

531 2.5.02.06b

532 2.5.02.06c.i

533 2.5.02.06c.ii

539 2.5.02.08a.i

540 2.5.02.08a.ii

541 2.5.02.08a.iii

543 2.5.02.08b.ii

545 2.5.02.09a

546 2.5.02.09b

547 2.5.02.09c

548 2.5.02.09d

523 2.5.02.02.ii 522 2.5.02.02.i

524 2.5.02.02.iii 522 2.5.02.02.i

525 2.5.02.03 522 2.5.02.02.i

526 2.5.02.04 522 2.5.02.02.i

528 2.5.02.05b

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

812 3.3.00.07e

554 2.5.03.01 555 2.5.03.02

566 2.5.05.02.ii 565 2.5.05.02.i

567 2.5.05.02.iii 565 2.5.05.02.i

568 2.5.05.03a.i 565 2.5.05.02.i

569 2.5.05.03a.ii 565 2.5.05.02.i


Page 13 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

571 2.5.05.03c

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

580 2.6.01.02.ii 579 2.6.01.02.i

581 2.6.01.02.iii 579 2.6.01.02.i

583 2.6.01.03b

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

585 2.6.01.04b 622 2.6.04.02a

592 2.6.02.01

593 2.6.02.02a

594 2.6.02.02b

595 2.6.02.02c


Page 14 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

596 2.6.03.01

601 2.6.03.04a

603 2.6.03.04c

604 2.6.03.04d

605 2.6.03.04e

606 2.6.03.04f

607 2.6.03.04g

608 2.6.03.04h

609 2.6.03.04i

876 2.6.03.04j

610 2.6.03.05a

611 2.6.03.05b

612 2.6.03.05c

613 2.6.03.05d.i

614 2.6.03.05d.ii

598 2.6.03.02.ii 597 2.6.03.02.i

599 2.6.03.02.iii 597 2.6.03.02.i

600 2.6.03.03

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

627 2.6.05.01

628 2.6.05.02.i

633 2.6.05.05.i

634 2.6.05.05.ii

635 2.6.05.06.i

636 2.6.05.06.ii


Page 15 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

632 2.6.05.04

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

641 2.6.09.01 820 3.3.00.14

642 2.6.09.03 821 3.3.00.16

643 2.6.09.04 822 3.3.00.17

679 2.7.01.02b 678 2.7.01.02a

680 2.7.01.03a 678 2.7.01.02a

681 2.7.01.03b 678 2.7.01.02a

682 2.7.01.04a 678 2.7.01.02a

683 2.7.01.04b 678 2.7.01.02a

685 2.7.01.05.ii 684 2.7.01.05.i

686 2.7.01.05.iii 684 2.7.01.05.i

688 2.7.01.06b

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

689 2.7.01.07 696 2.7.01.10b

690 2.7.01.08a 698 2.7.01.12


Page 16 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number 691 2.7.01.08b 698 2.7.01.12

692 2.7.01.08c 698 2.7.01.12

702 2.7.02.02

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

708 2.7.03.02a 710 2.7.03.03

709 2.7.03.02b 710 2.7.03.03

713 2.7.04.02a 716 2.7.04.03

714 2.7.04.02b 716 2.7.04.03

715 2.7.04.02c 716 2.7.04.03

724 2.7.06.02.i

90 2.2.01.01

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

738 3.1.00.06

677 2.7.01.01

690 2.7.01.08a

692 2.7.01.08c

698 2.7.01.12

699 2.7.01.13


Page 17 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

746 3.2.00.03.i

677 2.7.01.01

678 2.7.01.02a

679 2.7.01.02b

680 2.7.01.03a

681 2.7.01.03b

682 2.7.01.04a

683 2.7.01.04b

684 2.7.01.05.i

685 2.7.01.05.ii

686 2.7.01.05.iii

687 2.7.01.06a

688 2.7.01.06b

689 2.7.01.07

690 2.7.01.08a

691 2.7.01.08b

692 2.7.01.08c

693 2.7.01.08d

694 2.7.01.09

695 2.7.01.10a

696 2.7.01.10b

697 2.7.01.11

698 2.7.01.12

699 2.7.01.13

700 2.7.01.14


Page 18 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

747 3.2.00.03.ii

252 2.2.05.01

253 2.2.05.02a

254 2.2.05.02b

255 2.2.05.03a

256 2.2.05.03b

257 2.2.05.04a

258 2.2.05.04b

259 2.2.05.05a.i

260 2.2.05.05a.ii

261 2.2.05.05a.iii

262 2.2.05.05b

263 2.2.05.06a

264 2.2.05.06b

265 2.2.05.07a.i

266 2.2.05.07a.ii

267 2.2.05.07a.iii

268 2.2.05.07b.i

269 2.2.05.07b.ii

270 2.2.05.07c

271 2.2.05.07d

272 2.2.05.08

273 2.2.05.09a

274 2.2.05.09b

275 2.2.05.10

276 2.2.05.11

277 2.2.05.12


Page 19 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

748 3.2.00.03.iii

596 2.6.03.01

597 2.6.03.02.i

598 2.6.03.02.ii

599 2.6.03.02.iii

600 2.6.03.03

601 2.6.03.04a

602 2.6.03.04b

603 2.6.03.04c

604 2.6.03.04d

605 2.6.03.04e

606 2.6.03.04f

607 2.6.03.04g

608 2.6.03.04h

609 2.6.03.04i

610 2.6.03.05a

611 2.6.03.05b

612 2.6.03.05c

613 2.6.03.05d.i

614 2.6.03.05d.ii

615 2.6.03.06

616 2.6.03.07

617 2.6.03.08

618 2.6.03.09

619 2.6.03.10

620 2.6.03.11

749 3.2.00.03.iv

627 2.6.05.01

628 2.6.05.02.i

629 2.6.05.02.ii

630 2.6.05.03.i

631 2.6.05.03.ii

632 2.6.05.04

633 2.6.05.05.i

634 2.6.05.05.ii

635 2.6.05.06.i

636 2.6.05.06.ii


Page 20 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

750 3.2.00.03.v

484 2.3.19.01a

485 2.3.19.01b

486 2.3.19.02a

487 2.3.19.02b

753 3.2.00.06.i

677 2.7.01.01

678 2.7.01.02a

679 2.7.01.02b

680 2.7.01.03a

681 2.7.01.03b

682 2.7.01.04a

683 2.7.01.04b

684 2.7.01.05.i

685 2.7.01.05.ii

686 2.7.01.05.iii

687 2.7.01.06a

688 2.7.01.06b

689 2.7.01.07

690 2.7.01.08a

691 2.7.01.08b

692 2.7.01.08c

693 2.7.01.08d

694 2.7.01.09

695 2.7.01.10a

696 2.7.01.10b

697 2.7.01.11

698 2.7.01.12

699 2.7.01.13

700 2.7.01.14

754 3.2.00.06.ii

627 2.6.05.01

628 2.6.05.02.i

629 2.6.05.02.ii

630 2.6.05.03.i

631 2.6.05.03.ii

632 2.6.05.04

633 2.6.05.05.i

634 2.6.05.05.ii

635 2.6.05.06.i

636 2.6.05.06.ii


Page 21 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

755 3.2.00.06.iii

484 2.3.19.01a

485 2.3.19.01b

486 2.3.19.02a

487 2.3.19.02b

771 3.3.00.02c

91 2.2.01.02a

92 2.2.01.02b

93 2.2.01.03a

94 2.2.01.03b

772 3.3.00.02d

95 2.2.01.04a.i

96 2.2.01.04a.ii

97 2.2.01.04b

773 3.3.00.02e

95 2.2.01.04a.i

96 2.2.01.04a.ii

97 2.2.01.04b

107 2.2.01.07.i

108 2.2.01.07.ii

824 3.5.00.01.ii 823 3.5.00.01.i

825 3.5.00.01.iii 823 3.5.00.01.i

826 3.5.00.02.i 823 3.5.00.01.i

827 3.5.00.02.ii 823 3.5.00.01.i

828 3.5.00.03

799 3.3.00.07d.i

800 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

801 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

802 3.3.00.07d.ii.c

803 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

804 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

805 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

806 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

807 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

808 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

809 3.3.00.07d.v.a

810 3.3.00.07d.v.b

811 3.3.00.07d.v.c

834 3.6.00.01.i 443 2.3.10.07a.i

444 2.3.10.07a.ii

835 3.6.00.01.ii

823 3.5.00.01.i

824 3.5.00.01.ii

825 3.5.00.01.iii


Page 22 of 22



Number ITAAC

Number

836 3.6.00.01.iii

19 2.1.02.05a.i

20 2.1.02.05a.ii

21 2.1.02.05a.iii

24 2.1.02.07a.i

25 2.1.02.07a.ii

45 2.1.02.10

837 3.6.00.01.iv

19 2.1.02.05a.i

20 2.1.02.05a.ii

21 2.1.02.05a.iii

24 2.1.02.07a.i

25 2.1.02.07a.ii

838 3.6.00.01.v

19 2.1.02.05a.i

20 2.1.02.05a.ii

21 2.1.02.05a.iii

24 2.1.02.07a.i

25 2.1.02.07a.ii

45 2.1.02.10

839 3.6.00.01.vi 316 2.3.02.13

840 3.6.00.01.vii 448 2.3.10.10



NND-17-0263

Enclosure 5

Assessment of Reference ITAAC

(LAR 17-12)


NND-17-0263 Enclosure 5 Assessment of Reference ITAAC (LAR-17-12)

Page 2 of 251

Reference ITAAC Number (Index

Number)

Referenced ITAAC Number (Index Number)

Basis for Reference ITAAC Index No. 3 Consolidation

2.1.01.03 (3) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the fuel handling and refueling system (FHS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 3, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the FHS system is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (3) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 3 Design Commitment requires that “The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 3 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107, respectively). .

• The referenced ITAAC 90 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the containment system (CNS) and associated systems is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1. The CNS functional arrangement is the collection of boundaries that separates the containment atmosphere from the outside environment during design basis accidents. The ITAAC 90 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built CNS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1.

• The referenced ITAAC 107 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 107 Acceptance Criteria is met when the leakage rate from containment for the integrated leak rate test is less than the maximum allowable leakage rate (La).

• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 3 is that the containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an


Page 3 of 251


Number)



actuation signal. However, the Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation Valve, FHS-PL-V001, identified in Table 2.2.1-1, is a manually operated valve that does not receive an actuation isolation signal. Per UFSAR Table 3.9-16, this valve closes one end of the fuel transfer tube, which is normally closed by a flange, except during refueling. FHS-PL-V001 has an active safety function to close when the fuel transfer tube flange is removed and normal shutdown cooling is lost. Closing this valve, along with other actions, provides containment closure which allows long-term core cooling to be provided by the passive core cooling system (PXS). Therefore, because FHS-PL-V001 is manually operated and does not receive an actuation signal, the referenced ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria is not applicable to this valve.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the two independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90) and leakage rate (ITAAC 107), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (3) to demonstrate containment isolation of the FHS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 3 Design Commitment is met.


Page 4 of 251


Number)



2.1.02.07c (27) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (27) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 27 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [reactor coolant system] RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 27 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index No. 799 through 811).

• The referenced ITAAC 799 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 799 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

o Within the main control room and remote shutdown room, the vertical separation is 3 inches or more and the horizontal separation is 1 inch or more.

• The referenced ITAAC 800 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non- Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 800 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

o Within other plant areas inside containment (limited hazard areas), the separation meets one of the following:

The vertical separation is 5 feet or more and the horizontal separation is 3 feet or more except.

The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables < 2/0 AWG.


Page 5 of 251


Number)


Basis for Reference ITAAC Index No. 27 Consolidation For configurations that involve

exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.

For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.

For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.


o Within other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (limited hazard areas), the separation meets one of the following:



For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.

For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open


Page 6 of 251


Number)



raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.



o Within other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (limited hazard areas), the separation meets one of the following:






• The referenced ITAAC 803 Design Commitment


Page 7 of 251


Number)



requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 803 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

o Where minimum separation distances are not met inside containment, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.


o Where minimum separation distances are not met inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.


o Where minimum separation distances are not met inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.

• The referenced ITAAC 806 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 806 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E


Page 8 of 251


Number)



raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

o For areas inside containment, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.


o For areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.


o For areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

• The referenced ITAAC 809 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 809 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E


Page 9 of 251


Number)



raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

o For areas inside containment, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.


o For areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.


o For areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the


Page 10 of 251


Number)



non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC 27 by demonstrating that separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 27 Design Commitment is met.


Page 11 of 251

Reference ITAAC Number (Index Number)



2.1.02.12a.vi (58) 2.1.02.08d.i (32)

Note: Reference ITAAC 58 is associated with verifying the automatic depressurization system (ADS) Stage 1-3 valve flow resistances are consistent with the ADS Stage 1-3 path flow resistances as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 58 Acceptance Criteria section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 58, only the ADS Stage 1-3 valve flow and path flow resistances are discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (58) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (32) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 – Corrected. The ITAAC 58 Design Commitment requires that “The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 58 refer to Table 2.1.2-4, item 8.d.i (ITAAC Index No. 32).

• The referenced ITAAC 32 Design Commitment requires that the reactor coolant system (RCS) provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. The ITAAC 32 Acceptance Criteria is met when the calculated ADS piping flow resistance from the pressurizer through the sparger with all valves of each ADS group open is ≤ 2.91E-6 ft/gpm2.

The referenced ITAAC (32) determines the total piping flow resistance of each ADS valve group connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 1-3, per Note above) from the pressurizer through the outlet of the downstream ADS control valves, and verifies that the ADS line routings for ADS Stage 1-3 are consistent with the ADS line routings used for the design flow resistance calculations. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analysis that the calculated ADS piping flow resistance from the pressurizer through the sparger with all valves of each ADS group open is ≤ 2.91E-6 ft/gpm2, the Design Commitment aspects associated with verification that the ADS Stage 1-3 valve flow resistances are consistent with the ADS Stage 1-3 path flow resistances for the Reference ITAAC (58) is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 58 Design Commitment is met.


Page 12 of 251




2.1.02.12a.vii (59) 2.1.02.08d.ii (33)

Note: Reference ITAAC 59 is associated with verifying the ADS stage 4 valve flow resistances are consistent with the ADS stage 4 path flow resistances as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 59 Acceptance Criteria section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 59, only the automatic depressurization system (ADS) Stage 4 valve flow and path flow resistances are discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (59) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (33) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 – Corrected. The ITAAC 59 Design Commitment requires that “The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 59 refer to Table 2.1.2-4, items 8.d.ii (ITAAC Index No. 33).

• The referenced ITAAC 33 Design Commitment requires that the reactor coolant system (RCS) provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. The ITAAC 33 Acceptance Criteria is met when it is verified that the calculated flow resistance for each group of fourth-stage ADS valves and piping with all valves open is:

Loop 1 : ≤1.70x10-7 ft/gpm2

Loop 2: ≤1.57x10-7 ft/gpm2

The referenced ITAAC (33) described above determines, through inspection and analysis of each fourth-stage ADS valve group (four valves and associated piping connected to each hot leg) that the ADS line routing is consistent with the ADS line routing used for the design flow resistance calculations. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections and analyses that the calculated ADS flow resistance for each group of fourth-stage ADS valves and piping with all valves open is: Loop 1 ≤1.70x10-7 ft/gpm2 and Loop 2 ≤1.57x10-7 ft/gpm2, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (59) to verify the ADS stage 4 valve flow resistances are consistent with the ADS stage 4 path flow resistances is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 59 Design Commitment is met.


Page 13 of 251




2.1.03.09c (84) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (84) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 84 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [reactor system] RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 84 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index No. 799 through 811).








Page 14 of 251












For configurations that involve an


Page 15 of 251




enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.








For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1


Page 16 of 251




inch.







• The referenced ITAAC 806 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 806


Page 17 of 251




Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:








Page 18 of 251










The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and


Page 19 of 251




remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (84) by demonstrating that separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 84 Design Commitment is met.


Page 20 of 251




2.2.01.06c (104) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (104) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 104 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [containment system] CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 104 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index No. 799 through 811).








Page 21 of 251














Page 22 of 251














Page 23 of 251




inch.









Page 24 of 251












Page 25 of 251












Page 26 of 251




remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspections for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (104) by demonstrating that separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 104 Design Commitment is met.


Page 27 of 251




2.2.02.06c (134) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (134) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 134 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [passive containment cooling system] PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 134 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








Page 28 of 251














Page 29 of 251












For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is


Page 30 of 251




1 inch.









Page 31 of 251












Page 32 of 251












Page 33 of 251




remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building(including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (134) by demonstrating that separation is provided between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 134 Design Commitment is met.


Page 34 of 251




2.2.02.07e.i (143) 2.2.02.01 (119)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (143) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (119) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 143 Design Commitment requires that “The [passive containment cooling system] PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup to the [passive containment cooling water storage tank] PCCWST.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 143 refer to Table 2.2.2-3, item 1 (ITAAC Index No. 119).

• The referenced ITAAC 119 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the PCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.2. The PCS functional arrangement is shown in Figure 2.2.2-1 and shows the flow path for long-term water makeup to the PCCWST. The ITAAC 119 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built PCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.2.

The referenced ITAAC described above shows the functional arrangement of the PCS and the long-term makeup flow to the PCCWST. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection associated with the functional arrangement (ITAAC 119) i.e., the PCS recirculation pumps and the passive containment cooling ancillary water storage tank (PCCAWST) flow path to the PCCWST, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (143) for the PCS to provide a flow path for long-term water makeup to the PCCWST is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 143 Design Commitment that the PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup to the PCCWST is met.


Page 35 of 251




2.2.02.08c (149)

2.3.04.01 (326)

2.3.04.02.i (327)

2.3.04.02.ii (328)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (149) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (326, 327, and 328) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 149 Design Commitment requires that “The [passive core cooling water storage tank] PCCWST includes a water inventory for the fire protection system.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 149 refer to Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 and 2 (ITAAC Index Nos. 326 and 327/328, respectively).

• The referenced ITAAC 326 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the fire protection system (FPS) is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.4. The FPS functional arrangement, as shown in Figure 2.3.4-1 (Sheet 2), includes water inventory from PCS-MT-01 (PCCWST) to the FPS. The ITAAC 326 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built FPS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.4.

• The referenced ITAAC 327 Design Commitment requires that the FPS piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. The ITAAC 327 Acceptance Criteria is met when the piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 is verified to be located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 328 Design Commitment requires that the FPS piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. The ITAAC 328 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built piping stress report exists and concludes that the piping (identified in Table 2.3.4-4) remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake.

The referenced ITAAC (326, 327, and 328) demonstrate the functional arrangement of the FPS and the functionality of piping following a safe shutdown earthquake. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and analysis associated with the three referenced ITAAC, i.e., functional arrangement; including the PCCWST and piping (ITAAC 326), FPS piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 is located on the Nuclear Island (ITAAC 327), and FPS piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 has a pipe stress report that concludes the piping remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake (ITAAC 328), the Design Commitment for the


Page 36 of 251




Reference ITAAC (149) that the PCCWST includes a water inventory for the FPS is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 149 Design Commitment is met.


Page 37 of 251




2.2.03.07c (173) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (173) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 173 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [passive core cooling system] PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 173 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).


o Within the main control room and remote shutdown room, the vertical separation is 3 inches or more and the horizontal separation is 1inch or more.





For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables


Page 38 of 251




(instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.








For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the


Page 39 of 251




open raceway.









• The referenced ITAAC 803 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 803 Acceptance


Page 40 of 251




Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:









Page 41 of 251










• The referenced ITAAC 810 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and


Page 42 of 251




non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 810 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:




The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (173) by


Page 43 of 251




demonstrating that separation is provided between PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 173 Design Commitment is met.


Page 44 of 251




2.2.03.08a (174) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the passive core cooling system (PXS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 174, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the PXS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (174) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 174 Design Commitment requires that “The PXS provides containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 174 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 174 is met when the PXS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds


Page 45 of 251




upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (174) to demonstrate containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 174 Design Commitment is met.


Page 46 of 251




2.2.04.07c (234) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (234) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 234 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [steam generator system] SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 234 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








Page 47 of 251














Page 48 of 251














Page 49 of 251




inch.









Page 50 of 251












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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (234) by demonstrating that separation is provided between SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 234 Design Commitment is met.


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2.2.04.08b.i (237) 2.2.04.11a (245)

2.2.04.11b.i (246)

2.2.04.11b.ii (247)

Note: Reference ITAAC 237 is associated with confirmation of the isolation of the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 237 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 237, only the confirmation of the isolation of the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (237) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (245, 246 and 247) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 237 Design Commitment requires that “During design basis events, the [steam generator system] SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 237 refers to Table 2.2.4-4, item 11 (ITAAC Index Nos. 245, 246 and 247).

• The referenced ITAAC 245 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the main control room to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 to perform active functions. The ITAAC 245 Acceptance Criteria is met when stroke testing on the valves demonstrates controls in the main control room operate to cause the remotely operated valves to perform active safety functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 246 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS. The ITAAC 246 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing of the remotely-operated valves listed in Table 2.2.4-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS demonstrates the remotely-operated valves having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

• The referenced ITAAC 247 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS. The ITAAC 247 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing of these valves demonstrates that they close within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal:


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V027A/B (Power-Operated Relief Valve Block Valves), < 44 sec; V040A/B (Main Steam Isolation Valves) and V057A/B (Main Feedwater Isolation Valves), < 5 sec; and V250A/B (Main Feedwater Control Valves), < 5 sec.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the ability to isolate the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with the independent aspects of line isolation noted above; i.e., valve control and closure (ITAAC 245 and 246), and valve closure time (ITAAC 247), the Design Commitment aspects associated with the ability to isolate the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines for Reference ITAAC 237 is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC (245, 246 and 247), and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 237 Design Commitment associated with the ability to isolate the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines is met.


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2.2.04.08c (239) 2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the steam generator system (SGS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 239, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the SGS system is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (239) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (107 and 108) and the referenced ITAAC 247 are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 239 Design Commitment requires that “The SGS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SGS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 239 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, item 7 (ITAAC Index No. 107/108).

• The referenced ITAAC 107 Design Commitment requires that the containment system (CNS) provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 107 Acceptance Criteria is met when the leakage rate from containment for the integrated leak rate test is less than the maximum allowable leakage rate (La).

• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 239 is met when SGS valves, SGS-PL-V040A/B and SGS-PL-V057A/B, close within the response time as required by subsection 2.2.4, Table 2.2.4-4, item 11.b.ii (ITAAC 247) and all other SGS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the containment isolation function of the SGS containment isolation valves. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with the two independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108 and 247), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (239) to demonstrate containment isolation of the SGS lines


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penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 239 Design Commitment is met.


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2.2.04.09b.i (242) 2.4.01.02 (493) Note: Reference ITAAC 242 is associated with the ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater to the steam generators as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 242 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 242, only the criterion regarding the ability of the FWS to provide feedwater to the steam generators is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (242) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (493) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 242 Design Commitment requires that “During shutdown operations, the [steam generator system] SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.” The Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 242 refers to Table 2.4.1-2, item 2 (ITAAC Index No. 493).

• The referenced ITAAC 493 Design Commitment requires that the FWS provides startup feedwater flow from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the SGS for heat removal from the reactor coolant system (RCS). The ITAAC 493 Acceptance Criteria is met when each FWS startup feedwater pump provides a flow rate greater than or equal to 260 gpm to each steam generator system at a steam generator secondary side pressure of at least 1106 psia.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrates the ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater flow from the CST to the steam generators. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing of the ability to provide feedwater from the CST to the steam generators, the Design Commitment aspects associated with the ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater to the steam generators for the Reference ITAAC 242 is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC (493), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 242 Design Commitment associated with ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater to the steam generators is met.


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2.2.05.06b (264) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (264) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 264 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [main control room emergency habitability system] VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 264 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is


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1 inch.









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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspections for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (264) by demonstrating that separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 264 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.01.02 (279) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the component cooling water system (CCS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 279, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the CCS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (279) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107 and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 279 Design Commitment requires that “The CCS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 279 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 279 is met when the CCS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds


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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (279) to demonstrate containment isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 279 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.02.06c (297) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (297) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 297 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [chemical and volume control system] CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 297 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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inch.









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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard area), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard area) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (297) by demonstrating that separation is provided between CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 297 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.02.07a (298) 2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the chemical and volume control system (CVS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 298, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the CVS system is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (298) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (107 and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 298 Design Commitment requires that “The CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 298 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, item 7 (ITAAC Index No. 107/108).


• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 298 is met when the CVS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the containment isolation function of the CVS containment isolation valves. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing applicable to the two independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., leakage rate (ITAAC 107) and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (298) to demonstrate containment isolation of the CVS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 298 Design Commitment that the CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS


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lines penetrating the containment is met.


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2.3.02.07b (299) 2.3.02.10b.i (307)

2.3.02.10b.ii (308)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (299) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (307 and 308) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 299 Design Commitment requires that “The [chemical and volume control system] CVS provides termination of an inadvertent [reactor coolant system] RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS.” The Inspections,Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 299 refer to Table 2.3.2-4, item 10b (ITAAC Index No. 307 and 308).

• The referenced ITAAC 307 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 307 Acceptance Criteria is met when the valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

• The referenced ITAAC 308 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 308 Acceptance Criteria is met when these valves close within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal: V090 (CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Motor-Operated Valve), V091 (CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Motor-Operated Valve), < 30 sec; V136A/B (CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valves), < 20 sec.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the ability to provide CVS termination of an inadvertent RCS borondilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS after receiving an actuation signal from the PMS. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with the independent aspects of isolation of demineralized water from the RCS after receipt of an actuation signal from PMS; i.e., valve active function (ITAAC 307) and valve closure time (ITAAC 308), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (299) to demonstrate the CVS provides termination of an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 299 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.02.07c (300) 2.3.02.10b.i (307)

2.3.02.10b.ii (308)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (300) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (307 and 308) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 300 Design Commitment requires that “The [chemical and volume control system] CVS provides isolation of makeup to the [reactor coolant system] RCS.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 300 refer to Table 2.3.2-4, item 10.b (ITAAC Index Nos. 307 and 308).

• The referenced ITAAC 307 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS). The ITAAC 307 Acceptance Criteria is met when the valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

• The referenced ITAAC 308 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 308 Acceptance Criteria is met when these valves close within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal: V090 (CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Motor-Operated Valve), V091 (CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Motor-Operated Valve), < 30 sec; V136A/B (CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valves), < 20 sec.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the ability to provide CVS isolation of makeup to the RCS after receiving an actuation signal from the PMS. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with the independent aspects of isolation of makeup to the RCS after receipt of an actuation signal from PMS; i.e., valve active function (ITAAC 307) and valve closure time (ITAAC 308), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (300) to demonstrate the CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 300 Design Commitment that the CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS is met.


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2.3.04.03 (329) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the fire protection system (FPS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 329, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the FPS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (329) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 329 Design Commitment requires that “The FPS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 329 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107, respectively). ITAAC 108 is not applicable to the FPS, as described below.



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria is that remotely


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operated containment isolation valves close within a specified time upon receipt of an actuation signal. The FPS containment isolation valves are comprised of a check valve and a normally closed, manually operated supply valve, which do not receive an actuation isolation signal. Therefore, because the FPS containment isolation valves are normally closed and do not receive an actuation signal, the referenced ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria is not applicable to these valves.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the applicable independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), and leakage rate (ITAAC 107), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (329) to demonstrate containment isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 329 Design Commitment that the CNS provides containment isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment is met.


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2.3.06.07c (369) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (369) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 369 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [normal residual heat removal system] RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 369 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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inch.









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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (369) by demonstrating that separation is provided between RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 369 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.06.08a (370) 2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the normal residual heat removal system (RNS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 370, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the RNS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (370) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (107 and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 370 Design Commitment requires that “The RNS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 370 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, item 7 (ITAAC Index No 107 and 108).


• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 370 is met when the RNS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the containment isolation function of the RNS containment isolation valves. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with the two independent aspects of containment isolation for the RNS; i.e., leakage rate (ITAAC 107) and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (370) to demonstrate containment isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 370 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.06.08b (371) 2.3.06.01 (354) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (371) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (354) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 371 Design Commitment requires that “The [normal residual heat removal system] RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the [reactor coolant system] RCS.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 371 refer to Table 2.3.6-4, item 1 (ITAAC Index No. 354).

• The referenced ITAAC 354 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the RNS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.6. The RNS functional arrangement is shown in Figure 2.3.6-1 and shows the RNS flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS. The ITAAC 354 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built RNS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.6.

The referenced ITAAC described above shows the functional arrangement of the RNS, and the flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection associated with the functional arrangement (ITAAC 354); including the RNS pumps, heat exchangers, makeup connections, and the RCS makeup flow path from inside reactor containment to outside reactor containment and back to inside reactor containment, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (371) to demonstrate that the RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 371 Design Commitment that the RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS is met.


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2.3.07.06b (400) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (400) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 400 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [spent fuel pool cooling system] SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 400 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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inch.









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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (400) by demonstrating that separation is provided between SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 400 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.07.07a (401) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the spent fuel pool cooling system (SFS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 401, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the SFS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (401) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 401 Design Commitment requires that “The SFS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SFS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 401 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 401 is met when the SFS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds


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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (401) to demonstrate containment isolation of the SFS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 401 Design Commitment that the SFS provides containment isolation of the SFS lines penetrating the containment is met.


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2.3.07.07b.iii (404) 2.3.07.01 (391) Note: Reference ITAAC 404 is associated with the requirement that a safety-related flow path exists from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 404 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section. Therefore, in considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 404, only the flow path from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (404) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (391) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 404 Design Commitment requires that “The [spent fuel pool cooling system] SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.” The Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 404 refers to Table 2.3.7-4, item 1 (ITAAC Index No. 391).

• The referenced ITAAC 391 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the SFS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.7. The SFS functional arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.3.7-1, with a flow path from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool. The ITAAC 391 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built SFS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.7.

The referenced ITAAC (391) demonstrates the functional arrangement of the SFS and shows a flow path from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection associated with the as-built flow path from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool (ITAAC391), the aspects of the Design Commitment associated with the flow path from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool for the Reference ITAAC (404) is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 404 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.07.07b.iv (405) 2.2.02.07f.i (145)

2.2.02.07f.ii (146)

Note: Reference ITAAC 405 is associated with the makeup water supply from the passive containment cooling system water storage tank (PCCWST) to the spent fuel pool as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 405 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 405, only the makeup water supply from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (405) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (145 and 146) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 405 Design Commitment requires that “The [spent fuel pool cooling system] SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 405 refer to Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f (ITAAC Index Nos. 145 and 146).

• The referenced ITAAC 145 Design Commitment requires that the passive containment cooling system (PCS) provides a flow path for long-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool. The ITAAC 145 Acceptance Criteria is met when, with the PCCWST water level at 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the bottom of the tank, the flow path from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool delivers greater than or equal to 118 gpm.

• The referenced ITAAC 146 Design Commitment requires that the PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool. The ITAAC 146 Acceptance Criteria is met when the volume of the PCCWST is greater than 756,700 gallons.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the capability of the PCCWST to provide makeup water supply from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing and inspection associated with the two related aspects of the PCCWST makeup water supply to the spent fuel pool; i.e., PCCWST to spent fuel pool flow path flow rate (ITAAC 145), and PCCWST volume (ITAAC 146), the Design Commitment aspects associated with the makeup water supply from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool for the Reference ITAAC 405 is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 405


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Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.07.07b.v (406) 2.2.02.07f.i (145)

2.2.02.07f.ii (146)

Note: Reference ITAAC 406 is associated with the passive containment cooling system water storage tank (PCCWST) having a sufficient volume of water as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 406 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 406, only the criteria that the PCCWST has a sufficient volume of water is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (406) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (145 and 146) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 406 Design Commitment requires that “The [spent fuel pool cooling system] SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.” The Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 406 refers to Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f (ITAAC Index Nos. 145 and 146).

• The referenced ITAAC 145 Design Commitment requires that the passive containment cooling system (PCS) provides a flow path for long-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool. The ITAAC 145 Acceptance Criteria is met when, with the PCCWST water level at 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the bottom of the tank, the flow path from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool delivers greater than or equal to 118 gpm.

• The referenced ITAAC 146 Design Commitment requires that the PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool. The ITAAC 146 Acceptance Criteria is met when the volume of the PCCWST is greater than 756,700 gallons.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate that the PCCWST has a volume greater than 756,700 gallons and provides a sufficient volume of available water to the spent fuel pool. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing and inspection associated with the two related aspects of the PCCWST water volume; i.e., PCCWST to spent fuel pool flow path flow rate (ITAAC 145), and PCCWST volume (ITAAC 146), the Design Commitment aspects associated with the PCCWST water volume for the Reference ITAAC 406 is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 406 Design Commitment


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associated with the PCCWST water volume available is met.


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2.3.07.07b.vi (407) 2.2.02.08a (147)

2.2.02.08b (148)

Note: Reference ITAAC 407 is associated with the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank (PCCAWST) having a sufficient volume of water as clarified in the Reference ITAAC 407 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC 407, only the criteria that the PCCAWST has a sufficient volume of water is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (407) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (147 and 148) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 407 Design Commitment requires that “The [spent fuel pool cooling system] SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 407 refer to Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b (ITAAC Index Nos. 147 and 148).

• The referenced ITAAC 147 Design Commitment requires that the PCCAWST contains an inventory of cooling water sufficient for passive containment cooling system (PCS) containment cooling from hour 72 through day 7. The ITAAC 147 Acceptance Criteria is met when the volume of the PCCAWST is greater than 780,000 gallons.

• The referenced ITAAC 148 Design Commitment requires that the PCS delivers water from the PCCAWST to the PCCWST and spent fuel pool simultaneously. The ITAAC 148 Acceptance Criteria is met when the PCCAWST is aligned to the suction of the recirculation pumps, each pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm to the passive containment cooling system water storage tank (PCCWST) and 35 gpm to the spent fuel pool simultaneously when each pump is tested separately.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate that the PCCAWST has a volume greater than 780,000 gallons and provides a sufficient volume of available water to the spent fuel pool and the PCCWST. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the two related aspects of the PCCAWST; i.e., PCCAWST water volume (ITAAC 147), and the PCCAWST flow rate to the spent fuel pool and PCCWST (ITAAC 148), the Design Commitment aspects associated with the PCCAWST water


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volume for the Reference ITAAC 407 is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 407 Design Commitment associated with the PCCAWST water volume is met.


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2.3.10.06a (441) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than liquid radwaste system (WLS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 441, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the WLS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (441) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 441 Design Commitment requires that “The WLS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 441 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 441 is met when the WLS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds


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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (441) to demonstrate containment isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 441 Design Commitment that the WLS provides containment isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment is met.


Page 107 of 251




2.3.10.06b (442) 2.3.10.09 (447)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (442) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (447) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 – Corrected. The ITAAC 442 Design Commitment requires that “Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 442 refer to Table 2.3.10-4, item 9 (ITAAC Index No. 447).

• The referenced ITAAC 447 Design Commitment requires that the check valves, identified in Table 2.3.10-1, perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table. The ITAAC 447 Acceptance Criteria is met when each check valve changes position as indicated on Table 2.3.10-1.

The referenced ITAAC (447) demonstrates the ability of the liquid radwaste system (WLS) check valves in the drain lines to the containment sump to transfer closed, thereby limiting cross flooding of compartments. By verifying satisfactory completion of the exercise testing to demonstrate the WLS drain line check valves active safety function to change position as indicated on Table 2.3.10-1 (ITAAC 447), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (442) to demonstrate the check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding in compartments is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC (447), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 442 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.13.06c (468) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (468) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 468 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [primary sampling system] PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E divisions.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 468 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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Page 110 of 251














Page 111 of 251




inch.









Page 112 of 251












Page 113 of 251












Page 114 of 251




remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (468) by demonstrating that separation is provided between PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E divisions. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 468 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.13.07 (469) 2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the primary sampling system (PSS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 469, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the PSS system is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (469) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (107 and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 469 Design Commitment requires that “The PSS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 469 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, item 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 107/108).


• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 469 is met when the PSS containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the CNS containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with leakage rate (ITAAC 107) and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (469) to demonstrate containment isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 469 Design Commitment is met.


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2.3.14.02 (478) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the demineralized water transfer and storage system (DWS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 478, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the DWS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (478) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 478 Design Commitment requires that “The DWS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 478 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria is that remotely operated containment isolation valves close within a


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specified time upon receipt of an actuation signal. The DWS containment isolation valves are comprised of a check valve and a normally closed, manually operated supply valve, which do not receive an actuation isolation signal. Therefore, because the DWS containment isolation valves are normally closed and do not receive an actuation signal, the referenced ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria is not applicable to these valves.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the applicable independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), and leakage rate (ITAAC 107), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (478) to demonstrate containment isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 478 Design Commitment is met..


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2.3.15.02 (482) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the compressed and instrument air system (CAS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 482, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the CAS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (482) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 482 Design Commitment requires that “The CAS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 482 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 482 is met when the remotely


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operated CAS containment isolation valve closes within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (482) to demonstrate containment isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 482 Design Commitment is met.


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2.5.01.05 (520) 3.2.00.01a (739)

3.2.00.01b (740)

3.2.00.01c.i (741)

3.2.00.01c.ii (742)

3.2.00.01d (743)

3.2.00.01e (744)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (520) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (739, 740, 741, 742, 743 and 744) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 520 Design Commitment requires that “The [diverse actuation system] DAS manual actuation of [automatic depressurization system] ADS, [in-containment refueling water storage tank] IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 520 refer to Table 3.2-1, item 1 (ITAAC Index Nos. 739, 740, 741, 742, 743 and 744).

• The referenced ITAAC 739 Design Commitment requires that the human factors engineering (HFE) verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes human-system interface (HSI) Task support verification. The ITAAC 739 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the task support verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that the information and controls provided by the HSI match the display and control requirements generated by the function-based task analyses and the operational sequence analyses.

• The referenced ITAAC 740 Design Commitment requires that the HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes HFE design verification. The ITAAC 740 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the HFE design verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that the HSI design is consistent with the AP1000 specific design guidelines developed for each HSI resource.

• The referenced ITAAC 741 Design Commitment requires that the HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes integrated system validation. The ITAAC 741 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the test scenarios listed in the implementation plan for integrated system validation were executed in conformance with the plan and


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noted human deficiencies were addressed.

• The referenced ITAAC 742 Design Commitment requires that the HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes integrated system validation. The ITAAC 742 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the test and analysis results demonstrate that the main control room (MCR) operators can perform the following:

o Heat up and start up the plant to 100% power

o Shut down and cool down the plant to cold shutdown

o Bring the plant to safe shutdown following the specified transients

o Bring the plant to a safe, stable state following the specified accidents

• The referenced ITAAC 743 Design Commitment requires that the HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes issue resolution verification. The ITAAC 743 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that HFE design issue resolution verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that human factors issues documented in the design issues tracking system have been addressed in the final design.

• The referenced ITAAC 744 Design Commitment requires that the HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the time of plant startup) verification. The ITAAC 744 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the plant HFE/HSI, as designed at the time of plant startup, is consistent with the HFE/HSI verified in items 1.a) through 1.d). (ITAAC 739, 740, 741, 742, 743)

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan. By verifying satisfactory completion of


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the Acceptance Criteria associated with the evaluation of the implementation of multiple aspects of the HFE verification and validation implementation plan: i.e., HSI task support verification (ITAAC 739), HFE design verification (ITAAC 740), integrated system validation (ITAAC 741), tests and analyses of plant evolutions and transients, such as DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation, using a simulated MCR (ITAAC 742), HFE design issue resolution verification (ITAAC 743), and as-built plant HFE/HSI verification (ITAAC 744), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (520) to demonstrate the DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably, is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 520 Design Commitment is met.


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2.5.02.05b (528) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

3.3.00.07e (812)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (528) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 528 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [protection and safety monitoring system] PMS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 528 refer to Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 812).








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Page 125 of 251














Page 126 of 251




inch.









Page 127 of 251












Page 128 of 251










• The referenced ITAAC 812 Design Commitment requires that Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the PMS voting logic is not defeated by the


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loss of any single raceway or fire area. The ITAAC 812 Acceptance Criteria is met when Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the PMS voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas); and how Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the PMS voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area. Satisfactory completion of the inspections for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811); and the Class 1E communication cables routing and separation for the PMS voting logic (ITAAC 812) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (528). Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 528 Design Commitment is met.


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2.5.05.03c (571) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (571) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 571 Design Commitment requires that “For cables other than those covered by 3.b, separation is provided between [in-core instrumentation system] IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” ITAAC 570 [ITAAC No. 2.5.05.03b (3.b)] states “The Class 1E cables between the Incore Thermocouple elements and the connector boxes located on the integrated head package have sheaths.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 571 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).






The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal


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separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables < 2/0 AWG.








For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),


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the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.








For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed


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raceway is below the open raceway.









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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (571) by demonstrating that for cables, other than those covered by ITAAC 570, separation is provided between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 571 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.01.03b (583) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (583) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 583 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [main ac power system] ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 583 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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inch.









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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspections for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (583) by demonstrating that separation is provided between ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 583 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.01.04b (585) 2.6.04.02a (622)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (585) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (622) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 585 Design Commitment requires that “The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power load system.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 585 refers to Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a (ITAAC Index No. 622).

• The referenced ITAAC 622 Design Commitment requires that on loss of power to a 6900 volt diesel-backed bus, the associated diesel generator automatically starts and produces ac power at rated voltage and frequency. The source circuit breakers and bus load circuit breakers are opened, and the generator is connected to the bus. Sheet 2 of Figure 2.6.1-1 illustrates the general relationship between the 6900 volt diesel-backed bus and the associated ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 switchgear. The ITAAC 622 Acceptance Criteria is met when tests confirm that each as-built diesel generator automatically starts on receiving a simulated loss-of-voltage signal and attains a voltage of 6900 ± 10% V and frequency of 60 ± 5% Hz after the start signal is initiated and opens the main ac power system (ECS) breakers on the associated 6900 V bus.

The referenced ITAAC (622) demonstrates the 6900 Vac power system breakers in in switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system (ZOS). By verifying satisfactory completion of the tests that each as-built diesel generator automatically starts on receiving a simulated loss-of-voltage signal and attains a voltage of 6900 ± 10% V and frequency of 60 ± 5% Hz after the start signal is initiated and opens ECS breakers on the associated 6900 V bus (ITAAC 622), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (585) to demonstrate the 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the ZOS is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC, and meeting the Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 585 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.03.03 (600) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (600) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 600 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 600 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).







For configurations that involve


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For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open


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raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.










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inch.









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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building(including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (600) by demonstrating that separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 600 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.05.04 (632) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (632) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 632 Design Commitment requires that “The panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between [plant lighting system] ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 632 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).






The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways


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containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables < 2/0 AWG.








For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 3


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inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.








For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed


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raceway is below the open raceway.









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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (632) by demonstrating that separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable since the ELS panel lighting circuits are treated as Class 1E. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 632 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.09.01 (641) 3.3.00.14 (820) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (641) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (820) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 641 Design Commitment requires that “The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 641 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 14 (ITAAC Index No. 820).

• The referenced ITAAC 820 Design Commitment requires that the external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet- resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4. The ITAAC 820 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the performance of type test, analysis, or a combination of type test and analysis exists and concludes that the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

The referenced ITAAC (820) described above demonstrates that a report exists to conclude that the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4. By verifying satisfactory completion of the performance of type test, analysis, or a combination of type test and analysis in a report concluding that the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (641) is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC (820), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 641 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.09.03 (642) 3.3.00.16 (821) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (642) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (821) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 642 Design Commitment requires that “Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within the vital area.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 642 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 16 (ITAAC Index No. 821).

• The referenced ITAAC 821 Design Commitment requires that the secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area. The ITAAC 821 Acceptance Criteria is met when an inspection ensures that the secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communication equipment is located within a vital area.

The referenced ITAAC (821) described above demonstrates that secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communication equipment is located within a vital area. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection to determine that the secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communication equipment is located within a vital area, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (642) is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC (821), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 642 Design Commitment is met.


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2.6.09.04 (643) 3.3.00.17 (822) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (643) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (822) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 643 Design Commitment requires that “Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 643 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 17 (ITAAC Index No. 822).

• The referenced ITAAC 822 Design Commitment requires that the vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area. The ITAAC 822 Acceptance Criteria is met when the inspection of the as-built vital areas, and central and secondary alarm stations is performed and verifies the vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems and intrusion is detected and annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations.

The referenced ITAAC (822) described above demonstrates that the vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems and annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection to verify the as-built vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems and intrusion is detected and annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (643) is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC (822), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 643 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.01.06b (688) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (688) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 688 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between [nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system] VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 688 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).








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inch.









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Page 167 of 251












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remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building(including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (688) by demonstrating that separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 688 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.01.07 (689) 2.7.01.10b (696) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (689) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (696) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 689 Design Commitment requires that “The [nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system] VBS and [sanitary drainage system] SDS provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the [main control room] MCR pressure boundary.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 689 refer to Table 2.7.1-4, item 10.b (ITAAC Index No. 696).

• The referenced ITAAC 696 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having plant and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 696 Acceptance Criteria is met when the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

The referenced ITAAC (696) described above demonstrates the ability to provide the VBS and SDS safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary after receiving a signal from the PMS. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with ability to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary after receiving a signal from the PMS, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (689) to demonstrate the VBS and SDS provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC 696, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 689 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.01.08a (690) 2.7.01.12 (698) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (690) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (698) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 690 Design Commitment requires that “The [nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system] VBS provides cooling to the [main control room] MCR, [control support area] CSA, [remote shutdown room] RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 690 refer to Table 2.7.1-4, item 12 (ITAAC Index No. 698).

• The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.1-3 for the VBS components (i.e., fans) are to “Start” and “Run.” The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VBS components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform these listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VBS equipment, which provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR and Class 1E electrical rooms, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with ability to operate this VBS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (690) to demonstrate the VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 690 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.01.08b (691) 2.7.01.12 (698) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (691) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (698) is completed as described in NEI 08-01 Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 691 Design Commitment requires that “The [nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system] VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 691 refer to Table 2.7.1-4, item 12 (ITAAC Index No. 698).

• The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.1-3 for VBS components (i.e., fans) are to “Start” and “Run.” The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VBS components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform these listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VBS equipment, which provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with ability to operate this VBS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (691) to demonstrate the VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 691 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.01.08c (692) 2.7.01.12 (698) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (692) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (698) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 692 Design Commitment requires that “The [nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system] VBS maintains [main control room] MCR and [control support area] CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 692 refer to Table 2.7.1-4, item 12 (ITAAC Index No. 698).

• The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.1-3 for VBS components (i.e., fans) are to “Start” and “Run.” The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VBS components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform these listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VBS equipment, which maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with ability to operate this VBS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (692) to demonstrate the VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC, and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 692 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.02.02 (702) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than the central chilled water system (VWS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 702, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the VWS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (702) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 702 Design Commitment requires that “The applicable portions of the VWS provide the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 702 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to Reference ITAAC 702 is met when the VWS


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containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (702) to demonstrate containment isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 702 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.03.02a (708) 2.7.03.03 (710) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (708) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (710) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 708 Design Commitment requires that “The [annex/auxiliary building nonradioactive ventilation system] VXS provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the [onsite standby power system] ZOS operates and chilled water is available.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 708 refer to Table 2.7.3-2, item 3 (ITAAC Index No. 710).

• The referenced ITAAC 710 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed function. The control function listed in Table 2.7.3-1 for VXS components (i.e., air handling unit fans) is to “Start.” The ITAAC 710 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VXS components listed in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VXS equipment, which provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates and chilled water is available, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing of the ability to operate this VXS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (708) is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC (710), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 708 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.03.02b (709) 2.7.03.03 (710) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (709) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (710) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 709 Design Commitment requires that “The [annex/auxiliary building nonradioactive ventilation system] VXS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the [onsite standby power system] ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 709 refer to Table 2.7.3-2, item 3 (ITAAC Index No. 710).

• The referenced ITAAC 710 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed function. The control function listed in Table 2.7.3-1 for VXS components (i.e., air handling unit fans) is to “Start.” The ITAAC 710 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VXS components listed in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed function.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VXS equipment, which provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing of the ability to operate the VXS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (709) is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC (710), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 709 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.04.02a (713) 2.7.04.03 (716) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (713) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (716) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 713 Design Commitment requires that “The [diesel generator building ventilation system] VZS provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 713 refer to Table 2.7.4-2, item 3 (ITAAC Index No. 716).

• The referenced ITAAC 716 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.4-1 for VZS components (i.e., exhaust fans and electric unit heaters) is to “Start” and “Energize.” The ITAAC 716 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VZS components listed in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC (716) described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VZS equipment, which provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing of the ability to operate this VZS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (713) is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC (716), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 713 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.04.02b (714) 2.7.04.03 (716) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (714) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (716) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 714 Design Commitment requires that “The [diesel generator building ventilation system] VZS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 714 refer to Table 2.7.4-2, item 3 (ITAAC Index No. 716).

• The referenced ITAAC 716 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the [main control room] MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.4-1 for VZS components (i.e., exhaust fans and electric unit heaters) is to “Start” and “Energize.” The ITAAC 716 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the VZS components listed in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC (716) described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VZS equipment, which provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing of the ability to operate this VZS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (714) is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC (716), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 714 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.04.02c (715) 2.7.04.03 (716) Completion of the Reference ITAAC (715) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (716) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 715 Design Commitment requires that “The [diesel generator building ventilation system] VZS provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 715 refer to Table 2.7.4-2, item 3 (ITAAC Index No. 716).

• The referenced ITAAC 716 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the [main control room] MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.4-1 for VZS components (i.e., exhaust fans and electric unit heaters) is to “Start” and “Energize.” The ITAAC 716 Acceptance Criteria is met when controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed functions.

The referenced ITAAC (716) described above demonstrates the ability to operate the VZS equipment, which provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure, from the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the testing of the ability to operate this VZS equipment from the MCR, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (715) is achieved. Therefore, completion of the referenced ITAAC (716), and meeting its Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 715 Design Commitment is met.


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2.7.06.02.i (724) 2.2.01.01 (90)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Note: The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for systems other than containment air filtration system (VFS). In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 724, only the ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to the VFS is discussed.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (724) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (90, 107, and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 724 Design Commitment requires that “The [containment air filtration system] VFS provides the safety-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 724 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 90 and 107/108, respectively).



• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria applicable to


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Reference ITAAC 724 is met when the VFS containment purge isolation valves (VFS-PL-V003, -V004, -V009, and -V010) close within 10 seconds, and containment vacuum relief isolation valves (VFS-PL-V800A and -V800B) close within 30 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the functional arrangement of the CNS and the containment isolation function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the three independent aspects of containment isolation; i.e., functional arrangement (ITAAC 90), leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure time (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (724) to demonstrate containment isolation of the VFS lines penetrating the containment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 724 Design Commitment is met.


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3.1.00.06 (738) 2.7.01.01 (677)

2.7.01.08a (690)

2.7.01.08c (692)

2.7.01.12 (698)

2.7.01.13 (699)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (738) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (677, 690, 692, 698, and 699) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 738 Design Commitment requires that “The [control support area] CSA provides a habitable workspace environment.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 738 refer to Table 2.7.1-4, items 1, 8.a, 8.c, 12, and 13 (ITAAC Index Nos. 677, 690, 692, 698, and 699, respectively).

• The referenced ITAAC 677 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1. The VBS functional arrangement is represented by the depiction of the ventilation system and associated subsystems that serve the main control room (MCR)/CSA to provide breathable air and monitor the air supply for radioactive particulate. The ITAAC 677 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built VBS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1.

• The referenced ITAAC 690 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, remote shutdown room (RSR), and Class 1E electrical rooms. The ITAAC 690 Acceptance Criteria ismet when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met.

o The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components (i.e., fans) identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the identified function (i.e., “Start” or “Run”). The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 692 Design Commitment requires that the VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected. The ITAAC 692 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met.

o The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components (i.e., fans)


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Basis for Reference ITAAC Index No. 738 Consolidation identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the identified function (i.e., “Start” or “Run”). The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components (i.e., fans) identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the identified function (i.e., “Start” or “Run”). The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 699 Design Commitment requires that requires that displays of the parameters (i.e., run status) identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 699 Acceptance Criteria is met when the displays identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the following for the VBS and associated subsystems:

• Functional arrangement of the VBS (ITAAC 677)

• VBS cooling to MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical and battery rooms (ITAAC 690)

• VBS maintains MCR/CSA habitability when radioactivity detected (ITAAC 692)

• MCR functional control of VBS fans (ITAAC 698)

• MCR parameter displays of VBS fans (ITAAC 699)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (738) to demonstrate that the CSA provides a habitable workspace environment is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 738 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.03.i (746) 2.7.01.01 (677)

2.7.01.02a (678)

2.7.01.02b (679)

2.7.01.03a (680)

2.7.01.03b (681)

2.7.01.04a (682)

2.7.01.04b (683)

2.7.01.05.i (684)

2.7.01.05.ii (685)

2.7.01.05.iii (686)

2.7.01.06a (687)

2.7.01.06b (688)

2.7.01.07 (689)

2.7.01.08a (690)

2.7.01.08b (691)

2.7.01.08c (692)

2.7.01.08d (693)

2.7.01.09 (694)

2.7.01.10a (695)

2.7.01.10b (696)

2.7.01.11 (697)

2.7.01.12 (698)

2.7.01.13 (699)

2.7.01.14 (700)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (746) is accomplished when the ITAAC in the referenced Section 2.7.1 (677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, and 700) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 746 Design Commitment requires that “The [main control room] MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 746 refer to Section 2.7.1 (ITAAC Index Nos. 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, and 700).

• The referenced ITAAC 677 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1. The VBS functional arrangement provided in Figure 2.7.1-1 is the depiction of the ventilation system and associated subsystems that serve the MCR to provide breathable air and monitor the air supply for radioactive particulate. The ITAAC 677 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built VBS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1.

• The referenced ITAAC 678 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 678 Acceptance Criteria is met when the ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 679 Design Commitment requires that the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 679 Acceptance Criteria is met when the ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 680 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III


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requirements. The ITAAC 680 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 681 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 681 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the as-built pressure boundary welds exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 682 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 682 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the pressure test performed on the components exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 683 Design Commitment requires that the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. The ITAAC 683 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the pressure test performed on the piping exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 684 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 684 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection of the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 confirms the equipment is located on the Nuclear Island.



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requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 685 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the type tests analyses, or a combination of the type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

• The referenced ITAAC 686 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 686 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment, including anchorage, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 687 Design Commitment requires that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division. The ITAAC 687 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that a simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

• The referenced ITAAC 688 Design Commitment requires that separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. The ITAAC 688 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, and 811 Acceptance Criteria are met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 688 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 688 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 689 Design Commitment requires that the VBS and sanitary drainage system (SDS) provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary. The ITAAC 689 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 696 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 689 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 689 as a Reference ITAAC included within this


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Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 690 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides cooling to the MCR, control support area (CSA), remote shutdown room (RSR), and Class 1E electrical rooms. The ITAAC 690 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 690 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 690 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 691 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms. The ITAAC 691 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 691 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 691 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 692 Design Commitment requires that the VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected. The ITAAC 692 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 692 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 692 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 693 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides ventilation cooling via the ancillary equipment in Table 2.7.1-3 to the MCR and the division B and C Class 1E I&C rooms. The ITAAC 693 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the fans start and run.

• The referenced ITAAC 694 Design Commitment requires that safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 694 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 695 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions. The ITAAC 695


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Acceptance Criteria is met when stroke testing demonstrates that controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 696 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 696 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing using real or simulated signals demonstrates that the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

• The referenced ITAAC 697 Design Commitment requires that after loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position. The ITAAC 697 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

• The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.1-3 for the VBS components (i.e., fans) are to “Start” and “Run.” The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform these listed functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 699 Design Commitment requires that requires that displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 699 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection verifies that the displays identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 700 Design Commitment requires that the background noise level in the MCR and RSR does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating. The ITAAC 700 Acceptance Criteria is met when the background noise level in the MCR and RSR is measured and does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating.


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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how the MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators through the following VBS and associated subsystems ITAAC:


• Components and piping meet ASME Code Section III requirements (ITAAC 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683)

• Seismic Category I Equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads (ITAAC 684, 685, 686)

• Class 1E components are powered by their respective Class 1E division (ITAAC 687)

• VBS Class 1E division separation, and VBS Class 1E division and non-1E cable separation (ITAAC 688)

• Isolation of MCR pressure boundary pipe penetration (ITAAC 689)

• VBS cooling and habitability maintenance to MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical, I&C and battery rooms (ITAAC 690, 691, 693)


• Retrieval of safety displays in the MCR (ITAAC 694)

• MCR operation of remotely operated valves with active functions (ITAAC 695)

• PMS control of valves with active safety function (ITAAC 696)

• Loss of motive power position of remotely operated valves (ITAAC 697)



• Background noise level of MCR and RSR during VBS operation (ITAAC 700)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (746) to demonstrate that the MCR provides the MCR operators with a suitable workspace environment for use is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 746 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.03.ii (747) 2.2.05.01 (252)

2.2.05.02a (253)

2.2.05.02b (254)

2.2.05.03a (255)

2.2.05.03b (256)

2.2.05.04a (257)

2.2.05.04b (258)

2.2.05.05a.i (259)

2.2.05.05a.ii (260)

2.2.05.05a.iii (261)

2.2.05.05b (262)

2.2.05.06a (263)

2.2.05.06b (264)

2.2.05.07a.i (265)

2.2.05.07a.ii (266)

2.2.05.07a.iii (267)

2.2.05.07b.i (268)

2.2.05.07b.ii (269)

2.2.05.007c (270)

2.2.05.07d (271)

2.2.05.08 (272)

2.2.05.09a (273)

2.2.05.09b (274)

2.2.05.10 (275)

2.2.05.11 (276)

2.2.05.12 (277)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (747) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, and 277) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 747 Design Commitment requires that “The [main control room] MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 747 refers to Section 2.2.5 (ITAAC Index Nos. 252 through 277).

• The referenced ITAAC 252 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the main control room emergency habitability system (VES) is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.5. The ITAAC 252 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection determines that the as-built VES conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.5.



• The referenced ITAAC 255 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 255 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary


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welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 256 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 256 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 257 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 257 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the results of a hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 258 Design Commitment requires that the piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. The ITAAC 258 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the results of a hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 259 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 259 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection verifies that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 260 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 260 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses performed exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.


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• The referenced ITAAC 261 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 261 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the inspections performed exists and concludes that the as-built equipment, including anchorage, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 262 Design Commitment requires that each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability. The ITAAC 262 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the inspections performed exists and concludes that each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

• The referenced ITAAC 263 Design Commitment requires that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division. The ITAAC 263 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed that demonstrates that a simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

• The referenced ITAAC 264 Design Commitment requires that separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. The ITAAC 264 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, and 811 Acceptance Criteria are met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 264 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 264 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 265 Design Commitment requires that the VES provides a 72-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR. The ITAAC 265 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the air flow rate from the VES is at least 60 scfm and not more than 70 scfm.


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• The referenced ITAAC 266 Design Commitment requires that the VES provides a 72-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR. The ITAAC 266 Acceptance Criteria is met when analysis demonstrates that the calculated storage capacity is greater than or equal to 327,574 scf.

• The referenced ITAAC 267 Design Commitment requires that the VES provides a 72-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR. The ITAAC 267 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing and analysis demonstrates that the MCR air is of breathable quality.

• The referenced ITAAC 268 Design Commitment requires that the VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas. The ITAAC 268 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the MCR pressure boundary is pressurized to greater than or equal to 1/8-in. water gauge with respect to the surrounding area.

• The referenced ITAAC 269 Design Commitment requires that the VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas. The ITAAC 269 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing and measurement demonstrates that air leakage into the MCR is less than or equal to 10 cfm.

• The referenced ITAAC 270 Design Commitment requires that the heat loads within the MCR, the I&C equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms are within design basis assumptions to limit the heatup of the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4. The ITAAC 270 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of analyses performed exists and concludes that the heat loads within rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4 are less than or equal to the specified values or that an analysis report exists that concludes:

o The temperature and humidity in the MCR remain within limits for reliable human performance for the 72-hour period.

o The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the I&C rooms is less than or equal to 120°F.

o The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the Class 1E dc equipment rooms is less than or


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equal to 120°F.

• The referenced ITAAC 271 Design Commitment requires that the system provides a passive recirculation flow of MCR air to maintain MCR dose rates below an acceptable level during VES operation. The ITAAC 271 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the air flow rate at the outlet of the MCR passive filtration system is at least 600 cfm greater than the flow measured by VES-003A/B.

• The referenced ITAAC 272 Design Commitment requires that the safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 272 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that the safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 273 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active functions. The ITAAC 273 Acceptance Criteria is met when stroke testing demonstrates that controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active safety functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 274 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 274 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having PMS control perform the active safety function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

• The referenced ITAAC 275 Design Commitment requires that after loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position. The ITAAC 275 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that after loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.5-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.



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requires that displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 276 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that the displays identified in Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 277 Design Commitment requires that the background noise level in the MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operator workstations when VES is operating. The ITAAC 277 Acceptance Criteria is met when measurements taken with the as-built VES operating demonstrate that the background noise level in the MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operator work stations when the VES is operating.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how the MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators through the following VES and associated subsystems ITAAC:

• Functional arrangement of the VES (ITAAC 252)


• Equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads (ITAAC 259, 260, 261)

• Required lines meet functional capability requirements (ITAAC 262)

• Class 1E components are powered from their respective Class 1E division (ITAAC 263)

• VES Class 1E division separation, and VES Class 1E division and non-Class 1E cable separation (ITAAC 264)

• VES provides MCR occupants with 72-hour supply of breathable quality air (ITAAC 265, 266, 267)

• VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas (ITAAC 268, 269)

• Heat loads within the MCR, I&C equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms are within design basis heatup limit assumptions (ITAAC 270)

• Passive recirculation flow of MCR air to maintain MCR dose rates below an acceptable level during VES operation (ITAAC 271)


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• Retrieval of safety-related displays in the MCR (ITAAC 272)

• MCR operation of remotely operated valves with active safety functions (ITAAC 273)



• MCR parameter displays (ITAAC 276)

• Background noise level in MCR during VES operation (ITAAC 277)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (747) to demonstrate that the MCR provides the MCR operators with a suitable workspace environment for use is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 747 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.03.iii (748) 2.6.03.01 (596)

2.6.03.02.i (597)

2.6.03.02.ii (598)

2.6.03.02.iii (599)

2.6.03.03 (600)

2.6.03.04a (601)

2.6.03.04b (602)

2.6.03.04c (603)

2.6.03.04d (604)

2.6.03.04e (605)

2.6.03.04f (606)

2.6.03.04g (607)

2.6.03.04h (608)

2.6.03.04i (609)

2.6.03.05a (610)

2.6.03.05b (611)

2.6.03.05c (612)

2.6.03.05d.i (613)

2.6.05.05d.ii (614)

2.6.03.06 (615)

2.6.03.07 (616)

2.6.03.08 (617)

2.6.03.09 (618)

2.6.03.10 (619)

2.3.03.11 (620)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (748) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, and 620) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 748 Design Commitment requires that “The [main control room] MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 748 refer to Section 2.6.3 (ITAAC Index Nos. 596 through 620).

• The referenced ITAAC 596 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system (IDS) is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3. The ITAAC 596 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the as-built IDS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.

• The referenced ITAAC 597 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 597 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 598 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 598 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the type tests analyses, or a combination of the type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

• The referenced ITAAC 599 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 599 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of an inspection exists and concludes that the as-built equipment, including anchorage, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed


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conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 600 Design Commitment requires that separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 600 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, and 811 Acceptance Criteria are met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 600 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 600 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 601 Design Commitment requires that the IDS provides electrical independence between the Class 1E divisions. The ITAAC 601 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing confirms that a simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

• The referenced ITAAC 602 Design Commitment requires that the IDS provides electrical isolation between the non-Class 1E ac power system and the non-Class 1E lighting in the MCR. The ITAAC 602 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the type tests analyses, or a combination of the type tests and analyses of the isolation devices exists and concludes that the battery chargers, regulating transformers, and isolation fuses prevent credible faults from propagating into the IDS.

• The referenced ITAAC 603 Design Commitment requires that each IDS 24-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 24 hours without recharging. The ITAAC 603 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 210 V after a period of no less than 24 hours with an equivalent load that equals or exceeds the battery bank design duty cycle capacity.

• The referenced ITAAC 604 Design Commitment requires that each IDS 72-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 72 hours without recharging. The ITAAC 604 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing of each as-built battery bank confirms the battery terminal voltage is greater


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than or equal to 210 V after a period of no less than 72 hours with an equivalent load that equals or exceeds the battery bank design duty cycle capacity.

• The referenced ITAAC 605 Design Commitment requires that the IDS spare battery bank supplies a dc load equal to or greater than the most severe switchboard bus load for the required period without recharging. The ITAAC 605 Acceptance Criteria is met when load testing of the as-built spare battery bank confirms the battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 210 V after a period with a load and duration that equals or exceeds the most severe battery bank design duty cycle capacity.

• The referenced ITAAC 606 Design Commitment requires that each IDS 24-hour inverter supplies its ac load. The ITAAC 606 Acceptance Criteria is met when load testing of each 24-hour as-built inverter confirms that each 24-hour inverter supplies a line-to-line output voltage of 208 ± 2% V at a frequency of 60 ± 0.5% Hz.

• The referenced ITAAC 607 Design Commitment requires that each IDS 72-hour inverter supplies its ac load. The ITAAC 607 Acceptance Criteria is met when load testing of each 72-hour as-built inverter confirms that each 72-hour inverter supplies a line-to-line output voltage of 208 ± 2% V at a frequency of 60 ± 0.5% Hz.

• The referenced ITAAC 608 Design Commitment requires that each IDS 24-hour battery charger provides the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) with two loss-of-ac input voltage signals. The ITAAC 608 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing confirms that two PMS input signals exist from each 24-hour battery charger indicating loss of ac input voltage when the loss-of-input voltage condition is simulated.

• The referenced ITAAC 609 Design Commitment requires that the IDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E motor operated valves identified in subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.2, 2.3.6, and 2.7.1 that is greater than or equal to the minimum specified voltage. The ITAAC 609 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing confirms the motor starter input terminal voltage is greater


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than or equal 200 Vdc with the motor operating.

• The referenced ITAAC 610 Design Commitment requires that each IDS 24-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged. The ITAAC 610 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing confirms that each 24-hour battery charger provides an output current of at least 150 A with an output voltage in the range 210 to 280 V.

• The referenced ITAAC 611 Design Commitment required that each IDS 72-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged. The ITAAC 611 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing confirms each 72-hour battery charger provides an output current of at least 125 A with an output voltage in the range 210 to 280 V.

• The referenced ITAAC 612 Design Commitment requires that each IDS regulating transformer supplies an ac load when powered from the 480 V MCC. The ITAAC 612 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing confirms each regulating transformer supplies a line-to-line output voltage of 208 ± 2% V.

• The referenced ITAAC 613 Design Commitment requires that the IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post-72-hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator. The ITAAC 613 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the ancillary diesel generator 1 is electrically connected to regulating transformer IDSC-DT-1.

• The referenced ITAAC 614 Design Commitment requires that the IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post-72-hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator. The ITAAC 614 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the ancillary diesel generator 2 is electrically connected to regulating transformer IDSB-DT-1.

• The referenced ITAAC 615 Design Commitment requires that the safety-related displays identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 615 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the safety-related displays


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identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 616 Design Commitment requires that the IDS dc battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, motor control centers (MCCs), and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements. The ITAAC 616 Acceptance Criteria is met when the analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the capacities of as-built IDS battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, as determined by their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.

• The referenced ITAAC 617 Design Commitment required that the circuit breakers and fuses in IDS battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits are rated to interrupt fault currents. The ITAAC 274 Acceptance Criteria is met when the analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the interrupt capacity of circuit breakers and fuses in the battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

• The referenced ITAAC 618 Design Commitment requires that the IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. The ITAAC 618 Acceptance Criteria is met when the analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the fault current capacities of as-built IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs, as determined by manufacturer’s ratings, exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

• The referenced ITAAC 619 Design Commitment requires that The IDS electrical distribution system cables are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. The ITAAC 619 Acceptance Criteria is met when the


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analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the IDS dc electrical distribution system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturer’s ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

• The referenced ITAAC 620 Design Commitment requires that the displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 620 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the displays identified in Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrieved in the MCR.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how the MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators through the following IDA and associated subsystems ITAAC:

• Functional arrangement of the IDS (ITAAC 596)

• Seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads (ITAAC 597, 598, 599)

• Separation is provided between IDS Class 1E divisions, and between IDS Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables (ITACC 600)

• IDS provides electrical independence between the Class 1E divisions (ITAAC 601)

• IDS provides electrical isolation between the non-Class 1E ac power system and the non-Class 1E lighting in the MCR (ITAAC 602)

• Each IDS 24-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 24 hours without recharging (ITAAC 603)

• Each IDS 72-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 72 hours without recharging (ITAAC 604)

• IDS spare battery bank supplies a dc load equal to or greater than the most severe switchboard bus load for the required period without recharging (ITAAC 605)

• Each IDS 24-hour inverter supplies its ac load (ITAAC 606)

• Each IDS 72-hour inverter supplies its ac load


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(ITAAC 607)

• Each IDS 24-hour battery charger provides the PMS with two loss-of-ac input voltage signals (ITAAC 608)

• IDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E motor operated valves identified in subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.2, 2.3.6, and 2.7.1 that is greater than or equal to the minimum specified voltage (ITAAC 609)

• Each IDS 24-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged (ITAAC 610)

• Each IDS 72-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged (ITAAC 611)

• Each IDS regulating transformer supplies an ac load when powered from the 480 V MCC (ITAAC 612)

• IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post-72-hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator (ITAAC 613, 614)

• Retrieval of safety-related displays in the MCR (ITAAC 615)

• IDS dc battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements (ITAAC 616)

• Circuit breakers and fuses in IDS battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits are rated to interrupt fault currents (ITAAC 617)

• IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source (ITAAC 618)

• IDS electrical distribution system cables are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source (ITAAC 619)

• MCR parameter displays (ITAAC 620)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (748) demonstrate that the MCR provides the MCR operators a suitable workspace environment for use is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and


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meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 748 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.03.iv (749) 2.6.05.01 (627)

2.6.05.02.i (628)

2.6.05.02.ii (629)

2.6.05.03.i (630)

2.6.05.03.ii (631)

2.6.05.04 (632)

2.6.05.05.i (633)

2.6.05.05.ii (634)

2.6.05.06.i (635)

2.6.05.06.ii (636)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (749) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, and 636) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 749 Design Commitment requires that “The [main control room] MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 749 refer to Section 2.6.5 (ITAAC Index Nos. 627 through 636).

• The referenced ITAAC 627 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the plant lighting system (ELS) is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5. The ITAAC 627 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the as-built ELS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.

• The referenced ITAAC 628 Design Commitment requires that the ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the remote shutdown workstation (RSW), with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters, and four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division). The ITAAC 628 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the as-built ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW and has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 629 Design Commitment requires that the ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters, and four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division). The ITAAC 629 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing of the as-built system confirms that each of the six as-built emergency lighting groups is supplied power from its respective Class 1E inverter and each of the four as-


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built panel lighting groups is supplied power from its respective Class 1E inverter.

• The referenced ITAAC 630 Design Commitment requires that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports. The ITAAC 630 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 631 Design Commitment requires that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports. The ITAAC 631 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report providing an analysis of the seismic supports exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.

• The referenced ITAAC 632 Design Commitment requires that the panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable. The ITAAC 632 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, and 811 Acceptance Criteria are met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 632 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 632 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 633 Design Commitment requires that the normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 633 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built normal lighting in the MCR provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the main ac power system (ECS).

• The referenced ITAAC 634 Design Commitment requires that the normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 634 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built normal lighting in the


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RSW provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the ECS.

• The referenced ITAAC 635 Design Commitment requires that the emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 635 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built emergency lighting in the MCR provides at least 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the six Class 1E inverters.

• The referenced ITAAC 636 Design Commitment requires that the emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 636 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built emergency lighting provides at least 10 foot candles at the RSW, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the six Class 1E inverters.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how the MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators though the following ELS ITAAC:

• Functional arrangement of the ELS (ITAAC 627)

• ELS emergency lighting fixture groups located in the MCR and at the RSW, and panel lighting fixture groups in the MCR (ITAAC 628)

• ELS as-built emergency lighting group and panel lighting group power supplies (ITAAC 629)

• MCR lighting fixtures location and utilization of seismic supports. (ITAAC 630, 631)

• ELS division separation and ELS division and non-Class 1E cable separation (ITAAC 632)

• ELS normal lighting illumination criteria at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW (ITAAC 633, 634)

• ELS emergency lighting illumination criteria at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and


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at the RSW (ITAAC 635, 636)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analyses with the reference ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (749) demonstrate that the MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators is achieved. Therefore, completion of these reference ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 749 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.03.v (750) 2.3.19.01a (484) 2.3.19.01b (485) 2.3.19.02a (486) 2.3.19.02b (487)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (750) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (484, 485, 486, and 487) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 750 Design Commitment requires that “The [main control room] MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 750 refer to Section 2.3.19 (ITAAC Index Nos. 484, 485, 486 and 487).

• The referenced ITAAC 484 Design Commitment requires that the communication system (EFS) has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system. The ITAAC 484 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that the as-built EFS has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system.

• The referenced ITAAC 485 Design Commitment requires that the EFS has sound-powered equipment connected as a system. The ITAAC 485 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that the as-built EFS has sound-powered equipment connected as a system.

• The referenced ITAAC 486 Design Commitment requires that the EFS telephone/page system provides intraplant, station-to-station communications and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.3.19-1. The ITAAC 486 Acceptance Criteria is met when an inspection and test demonstrate that the telephone/page equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception from the MCR are accomplished.

• The referenced ITAAC 487 Design Commitment requires that the EFS provides sound-powered communications between the MCR, the RSW, the Division A, B, C, D dc equipment rooms (Rooms 12201/12203/12205/12207), the Division A, B, C, D I&C rooms (Rooms 12301/12302/12304/12305), and the diesel generator building (Rooms 60310/60320) without external power. The ITAAC 486 Acceptance Criteria is met when an inspection and test demonstrate that the sound-powered equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception are


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accomplished.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the following for the EFS

• Handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system (ITAAC 484)

• Sound-powered equipment connected as a system (ITAAC 485)

• Telephone/page equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception from the MCR are accomplished (ITAAC 486)

• Sound-powered equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception are accomplished (ITAAC 487)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the Acceptance Criteria with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (750) to demonstrate that the MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators is achieved. Therefore, completion of these reference ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 750 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.06.i (753) 2.7.01.01 (677)

2.7.01.02a (678)

2.7.01.02b (679)

2.7.01.03a (680)

2.7.01.03b (681)

2.7.01.04a (682)

2.7.01.04b (683)

2.7.01.05.i (684)

2.7.01.05.ii (685)

2.7.01.05.iii (686)

2.7.01.06a (687)

2.7.01.06b (688)

2.7.01.07 (689)

2.7.01.08a (690)

2.7.01.08b (691)

2.7.01.08c (692)

2.7.01.08d (693)

2.7.01.09 (694)

2.7.01.10a (695)

2.7.01.10b (696)

2.7.01.11 (697)

2.7.01.12 (698)

2.7.01.13 (699)

2.7.01.14 (700)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (753) is accomplished when the ITAAC in the referenced Section 2.7.1 (677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, and 700) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 753 Design Commitment requires that “The [remote shutdown room] RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the [main control room] MCR, for use by the [remote shutdown workstation] RSW operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 753 refer to Section 2.7.1 (ITAAC Index Nos. 677 through 700).

• The referenced ITAAC 677 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1. The VBS functional arrangement provided in Figure 2.7.1-1 is the depiction of the ventilation system and associated subsystems that serve the MCR to provide breathable air and monitor the air supply for radioactive particulate. The ITAAC 677 Acceptance Criteria is met when the as-built VBS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1.



• The referenced ITAAC 680 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III


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requirements. The ITAAC 680 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the inspection of the as-built pressure boundary welds exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 681 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 681 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the as-built pressure boundary welds exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 682 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 682 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the pressure test performed on the components exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 683 Design Commitment requires that the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. The ITAAC 683 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the pressure test performed on the piping exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 684 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 684 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection of the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 confirms the equipment is located on the Nuclear Island.



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requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 685 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report of the type tests analyses, or a combination of the type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

• The referenced ITAAC 686 Design Commitment requires that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. The ITAAC 686 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment, including anchorage, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 687 Design Commitment requires that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division. The ITAAC 687 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that a simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

• The referenced ITAAC 688 Design Commitment requires that separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. The ITAAC 688 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, and 811 Acceptance Criteria are met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 688 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 688 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 689 Design Commitment requires that the VBS and sanitary drainage system (SDS) provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary. The ITAAC 689 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 696 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 689 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 689 as a Reference ITAAC included within


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this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 690 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides cooling to the MCR, control support area (CSA), RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms. The ITAAC 690 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 690 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 690 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 691 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms. The ITAAC 691 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 691 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 691 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 692 Design Commitment requires that the VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected. The ITAAC 692 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 692 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 692 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 693 Design Commitment requires that the VBS provides ventilation cooling via the ancillary equipment in Table 2.7.1-3 to the MCR and the division B and C Class 1E I&C rooms. The ITAAC 693 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that the fans start and run.

• The referenced ITAAC 694 Design Commitment requires that safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 694 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 695 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions. The ITAAC 695


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Acceptance Criteria is met when stroke testing demonstrates that controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 696 Design Commitment requires that the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The ITAAC 696 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing using real or simulated signals demonstrates that the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

• The referenced ITAAC 697 Design Commitment requires that after loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position. The ITAAC 697 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

• The referenced ITAAC 698 Design Commitment requires that controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function. The control functions listed in Table 2.7.1-3 for the VBS components (i.e., fans) are to “Start” and “Run.” The ITAAC 698 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing demonstrates that controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform these listed functions.

• The referenced ITAAC 699 Design Commitment requires that requires that displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. The ITAAC 699 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection verifies that the displays identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 700 Design Commitment requires that the background noise level in the MCR and RSR does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating. The ITAAC 700 Acceptance Criteria is met when the background noise level in the MCR and RSR is measured and does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating.


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The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how the RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators through the following VBS and associated subsystems ITAAC:



• Seismic Category I Equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads (ITAAC 684, 685, 686)

• Class 1E components are powered by their respective Class 1E division (ITAAC 687)

• VBS Class 1E division separation, and VBS Class 1E division and non-1E cable separation (ITAAC 688)

• Isolation of MCR pressure boundary pipe penetration (ITAAC 689)

• VBS cooling and habitability maintenance to MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical, I&C and battery rooms (ITAAC 690, 691, 693)


• Retrieval of safety displays in the MCR (ITAAC 694)

• MCR operation of remotely operated valves with active functions (ITAAC 695)





• Background noise level of MCR and RSR during VBS operation (ITAAC 700)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (753) to demonstrate that the RSR provides the RSW operators with a suitable workspace environment for use, separate from the MCR, is achieved. Therefore, completion of these


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referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 753 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.06.ii (754) 2.6.05.01 (627)

2.6.05.02.i (628)

2.6.05.02.ii (629)

2.6.05.03.i (630)

2.6.05.03.ii (631)

2.6.05.04 (632)

2.6.05.05.i (633)

2.6.05.05.ii (634)

2.6.05.06.i (635)

2.6.05.06.ii (636)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (754) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, and 636) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 754 Design Commitment requires that “The [remote shutdown room] RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the [main control room] MCR, for use by the [remote shutdown workstation] RSW operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 754 refer to Section 2.6.5 (ITAAC Index Nos. 627 through 636).

• The referenced ITAAC 627 Design Commitment requires that the functional arrangement of the plant lighting system (ELS) is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.5. The ITAAC 627 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the as-built ELS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.

• The referenced ITAAC 628 Design Commitment requires that the ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters, and four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division). The ITAAC 628 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the as-built ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW and has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR.

• The referenced ITAAC 629 Design Commitment requires that the ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters, and four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR, with each group being powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division). The ITAAC 629 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing of the as-built system confirms that each of the six as-built emergency lighting groups is supplied power from its respective Class 1E inverter and each of the four as-


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built panel lighting groups is supplied power from its respective Class 1E inverter.

• The referenced ITAAC 630 Design Commitment requires that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports. The ITAAC 630 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection confirms that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 631 Design Commitment requires that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports. The ITAAC 631 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report providing an analysis of the seismic supports exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.

• The referenced ITAAC 632 Design Commitment requires that the panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable. The ITAAC 632 Acceptance Criteria is met when referenced ITAAC 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, and 811 Acceptance Criteria are met. The justification for referenced ITAAC 632 is provided in the basis for the consolidation of ITAAC 632 as a Reference ITAAC included within this Enclosure.

• The referenced ITAAC 633 Design Commitment requires that the normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 633 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built normal lighting in the MCR provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the main ac power system (ECS).

• The referenced ITAAC 634 Design Commitment requires that the normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 634 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built normal lighting in the


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RSW provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the ECS.

• The referenced ITAAC 635 Design Commitment requires that the emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 635 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built emergency lighting in the MCR provides at least 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the six Class 1E inverters.

• The referenced ITAAC 636 Design Commitment requires that the emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. The ITAAC 636 Acceptance Criteria is met when testing is performed and confirms that the as-built emergency lighting provides at least 10 foot candles at the RSW, when adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the six Class 1E inverters.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how the RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators though the following ELS ITAAC:

• Functional arrangement of the ELS (ITAAC 627)

• ELS emergency lighting fixture groups located in the MCR and at the RSW, and panel lighting fixture groups in the MCR (ITAAC 628)

• ELS as-built emergency lighting group and panel lighting group power supplies (ITAAC 629)

• MCR lighting fixture locations and utilization of seismic supports (ITAAC 630, 631)

• ELS divisional separation and ELS division and non-Class 1E cable separation (ITAAC 632)

• ELS normal lighting illumination criteria at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW (ITAAC 633, 634)

• ELS emergency lighting illumination criteria at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and


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at the RSW (ITAAC 635, 636)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests, and analyses with the reference ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (754) demonstrate that the RSR provides the RSW operators with a suitable workspace environment for use, separate from the MCR, is achieved. Therefore, completion of these reference ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 754 Design Commitment is met.


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3.2.00.06.iii (755) 2.3.19.01a (484)

2.3.19.01b (485)

2.3.19.02a (486)

2.3.19.02b (487)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (755) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (484, 485, 486, and 487) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 755 Design Commitment requires that “The [remote shutdown room] RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the [main control room] MCR, for use by the [remote shutdown workstation] RSW operators.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 755 refer to Section 2.3.19 (ITAAC Index Nos. 484, 485, 486 and 487).

• The referenced ITAAC 484 Design Commitment requires that the communication system (EFS) has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system. The ITAAC 484 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that the as-built EFS has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system.

• The referenced ITAAC 485 Design Commitment requires that the EFS has sound-powered equipment connected as a system. The ITAAC 485 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection demonstrates that the as-built EFS has sound-powered equipment connected as a system.

• The referenced ITAAC 486 Design Commitment requires that the EFS telephone/page system provides intraplant, station-to-station communications, and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.3.19-1. The ITAAC 486 Acceptance Criteria is met when an inspection and test demonstrate that the telephone/page equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception from the MCR are accomplished.

• The referenced ITAAC 487 Design Commitment requires that the EFS provides sound-powered communications between the MCR, the RSW, the Division A, B, C, D dc equipment rooms (Rooms 12201/12203/12205/12207), the Division A, B, C, D I&C rooms (Rooms 12301/12302/12304/12305), and the diesel generator building (Rooms 60310/60320) without external power. The ITAAC 486 Acceptance Criteria is met when an inspection and test demonstrate that the sound-powered equipment is


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installed and voice transmission and reception are accomplished.

The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate the following for the EFS:

• Handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators are connected as a telephone/page system (ITAAC 484)

• Sound-powered equipment are connected as a system (ITAAC 485)

• Telephone/page equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception from the MCR are accomplished (ITAAC 486)

• Sound-powered equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception are accomplished (ITAAC 487)

By verifying satisfactory completion of the Acceptance Criteria with the referenced ITAAC above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (755) to demonstrate that the RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators is achieved. Therefore, completion of these reference ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 755 Design Commitment is met.


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3.3.00.02c (771) 2.2.01.02a (91)

2.2.01.02b (92)

2.2.01.03a (93)

2.2.01.03b (94)

Note: Per the footnote to Reference ITAAC Index Number 771, containment isolation devices are addressed in subsection 2.2.1, Containment System. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Number 771, only the containment and its penetrations are discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (771) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (91, 92, 93, and 94) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 771 Design Commitment requires that “The containment and its penetrations are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 771 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a and 3.b (ITAAC Index Nos. 91, 92, 93 and 94).



• The referenced ITAAC 93 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. The ITAAC 93 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

• The referenced ITAAC 94 Design Commitment requires that the pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. The


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ITAAC 94 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

The referenced ITAAC (91, 92, 93 and 94) demonstrate that the as-built piping and components, associated with the containment and its penetrations, are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Class MC requirements. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections associated with the design and construction (ITAAC 91 and 92) and pressure boundary welds (ITAAC 93 and 94) of the as-built components and piping identified as ASME Code Section III in Tables 2.2.1-1 and 2.2.1-2, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (771) is met.


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3.3.00.02d (772) 2.2.01.04a.i (95)

2.2.01.04aii (96)

2.2.01.04b (97)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (772) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (95, 96, and 97) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 772 Design Commitment requires that “The containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 772 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 4.a and 4.b (ITAAC Index Nos. 95, 96 and 97).

• The referenced ITAAC 95 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 95 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 96 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 96 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials conform with fracture toughness requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 97 Design Commitment requires that the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. The ITAAC 97 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

The referenced ITAAC (95, 96 and 97) demonstrate the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure, the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials conform with ASME Code Section III requirements for fracture toughness, and the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. By


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verifying satisfactory completion of the testing associated with piping and component pressure boundary integrity at design pressure (ITAAC 95 and 97) and conformance of the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials with ASME Code Section III requirements for fracture toughness (ITAAC 96), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (772) to demonstrate the containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 772 Design Commitment is met.


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3.3.00.02e (773) 2.2.01.04a.i (95)

2.2.01.04aii (96)

2.2.01.04b (97)

2.2.01.07.i (107)

2.2.01.07.ii (108)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (773) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (95, 96, 97, 107 and 108) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 773 Design Commitment requires that “The containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 773 refer to Table 2.2.1-3, items 4.a, 4.b and 7 (ITAAC Index Nos. 95, 96, 97, 107 and 108).

• The referenced ITAAC 95 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 95 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 96 Design Commitment requires that the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. The ITAAC 96 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials conform with fracture toughness requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 97 Design Commitment requires that the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. The ITAAC 97 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

• The referenced ITAAC 107 Design Commitment requires that the containment system (CNS) provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 107 Acceptance Criteria is


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met when the leakage rate from containment for the integrated leak rate test is less than the maximum allowable leakage rate (La).

• The referenced ITAAC 108 Design Commitment requires that the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. The ITAAC 108 Acceptance Criteria is met when the containment isolation valves close within the required response times after receipt of an actuation signal.

The referenced ITAAC (95, 96, 97, 107 and 108) demonstrate that components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure, the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials conform with ASME Code Section III requirements for fracture toughness, the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure, and the CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections and testing associated with piping and component pressure boundary integrity at design pressure (ITAAC 95 and 97), conformance of the containment and pressure-retaining penetration materials with ASME Code Section III requirements for fracture toughness (ITAAC 96), containment leakage rate (ITAAC 107), and isolation valve closure times (ITAAC 108), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (773) to demonstrate the containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 773 Design Commitment is met.


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3.5.00.03 (828) 3.3.00.07d.i (799)

3.3.00.07d.ii.a (800)

3.3.00.07d.ii.b (801)

3.3.00.07d.ii.c (802)

3.3.00.07d.iii.a (803)

3.3.00.07d.iii.b (804)

3.3.00.07d.iii.c (805)

3.3.00.07d.iv.a (806)

3.3.00.07d.iv.b (807)

3.3.00.07d.iv.c (808)

3.3.00.07d.v.a (809)

3.3.00.07d.v.b (810)

3.3.00.07d.v.c (811)

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (828) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 828 Design Commitment requires that “Separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 828 refer to Table 3.3-6, item 7.d (ITAAC Index Nos. 799 through 811).


o Within the main control room and remote shutdown room, the vertical separation is 3 inches or more and the horizontal separation is 1inch or more.





For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables


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(instrumentation and control), the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch.



• The referenced ITAAC 801 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained betweenClass 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 801 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:





For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the


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open raceway.









• The referenced ITAAC 803 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 803 Acceptance


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Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:









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• The referenced ITAAC 810 Design Commitment requires that physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and


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non-Class 1E cables. The ITAAC 810 Acceptance Criteria is met when inspection results confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:




The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate how as-built physical separation is maintained between the Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables within the main control room and remote shutdown room, other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas). Satisfactory completion of the inspection for physical separation in the main control room and remote shutdown room (ITAAC 799), other plant areas inside containment (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 800, 803, 806 and 809), other plant areas inside the non-radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 801, 804, 807, and 810), and other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled areas of the auxiliary building (including limited hazard areas) (ITAAC 802, 805, 808 and 811) satisfy the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (828) by


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demonstrating that separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 828 Design Commitment is met.


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3.6.00.01.i (834) 2.3.10.07a.i (443)

2.3.10.07a.ii (444)

Note: The ITAAC 443 and 444 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for WLS-034, WLS-035, and WLS-036. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 834, only WLS-034 and WLS-035 are applicable to the ITAAC 834 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 834 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (834) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (443 and 444) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 834 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when [reactor coolant system] RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 834 refer to Table 2.3.10-4, item 7.a (ITAAC Index Nos. 443 and 444).

• The referenced ITAAC 443 Design Commitment requires that the liquid radwaste system (WLS) provides the nonsafety-related function of detecting leaks within containment to the containment sump. The ITAAC 443 Acceptance Criteria is met when the nonsafety-related displays of WLS containment sump level channels WLS-034 and WLS-035 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

• The referenced ITAAC 444 Design Commitment requires that the WLS provides the nonsafety-related function of detecting leaks within containment to the containment sump. The ITAAC 444 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that sump level channels WLS-034 and WLS-035 can detect a change of 1.75 ± 0.1 inches.

Diverse leakage detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 834 is accomplished using the WLS containment sump level channels WLS-034 and WLS-035. These containment sump level channels are designed to detect small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation. The referenced ITAAC (443 and 444) described above demonstrate the retrievability and level change detection capability of WLS containment sump level channels WLS-034 and WLS-035. By verifying satisfactory completion of the Acceptance Criteria associated with retrievability of containment sump level displays in the MCR (ITAAC 443) and containment sump level change detection


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capability (ITAAC 444), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (834) to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 834 Design Commitment is met.


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Number)



3.6 00.01.ii (835) 3.5.00.01.i (823)

3.5.00.01.ii (824)

3.5.00.01.iii (825)

Note 1: The ITAAC 823, 824 and 825 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for equipment not identified in the Acceptance Criteria of ITAAC 835. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 835, only the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor, PSS-RE027, is applicable to the ITAAC 835 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 835 Inspections, Tests, Analyses section and discussed below.

Note 2: As described in UFSAR subsection 5.2.5.4, leak detection monitoring is not a safety function. Therefore, the referenced ITAAC Design Commitment discussions of “loss of safety function” is not applicable to the leak detection monitoring equipment nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks and is not discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (835) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (823, 824 and 825) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 835 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when [reactor coolant system] RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 835 refer to Table 3.5-6, item 1 (ITAAC Index Nos. 823, 824 and 825).

• The referenced ITAAC 823 Design Commitment requires that the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor (PSS-RE027) can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of function. The ITAAC 823 Acceptance Criteria is met when the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor is located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 824 Design Commitment requires that the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor (PSS-RE027) can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of functions. The ITAAC 824 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of function.



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Number)



requires that the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor (PSS-RE027) can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of function. The ITAAC 825 Acceptance Criteria is met when a report exists and concludes that the as-built containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor, including anchorage, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Diverse leak detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 835 is accomplished using the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor, PSS-RE027. This monitor must meet Seismic Category I requirements to accomplish the nonsafety-related diverse leak detection monitoring function. The referenced ITAAC (823, 824 and 825) described above demonstrate that the seismic Category I containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor, PSS-RE027, is located on a seismic Category I structure and can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection and testing associated with the referenced ITAAC (823, 824 and 825) described above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (835) to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 835 Design Commitment is met.


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3.6.00.01.iii (836) 2.1.02.05a.i (19)

2.1.02.05a.ii (20)

2.1.02.05a.iii (21)

2.1.02.07a.i (24)

2.1.02.07a.ii (25)

2.1.02.10 (45)

Note 1: The ITAAC 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, and 45 Acceptance Criteria include criteria for equipment not identified in the Acceptance Criteria of ITAAC 836. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 836 only the pressurizer level measuring instruments, RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C and RCS-195D, are applicable to the ITAAC 836 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 836 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and discussed below.

Note 2: As described in UFSAR Subsection 5.2.5.4, leak detection monitoring is not a safety function. Therefore, the referenced ITAAC Design Commitment discussions of “loss of safety function” is not applicable to the leak detection monitoring equipment nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks and is not discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (836) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (19, 20, 21, 24, 25, and 45) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 836 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when [reactor coolant system] RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 836 refer to Table 2.1.2-4, items 5.a, 7.a, and 10 (ITAAC Index Nos. 19/20/21, 24/25, and 45, respectively).

• The referenced ITAAC 19 Design Commitment requires that the pressurizer level measuring instruments (RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C and RCS-195D) can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 19 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 836 is met when these pressurizer level measuring instruments are located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 20 Design Commitment requires that the pressurizer level measuring instruments identified above can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of function. The ITAAC 20 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 836 is met when a report exists and concludes that these pressurizer level measuring instruments can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of function.


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• The referenced ITAAC 21 Design Commitment requires that the pressurizer level measuring instruments identified above can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 21 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 836 is met when a report exists and concludes that these as-built pressurizer level measuring instruments, including anchorage, are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 24 Design Commitment requires that the pressurizer level measuring instruments identified above are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function. The ITAAC 24 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 836 is met when a report exists and concludes that these pressurizer level measuring instruments are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function.

• The referenced ITAAC 25 Design Commitment requires that the pressurizer level measuring instruments identified above are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function. The ITAAC 25 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 836 is met when a report exists and concludes that these as-built pressurizer level measuring instruments and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations are qualified for a harsh environment and bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

• The referenced ITAAC 45 Design Commitment requires that displays of the pressurizer level measuring instruments identified above can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).The ITAAC 45 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 836 is met when displays of the pressurizer level measuring instruments can be retrieved in the MCR.


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Diverse leak detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 836 is accomplished using pressurizer level measuring instruments (RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C and RCS-195D). These instruments must meet seismic Category I and harsh environment requirements as well as have displays in the MCR in order to accomplish this nonsafety-related function. The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate that these pressurizer level measuring instruments are located on a seismic Category I structure, can withstand seismic design basis loads and the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function , and have displays in the MCR. This bounds the nonsafety-related function for these instruments. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests, and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC described above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC 836 to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the Reference ITAAC 836 Design Commitment is met.


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3.6.00.01.iv (837) 2.1.02.05a.i (19)

2.1.02.05a.ii (20)

2.1.02.05a.iii (21)

2.1.02.07a.i (24)

2.1.02.07a.ii (25)

Note 1: The ITAAC 19, 20, 21, 24, and 25 Acceptance Criteria include criteria for equipment not identified in the Acceptance Criteria of ITAAC 837. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 837, only the reactor coolant system (RCS) hot and cold leg temperature instruments (RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D) are applicable to the ITAAC 837 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 837 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and discussed below.

Note 2: As described in UFSAR Subsection 5.2.5.4, leak detection monitoring is not a safety function. Therefore, the referenced ITAAC Design Commitment discussions of “loss of safety function” is not applicable to the leak detection monitoring equipment nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks and is not discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (837) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (19, 20, 21, 24, and 25) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 837 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 837 refer to Table 2.1.2-4, items 5.a and 7.a (ITAAC Index Nos. 19/20/21 and 24/25).

• The referenced ITAAC 19 Design Commitment requires that the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments (RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D) can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 19 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 837 is met when these RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments are located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 20 Design Commitment requires that the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments identified above can withstand seismic


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design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 20 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 837 is met when a report exists and concludes that these RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function.

• The referenced ITAAC 21 Design Commitment requires that the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments identified above can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 21 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 837 is met when a report exists and concludes that these as-built RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments, including anchorage, is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 24 Design Commitment requires that the Class 1E RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments identified above are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function. The ITAAC 24 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 837 is met when a report exists and concludes that these Class 1E RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function.

• The referenced ITAAC 25 Design Commitment requires that the Class 1E RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments identified above are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function. The ITAAC 25 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 837 is met when a report exists and concludes that these as-built Class 1E RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations are qualified for a harsh environment and bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.


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Diverse leak detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 837 is accomplished using RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments (RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D). These instruments must meet seismic Category I and harsh environment requirements in order to accomplish this nonsafety-related function. The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate that these RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments are located on a seismic Category I structure, can withstand seismic design basis loads, and the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function. This bounds the nonsafety-related functions for these instruments. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC described above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (837) to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the Reference ITAAC 837 Design Commitment is met.


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3.6.00.01.v (838) 2.1.02.05a.i (19)

2.1.02.05a.ii (20)

2.1.02.05a.iii (21)

2.1.02.07a.i (24)

2.1.02.07a.ii (25)

2.1.02.10 (45)

Note 1: The ITAAC 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, and 45 Acceptance Criteria include criteria for equipment not identified in the Acceptance Criteria of ITAAC 838. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 838 only the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure instruments (RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D) are applicable to the ITAAC 838 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 838 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and discussed below.

Note 2: As described in UFSAR subsection 5.2.5.4, leak detection monitoring is not a safety function. Therefore, the referenced ITAAC Design Commitment discussions of “loss of safety function” is not applicable to the leak detection monitoring equipment nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks and is not discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (838) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (19, 20, 21, 24, 25, and 45) are completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 838 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 838 refer to Table 2.1.2-4, items 5.a, 7.a, and 10 (ITAAC Index Nos. 19/20/21, 24/25, and 45).

• The referenced ITAAC 19 Design Commitment requires that the RCS pressure instruments (RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D) can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 19 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 838 is met when these RCS pressure instruments are located on the Nuclear Island.

• The referenced ITAAC 20 Design Commitment requires that the RCS pressure instruments identified above can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 20 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 838 is met when a report exists and concludes that these RCS pressure instruments can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function.

• The referenced ITAAC 21 Design Commitment requires that the RCS pressure instruments identified


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above can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of function. The ITAAC 21 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 838 is met when a report exists and concludes that these as-built RCS pressure instruments, including anchorage, are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

• The referenced ITAAC 24 Design Commitment requires that the RCS pressure instruments identified above are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without a loss of function for the time required to perform the function. The ITAAC 24 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 838 is met when a report exists and concludes that these RCS pressure instruments are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident.

• The referenced ITAAC 25 Design Commitment requires that the RCS pressure instruments identified above are qualified for a harsh environment and can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function. The ITAAC 25 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 838 is met when a report exists and concludes that these as-built RCS pressure instruments and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations are qualified for a harsh environment and bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

• The referenced ITAAC 45 Design Commitment requires that displays of the RCS pressure instruments identified above can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).The ITAAC 45 Acceptance Criteria applicable to ITAAC 838 is met when displays of these RCS pressure instruments can be retrieved in the MCR.

Diverse leak detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 838 is accomplished using RCS pressure instruments (RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D). These instruments must meet seismic Category I and harsh environment requirements as well as have displays in the


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MCR in order to accomplish this nonsafety-related function. The referenced ITAAC described above demonstrate that these RCS pressure instruments are located on a seismic Category I structure, can withstand seismic design basis loads, the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of function for the time required to perform the function and have displays in the MCR. This bounds the nonsafety-related functions for these instruments. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspections, tests, and analyses associated with the referenced ITAAC described above, the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (838) to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the Reference ITAAC 838 Design Commitment is met.


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3.6.00.01.vi (839) 2.3.02.13 (316) Note: The ITAAC 316 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for equipment not identified in the Acceptance Criteria of ITAAC 839. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 839, only the letdown and makeup flow instruments, CVS-001 and CVS-025, are applicable to the ITAAC 839 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 839 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (839) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (316) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 839 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when [reactor coolant system] RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 839 refer to Table 2.3.2-4, item 13 (ITAAC Index No. 316).

• The referenced ITAAC 316 Design Commitment requires that displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.2-3 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). The ITAAC 316 Acceptance Criteria is met when the displays identified in Table 2.3.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Diverse leak detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 839 is accomplished using letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 (Purification Flow Sensor) and CVS-025 (Purification Return Flow Sensor). The referenced ITAAC (316) described above demonstrates the retrievability of the letdown and makeup flow instruments, CVS-001 and CVS-025, displays in the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection associated with retrievability of these instrument displays in the MCR (ITAAC 316), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (839) to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of these referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 839 Design Commitment is met.


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3.6.00.01.vii (840) 2.3.10.10 (448) Note: The ITAAC 448 Acceptance Criteria includes criteria for equipment not identified in the Acceptance Criteria of ITAAC 840. In considering the basis for Reference ITAAC Index Number 840, only the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument, WLS-002, is applicable to the ITAAC 840 Acceptance Criteria as clarified in the ITAAC 840 Inspections, Tests, Analyses (ITA) and discussed below.

Completion of the Reference ITAAC (840) is accomplished when the referenced ITAAC (448) is completed as described in NEI 08-01, Revision 5 - Corrected. The ITAAC 840 Design Commitment requires that “The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when [reactor coolant system] RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.” The Inspection, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC 840 refer to Table 2.3.10-4, item 10 (ITAAC Index No. 448) for reactor coolant drain tank level instrument, WLS-002.

• The referenced ITAAC 448 Design Commitment requires that displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.10-3 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). The ITAAC 448 Acceptance Criteria is met when displays identified in Table 2.3.10-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Diverse leak detection monitoring associated with ITAAC 840 is accomplished using the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002 (WLS-JE-LT002). The referenced ITAAC (448) described above demonstrates the retrievability of the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002 display in the MCR. By verifying satisfactory completion of the inspection associated with retrievability of the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument display in the MCR (ITAAC 448), the Design Commitment for the Reference ITAAC (840) to demonstrate the diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation is achieved. Therefore, completion of this referenced ITAAC, and meeting their Acceptance Criteria, verifies the ITAAC 840 Design Commitment is met.



NND-17-0263

Enclosure 6

Reviewer’s Aid: Clean Pages of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents

(LAR 17-12)


NND-17-0263 Enclosure 6 Reviewer’s Aid: Clean Pages of the Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-17-12)

Page 2 of 85

The COL Appendix C changes presented in this enclosure will also require the COL Appendix C Table of Contents on pages C-1 through C-30 to be revised accordingly.

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.1, Fuel Handling and Refueling System, Table 2.1.1-1, as shown below:



* * *

3 Not used.

* * *


Page 3 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.2, Reactor Coolant System, Table 2.1.2-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.1.02.12a.i, 2.1.02.12a.ii, 2.1.02.12a.iv and 2.1.02.12a.v in

Table 2.1.2-4, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 12a.i, 12a.ii, 12a.iv and 12a.v in Table 2.1.2-4 is needed.



* * *










4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.




Page 4 of 85









14 Not used.

15 Not used.

16 Not used.

17 Not used.

18 Not used.





Page 5 of 85











Page 6 of 85





20 Not used.

21 Not used.

22 Not used.

23 Not used.

24 Not used.

25 Not used.

* * *

27 Not used.

* * *


Page 7 of 85



53 2.1.02.12a.i 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.





54 Not used.

* * *

56 2.1.02.12a.iv 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

iv) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.



57 Not used.

58 Not used.

59 Not used.

* * *


Page 8 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.1, Reactor, Subsection 2.1.3, Reactor System, Table 2.1.3-2, as shown below:



* * *






A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds

.

5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.


A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

73 Not used.

74 Not used.


i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island

.



Page 9 of 85













Page 10 of 85



76 Not used.

77 Not used.

* * *

81 Not used.

82 Not used.

* * *

84 Not used.

* * *


Page 11 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.1, Containment System, Table 2.2.1-3, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.01.06d.i, 2.2.01.06d.ii, 2.2.01.11a.i and 2.2.01.11a.ii in

Table 2.2.1-3, shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 6d.i, 6d.ii, 11a.i and 11a.ii in Table 2.2.1-3 is needed.



* * *













Page 12 of 85






92 Not used.

93 Not used.

94 Not used.

95 Not used.

* * *

97 Not used.

98 2.2.01.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.






Page 13 of 85




iii) The as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.


i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harh environment.





Page 14 of 85



6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.





99 Not used.

100 Not used.

101 Not used.

102 Not used.

* * *

104 Not used.

105 Not used.


Page 15 of 85



106 Not used.

* * *






115 Not used.

* * *


Page 16 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.2, Passive Containment Cooling System, Table 2.2.2-3, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.02.11a.i and 2.2.02.11a.ii in Table 2.2.2-3, shown below,




* * *


2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.




3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.




Page 17 of 85




4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.



121 Not used.

122 Not used.

123 Not used.

124 Not used.

125 Not used.

126 2.2.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components and valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.



Page 18 of 85







6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.





127 Not used.

128 Not used.


Page 19 of 85



129 Not used.

* * *

131 Not used.

132 Not used.

* * *

134 Not used.

* * *

143 Not used.

* * *

149 Not used.

* * *







Page 20 of 85



155 Not used.

* * *


Page 21 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.3, Passive Core Cooling System, Table 2.2.3-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.03.12a.i and 2.2.03.12a.ii in Table 2.2.3-4, shown below,




* * *






3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements

.




Page 22 of 85













160 Not used.

161 Not used.

162 Not used.

163 Not used.


Page 23 of 85



164 Not used.









Page 24 of 85








166 Not used.

167 Not used.

168 Not used.

169 Not used.

170 Not used.

171 Not used.


Page 25 of 85



* * *

173 Not used.

174 Not used.

* * *

214 2.2.03.12a.i 12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design condition.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 under design conditions.



215 Not used.

* * *


Page 26 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.4, Steam Generator System, Table 2.2.4-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.04.12a.i and 2.2.04.12a.ii in Table 2.2.4-4, shown below,


Table 2.2.4-4



* * *










Page 27 of 85

Table 2.2.4-4













221 Not used.

222 Not used.

223 Not used.

224 Not used.


Page 28 of 85

Table 2.2.4-4



225 Not used.












Page 29 of 85

Table 2.2.4-4





227 Not used.

228 Not used.

229 Not used.

230 Not used.

231 Not used.

232 Not used.

* * *

234 Not used.

* * *

237 Not used.

* * *


Page 30 of 85

Table 2.2.4-4



239 Not used.

* * *

242 Not used.

* * *






249 Not used.

* * *


Page 31 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.2, Nuclear Safety Systems, Subsection 2.2.5, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System, Table 2.2.5-5, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.2.05.05a.i, 2.2.05.05a.ii and 2.2.05.05a.iii in Table 2.2.5-5,


Table 2.2.5-5



* * *










Page 32 of 85

Table 2.2.5-5










254 Not used.

255 Not used.

256 Not used.

257 Not used.

258 Not used.





Page 33 of 85

Table 2.2.5-5







260 Not used.

261 Not used.

262 Not used.

* * *

264 Not used.

* * *


Page 34 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.1, Component Cooling Water System, Table 2.3.1-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.1-2



* * *

279 Not used.

* * *


Page 35 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.2, Chemical and Volume Control System, Table 2.3.2-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.02.11a.i and 2.3.02.11a.ii in Table 2.3.2-4, shown below,


Table 2.3.2-4



* * *










Page 36 of 85

Table 2.3.2-4







286 Not used.

287 Not used.

288 Not used.

289 Not used.

290 Not used.







Page 37 of 85

Table 2.3.2-4










292 Not used.

293 Not used.

294 Not used.


Page 38 of 85

Table 2.3.2-4



295 Not used.

* * *

297 Not used.

298 Not used.

299 Not used.

300 Not used.

* * *

309

2.3.02.11a.i






310 Not used.

* * *


Page 39 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.4, Fire Protection System, Table 2.3.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.4-2



* * *

329 Not used.

* * *


Page 40 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.5, Mechanical Handling System, Table 2.3.5-2, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.05.02.i, 2.3.05.02.ii and 2.3.05.02.iii in Table 2.3.5-2, shown


Table 2.3.5-2



* * *








341 Not used.

342 Not used.

* * *


Page 41 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.6, Normal Residual Heat Removal System, Table 2.3.6-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.06.12a.i and 2.3.06.12a.ii in Table 2.3.6-4, shown below,


Table 2.3.6-4



* * *










Page 42 of 85

Table 2.3.6-4













356 Not used.

357 Not used.

358 Not used.


Page 43 of 85

Table 2.3.6-4



359 Not used.

360 Not used.








7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.




Page 44 of 85

Table 2.3.6-4





362 Not used.

363 Not used.

364 Not used.

365 Not used.

366 Not used.

367 Not used.

* * *

369 Not used.

370 Not used.

371 Not used.


Page 45 of 85

Table 2.3.6-4



* * *






385

* * *


Page 46 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.7, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System, Table 2.3.7-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.07.05.i, 2.3.07.05.ii and 2.3.07.05.iii in Table 2.3.7-4, shown


Table 2.3.7-4



* * *


2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the ASME as-built components and piping as documented in the ASME design reports.


3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.



4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



393 Not used.


Page 47 of 85

Table 2.3.7-4



394 Not used.

395 Not used.

396 2.3.07.05.i 5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.






397 Not used.

398 Not used.

* * *

400 Not used.

401 Not used.


Page 48 of 85

Table 2.3.7-4



* * *

404 Not used.

405 Not used.

406 Not used.

407 Not used.

* * *


Page 49 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.10, Liquid Radwaste System, Table 2.3.10-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.10.05a.i, 2.3.10.05a.ii and 2.3.10.05a.iii in Table 2.3.10-4,


Table 2.3.10-4



* * *




The ASME Code Section III design report exists for the as built components and piping identified in Tables 2.3.10-1 and 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.






Page 50 of 85

Table 2.3.10-4










432 Not used.

433 Not used.

434 Not used.

435 Not used.

436 Not used.





Page 51 of 85

Table 2.3.10-4







438 Not used.

439 Not used.

440 Not used.

441 Not used.

442 Not used.

* * *


Page 52 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.11, Gaseous Radwaste System, Table 2.3.11-2, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.3.11.02.i, 2.3.11.02.ii and 2.3.11.02.iii in Table 2.3.11-2,

shown below, only impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 2.i, 2.ii and 2.iii in Table 2.3.11-2 is needed.

Table 2.3.11-2



* * *

450 2.3.11.02.i 2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.





451 Not used.

452 Not used.

* * *


Page 53 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.13, Primary Sampling System, Table 2.3.13-3, as shown below:

Table 2.3.13-3



* * *







4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.



460 Not used.

461 Not used.

462 2.3.13.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.




Page 54 of 85

Table 2.3.13-3







6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.






Page 55 of 85

Table 2.3.13-3



463 Not used.

464 Not used.

465 Not used.

466 Not used.

* * *

468 Not used.

469 Not used.

* * *


Page 56 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.14, Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System, Table 2.3.14-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.14-2



* * *

478 Not used.

* * *


Page 57 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.3, Auxiliary Systems, Subsection 2.3.15, Compressed and Instrument Air System, Table 2.3.15-2, as shown below:

Table 2.3.15-2



* * *

482 Not used.

* * *


Page 58 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.1, Diverse Actuation System, Table 2.5.1-4, as shown below:

Table 2.5.1-4



505 Not used.

* * *

520 Not used.


Page 59 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.2, Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Table 2.5.2-8, as shown below:

Table 2.5.2-8



521 Not used.

522 2.5.02.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.








Page 60 of 85

Table 2.5.2-8



3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.



523 Not used.

524 Not used.

525 Not used.

526 Not used.

* * *

528 Not used.


Page 61 of 85

Table 2.5.2-8



* * *


Page 62 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.3, Plant Control System, Table 2.5.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.3-2



554 Not used.

* * *


Page 63 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.5, Instrumentation and Control Systems, Subsection 2.5.5, In-Core Instrumentation System, Table 2.5.5-2, as shown below:

Table 2.5.5-2



* * *

565 2.5.05.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.








Page 64 of 85

Table 2.5.5-2



3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.





566 Not used.

567 Not used.

568 Not used.

569 Not used.

* * *

571 Not used.


Page 65 of 85

Table 2.5.5-2



* * *


Page 66 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.1, Main ac Power System, Table 2.6.1-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.01.02.i, 2.6.01.02.ii and 2.6.01.02.iii in Table 2.6.1-4, shown


Table 2.6.1-4



* * *








580 Not used.

581 Not used.

* * *


Page 67 of 85

Table 2.6.1-4



583 Not used.

* * *

585 Not used.

* * *


Page 68 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.2, Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.2-1, as shown below:

Table 2.6.2-1



592 Not used.

* * *


Page 69 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System, Table 2.6.3-3, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.03.02.i, 2.6.03.02.ii and 2.6.03.02.iii in Table 2.6.3-3, shown


Table 2.6.3-3



596 Not used.





ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function



598 Not used.

599 Not used.

600 Not used.


Page 70 of 85

Table 2.6.3-3



* * *


Page 71 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System, Table 2.6.5-1, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.6.05.03.i and 2.6.05.03.ii in Table 2.6.5-1, shown below, only

impact COL Appendix C. No change to corresponding plant-specific Tier 1 items 3.i and 3.ii in Table 2.6.5-1 is needed.

Table 2.6.5-1



627 Not used.

* * *

630 2.6.05.03.i 3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.



631 Not used.

632 Not used.

* * *

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.6, Electrical Power Systems, Subsection 2.6.9, Plant Security System, Table 2.6.9-1, as shown below:


Page 72 of 85

Table 2.6.9-1



641 Not used.

* * *

642 Not used.

643 Not used.

* * *


Page 73 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1)* Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.1-4, as shown below: * Note: Changes to ITAAC Nos. 2.7.01.05.i, 2.7.01.05.ii and 2.7.01.05.iii in Table 2.7.1-4, shown


Table 2.7.1-4



* * *




The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components and piping identified in Table 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.







A pressure test will be performed on the components and piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components and piping identified in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.


Page 74 of 85

Table 2.7.1-4



679 Not used.

680 Not used.

681 Not used.

682 Not used.

683 Not used.








685 Not used.

686 Not used. .


Page 75 of 85

Table 2.7.1-4



* * *

688 Not used.

689 Not used.

690 Not used.

691 Not used.

692 Not used.

* * *


Page 76 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.2, Central Chilled Water System, Table 2.7.2-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.2-2



* * *

702 Not used.

* * *


Page 77 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.3, Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System, Table 2.7.3-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.3-2



* * *

708 Not used.

709 Not used.

* * *


Page 78 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.4, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System, Table 2.7.4-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.4-2



* * *

713 Not used.

714 Not used.

715 Not used.

* * *


Page 79 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 2.7, HVAC Systems, Subsection 2.7.6, Containment Air Filtration System, Table 2.7.6-2, as shown below:

Table 2.7.6-2



* * *

724 Not used.

* * *


Page 80 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Table 3.1-1, as shown below:

Table 3.1-1



* * *

738 Not Used

* * *


Page 81 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.2, Human Factors Engineering, Table 3.2.-1, as shown below:

Table 3.2.-1



* * *

746 Not used.

747 Not used.

748 Not used.

749 Not used.

750 Not used.

* * *

753 Not used.

754 Not used.

755 Not used.

* * *


Page 82 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.3, Buildings, Table 3.3-6, as shown below:

Table 3.3-6



* * *

771 Not used.

772 Not used.

773 Not used.

* * *


Page 83 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring, Table 3.5-6, as shown below:

Table 3.5-6



823 3.5.00.01.i 1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.





2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.




Page 84 of 85

Table 3.5-6





824 Not used.

825 Not used.

826 Not used.

827 Not used.

828 Not used.

* * *


Page 85 of 85

Revise COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) Section 3.6, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection, Table 3.6-1, as shown below:

Table 3.6-1



834 Not used.

835 Not used.

836 Not used.

837 Not used.

838 Not used.

839 Not used.

840 Not used.

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